能活到两三代的人，就像在集市上坐在魔术师的摊位前，连续观看两三次表演的人一样。魔术原本只该看一次；一旦它们不再新鲜，不再能骗人，效果也就消失了。
He who lives to see two or three generations is like a man who sits some time in the conjurer’s booth at a fair, and witnesses the performance twice or thrice in succession. The tricks were meant to be seen only once; and when they are no longer a novelty and cease to deceive, their effect is gone.
阿图尔·叔本华，《论世间苦难》
Arthur Schopenhauer, “On the Sufferings of the World”
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美国国会图书馆出版物数据：
莱斯利·柏林 (Leslie Berlin)，1969 年生。
《微芯片背后的男人：罗伯特·诺伊斯与硅谷的诞生》/ 莱斯利·柏林著。
页数：厘米。
包含参考文献和索引。ISBN
-13：978-0-19-516343-8
；ISBN-10：0-19-516343-5（碱性纸）
。1. 诺伊斯，罗伯特·N.，1927 年生。2. 电子工程师——美国——传记。3
. 圣克拉拉谷（加利福尼亚州圣克拉拉县）——历史。I. 书名。TK7807.N69B47
2005
621.381'092—dc22
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Berlin, Leslie, 1969–
The man behind the microchip : Robert Noyce and the invention of Silicon Valley / Leslie Berlin.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-19-516343-8
ISBN-10: 0-19-516343-5 (alk. paper)
1. Noyce, Robert N., 1927–. 2. Electronics engineers—United States—Biography.
3. Santa Clara Valley (Santa Clara County, Calif.)—History. I. Title.
TK7807.N69B47 2005
621.381’092—dc22
2004065494
2004065494
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
美国印刷，
采用无酸纸
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
致谢
Acknowledgments
我花了数年时间才完成这本书，其中一个原因是，在动笔之前，我需要先建立自己的档案库。诺伊斯的文稿并未被整理——他坦言自己“在记录方面非常马虎”——硅谷历史上许多重要的文献都已遗失、被遗忘，或者（令我沮丧的是）被销毁。在全国各地的地下室和档案馆里复印或收集资料的过程中，我有幸遇到了一百多位愿意分享他们的文件以及他们对诺伊斯和硅谷半导体产业早期发展的回忆的人。这些慷慨人士的姓名列于附录A；我对他们每个人都感激不尽。此外，我还要特别感谢以下几位多次与我会面或与我分享过有用资料的人士：朱利叶斯·布兰克、罗杰·博罗沃伊、沃伦·巴菲特、玛丽莱斯和玛尔·戴尔·卡斯托、泰德·霍夫、保罗·霍辛斯基、史蒂夫·乔布斯、简·琼斯、吉姆·拉弗蒂、杰伊·拉斯特、克里斯托夫·莱库耶、雷吉斯·麦肯纳、戈登·摩尔、亚当·诺伊斯、比尔·诺伊斯、盖洛德·诺伊斯、佩妮·诺伊斯、波莉·诺伊斯、拉尔夫·诺伊斯、卡尔·彼得森、埃文·拉姆斯塔德、T·R·里德、丹尼尔·塞利格森、罗伯特·史密斯、查理·斯波克、鲍勃和唐娜·特雷西夫妇以及巴德·惠伦。唐纳德·诺伊斯是罗伯特·诺伊斯的哥哥，他是一位业余历史学家，而且——谢天谢地——是个十足的收藏家。 2004 年 11 月，他意外去世，临终前，他与我分享了他收藏的家庭纪念品，这份礼物对《微芯片背后的人》的早期章节的创作做出了不可估量的贡献。
One reason it took me several years to write this book was that before I could even start, I needed to create my own archive. Noyce’s papers were not collected—he freely admitted he was “very sloppy in record-keeping”—and many important documents in the history of Silicon Valley have been lost, forgotten, or (I was dismayed to learn) destroyed. In the process of copying or gathering materials from basements and archives around the country, I have been fortunate to encounter more than a hundred people who were willing to share their documents and their memories of Noyce and the early days of the Silicon Valley semiconductor industry. The names of those generous people appear in Appendix A; to each of them, I am endlessly grateful. In addition, I would like to express particular gratitude to the following people who met with me multiple times or shared useful documents with me: Julius Blank, Roger Borovoy, Warren Buffett, Maryles and Mar Dell Casto, Ted Hoff, Paul Hwoschinsky, Steve Jobs, Jean Jones, Jim Lafferty, Jay Last, Christophe Lécuyer, Regis McKenna, Gordon Moore, Adam Noyce, Bill Noyce, Gaylord Noyce, Penny Noyce, Polly Noyce, Ralph Noyce, Karl Pedersen, Evan Ramstad, T. R. Reid, Daniel Seligson, Robert Smith, Charlie Sporck, Bob and Donna Teresi, and Bud Wheelon. Donald Noyce, Robert Noyce’s older brother, was an amateur historian and—thank goodness—an inveterate packrat. Before he died quite unexpectedly in November 2004, he shared his collection of family memorabilia with me, a gift that contributed immeasurably to the early chapters of The Man Behind the Microchip.
安·鲍尔斯女士值得特别感谢。这本传记完全是我独立完成的，但如果没有她的支持，它就不会是现在的样子。她陪我进行了数小时的采访，帮助我联系了鲍勃·诺伊斯生前的重要人物，并允许我查阅大量的资料和照片——所有这些都没有对我的研究或写作施加任何限制。
Ann Bowers deserves special thanks of her own. This biography has been an entirely independent undertaking, but it would not be the book it is without her support. She sat through many hours of interviews, helped me contact key players in Bob Noyce’s life, and granted me access to boxes of papers and photos—all without imposing any limitations of any kind on my research or writing.
此外，还要感谢以下专家的指导：斯坦福大学特藏部的 Polly Armstrong、Maggie Kimball、Henry Lowood 和 Christy Smith；Dietz and Associates 公司的 Tim Dietz 和 Annie Fitzpatrick；福特汽车公司档案馆的 Leslie Gowan Armbruster；格林内尔学院的 Mickey Munley 和 Catherine Rod；半导体行业协会 (SIA) 的 Daryl Hatano；SEMATECH 的 Marilyn Redmond；美国国家半导体公司的 John Clark；以及英特尔档案馆和博物馆的 Rachel Stewart。本书也受益于以下档案馆和资料库提供的资料：美国物理学会物理史中心；德安扎学院加州历史中心；电化学学会；爱荷华州格林内尔市斯图尔特公共图书馆格林内尔阅览室；惠普公司档案馆；IEEE 历史中心口述历史收藏。缅因州波特兰市的 Libra 基金会；麻省理工学院图书馆的研究所档案馆和特藏部；麻省理工学院物理系；加利福尼亚州山景城的太平洋研究中心；以及斯坦福新闻社。
In addition, the following experts merit thanks for their guidance: Polly Armstrong, Maggie Kimball, Henry Lowood, and Christy Smith at the Stanford Special Collections; Tim Dietz and Annie Fitzpatrick at Dietz and Associates; Leslie Gowan Armbruster at the Ford Motor Company archives, Ford Motor Company; Mickey Munley and Catherine Rod at Grinnell College; Daryl Hatano at the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA); Marilyn Redmond at SEMATECH; John Clark at National Semiconductor; and the incomparable Rachel Stewart at the Intel archives and museum. The book also benefited from materials made available to me at the following archives and repositories: the Center for History of Physics, American Institute for Physics; the California History Center, De Anza College; the Electrochemical Society; the Grinnell Room, Stewart Public Library, Grinnell, Iowa; the Hewlett-Packard archives, Hewlett-Packard Corporation; the IEEE History Center Oral History Collection; the Libra Foundation, Portland, Maine; the Institute Archives and Special Collections, MIT Libraries; the MIT University Physics Department; the Pacific Studies Center, Mountain View, California; and the Stanford News Service.
非常感谢斯坦福传记作家研讨会的成员；感谢 Alex Kline；感谢牛津大学出版社选定的两位匿名审稿人；感谢 Liz Borgwardt、David Jeffries 和 Ron Newburgh，他们阅读了早期章节草稿；感谢我的朋友兼物理学家 Jose Arreola，他花了一个多小时与我讨论诺伊斯博士论文；感谢 David M. Kennedy，他对稿件的审阅对改进稿件的贡献可能远超他所知；还要感谢 Ross Bassett，他不仅是一位出色的审稿人，还是一位优秀的半导体史著作的作者。
Many thanks to members of the Stanford biographers seminar; to Alex Kline; to two anonymous readers selected by Oxford University Press; to Liz Borgwardt, David Jeffries, and Ron Newburgh, who read early chapter drafts; to Jose Arreola, a friend and physicist who spent more than an hour talking to me about Noyce’s doctoral dissertation; to David M. Kennedy, whose review of the manuscript did more to improve it than he will ever know; and to Ross Bassett, not only a fantastic reader but also the author of an excellent work of semiconductor history.
我在牛津大学的编辑苏珊·费伯总是能提出恰到好处的问题，并给予我足够的鼓励。我的经纪人唐纳德·拉姆在整个过程中都给予了我极大的帮助。我的父母史蒂夫·柏林和维拉·柏林，以及我的姐妹杰西卡和洛伦，也一直保持着浓厚的兴趣和支持。
My editor at Oxford, Susan Ferber, always asked the right questions and pushed me just as much as I needed. Donald Lamm, my agent, has helped me through every step of this process. My parents, Steve Berlin and Vera Berlin, and my sisters Jessica and Loren have been endlessly inquisitive and supportive.
《微芯片背后的人》一书的研究得到了 IEEE 电气史终身会员奖学金和美国哲学学会富兰克林研究基金的支持；安德鲁·P·梅隆基金会、查尔斯·巴贝奇研究所和斯坦福大学的资助，为我早期的博士论文研究提供了资金，其中一些研究成果已被纳入本书。
The Life Member’s Fellowship in Electrical History from the IEEE and a Franklin Research Grant from the American Philosophical Society supported the research for The Man Behind the Microchip; grants from the Andrew P. Mellon Foundation, the Charles Babbage Institute, and Stanford University funded earlier research for my doctoral dissertation, some of which has been incorporated into this book.
特别感谢斯坦福大学历史系，过去两年我一直担任该系科学技术史与哲学项目的访问学者。该系的两位教授——蒂姆·勒努瓦和戴维·M·肯尼迪——自1997年起就与我一起思考罗伯特·诺伊斯，当时他们开始指导我撰写关于诺伊斯生平的博士论文。我一直认为蒂姆大卫是我的导师，现在我很荣幸能将他们也视为我的朋友。
A special thanks to the History Department at Stanford University, where I have worked for the past two years as a visiting scholar in the Program in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology. Two professors in the department—Tim Lenoir and David M. Kennedy—have been thinking with me about Robert Noyce since 1997, when they began advising my dissertation on Noyce’s career. I have long considered Tim and David mentors and am now honored to count them among my friends, as well.
此外，我非常感谢 Discovery 儿童之家的全体工作人员，以及两位优秀的年轻女性——Michelle Casady 和 Megan Baldwin——她们每周都会在我投入研究和写作的几个小时里照顾我的孩子。
In addition, I am immensely grateful to the staff of Discovery Children’s House, as well as to two wonderful young women—Michelle Casady and Megan Baldwin—who cared for my children for the hours each week that I devoted to research and writing.
最后，我要感谢我的丈夫里克·多德，他是我生命中最爱的人，也是我各方面最忠实的伴侣。从指导我学习半导体电子学的精髓，到跑去复印店，再到深夜阅读稿件，以及第二天早上为孩子们准备早餐，他竭尽所能，确保这本书能够获得最大的成功机会。
The final thanks—and the word seems so inadequate—goes to my husband, Rick Dodd, the great love of my life and my partner in every possible way. From tutoring me on the finer points of semiconductor electronics, to running to the copy store, to reading the manuscript at midnight, to making the kids’ breakfasts the next morning, he did everything possible to ensure that this book had the best chance of success.
介绍
Introduction
“鲍勃·诺伊斯对我关怀备至，”苹果公司创始人史蒂夫·乔布斯解释道。“我当时才二十出头，他五十出头。他努力让我了解行业现状，给我一些我当时只能部分理解的视角。”乔布斯继续说道，“如果你不了解过去，就无法真正理解现在正在发生的事情。”1
Bob Noyce took me under his wing,” Apple Computer founder Steve Jobs explains. “I was young, in my twenties. He was in his early fifties. He tried to give me the lay of the land, give me a perspective that I could only partially understand.” Jobs continues, “You can’t really understand what is going on now unless you understand what came before.”1
在英特尔、谷歌、微软、互联网泡沫、苹果、思科、太阳半导体、皮克斯、股票期权百万富翁、创业遗孀和亿万富翁风险投资家出现之前，有八位年轻人——其中六位拥有博士学位，且均不超过32岁——不满他们的老板，决定创办自己的晶体管公司。那是1957年。领导这八人的是一位出生于爱荷华州的物理学家，名叫罗伯特·诺伊斯，他是牧师的儿子，曾是跳水冠军，拥有麻省理工学院的博士学位，思维敏捷（而且很会讨女人欢心），以至于他的研究生同学都称他为“快手罗伯特”。在接下来的十年里，诺伊斯一边自学商业技能，一边管理着这家名为仙童半导体（Fairchild Semiconductor）的公司。到1967年，仙童半导体已拥有11000名员工，利润达1200万美元。
Before Intel and Google, before Microsoft and dot-coms and Apple and Cisco and Sun and Pixar and stock-option millionaires and startup widows and billionaire venture capitalists, there was a group of eight young men—six of them with PhDs, none of them over 32—who disliked their boss and decided to start their own transistor company. It was 1957. Leading the group of eight was an Iowa-born physicist named Robert Noyce, a minister’s son and former champion diver, with a doctorate from MIT and a mind so quick (and a way with the ladies so effortless) that his graduate-school friends called him “Rapid Robert.” Over the next decade, Noyce managed the company, called Fairchild Semiconductor, by teaching himself business skills as he went along. By 1967, Fairchild had 11,000 employees and $12 million in profits.
在互联网、万维网、手机、个人数字助理、笔记本电脑、台式电脑、袖珍计算器、电子表、心脏起搏器、自动取款机、巡航控制系统、数码相机、运动探测器和电子游戏出现之前——在所有这些发明出现之前，所有这些发明的电子核心，是一种叫做集成电路的微小装置。1959年，罗伯特·诺伊斯发明了第一块实用的集成电路。这是他获得的17项专利之一。
Before the Internet and the World Wide Web and cell phones and personal digital assistants and laptop computers and desktop computers and pocket calculators and digital watches and pacemakers and ATMs and cruise control and digital cameras and motion detectors and video games—before all these, and the electronic heart of all these, is a tiny device called an integrated circuit. The inventor of the first practical integrated circuit, in 1959, was Robert Noyce. It was one of 17 patents awarded to him.
1968年，诺伊斯和他在仙童半导体公司的联合创始人戈登·摩尔创办了自己的新公司——一家名为英特尔的小型存储器公司。诺伊斯领导英特尔六年担任总裁，五年担任董事会主席，九年担任董事，在他的领导下，公司盈利能力约为竞争对手的两倍，如今已成为全球最大的半导体芯片生产商。
In 1968, Noyce and his Fairchild co-founder Gordon Moore launched their own new venture, a tiny memory company they called Intel. Noyce’s leadership of Intel—six years as president, five as board chair, and nine as a director—helped create a company that was roughly twice as profitable as its competitors and that today stands as the largest producer of semiconductor chips in the world.
但诺伊斯认为“大即是坏”——即便不是彻头彻尾的坏，至少也不如小公司有趣，因为在小公司里，“每个人都更加努力工作，合作也更加紧密”。1975年，他离开英特尔的日常管理岗位后，将目光转向了下一代高科技企业家。正是在那时，他结识了乔布斯。也正是在那时，他加入了六家初创公司的董事会，并以非正式的方式为更多公司提供了种子资金。他并不认为所有这些公司都会成功——他甚至把其中几家公司的资料都装在鞋盒里，放在衣橱里——但他坚信，通过投资，他就是尽自己的一份力，正如他所说，“为我曾经垂钓过的溪流重新注入活力”。2
But Noyce believed “big is bad”—or if not downright bad, at least not as much fun as small companies in which “everyone works much harder and cooperates more.” When he left daily management at Intel in 1975, he turned his attention to the next generation of high-tech entrepreneurs. This is how he met Jobs. This is how he came to serve on the boards of a half dozen startup companies and informally provide seed money to many more. He did not think that all these companies would succeed—he filed his paperwork for several of them in shoe boxes that he kept in his closet—but he strongly believed that by investing, he was doing his part, as he put it, to “restock the stream I’ve fished from.”2
诺伊斯天生就无法置身事外，参与任何他负责的事务。他曾称自己发明的集成电路是“对未来的挑战”，然后他转过身，背对着电视采访者，直视镜头，对着观众说：“现在，让我们看看你们能不能超越这个，”说着，他露出了灿烂的笑容。在一场父子棒球赛上，按照惯例，父亲们都会让儿子们赢，而诺伊斯却在第一球就击出了全垒打。“我可怜的父亲当时情不自禁，”他的女儿佩妮回忆道，那天她也在看台上。“他总是全身心地投入到手头的事情中——无论做什么，他都力求做到最好。”3
Noyce was constitutionally unable to sit on the sidelines of any operation with which he was involved. He once called his invention of the integrated circuit “a challenge to the future,” and turning away from the television interviewer, he stared straight into the camera to speak directly to the viewers: “Now let’s see if you can top that one,” he said, flashing a smile. At a father-son baseball game, which the dads traditionally allowed the boys to win, Noyce hit the very first pitch out of the park. “My poor father couldn’t help himself,” recalls his daughter Penny, who was in the stands that day. “He always threw himself entirely into the activity at hand—in whatever he did, he tried to excel.”3
罗伯特·诺伊斯最喜欢的滑雪服上缝着一块布贴，上面写着“不入虎穴，焉得虎子”。这句格言对这位驾驶私人飞机、包租直升机直达山顶滑雪、在巴厘岛暴风雨中骑摩托车穿梭于街道、甚至曾穿着滑雪板从25英尺高的悬崖上跃入厚厚的粉雪中，并为此兴奋不已（因为他“从未从悬崖上跳进过这么厚的雪里”）的人来说，可谓恰如其分。他的说服力堪称传奇。1963年，他成功说服了旗下某家公司出了名的保守的董事会，在当时完全被水淹没、即将由香港政府填海造陆的地点，建立了半导体行业首个海外制造工厂。他还说服了一车同行的伙伴和他一起跳进一条浑浊的西藏咸水河里游泳，这条河上游不远处就鳄鱼出没。他几乎让所有与他接触过的人都感受到未来无限的可能，以及大家可以一起“去做一些了不起的事情”，正如他常说的那样。英特尔前首席法律顾问回忆道：“他就像个吹笛人。如果鲍勃想让你做什么，你就得去做。”4
Robert Noyce’s favorite ski jacket featured a patch that declared “no guts, no glory.” It was a fitting motto for a man who flew his own planes, chartered a helicopter to drop him on mountaintops so he could ski down through the trees, rode a motorcycle through the streets of Bali in the middle of a thunderstorm, and once leapt with his skis off a 25-foot ledge into deep powder, exultant because he “had never jumped off a cliff into that much snow.” His powers of persuasion were legendary. In 1963, he convinced the notoriously conservative board of one of his companies to start the semiconductor industry’s first offshore manufacturing facility—at a site that was then completely under water, soon to be reclaimed from the bay by the government of Hong Kong. He talked a carload of traveling companions into joining him for a dip in a brackish Tibetan river, murky and, just a bit upstream, filled with crocodiles. He inspired in nearly everyone whom he encountered a sense that the future had no limits, and that together they could, as he liked to say, “Go off and do something wonderful.” Recalls Intel’s former chief counsel, “He was like the pied piper. If Bob wanted you to do something, you did it.”4
和许多其他生活在聚光灯下的人一样，诺伊斯为人极其低调。“他是我唯一能想到的既冷漠又迷人的人，”英特尔董事长安迪·格鲁夫说道。“我不知道鲍勃是怎么做到让你对他敬而远之的，你对他一无所知。而就在我还是个无名小卒的时候，他却会单膝跪地帮我调整滑雪板，帮我装上防滑链。”5
Like so many others who spend their lives in the limelight, Noyce was an intensely private man. “He was the only person I can think of who was both aloof and charming,” says Intel chairman Andy Grove. “I don’t know how Bob kept you away, but you just didn’t know anything about him. And this is the guy who would go down on one knee to adjust my skis, put my chains on, when I was a nobody.”5
诚然，诺伊斯的个性绝非简单。他出身小镇，对庞大的官僚机构抱有怀疑，却一手创建了两家公司，员工总数达数万人。在协助创立半导体行业协会（如今已成为美国最具影响力的游说组织之一）之后，他又在错综复杂的联邦政治中摸爬滚打了多年。他出身牧师家庭，却拒绝了有组织的宗教；他是一位杰出的运动员，却烟不离手；他极具竞争意识，却又非常在意别人是否喜欢他。他身价数千万美元，拥有数架飞机和房产，却依然保持着一种平易近人的魅力：当他的家乡宣布设立“鲍勃·诺伊斯日”，或者某个精英工程团体授予他被誉为“工程界诺贝尔奖”的首届奖项时，你总觉得他会跺跺脚，嘟囔着“哎呀，你们这些人啊”。沃伦·巴菲特曾与诺伊斯在大学董事会共事多年，他回忆说：“每个人都喜欢鲍勃。他非常聪明，但从不需要让你知道他有多聪明。他就像你的邻居一样，但脑子里却装着很多精密的仪器。”6
To be sure, Noyce’s was not a simple personality. A small-town boy suspicious of large bureaucracies, he built two companies that between them employed tens of thousands of people, and he spent many years working through the maze of federal politics after he helped launch the Semiconductor Industry Association, today one of the nation’s most effective lobbying organizations. He was a preacher’s son who rejected organized religion, an outstanding athlete who chainsmoked, and an intensely competitive man who was greatly concerned that people like him. He was worth tens of millions and owned several planes and houses but nonetheless somehow maintained a “just folks” sort of charm: you half expected him to kick the ground and mutter “aw shucks, you guys,” when his hometown declared “Bob Noyce Day” or an elite engineering group named him the first recipient of an award many called the Nobel Prize for Engineering. Recalls Warren Buffett, who served on a college board with Noyce for several years, “Everybody liked Bob. He was an extraordinarily smart guy who didn’t need to let you know he was that smart. He could be your neighbor, but with lots of machinery in his head.”6
不难想象，2000年10月，身着燕尾服的诺伊斯腼腆微笑，渴望着一支香烟。如果他当时还活着，无疑会与集成电路的共同发明人杰克·基尔比分享诺贝尔物理学奖。令人惊讶的是，这已经是诺伊斯第二次本应获得诺贝尔奖了。第一次是在1973年，当时日本物理学家江崎利夫是三位诺贝尔物理学奖得主之一。江崎因其在隧道二极管方面的开创性工作而获奖。隧道二极管首次提供了物理证据，证明隧道效应——量子力学的基本假设——不仅仅是一个引人入胜的理论概念。早在江崎于1958年发表论文的一年半之前，诺伊斯就已经完整地描述了隧道二极管。因此，这两位科学家的研究几乎同时在太平洋的两岸进行。然而，诺伊斯并没有发表他的想法，因为他的老板，诺贝尔奖获得者威廉·肖克利，不鼓励他继续研究这些想法。
It is easy to imagine Noyce, tuxedoed, smiling shyly, and desperately wanting a cigarette, in October 2000, when, had he lived, he undoubtedly would have shared the Nobel Prize for Physics awarded to his integrated circuit co-inventor, Jack Kilby. Amazingly, this is the second Nobel Prize that Noyce might rightfully have won. The first was in 1973, when a Japanese physicist named Leo Esaki was one of three recipients of the physics prize. Esaki was cited for his pathbreaking work on the tunnel diode, a device that provided the first physical evidence that tunneling, a foundational postulate of quantum mechanics, was more than an intriguing theoretical concept. Noyce had written a complete description of the tunnel diode nearly a year and a half before Esaki published his work in 1958. The two men’s research was thus happening almost simultaneously on opposite sides of the Pacific. Noyce had not published his ideas, however, because his boss, the Nobel laureate William Shockley, discouraged him from pursuing them.
诺伊斯对万物起源充满热情。他能预见到鲜有人能预见的事物。1965年，按键式电话刚刚问世，最先进的计算机仍然占据着整个房间，诺伊斯就预言集成电路将催生“便携式电话、个人寻呼系统和掌上电视”。他对近乎无限可能性的感知驱使他去探索那些同事认为毫无意义的技术猜想。（他的同行往往是对的，但偶尔也会犯下惊人的错误。）诺伊斯的灵感如同树叶般源源不断地涌现。为了确保他的工作取得成功，他身边必须有能够跟进他的想法、筛选信息并处理公司运营细节的人，因为诺伊斯几乎刚提出一个想法，就立刻将其抛诸脑后，继续推进后续工作。去探索另一个。诺伊斯的思维方式天马行空，有时令人抓狂。安迪·格鲁夫将其比作“一只蝴蝶在思绪间跳跃。未完成的句子，未完成的想法：你必须时刻保持警觉才能跟上他的思路。”7
Beginnings fascinated Noyce. He could imagine things few others could see. In 1965, when push-button telephones were brand new and state-of-the-art computers still filled entire rooms, Noyce predicted that the integrated circuit would lead to “portable telephones, personal paging systems, and palm-sized TVs.” His sense of near-limitless possibility led Noyce to pursue technical hunches that his colleagues believed were dead ends. (Often his peers were right, but occasionally, spectacularly, they were wrong.) Ideas fell from Noyce like leaves from a tree. For his work to be successful, he had to be surrounded by people who could follow up on his thoughts, filter them, and attend to the detail-work of running a company, because almost as soon as Noyce mentioned an idea, he had left it behind in order to explore another one. Noyce’s peripatetic mental style could be maddening at times. Andy Grove likens it to “a butterfly hopping from thought to thought. Unfinished sentences, unfinished thoughts: you really had to be on your toes to follow him.”7
诺伊斯总是激励人们将自己的想法拓展到他们自认为的极限之外。“你就只有这些想法？”他会问。“你有没有想过……”这样的对话让诺伊斯的同事和员工感觉，他那双蓝眼睛仿佛能穿透他们的头骨，发现他们内心深处或想法中隐藏的、他们自己都未曾意识到的潜力。这既令人兴奋，又有点吓人。“如果你不畏惧鲍勃·诺伊斯，你就永远不会畏惧任何人，”诺伊斯的朋友兼飞行员同事吉姆·拉弗蒂回忆道。“这个人做什么都那么能干，而你却还在跌跌撞撞地摸索着生活，努力让自己看起来体面，现在你还得努力追赶他。但没人能追上他。”8
Noyce was forever pushing people to take their own ideas beyond where they believed they could go. “That’s all you’ve got?” he’d ask. “Have you thought about …” An exchange of this sort left Noyce’s colleagues and employees feeling as though his blue eyes had bored right through their skulls to discover some potential buried inside themselves or their ideas that they had not known existed. It was exhilarating and a bit frightening. “If you weren’t intimidated by Bob Noyce, you’d never be intimidated by anybody,” recalls Jim Lafferty, Noyce’s friend and fellow pilot. “Here is this guy who is so capable in everything he does, and here you are trying to stumble through life and make it look respectable, and now you’re trying to keep up with him. And nobody can keep up with him.”8
的确，诺伊斯听起来完美得令人难以置信。他才华横溢、家财万贯、慷慨大方，深受爱戴，且极具远见卓识。然而，如果仅止于此，对诺伊斯的描述便显得不够全面。他并非超级英雄。他优柔寡断，几乎会不惜一切代价避免冲突，这种性格使他难以做出艰难的决定，也难以采取强硬的行动。他对未来的执着追求，以及对未来长远发展的执着，使他忽略了许多细节，对公司管理的琐碎事务也漠不关心。这种疏忽造成了切实的后果。他难以承受强烈的情绪，宁愿假装问题不存在，也不愿直面挑战。多年来，他的个人生活并不顺利，在这方面，他并非完全没有过错。
Indeed, Noyce can sound too good to be true. He was a brilliant, wealthy, generous, greatly beloved man gifted with enormous vision. But to leave a description of Noyce here would be to sell him short. He was not a superhero. He could be indecisive and would do almost anything to avoid confrontation, a trait that kept him from making difficult decisions and taking tough actions. His resolute focus on the future, his persistent gaze beyond the horizon, left him blind to many details and uninterested in the mundane minutiae of corporate management. This lack of attention had real consequences. He recoiled from strong emotions and would rather pretend a problem did not exist than address it head on. For many years, his personal life was difficult, and he was not entirely without fault in this area.
但诺伊斯性格中的这些特质，非但没有让他逊色，反而使他更像一个真正的男人。看着他逐渐认识到自身的不足，并想方设法克服这些不足，尤其是在管理方面，就如同亲眼目睹一位极具创造力的头脑在运作。
But these elements of Noyce’s character make him more of a man, not less. And to watch him come to recognize—and then devise means of working around—his own shortcomings, particularly as a manager, is to observe an exceptionally creative mind in action.
诺伊斯的核心圈子囊括了硅谷最知名的人物——英特尔的安迪·格鲁夫和戈登·摩尔、风险投资界的阿瑟·洛克和尤金·克莱纳、苹果公司的史蒂夫·乔布斯、晶体管的共同发明人威廉·肖克利——以及平面工艺（使得大规模生产复杂的微电子器件成为可能）和微处理器的发明者。一些与诺伊斯共事的、鲜为人知的硅谷先驱也颇具魅力：其中包括一位执着于单一目标的奇才、一位拥有两个博士学位的瑞士人、一位逃离纳粹恐怖统治的贵族难民，以及一位梦想经营民宿的纽约出租车司机的儿子。大多数与诺伊斯共事的人都钦佩他——有些人甚至爱戴他——但也有一些人对他的名声感到不满。他们掩盖了自己的贡献。“功劳总是往上爬”是人们对他前老板唯一的评价。
NOYCE’S INNER CIRCLE included the best-known players in Silicon Valley—Andy Grove and Gordon Moore of Intel, Arthur Rock and Eugene Kleiner of venture capital fame, Steve Jobs of Apple, William Shockley, co-inventor of the transistor—as well as the inventors of the planar process (which made it possible to mass produce complex microelectronic devices) and the microprocessor. Some of the lesser-known Silicon Valley pioneers who worked with Noyce hold their own interest: among them are a monomaniacal genius, a Swiss with two doctorates, an aristocratic refugee from Nazi terror, and the son of a New York cabbie who really wanted to run a bed-and-breakfast. Most of the people who worked with Noyce admired him—some loved him—but a few resented his notoriety, which they felt obscured their own contributions. “Credit floats up” was the only comment one would offer about his former boss.
这些人共同构建了一个由专业设备供应商、高水平技术职业学校和工程项目，以及精通技术的金融、公关和法律支持服务组成的网络，帮助曾经的乡村圣克拉拉谷转型成为一座名为硅谷的高科技商业中心。1956年4月，诺伊斯抵达旧金山湾区时，电子行业是该地区发展最快的产业，政府国防合同和军方销售额占总业务的一半以上。但曾经支撑着山谷经济的李子树、樱桃树和杏树仍然点缀着这片土地。二十年后，果园已不复存在，政府采购占集成电路销售额的比例不到四分之一，曾经依赖政府订单的电子产业如今依靠一个建立在高风险文化基础上的复杂私人网络来维持运转。诺伊斯的职业生涯为我们了解这一切是如何发生的提供了一个绝佳的窗口。
Together these men built a network of specialized equipment providers, high-caliber technical trade schools and engineering programs, and tech-savvy financial, public relations, and legal support services that helped to transform the once rural Santa Clara Valley into a high-tech business machine called Silicon Valley. When Noyce arrived in the San Francisco Bay Area in April 1956, electronics was the fastest growing industry in the region, with government defense contracts and sales to the military accounting for well over half the business. But the plum, cherry, and apricot trees that had once anchored the valley’s economy still dotted the landscape. Twenty years later, the orchards were gone, government purchases accounted for less than a quarter of integrated circuit sales, and the electronics industry that had been suckled on government work was now sustained by a complex private network founded on a culture of high-stakes risk. Noyce’s career offers an ideal window into how this happened.
诺伊斯和他的同时代人改变了世界，但这只是故事的一半。他们的生活也深深烙印着20世纪下半叶重塑美国的巨大社会、政治、技术和经济变革的印记。诺伊斯西迁时，加入了战后涌向加利福尼亚的大规模移民潮。他的产业诞生于国防开支的洪流和由苏联1957年发射的小型卫星引发的创新恐慌之中，并在20世纪80年代成为产业政策辩论的焦点。半导体行业也催生了20世纪90年代的高科技泡沫。
That Noyce and his contemporaries changed their world is only half the story. Their lives bear the marks of the monumental social, political, technical, and economic shifts that reshaped America in the second half of the twentieth century. When Noyce went west, he joined the massive postwar migration to California. His industry, launched in the torrent of defense spending and creative panic triggered by a tiny beeping satellite that the Soviets had lofted into orbit in 1957, placed itself at the center of the debate over industrial policy in the 1980s. Semiconductors also catalyzed the high-tech bubble in the 1990s.
十几年前，《圣何塞水星报》称诺伊斯是硅谷的托马斯·爱迪生和亨利·福特。他先后荣获卡特总统颁发的国家科学奖章和里根总统颁发的国家技术奖章。数百家报刊杂志都曾报道过诺伊斯。美国广播公司（ABC）的彼得·詹宁斯将他评为“本周人物”。哥伦比亚广播公司（CBS）主播查尔斯·奥斯古德称诺伊斯为“改变世界的人”。汤姆·沃尔夫是一位慧眼识珠的英雄，他在1983年《时尚先生》（Esquire）杂志上发表了一篇关于诺伊斯的文章，这篇文章与杰基·罗宾逊、约翰·F·肯尼迪、贝蒂·弗里丹、沃尔特·迪士尼和埃尔维斯·普雷斯利等其他“美国传奇人物”的文章并列刊登。未来学家乔治·吉尔德称罗伯特·诺伊斯“无疑是战后时代最重要的美国人”，而艾萨克·阿西莫夫则更进一步，将集成电路的发明誉为“自人类出现以来最重要的时刻”。9
Little more than a dozen years ago, the San Jose Mercury News declared Noyce the Thomas Edison and the Henry Ford of Silicon Valley. He received the National Medal of Science from President Carter and the National Medal of Technology from President Reagan. Noyce was featured in hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles. Peter Jennings profiled him as “the person of the week” on ABC. CBS anchor Charles Osgood called Noyce “the man who changed the world.” Tom Wolfe, who knew a hero when he saw one, wrote about Noyce in a 1983 Esquire article that ran next to pieces on other “American Originals,” including Jackie Robinson, John F. Kennedy, Betty Friedan, Walt Disney, and Elvis Presley. Futurist George Gilder called Robert Noyce “undoubtedly the most important American of the postwar era,” while Isaac Asimov went even further by hailing the invention of the integrated circuit as “the most important moment since man emerged as a life form.”9
然而，罗伯特·诺伊斯的故事至今仍未完整呈现。“高科技史”几乎是个自相矛盾的说法，”诺伊斯曾说过，“我们的主要任务是让昨天的‘哇！’变成今天的平淡无奇。” 书写一个人、一个行业和一个地方的历史，他们都认为自我淘汰是理所当然的。成功的巅峰并非唾手可得。公司通常会销毁纸质文件，而那些未被公司指令销毁的文件，则被员工随意丢弃在垃圾桶或垃圾箱里。他们无法想象，有一天，世人会像这些技术人员关注未来一样，对他们的过去充满兴趣。直到如今，这些曾经叱咤半导体行业的青年才俊步入七八十岁，才开始回首往事，追忆往昔。
And yet until now the story of Robert Noyce has not been told in full. “High-tech history’ is almost an oxymoron,” Noyce once said. “Our major activity is to make yesterday’s ‘gee-whiz!’ mundane today.” Writing the history of a man, an industry, and a place that consider self-obsolescence the pinnacle of success is not easy. Companies routinely shred their paperwork, and those items not destroyed by corporate fiat are consigned to wastebaskets and dumpsters by employees unable to imagine that the world might one day be as interested in their past as these technologists are in the future. It is only now that the one-time young Turks of the semiconductor industry are entering their seventies and eighties that they have begun to look backward, and remember.
诺伊斯没能活着回顾过去。1990年，62岁的诺伊斯在告知SEMATECH董事会他计划卸任其创始首席执行官一职几周后，因心脏病突发去世。SEMATECH是一个成立两年、价值十亿美元的制造联盟，由14家半导体公司和美国国防部共同出资成立。他的追悼会吸引了三千人参加。老布什总统致电诺伊斯的遗孀，表示个人慰问。
Noyce did not live to look back. In 1990, at age 62, and just weeks after informing the board of SEMATECH—a two-year-old, billion-dollar, manufacturing consortium jointly funded by 14 semiconductor companies and the Department of Defense—that he planned to leave his job as the consortium’s founding CEO, Noyce succumbed to a heart attack. Three thousand people attended memorial services for him. President George H. W. Bush phoned Noyce’s widow to offer his personal condolences.
然而，即使是一向向前看的诺伊斯也承认“根很重要”。他的灵魂深处，源于大萧条时期在爱荷华州格林内尔小镇度过的童年时光，以及他出身于一个根植于中西部、有着深厚传统、男性从事教师、牧师或两者兼任职业的家庭。诺伊斯深知，他如今这位才华横溢、精通高科技的成年人，其根源可以追溯到那个骑着自行车挨家挨户推销年度铲雪合同、利用所有空闲时间制作电动雪橇和镇上最好的模型飞机的爱荷华男孩。或许，这位未来电子企业家的雏形，可以从12岁的鲍比·诺伊斯在一本早已被人遗忘的日记中窥见一斑：“我的爱好是手工，”他在1939年写道，“我喜欢这个爱好，因为它很有用。你可以用很少的成本做出价值很高的东西。”10
And yet even Noyce, the man who always looked forward, acknowledged that “roots are important.” His core had been shaped by his Depression-era boyhood in the small town of Grinnell, Iowa, and by his birth into a family with deep Midwestern roots and a tradition of its men serving as teachers, ministers, or both. Noyce knew that his high-flying, high-tech adult self had its source in the Iowa boy who pedaled flat-rate annual snow-shoveling contracts to his neighbors and who spent every spare minute building motorized sleds and the town’s best model airplanes. Surely the shape of the future electronics entrepreneur can be divined in 12-year-old Bobby Noyce’s comment from a long-forgotten journal: “My hobby is handicraft,” he wrote in 1939. “I like this hobby because it is useful. You can make things cheaply that are worth a lot.”10
1.
肾上腺素和汽油
1
Adrenaline and Gasoline
问问任何一个在20世纪40年代和50年代居住在爱荷华州格林内尔的人，他们对鲍勃·诺伊斯（Bob Noyce）的记忆是什么，答案几乎都离不开滑翔机。1940年夏天，当时12岁的诺伊斯和14岁的哥哥盖洛德（Gaylord）一起造了一架儿童尺寸的飞机。这架滑翔机在格林内尔当地人心中已成为传奇，有些人声称亲眼见过诺伊斯兄弟从格林内尔学院马厩的屋顶、学院体育场的看台，甚至诺伊斯家三楼的一扇大窗户里起飞。其中最惊险的故事是，盖洛德和鲍勃说服他们7岁的弟弟爬进滑翔机，然后哥哥们把它绑在一辆汽车的保险杠上，汽车飞驰而去。
Ask nearly anyone who lived in Grinnell, Iowa, during the 1940s and 1950s what they remember about Bob Noyce, and the answer is bound to involve a glider. In the summer of 1940, Noyce, who was then 12, built a boy-sized aircraft with his 14-year-old brother, Gaylord. This glider has attained mythic proportions among native Grinnellians, some of whom claim to have seen one of the Noyce brothers take flight from the roof of the Grinnell College stables, from the bleachers at the college stadium, from a large open window on the third floor of the Noyce home. The most dramatic story involves Gaylord and Bob convincing their seven-year-old brother to climb in the glider, which the older boys then tied to the bumper of a car that took off at top speed.
对鲍勃·诺伊斯来说，滑翔机是他“漫长制作生涯”中的“巅峰之作”——至少在他17岁时是这么说的。他曾亲手制作过收音机，还把一台旧布里格斯-斯特拉顿洗衣机的螺旋桨和发动机焊接到雪橇后面，使其具备动力。当寒冬来临，他的双手因为无数个清晨在格林内尔寂静的街道上挨家挨户送《得梅因纪事报》而皲裂时，他把一个汽车前灯连接到从垃圾场捡来的电池上。早起的人们可以看到他肩扛晨报，手里拿着温暖的前灯，车把上的铁丝篮里放着十磅重的电池，小心翼翼地沿着送报路线滑行。他还用《大众科学》杂志上的图纸装饰了一本剪贴簿，里面记录着各种船模、床、一种类似帆板但可以在冰上使用的装置、滑冰鞋磨刀器、木琴，以及一辆“半马力人行道跑车”的制作方案。1
For Bob Noyce, the glider was “an all-time high” in “my long career of making things”—or so he claimed at 17. He had built a radio from scratch and motorized his sled by welding a propeller and an engine from an old Briggs and Stratton washing machine to the back of it. When the winter weather grew bitter and his hands cracked from one too many cold mornings delivering the Des Moines Register through the quiet streets of Grinnell, he had wired a car headlight to a battery that he found at the dump. Early risers could watch him precariously balance his way along his route, morning papers over his shoulder, warm headlight in his hands, ten-pound battery perched in the wire basket on his handlebars. He filled a scrapbook with Popular Science plans for constructing various ship models, a bed, a contraption that worked like a windsurfer but was used on ice, a skate sharpener, a xylophone, and a “half-horsepower sidewalk roadster.”1
但他始终热爱飞行。夏日的夜晚，他和盖洛德用包装纸和铁丝制作气球，在气球底部点燃油腻的破布，看着他们的作品像一轮轮明月般升入夜空，直到破布燃尽，气球才飘落到农田里。他们制作了无数轻木模型飞机，零件总是散落在窗台和台阶上，这让他们的母亲非常不高兴。鲍勃诺伊斯可以花上几个星期的时间在飞机上，完善设计，微调发动机，并在城镇周围田野里茂密的杂草丛中寻找飞机的踪迹。但当一架飞机破旧不堪时，他却毫不留情。他会大胆地、气势磅礴地点燃它，然后从窗户纵身跃下。2
But always, his passion was flight. On summer evenings, he and Gaylord built balloons from wrapping paper and wire, lit oily rags underneath and watched their creations rise into the night skies like so many moons before drifting into a farmer’s field when the rags burned out. They built innumerable balsa-wood model airplanes, the parts forever littering the window sills and steps of their house, to their mother’s great displeasure. Bob Noyce could spend weeks on a plane, perfecting the design, fine tuning the motor, and hunting it through the tall weeds that dotted the fields around town. But when a plane was shopworn, he showed no remorse. Grandly, boldly, he lit it on fire and sailed it from a window.2
鲍勃·诺伊斯11岁那年，他和邻居骑着自行车来到一片牧场，格林内尔的第一位特技飞行员正驾驶着他的新福特三引擎摩托车，提供15分钟的观光飞行，每次收费一美元。诺伊斯和他的朋友一整天都仰着脖子往上看，等排队的人少了些，两个男孩说服售票员让他们共用一个座位。诺伊斯坐在座位边缘，看着地面渐渐消失，很快他就看到了公理会教堂，那是他们一家每周日做礼拜的地方，还有格林内尔学院，他的大哥唐在那里上课，他的父亲是一位牧师，在地区公理会办公室工作。鲍勃找到了自己的家，那是一栋简朴的房子，坐落在一块维护良好的地块上，就在学院对面。落地之后，两个男孩飞快地骑车回家吃晚饭，诺伊斯洗漱完毕，低头祷告后，他没有把这次奇妙的冒险经历告诉父母。保密反而让事情更加刺激。3
When Bob Noyce was 11, he and a neighbor rode their bikes to a pasture where Grinnell’s first barnstormer was giving 15-minute trips in his new Ford tri-motor for a dollar per ride. Noyce and his friend spent the day craning their necks upward, and when the line for rides had dwindled, the two boys convinced the ticket seller to let them share a seat. Perched on the edge of his half of the seat, Noyce watched the ground fall away, and soon he could see the Congregational Church where his family worshipped every Sunday and Grinnell College, where his oldest brother Don attended classes and his father, a minister, worked for the regional Congregationalist offices. Bob found his house, a modest one on a well-kept lot, just across the street from the college. And after they landed, after the two boys pedaled furiously home for dinner, after Noyce washed up and bowed his head for grace, he told his parents nothing of his great adventure. Keeping it secret made it that much more exciting.3
鲍勃·诺伊斯向盖洛德提议一起制作滑翔机时，几乎可以肯定想起了那次飞行。鲍勃早就证明了自己是家里的捣蛋鬼，这个胆大妄为的人总是拉着盖洛德——盖洛德将来会成为一名牧师，而且他当时已经是个非常乖巧的孩子——一起胡闹。两个男孩自己设计了滑翔机，他们借鉴了自己制作模型飞机的经验，还参考了《知识之书》中的一幅插图。《知识之书》是一套多卷本的百科全书，他们的父母特意把它放在客厅书架的低矮架子上，方便他们随时取阅。
Bob Noyce was almost certainly remembering this flight when he proposed to Gaylord that they make their own glider. Bob had long ago proven himself the mastermind of mischief in their home, the daredevil forever pulling Gay, who would one day become a minister and who was already a very good boy, into impish hijinks. The two boys designed the glider themselves, working from their experience building model planes and from an illustration that they found in the Book of Knowledge, a multivolume encyclopedia that their parents kept deliberately accessible on a low shelf in the living room bookcase.
兄弟俩凑了他们仅有的4.53美元积蓄，用来购买材料，并告诉邻居们，他们正在建造一个伟大的发明。很快，朋友们也加入了帮忙的行列。鲍勃·史密斯的父亲拥有一家家具店，经常收到缠绕在竹轴上的地毯卷，他便提供了制作框架的木棍。夏洛特·马修斯是他们街区17个男孩中唯一的女孩，她缝制了覆盖机翼的粗棉布。当诺伊斯兄弟宣布滑翔机完工时，它大约有四英尺高，机翼从翼尖到翼尖展开近18英尺。这架滑翔机主要由1英尺×2英尺的松木板制成，既没有轮子也没有滑橇，完全依靠男孩们的人力驱动。4
The brothers pooled their combined savings of $4.53 to buy materials and sent word to their neighborhood pals that a great invention was under construction. Soon the friends were helping too. Bob Smith, whose father owned a furniture store that regularly received rolls of carpet wound around bamboo spindles, provided sticks for the frame. Charlotte Matthews, the only girl on their block of 17 boys, sewed the cheese cloth to cover the wings. When the Noyce brothers declared the glider finished, it stood some four feet tall, and its wings stretched nearly 18 feet from tip to tip. Constructed largely from 1´ × 2´ pine boards, it had neither wheels nor skids and ran entirely on boy power.4
飞行员站在机舱中央的一个开口处，双手撑着机架，拼命奔跑，以此来移动和操控飞机。“我们通过奔跑和跳跃获得了一点升力，就像飞行员那样，”盖洛德回忆道。“从四五英尺高的土堆上跑下来，我们获得了更大的升力。”但这还不够鲍勃。他和盖洛德一起说服了他们的邻居杰瑞·斯特朗，这位刚刚被附身的……杰瑞拿了驾照和他父亲的车钥匙，准备把滑翔机挂在汽车保险杠上。他被指示沿着公园街快速行驶，以便让滑翔机升空并保持飞行。这项实验并没有让他七岁的弟弟参与，结果证明它恐怖至极，而非有效。5
The pilot moved and steered the plane by standing amidship in an opening, holding up the frame with his two hands, and running as fast as he could. “We succeeded in running and jumping to get a little lift as experienced by the pilot,” Gaylord recalls. “In running off a mound about four or five feet high, we got more.” This was not good enough for Bob. Together he and Gaylord convinced their neighbor Jerry Strong, newly possessed of a driver’s license and the keys to his father’s car, to hitch the glider to the auto’s bumper. Jerry was instructed to drive down Park Street fast enough to launch the glider and keep it aloft. The experiment, which in no way involved a seven-year-old brother, proved more terrifying than effective.5
但这对于鲍勃·诺伊斯来说还不够刺激。他和杰瑞·斯特朗决定尝试一下，正如诺伊斯几年后所说，“从谷仓顶上跳下来还能活着”。那座谷仓位于梅里尔公园，就在诺伊斯家后面的空地和芦笋地对面。消息很快传遍了全镇，《格林内尔先驱报》也派了一名摄影师前去报道。6
Still this was not sufficiently thrilling for Bob Noyce. He and Jerry Strong decided to try, as Noyce put it a few years later, “to jump off the roof of a barn and live.” The barn in question was in Merrill Park, just across the empty fields and asparagus patch behind the Noyces’ house. Word spread through town, and the Grinnell Herald sent a photographer.6
鲍勃爬上谷仓的屋顶，几个男孩递给他一架滑翔机，重约25磅。鲍勃深吸一口气，用他结实的身体抵住滑翔机的框架……然后纵身一跃。一秒、两秒、三秒，年轻的鲍勃·诺伊斯飞了起来。他几乎立刻就落回了地面，但正如他几年后在大学申请文书中自豪地写道：“我们成功了！”就连男孩们的母亲，私下里觉得儿子们对飞机的痴迷有点儿轻浮，也感到印象深刻。“这都是他们的主意，”哈丽特·诺伊斯后来强调说，“不过是我做的糊状物。 ”7
Bob clambered up to the barn’s roof and a few other boys handed him the glider, which weighed about 25 pounds. Bob then took a deep breath, thrust his sturdy body against the glider’s frame … and jumped. Then, for one second, two, three, young Bob Noyce was flying. He hit the ground almost immediately, but as he proudly reported in a college admissions essay a few years later, “We did [it]!” Even the boys’ mother, who privately thought her sons’ fascination with airplanes a bit frivolous, was impressed. “It was all their idea,” Harriet Noyce later recalled with emphasis, “but I made the paste.”7
毫无疑问，诺伊斯对冒险的热爱遗传自他的母亲哈丽特。哈丽特·诺顿在芝加哥郊区长大，父母和孙女都是公理会牧师。她从小就梦想成为一名传教士——这或许是她那个年代虔诚的年轻女性所能选择的最冒险的道路。她想象着自己身处中国，她母亲的母校奥柏林学院在那里设立了一所教会学校。哈丽特会成为一名优秀的传教士。她无所畏惧、机智敏捷、勤奋好学、能言善辩，几乎对所有事情都有自己的看法，而且习惯于大声讲述自己的想法，以至于她似乎永远说不完话。她常说自己喜欢“做很多事，并且把每件事都做好”。17岁那年，她离开家乡前往奥柏林学院求学，几乎没有回头。8
IT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY FROM HIS MOTHER Harriet that Noyce inherited his love of adventure. Growing up in suburban Chicago, the daughter and granddaughter of Congregationalist ministers, Harriet Norton had dreamed of work as a missionary—perhaps the most daring path available to churchgoing young women of her age. She could imagine herself in China, where her mother’s alma mater Oberlin had established a mission school. Harriet would have made a good missionary. She was fearless, quick witted, studious, and voluble, with an opinion on nearly every subject and a habit of narrating her thoughts aloud so that she seemed never to stop talking. She often said that she liked to “do a lot and do it well.” When she left home to attend Oberlin at the age of 17, it was with scarcely a backwards glance.8
1920年，哈丽特即将完成社会学专业的学习时，她的哥哥把她介绍给了拉尔夫·诺伊斯。诺伊斯性格腼腆内向，刚刚从奥柏林神学院研究生院毕业。这位即将成为牧师的诺伊斯身材瘦削，穿着周日礼拜鞋也只有五英尺半高，年仅28岁，曾参加过第一次世界大战。他成长于内布拉斯加州东北角，父亲是一位受过正式任命的公理会牧师，在那里一边布道一边经营着一家奶牛场。拉尔夫·诺伊斯为人谨慎，说话轻声细语，热爱哲学，并自认为更像一位知识分子而非宗教领袖。他曾在多恩学院学习古希腊语和拉丁语，并收集圣母玛利亚的画像，以便像艺术史学家一样侃侃而谈。
In 1920, when Harriet was wrapping up her sociology major, her brother introduced her to Ralph Noyce, a shy, quiet man just finishing his studies at Oberlin’s Graduate School of Theology. The soon-to-be Reverend Noyce, slight and barely over five-and-a-half feet tall in his Sunday shoes, was 28 years old, a veteran of the Great War. He had been raised in the northeast corner of Nebraska, where his father, an ordained Congregationalist minister, preached and ran a dairy. A careful, soft-spoken man, Ralph Noyce loved philosophy and fancied himself more an intellectual than a religious leader. He studied ancient Greek and Latin at Doane College and collected images of the Madonna on which he could discourse in the manner of an art historian.
教会是他们恋爱生活的中心，但这并不意味着教会左右了他们的信仰。公理会并没有统一的信条或正式的仪式来定义这个宗教，而且各个教会大多独立运作，没有主教或主教会议凌驾于其上。相反，这个宗教为哈丽特·诺顿和拉尔夫·诺伊斯提供了一种共同的语言和价值观：宽容、尊重教育、平等主义，以及相信上帝与其尘世仆人之间存在直接的联系。正如哈丽特所说，她和拉尔夫有着共同的梦想：“成为真正意义上的基督教领袖……关心弱势群体，视人为平等，并赋予每个人神圣的意义。”9
The church centered their courtship, which is not to say that it dictated their beliefs. No Congregationalist creed or formalized set of rituals defined the religion, and the individual churches for the most part operated independently, with no bishop or synod above them. Instead, the religion offered Harriet Norton and Ralph Noyce a common language and set of values: tolerance, respect for education, egalitarianism, and a belief in an unmediated relationship between God and His earthly servants. As Harriet put it, she and Ralph shared the same dream: “to be Christian leaders, in the best sense … equip[ped with] a concern for the needy, [and] an attitude towards people as equals, sacred in some way.”9
但哈丽特一向独立自主、意志坚定，坚持大学毕业后先工作一年再结婚。她在父母家附近的一所高中教拉丁语和英语，以此证明自己能够照顾好自己，这让她自己也感到满意。学年一结束，1922年6月20日，哈丽特·诺顿和拉尔夫·诺伊斯就结婚了。她的父亲主持了婚礼，他的父亲则担任了伴郎。
But Harriet, always independent and strong willed, insisted on working for a year after college before she would marry. She taught high-school Latin and English near her parents’ home and proved to her own satisfaction that she was capable of caring for herself. As soon as the school year ended, on June 20, 1922, Harriet Norton and Ralph Noyce were married. Her father performed the service; his assisted.
短暂的蜜月之后，这对年轻夫妇抵达了爱荷华州丹麦镇，这是一个位于该州东南角、人口约250人的小镇。丹麦镇的教堂虽小却颇负盛名：它是密西西比河以西最古老的公理会教堂，教堂顶部耸立着一座250英尺高的尖顶，数英里外的农场都能看到。那些农场的居民都是拉尔夫·诺伊斯的教友，他们不畏严寒，冬天要冒着冰雪覆盖的乡间小路，夏天要忍受酷暑，只为聆听拉尔夫用他精心注释的讲稿，就“基督教乐观主义”等主题发表演讲。10
After a short honeymoon, the young couple arrived in Denmark, Iowa, a town of about 250 in the southeasternmost corner of the state. The Denmark church was small but prestigious: the oldest Congregational church west of the Mississippi, it was crowned with a 250-foot spire visible from farms miles away. The families on those farms were Ralph Noyce’s parishioners, and they braved icy country roads in the winter and sweltering heat in the summer to hear Ralph speak to them from his well-annotated outlines on subjects such as “Christian Optimism.”10
拉尔夫和哈丽特·诺伊斯住在牧师住宅里。由于教会承担了住房费用，他每年 1500 美元的薪水可以让他享受一些小奢侈，比如去理发店理发、买一辆二手车，以及在医院生下唐纳德·斯特林·诺伊斯（1923 年 5 月出生）和盖洛德·布鲁斯特·诺伊斯（1926 年 7 月出生）。11
Ralph and Harriet Noyce lived in the parsonage. With housing expenses covered by the church, his $1,500 annual salary could provide small indulgences such as barbershop haircuts, a secondhand car, and hospital births for Donald Sterling Noyce, who arrived in May 1923, and Gaylord Brewster Noyce, born in July 1926.11
1927年感恩节前后，哈丽特得知第三个孩子即将出生，她和拉尔夫觉得，如果能提高收入，搬到更大的城市，对家庭生活会更有利。拉尔夫得知爱荷华州大西洋城的一家教堂有个空缺，这个小镇的规模大约是丹麦镇的三倍，从丹麦镇乘坐伯灵顿和岩岛铁路向西几个小时就能到达。他安排去应聘，当对方提供的薪水几乎是他现在的两倍时，他同意在新孩子出生后立即上岗。
When Harriet discovered that a third child would arrive around Thanksgiving 1927, she and Ralph decided that their family could benefit from an increase in pay and a move to a larger community. Ralph learned of an opening at the church in Atlantic, Iowa, a town roughly triple the size of Denmark and a few hours’ ride west on the Burlington and Rock Island railroad. He arranged to “candidate” for the job, and when he was offered the position at a salary nearly twice his current pay, he agreed to start as soon as the new baby was born.
与此同时，哈丽特正准备迎接第三个孩子的到来。一位朋友来帮拉尔夫照顾两个儿子，哈丽特在医生的建议下，在离家18英里的伯灵顿医院附近租了一间病房。她告诉母亲、公婆和朋友们，生了两个儿子后，她非常想要个女儿。为了给自己留条后路，她甚至连男孩的名字都没想好。1927年12月12日，诺伊斯家的第三个儿子出生了。拉尔夫抢在医生之前冲进了产房。“恭喜，并致以我最诚挚的慰问，”拉尔夫的兄弟来信写道，“可惜是个男孩。 ”不过，哈丽特很快就恢复了过来。这个健康的男婴被取名为罗伯特，小名叫鲍比。12
Meanwhile, Harriet prepared for the arrival of her third child. A friend came to help Ralph with the boys and, at the suggestion of her doctor, Harriet took a room near the hospital in Burlington, 18 miles from home. She told her mother, her in-laws, and her friends that after two boys, she desperately wanted a little girl. Hedging her bets, she did not even pick out a boy’s name. On December 12, 1927, the Noyces’ third son arrived in a flash, beating his doctor to the delivery room. “Congratulations, and my sincere sympathy,” read a letter from Ralph’s brother. “Too bad he was a he.” Harriet rallied soon enough, however. The healthy baby boy was named Robert, to be called Bobby.12
鲍比六周大的时候，诺伊斯一家来到了大西洋城。教堂有两百名活跃的教友，还有一个供拉尔夫学习的房间。拉尔夫几乎每天都待在那里，与教友们见面，并从《生活》、《文学文摘》和《基督教世纪》等杂志上剪下文章，作为讲道的素材。哈丽特在一群教会妇女中找到了志同道合的朋友，她们会定期组织类似肖托夸式的学习小组。诺伊斯家的两个大儿子——快五岁的唐和快两岁的盖洛德——非常喜欢教堂里歌剧院式的座椅，他们在上面蹦蹦跳跳、爬上爬下，玩得不亦乐乎。
WHEN BOBBY WAS SIX WEEKS OLD, the Noyce family arrived in Atlantic. The church had 200 active members and a study for Ralph, who spent most days there, meeting with parishioners and clipping articles from Life, Literary Digest, and Christian Century for sermon fodder. Harriet found kindred spirits among a group of church women who organized Chautauqua-style study sessions for themselves. The two older Noyce boys—Don, who was nearly five, and almost-two-year-old Gaylord—delighted in the sanctuary’s opera-style seats, which provided hours of slamming and clambering fun.
诺伊斯一家居住的牧师住宅不仅归教会所有，而且是由妇女辅助会负责布置和装饰的，这意味着拉尔夫和哈丽特从不敢随意改动屋内的陈设。哈丽特负责假期圣经学校的运营，在教会组织的露营旅行中掌管临时厨房，见证结婚证的颁发，监管妇女辅助会，并在圣诞节演出后台悄悄提醒演员们忘记的台词。
The parsonage in which the Noyce family lived was not only owned by the church, it was furnished and decorated by the Ladies Auxiliary, which meant that Ralph and Harriet were never comfortable changing things to suit their taste. Harriet ran the vacation bible school, headed the makeshift kitchens on church-sponsored camping trips, witnessed marriage licenses, oversaw the Ladies Auxiliary, and whispered forgotten lines from backstage at Christmas pageants.
对于男孩们来说，家里几乎每天晚上都有赞美诗和祷告，此外还有周日礼拜、主日学和周日晚餐。诺伊斯牧师毕生致力于教会儿童的牧养工作，他理所当然地认为自己的儿子们也会参加他组织的课程、静修会、教会青年团契活动和圣诞节戏剧。而且，如果没有人自愿带领这些活动，诺伊斯家的兄弟俩就得承担起这个责任。虽然哈丽特和拉尔夫都没有特别强调，但男孩们也必须面对身为牧师子女的无形责任：他们的行为不仅影响着自己，也影响着他们的父亲、他们的信仰，甚至可能影响着上帝。
For the boys, there were hymns and prayers most evenings at home, as well as Sunday services, Sunday school, and Sunday supper. Reverend Noyce devoted his ministry to the children of the church, and he assumed his own sons would participate in the classes, retreats, church youth group meetings, and Christmas plays he organized. Moreover, if no one volunteered to lead these activities, the Noyce brothers were expected to do so. And though neither Harriet nor Ralph emphasized them, the boys also had to contend with the intangible responsibilities of being a preacher’s child: their behavior reflected not only on themselves, but on their father, their religion, and maybe even on God.
拉尔夫·诺伊斯始终是儿子们生活中不可或缺的一部分。他经常在家工作，房间里摆满了希腊语和拉丁语书籍。即使白天在教堂做礼拜，他也会每天中午步行三个街区到牧师住宅，和妻子儿子们一起吃饭。孩子们都知道星期六不要打扰爸爸，因为那天他讲道结束了；但除此之外，他通常都随叫随到。鲍勃·诺伊斯最早的童年记忆是，他打乒乓球赢了父亲，但母亲听到这个激动人心的消息后却心不在焉地说：“爸爸让你赢了，真是太好了！”这让他感到无比沮丧。
Ralph Noyce was a constant presence in his sons’ lives. He often worked at home, in a room lined with his books in Greek and Latin. Even when he was spending his day at the church, he walked the three blocks to the parsonage at noon to eat with his wife and sons. The boys knew not to disturb Dad on Saturdays, when he finished his sermons, but otherwise, he was usually available. Bob Noyce’s earliest childhood memory involves beating his father at Ping Pong and feeling absolutely devastated when his mother’s reaction to this thrilling news was a distracted “Wasn’t that nice of Daddy to let you win?”
即使只有五岁，诺伊斯也无法接受故意输掉任何事情。“游戏不是这样的，”他闷闷不乐地对妈妈说，“要玩就得赢！”13
Even at age five, Noyce was offended by the notion of intentionally losing at anything. “That’s not the game,” he sulked to his mother. “If you’re going to play, play to win!”13
1932年，农业萧条迅速加剧，并全面席卷大西洋城，农产品价格和收入跌至历史新低。到1935年，一蒲式耳小麦的价格仅为1919年的20%，而玉米的价格更是跌至每蒲式耳10美分，最有效的用途竟然是烧掉以节省煤炭。农场被取消抵押赎回权的情况屡见不鲜。干旱肆虐乡村。1933年2月，就在诺伊斯夫妇的第四个儿子拉尔夫·哈罗德出生前不久，大西洋银行倒闭了，诺伊斯牧师为了支付医疗费用而用政府人寿保险保单抵押的贷款也随之付诸东流。14
THE RAPIDLY DEEPENING agricultural depression fully descended upon Atlantic in 1932, when farm prices and income hit record lows. By 1935, a bushel of wheat still fetched only 20 percent of its 1919 price, and at ten cents a bushel, the most efficient use for corn was to burn it to save the need for coal. Farm foreclosures were common. A drought plagued the countryside. The Atlantic bank failed in February 1933, shortly before the birth of the Noyces’ fourth son, Ralph Harold, taking with it the amount Reverend Noyce had borrowed against his government life insurance policy to cover hospital expenses.14
拉尔夫所在的教会开始“收养”贫困家庭，一位教友资助他们参加全州公理会会议，另一位教友缝制校服，诺伊斯一家则经常邀请小孩子来和盖洛德和鲍比玩耍，以便父母们能尽力做些家务。牧师住宅成了流浪汉们经常落脚的地方。哈丽特几乎总能设法给他们提供三明治和一杯牛奶，有时还能让他们做些零工来换取一顿饭和一个废弃鸡舍里的栖身之所。
Ralph’s church began “adopting” needy families, with one member paying the way to statewide Congregationalist conferences, another sewing school clothes, and the Noyces regularly inviting small children to play with Gaylord and Bobby while the parents did what work they could. The parsonage became a regular stopping point for hoboes. Harriet could almost always manage to offer them a sandwich and a glass of milk, or sometimes a short stint of labor in exchange for a meal and a spot to sleep in an unused chicken coop.
尽管诺伊斯一家最初拥有稳定的收入和可靠的住房，但他们很快就感受到了经济大萧条的冲击。1932年，为了节省取暖费和电话费，教会理事会关闭了拉尔夫心爱的教堂办公室。（他们把电话听筒给了拉尔夫，他和儿子们立刻把它接好，让他可以拨到自己在家里的书房里——这在当时可不是件容易的事。）拉尔夫的年薪，官方公布的2400美元，骤降。1934年，他只拿到了1200美元。到1935年中期，教会已经拖欠了五个月的工资；他经常只能拿到一车玉米芯或一块火腿来代替报酬。这个家庭不得不动用哈丽特的弟弟唐的退伍军人人寿保险金，唐在介绍哈丽特和拉尔夫认识后不久就因脑膜炎去世了。这笔钱原本计划用于投资和子女大学教育储蓄，现在却不得不用于日常开支。
Although the Noyce family was initially blessed with a steady income and reliable housing, they too soon felt the pinch of the Depression. In 1932, the trustees closed Ralph’s beloved church office to save the expenses of heat and a telephone. (They gave Ralph the telephone handset, which he and his boys promptly wired to ring in the study he set up at home—no easy feat at the time.) Ralph’s salary, officially $2,400 annually, plummeted. In 1934, he was paid only $1,200. By mid-1935, the church was five months in arrears; often he was given a wagonload of corncobs or a ham in lieu of remuneration. The family found itself dipping into the GI life insurance benefits of Harriet’s younger brother Don, who had died of meningitis shortly after introducing Harriet and Ralph. This money, now pressed into service for daily expenses, had been earmarked for investments and college savings.
压力太大了。在服务八年后，拉尔夫于1936年10月25日在大西洋城做了最后一次布道。一家人把一个万圣节南瓜绑在老福特车的保险杠上，开始驱车穿越爱荷华州，前往东北角的迪科拉。迪科拉受旱灾的影响相对较小。诺伊斯一家希望，在一个不那么萧条的地区，教会能够履行对牧师的承诺。然而，一家人抵达迪科拉几个月后，拉尔夫的宗教理念就激怒了几位重要的教友。拉尔夫是一位人道主义者和知识分子——鲍比不确定父亲是否相信来世——他认为牧师的首要职责是倾听，“是人们倾诉的对象”。会众们想要更激烈的宗教氛围，因此，诺伊斯一家来到迪科拉不到两年，就再次搬家，这次搬到了韦伯斯特城，位于得梅因以北65英里处，面积与大西洋城大致相当。当时鲍比十岁。15
The strain was too much. After eight years of service, Ralph preached his last sermon in Atlantic on October 25, 1936. The family strapped a Halloween pumpkin to the bumper of their old Ford and began a drive across the state to Decorah, in the northeastern corner of Iowa that had not suffered as badly from drought. The Noyces hoped the church in a less depressed area could meet its commitments to its minister, but within months of the family’s arrival, Ralph’s approach to religion had rankled several prominent congregants. Ralph was a humanitarian and an intellectual—Bobby was unsure if his father believed in an afterlife—who felt a minister, first and foremost, should be a listener, “someone to tell things to.” The congregation wanted a bit more fire and brimstone, and so, less than two years after they came to Decorah, the Noyces were on the move once more, this time to Webster City, 65 miles north of Des Moines, a town roughly the size of Atlantic. Bobby was ten years old.15
这次搬迁极大地改变了拉尔夫的工作以及他与儿子的关系。韦伯斯特城的工作并非教区牧师职位，而是爱荷华州公理会会议（该州各教会的伞式组织）的行政职务。作为副主管，拉尔夫负责策划和主持会议，在牧师缺席时代为履行职责，并指导爱荷华州各地的青少年教育项目。一年之内，拉尔夫驾车行驶了超过25000英里的蜿蜒乡村公路，并向110个不同的听众发表演讲。他的儿子们觉得，如果他每六周能回家吃一次周日晚餐，就已经很幸运了。16
Ralph’s work and his relationship with his sons changed significantly with this move. The Webster City job was not a parish ministry but an administrative post with the Iowa Congregational Conference, the umbrella organization for the churches in the state. As associate superintendent, Ralph planned and ran meetings, filled in for absent ministers, and directed youth education programs throughout Iowa. In a single year, Ralph drove more than 25,000 miles of twisting rural roads and addressed 110 different audiences. His boys felt lucky if he made it home for Sunday dinner once every six weeks.16
哈丽特把这段时期称为“爸爸在外奔波时独自带娃”的岁月。她对儿子们倾注了全部心血，和他们玩字母游戏，倾听他们的烦恼（总是站在他们这边），并留意他们的朋友和作业。她教导儿子们礼仪和社交礼节，反复告诫他们说话要“友善、必要、诚实”。对她来说，那段日子肯定不容易。唐患上了严重的哮喘，以至于他只能上午上学。鲍比和盖洛德对科学的兴趣也从挖蚯蚓，发展到用猫和硝石做标本实验，再到用三碘化氮和爆炸苍蝇搞化学实验，最终酿成了灾难。然而，哈丽特却觉得这段时期有一种奇特的解放感。“我感到自己作为一个有价值的人，而不仅仅是牧师的妻子，”她说。17
Harriet called these the years of “Mothering with a Daddy on the Road.” She was fiercely devoted to her boys, playing anagram games with them, listening to their troubles (always taking their side), and keeping watch over their friends and their homework. She schooled her sons in manners and social niceties, cautioning them again and again to speak only in ways that were “kind, necessary, and honest.” It could not have been an easy time for her. Don developed asthma so debilitating that he could attend school only in the mornings. Bobby and Gaylord’s early interest in science progressed from digging up earthworms, to taxidermy experiments with cats and saltpeter, to chemistry disasters involving nitrogen tri-iodide and exploding houseflies. Harriet nonetheless found this period strangely liberating. “I felt the sense of belonging as a person of worth for myself,” she said, “and not just as the minister’s wife.”17
韦伯斯特城又是一个暂时的落脚点。孩子们抵达不到一年，就被告知学年结束时就要搬家。他们父亲的工作调到了格林内尔学院的校园，那里是州教会会议的总部所在地。自从拉尔夫接受了韦伯斯特城的工作后，他和哈丽特就一直暗自期盼着这一天的到来。格林内尔学院为所有当地牧师的子女提供奖学金，无论教派如何，奖学金金额大约相当于学费的三分之一。对于计划在未来五年内送三个儿子上大学的父母来说，这无疑是一个极具吸引力的机会。而对于孩子们来说，这意味着又要去一所新学校，结交新的朋友，而且也无法保证一家人会在那里待上一两年以上。
Webster City proved yet another temporary stop. Barely a year after their arrival, the boys were told they would be moving at the end of the school year. Their father’s job had been transferred to the campus of Grinnell College, site of the state conference’s headquarters. Ralph and Harriet had secretly been hoping for this outcome ever since Ralph accepted the Webster City job. Grinnell College offered all children of local ministers, regardless of denomination, a scholarship equivalent to roughly one-third the cost of tuition. For parents expecting to send three boys to college in the next five years, this was an attractive offer indeed. For the boys themselves, it meant yet another new school and another new set of friends, with no guarantee the family would stay any more than a year or two.
格林内尔，至少对鲍比来说，成了他唯一的家，其他任何城镇都无法与之相比。在来到格林内尔之前的四年里，他搬了三次家，但从12岁到大学毕业，他一直住在这个小镇。1940年春天，诺伊斯一家搬进了他们在第十街和公园街拐角处租的一栋白色维多利亚式房屋。当时，格林内尔有6000名居民和21座教堂。这片街区东临大学校园，北接市区边界，到处都是孩子——他们骑着自行车在街上飞驰，或者听到母亲摇响门廊上的牛铃，就冲进家门。打电话叫他们回家吃晚饭。父母们要么是教师，要么是律师，要么经营着镇上的小生意：木材厂、殡仪馆或饲料店。这些人虽然感受到了经济大萧条的影响，但在过去几年里并没有遭受特别严重的苦难。几乎所有人都是白人，而且几乎所有人都是基督徒，无论他们是否去教堂。诺伊斯一家很快安顿下来，拉尔夫也恢复了旅行，尽管频率有所降低。18
GRINNELL, at least for Bobby, became home in a way no other town had been. He had moved three times in the four years before he came to Grinnell, but he would stay in this town from the age of 12 until he graduated from college. Grinnell had 6,000 residents and 21 churches when the Noyces moved into a white Victorian they rented at the corner of Tenth and Park in the spring of 1940. The neighborhood, which abutted the college campus to the east and the city limits to the north, teemed with children—children tearing down the streets on bikes, or rushing in the front door when their mothers rang the cow bells they kept on the porch to call them home for dinner. Parents worked as teachers or lawyers, or they owned one of the town’s small businesses: the lumber yard or funeral home or feed shop. These people had felt the impact of the Depression but had not suffered inordinately during the past few years. Nearly everyone was white, and nearly everyone, whether or not they went to church, was Christian. The Noyces set up housekeeping quickly, and Ralph resumed his traveling, though at a somewhat reduced intensity.18
格林内尔坐落在爱荷华州优质农田的中心地带。1853年，热情奔放的公理会牧师约西亚·格林内尔创建了以他名字命名的村庄（之所以选择此地，是因为有传言说这里将成为爱荷华州东西向和南北向两条主要铁路的交汇点）。然而，仅仅十年之后，前来定居的农民就砍伐了城镇边界方圆三英里内的所有树木。近一个世纪后，当诺伊斯一家来到这里时，环绕城镇的农田里种满了大豆、玉米，牲畜也繁衍生息。农民是日常生活的一部分，也是城镇经济的重要组成部分。男人们开车到格林内尔购买饲料和肥料。女人们在集市上出售自家种植的农产品和手工皂。孩子们乘坐县里出资的黄色校车上学。
Grinnell sat in the middle of prime Iowa farmland. Scarcely a decade after the fiery Congregationalist minister Josiah Grinnell founded his namesake village in 1853 (choosing the site because it was rumored to become the crossing point of Iowa’s main East-West and North-South railroads), homesteading farmers had cleared every tree within a three-mile radius of the town’s borders. When the Noyces arrived nearly a century later, soybean, corn, and livestock flourished in the farmland that ringed the city limits. Farmers were a regular part of daily life and an essential part of the town’s economy. Men drove to Grinnell for feed and fertilizer. The women sold their produce and handmade soaps at the market. Their children came to school in yellow buses paid for by the county.
即将升入格林内尔学院八年级的鲍比·诺伊斯，对自己的智力水平能否与哥哥们匹敌感到十分担忧。哈丽特和拉尔夫·诺伊斯夫妇期望他们的儿子们都能成为优秀的学生。哈丽特和拉尔夫不仅大学毕业，他们的父母四人也都大学毕业——考虑到十九世纪末只有不到2%的人口接受过大学教育，这的确是一个了不起的成就。男孩们的曾曾祖父鲁本·盖洛德曾于1846年参与创建了格林内尔学院，这是十九世纪中期由公理会教徒创办的约20所“草原学院”之一。19
HOW HIS OWN BRAIN stacked up against his older brothers’ caused Bobby Noyce no small measure of worry as he prepared to start eighth grade in Grinnell. Harriet and Ralph Noyce expected their boys to be excellent students. Not only were Harriet and Ralph college graduates, but all four of their parents had also graduated college—a remarkable fact given that, at the end of the nineteenth century, less than 2 percent of the population received a university education. The boys’ great-great-grandfather Reuben Gaylord had helped found Grinnell College in 1846, one of some 20 “prairie colleges” founded by Congregationalists in the mid-nineteenth century.19
诺伊斯的大哥唐在学业上表现得极其出色。尽管多次搬家，也因哮喘病缺课，他仍然以高中第二名的成绩毕业，并在全家离开韦伯斯特城之前获得了格林内尔学院丰厚的奖学金。盖洛德在全家搬到格林内尔时刚上高中，他注定要延续家族的学术光荣。15岁的他身材精瘦，头发有一撮不听话的翘发，是个模范学生，举止文雅，相貌英俊，平均成绩接近满分。他最终以全校第一名的成绩毕业，并像他父亲一样，日后获得了罗德奖学金的提名。而小博比·诺伊斯则截然相反，12岁时身材矮壮，性格阴郁。他带回家的成绩单上偶尔会出现B，通常是因为字迹潦草或行为不端。他总是拖到最后一刻才做作业。20
Noyce’s eldest brother Don set a blistering academic pace. Despite multiple moves and asthma-related absences, he managed to graduate second in his high school class and earn a generous merit-based scholarship at Grinnell College before the family left Webster City. Gaylord, just starting high school when the family moved to Grinnell, was poised to extend the family’s intellectual honor. At 15, with a lean build and an unruly cowlick, he was a model student, polite and handsome with a near-perfect grade point average. He would graduate as valedictorian and would one day be nominated for a Rhodes scholarship, like his father before him. Bobby Noyce, on the other hand, was short, stocky, and sullen at 12. He brought home report cards marred with the occasional B, usually appearing in penmanship or conduct. He would delay doing his schoolwork until the last possible instant.20
他进入格林内尔高中一年级三个月后，校长克拉尼召集了全体400名学生召开了一次特别集会。珍珠港事件发生后的第二天，克兰尼告诉学生们，罗斯福总统刚刚发表讲话，宣布12月7日是“永载史册的耻辱之日”，并要求国会“接受日本强加给美国的战争状态”。一些男孩兴奋地低声交谈。大多数学生则因为想到家里的兄弟或自己即将入伍而情绪低落。没有人确切知道战争对爱荷华州格林内尔镇意味着什么，但每个人都知道它对18岁男孩意味着什么。21
He was three months into his freshman year at Grinnell High when Principal Cranny called a special assembly for all 400 students. It was the day after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Cranny told the students that President Roosevelt had just delivered a speech declaring December 7 “a day which will live in infamy” and requesting that Congress “accept the state of war Japan had thrust upon the United States.” Some of the boys whispered excitedly. Most of the students were subdued by the thought of the brothers they had at home or by their own proximity to draft age. No one knew exactly what war meant for the town of Grinnell, Iowa, but everyone knew what it meant for 18-year-old boys.21
几个月内，政府就开始实行橡胶、肉类、咖啡和汽油的配给制。近2000名男子来到格林内尔学院参加军事训练项目。《格林内尔先驱报》呼吁镇民和农民将铁、橡胶、铝、铜、黄铜和粗麻布运到中央公园的一战时期大炮旁。这250吨物资，连同从塔上取下的500磅重的消防钟（它已经在那里悬挂了几十年），都被拖走当废品处理。药剂师们向政府捐赠奎宁用于战争。53名格林内尔妇女为英国的难民婴儿缝制毛衣、长袜、毯子和衣物。联邦政府发出“农民动员令！”，敦促农民通过提高10%的产量来“保障粮食供应”。 1942 年，该县的农场预计将生产 220 万打鸡蛋、近 10,000 英亩大豆和超过 6600 万磅牛奶。22
Within months, the government had rationed rubber, meat, coffee, and gasoline. Nearly 2,000 men arrived on the campus of Grinnell College to participate in military training programs. The Grinnell Herald Register exhorted townfolk and farmers to bring iron, rubber, aluminum, copper, brass, and burlap to the World War One cannon in Central Park. The 250-ton take, along with a 500-pound fire bell that was lowered from the tower where it had hung for decades, was towed off for scrap. Druggists donated quinine to the government for war use. A group of 53 Grinnell women made sweaters, stockings, blankets, and clothes for refugee infants in England. The federal government issued a “Call to (F)arms!” urging farmers to “keep ‘em eating” by upping production by ten percent; the county’s farms were to expected to produce 2.2 million dozen eggs, nearly 10,000 acres of soybeans, and more than 66 million pounds of milk in 1942.22
诺伊斯和他的同学们每天都能感受到战争的影响。每周二早上，老师们会出售十美分的邮票，这些邮票可以贴在册子上，然后兑换成战争债券。格林内尔高中的校报刊登了毕业生参战的故事，年鉴的开篇是一组令人心酸的照片，照片中的年轻人身着军装，却再也无法回到学校参加同学聚会。鲍比自愿加入了民用航空巡逻队，在灯火管制演习期间负责警戒。他和盖洛德一起收集、注释并费力地打字制作战争诗歌小册子。那些父母可以无限量使用汽油的农家孩子，突然发现自己成了学校里出了名的受欢迎人物。他们想不想去看橄榄球赛？顺便问一句，他们介意开车吗？
Noyce and his classmates felt the effects of the war every day. On Tuesday mornings, teachers sold ten-cent stamps that could be pasted into a book and traded in for a war bond. The Grinnell High School newspaper carried stories of graduates in the war, and the yearbook began with a sobering series of photos featuring very young men in uniform who would never return for their reunions. Bobby volunteered for the civil air patrol, which was on alert during blackout drills. He and Gaylord compiled, annotated, and laboriously typed booklets of war poetry. Farm kids, whose parents were allowed unlimited gasoline for their tractors, suddenly found themselves uncommonly popular. Did they want to go to the football game, and by the way, would they mind driving?
然而，在很多方面，鲍比·诺伊斯的生活并没有因为战争而改变。高中中期，他开始自称鲍勃。他在乐队里吹双簧管——盖洛德吹的是巴松管——他还自豪地在新生年鉴的乐队合影上标注着“自1939年以来，我们一直是州冠军！”下午的时光总是充满着拉太妃糖、乘坐干草车、戏剧排练、派对，以及收听汤姆·米克斯、杰克·阿姆斯特朗和《小孤女安妮》的广播节目。诺伊斯也经常光顾第四街的糖果乐园汽水店，盯着那些穿着羊毛裙和短袜、挤在高背卡座里的女孩们看。
In many ways, though, life for Bobby Noyce proceeded in much the same way as it might have without the war. Midway through high school, he started calling himself Bob. He played the oboe in the band—Gaylord was on bassoon—and proudly labeled the band photo in his freshman annual “STATE WINNERS SINCE ‘39!” Afternoons were filled with taffypulls, hayrides, play rehearsals, parties, and listening to Tom Mix, Jack Armstrong, and Little Orphan Annie on the radio. Noyce spent his share of time at Candyland, the soda fountain on Fourth Street, eyeing the girls in wool skirts and bobby socks crammed together in the high-backed booths.
鲍勃·诺伊斯从青少年时期就开始每周工作近20个小时。每天早上上学前，他会把《得梅因纪事报》挨家挨户地分发给邻居；几乎每天下午，他要么在市中心的贝茨花店帮忙插花和制作胸花，要么骑着自行车去邮局送特快专递。他还和邻居们签订了一份固定价格的年度铲雪合同——然后就盼着天气暖和些。这些零花钱是他主要的零花钱来源。他后来表示，自己小时候并没有感到特别匮乏，只是诺伊斯家的经济状况比较拮据。
Bob Noyce also worked nearly 20 hours each week beginning in very early adolescence. He threw the Des Moines Register on porches in the mornings before school, and he worked almost every afternoon either at Bates Flower Shop downtown, where he arranged flowers and corsages, or at the post office, where he delivered special orders on his bike. He developed a flat-rate annual snow shoveling contract that he would offer his neighbors—and then he would hope for mild weather. These jobs were his primary source of spending money. He later said he felt no particular deprivation as a child, but finances were tight in the Noyce household.
诺伊斯牧师的工作并不稳定。一家人搬到格林内尔不久，他就突发轻微脑出血，导致短期记忆受损，部分失明。哈丽特不愿承担买房所需的债务，这意味着他们一家几乎每年都要搬家。
Reverend Noyce’s employment was precarious. Shortly after the family moved to Grinnell, he suffered a mild cerebral hemorrhage that damaged his short-term memory and left him partially blind. Harriet did not want to assume the debt they would need to buy a home, which meant that nearly every year, the family moved to a new house.
“哈丽特忙得不可开交，”一位格林内尔的邻居回忆道，“那些男孩，尤其是鲍勃，都喜欢恶作剧。”诺伊斯会带着满满一口袋电线和夹子出现在邻居家，借用厨房炉灶的220伏插座，以便尝试制造《大众科学》杂志声称能够烧穿钢铁的电弧。他开始抽烟。他和朋友们喜欢推倒附近农场的旱厕，但良心的谴责常常让他们回到“犯罪现场”，一边咒骂一边汗流浃背地把木制厕所扶正。他们在梅里尔公园的滑梯上和大学校园盖茨楼的屋顶上燃放鞭炮。当他的哥哥们在高中时对公理会的信仰日益加深时，鲍勃却越来越少地去位于第四街和布罗德街拐角处的那座老石教堂。23
“Harriet had her hands full,” recalled a Grinnell neighbor. “Those boys, especially Bob, were into devilment.” Noyce would show up at neighbors’ houses, his pockets full of wires and clips, and ask to borrow the 220-volt outlet for the kitchen range so he could try to build the electrical arc Popular Science claimed was capable of burning a hole through steel. He started smoking cigarettes. He and his friends enjoyed tipping over outhouses on the nearby farms, though attacks of conscience often sent them back to the scene of the crime, swearing and sweating in the stench as they righted the wooden building. They shot firecrackers off the slides at Merrill Park and from the roof of Gates Hall on the college campus. And while his older brothers’ commitments to Congregationalism deepened in high school, Bob began spending less and less time at the old stone church at the corner of Fourth and Broad.23
16岁时，诺伊斯是班上少数几个拥有汽车的人之一，那是一辆1939年的普利茅斯，属于他母亲，但她很少开。（他父亲开的是家里那辆老福特。）诺伊斯经常偷偷溜到农场，从一辆没有防护措施的拖拉机油箱里偷点汽油。他开车就像着了魔一样，以每小时40英里的速度冲进沟里，在镇上两条主要街道之一的第六大道上和朋友们飙车。“他好像总是急着赶路，”他的一个朋友说，“而且他总能赶到。”24
At 16, Noyce was one of the select few in his class to have a car at his disposal, a ‘39 Plymouth that belonged to his mother but that she rarely drove. (His father put the miles on the old family Ford.) Noyce was not beyond sneaking off to a farm and siphoning a bit of precious gasoline from the tank of an unprotected tractor. He drove like a man possessed, taking ditches at 40 miles per hour and racing his friends down Sixth Avenue, one of the town’s two main drags. “It seemed like he was always in a hurry to get somewhere,” one of his friends observed. “And he got there.”24
诺伊斯上高二的时候，“所有女生都为他着迷，”他的一位同学回忆道，“她们觉得他是世界上最帅的男人。”他那略带歪斜的笑容、良好的举止和体面的家庭背景、高耸于额前的波浪卷发，以及一丝不羁的气质——这一切都让他魅力十足。他个子不高，只有1.73米，但儿时的胖乎乎已经变成了结实的肌肉，而且他对自己身材的自信也显而易见。“他可能是我见过的体态最优雅的男人。他只是走过草坪……“她会骑马，甚至还会开车，”玛丽安·斯坦丁回忆道。玛丽安是诺伊斯高中时期多年的固定女友。她是1945届的风云人物：一位拥有迷人烟熏妆的漂亮棕发女郎，言辞犀利，酷爱抽无过滤嘴香烟——而最令人震惊的是，她还是一位离异的母亲。哈丽特·诺伊斯认为玛丽安“天生爱惹麻烦，这都是她从离异父母之间挑拨离间学来的”，所以每次玛丽安来家里吃饭，她都会确保全家人在饭后唱赞美诗。25
By the time Noyce was a junior in high school, “all the girls were crazy about [him],” recalls one of his classmates. “They though he was the most handsome thing on the face of the earth.” The quick lopsided smile, the good manners and fine family, the wavy hair high on his forehead, the dash of rapscallion—it made for an appealing combination. He was not tall, only 5’8”, but his childhood pudginess had hardened into muscle, and he had acquired a visible confidence in his body. “He was probably the most physically graceful man I’ve ever met. Just walking across the lawn … on a horse, even driving a car,” recalls Marianne Standing, Noyce’s steady girlfriend for several years of high school. Marianne was the glamour girl of the class of ‘45: a gorgeous brunette with smoky eyes, a biting wit, a penchant for unfiltered cigarettes—and, most shocking of all, a divorced mother. Harriet Noyce, who thought Marianne “had a gift for trouble, learned from playing one divorced parent against the other,” made sure the family sang hymns after dinner whenever she joined them for a meal.25
诺伊斯活泼好动的举动并没有妨碍他练习双簧管、完成作业（有时还会帮朋友做作业），也没有妨碍他在老师们心中保持“非常优秀的孩子”的美誉。年鉴上称他为“我们班的答题高手，那个什么问题都能答上来的人”。他在高中保持着全A的成绩，展现出惊人的科学和数学天赋，两门科目的分数从未低于96%。尽管他在高中第一学期的物理课上，经常趁老师不注意，躲在桌子底下拆装手表——他甚至胆敢在老师转身时使用珠宝放大镜——但他仍然每次考试都取得了优异的成绩。26
His high-spirited antics did not keep Noyce from practicing his oboe, doing his homework (and sometimes his friends’ homework, too), or maintaining a reputation among teachers as a “very fine boy.” The yearbook called him “the Quiz Kid of our class, the guy who has the answers to all the questions.” He maintained a straight-A record in high school and demonstrated an astonishingly intuitive sense for science and math, never earning less than 96 percent in either subject. Although he spent much of the first semester of high school physics dismantling and rebuilding a watch under his desk during lectures—he had the audacity to use a jeweler’s loupe when the teacher’s back was turned—he nonetheless aced every test.26
哈丽特或许不知道那块手表，也不知道诺伊斯的其他怪癖，但她很清楚，鲍勃对高中物理感到厌倦，如果没有更合适的选择，他就会自己想办法挑战自己。尤其是在盖洛德——他一直以来都约束着鲍勃的过度行为——于1944年离家参加海军V-12军官训练计划之后，情况更是如此。盖洛德读过关于纳粹集中营的报道，认为这场战争是义不容辞的责任。鲍勃钦佩哥哥的理想，但盖洛德的离开让他感到失落，比以往更加焦躁不安。27
Harriet may not have known about the watch or Noyce’s other antics, but she well understood that high-school physics bored Bob and that he would create his own special brand of challenge in the absence of more appropriate alternatives. This was especially true after Gaylord, who had always moderated Bob’s tendencies towards excess, had left home in 1944 for the navy’s V-12 officer training program. Gaylord had read about the Nazis’ concentration camps and decided this war was a moral imperative. Bob admired his brother’s ideals, but Gaylord’s departure left him bereft and even more restless than usual.27
为了让鲍勃打发时间，哈丽特·诺伊斯决定主动去拜访格林内尔学院的物理学教授格兰特·盖尔先生。诺伊斯一家和盖尔一家经常一起去教堂，鲍勃或他的兄弟们每隔几周就会去盖尔家帮忙照看孩子、铲雪、修理割草机或安装纱窗。28
Desperate for a productive time-filler for Bob, Harriet Noyce took it upon herself to pay a call on Mr. Grant Gale, the physics professor at Grinnell College. The Noyces and the Gales attended church together, and Bob or his brothers went to the Gales every few weeks to help with babysitting, snow shoveling, repairing the lawn mower, or installing screens on the windows.28
哈丽特以她一贯直率的方式请求盖尔让鲍勃加入他的物理入门课程。盖尔确认过，这些年来也有一些高中生偶尔在格林内尔学院选修过课程后，同意诺伊斯在1945年1月第二学期开始时入学。当时，由于校园里几乎所有物理专业的学生都被征召入伍，他的班级规模异常小。
In her characteristically straightforward way, Harriet asked Gale to let Bob join his introductory physics course. After verifying that a few other high school students had taken an occasional course at Grinnell College over the years, Gale agreed to let Noyce enroll when the second semester began in January 1945. As it was, his classes were unusually small, since nearly every physics major on the campus had been drafted.
在这门入门课程中，盖尔着重展示物理学与日常生活的关联。他摒弃了记笔记的做法——“那是教科书的用处”——而是提倡用实际案例进行演示。他扔向科学楼外墙的雪球撞击砖块的力有多大？为什么滑冰运动员收拢双臂时旋转速度会更快？为什么你能用吸管装满水，用手指封住吸管口，然后提起吸管而不洒出水吗？你如何证明你对这些问题的答案？他的格言警句可谓家喻户晓。“要有勇气坚持你的信念，”他会这样鼓励那些犹豫不决的学生。“要勇敢。”当一个真正有潜力的学生开始滔滔不绝时，盖尔会温和地告诫道：“如果你不能用一句话概括，那你可能根本没理解它。”29
In this introductory course, Gale focused on demonstrating the relevance of physics to daily life. He eschewed note taking—“that’s what textbooks are for”—in favor of real-life demonstrations. With what force did the snowball he hurled against the side of the science building hit the bricks? Why did a skater spin faster when she pulled her arms in to her side? Why could you fill a drinking straw with water, seal the top with your finger, and lift the straw without spilling the water? How could you prove your answers to these questions? His stock of homilies was legendary. “Have the courage of your convictions,” he would urge a student hesitating to guess an answer. “Be brave.” When a student with real promise began to ramble, Gale would gently admonish, “If you can’t define it in one sentence, you probably don’t understand it.”29
诺伊斯是班上14名学生中唯一的男生，他对此并不介意。盖尔讲课时，诺伊斯会靠在椅背上，认真聆听，偶尔也会发表一些看法。“盖尔的兴趣很有感染力，”诺伊斯后来回忆说，“我也被感染了。”在实验台上，诺伊斯热情认真，一丝不苟，尽管他有时会忍不住和实验搭档们调情，而搭档们尽管他百般讨好，却依然把他当成小弟弟一样对待。学期末，诺伊斯获得了这门课的最高分。30
Noyce was the only male in the class of 14, a position to which he did not object. While Gale lectured, Noyce would lean back in his chair, listening carefully and occasionally volunteering comments. “[Gale’s] interest was infectious,” Noyce later recalled. “I caught the disease.” At the lab tables, Noyce was eager and thorough, despite being somewhat preoccupied with flirting with his lab partners, who despite his best efforts, treated him like a kid brother. At the semester’s end, Noyce had earned the highest grade in the course.30
令他松了一口气的是——“这几乎成了我们家的传统，”他解释道——鲍勃·诺伊斯被评为高中毕业班的优秀毕业生代表。这项荣誉让他的几个朋友感到惊讶，他们知道诺伊斯是个好学生，但没想到他会这么优秀。他们知道他上过大学，但不知道他是班上最优秀的学生；他们知道他铲过雪，但不知道他开发了一套复杂的合同系统来吸引客户。诺伊斯并没有试图或需要向朋友们隐瞒这些事实。他们根本想不到他会做这些事，他们中的一个朋友形容他“聪明但很普通”。31
MUCH TO HIS RELIEF—“it’s almost become a family tradition now,” he explained—Bob Noyce was named valedictorian of his high school class. The honor surprised several of his friends, who knew Noyce was a good student, but not that good. They knew he took a class at the college, but not that he was the best student in the room; that he shoveled walks, but not that he had developed an elaborate contract system to entice clients. Noyce did not try or need to hide such facts from his friends. They simply never would have expected such things from him, the buddy one of them described as “bright but common.”31
毕业后的那个暑假，他去了俄亥俄州迈阿密大学上课，当时盖洛德正在那里接受军官训练。诺伊斯带着年末的成就来到迈阿密，显得有些自负。他告诉他的数学老师，他“从她的课上学到了不少东西，尽管我没去上课。”32
He spent the summer after graduation taking classes at Miami University of Ohio where Gaylord was undergoing his officer training. Noyce arrived at Miami a bit cocky from his end-of-year accomplishments. He told his math instructor that he was “getting a nice bit of review out of her course, even though [he] didn’t attend classes.”32
与哥哥单独相处时，诺伊斯的世界开始远远超出爱荷华州的乡村。他第一次观看歌剧——威尔第的《阿依达》，并被深深吸引。他与盖洛德和朋友们彻夜长谈，谈论着刚刚摧毁广岛和长崎的原子弹。他搭便车行驶了200英里，前往俄亥俄州的加利波利斯，拜访玛丽安·斯坦丁。他认真聆听盖洛德讲述他的纽约之旅，心中涌起一股嫉妒和不安交织的复杂情绪——这是他对哥哥们任何成就的惯常反应——于是给父母写信说：“盖伊居然见过自由女神像！也许有一天我也能去。但愿如此。我还是别做梦了。”33
Alone with his brother, Noyce’s world began telescoping far beyond rural Iowa. He saw his first opera, Verdi’s Aida, and was transfixed. He stayed up late talking with Gaylord and his friends about the atomic bomb that had recently devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He hitchhiked 200 miles to Gallipolis, Ohio, to visit Marianne Standing. He listened attentively to Gaylord’s stories about his trip to New York City, and swamped with the admixture of envy and insecurity that was his typical response to any of his brothers’ accomplishments, wrote to his parents: “So Gay has seen the Statue of Liberty, huh! Some day I may get to. I hope. I’d better stop dreaming.”33
他开始每天游泳一小时，在观看了三位迈阿密跳水运动员在空中翻腾跳跃后，他也决定要学习跳水。“在两次背部着地后，我很快就掌握了技巧。”“我练了个技巧，”他向家人汇报说。“回家之前，我从十英尺高的跳板上做了半跳和全跳——太棒了！”34
He began swimming for an hour every day and after watching three Miami divers flipping and twisting through the air, he decided he wanted to dive, too. “After landing flat on my back only twice, I perfected the technique,” he reported to his family. “Before I went home, I did both a half and a full gainer off the ten-foot board—Whoopee!”34
他在学业上也取得了类似的成功。夏末，物理系主任向他发出了一份工作邀请：如果诺伊斯秋季入学，系里就会把他列入教职工名单，聘为实验室助理——这个职位通常是研究生才能担任的。他需要批改作业、代课，还要给其他学生讲解实验——而他当时只是个大一新生。这份邀请打破了诺伊斯伪装的学术漫不经心。“我的门牙差点掉了，”他自豪地给父母写信，语气就像他当时17岁时那样兴奋。35
He met with similar academic success. At the end of the summer, the head of the Physics Department made him a job offer: if Noyce would enroll in the fall, the department would place him on the faculty payroll and employ him as a lab assistant, a position traditionally reserved for graduate students. He would be expected to grade papers, teach a few class sessions, and explain experiments to other students—all while he was a freshman. The invitation pierced Noyce’s veneer of academic nonchalance. “My front teeth almost fell out,” he proudly wrote to his parents, sounding like the 17-year-old he was.35
诺伊斯慢慢积累着各种经历，这些经历将奠定他成年后的人生观。与其说是一种人生观，不如说是一种勇往直前、不顾一切挑战的心态，他坚信自己不仅会成功，而且会凯旋而归。如果高中毕业前选修大学物理课意味着能拿到班级第一名或者获得一份教职，如果约会意味着能把学校里最漂亮的女孩子追到手，如果学习跳水意味着能在第一次登上跳台的几个小时内就从跳台边缘完成后空翻——那么，你又怎会不觉得自己几乎无所不能呢？
Noyce was slowly gathering experiences that would anchor his adult approach to life, which was not so much an approach as a headlong rush into any challenge with the unshakable assumption that he would emerge not only successful, but triumphant. If joining a college physics course as a high school senior meant finishing first in the class or getting an offer to teach, if dating meant snagging the most desirable girl in the school for your steady, and learning to dive meant turning full back flips off the platform’s edge within hours of climbing the board for the first time—well, why wouldn’t you come to think you could do almost anything?
诺伊斯很心动迈阿密大学的教职邀请，但他担心自己在这所庞大的校园里可能只是“一个毫不起眼的学生”。但如果他选择格林内尔学院，就完全不用担心这种可能性。他已经获得了和哥哥唐一样的著名奖学金。格林内尔学院院长塞缪尔·史蒂文斯是他们家的朋友，他亲自祝贺鲍勃被格林内尔录取，并在贺信中无意间道出了诺伊斯家男孩生活的酸甜苦辣：“你的哥哥们都表现出色。你似乎也具备同样的潜质。我们对你寄予厚望。” 夏末，诺伊斯决定回到格林内尔继续他的大学生涯。36
Noyce was tempted by the offer to teach at Miami but worried he might be just “another insignificant student” on the large campus. If, on the other hand, he attended Grinnell College, he would face no possibility of insignificance. He had already won the same prestigious scholarship earlier awarded to his brother Don. The college president, Samuel Stevens, was a family friend who personally congratulated Bob on his acceptance to Grinnell with a note that inadvertently encapsulated the best and worst aspects of life as a Noyce boy: “Your brothers before you have performed in a distinguished manner. You seem to have the ability to perform equally well. We expect great things from you.” At the end of the summer, Noyce decided to return to Grinnell for college.36
一到格林内尔学院，诺伊斯就全身心投入到各种活动中。除了繁重的课业，他醒着的时间也安排得满满当当：每晚打桥牌、参加合唱团排练、参加年鉴编辑会议、话剧排练，还要出席几十场讲座和音乐演出。诺伊斯还主演了一部校园广播剧，令他父母欣喜的是，他们竟然能从邻居家的收音机里听到。他对约会也像他做任何事一样充满热情。闲暇时，他会仔细研读最近发布的史密斯原子弹报告，对原子弹技术发展的细节着迷不已。37
Once on the Grinnell campus, Noyce hurled himself into a frenzy of activity. In addition to a full course load, he stuffed his waking hours with nightly bridge games, chorus practice, yearbook staff meetings, play rehearsals, and attendance at dozens of lectures and musical performances. Noyce starred in a campus radio melodrama that his parents, to their great delight, could pick up on a neighbor’s radio set. He approached dating with the same gusto that characterized everything he did. In his spare time, he plowed through the recently issued Smyth report on the atomic bomb, fascinated by the details of its technical development.37
退伍军人法案和战争的结束使得校园里到处都是退伍老兵，但诺伊斯的大部分朋友却来自一群更传统的大学新生——刚从高中毕业的男生女生，大多数他来自爱荷华州虔诚的教会家庭，家境殷实，能够负担得起当时州内最高的学费之一。他很快就在这个群体中扮演了领导者的角色，通常都能说服那些最爱学习的学生停下来吃个三明治，或者去女生宿舍附近散散步。“他从不主动出击，”诺伊斯的一位大学室友回忆道，“但为什么不跟着他呢？”38
The GI Bill and the end of the war meant that the campus now teemed with veterans, but Noyce drew most of his friends from a more traditional group of freshmen—boys and girls just graduated from high school, most from churchgoing Iowa families that could afford to pay what was then one of the highest tuitions in the state. He immediately assumed a leadership role among this group, usually managing to convince even the most studious to take a break for a sandwich or a stroll past the girls’ dorms. “He never pushed himself forward at all,” recalled one of Noyce’s college roommates. “But why not follow him?”38
诺伊斯的父亲曾写道，就像幼儿靠果汁和牛奶茁壮成长一样，鲍勃靠“肾上腺素和汽油”茁壮成长。39
Noyce’s father once wrote that in the same way toddlers thrive on juice and milk, Bob thrived on “adrenaline and gasoline.”39
诺伊斯在课外活动中展现出的热情也延伸到了课堂上。他挑战自己，力求推导出物理课上用到的每一个公式，而不是简单地接受黑板上写着的公式。即使对诺伊斯来说，这也不是一件容易的事。推导出液体粘度的公式后，他欣喜若狂。他的电子学教授让他自己编写考试题，并请他帮忙设计飞机模型的电路。他的微积分教授邀请他讲授一门课程，内容基于诺伊斯对复数计算中棣莫弗定理的独立研究。这些学术成就为诺伊斯赢得了加入校园荣誉学会的邀请，也让他的父亲写了一封情真意切的信，信中写道：“只有当你的儿子在大学里像你在格林内尔学院一样取得如此卓越的成就时，你才会明白我们从你的出色表现中获得的满足感。”40
THE INTENSITY THAT NOYCE BROUGHT to his extracurricular activities extended to the classroom. He challenged himself to derive every formula he used in physics class rather than simply accepting the formulas written on the board as accurate. This was not easy work, even for Noyce, who declared himself “elated” after deriving the formula for determining the viscosity of a liquid. His electronics professor had him write his own exam and requested his help designing the circuits for his airplane models. His calculus professor asked him to teach a class based on the independent investigations Noyce had conducted into De Moivre’s theorem for calculating complex numbers. These academic accomplishments earned Noyce an invitation to join the campus honorary society and inspired a heartfelt note from his father, who wrote, “You won’t know till you have a son in college doing as good and grand work there as you are in Grinnell[,] how much satisfaction we are getting from reports of your good work.”40
这样的赞扬并没有减少诺伊斯将自己与兄弟们进行比较。盖洛德大学只读了五个学期就被授予美国大学优等生荣誉学会（Phi Beta Kappa）会员资格时，鲍勃的祝贺中夹杂着一丝疑虑。“我只是很遗憾要追随这样优秀的兄弟，”他写道，“如果我也能获得同样的荣誉，那也只不过是家族中又多了一把钥匙而已。”仿佛为了证明自己的价值，他接着详细描述了格兰特·盖尔如何请他帮忙建造一台研究金属膨胀和压缩的装置。41
Such praise did not lessen Noyce’s constant comparison of himself to his brothers. When Gaylord was named to Phi Beta Kappa after only five semesters of college, Bob’s congratulations were tempered with doubt. “I’m just sorry that I’ve got such brothers to follow,” he wrote. “When and if I get the same, it will just be another key in the family.” As if to prove his own worth, he proceeded to describe in great detail how Grant Gale had asked him to help build an apparatus to study expansion and compression of metals.41
钱一直是个问题。“银行里5美元，口袋里4美元”是他刚到格林内尔学院时的经济状况。诺伊斯做过好几份工作——在校园邮局跑腿（直到一位退伍老兵来找他帮忙）、周日下午自由游泳时的救生员、格兰特·盖尔实验室的助手——但他写给父母的信里，大部分都是向父母乞讨，并详细汇报他上一笔钱的去向。哈丽特·诺伊斯始终记得，鲍勃曾在战争期间用他仅有的19美元积蓄买了一双马鞍鞋和一件毛衣，而不是买债券。她认为他挥霍无度，尤其是在衣服和女人方面。她反复询问一些她觉得可疑的开支，包括一张给一位不知名女士的支票。诺伊斯非常沮丧地解释说，那只是兑现支票的银行职员，没什么好担心的。42
Money was always an issue. “$5 in the bank, $4 in my pocket” was the state of his finances soon after his arrival at Grinnell. Noyce worked several jobs—go-fer in the campus post office (until a returning vet asked for the work), lifeguard during Sunday afternoon free swims, assistant in Grant Gale’s lab—but pleas for cash, accompanied by detailed accounts of where his last installment went, dominated many of his letters to his parents. Harriet Noyce, who never forgot that Bob once used his $19 savings to buy a pair of saddle shoes and a sweater rather than a bond during the war, thought him a spendthrift, particularly when it came to clothes and girls. She asked repeatedly about expenditures she found suspicious, including a check to an unnamed woman, whom Noyce, in great frustration, explained was simply the bank clerk who cashed the check, not a cause for worry.42
大一第二学期，诺伊斯就下定决心要从格林内尔学院拿到校队资格。他身材矮小，缺乏经验，这在大多数运动项目中都会成为劣势，但他觉得跳水或许是个机会。格林内尔学院的游泳池很简陋，就是一个建在混凝土坑上的木结构建筑，下面是一块木板。屋顶很低，如果不是在跳板正上方开了一个10英尺乘12英尺的洞，屋顶在这个位置抬高了大约8英尺，跳水运动员肯定会撞到头。从外面看，这个“跳水池”就像一个离主屋顶线8英尺高的瞭望台。在里面，跳水运动员从跳板上向上看，就像是在往一个又矮又宽的烟囱里窥视。训练的时候，泳池里或甲板上的人会看到跳水运动员离开跳板，消失在“烟囱”里（他会在里面翻腾、旋转），然后在入水前不久再次出现。跳水井虽然令人紧张，但却给了格林内尔学院的跳水运动员一个优势。如果他们能潜入烟囱，那其他一切都易如反掌了。43
In the second semester of his freshman year, Noyce decided he wanted a varsity letter from Grinnell. His small stature and lack of experience would handicap him in most sports, but he thought he had a shot in diving. The Grinnell College pool was primitive, a wood-frame building over a concrete hole and a wooden deck. The roof was so low that divers would have undoubtedly hit their heads on it had a ten-foot by twelve-foot hole not been cut into the area directly over the diving board and the roof raised some eight feet in this one spot. From the outside, this “diving well” looked a bit like a widow’s walk eight feet above the main roofline. Inside, a diver looking up from the board would have had the sense of peering up a short, broad chimney. When the team practiced, people in the pool or on the deck would see the diver leave the board, disappear into the chimney (where he would twist, flip, and turn) and then reappear shortly before he hit the water. The diving well was nerve wracking, but it gave an advantage to Grinnell divers. If they could dive up a chimney, everything else was pretty simple.43
每天晚上睡前，诺伊斯都会在脑海中慢动作回放每一次跳水动作，直到他能清晰地看到自己完美完成每一个动作。他把这个习惯称为“想象自己达到更高水平”，并终其一生都保持着这个习惯。在他的脑海中，他总能看到自己取得更大的成就。44
Every night before he fell asleep, Noyce would mentally rehearse each of his dives in slow motion until he could see himself executing them perfectly. He called this habit “envisioning myself at the next level,” and he carried it with him throughout his life. In his mind’s eye, he could always see himself achieving something more.44
加入跳水队两年后，诺伊斯在伊利诺伊州罗克福德举行的1948年中西部联盟跳水锦标赛上夺冠，击败了来自贝洛伊特学院、卡尔顿学院、诺克斯学院和蒙茅斯学院的选手。他在接下来的赛季中保持不败，但在1949年的联盟锦标赛上以两分之差惜败。他的父母在现场观看了1949年的锦标赛，他担心他们会对他的表现感到失望。45
Two years after joining the diving team, Noyce won the 1948 Midwest Conference Diving Championship in Rockford, Illinois, defeating divers from Beloit, Carleton, Knox, and Monmouth colleges. He proceeded undefeated through the next season, when he lost the conference championship by two points. His parents were in the audience for this 1949 championship, and he worried that they were disappointed by his performance.45
和格林内尔学院其他未婚学生一样，诺伊斯也被分配到一栋宿舍楼，他将在那里住满四年。这些宿舍楼的运作方式很像兄弟会，设有内部管理机构，并与其他宿舍楼在体育、学术和社交方面展开竞争。每年春秋两季，每个宿舍楼都会举办派对。为了打造最精彩的派对——派对越盛大，潜在的约会对象就越多——学生们常常会从毫不知情的农民或镇民那里“借”来几捆干草或一堆木材，以此来装饰派对。
LIKE OTHER UNMARRIED STUDENTS at Grinnell, Noyce had been assigned to a residence hall in which he was to live for all four years of school. The halls functioned much like fraternities, complete with internal house governments and athletic, academic, and social competition with other houses. Every spring and fall, each hall hosted a party. In their zeal to create the most spectacular party—the better the celebration, the larger the pool of potential dates—residents often enhanced the décor with a few bales of hay or a stack of lumber “borrowed” from unsuspecting farmers or townfolk.
诺伊斯住在克拉克宿舍楼，在他大三结束前几周，宿舍楼决定举办以夏威夷烤猪宴为主题的春季派对。由于诺伊斯对格林内尔镇非常熟悉，他被指派去弄来一头小猪，放在一个看起来很逼真的烤肉架上烤。46
Noyce lived in Clark Hall, which decided upon a Hawaiian luau theme for its spring house party a few weeks before the end of his junior year. Since Noyce knew the town of Grinnell especially well, he was assigned the task of liberating a young pig to be roasted upon a realistic looking spit.46
诺伊斯接受了这项任务，但很可能并未认真考虑。他正面临着人生中最沉重的打击：他的女友怀孕了，他是孩子的父亲。而她却打算堕胎。诺伊斯是否鼓励她做手术，是否向这位年轻女子求婚，以及他们如何支付手术费用——这些都成了谜。然而，可以确定的是，诺伊斯和同伙喝了几杯酒后，出发去偷那头猪准备在夏威夷烤猪宴上享用。当晚，诺伊斯情绪极度激动。47
Noyce accepted the assignment but most likely gave it little thought. He was contending with the direst news of his young life. His girlfriend was pregnant. He was the father. She was going to have an abortion. Whether Noyce encouraged her to have the operation, whether he offered to marry the young woman, how they paid for the procedure—these are all mysteries. What is known, however, is that Noyce was in an extremely agitated state the night he and a partner in crime downed a few drinks and set off to steal the pig for the luau.47
他们穿过校园后面的高尔夫球场，抓起一头乳猪，跑回了克拉克宿舍楼。他的室友决定在三楼的淋浴间宰杀这头小猪。一头疯狂尖叫的动物，几个醉醺醺的年轻人拿着刀——场面十分混乱，校园里的学生立刻就知道克拉克宿舍楼里发生了不寻常的事情。然而，校方直到第二天才得知此事，当时诺伊斯和他的室友忏悔后回到了农场，并表示愿意赔偿那头猪的损失，而猪的失踪当时还没有被发现。
They walked across the golf course behind campus, grabbed a suckling pig, and ran with it back to Clark Hall. His housemates decided to butcher the piglet in a third-floor shower. A frantically squealing animal, intoxicated young men with knives—the ruckus was such that students all over campus immediately knew something untoward was happening in Clark Hall. The administration, however, did not hear about it until the next day, when Noyce and his housemate repented and returned to the farm with an offer to pay for the pig, whose absence had not yet been noticed.
很快，诺伊斯就发现自己选错了目标。农场主是格林内尔市的市长，一个不苟言笑、惯于用轻微恐吓来激励选民的人。他想提起诉讼。学院的人事主任，一位刚退役的陆军上校，也倾向于处以最严厉的惩罚；几个月后，他开除了盖尔的另一位学生，因为该学生辱骂了宿舍管理员。由于农场位于市郊，县治安官被叫来了。48
It quickly became apparent that Noyce had not chosen a good farm to target. The farmer was the mayor of Grinnell, a no-nonsense man given to motivating his constituents through mild intimidation. He wanted to press charges. The college’s dean of personnel, a recently retired army colonel, was also inclined towards the harshest punishment possible; a few months later, he would expel another of Gale’s advisees for swearing at his housemother. Since the farm was outside the city limits, the county sheriff was called in.48
诺伊斯之前的恶作剧——比如掀翻厕所、非法燃放烟花——都被认为是男孩子爱胡闹。但偷猪就完全是另一回事了。这触及了诺伊斯整个高中时期都在游走的底线，正如院长写给拉尔夫和哈丽特·诺伊斯的信中所解释的那样：“在农业大州爱荷华州，偷窃家畜是重罪，最低刑罚是一年监禁和一千美元罚款。”一头名贵的猪很容易就能卖到一千美元，几乎是诺伊斯一年大学学费的三倍。49
Noyce’s previous exploits—tipping outhouses, lighting illegal fireworks—had been dismissed as boys-will-be-boys tomfoolery. Stealing a pig was a different matter entirely. It crossed the line Noyce had skirted throughout his high school years, for as the letter the dean sent home to Ralph and Harriet Noyce explained, “In the agricultural state of Iowa, stealing a domestic animal is a felony which carries a minimum penalty of a year in prison and a fine of one thousand dollars.” A prize pig could easily sell for $1,000, nearly three times Noyce’s annual college tuition.49
格兰特·盖尔和格林内尔学院院长史蒂文斯都焦头烂额。即使没有刑事定罪，仅仅是开除学籍就意味着这两个男孩的学业就此终结。在1948年，没有哪所学校会接收被其他学校开除的学生，盖尔尤其无法忍受“失去鲍勃”的前景。这两位学院代表都是格林内尔的长期居民，也是诺伊斯一家的朋友，他们最终达成了一项妥协：学院将赔偿农场主损失的猪，并且不会追究任何责任。这两个男孩可以完成大三剩余的几天课程，但大四第一学期将被停学——他们不仅被学院驱逐，也被逐出了格林内尔镇。
Grant Gale and Grinnell College president Stevens were in a frenzy. Even without a criminal conviction, expulsion alone would have meant the end of the boys’ education. In 1948 no school would have accepted a student expelled from another, and Gale in particular could not bear the prospect of “losing Bob.” The two college representatives, both longtime residents of Grinnell and friends of the Noyces, brokered a compromise in which the college would compensate the farmer for his pig, and no charges would be pressed. The boys would be allowed to finish the few remaining days of their junior year but were suspended for the first semester of their senior year—exiled not only from the college, but from the town of Grinnell as well.
判决下达后，诺伊斯逃走了。他搭便车去了伊利诺伊州的桑威奇，他的父母和最小的弟弟在他被要求离开公理会会议的工作后搬到了那里。鲍勃·诺伊斯回到父母身边时，已是悔悟之人，他深信……他给自己和家人带来了耻辱。得知哈丽特和拉尔夫·诺伊斯夫妇对那个农场主的愤怒远胜于对他的愤怒，想必令他们松了一口气。诺伊斯牧师谴责那些“只关心养猪，却不关心青少年问题以及年轻人如何在这个充满不确定性的世界中找到自己位置的人，而我们成年人正是把这个世界呈现给他们。”他给男学生院长写了一封措辞激烈的信，信的结尾意味深长：“即使爱荷华州的养猪户不这么认为，我们其他人也必须更加乐于接受年轻人的忏悔和对宽恕的渴望。”鲍勃劝父亲不要寄出这封信，因为他认为信中批评了学校对他的案件的处理方式，但他父亲还是寄了出去。50
After his sentence was handed down, Noyce fled. He hitchhiked to Sandwich, Illinois, where his parents and youngest brother had moved after Reverend Noyce had been asked to leave his job at the Congregational Conference. Bob Noyce returned to his parents a chastened soul, convinced he had brought disgrace on himself and his family. It must have come as a relief to discover that Harriet and Ralph Noyce were angrier at the farmer than at him. Reverend Noyce decried those “who are more concerned with hogs than they are with the problems of adolescence and youth’s efforts to find it[s] place in this terribly uncertain world that we adults are presenting to them.” He wrote an angry letter to the dean of men that pointedly concluded: “the rest of us will have to be the more ready to accept youth’s offer of repentance and desire for forgiveness even if Iowa hog farmers do not see it that way.” Bob urged his father not to mail the letter, which he thought criticized college’s handling of his case, but his father sent it anyway.50
诺伊斯决定利用被学校开除的那一个学期，在曼哈顿的公平人寿保险公司精算部门做文员。他的数学教授帮他找到了这份工作。诺伊斯想象着大学毕业后成为一名精算师：每天沉浸在数字的世界里，薪水稳定且丰厚，晚上还能享受一些娱乐。然而，要想成为一名精算师，他必须在回到格林内尔学院，重新回到那里忙碌的生活之前，通过五门科目的精算考试。这项考试出了名的难，而且要求考生修读过几门诺伊斯没有修过的研究生数学课程。尽管如此，他还是报名参加了考试。
NOYCE DECIDED to spend his semester’s expulsion working as a clerk in the actuarial department of the Equitable Life Insurance Company in Manhattan, where his math professor helped him secure a position. Noyce could imagine himself as an actuary after college: the days immersed in numbers and the paycheck steady and generous enough to permit some fun in the evenings. To become an actuary, however, he would need to pass the five-part actuarial exam before he returned to Grinnell and his frantic pace of life there. The exam was notoriously difficult and assumed several graduate-level math courses that Noyce had not taken. He nonetheless signed up to take the exam.
诺伊斯一动身前往曼哈顿，他的母亲就更加忧心忡忡了。此前，她对鲍勃的隐隐担忧在猪劫案后得到了证实。她批评他选择的室友（她只是略有耳闻，觉得那人酗酒），提醒他去探望正在哥伦比亚大学攻读化学博士学位的哥哥唐，并仔细审查他写的每一封信，寻找任何关于教堂的字眼。在他安顿下来的那几周里，他似乎经常去教堂。
As soon as Noyce left for Manhattan, his mother, whose inchoate fears about Bob had been confirmed by the pig heist, began worrying about him with fresh vigor. She criticized his choice of roommate (whom she knew vaguely and thought drank too much), reminded him to visit his brother Don, who was completing a PhD in chemistry at Columbia, and carefully scrutinized his every letter for any mention of church, which he appeared to have attended with some regularity for several weeks as he was settling in.
诺伊斯穿着从朋友那里花十美元买来的西装去上班，每天在办公桌前一坐就是几个小时。他和其他许多年轻人一样，对数字情有独钟，又急需用钱。“我一直在研究养老金结算方案的死亡率，”他写信给父母说，“看起来，现在用的年金领取者表格已经相当过时了……”他很快发现这份工作枯燥乏味得令人难以忍受，唯一能让他感到一丝慰藉的是，女职员的数量是男职员的十倍。诺伊斯把所有的时间都花在了夜晚和周末，他几乎把挣来的每一分钱都花在了戏剧、电影、博物馆展览以及和在办公室认识的年轻女性共度的夜晚。他结识了一些身无分文的制片人、剧作家和艺术家——格林内尔的人可能会觉得这些人不入流。他很忙，但并不快乐，他说，他正饱受“身处世界最大城市中心时常感受到的孤独”的折磨。51
Noyce reported to work in a ten-dollar suit he had bought from a friend and spent hours at his desk, one of scores of young men with a penchant for numbers and a need for cash. “I have been working on settlement option mortality,” he wrote his parents. “From the looks of things, the annuitant table which is being used is now quite outdated….” He soon found the work unceasingly, unbearably dull, the tedium relieved only by the fact that female clerks outnumbered male by a ratio of ten to one. Noyce lived for the nights and weekends, when he spent nearly every cent he earned on plays, films, museum exhibits, and evenings with young women he met at the office. He befriended flat-broke producers, playwrights, and artists—the kind of folks that people in Grinnell might have called unsavory. He was busy but not particularly happy, suffering, he said, from “the loneliness which often overtakes you here in the middle of the largest city on earth.”51
停学给了诺伊斯时间思考自己的未来。他在前三年修了足够的额外学分，足以让他重返格林内尔学院，并在1949年春季与同班同学一起毕业。诺伊斯曾尝试加入空军，但当他得知自己因为色盲而无法成为战斗机飞行员时，他发誓永远不参军。之后，他考虑如果能通过精算师考试——他的数学教授推荐了几本备考教材——或许可以尝试在加州找份工作，那里一直是他梦寐以求的居住地。格兰特·盖尔写信建议他申请麻省理工学院的物理学博士项目。诺伊斯照做了。
The suspension gave Noyce time to think about his future. He had taken sufficient extra credits in his first three years that he could return to Grinnell and graduate with his class in the spring of 1949. Noyce tried to join the air force, but when he learned he could not serve as a fighter pilot because he was color blind, he swore to avoid military service all together. He then considered that if he passed the actuarial exam—his math professor had suggested a few textbooks to read in preparation—he might try to find a job in California, where he had always wanted to live. Grant Gale wrote to suggest he apply to the doctoral program in physics at MIT. Noyce did.
1949年2月，诺伊斯回到格林内尔学院后，立刻恢复了大学早期那种忙碌的生活：工作、潜水、学习、唱歌、演戏、约会，各种活动应接不暇。开学几周后，他收到一封信，通知他通过了精算师考试。家人如释重负，几乎能感受到他的喜悦。“恭喜你，我的天才跳水天才！”一位朋友从西联电报公司发来电文，“别小题大做。”公平保险公司为他提供了一份正式工作，周薪超过80美元，这笔钱颇具诱惑力，诺伊斯心想，或许能借此克服他对精算工作的厌恶。52
When he returned to Grinnell in February 1949, Noyce immediately resumed the back-to-back schedule of working, diving, studying, singing, acting, and dating that had filled his earlier college days. A few weeks into the semester, he received a letter notifying him that he had passed the actuarial exam. His family’s relief was almost palpable. “Congratulations high dive brain child!” read a Western Union telegram from a family friend. “Make no small plans.” The Equitable offered him a permanent job at more than $80 per week, a sum tempting enough that Noyce thought it might overcome his dislike of actuarial work.52
与此同时，在物理课上，格兰特·盖尔开始谈论一种非常不寻常且可能具有革命性的装置，盖尔的描述对诺伊斯来说“就像原子弹爆炸一样”。诺伊斯后来解释说：“我当时无法立刻理解它的工作原理——或者说它为什么有效——但它确实有效……”他的声音渐渐低了下去。53
Meanwhile, in his physics class, Grant Gale had begun talking about a device so unusual and potentially revolutionary that Gale’s description of it struck Noyce “like an atom bomb.” Noyce later explained, “I couldn’t grasp how it worked—or why it worked—immediately, but that it worked …” His voice trailed off.53
它被称为晶体管。这种仅有半英寸长的小装置能够放大电信号，而此前只有体积更大、也更脆弱的真空管才能做到这一点。战后美国到处都是真空管，它们放大微弱电流，用于接收广播和电视信号、传输电话信号、驱动助听器，以及振动扬声器的振膜来产生声音。诺伊斯还利用真空管来控制他的模型飞机。54
It was called a transistor. A mere half-inch long, it could amplify electrical signals, a feat that had previously been accomplished only by much larger, and very fragile, vacuum tubes. These vacuum tubes were everywhere in postwar America, amplifying small currents to pull in radio and television stations, transmit telephone signals, operate hearing aids, and vibrate the cones of loudspeakers to produce sound. Vacuum tubes also enabled Noyce to control his model airplanes.54
晶体管有望完成同样的任务——但有一个本质区别。它不是在真空中放大信号，而是通过锗晶体进行放大。多年来，科学家们一直推测可以通过固体放大电流，从而避免真空管的高功耗和发热。但在晶体管出现之前，没有人能够做到这一点。“无需真空即可实现放大，这真是一个令人震惊的发现，”诺伊斯回忆道。他认为晶体管是“一种极其新颖且奇妙的发明，它预示着电子学未来可能的发展方向。”55
The transistor promised to accomplish the same tasks—but with one essential difference. It amplified signals through a solid crystal of germanium, not through a vacuum. For years, scientists had theorized that it would be possible to amplify current through solids, thereby avoiding the high power consumption and heat generated by vacuum tubes. But no one had been able to do it until the transistor. “It was really a rather astonishing revelation that could get amplification without a vacuum,” Noyce recalled. He decided the transistor was “a phenomenally new and wonderful thing, [a glimpse] as to what might happen in electronics in the future.”55
晶体管于1947年在新泽西州默里山的贝尔实验室发明。贝尔实验室是美国电话电报公司（AT&T）的研究部门，也是美国首屈一指的电子研究实验室。其科学家们，其中一些人后来……他们最终获得了诺贝尔奖，他们可能是世界上最优秀的电子研究人员。
The transistor was invented at Bell Labs, in Murray Hill, New Jersey, in 1947. Bell Labs was the research arm of AT&T and the nation’s premier electronics research laboratory. Its scientists, several of whom would go on to win the Nobel Prize, were probably the best electronics researchers in the world.
贝尔实验室通常是一个略显沉稳的地方，但当晶体管的发明者沃尔特·布拉顿和约翰·巴丁在1947年底首次向实验室高层展示他们的装置时，研究人员几乎欣喜若狂。一份关于此事的记录这样描述道：“他们把麦克风连接到发明的一端，扬声器连接到另一端。他们一个接一个地拿起麦克风，轻声说‘你好’；电路另一端的扬声器则大声喊出‘你好！’”威廉·肖克利是一位物理学家，他指导布拉顿和巴丁的工作，贝尔实验室很快就认定他是晶体管的共同发明人。后来，肖克利借此机会回忆起贝尔实验室历史上另一个意义非凡的时刻：“听到晶体管放大的语音，”他说，“就像亚历山大·格雷厄姆·贝尔那句著名的‘沃森先生，过来，我需要你’一样。”56
Bell Labs was normally a somewhat staid place, but when the transistor’s inventors Walter Brattain and John Bardeen first demonstrated their device to the lab’s senior management at the end of 1947, the researchers were almost giddy. One history of the event explains, “They hooked up a microphone to one end of their invention and a loudspeaker to the other. One by one, the men picked up the microphone and whispered ‘hello’; the loudspeaker at the other end of the circuit shouted ‘HELLO!’” William Shockley, a physicist who supervised Brattain and Bardeen and whom Bell Labs quickly named a co-inventor of the transistor, later used the occasion to recall another auspicious moment in Bell Labs history: “Hearing speech amplified by the transistor,” he said, “was in the tradition of Alexander Graham Bell’s famous, ‘Mr. Watson, come here, I want you.’”56
在这次戏剧性的演示六个月后，贝尔实验室宣布了晶体管的发明，但不是刊登在技术期刊上，而是在曼哈顿市中心举行的新闻发布会上宣布的，距离诺伊斯当时在公平保险公司计算年金的地方不远。
Six months after this dramatic demonstration, Bell Labs announced the transistor’s invention not in the pages of a technical journal, but at a press conference in downtown Manhattan, not far from where Noyce was then calculating annuities at the Equitable.
然而，诺伊斯在纽约期间并没有了解到晶体管的发明。当时自动变速器、冷冻食品、电动干衣机和宝丽来相机刚刚上市，美国人对这种当时还很冷门、没有明显消费用途的晶体管几乎不感兴趣。在大多数美国家庭里，装在木制柜子里的真空管收音机占据着显眼的位置。《纽约时报》是诺伊斯唯一可能读到晶体管发明消息的报纸，但它把这条新闻放在了第46页，用了四个段落放在“广播新闻”专栏的末尾，而该专栏的标题是“哥伦比亚广播公司将在夏季推出新节目，取代‘广播剧场’”。57
Noyce, however, did not learn about the transistor’s invention while he was in New York. With automatic transmissions, frozen foods, the electric clothes dryer, and the Polaroid camera just coming on the market, Americans had little interest in the esoteric transistor, which had no obvious consumer application. In most American homes, vacuum-tube-powered radios encased in wooden cabinets occupied places of honor. The New York Times, the only paper in which Noyce might have read of the transistor’s invention, buried the story on page 46, allotting it four paragraphs at the end of a “News of the Radio” column headlined with the promise, “New Shows on CBS Will Replace ‘Radio Theatre’ During the Summer.”57
在公开新闻发布会前一周就已观看过该设备演示的军事研究人员，对此反应截然不同。一份军方新闻稿宣称，该设备“能大大减轻地面士兵的负重”。这并非夸张。历史学家估计，当时制式对讲机中用于为真空管供电的笨重电池，重量几乎占整机重量的40%。在考虑并否决了将晶体管列为机密的方案后，军方代表率先向贝尔实验室索取了样品。58
Military researchers, who had witnessed a demonstration of the device a week before the public press conference, had a very different reaction. A military press release declared that the device “could take a great load off the ground soldier’s back.” The statement was literal. Historians estimate that the heavy batteries used to power the vacuum tubes in standard-issue “walkie-talkie” radio telephone sets accounted for almost 40 percent of a set’s weight. After considering and rejecting a plan to classify the transistor, representatives from the armed services were the first to request samples from Bell Labs.58
接下来前来索要“几个晶体管”的人中，有一位是格兰特·盖尔。他读过《纽约时报》那篇短文，并理解了其中的意义，随即把文章贴在了格林内尔学院物理教室外的公告栏上。盖尔感觉自己与晶体管有着某种特殊的联系。晶体管的发明者之一约翰·巴丁就读于……盖尔在威斯康星州长大，与盖尔的妻子一起生活。贝尔实验室的研究主管奥利弗·巴克利毕业于格林内尔学院，也是两个在读学生的父亲。巴克利经常把贝尔实验室淘汰的设备和备用的技术报告寄给盖尔，盖尔也是通过邮件向他索要晶体管。59
Among those next requesting “a couple of transistors” was Grant Gale, who had read and understood the significance of the short Times story, which he immediately posted on the bulletin board outside the physics classroom at Grinnell. Gale felt almost personally connected to the transistor. One of the inventors, John Bardeen, had attended the University of Wisconsin with Gale and grown up with Gale’s wife. The head of research at Bell Labs, Oliver Buckley, was a Grinnell graduate and the father of two current students. Buckley regularly sent Gale castoff equipment and spare copies of technical reports from Bell Labs, and it was to him that Gale mailed his request for transistors.59
巴克利没有多余的设备，但他寄给盖尔几本贝尔实验室撰写的关于晶体管的技术专著。这些专著构成了诺伊斯最初接触晶体管的基础。当时没有教科书专门介绍晶体管，而且（尽管坊间流传的说法并非如此）贝尔实验室直到诺伊斯毕业后才寄给他晶体管。盖尔和诺伊斯一起仔细研读了贝尔实验室的专著，诺伊斯对晶体管的兴趣远超其他学生，这些专著包括：《晶体管及相关实验》、《正空穴与晶体管》、《晶体管工作原理》、《晶体管电子学研究进展》。60
Buckley did not have any devices to spare, but he did send Gale copies of several technical monographs that Bell Labs had written on the transistor. These monographs formed the basis of Noyce’s initial exposure to the device. No textbooks addressed transistors, and (although prevailing mythology claims otherwise) Bell Labs did not ship Gale a transistor until after Noyce graduated. Together Gale and Noyce, who was far more interested in the transistor than any other student, pored over the Bell Labs monographs: “The Transistor and Related Experiments,” “Positive Holes and the Transistor,” “Physical Principles Involved in Transistor Action,” “Some Contributions to Transistor Electronics.”60
通过这些专著，诺伊斯了解到晶体管的秘密在于一种名为半导体的元素的特殊性质。半导体的导电性介于金属（可以自由导电）和绝缘体（完全不导电）之间。此外，半导体的导电性是可以改变的。对半导体施加某种刺激——例如光、电压或温度——它就会变成导体。改变刺激，半导体就可以变成绝缘体。用电学术语来说，这相当于瞬间将铜变成玻璃。61
Through these monographs, Noyce learned that the secret to the transistor lay in the unusual properties of elements called semiconductors. The conductivity of semiconductors falls in between that of metals (which conduct electricity freely) and insulators (which do not conduct electricity at all). Moreover, a semiconductor’s conductivity can be changed. Apply a certain stimulus to a semiconductor—light, voltage, or temperature—and it becomes a conductor. Change the stimulus, and the semiconductor can be made into an insulator. In electrical terms, it is equivalent to turning copper into glass instantaneously.61
半导体可以通过掺杂或改性分为两种类型。N型半导体中的电子（带负电荷）与原子核的束缚较弱，因此可以自由移动，从而导电。P型半导体中的空穴（带正电荷）与原子核的束缚较弱，因此也可以自由移动。如果P型半导体和N型半导体接触——接触点称为结——就会发生奇妙的现象：少量电子会从N型区域流过结，进入P型区域。在结上施加电压会加速电子的流动。但如果反向施加电压，则几乎没有电子能够流过结。贝尔实验室希望利用半导体的这些特性来制造一种可以作为电开关的器件。
Semiconductors can be doped or modified to come in two varieties. N-type semiconductors have an electron (negative charge) that is only loosely bound to its atom and is thus free to move around, thereby conducting electricity. P-type semiconductors have the positive virtual-equivalent of the electron, called a hole, that is only loosely bound to its atom and thus free to move around. If P- and N-type semiconductors make contact—at a point called a junction—something remarkable happens: a few electrons flow from the N-type area, across the junction, and into the P-type area. A voltage applied to the junction will accelerate the trickle of electrons into a rush. But reverse the voltage and essentially no electrons at all can flow across the junction. Bell Labs hoped to use these properties of semiconductors to create a device that would serve as an electrical switch.
在贝尔实验室，沃尔特·布拉顿和约翰·巴丁用一种名为锗的N型半导体条制造了晶体管。他们将一个塑料三角形（尖端朝下）悬挂在锗条上方。三角形的每条边上都连着一根细金触点，触点之间的距离不到千分之二英寸。科学家们小心地调整三角形的位置，使金触点刚好接触锗条表面。然后，他们通过一根细金触点向锗条中引入微弱电流。一根导线。如果他们“以正确的方式扭动（导线）”，该装置可以将电流放大100倍。62
At Bell Labs, Walter Brattain and John Bardeen built their transistor from a strip of an N-type semiconductor called germanium. They suspended a plastic triangle, point-down, above the germanium strip. A thin gold contact ran down each side of the triangle, with less than two-thousandths of an inch between the contacts at the point. The scientists carefully positioned the triangle so that the gold contacts just touched the surface of the germanium. Then they introduced a tiny current into the germanium via a thin wire. If they “wriggled [the wire] just right,” the device could amplify current 100-fold.62
令人印象深刻的是，21岁的诺伊斯就能理解贝尔实验室描述这些事件的晶体管专著。这些报告是由博士科学家为资深电子研究人员撰写的，而不是为本科生写的。然而，盖尔坚持认为，就晶体管而言，“说我教了鲍勃很多东西，那就太夸张了……我们是一起学习的。”63
It is impressive that Noyce, at 21, was able to understand the Bell Labs transistor monographs describing these events. The reports had been written by PhD scientists for senior electronics researchers, not for undergraduates. Yet Gale insists that when it came to transistors, “it would be a gross overstatement to suggest that I taught Bob much…. We learned about them together.”63
诺伊斯在格林内尔学院的最后几个月里了解到的晶体管知识深深地启发了他。当他获得麻省理工学院的部分奖学金录取时，他告诉盖尔，他希望将研究重点放在电子在固体中的运动上。64
The information that Noyce absorbed about the transistor in his last months at Grinnell inspired him. When he was accepted at MIT with a partial scholarship, he told Gale that he hoped to focus his studies on the movement of electrons through solids.64
诺伊斯从格林内尔学院毕业，获得了数学和物理双学位，并荣获了美国大学优等生荣誉学会（Phi Beta Kappa）会员资格。他还获得了同学们的一项殊荣：布朗德比奖，该奖项旨在表彰“用最少的努力获得最高成绩的高年级男生”——或者正如诺伊斯更喜欢向父母解释的那样，获奖者是“在学习上投入的时间获得最大回报的人”。65
Noyce graduated from Grinnell College with a double major in math and physics and a Phi Beta Kappa key. He also received a signal honor from his classmates: the Brown Derby Prize, which recognized “the senior man who earned the best grades with the least amount of work”—or as Noyce preferred to explain to his parents, the recipient was the “man who gets the best returns on the time spent studying.”65
2
快速罗伯特
2
Rapid Robert
对诺伊斯来说，去麻省理工学院读书是一场巨大的赌博。他根本负担不起。物理系每学期400美元的奖学金勉强够支付学费，但对于学校预估的735美元书本费和食宿费来说，却远远不够。诺伊斯的父母也帮不上什么忙，而鲍勃也不想再向大学时借钱给他的外婆要钱。他必须在去读研究生之前的那个夏天尽可能多地挣钱。这意味着他要住在桑威奇的父母家，每天在建筑工地长时间辛勤劳作，汗流浃背。在那里，他搬运过用挥发性防腐剂杂酚油处理过的木材，结果背部和双手严重烧伤。即便在受伤之前，诺伊斯也一直厌恶这种体力劳动。他的大多数高中和大学同学每年夏天都靠打捆干草或给玉米去雄穗为生，但诺伊斯和他的一个好友在大学一、二年级结束后的暑假里，却在纽约市北部的世纪乡村俱乐部当调酒师和服务员。在那里，诺伊斯震惊地发现，他的顾客经常花25美元吃一顿晚餐，花2000美元租一间水边小屋。1
The decision to attend MIT was an enormous gamble for Noyce. He could not afford it. The $400-per-semester scholarship he received from the Physics Department was enough to cover tuition, but provided nothing toward the remaining $735 the university estimated would be needed for books and room and board. Noyce’s parents were unable to be of much assistance, and Bob did not want to ask his maternal grandmother, who had loaned him money in college, for more. He needed to earn as much as he could in the summer before leaving for graduate school. This meant living with his parents in Sandwich and working long, sweaty days at a construction site, where he was badly burned on his back and hands after carrying wood that had been treated with the volatile preservative creosote. Even before this injury, Noyce had always hated this sort of labor. Most of his high school and college classmates worked every summer baling hay or detasseling corn, but Noyce and a close friend had spent the summers after their first and second years of college tending bar and waiting tables at the Century Country Club north of New York City. There Noyce had been shocked and more than a little impressed to learn that his customers regularly paid $25 for a dinner and $2,000 to rent a tiny home on the water.1
1949年夏天，诺伊斯经历了乡村俱乐部的悠闲时光与酷暑的辛劳，这让他痛恨这个世界：一个获得美国大学优等生荣誉学会（Phi Beta Kappa）的物理学专业毕业生，靠体力劳动比靠脑力劳动挣的钱更多。这也促使他下定决心：他绝不再重蹈覆辙。他要给物理系的权威人士留下深刻印象，以至于不到一年，他们就给了他相当于免费读研的奖学金：一份研究奖学金，不仅涵盖学费，每月还支付122.50美元。2
The contrast between those country club summers and the blazing toil of the summer of 1949 left Noyce cursing a world in which a Phi Beta Kappa physics major could earn more with his muscles than with his mind. It also led him to a decision. He would not do this again. He would so impress the Physics Department powers-that-be that within a year they would give him the graduate-school equivalent of a free ride: a research fellowship that not only covered tuition but also paid $122.50 every month.2
1949年9月，当诺伊斯把他那辆破旧的福特车停在剑桥时，他发现这里与格林内尔学院截然不同。格林内尔学院曾是一个自成一体的红砖世界，安全地坐落在玉米地中央，位于州中心，位于国家中心。麻省理工学院是一所位于城市中心的大学——距离波士顿市中心仅三英里，乘火车很快就能到达纽约——由一群渴望突破传统学术界限的人士管理。麻省理工学院的教授们参与研发了拯救美国飞机的雷达技术，也参与制造了摧毁日本的原子弹。麻省理工学院的教职员工曾担任总统委员会成员，也曾是美国最具影响力的企业董事会成员。
WHEN NOYCE parked his beat-up Ford in Cambridge in September 1949, he encountered a world dramatically different from Grinnell College. Where Grinnell had been a self-contained red-brick universe safely tucked in the middle of cornfields, in the middle of a state, in the middle of the country, MIT was an urban campus—three miles from downtown Boston, a short train ride to New York—run by men eager to extend its reach beyond the traditional limits of the academy. MIT professors helped develop the radar technology that saved American planes, and they helped build the atomic bomb that devastated Japan. MIT faculty served on presidential commissions and in the boardrooms of the nation’s most powerful corporations.
“军工复合体”这个名称直到诺伊斯进入研究生院十二年后才出现，但在1949年秋季，它在麻省理工学院（MIT）已经初具规模。二战期间，MIT从美国科学研究与发展办公室（ORDR）获得了1.17亿美元的联邦研究合同——这是战争期间美国大学获得的最高金额。诺伊斯开学几周后，苏联引爆了第一颗原子弹，这带来的巨大威胁确保了整个冷战期间MIT研究人员能够持续获得联邦国防资金。
The “military-industrial complex” would not be named until a dozen years after Noyce entered graduate school, but it was well under construction at MIT in the fall of 1949. During the Second World War, MIT received $117 million in federal research contracts from the Office of Scientific Research and Development—by far the most money awarded to any American university during the war. A few weeks after Noyce started classes, the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb, and the monumental threat this implied would help ensure a steady flow of federal defense dollars to MIT researchers throughout the Cold War.
麻省理工学院物理楼坐落在校园中心附近。它的地下室里有多条地下通道，其中一些通往光线昏暗的教室，所有这些都构成了一个庞大的隧道网络，将麻省理工学院的各个建筑连接起来。这个地下世界仿佛与世隔绝，到处都是裸露的管道，数以千计的工具用于制造各种科学仪器，巨大的机器占据了整个房间，一群群年轻人围坐在摆满仪器的桌子旁一起工作。换句话说，物理系的这部分就像是世界上最大的地下工作室——诺伊斯或许会问自己，还有什么比这更棒的呢？3
The MIT physics building sat near the middle of campus. In its basement were multiple subterranean corridors, some of which branched off into dimly lit classrooms, all part of the vast network of tunnels that linked MIT buildings to each other. This underground universe was a place apart, filled with miles of exposed overhead pipes, thousands of tools to build all sorts of scientific equipment, giant machines that occupied entire rooms, and clusters of young men working together over tables covered with instruments. This part of the Physics Department, in other words, resembled the world’s greatest basement workshop—and what, Noyce might have asked himself, could be better than that?3
过去二十年间，物理系经历了翻天覆地的变化。1930年以前，该系主要致力于为工程师教授物理。1930年，麻省理工学院校长卡尔·康普顿聘请了一位名叫约翰·克拉克·斯莱特的年轻教授，旨在建立一个足以媲美世界任何顶尖学府的物理研究项目。斯莱特是一位令人敬佩的人物：他是量子理论的领军人物，一位诺贝尔奖得主的得意门生，雷达电磁理论的先驱，同时也是一位著作颇丰的作家，他不仅发表了数十篇论文，而且大约每三年还会撰写一部教科书或其他鸿篇巨著。（这些成就使他在31岁时当选为美国国家科学院院士。）他年轻而略显拘谨的外表——饱满的脸庞，浓密的棕色头发一丝不苟地梳向一侧——常常让人误以为他是本科生，但没有人会认错他超过一次。斯莱特的目光锐利得令人胆寒，一位学生形容他整体给人的感觉是“疏离而冷峻，就像一座冰山，毫无温情可言”。4
The Physics Department had undergone dramatic changes during the past two decades. Before 1930, the department had focused on teaching physics to engineers. Then in 1930, MIT’s president Karl Compton recruited a young professor named John Clarke Slater to build a research program in physics that would rival any in the world. Slater was an impressive man: a leading proponent of quantum theory, a top student of a Nobel Prize winner, a pioneer in the electromagnetic theory behind radar, and a prolific author who churned out dozens of articles while also writing a textbook or other weighty tome roughly every three years. (Such accomplishments led to his election to the National Academy of Sciences at the age of 31.) His youthful, almost prissy, appearance—his face full-cheeked, his brown hair thick and parted carefully at the side—led more than one person to mistake him for an undergraduate, but no one made that mistake more than once. Slater had a glare that could petrify and an overall presence that one student called “remote and austere, with all the warmth of an emotional iceberg.”4
凭借麻省理工学院校长慷慨的资助，斯莱特在20世纪30年代和40年代致力于提高毕业标准，提升了……教职工薪酬提高，以及系里对教职工科研活动的管控放松。战时联邦拨款增加，加上大量顶尖欧洲物理学家渴望移民，这对斯莱特来说都是有利的。诺伊斯来到耶鲁大学时，一些世界上最著名的物理学家——核物理学家赫尔曼·费什巴赫和维克托·魏斯科普夫、微波物理学家纳撒尼尔·弗兰克、声学和运筹学先驱菲利普·莫尔斯——都已是该系的教员。此外，该系还拥有美国最著名的研究生默里·盖尔曼，他比诺伊斯早一年入学。盖尔曼是一位神童，七岁自学微积分，在即将年满十五岁时进入耶鲁大学学习物理，仅用了两年时间就获得了量子理论博士学位。他是诺伊斯在研究生院的两位日后荣获诺贝尔物理学奖的学生之一。
Armed with a generous grant from the MIT president, Slater spent the decades of the 1930s and 1940s tightening graduation standards, raising faculty salaries, and loosening departmental controls over faculty research. The wartime combination of increased federal funds and a pool of top-notch European physicists eager to emigrate worked to Slater’s advantage. By the time Noyce came to campus, some of the best-known physicists in the world—nuclear physicists Herman Feshbach and Victor Weisskopf, microwave physicist Nathaniel Frank, acoustics and operations research pioneer Philip Morse—were members of the faculty. The department was also home to the most famous graduate student in America, Murray Gell-Mann, who had arrived a year before Noyce. A prodigy who taught himself calculus at age seven and began studying physics at Yale just a few weeks shy of his fifteenth birthday, Gell-Mann would emerge with his PhD in quantum theory after only two years in the program. He was one of two students in graduate school with Noyce who would one day win the Nobel Prize for Physics.
无论从哪个角度来看，那都是个令人望而生畏的地方，对于一个来自只有两名成员的物理系的学生来说，更是如此，而这位物理系主任甚至连博士学位都没有。“我来自一个受保护的家庭，大学期间一路顺风顺水，从来不用担心作业完成情况，”诺伊斯那一届学生中少数几个背景与他相似的学生之一回忆道，“然后我到了麻省理工学院，砰！我一下子就和最优秀的学生在一起，离家800英里……这简直太难了。”格兰特·盖尔当然担心自己是否让诺伊斯做好了充分的准备，以应对这所美国顶尖科学大学的学术严苛要求。他写信给系主任，询问麻省理工学院对诺伊斯先生及其所受训练的“反馈”。5
It was an intimidating place by any standard, and presumably even more so for a student from a two-man Physics Department led by someone who did not even have a PhD. “I had come from a protected home and sort of sailed through college, never worrying too much about getting the work done,” recalled one of the few students in Noyce’s cohort who arrived with a similar background. “Then I got to MIT and bam! I was with the best of the bunch, 800 miles from home…. It was incredibly difficult.” Grant Gale certainly worried whether he had adequately prepared Noyce for the academic rigors of the nation’s premier scientific university. He wrote to the head of the department, asking for periodic updates on MIT’s “reaction to Mr. Noyce and to the training which he has had.”5
如果诺伊斯（Noyce）在得知大多数同学都带着教学奖学金来到麻省理工学院后，开始怀疑自己是否属于剑桥，那么他在校园里的头几个月无疑加剧了他的这种怀疑。大多数学生都住在马萨诸塞大道和查尔斯河交汇处的研究生宿舍楼里——距离物理楼只有五分钟步行路程，那里也是研究生社交生活的中心——但每月78美元的住宿费对诺伊斯来说太贵了，于是他和一位在麻省理工学院做精算师的朋友合租了一间位于剑桥略显破旧街区的公寓。开学一个月后，诺伊斯参加了第一轮必修考试，这些考试旨在评估学生的物理知识，并确定他是否需要补习某些科目。他第一次考试考得非常糟糕，以至于他拒绝告诉父母自己的成绩，甚至还让当时的女友周末不要来，大概是因为他需要复习。6
If Noyce, who soon learned that most of his classmates came to MIT with teaching fellowships in hand, had begun to wonder whether he belonged in Cambridge, his first months on campus could not have helped matters. Most students lived in the Graduate House at the corner of Massachusetts Avenue and the Charles River—a five-minute walk from the physics building and the center of graduate student social life—but the monthly $78 room-and-board fee was too dear for Noyce, who instead shared an apartment in a slightly seedy part of Cambridge with a friend from his semester as an actuary. A month into the school year, Noyce took the first set of required exams, which were designed to assess a student’s knowledge of physics and determine in which subjects, if any, he needed to do remedial coursework. He did so badly on the first test that he refused to tell his parents his grade and even asked his current girlfriend to stay away for the weekend, presumably because he needed to study.6
考试结束后，负责系里注册工作的菲利普·莫尔斯（Philip Morse）认为诺伊斯（Noyce）的背景在几个方面“不足”，并要求他补修两个学期的本科理论物理入门课程以及电子学高级本科课程。以及实验物理。“我唯一感到欣慰的是，”诺伊斯告诉他的父母，“我跟每个人交谈过，他们的情况至少和我一样糟糕。”7
At the end of the exam period, Philip Morse, who oversaw registration in the department, marked Noyce’s background “deficient” in several areas and required him to take the two-semester undergraduate introduction to theoretical physics as well as advanced undergraduate courses in electronics and experimental physics. “My only observation for comfort,” Noyce told his parents, “is that everyone I talked to did at least as badly as I did.”7
这并不完全属实。诺伊斯进入麻省理工学院时，与许多同学相比，无论在教育背景还是经济条件上都处于明显的劣势。例如，阿尔弗雷德·“巴德”·惠伦，他19岁时刚从斯坦福大学获得工程学位就来到麻省理工学院。惠伦在加州的导师是弗雷德里克·特曼，这位雄心勃勃的斯坦福大学工程学院院长，他本人曾在麻省理工学院师从范内瓦尔·布什（罗斯福总统科学研究与发展办公室的创始主任）获得博士学位。当特曼认为斯坦福大学无法为惠伦提供足够具有挑战性的研究生教育时，他打了几通电话。“这孩子很棒，”特曼告诉他在麻省理工学院的同事，“赶紧安排他。”麻省理工学院以助教职位吸引惠伦。入学考试时，他轻松通过了所有科目。8
This was not exactly true. Noyce entered MIT at a distinct educational, as well as financial, disadvantage relative to many of his classmates. Consider, for example, Alfred “Bud” Wheelon, who was just 19 years old when he came to MIT with a freshly minted engineering degree from Stanford. Wheelon’s mentor in California had been Frederick Terman, Stanford’s ambitious dean of engineering who had himself earned his PhD at MIT under Vannevar Bush (the founding director of President Roosevelt’s Office of Scientific Research and Development). When Terman decided that Stanford could not provide Wheelon a sufficiently challenging graduate education, he made a few calls. “This guy is great,” Terman told his colleagues at MIT. “Fix him up.” MIT enticed Wheelon with a teaching assistantship. When it came time for the entrance exams, he passed every one easily.8
诺伊斯向父母坦言，“生活有时并不美好”，但他尽力以积极的态度看待自己面临的挑战。他说，他很庆幸自己没有获得研究奖学金，因为那只会拖慢他的脚步。诺伊斯提醒父母，也提醒自己，他的目标是尽快度过人生的这个阶段——这种理念自幼便一直指引着他。9
Noyce admitted to his parents that “life looks unpleasant in spots,” but he tried to put the best spin possible on the challenges he faced. He was glad he did not have a research fellowship, he said. It would just slow him down. His goal, Noyce reminded them and himself, was to get through this stage of his life as quickly as possible—a philosophy that had served as his guiding force since childhood.9
他在写给父母的信中展现出的那种豪情壮志，在现实生活中却难以维持。他开始在家乡的朋友们那里寻求慰藉。斯特朗兄弟是格林内尔的邻居，他们曾帮助诺伊斯制作滑翔机，当时两人都在剑桥，一个在读建筑学，另一个在哈佛法学院。他的哥哥盖洛德在纽黑文，诺伊斯在他和新婚妻子多蒂家住了几天。这次拜访充满了美味的家常晚餐和有趣的谈话。回到剑桥后，他感到自己的生活如此黯淡，以至于他一生中为数不多的几次公开质疑自己所做的事情：“（拜访盖洛德）让我意识到自己有多么误入歧途。这些人都有值得追求的人生目标。而我似乎没有。我一直希望自己能全身心投入到物理学中，从而忘记这一切。总之，我的物质欲望被抛诸脑后，直到我回到这里，开始思考自己该如何活下去。”10
The bravado he displayed in letters to his parents was harder to maintain in person. He sought comfort in his hometown friends. The Strong brothers, neighbors from Grinnell who had helped with the glider, were both in Cambridge, one studying architecture, the other in law school at Harvard. His brother Gaylord was in New Haven, and Noyce spent several days with him and his new wife Dotey. The visit was filled with good home-cooked dinners and interesting conversation. When he returned to Cambridge, his own life struck him as so bleak that for one of the few times in his life, Bob Noyce openly questioned what he was doing: “The whole of [the visit to Gaylord] served to point out to me how misdirected I am. These people have some worthwhile goals in life. It doesn’t seem to me that I have. I keep hoping that I will get wrapped up enough in physics to forget this. Anyway, my materialistic interests flew out the window until I got back here and started to wonder how I was to stay alive.”10
在麻省理工学院，诺伊斯的同学中很少有人察觉到他的绝望。他结交了一群他母亲无疑会称之为“很棒的男孩”。乔治·克拉克，一位来自芝加哥富裕家庭、毕业于哈佛大学的学者，正在研究宇宙射线，并将在麻省理工学院从事物理教学工作。另一位朋友是亨利·斯托克，一位来自匈牙利的犹太难民，十几岁时先逃往巴黎，后又逃往西班牙，最终于1943年被贵格会教徒带到新泽西州。斯托克后来也成为了一名教授。莫里斯·纽斯坦似乎比任何人都更了解诺伊斯。麻省理工学院的另一位成员，是一位来自新泽西州、说话尖刻的年轻人。他从小家境贫寒，连自行车都买不起，靠退伍军人法案资助自己完成学业。纽斯坦在进入学术界之前，曾在工业界工作多年。
AT MIT, few of Noyce’s classmates sensed his despair. He had fallen in with what his mother undoubtedly would have called “a nice group of boys.” George Clark, a Harvard graduate from a well-to-do Chicago family, was studying cosmic rays and would spend his career at MIT teaching physics. Another friend was Henry Stroke, a Jewish refugee from Hungary who, as a teenager, had escaped first to Paris and then to Spain before being brought to New Jersey by the Quakers in 1943. Stroke, too, would become a professor. Maurice Newstein, who seemed to know Noyce better than anyone else at MIT, was a sharp-tongued young man from New Jersey who had grown up too poor to own a bicycle and who was financing his education through the GI Bill. Newstein would spend years in industry before joining the academy himself.
这四个朋友一心想着如何熬过大一的课程。诺伊斯选修了五门课，还不包括他作为“旁听生”必须旁听的本科课程。和系里其他同学一样，他也选修了菲利普·莫尔斯教授的理论物理课。这门课的习题极其复杂，以至于学生们半开玩笑地说，每答对一道题就应该自动获得一个硕士学位。诺伊斯选修的热力学和统计学课也好不到哪里去：第一次考试的平均分只有29分（满分100分），而由斯莱特和弗兰克两位教授编写的教材，被学生们戏称为“屠杀与失败”。诺伊斯还在数学系选修了一门现代代数课。11
The four friends focused on surviving their first year classes. Noyce took five, not including the undergraduate courses he was required to attend as a “listener.” Like everyone else in the department, he took Philip Morse’s Theoretical Physics course, which included problems so elaborate that the students claimed—only half jokingly—that they ought to receive an automatic master’s degree for each one answered correctly. Noyce’s Thermodynamics and Statistics course was hardly any better: the class average on the first exam was 29 out of 100, and the textbook, written by professors Slater and Frank, was bitterly known as “Slaughter and Flunk” by the students making their way through it. Noyce also took a Modern Algebra course in the math department.11
约翰·斯莱特教授那门为期两个学期的物质量子理论课程是诺伊斯最喜欢的课程之一。斯莱特会在上课铃响的那一刻走进教室。他迅速地和学生们打过招呼后，会分发前一天晚上打好的蓝色讲义——这些讲义很快就会出版成书，成为该领域的奠基性著作之一——然后快步走到教室前面。斯莱特背对着学生，面向黑板，开始用铿锵有力、完整的段落进行讲解，他那工整的字迹在黑板上蜿蜒流淌。讲课就这样持续进行——偶尔会被斯莱特喊出的问题打断（但他仍然不转身）——直到他的字迹到达黑板的右下角。这时，斯莱特会把讨论中遗留的问题巧妙地融入到讲解的结尾，然后转身面向学生。 “今天就到这里吧，先生们，”他总是这样总结——就在下课铃响前几秒钟。每次讲课都是如此。12
The two-semester Quantum Theory of Matter course taught by the imperious John Slater was one of Noyce’s favorites. Slater would enter the room on the last ring of the bell announcing the start of class. After quickly greeting the students, he would distribute the blue sheets of notes he had typed up the night before—they would soon be published in a book that became one of the field’s foundational texts—and walk briskly to the front of the room. Slater then turned his back on the class, faced the blackboard, and began to lecture in ringing, complete paragraphs, his precise script snaking its chalky way across the board. The lecture would continue in this manner—occasionally punctuated by Slater’s calling out a question (still not turning around)—until his writing reached the lower right-hand corner of the board. At that point, Slater would tuck any loose end of the discussion neatly into the conclusion of his talk, and turn to face the students. “That will be all for today, gentlemen,” he invariably concluded—mere seconds before the dismissal bell rang. This happened at every lecture.12
斯莱特的出色表现涵盖了多个科目，第一学期包括量子力学、简单系统和热力学，第二学期——也是最后一学期——则学习了固态物理：研究电子在固体中的运动。这一领域建立在斯莱特精通的量子力学之上，而它最激动人心的实际应用，当然就是晶体管——诺伊斯在盖尔的格林内尔课堂上就被它深深吸引。诺伊斯对固态物理有着敏锐的直觉，甚至令他那些准备最充分的麻省理工学院同学都叹为观止。他几乎能迅速回答斯莱特提出的任何问题。
The subjects covered in Slater’s remarkable performance included quantum mechanics, simple systems, and thermal dynamics in the first semester, and then in the second—finally—solid-state physics: the study of how electrons move in solids. The field was founded on the quantum mechanics in which Slater was expert, and its most exciting practical application, of course, was the transistor that had captivated Noyce in Gale’s Grinnell classroom. Noyce had an intuitive sense about solid-state physics that impressed even his most well prepared MIT classmates. He could answer almost any question Slater posed with alacrity.
诺伊斯的第五门课是电子学，授课老师是一位名叫韦恩·诺丁汉的实验物理学家，他眼神苍白，下巴线条分明。他是麻省理工学院“物理电子学”领域的主要专家，该领域研究电子在固体、真空和气体中的运动。像大多数实验物理学家一样，诺丁汉教授的课程也与此类似。物理学家们，以及诺伊斯本人，都拥有着与生俱来的捣鼓天赋。诺丁汉总是制造出他在别处找不到的设备。他对该领域最重要的贡献是诺丁汉真空计，它能够以电子方式测量真空中的压力。
Noyce’s fifth course was Electronics, taught by a pale-eyed, strong-jawed experimental physicist named Wayne Nottingham. He was MIT’s primary expert in a field called “physical electronics,” which explored the movement of electrons through solids, vacuums, and gases. Like most experimental physicists, and like Noyce himself, Nottingham possessed a God-given talent for tinkering. Nottingham was forever building equipment that he could not find elsewhere. His most significant contribution to the field was the Nottingham gauge, which measured the pressure in vacuums electronically.
尽管诺丁汉在真空电子研究领域声名鹊起，但他和他的学生们仍然密切关注着固态物理的发展。他们每年都会在麻省理工学院举办物理电子学研讨会，而诺丁汉正是该研讨会的组织者。研讨会形式极其随意——演讲没有时间限制，而且与会者事先被告知，他们并非要深入探讨具体主题，而是“提出一些话题供大家讨论”——但即便如此，它仍然吸引了美国一些顶尖的固态电子学研究人员。在诺伊斯进入麻省理工学院的第一年，研讨会就专门设立了一个关于晶体管的小组讨论，以及几个关于半导体的小组讨论。其中一位演讲者是约翰·巴丁，他是贝尔实验室晶体管的三位发明者之一。13
Although Nottingham had made his reputation in the study of electrons in vacuums, he and his students followed the developments in solid-state physics from ringside seats at the Seminar on Physical Electronics, a conference Nottingham organized every year at MIT. The seminar was extremely informal—presentations had no time limits, and panelists were warned that they would not so much be addressing specific subjects as “introducing topics for discussion”—but it nonetheless attracted some of the nation’s top solid-state electronics researchers. In Noyce’s first year at MIT, the seminar included a panel specifically on transistors and several on semiconductors. One of the speakers was John Bardeen, one of the three inventors of the transistor at Bell Labs.13
那一年，物理电子学研讨会很可能是诺伊斯唯一一次直接学习晶体管相关知识，因为麻省理工学院当时尚未将晶体管纳入正式课程。例如，诺丁汉的电子学课程在1949年根本没有提及这种器件。晶体管是一项新技术，而且存在着非常实际的问题。制造一个功能齐全的点接触晶体管非常困难；事实上，仅仅是复现贝尔团队的实验结果都很难。相比之下，真空管正值鼎盛时期：它们比以往任何时候都更加便宜、更加稳定。没有人——当然也包括诺丁汉——看到任何迹象表明点接触晶体管能够在很长一段时间内取代真空管。14
The Physical Electronics seminar might well have been Noyce’s only direct instruction on the topic that year, for MIT had yet to incorporate the transistor into its formal curriculum. Nottingham’s Electronics class, for example, did not mention the device at all in 1949. The transistor was a new technology, and it had very real problems. It was hard to build a functional point-contact transistor; indeed, simply replicating the Bell team’s results was difficult. Vacuum tubes, by contrast, were entering their heyday: they were far cheaper and more stable than ever before. No one—certainly not Nottingham—saw any evidence to indicate that the point-contact transistor would be in a position to replace tubes for a long, long time.14
在麻省理工学院的第一个学期里，诺伊斯逐渐摸索出一些方法来弥补本科科学课程的不足。他学会了如何学习，这在大学时他几乎从未认真对待过。当时他选择数学和物理双学位，是因为对他来说这是“阻力最小的途径”。事实上，他说，他喜欢格林内尔学院的科学课程的原因之一是，与历史等课程不同——在历史课上“你必须预习才能通过考试”，而科学课上，他“总能找到答案”，只需运用他已有的“基本科学原理”知识即可。然而，这种方法在他来到麻省理工学院后就完全失效了，因为他对这些基本原理的掌握程度远远落后于同学。或许这是他人生中第一次需要真正努力地去获取科学知识。15
OVER THE COURSE of his first semester at MIT, Noyce developed tactics to compensate for his deficits in undergraduate science classes. He learned how to study, something he had hardly bothered with in college, where he had chosen his math and physics double major because it offered “the path of least resistance” for him. Indeed, one reason he had enjoyed his science classes at Grinnell, he said, was that unlike courses such as history, in which “you had to study because you had to know the answer going into the exam,” in his science classes, he could “always come up with the answer” simply by deriving it from his existing knowledge of “basic scientific principles.” This approach simply did not work when he arrived at MIT, where his knowledge of those basic principles lagged that of his classmates so dramatically. For perhaps the first time in his life, he had to make a concerted effort to acquire scientific knowledge.15
但经过最初几周艰难的、拼命吸收新知识之后，诺伊斯开始放松下来。一旦他掌握了自己的知识，他就开始放松了。当他的基础达到与同学们相当的水平时，他发现自己又能随机应变，推导出解决方案了。事实上，在麻省理工学院的第一个学期结束后，他所有课程都以优异成绩通过。16
But after those first difficult weeks spent cramming new information into his head, Noyce began to relax. Once he had brought his knowledge base to the point that it equaled his classmates,’ he found he could once again improvise and derive his way into solutions. Indeed, after his first semester, he passed every course he took at MIT with honors.16
他的同学们最初注意到他思维敏捷，是在研究生宿舍几乎每晚举行的即兴学习小组中。（诺伊斯必须从公寓开车过去，然后在凌晨时分再开车回家。）大多数晚上，人们都能看到诺伊斯和三四个同学聚在一起，他嘴里叼着烟，椅子向后倾斜得厉害，以至于他偶尔会摔倒。诺伊斯依靠一系列的速记技巧来保持专注，并迅速找到问题的答案。例如，在微积分中，导数的符号是小写字母“d”。偏导数用圆角小写字母“d”（∂）表示，在黎明破晓时，它看起来很容易和小写字母“d”混淆。其他人都是这样念题的：“求X的导数（或偏导数）”，而诺伊斯发明了一种口头表达方式，既减少了混淆，又加快了阅读速度。他会说“Dee X”，而不是“求X的导数”；他用“die”来表示偏导数。这虽是小事，但正是这种节省时间的小技巧让他比几乎所有人都能更快地解决问题——而他所在的圈子可是个快节奏的地方。朋友们很快就给他起了个绰号叫“快手罗伯特”。17
His classmates first began to take note of his quick mind during the impromptu study sessions that convened nearly every night in the Graduate House. (Noyce had to drive there from his apartment and then drive home in the early hours of the morning.) Most nights Noyce could be found in a group of three or four students, his cigarette aglow and his chair tilted back so far that he occasionally toppled over. Noyce relied on a stock of shortcuts to stay focused and drill through to a problem’s solution. In calculus, for example, the symbol for derivative is a lowercase “d.” Partial derivatives are represented by a rounded lowercase “d” (∂), which had a tendency, when dawn was breaking, to look remarkably similar to a lowercase d. Instead of saying “take the derivative (or partial deriviative) of X,” which was how everyone else read problems aloud, Noyce invented a verbal notation that simultaneously reduced confusion and sped up the reading. “Dee X,” he would say, rather than “take the derivative of X”; he used “die” for partial derivative. It was a small thing, but little timesavers like this enabled him to solve problems faster than almost anyone else—and this was fast company. His friends soon nicknamed him “Rapid Robert.”17
才华横溢的斯坦福毕业生巴德·惠伦得知拉皮德·罗伯特没有助教职位，生活拮据，感到非常震惊。惠伦日后将在冷战高峰时期担任中央情报局的技术主管，20岁时就已是个行动派。他约见了约翰·斯莱特教授，他坦言，斯莱特教授让他感到恐惧。到了约定的时间，惠伦身着西装领带出现在斯莱特的办公室。“我知道这不关我的事，”他说，“但我确信这里最聪明的两个人之一（另一个是盖尔曼）没有任何资助。他真的过得很艰难，可能会离开。”惠伦认为，既然这么多学生都有研究助理职位，系里应该能再给诺伊斯提供一个。18
Bud Wheelon, the gifted Stanford graduate, was shocked to learn that Rapid Robert did not have an assistantship and was living in penury. Wheelon, who would one day run technical operations for the CIA at the height of the Cold War, was already a man of action at age 20. He scheduled an appointment with Professor John Slater who, he freely admitted, scared him to death. At the appointed time, Wheelon appeared at Slater’s office in coat and tie. “I know it’s not any of my business,” he said, “but I’m convinced one of the two smartest people here [Gell-Mann being the other] is without any assistance. He’s really struggling and might leave.” Wheelon ventured that so many students had research assistantships that the department should be able to fund one more for Noyce.18
斯莱特认真地听着，然后露出了惠伦所说的“转瞬即逝的微笑”。他的回答很简短：“你说得对，这不关你的事。”惠伦被打发走了，之后两人再也没有提起过这件事。
Slater listened carefully and then flashed what Wheelon called a “microsecond smile.” The reply was short: “You’re right. It’s none of your business.” Wheelon was dismissed and the conversation was never mentioned again.
然而，几周之内，系里就授予诺伊斯教学奖学金，外加240美元的“教职工奖励”，这笔钱在假期结束后开学时生效。斯莱特肯定知道诺伊斯新近优异的学业成绩，即使没有惠伦的干预，他很可能也计划在学期末增加诺伊斯的助学金。但话说回来，他或许并没有这样的计划。我们无从得知。巴德·惠伦从未告诉诺伊斯他为诺伊斯做了什么。19
Within weeks, however, the department awarded Noyce a teaching fellowship, plus a $240 “staff award” effective when school resumed after the holiday break. Slater, who certainly was familiar with Noyce’s newly outstanding academic performance, might well have been planning to increase Noyce’s financial aid at the end of the semester, even without Wheelon’s intercession. But then again, he might not have had such plans. It is impossible to know. Bud Wheelon never told Noyce what he did on his behalf.19
诺伊斯在经济资助问题上的挣扎，既展现了他的才华——他的才华足以激发如此行动，令人印象深刻——也揭示了他的性格，正是这种性格让他不愿为自己争取利益。毕竟，诺伊斯完全可以亲自去找斯莱特，要么恳求他增加资助，要么要求斯莱特增加他的经费，因为他已经证明自己是系里最优秀的学生之一。
The struggles over financial assistance reveal something about Noyce’s talents—that they could inspire such action is impressive—and his temperament, which kept him from lobbying on his own behalf. After all, Noyce could have gone to Slater himself, either to plead for more money or to demand that Slater increase his funding since he had proven himself one of the top students in the department.
诺伊斯天生就无法做到这两种方式。他讨厌求助，也总是尽可能避免冲突。最典型的例子就是诺伊斯在剑桥市中心遭遇的那场交通事故。两名司机下了车，一边查看事故现场，一边提高音量争吵。就在事故发生前几分钟，诺伊斯把莫里斯·纽斯坦送到街角，纽斯坦随后返回事故现场，却惊讶地发现诺伊斯突然从对方身边退开，回到了自己的车里。当他意识到纽斯坦目睹了这一切时，诺伊斯似乎有些尴尬——不是因为自己发脾气，而是因为自己退缩了。“他觉得他应该和那家伙理论，”纽斯坦说。诺伊斯担心在朋友面前显得懦弱，但即便如此，他也觉得比直接冲突要好。多年后，他会对女儿说：“生气从来没带来任何好处。”20
Noyce was constitutionally incapable of either of these approaches. He hated to ask for help, and he always avoided confrontation if he could. Typical was the occasion when Noyce was involved in a traffic accident in downtown Cambridge. The two drivers climbed out of their cars, their voices rising as they surveyed the damage. As Maurice Newstein, whom Noyce had dropped off at a corner just moments before the accident, headed back towards the scene, he was surprised to see Noyce suddenly back away from the other driver and return to his own car. When he realized that Newstein had witnessed the exchange, Noyce seemed embarrassed—not about losing his temper but about backing down. “He thought he should have stood up to the guy,” Newstein said. Noyce worried about looking like a coward to his friend, but even that was preferable to a direct confrontation. Years later he would tell his daughter, “Nothing good ever came from being angry.”20
助教这份工作解放了诺伊斯。他搬进了研究生宿舍，和朋友纽斯坦和克拉克合住。经济状况稳定后，他很快就投入到忙碌的生活中，仿佛回到了大学时代。剑桥是东海岸各高校年轻男女（大多是单身）的聚集地。城里到处张贴着各种传单，宣传橄榄球赛、冰球锦标赛、赛艇比赛、正式舞会、社交活动和派对——诺伊斯也参加了其中许多活动。他在安角附近的温格斯海克海滩组织了一场蛤蜊宴。1950年，麻省理工学院臭名昭著的“啤酒雨”派对也在那里举行。当时，主人不知道如何打开买来的啤酒桶，于是决定用开瓶器钻开，结果一屋子的物理系研究生都被啤酒淋了个透。他还参演了几部音乐剧，至少在其中一部中担任主角，他的弟弟盖洛德也去看了这部剧。盖洛德回忆说，坐在观众席上，他第一次真正理解了哥哥鲍勃的为人。鲍勃的自信和魅力——而非他与生俱来的天赋——让他能够“把自己伪装成一位专家级”的表演者。“他的音色并不出色，也不准确，”盖洛德解释说，“但他却在那里担任主唱。”21
THE TEACHING ASSISTANTSHIP liberated Noyce. He moved to the Graduate House, where he roomed with his friends Newstein and Clark. His finances in order, he quickly immersed himself in a whirlwind schedule that recalled his college days. Cambridge was a mecca for young, mostly single, men and women attending schools up and down the Eastern Seaboard. Handbills posted around town advertised football games, hockey tournaments, crew regattas, formal dances, socials, and parties—many of which Noyce attended. He organized a clambake at Wingaersheik Beach, off Cape Ann. He was there for MIT’s infamous “raining beer” party of 1950 during which a room full of physics graduate students was drenched in suds when the hosts, unable to determine how to tap the keg they bought, decided to drill into it with a corkscrew. He performed in several musicals, landing the lead in at least one, which his brother Gaylord attended. Sitting in the audience, Gaylord recalls, he understood something important about his brother for the first time. Bob’s confidence and charisma—not his innate talent—enabled him to “pass himself off as an expert” performer. “His tone wasn’t that great or accurate,” Gaylord explains, “but there he was, singing a lead.”21
然而，鲍勃·诺伊斯的音色应该不会太差。他参加了波士顿合唱团（Chorus Pro Musica）的试镜并成功加入，该合唱团是美国顶尖的合唱团之一。加入合唱团意味着每周要进行两个半小时的排练，并且每年还要进行几场演出。诺伊斯是男中音，他很喜欢合唱。他们演唱的曲目范围很广：不仅包括像海顿《弥撒曲》（合唱团每年都会在新英格兰音乐学院的乔丹音乐厅演出）这样的传统名曲，还包括兰德尔·汤普森的《哈利路亚》这样的现代作品——这是一首以“哈利路亚”一词为基础的缓慢冥想之作。很快，诺伊斯就开始与合唱团的女歌手们周旋，一个接一个地与她们约会。“他风度翩翩，魅力四射，”一位也曾在麻省理工学院就读的合唱团朋友回忆道，“无论他走到哪里，所有女孩都对他非常感兴趣。”22
Bob Noyce’s tone could not have been too off, however. He auditioned for and joined Boston’s Chorus Pro Musica, one of the top choral groups in the country. Membership entailed weekly two-and-a-half-hour rehearsals, plus several performances each year. Noyce was a baritone and enjoyed singing a wide range of music: not just traditional favorites like the Haydn Mass (which the chorus performed each year in the New England Conservatory’s Jordan Hall), but also more modern pieces such as Randall Thompson’s “Alleluja”—a slow, meditative work based on the single word. In short order, Noyce began working his way through the female choral singers, dating one after the other. “He was smooth as silk,” recalls a friend from chorus who also attended MIT. “All the girls, wherever he went, were always very interested.”22
“诺伊斯体格健壮，”他的朋友莫里斯·纽斯坦解释说，“他身材像个健美运动员。”诺伊斯几乎每天都游泳，拥有拳击手般线条分明的体格。在麻省理工学院的四年里，他和纽斯坦、克拉克合租的几处房子门口，总有一群极其迷人的女性陪伴着他。诺伊斯似乎曾多次对某个女孩非常认真，但不知何故——他从不透露这些事——这些关系最终都无疾而终。23
“[Noyce] was a physical specimen,” explains his friend Maurice Newstein. “He was built like a bodybuilder.” Noyce swam almost daily and had a prizefighter’s well-defined physique. An ongoing parade of extremely attractive women appeared with Noyce at the front doors of the various houses he shared with Newstein and Clark during their four years at MIT. Noyce at several times seemed quite serious about a particular girl, but for whatever reason—he kept such matters to himself—the relationships inevitably ended.23
除了容貌姣好，这些女性往往还散发着某种气质，一种东海岸都市女性特有的世故老练，令诺伊斯难以抗拒。出身名门的克拉克和自称刻意营造“傲慢”形象的纽斯坦也符合这种描述。他的朋友们猜测，诺伊斯内心深处或许害怕被人视为中西部乡巴佬。或许，与这些世故老练的人交往，能让他自己也沾染上几分潇洒不羁。没人会指责诺伊斯伪装自己——他在麻省理工学院的同事们总是用“平易近人”、“容易相处”、“从不摆架子”或“脚踏实地”来形容他——但有时，他的朋友们会感觉他像是在观察他们，仿佛他们是他尚未完全掌握的课程。24
In addition to their good looks, the women tended to share a certain attitude, a shell of East Coast urban sophistication that Noyce found irresistible. Clark, who came from a socially prominent family, and Newstein, who says he tried to project a “cocky” personality, also fit this description. His friends surmised that Noyce harbored deep within himself a fear that he would be seen as a Midwestern hayseed. Perhaps by associating with sophisticates, he might absorb a bit of élan himself. No one could ever accuse Noyce of pretending to be something he was not—his MIT colleagues invariably described him with terms such as “ordinary,” “easy to talk to,” “never put on airs,” or “down to earth”—but occasionally his friends would feel him studying them almost as if they were a lesson he had yet to fully master.24
诺伊斯将朋友们的优势视为一种个人挑战。例如，他的室友乔治·克拉克是一位业余天文学家，房间里放着一面六英寸的抛物面望远镜镜，那是他在高中时亲手研磨抛光的。尽管诺伊斯对天文学一窍不通，但在克拉克的指导下，他还是成功地将这面镜子改造成了一台可用的望远镜。还有一次，诺伊斯饶有兴致地看着克拉克制作一面新镜子：克拉克小心翼翼地将一把砂砾夹在两块玻璃之间研磨——一块略微凸起，一块略微凹陷——经过一段时间的研磨和旋转，两块玻璃的曲率逐渐接近球面。这时，就可以在玻璃上镀上反射膜，然后安装到望远镜里了。诺伊斯觉得研磨镜子太费力了。于是，他自己动手，给一台留声机装上一个木柄，实际上就做成了一台自动磨镜机：一个镜片在旋转的转盘上转动，另一个镜片则被固定住。他抓住把手，拼凑出一个能用的模型，但完工后不久就失去了兴趣。25
Noyce took his friends’ strengths as a personal challenge. His roommate George Clark, for example, was an amateur astronomer who kept in his room a six-inch parabolic telescope mirror that he had ground and polished by hand in high school. Although Noyce knew nothing about astronomy, he managed to turn the mirror into a working telescope with only a little direction from Clark. In another instance, Noyce watched with avid attention while Clark made a new mirror, carefully grinding a handful of grit between two pieces of glass—one slightly convex, one slightly concave—until, after a good interval of grinding and rotating the glass, the curvature of the two pieces began to approximate a sphere. At this point, the glass could be covered with a reflective coating and installed in a telescope. Noyce decided grinding mirrors was unnecessarily labor intensive. He took it upon himself to outfit a phonograph machine with a wooden handle and built, in effect, an automatic mirror grinder, where one lens rotated on the spinning turntable, and the other was held in place by the handle. He jerry-rigged a workable model, but lost interest shortly after it was finished.25
莫里斯·纽斯坦是一位才华横溢的业余画家，于是诺伊斯也决定尝试绘画。不出所料，诺伊斯认为激发他创作出伟大画作的关键要素并非课堂，而是模特。他设法说服了一位年轻女子——可能是他的女友——穿着胸罩和内裤为他、纽斯坦和其他几人做模特。整个过程非常隐秘，没有发生任何不愉快的事情，但对参与者来说，这段经历远比鲍勃·诺伊斯创作的任何一幅画作都更令人难忘。26
Maurice Newstein was a talented amateur painter, and so Noyce decided that he, too, wanted to try painting. True to form, Noyce determined that the key element he needed to inspire painterly greatness was not a class, but a model. He managed to convince a young woman—possibly his girlfriend—to model in bra and panties for him, Newstein, and a few others. It was all very discreet, and nothing untoward happened, but the experience was far more memorable for its participants than any painting Bob Noyce ever managed to produce.26
诺伊斯还抽出时间放飞父母从家乡寄来的模型飞机，并且经常打桥牌，常常打到深夜。他申请了富布赖特奖学金去法国学习，选择法国是因为他想看看欧洲，他会说一点法语——他的外祖母教了他一些，足以满足格林内尔学院的语言要求——而且他估计自己被派往法国的可能性比去任何英语国家都大。他最终获得了奖学金，但他为了尽快完成学业而放弃了。真是个“快如闪电”的罗伯特。27
Noyce also found time to fly the model airplane his parents sent from home, and to play a great deal of bridge, often late into the night. He applied for a Fulbright award to study in France, a country he chose because he wanted to see Europe, he could speak a bit of French—his maternal grandmother had taught him enough to complete his language requirement at Grinnell—and he calculated that he would be more likely to win a posting to France than to any English-speaking country. He won the award but declined it in favor of finishing his studies as soon as possible. Rapid Robert indeed.27
在诺伊斯研究生第一年结束时，纳撒尼尔·弗兰克（因《屠杀与失败》而闻名）回复了格兰特·盖尔的信，信中询问了诺伊斯的表演情况：
AT THE END OF NOYCE’S FIRST YEAR of graduate school, Nathaniel Frank (of “Slaughter and Flunk” fame) replied to Grant Gale’s letter requesting information about Noyce’s performance:
诺伊斯先生在各方面都是一位杰出的学生……我们对他的潜力印象深刻，因此提名他参加下一学年的壳牌物理学奖学金项目，他已获得该奖学金。
Mr. Noyce has been an outstanding student in all respects…. We are sufficiently impressed with his potential that we have nominated him for a Shell Fellowship in physics for the next academic year, and he has received this fellowship.
您应该祝贺他接受了如此优秀的训练，我们期待诺伊斯先生能有出色的表现。28
You are to be congratulated on the excellence of the training which he has had, and we look forward to an outstanding performance by Mr. Noyce.28
格兰特·盖尔终其一生都珍藏着这封信。
Grant Gale kept this letter for the rest of his life.
壳牌奖学金每年提供1200美元，外加学费，这意味着诺伊斯第二年不用为经济问题担忧。之后，他几乎肯定能获得导师实验室的研究助理职位。“今年秋天我来这里的时候，就希望这样的机会能成真，”他告诉父母，“看来我的乐观是有道理的。”29
The Shell Fellowship, which provided $1,200 per year, plus tuition, meant that Noyce would not have to worry about finances for his second year of school. After that, he was virtually guaranteed a research assistantship in his adviser’s lab. “When I came here this fall, I was hoping something like this might work out,” he told his parents. “It seems that my optomism [sic] was somewhat justified.”29
在波士顿为西尔瓦尼亚公司工作了一个夏天后，诺伊斯开始了第二年的学习，首先上了一个学期的课程，然后参加了口试。他于1951年5月通过了考试。他曾短暂地在一家光学公司担任顾问，诺丁汉是该公司的董事会成员。此外，诺伊斯还在物理研究所担任研究助理，开始从事阴极射线管和真空管的研究工作。他曾在麻省理工学院电子研究实验室（RLE）的电子学小组工作。由于他已经修完了麻省理工学院所有相关的课程，所以他还旁听了哈佛大学的一门固态物理课程。但诺伊斯的大部分精力都投入到了选择导师和开始博士论文的研究工作中。30
After a summer in Boston working for Sylvania, Noyce began his second year with a semester of course work followed by oral examinations. These he passed in May 1951. He briefly worked as a consultant with an optics company on whose board Nottingham served, and Noyce also began working on cathodes and vacuum tubes as a research assistant in the Physical Electronics group at MIT’s Research Laboratory of Electronics (RLE). He audited a Solid-State Physics course at Harvard because he had already taken every relevant MIT class. But the bulk of Noyce’s attention shifted to selecting an adviser and starting the research for his PhD dissertation.30
诺丁汉是导师的不二人选。诺伊斯很清楚自己想做的是实验研究，而不是理论研究。（纽斯坦说：“他欣赏那些付诸行动的人。”）他也知道自己想写一篇与晶体管相关的论文，而诺丁汉的研究是麻省理工学院在该领域最接近实验研究的成果。到1951年，他电子学考试中一半的题目都与晶体管有关，他的几位学生也在撰写论文，尽管是间接地探讨了晶体管的基本物理原理。
Nottingham was the obvious choice for an adviser. Noyce knew that he wanted to do experimental, not theoretical research. (“He admired people who did things,” says Newstein.) He also knew that he wanted to write a thesis somehow relevant to the transistor, and Nottingham’s work was as close as MIT got to experimental research on the topic. By 1951, half the questions on his Electronics exam involved transistors, and several of his advisees were writing dissertations that addressed the basic physics of the device, albeit indirectly.
此外，诺伊斯很喜欢诺丁汉，他热情好客，走路都轻快得像在蹦蹦跳跳。诺丁汉在新罕布什尔州林奇镇莫纳德诺克山脚下拥有一座乡村风格的滑雪小屋，他想尽一切办法在那里度过冬天，经常邀请一小群研究生到北方进行“工作滑雪之旅”。作为滑雪和住宿的交换，诺丁汉要求访客帮忙劈柴或修理他设计的缆车。晚上，他会用藏在地下室冰柜里的特制杜松子酒调制马提尼。
Moreover, Noyce liked Nottingham, who oozed bonhomie and practically bounced when he walked. Nottingham owned a rustic ski home in Rindge, New Hampshire, at the foot of Mount Monadnoc, and he did everything he could to spend his winters there, often inviting small groups of graduate students north for “working ski trips.” In exchange for skiing and lodging privileges, Nottingham required his visitors to help chop wood or work on the rope tow he had designed. In the evenings, he would mix martinis with the special gin he kept in deep freeze in his basement.
在一次去诺丁汉家的旅途中，诺伊斯学会了滑雪。或许更准确地说，他是从那时起开始滑雪的——没人记得诺伊斯像大多数初学者那样，滑雪板歪斜地从山上摔下来。滑雪和潜水一样，都能让人感受到一种令人兴奋的感觉：身体仿佛被重力束缚，在高速滑行的同时，还能精准地控制自己的身体。诺伊斯显然是从中级雪道开始的，他觉得既然迟早都要滑到那里，何不直接跳过初级雪道，挑战更高难度呢？诺伊斯对滑雪的热情很快就达到了顶峰，以至于到了他在波士顿的第三个冬天，他开始担心滑雪会影响他的学业。“我仍然觉得今年冬天有可能毕业，”他在1952年感恩节前后写道，“但我认为我必须给自己定一条‘不写论文就不滑雪’的规矩。”31
During one of his trips to Nottingham’s house, Noyce learned to ski. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that he began skiing at this time—no one remembers Noyce in the skis-awry-falling-down-the-mountain stage that plagues most beginners. Skiing shares with diving an exhilarating sense of abandoning the body to gravity, of tightly controlling physical form while hurtling through space. Noyce apparently started on the intermediate runs, on the assumption that since he would end up there soon enough, why not just skip the bunny slopes and aim high? Noyce’s passion for skiing soon ran so strong that by his third winter in Boston, he worried it might interfere with completing his studies. “I still see some possibility of getting out [of graduate school] sometime this winter,” he wrote near Thanksgiving, 1952, “but I think that I will have to introduce a ‘no thesisno ski’ rule to do so.”31
诺丁汉的个性和体格吸引了诺伊斯，诺伊斯对那些他认为过于理性的人抱有深深的不信任感。（他曾形容一位教授的思想“扭曲……过于沉浸于自己的领域，对其他任何事物都封闭……[他]宁愿沉默不语，也不愿谈论数学以外的任何事情。”）然而，诺伊斯知道，在选择导师时，他需要考虑的不仅仅是性格上的契合。导师的声誉会影响到他的学生，而诺丁汉的名望远不及斯莱特或魏斯科普夫。此外，诺伊斯还担心诺丁汉实验室的设备“陈旧”，而且……这位教授本人“不懂任何理论，只知道如何比任何人都更好地做实验”。32
Nottingham’s personality and physicality appealed to Noyce, who had a profound distrust of people he thought overly cerebral. (He once described a professor’s mind as “perverted … too much wrapped up in his own field and closed to anything else…. [He] will sit in silence rather than talk about anything but math.”) Noyce knew that he needed to consider more than just a personality match when choosing an adviser, however. An adviser’s reputation spilled over to his students, and Nottingham’s name did not hold the same power as Slater’s or Weisskopf’s. Moreover, Noyce worried that the equipment in Nottingham’s lab was “archaic” and that the professor himself “kn[ew] no theory, only how to do an experiment better than anyone else.”32
然而，最终，撰写固态电子学论文的愿望压倒了所有其他考虑。诺伊斯请诺丁汉大学指导他撰写一篇题为“绝缘体表面态的光电研究”的论文。早在二十世纪初，物理学家们就知道，他们可以通过向固体材料照射光来研究其中电子的运动。光会激发材料内部的电子，当电子在材料内部从一个区域（称为能带）跃迁到另一个区域时，它们会吸收或释放微量的能量，这些能量是可以测量的。这些光电测量可以指示电子在固体内部的聚集位置和密度，以及它们在光刺激下的运动方式。
In the end, however, the desire to write on solid-state electronics outweighed all other considerations. Noyce asked Nottingham to advise a dissertation to be called “A Photoelectric Investigation of Surface States on Insulators.” Since early in the twentieth century, physicists had known they could study the movement of electrons in a solid by shining a light on the material. The light would excite the electrons within the bulk of the material, and as electrons made transitions from one area (called an energy band) within the material to another, they either absorbed or emitted a minute amount of energy that could be measured. These photoelectric measurements would indicate where and at what density within the solid the electrons congregated, and also how they moved under the stimulus of light.
二战结束时，光电效应的研究成果使科学家们对固体内部的电子有了较为深入的了解。例如，在晶体内部，每个原子都与其他原子紧密相连。我们可以想象这样一个社区：房屋（原子）之间通过清晰的路径连接，这些路径从每栋房屋的前院、后院和侧院向外辐射。任何想要从一栋房屋移动到另一栋房屋的电子都必须沿着既定的路径行进。33
By the end of the Second World War, the photoelectric findings had given scientists a relatively good understanding of electrons inside solids. Inside a crystal, for example, every atom is firmly connected to every other. One might picture a neighborhood in which houses (atoms) are connected to each other by a clearly defined pattern of walkways that radiate from the front, back, and side yards of each house. Any electron wanting to move from one house to another needs to stick to the established pathways.33
那么，社区最外层的房子呢？或者说，位于社区“表面”的房子呢？这些原子没有后门邻居可以连接，电子也没有从后院出发的路径。任何从这些房子后门逃逸出来的电子都会遇到一片无人区，那里是院子的尽头，也是未知领域的起点。诺伊斯提出的研究对象——“表面态”——可以理解为社区尽头与未知领域交汇的区域。在这种表面态下，脱离既定路径的电子不像社区内部（固体主体）的电子那样可预测。表面态的电子拥有广阔的活动空间，在这些开阔的空间里，它们甚至可能遇到一些外来入侵者。
But what about the last row of houses in the neighborhood, the houses at the “surface” of the neighborhood, so to speak? These atoms have no back-door neighbors to connect to, no paths from their back yards for an electron to follow. Any electrons that made it out the back door of these houses would encounter a no man’s land where the yard ends and whatever-comes-next begins. The “surface states” that Noyce proposed to investigate can be thought of as this area where the end of the neighborhood meets the whatever-comes-next. In this surface state, electrons liberated from the established paths would not be as predictable as their counterparts in the interior of the neighborhood (the bulk of the solid). The electrons in the surface state would have a lot of room to move about, and in these wide open spaces they might even meet a few foreign intruders.
20世纪50年代初期，表面态仍然是一个令人困惑的领域。哪些量子力学定律支配着表面态中电子的行为？一次最多能有多少电子挤进这个空间？是什么因素导致电子进出表面态？材料表面杂质的存在如何影响其电学性质？从最基本的层面来说，对于大多数材料而言，这些“表面态”的存在尚未得到证实。诺伊斯想要探究它们是否存在于两种特定的绝缘体中：石英和氧化镁。
Surface states remained an area of great confusion in the early 1950s. What quantum mechanical laws governed the behavior of electrons in the surface state? How many could squeeze into this space at one time? What could move an electron in or out of the surface state? How did the presence of impurities on the surface of a material affect its electrical properties? On the most fundamental level, for most materials, the existence of these “surface states” had yet to be demonstrated at all. Noyce wanted to see if they existed in two particular insulators: quartz and magnesium oxide.
诺伊斯对表面态的兴趣直接源于贝尔实验室的晶体管研究。点接触晶体管最重要的工作是在锗的表面完成的，尤其是在锗表面的那个点上。这是金线与PN结接触的表面。该器件是在研究半导体表面态的过程中开发的；三位发明者都撰写了相关论文。贝尔公司甚至一度将他们的晶体管研究项目称为“表面态项目”。
Noyce’s interest in surface states came directly out of the Bell Labs transistor research. The point-contact transistor did its most important work at the surface of the germanium, specifically at that point on the surface where the gold wires contacted the P-N junction. The device had been developed in the course of investigations into surface states in semiconductors; all three inventors wrote papers on the subject. For a while, Bell had even referred to its transistor research by the code name “Surface States Project.”
然而，晶体管与诺伊斯提出的绝缘体表面态研究之间的联系充其量也只能说是牵强附会。贝尔实验室的表面态研究对象是半导体，而非诺伊斯提议研究的绝缘体。此外，从1947年底晶体管发明到1951年诺伊斯提出相关提案的这段时间里，晶体管的研究方向已经偏离了表面态。贝尔实验室晶体管研究小组的负责人威廉·肖克利在点接触晶体管专利申请提交几周后，发明了一种完全不同的器件——结型晶体管。结型晶体管的工作点不在半导体表面，而是在半导体内部，也就是其PN结所在的位置——想象一下，在两片P型面包之间夹着一层极薄的N型花生酱。这种结型晶体管于1951年7月公开发布，它比点接触晶体管更可靠、更容易生产，并且信号放大效率提高了近百万倍。那是一个精妙的装置，但它与表面态无关。34
The connection between the transistor and Noyce’s proposed surface-state research on insulators was tenuous at best, however. The Bell Labs surface-state research concerned semiconductors, not the insulators that Noyce proposed to study. Moreover, transistor research had taken a turn away from surface states in the years between the device’s invention at the end of 1947 and Noyce’s proposal in 1951. William Shockley, the leader of the Bell Labs transistor group, had invented a completely different type of device, called a junction transistor, a few weeks after the patents on the point-contact transistor were filed. The junction transistor did its work not on the surface, but in the middle of the semiconductor, which is where its P-N junction was located—picture a microscopically thin layer of N-type peanut butter between two P-type pieces of bread. This junction transistor, made public in July 1951, was more reliable, more easily produced, and capable of amplifying signals nearly a million times more efficiently than its point-contact predecessor. It was a marvelous device, but it had nothing to do with surface states.34
诺伊斯无疑了解晶体管研究领域已逐渐淡化表面态。事实上，就在诺伊斯撰写论文提案前后，威廉·肖克利曾在系里的一次茶话会上发表过演讲。尽管如此，诺伊斯仍然明白，他需要设计一个自己能够完成且诺丁汉大学能够提供指导的论文项目。此外，科学家们仍在争论点接触晶体管和结型晶体管的优劣。无论如何，表面态仍然是一个值得研究的课题，研究表面态仍然能够帮助诺伊斯学习电子、空穴、量子力学以及其他一些他毕业后若想从事晶体管研究就必须掌握的知识。
Noyce undoubtedly knew about the shift away from surface states in transistor research. In fact, William Shockley spoke at a departmental tea around the time Noyce was writing his proposal. Noyce nonetheless understood that he needed to devise a thesis project that he could complete and that Nottingham could advise. Moreover, scientists continued to debate the merits of point-contact versus junction transistors. In any case, surface states were still a worthwhile subject of study, and investigating them would still enable Noyce to research the electrons, holes, quantum mechanics, and other topics he would need to understand if he wanted to work with transistors after he graduated.
诺伊斯给自己设定的项目——测量石英和氧化镁表面电子的存在——如今看来简直微不足道，一台价值600美元的数字静电计几乎可以瞬间完成。然而，在20世纪50年代初期，诺伊斯却发现获取这些信息是一项持续一年多的艰巨任务。
The project Noyce set for himself—to measure the presence of electrons at the surface of quartz and magnesium oxide—is today absolutely trivial, the near-instantaneous work of a $600 digital electrometer. In the early 1950s, however, Noyce found obtaining this information to be an ordeal that lasted more than a year.
他需要绝对纯净的样品，因为表面杂质会导致读数混乱，使数据失效。这意味着他需要在真空环境下进行实验，确保样品不受任何气体或氧气的污染。诺伊斯和许多其他诺丁汉大学的学生一样，他们的研究也需要在高真空环境下进行。诺伊斯将实验装置安装在一个玻璃容器中，并连接到真空泵上。然后，他将整个装置放入烤箱中，并在真空条件下进行加热。温度要达到玻璃所能承受的最高温度。随着诺伊斯工作的推进，分配给他的实验台逐渐被他正在使用或曾经使用过的玻璃器皿、玻璃罐、玻璃管、玻璃烟斗和玻璃喷嘴所覆盖。房间里的其他桌子也同样如此。在不熟悉情况的人看来，这简直就像一个疯了的玻璃工匠的工作室。
He needed perfectly clean samples, since impurities on the surface could cause confusing readings that would render his data useless. This meant he needed to conduct the experiment in a vacuum, where not even gas or oxygen could contaminate the sample. Noyce, like many of Nottingham’s students who were also conducting research that needed to run at high vacuum, built his experiment in a glass vessel that he hooked to a vacuum pump. The whole apparatus was then put into an oven and cooked at as high a temperature as the glass could withstand. As Noyce’s work progressed, the lab table assigned to him gradually disappeared beneath a layer of glass vessels, glass jars, glass tubes, glass pipes, and glass nozzles that he was using or had used at various points in his work. The other tables in the room looked the same way. The overall effect to the untrained eye was of a workshop belonging to a glassblower gone mad.
“哦，诺伊斯当年可真是历尽艰辛，”一位物理学家笑着说道，他在诺伊斯博士论文发表约50年后对其进行了审阅。诺伊斯需要将样品加热到约1000摄氏度，但他尝试了好几次才找到足够强大的加热装置。他试用了两种不同的光源，才找到第三种亮度足以产生可测量电流的光源。他使用的样品在清洗过程中两次破碎。还有一次，加热器和背电极之间发生了短路，导致样品无法使用。每一次失败都意味着他必须从头开始重建实验：向与诺丁汉合作的玻璃工匠订购新设备（有时，如果工作足够简单，他甚至会自己吹制玻璃），在新设备中搭建实验装置，抽真空，并重新校准仪器。35
“Oh, Noyce had a hell of a time,” chuckles one physicist who reviewed Noyce’s doctoral work some 50 years after its publication. Noyce needed to heat his sample to about 1,000° C, but it took him several tries to find a sufficiently powerful heating device. He tried two different light sources before finding a third that was bright enough to generate a measurable current. Twice the samples he was using shattered in the process of trying to clean them. Another time, a short developed between the heater and a back electrode, rendering the sample unusable. Each of these failures meant completely reconstructing the experiment from the beginning: requesting new equipment from the glassblowers who worked with Nottingham (or occasionally, if the job was easy enough, blowing his own glass), building the experiment inside this new equipment, pumping it out, and re-calibrating his instruments.35
仪器本身也存在问题。诺伊斯原本计划使用康普顿静电计进行测量，但发现其灵敏度不足，于是他改用振动簧片静电计。振动簧片静电计性能更高，但他需要自学如何使用。然而，他很快发现，振动簧片静电计灵敏度过高，而他要测量的电流又非常微弱，导致他检测到了来自实验室杂散电场的干扰。他尝试用聚苯乙烯包裹静电计的引线以减少干扰，但这并没有效果。最终，他发现，如果除了待测样品和真空管的玻璃压板之外，实验装置中所有其他绝缘体都被移除，那么只需不时地稍微改变真空管和静电计的相对位置，就能将杂散电场的干扰降至几乎为零。但这并非理想的解决方案，因为每次改变位置都需要等待几个小时，直到背景电流稳定下来。
The instruments presented their own problems. The Compton electrometer Noyce had planned to use to conduct his measurements proved insufficiently sensitive, so he switched to a vibrating-reed electrometer, a higher-performing device that he needed to teach himself how to use. He soon discovered, though, that the device was so sensitive and the currents he wanted to measure so small that he was detecting interference from stray fields in the lab. He tried wrapping the leads to the electrometer with polystyrene to reduce interference, but this did not help. Finally he discovered that if he rid the experimental apparatus of any insulators other than two—the sample he was studying and the glass press of the vacuum tube—he could cut the interference from stray electric fields to nearly zero simply by slightly altering the relative positions of the tube and the electrometer from time to time. This was not an ideal solution, however, because every change of position entailed a wait of several hours while the background currents settled down.
诺伊斯在诺丁汉家附近练习跳台滑雪时，不慎摔倒，右肘重重着地，导致肱骨严重螺旋骨折，工作被迫中断。他接受了两周的牵引治疗，疼痛难忍，因为肘部上方的一根神经被两块骨头挤压。盖洛德、莫里斯·纽斯坦和乔治·克拉克从波士顿赶来，开车送诺伊斯前往汉诺威，达特茅斯的医生在那里为他进行了手术，切除了一块骨头。之后，他的手臂又出现了血栓。等到他完全康复回到麻省理工学院时，诺伊斯已经耽误了近两个月的工作。他的手臂伤痛将伴随他一生。36
Noyce’s work was interrupted when he suffered a bad spiral fracture of the humerus from falling hard on his right elbow while practicing his ski jumping near Nottingham’s property. Noyce was in traction for two weeks—and in agony because a nerve just above his elbow was pinched between two pieces of bone. Gaylord, Maurice Newstein, and George Clark came up from Boston to drive Noyce to Hanover, where the doctors at Dartmouth surgically removed a piece of bone. Then a blood clot set in. By the time he was fully recovered and back at MIT, Noyce had lost almost two months of work. His arm would bother him for the rest of his life.36
到1953年夏天，他的博士论文已接近完成。最终，结果却有些令人失望。诺伊斯未能在他研究的绝缘体中找到表面态的证据。更糟糕的是，他不得不承认，他不知道自己的实验结果究竟意味着这些材料中不存在表面态，还是仅仅意味着他的实验方法存在缺陷。唯一让他感到欣慰的是他对氧化镁的研究。他成功地表征了氧化镁的电学性质，并绘制了11条曲线来展示他的发现，这虽是微小的贡献，但却是对该领域知识的切实贡献。
By the summer of 1953, his dissertation was nearly finished. In the end, it had proven a bit of a disappointment. Noyce had not been able to find evidence of surface states in the insulators he studied. To make matters worse, he had to admit he did not know whether his results meant that surface states did not exist in these materials or simply that his experimental methodology had been poor. The one consolation came from the work with magnesium oxide. He had managed to characterize its electrical properties, and the 11 curves he drew to demonstrate his findings were a small but real contribution to knowledge in his field.
诺伊斯从博士论文中学到的最重要的一课，很难用文字表达出来。作为一名固态实验物理学家，他练就了卓越的实验室技能。早期的失败经历让他学会了如何制备材料以及如何防止材料污染。他还理解了光电发射、电子、空穴、量子态以及固体的物理性质。
The most important lesson that Noyce learned from his dissertation could not easily be translated onto paper. He had developed outstanding laboratory skills as a solid-state experimental physicist. His early false starts had taught him how to prepare materials and how to keep them from contamination. He also understood photoelectric emissions, electrons, holes, quantum states, and the physical properties of solids.
他的知识和技能吸引了贝尔实验室的邀请，起薪7500美元，从事研究工作。IBM也向他提供了一份类似的研究职位，年薪7300美元。诺伊斯拒绝了这两份令人艳羡的邀请，转而接受了费城菲尔科公司的工作，年薪6900美元。菲尔科是一家以生产收音机和电视机而闻名的公司。尽管菲尔科拥有25000名员工，但半导体研究部门只有30名员工。诺伊斯喜欢在小公司工作——他想，或许是因为他在小镇长大——而且他也相信“菲尔科非常非常需要我。他们当时真的不知道自己在做什么。我会成为这台机器上不可或缺的齿轮，而如果是在那些规模更大、资金更雄厚的研究机构，我可能就无法扮演重要角色了。”诺伊斯私下里认为，菲尔科公司缺乏一流的研究团队，这意味着他在那里比在 IBM 或贝尔实验室有更好的机会成名。37
His knowledge and skills attracted offers to conduct research at Bell Labs at a starting salary of $7,500. IBM offered him a similar research position at $7,300 annual pay. Noyce spurned both these prestigious offers to accept a job at Philco, a Philadelphia-based company best known as a manufacturer of radios and televisions, for $6,900. Although Philco had 25,000 employees, only 30 worked in its semiconductor research group. Noyce liked the idea of working at a small company—perhaps, he thought, because he had grown up in a small town—and he also believed “[Philco] needed me very, very badly. They literally did not know what they were doing. I would be a necessary cog in that machine [whereas] in those larger, better-funded research organizations, I wasn’t going to have an essential role.” Noyce privately felt that the lack of a top-notch research team at Philco meant that he would have better opportunities to make a name for himself there than at either IBM or Bell Labs.37
与此同时，他还要提交博士论文，这是一项艰巨的任务。1953年，麻省理工学院物理系要求提交五份崭新的论文副本，这意味着诺伊斯79页的论文每一页都需要一套新的复写纸。哪怕只有一个印刷错误，整页论文都会被毁掉。诺伊斯还在论文中手绘了22幅图。
Meantime, he had to file the dissertation, a daunting task. In 1953, the MIT Physics Department required five pristine copies of the document, which meant a new set of carbon papers for each of Noyce’s 79 pages. A single typographical error, and the entire page was ruined. Noyce also hand-drew 22 figures included in the dissertation.
1953年8月，就在诺伊斯计划提交博士论文的几周前，他史无前例地亲自给父亲打了个电话。据哈丽雅特·诺伊斯回忆，这次谈话非常简短：
IN AUGUST 1953, a few weeks before Noyce was slated to submit the dissertation, he placed an unprecedented person-to-person call to his father. As Harriet Noyce recalled it, the conversation was remarkably brief:
“我是鲍勃，在威斯康星州埃弗雷姆。爸爸，您愿意为我们主持婚礼吗？”
“This is Bob, at Ephraim, Wisconsin. Will you marry us, Dad?”
你和谁？38
“You and who?”38
诺伊斯说，女孩名叫贝蒂·博托姆利。他们当时已经从波士顿出发，想在一周内结婚。
THE GIRL WAS NAMED BETTY BOTTOMLEY, Noyce said. They were already en route from Boston, and they wanted to be married within the week.
鲍勃·诺伊斯在塔夫茨大学演出音乐剧时结识了贝蒂·博特姆利，博特姆利是该剧的服装设计师。（诺伊斯陪女友去试镜，结果自己也得到了一个角色。）贝蒂·博特姆利22岁，身材娇小纤细，一头金色短卷发紧贴着头皮。严重的湿疹使她的皮肤粗糙不平，与传统意义上的美女相去甚远，但诺伊斯并非被她的外貌所吸引。从高中起，他就喜欢那种内心带点尖酸刻薄、说话“像剃刀一样锋利”的女人，正如他曾经形容的那样。贝蒂·博特姆利无疑符合这个描述。她从小体弱多病，患有哮喘，而且不擅长运动，而她的家人却经常滑雪和帆船。这让她练就了一副犀利的幽默感，能够用一种令人瞠目结舌的幽默和辛辣的讽刺来评论任何情况。不止一个人觉得她像多萝西·帕克。就连她自己的家人，在贝蒂在场的时候，也会略带尴尬地开玩笑说需要“提高警惕”。她看起来完全符合诺伊斯眼中那种东海岸的世故老练的形象。39
Bob Noyce had met Betty Bottomley while performing in a musical at Tufts College, for which Bottomley was the costume designer. (Noyce had accompanied a girlfriend to auditions for the play and ended up with a role himself.) Betty Bottomley was 22, small and slight, with short blonde curls that hugged her head. Bad eczema that left her skin flaky and bumpy kept her from conventional prettiness, but Noyce had not been drawn to her by her looks. Ever since high school, he had liked a woman to have a touch of acid in her heart and a “tounge [sic] as sharp as a razor,” as he once put it. Betty Bottomley certainly fit this description. A sickly child, asthmatic and unathletic in a family that spent a good deal of its time skiing and sailing, she had developed a slicing wit and an ability to comment on any situation with a jaw-dropping combination of humor and venom. She reminded more than one person of Dorothy Parker. Even her own family joked somewhat uneasily about the need to “sharpen our wits” when Betty was around. She seemed every inch the East Coast sophisticate that Noyce found attractive.39
贝蒂·博特姆利的母亲称她为“一个小小能量机器”。论精力、冲动和意志力，她与鲍勃·诺伊斯不相上下。1952年，她从塔夫茨大学英语系毕业，并在接下来的一年里，一边攻读研究生写作课程，一边在母校的公共关系办公室工作，同时还为一家文学杂志撰稿，并为吉尔伯特与沙利文协会设计和缝制服装。闲暇时，她喜欢钻研《大西洋月刊》等杂志上的复杂填字游戏。不久前，她刚与交往多年的男友分手，因为诺伊斯很快就得知了此事。40
Betty Bottomley’s mother called her “a little human dynamo.” In raw energy, impulsivity, and strength of will, she was every inch Bob Noyce’s equal. She had graduated Tufts with a degree in English in 1952 and had spent the next year taking a graduate writing course, working in the public relations office of her alma mater, and writing for a literary magazine in addition to designing and sewing costumes for the Gilbert and Sullivan society. In her spare time, she enjoyed working complex word puzzles she found in magazines such as the Atlantic. She had also recently broken up with a boyfriend of several years, as Noyce made it his business to learn in relatively short order.40
五月话剧短暂演出结束后，两人已经正式成为情侣。三个月后，贝蒂开始帮鲍勃打字撰写论文。两人之间既有友谊又有压力，这种共同的感受想必令人兴奋。这段感情对贝蒂来说无疑很特别，她带着鲍勃去她位于罗德岛州普罗维登斯附近的家中见父母。她经常邀请一群朋友来家里做客，但只邀请一个人却很不寻常。她的父母很快就注意到了这一点。
By the end of the play’s short run in May, the two were a couple. Three months later, Betty was typing Bob’s thesis for him. The shared sense of camaraderie and stress must have been exhilarating. The relationship certainly felt special to Betty, who brought Bob to meet her parents at their home near Providence, Rhode Island. She often invited groups of friends to stay, but inviting just one was unusual. Her parents noticed immediately.
贝蒂一家与鲍勃在世纪乡村俱乐部当服务员时遇到的那些男人，比与诺伊斯一家更有共同之处。弗兰克·博特姆利是西拉尔制造公司的副总裁。海伦·麦克拉伦·博特姆利养育了四个孩子（贝蒂是最小的），同时还在她所在的俱乐部担任委员会成员，并在一家为来自破碎家庭的残疾男孩设立的学校做义工。博特姆利一家拥有一艘大型帆船，他们经常在游艇俱乐部附近的水域上消磨时光，以至于他们常说，他们还不如就住在纳拉甘西特湾里。
Betty’s family had more in common with the men Bob had served as a waiter at the Century Country Club than with the Noyces. Frank Bottomley was a vice president at the Sealall manufacturing company. Helen MacLaren Bottomley had raised four children (Betty was the youngest) while serving on committees at her club and volunteering at a school for handicapped boys from broken homes. The Bottomleys owned a large sailboat and spent so much time on the waters around their yacht club that they often said they might as well live in Narragansett Bay itself.
尽管博特姆利一家拥有财富——虽然实际上并不算巨额，但在诺伊斯看来或许如此——但他们为人谦逊低调。弗兰克·博特姆利他从英国移民而来，八年级后便辍学，自诩为一名高级绘图员。海伦·博特姆利任由风吹日晒，弄脏了她每天早晨盘在头上的简单辫子。她把在俱乐部组织的午餐会称为“娱乐委员会的流水线”。诺伊斯的最终评价是：博特姆利一家加入游艇俱乐部是为了航海，而不是为了社交。他赞同这种态度。41
For all their wealth—which was not truly substantial but may have seemed so to Noyce—the Bottomleys were unpretentious. Frank Bottomley, who had emigrated from England and left school after eighth grade, considered himself a glorified draftsman. Helen Bottomley had let the wind and sun weather her face and the simple braids she wound around her head each morning. She called the luncheons she organized at the club “production lines for the entertainment committee.” Noyce’s final assessment: the Bottomleys were the sort who joined a yacht club for the sailing, not for the society connections. He approved of this attitude.41
博特姆利一家很喜欢鲍勃帮弗兰克修船，也很欣赏他总是兴致勃勃地和他们一起围坐在钢琴旁，背着歌声唱着吉尔伯特和沙利文的曲子。贝蒂的父母告诉她，鲍勃“几乎完美无缺”，但他们也清楚，他们的意见对贝蒂来说没什么影响。正如海伦·博特姆利曾经说过的那样，语气中既流露出疲惫又充满自豪，贝蒂“很久以来就一直自己做决定”。42
The Bottomleys liked how Bob helped Frank work on the boat, and they appreciated the eagerness with which he joined them around the piano to sing Gilbert and Sullivan tunes from memory. He was “pretty much all one could ask for” her parents told Betty, fully aware that their opinions would hold little sway over her. As Helen Bottomley once put it, weariness and pride equally evident in her voice, Betty “has made her own decisions for a long time.”42
仅仅一周就通知家人即将结婚，这未免也太突然了，即便对鲍勃来说也是如此，毕竟他冲动鲁莽、不善沟通的性格在家族里可是出了名的。唐和盖洛德在求婚前当然都把未来的妻子介绍给了诺伊斯夫妇，但拉尔夫和哈丽特·诺伊斯夫妇却从未听说过贝蒂·博特姆利这个人。鲍勃交往过的女人太多，为了躲避母亲没完没了的追问，他早就不再提起她们了。事实上，研究生毕业后，他很少给家里写信，一年可能就写几次，而且只有在真正重大的消息——比如他胳膊骨折了，或者得了什么奖——的时候才会写。
THIS ONE-WEEK NOTICE for an impending marriage was a bit much, even for Bob, whose impulsivity and lack of communication were legendary in his family. Both Don and Gaylord had introduced their future wives to the Noyces before proposing, of course, but Ralph and Harriet Noyce had never even heard of Betty Bottomley. Bob dated so many women that he had long ago stopped mentioning them in an effort to escape the inevitable deluge of questions from his mother. Indeed, he wrote home quite infrequently by the end of graduate school, perhaps only a few times per year, and then only to report truly dramatic news—that he had broken his arm, or won an award.
鲍勃·诺伊斯到底是怎么想的？诚然，男性在博士毕业几个月内结婚的情况相当普遍。虽然这种时机选择有其合理原因——毕业后的工作、收入和居住地往往要到毕业前几个月才能确定——但宿舍里的常识也告诫人们，隧道尽头的曙光往往会给身边的女性蒙上一层不切实际的幻想。
What was Bob Noyce thinking? To be sure, it was quite common for men to marry within months of finishing their PhDs. While there were good reasons for the timing—post-graduate jobs, income, and location often were not settled until a few months before graduation—dorm wisdom also warned that the light at the end of the tunnel had an unfortunate habit of bathing the nearest female in an idealized glow.
独自前往陌生之地开始新工作，身边没有任何同伴，这无疑促使一些人匆忙地提出邀请，但诺伊斯更渴望研究生毕业后能彻底摆脱束缚，重新开始。尽管他当时只有25岁，却已经养成了一种习惯：将生活中的一部分在精神上捆绑起来，束之高阁，从不回头。来到麻省理工学院不久，他就向母亲坦白，他最渴望的莫过于“自由”。从格林内尔高中毕业后，他几乎与儿时的朋友们断绝了联系。在剑桥最初的几个月里，他曾积极与大学好友保持联系，以此来缓解麻省理工学院繁重的学业和经济压力，但此后他很少再与他们联系。研究生毕业后，在接下来的四十年里，他的同事们，包括那些与他同住多年的室友，都只见过他寥寥几次面，也从未收到过他的任何消息。43
The prospect of heading off to a new place for a new job without any companionship undoubtedly led to a few hastily proffered proposals, but Noyce would have welcomed a completely unfettered beginning after graduate school. Although he was only 25 years old, he had already developed a habit of mentally tying up one part of his life, shelving it, and never looking back. Shortly after coming to MIT, he admitted to his mother that he wanted, more than anything else, to “be free.” He had almost nothing to do with his childhood friends after he graduated Grinnell High School. He rarely communicated with college buddies after those first few months in Cambridge when he had actively sought them out as an antidote to the academic and financial demands of MIT. After he left graduate school, none of his colleagues, including the ones he lived with for years, would see or hear from him more than a handful of times in the next four decades.43
就连他挚爱的哥哥盖洛德也感受到了鲍勃不断寻求新开始的习惯所带来的影响。随着岁月的流逝，兄弟二人渐行渐远。“老朋友和家人会让你慢下来，”盖洛德指出，“有生日要记住，有信要写，有电话要接，即使你不想接。鲍勃可不是那种会为任何事慢下来的人。”44
Even Gaylord, his beloved older brother, felt the effects of Bob’s need for constant new starts. The two brothers drifted apart as the years passed. “Old friends and family can slow you down,” Gaylord pointed out. “There are birthdays to remember, letters to write, and calls to accept even if you don’t want to talk. Bob was not the type to slow down for much of anything.”44
那么，诺伊斯为何会娶只认识三个月的贝蒂·博特姆利呢？贝蒂告诉朋友们，这是她一时冲动的决定，但这似乎不太可能。诺伊斯虽然行事冲动，但在关键时刻却很精明。他绝不会一时兴起就结婚。多年后，鲍勃告诉女儿，1953年夏天，他和贝蒂都担心她怀孕了。他不想再背负堕胎的罪孽。贝蒂是否真的怀孕流产，或者他们的担忧是否毫无根据，至今仍是个谜。但无论如何，这对夫妇婚后15个月都没有孩子。45
Why then would Noyce marry Betty Bottomley, whom he had known only three months? Betty told her friends that it had been a spur-of-the-moment decision, but again, this seems an unlikely explanation. Noyce was impulsive, but he was shrewd when it mattered. He would not have married on a whim. Years later Bob told his daughter that he and Betty had feared she was pregnant in the summer of 1953. He did not want another abortion on his conscience. It is unclear whether Betty was pregnant and miscarried, or whether the fears were unfounded, but the couple bore no children for 15 months after the wedding.45
哈丽特·诺伊斯一想到要主持婚礼招待富有的博特姆利一家就兴奋不已，以至于根本无暇顾及婚礼本身。“我当时觉得这简直难以置信，”她后来写道，“也许他只是说了‘你愿意为我们主持婚礼吗？’，却没说‘这周’。”贝蒂和鲍勃想要一个简单的婚礼，但筹备工作仍然令人头疼。哈丽特和拉尔夫几个月前才搬到伊利诺伊州的里士满——诺伊斯牧师又找到了一份新工作——他们还没能完全融入当地社区。更糟糕的是，家里的车坏了。哈丽特从当地杂货店订购了一个结婚蛋糕，自己动手做了一只鸡，还请桑威奇镇的朋友们帮忙烤面包卷、演奏婚礼进行曲、接待博特姆利一家（他们四天后就要到了），并用拉尔夫教区捐赠的粉色和白色剑兰装饰教堂。46
Harriet Noyce worked herself into such a frenzy over the prospect of hosting a wedding and entertaining the wealthy Bottomleys that she had no time to worry about the marriage itself. “I felt it simply could not be true,” she later wrote. “Maybe he had only said ‘will you marry us’ without saying ‘this week.’” Betty and Bob wanted a simple ceremony, but the logistics were daunting nonetheless. Harriet and Ralph had moved to Richmond, Illinois, only a few months before—Reverend Noyce had taken another new job—and they were not yet at home in the community. To make matters worse, the family car was broken. Harriet ordered a wedding cake from the local grocery store, dressed a chicken herself, and called on friends from Sandwich to bake rolls, play the wedding march, house the Bottomleys (who were arriving in four days), and decorate the sanctuary with pink and white gladiolas donated by Ralph’s congregation.46
她祈祷博特姆利一家不会对她的工作嗤之以鼻。“像他们这样的‘大人物’在这里适应起来确实比我们在那里适应要容易得多，”她向母亲解释道，“我只是想告诉他们，这是我们能为孩子们做的，代替结婚礼物。”如果哈丽特对鲍勃突然提出的要求感到不满，她也从未让他知道。不过，正是在这几天里，她爆了粗口——这是人们记忆中她唯一一次说脏话，当时鸡肉沙拉看起来不太对劲，她忍不住小声咒骂了一句。47
She prayed that the Bottomleys would not turn up their noses at her work. “It really is easier for ‘big’ folks like them to make the adjustment here than for us to do it there,” she explained to her mother. “I just tried to tell them this was what we could do for the children in lieu of a wedding present.” If Harriet resented the demands Bob had placed on her so suddenly, she never let him know it, though it was during these few days that she swore for the only time anyone could ever remember—a tiny “darn” escaped her lips when the chicken salad threatened not to turn out the way she wanted.47
贝蒂·博特姆利在哮喘发作时见到了未来的公婆。她面色潮红，气喘吁吁，与鲍勃描述的未婚妻——一位优雅的东部女子——截然不同。稍稍缓过神来后，她和鲍勃骑着拉尔夫·哈罗德的自行车——贝蒂坐在车把上——去做血液检查。验血结果很快被交给一位认识芝加哥公共卫生部门的人的家庭朋友，此人可以加快实验室的检测速度。鲍勃事先得知……他带来的那套西装——也是他唯一的一套——对于新郎来说太破旧了，于是他借了一辆卡车去买了一套新的。盖洛德和多蒂几天前就到了，像往常一样去看望他的父母；盖伊和鲍勃一样，都曾在格林内尔的花店工作过，他主动提出要为新娘制作捧花，为新郎制作胸花。
Betty Bottomley met her future in-laws in the throes of an asthma attack. Florid and wheezing, she was not the sophisticated Easterner the family had expected from Bob’s description of his fiancée. When she had recovered a bit, she and Bob rode off on Ralph Harold’s bicycle—Betty perched in the handle bars—for blood tests that were quickly handed off to a family friend who knew someone in the public health office in Chicago who would expedite the lab work. Bob, who had been informed that the suit he brought—the only one he owned—was too threadbare for a groom, borrowed a truck to buy a new one. Gaylord and Dotey had arrived a few days earlier for one of their regular visits to his parents; Gay, who, like Bob, had worked at the florist shop in Grinnell, offered to make the bride’s bouquet and groom’s boutonnière.
鲍勃和贝蒂看起来非常幸福。鲍勃为他的未婚妻感到骄傲，对她温柔体贴，这是他的家人从未见过的，他经常抚摸她，轻轻地梳理她的头发。但他和贝蒂有时也会针锋相对，争吵不休。他们喜欢互相斗嘴，在一些家人看来，这似乎是在炫耀他们敏捷的思维。
Bob and Betty seemed happy together. Bob was proud of his fiancée and treated her with a tenderness his family had never seen, touching her often and gently brushing her hair. But he and Betty could also be flamboyantly combative. They enjoyed verbally jousting with each other in what seemed to some family members to be a flagrant attempt to show off their agile minds.
观察了几天后，哈丽特觉得贝蒂“很适合鲍勃”。她喜欢贝蒂不想要那种热闹的社交婚礼，并赞许地称赞她“举止优雅，神态自若”。她安慰自己说：“鲍勃很优秀，也很成熟，我们可以相信他的决定。”拉尔夫·诺伊斯说贝蒂·博特姆利会是一位“优秀而慈爱的儿媳”，并谈到他为这对“受过良好教育、成熟稳重、才华横溢、兴趣广泛的年轻人”的婚姻感到“高兴”。虽然一位年轻的家庭成员觉得贝蒂出乎意料地“冷静”，但这被归咎于紧张。毕竟，她与未来的家人见面才几天，就要决定与他们共度一生了。48
After a few days’ observation, Harriet decided Betty was “all right for Bob.” She liked that Betty had not wanted “all the fuss” of a social wedding, and commented approvingly on her “nice poise and gaity [sic].” She reassured herself that “Bob is pretty fine and grown up, and we can trust his decision.” Ralph Noyce said Betty Bottomley would make “a fine and loving daughter-in-law” and spoke of the “joy” he felt in the marriage of these “young people trained, educated, mature, [and] with such brilliant minds and so many interests.” Though one younger family member found Betty surprisingly “cool,” this was chalked up to nerves. She was, after all, meeting her future family only a few days before she committed to spending a lifetime with them.48
婚礼当天早上，鲍勃穿着他新买的灰色西装，贝蒂则穿着一件简洁的蓝色连衣裙，戴着三串珍珠项链。这对年轻夫妇在20位宾客面前，手牵着手，深情地凝视着彼此，背诵着誓言，拉尔夫·诺伊斯显然被深深打动了。这些宾客几乎都是拉尔夫和哈丽特的家人或挚友。鲍勃唯一到场的朋友是他四年的室友乔治·克拉克和莫里斯·纽斯坦。贝蒂似乎除了父母和兄弟姐妹之外，没有邀请其他人。她和丈夫一样，认识很多人，但真正称得上知己的却寥寥无几。
On the morning of the ceremony, Bob wore his new gray suit, and Betty wore a simple blue dress and a triple strand of pearls. Ralph Noyce was visibly moved by the young couple reciting their vows from memory, holding hands and looking seriously into each other’s faces before their 20 guests, almost all of whom were family or intimate friends of Ralph and Harriet. Bob’s only friends to attend were his roommates of four years, George Clark and Maurice Newstein. Betty does not appear to have invited anyone other than her parents and siblings. She, like her husband, knew many people but counted few among them good friends.
在哈丽特的招待会上，博特姆利一家表示，他们对诺伊斯一家及其好友能在如此短的时间内筹办如此温馨的聚会感到“无比惊喜”。哈丽特兴奋地对母亲说：“在他们的朋友中，这种聚会可不会这么快就办成……他们也承认，有些朋友确实很势利眼。”49
At Harriet’s reception, the Bottomleys declared themselves positively “overwhelmed” that the Noyces and their close friends could create such a lovely gathering with so little notice. Harriet crowed to her mother, “It wouldn’t have happened so soon among their friends … some of whom they admit are definitely snooty.”49
1953年8月26日下午，招待会结束后几个小时，罗伯特·诺顿·诺伊斯博士和夫人启程前往位于密歇根州特拉弗斯城附近水晶湖畔的哈丽特家度假小屋，开始为期一周的蜜月之旅。之后，他们将前往费城，鲍勃将在那里开始他在菲尔科公司的工作。“他的薪水相当不错，他打算还清欠你的债，”哈丽特在给母亲的信中写道，“还能还我们一点钱。大家都说鲍勃的名声很好。”50
On the afternoon of August 26, 1953, several hours after the reception ended, Dr. and Mrs. Robert Norton Noyce left for a week’s honeymoon at Harriet’s family cottage on the shores of Crystal Lake near Traverse City, Michigan. From there they would head to Philadelphia, where Bob was slated to begin his job at Philco. “It’s a good enough salary so that he plans to pay off his debts to you,” Harriet wrote to her mother, “and a little to us. They really say lots of nice things about Bob.”50
鲍勃·诺伊斯和贝蒂·诺伊斯夫妇在埃尔金斯公园的一套两居室公寓里开始了他们的生活，公寓位于菲尔科公司费城总部以北约20分钟车程的地方。他们的婚姻堪称20世纪50年代的典型典范。每天早上8点，诺伊斯都会在公寓停车场的一角与他的拼车伙伴会合——其他三位乘客也都是菲尔科公司晶体管部门的研究员。诺伊斯上班时，贝蒂则忙于家务、做饭、缝纫、采购食品杂货，以及为她正在上的绘画课而画画。诺伊斯大约6点到家后，他们会一起吃晚饭。晚上，诺伊斯要么继续完成他在菲尔科的工作，要么组装他的模型飞机，而贝蒂则读书，或者偶尔和住在隔壁公寓的朋友一起玩拼字游戏。有时，鲍勃还会教她打桥牌。他们都喜欢招待朋友，经常邀请朋友们来家里做客。他们在费城只住了一个月，就得知他们的第一个孩子将于 1954 年夏天出生。
BOB AND BETTY NOYCE started their life together in a two-room apartment in Elkins Park, about 20 minutes north of Philco’s Philadelphia headquarters. Theirs was the quintessential 1950s marriage. Every morning at 8:00 Noyce met his carpool—the three other riders were also researchers in the transistor division at Philco—in the corner of the apartment parking lot. While he was at work, Betty spent her days keeping house, cooking, sewing, grocery shopping, and painting for a class she was taking. They would have dinner together when Noyce arrived home around 6:00. In the evenings, Noyce either finished up his Philco work or pieced together his model airplanes while Betty read or occasionally went off “Scrabbling” with a friend who lived in the apartment next door. Sometimes Bob would give her a bridge lesson. They both enjoyed entertaining and often invited friends for an evening. They had lived in Philadelphia for only a month when they learned their first child would arrive in the summer of 1954.
诺伊斯的工作虽然不如在家时那么平静，但也同样令人愉快。诺伊斯加入菲尔科公司时，正值晶体管研究人员蓬勃发展的时期。与他拼车的四人几乎占了公司晶体管研究人员总数的15%。直到不久前，晶体管对菲尔科公司来说还只是副业，是反向整合的一次尝试：晶体管是收音机的关键元件，未来显然也会在电视机中扮演重要角色。更重要的是，菲尔科公司觊觎军用晶体管市场。几十年来，该公司一直与美国国防部签订合同——二战期间，其获得的保险丝、雷达设备、收音机、真空管和蓄电池等合同总额超过1.5亿美元——1953年诺伊斯加入公司时，菲尔科公司正在美国海军担保的4000万美元V型循环贷款的资助下，对其军用生产设施进行全面改造。51
Work for Noyce was less peaceful but no less pleasant than his time at home. Noyce had joined Philco at an exciting time for its transistor researchers. The four men in Noyce’s carpool represented nearly 15 percent of the company’s transistor research staff. Until quite recently transistors had been a sideline business for Philco, an experiment in backwards integration: transistors were essential components in radios and would clearly play a role in televisions in the future. Even more important, Philco coveted the military market for transistors. The company had worked under Defense Department contract for decades—its combined WWII contracts for fuses, radar equipment, radios, vacuum tubes, and storage batteries amounted to more than $150 million—and when Noyce arrived in 1953, the company was overhauling its military production facilities with the assistance of a $40 million line of V-loan revolving credit guaranteed by the United States Navy.51
1950年，菲尔科公司启动了自主研发晶体管的项目，时年40岁的应用物理研究组负责人比尔·布拉德利被委任领导这项工作。当时，晶体管领域的正规高等教育并不存在——诺伊斯在麻省理工学院的学习成果可谓是拼凑而成——因此，布拉德利为研究部门招募了一批背景各异的人员（其中一位是女性）：几位物理学博士、几位电气工程师、许多自学成才的工程师和技术人员，以及一些刚毕业的理科生。对于一家公司而言，经验与学历同等重要，因为该公司更看重的是能够销售的晶体管，而不是理论上引人入胜的晶体管。正如菲尔科公司负责研究的副总裁所说，这种晶体管将成为“对社会有用的人”。由于市场在菲尔科公司与科学同等重要，诺伊斯的团队在进行基础科学研究的同时，也开展了应用研究。52
When Philco launched its program to develop a proprietary transistor in 1950, Bill Bradley, the 40-year-old head of research within the applied physics group, was tapped to lead the effort. An advanced formal education in transistors did not exist—witness Noyce’s cobbled-together efforts at MIT—and so Bradley hired an eclectic group of men (and one woman) for the research division: a few Physics PhDs, several electrical engineers, many self-taught engineers and technicians, and a sprinkling of fresh-faced college kids with science degrees. Experience was education’s equal for a company less interested in a theoretically intriguing transistor than in a sellable transistor, a device that would be, in the words of Philco’s vice president of research, a “useful member of society.” Because markets were as important as science at Philco, Noyce’s group conducted research on applications at the same time as the basic scientific investigations.52
晶体管小组的首项重要发明是一种锗器件，他们称之为“表面势垒晶体管”。在点接触晶体管领域，菲尔科公司（Philco）的器件巧妙地绕过了贝尔实验室的专利。1953年12月，菲尔科公司在一次特别会议上宣布了表面势垒晶体管的发明。出席会议的有美国国防部和无线电工程师协会（IRE，电子研究人员的顶级专业组织）的代表。菲尔科公司研发主管断言：“表面势垒晶体管是自点接触晶体管发现以来电子领域最重要的进步。”与其他晶体管相比，它的工作频率更高，功耗更低，这意味着它比同类产品更稳定。该晶体管的关键创新在于一种新的锗加工方法，菲尔科公司认为这种方法“有望在不久的将来实现晶体管的大规模生产”。在20世纪50年代初期，可靠的大规模生产是整个行业的终极目标，当时器件的生产仍然采用缓慢而繁琐的小批量工艺。 IRE 在其会议记录中用了 50 页篇幅刊登 Philco 工作人员撰写的技术文章，内容涵盖了该设备背后的理论、生产该设备所使用的生产方法及其市场应用。53
The first important invention to emerge from the transistor group was a germanium device they called the “surface-barrier transistor.” A variation on the point-contact transistor, the Philco device somehow managed to sidestep the Bell Labs patents. Philco announced the invention of the surface-barrier transistor in December 1953, at a special meeting attended by representatives of the Department of Defense and the Institute of Radio Engineers (IRE), the premier professional organization for electronics researchers. “The surface-barrier transistor is the most important advance in electronics since discovery of the point-contact transistor,” asserted Philco’s head of Research and Engineering. It operated at higher frequencies and consumed less power than other transistors, which meant it would be more stable than competing devices. The key innovation behind the transistor was a new method of processing germanium that Philco thought “promised transistor mass production” in the very near future. Reliable mass production was the holy grail of the industry in the early 1950s, when devices were still produced in small batches in a slow and painstaking process. The IRE devoted 50 pages in its Proceedings to technical articles by the Philco staff that covered the theory behind the device, the production methods used to produce it, and its market applications.53
在诺伊斯加入公司大约三个月后，公告和相关文章的发布时机想必令他欣喜若狂。他一直渴望成为小池塘里的大鱼，而现在，在他到任仅仅几周后，整个晶体管界的目光都聚焦在了菲尔科这家小小的公司上。正如他所期望的那样，诺伊斯从一开始就能做出重大贡献。顾名思义，表面势垒晶体管的工作原理是在锗的表面进行。这与诺伊斯在表面态方面的专长完美契合，因此他能够轻松地加入到这项研发工作中。54
The timing of the announcement and articles, roughly three months after Noyce’s arrival at the company, must have thrilled him. He had wanted to be a large fish in a small pond, and now, just weeks after his arrival, the eyes of the entire transistor world were focused on the tiny Philco pond. And just as he had hoped, Noyce could contribute in significant ways from the beginning. As its name implied, the surface-barrier transistor did its work on the surface of the germanium. It thus correlated well with Noyce’s expertise in surface states, and he had no trouble jumping into the effort midstream.54
Philco公司的关键生产创新在于一种蚀刻和电镀锗的方法：向半导体薄片的两侧喷射两股液态铟盐。诺伊斯的第一个任务是协助开发一种方法，以确定何时停止蚀刻并开始电镀。这并非他在麻省理工学院学习的基础物理。它具有直接的实用性，并且显然与一个具体问题相关——在某些方面，它更偏向工程学而非物理学。对于一个最看重实际应用价值的人来说，这是一项理想的任务。诺伊斯建议用一束光照射晶体管来测量其基区宽度。随着晶体管基区宽度的减小，光强会增加。当光强表明基区宽度已蚀刻到合适的厚度时，即可开始电镀工艺。Philco公司采纳了这种方法，并取得了一定的成功，这项创新也成为诺伊斯第一项专利的基础。几个月后，诺伊斯与人合著了关于表面势垒晶体管理论的基础论文。该论文于 1955 年完成，但公司认为它太过重要，不宜在公开文献中发表。55
The key Philco production innovation was a method of etching and electroplating germanium by shooting two jets of liquid indium salt at either side of a sliver of the semiconductor. Noyce’s first assignment was to help develop a way to determine when it was time to stop etching and start electroplating. This was not the fundamental physics he had studied at MIT. It was immediately practical and obviously relevant to a specific problem—more engineering than physics in some ways. This was an ideal assignment for someone who valued, above all, doing something useful. Noyce suggested measuring the base width of the transistor by shining a beam of light on it. As the base width of transistor decreased, the intensity of the light would increase. When the light indicated that the base width had been etched to the appropriate thinness, the electroplating process could begin. Philco adopted this approach with some success, and the innovation served as the basis of Noyce’s first patent. Within months, Noyce was coauthoring the basic paper on surface-barrier transistor theory, which, when it was completed in 1955, the company considered too important to publish in the open literature.55
诺伊斯的直属上司卡洛·博恰雷利是一位肤色黝黑、体态圆润的前艺术家，他不屑于传统的经商方式。除了母语意大利语外，他还会说三种语言，而且不用皮带，而是用绳子穿过裤子的扣眼打个结。博恰雷利经常公开地盯着公司里那些漂亮的女秘书和生产工人看。他尤其欣赏那些染成金发的姑娘，他认为她们漂白的头发是“讨人喜欢的良好迹象”。诺伊斯也效仿老板，连西装领带都不穿。他也很喜欢菲尔科公司的女性员工，而且很高兴其中有几位碰巧也叫贝蒂。“我在家做梦梦到说梦话的时候，”他后来解释说，“这没什么大不了的。”56
Noyce’s immediate boss, Carlo Bocciarelli, was a swarthy, rotund, former artist who had no use for traditional ways of doing business. He spoke three languages in addition to his native Italian and knotted a rope through the buttonholes in his pants instead of wearing a belt. Bocciarelli openly ogled the attractive women who worked throughout the company as secretaries and production workers. He particularly admired the bottle blondes, whose bleached hair he called “a promising indication of a willingness to please.” Noyce followed his boss’s example enough to eschew both coat and tie. He also enjoyed the women at Philco and was happy that several of them happened to be named Betty. “When I talked in my sleep [at home],” he explained later, “it was fine.”56
诺伊斯喜欢博恰雷利，但他真正视为职业导师的是晶体管项目负责人比尔·布拉德利。布拉德利比诺伊斯年长约十二岁。他拥有电气工程学士学位，二战期间曾在麻省理工学院辐射实验室工作，之后加入菲尔科公司。他热爱音乐——尤其钟情于中世纪歌唱——并且从小就创办了一个“科学促进协会”，成员全部是志同道合的朋友，他们热衷于化学实验，制作鞭炮和火箭。布拉德利拥有多项电视和晶体管生产技术的专利，他似乎能为任何愿意倾听的人提供源源不断的想法和潜在的研究方向。诺伊斯称布拉德利为“白噪声源”，其中蕴藏着宝贵的“有用信号”。他发现导师那种坚持不懈、永不放弃的精神极具启发性。57
Noyce liked Bocciarelli, but it was Bill Bradley, the head of the transistor program, whom he considered a professional mentor. Bradley was roughly a dozen years older than Noyce. He held a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, and had spent the Second World War at the MIT Rad Lab before joining Philco. He loved music—particularly medieval singing—and as a boy had started an “association for the advancement of science” consisting entirely of friends who wanted to experiment with chemicals and build firecrackers and rockets. Bradley held several patents in television and transistor production techniques, and he could offer an apparently endless stream of ideas and potential research routes to anyone who would listen. Noyce, who called Bradley a “white noise source” with a buried but valuable “useful signal,” found his mentor’s relentless there-must-be-away attitude extremely encouraging.57
1954年春，诺伊斯被临时委任管理一小群研究人员时，他采用了布拉德利的管理方式：总是鼓励和解释，如果最初的想法有失败的可能，他总是随时准备提出新的想法。一位当时在诺伊斯手下工作的同事回忆说，他“非常平易近人，乐于助人，与典型的管理者截然不同”。诺伊斯只有在面对他认为思维迟钝的人时才会表现出不耐烦。他会想方设法避开这些人，如果避而远之，他就会一动不动地坐在那里听他们讲话，仿佛能看到他头顶上冒出一个卡通式的内心独白：“我为什么要被迫听这些？”58
When he was temporarily given management responsibility for a small group of researchers in the spring of 1954, Noyce adopted Bradley’s approach, always encouraging and explaining, always ready with a new idea to try if the original one threatened to fail. One man who worked for Noyce during this period recalled him as “very easy to talk to, very helpful, and very different from a typical manager.” Noyce only expressed impatience when dealing with people he considered intellectually slow. He did everything he could to avoid them, and when that failed, he would sit so immobilized as they spoke that one could almost see a cartoon thought bubble over his head: “Why am I forced to sit through this?”58
在诺伊斯工作大约一年半后，他对菲尔科公司的看法开始转变。该公司曾大肆宣扬其技术将开启晶体管自动化生产的时代，但自宣布这一消息以来的一年里，菲尔科公司始终未能将晶体管从研发阶段推进到位于宾夕法尼亚州兰斯代尔（曾生产真空管）的工厂的生产阶段。尽管该公司声称其专利蚀刻和电镀技术能够实现“迄今为止锗加工中最高的机械精度”，但从兰斯代尔工厂生产的晶体管存在漏电和可靠性问题。诺伊斯是受邀前来提高晶体管良率（即生产过程中可用晶体管的比例）的几位研究人员之一。他所在的团队研制了一种利用扫描电子束监测晶体管表面电压差的设备。这项原始技术虽然能够精确定位问题所在，但调整生产线却耗时耗力。与此同时，其他问题也接踵而至，其中最令人担忧的是，即使晶体管能够正常工作，其启动延迟也过长，无法满足军事用途。59
ABOUT A YEAR AND A HALF into his work, Noyce’s feelings about Philco began to change. The company had trumpeted that its techniques would usher in an era of automated transistor production, but in the year that had passed since that announcement, Philco had been unable to move the transistors out of development and into production at the Landsdale, Pennsylvania, facility that had once made vacuum tubes. Although the company claimed that its patented etching and plating techniques allowed for “the highest mechanical precision yet attained in machining germanium,” the transistors that emerged from the Landsdale facility were leaky and unreliable. Noyce was one of several researchers brought in to try to improve the yield, or percentage of usable transistors to emerge from the production process. He was part of a team that built a device that used a scanning electron beam to monitor voltage differences on the surface of the transistor. The crude technology did pinpoint the location of the problems, but tweaking the production line proved time consuming and expensive. Meanwhile, other problems had emerged, most troubling among them the fact that even when the transistors worked, their delay before starting was too long for military purposes.59
诺伊斯对工作的不满还源于他与国防部官僚机构日益密切的接触。尽管菲尔科公司晶体管研发的主要资金来源是海军舰艇局，该局需要这些器件用于其“响尾蛇”导弹，但诺伊斯在1955年之前的大部分工作都不属于海军合同范围，而是由菲尔科公司内部的商业研发预算资助。然而，1955年初，菲尔科公司意识到自己无力承担研发费用。公司陷入困境。1953年至1954年间，公司收益下降了三分之二，期间一场罢工导致两家关键工厂停产，联邦政府也起诉菲尔科公司，指控其与分销商的关系存在反垄断行为。这场动荡最终导致晶体管研究小组开始完全依赖政府合同开展工作。“看来菲尔科公司仍然没有真正相信研发从长远来看能够带来回报，”诺伊斯愤愤不平地向家人抱怨道。60
Adding to Noyce’s frustration with his job was his increasing involvement with Defense Department bureaucracy. Although Philco’s primary backing for its transistor research came from the Bureau of Ships branch of the navy, which wanted the devices for its Sidewinder missile, most of Noyce’s work before 1955 had fallen outside the navy contract and was funded by Philco’s in-house commercial research and development budget. In early 1955, however, Philco decided it could not afford to fund its own research. The company was in trouble. Earnings dropped by two-thirds from 1953 to 1954, when a strike closed down two key plants and the federal government sued Philco, charging antitrust activities in its relationships with distributors. The net effect of this turmoil for Noyce was that the transistor group began working exclusively under government contract. “It seems that Philco is not yet really convinced that research pays for itself in the long run,” Noyce bitterly reported to his family.60
诺伊斯简直无法相信他在空军晶体管合同下研究P型和N型半导体沟道时所面临的“种种胡扯、浪费、无谓的工作和缺乏激励”。他的工作性质在每个经费周期都充满不确定性。他必须填写工时卡，并按月和按季度提交关于他小型研究小组进展情况的报告。他尤其厌恶这些报告要求，总是拖延，这让菲尔科公司近六名专门负责监督晶体管小组报告合规性的撰稿人非常恼火。最终，负责管理这些撰稿人的乔·查普林开始伪造诺伊斯的报告，甚至编造了一些“好消息”。他向诺伊斯发出最后通牒：要么修改这些虚假报告，要么签字。诺伊斯当然照做了。查普林不得不对诺伊斯提交的几乎每一份报告都使用这种伎俩，而且他还不得不对其他几位研究人员也使用过这招。61
Noyce could not believe the “bullshit, waste, make-work, and lack of incentive” he faced in his research measuring the channels in P- and N-semiconductors under an air force transistor contract. The nature of his work was uncertain from one funding cycle to the next. He had to complete a time card and to file monthly and quarterly reports on his small research group’s progress. He particularly loathed the reporting requirements and would never write his reports on time, much to the frustration of the nearly half-dozen writers whose sole job at Philco was to oversee reporting compliance in the transistor group. Finally, Joe Chapline, who managed the writers, began preparing his own version of Noyce’s reports, complete with imaginary “good news.” His ultimatum: correct the fictitious reports or sign them. Noyce, of course, corrected them. Chapline had to resort to this ruse for nearly every report Noyce was required to submit, and he had to use it on a few other researchers, as well.61
与军事策划人员、采购代理和技术专家的会面占据了诺伊斯的大部分时间。他前往俄亥俄州代顿市，与赖特机场的军事工程师进行磋商；又前往新泽西州蒙茅斯堡，商讨一份陆军合同。除了审查“正确程序”和报告要求的会议之外，还要应对在他办公室外罢工者的叫喊声。窗口期的关闭，以及公司实际上告知他工作不够重要，不予资助的间接侮辱——所有这些都让诺伊斯无法像他常说的那样“做好科研”。更糟糕的是，他认为自己在菲尔科公司管理其他研究人员方面“做得一团糟”。他说，管理工作是一项“占用宝贵时间”的苦差事，让他无法专注于真正有用的工作。62
Meetings with military planners, purchasing agents, and technical experts filled Noyce’s days. He went to Dayton, Ohio, to consult with military engineers at Wright Field and to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to discuss an army contract. The meetings to review “proper procedure” and the reporting requirements, not to mention the strikers yelling outside his window and the indirect insult of effectively being told by his company that his work was not important enough to fund—all of this kept Noyce from “doing good science,” as he liked to say. To make matters worse, he thought he was doing “a lousy job” managing other researchers at Philco. Management, he said, was a chore that “took time away from useful work.”62
贝蒂·诺伊斯也过得很不开心。她和鲍勃都担心他会被征召入伍。她为儿子比利感到欣喜，比利于1954年7月出生，但她觉得“诺伊斯太太”的生活令人窒息。她整天要么待在家里，要么去邻居家照顾孩子。她和鲍勃仍然会招待客人，他们花很多时间一起拍摄比利的家庭录像，但贝蒂仍然觉得缺少成年人的陪伴比她希望的要多得多。鲍勃每周一个晚上在当地教堂的清唱剧合唱团唱歌。他经常会宣布自己要离开整个星期六——凌晨4点半就开车出发——去看模型飞机聚会，这毫不在意。与军方的会面和去兰斯代尔的行程意味着鲍勃经常不在家，贝蒂越来越反感他的这种奔波。 “鲍勃这周五或周一要去波士顿出差。他让我选哪天去——我不知道这是不是邀请我一起去……还是他只是想问问我什么时候最想一个人待着，”她写信给家人。每次鲍勃拿出行李箱，小比利都会嚎啕大哭。诺伊斯在家的时候，喜欢把自己关在客厅的角落里，用一本菲尔科公司另一位热爱音乐的员工借给他的书，尝试组装一台晶体管风琴。（“他们接下来还会想出什么花样？”贝蒂喃喃自语。）63
Betty Noyce was also miserable. She and Bob both worried that he might be drafted. She delighted in her son Billy, who was born in July 1954, but she found life as “Mrs. Noyce” stifling. She spent her days at home or at a neighbor’s with the baby. She and Bob still entertained, and they spent long hours making home movies of Billy together, but Betty nonetheless found herself without adult companionship more than she would like. Bob sang in an oratorio choir at a local church one evening per week. He thought nothing of announcing that he would be gone for an entire Saturday—taking the car with him at 4:30 in the morning—to watch a model airplane meet. The meetings with the military and trips to Landsdale meant Bob was often absent, and Betty found herself increasingly resentful of the travel. “Bob has got to go up to Boston on business either this Friday or Mon. He gave me my choice which day he should go—I don’t know if this is an invitation to come along … or if I was just consulted on when I’d most like to be alone,” she wrote to her family. When Bob took out the suitcase, little Billy would burst into tears. When Noyce was home, he liked to sequester himself in a corner of the living room, where he was trying to build a transistorized organ with the help of a book loaned to him by another Philco employee with a penchant for music. (“What will they think of next?” Betty muttered to herself.)63
诺伊斯的同事们怀疑他的婚姻并不幸福。“诺伊斯从不谈论他的妻子，”一位同事回忆说，“他从不提结婚纪念日、她的生日，或者她喜欢做什么。”另一位同事也表示赞同：“我唯一一次见到她，是我过去帮忙修理窗式空调的时候。鲍勃似乎把她藏在了屋里。”64
Noyce’s co-workers suspected that his marriage was not happy. “Noyce never talked about his wife,” recalled one. “He never mentioned an anniversary, or her birthday, or what she liked to do.” Concurred another, “The only time I ever saw her was when I came over once to help with a window air conditioning unit. Bob seemed to have kept her in the back.”64
尽管遭遇种种困境，贝蒂依然保持着她的机智。她给拉尔夫和哈丽特（她承担起了写信的重任）的信上署名：“B, B, b, & 1/2 b”，分别代表鲍勃、贝蒂、比利，以及比利满一周岁几个月后即将出生的宝宝。她用对美好未来的憧憬来安慰自己。她想买一栋房子，一栋漂亮的老房子，带个大院子，孩子们可以在里面玩耍。她还幻想在科德角或新罕布什尔州拥有一栋避暑别墅，这样鲍勃不在家的时候，她可以带孩子们去那里，或者和家人团聚。然而，这些美好的愿望都只是幻想。诺伊斯一家每月大约300美元的租金和取暖费，只能买到他们不想要的房子：费城中心的一栋联排别墅，贝蒂称之为“令人作呕”；或者莱维敦的一栋平房，一个贝蒂承认自己“太势利眼”而无法欣赏的“千篇一律的郊区”，尽管鲍勃很喜欢那里的开发项目。65
Through all her troubles, Betty maintained her wit. She signed her letters to Ralph and Harriet (she had assumed the writing duties): “B, B, b, & 1/2 b,” for Bob, Betty, Billy, and the baby due a few months after Billy turned one. She consoled herself with dreams of dramatic change. She wanted to buy a home, a nice old place with a big yard for the children. She imagined a summer cottage on Cape Cod or in New Hampshire, where she could take the children or meet her family when Bob was away. Such reveries were pure fantasy. The roughly $300 the Noyces spent to rent and heat their little apartment each month could only buy a house they did not want: a downtown Philadelphia rowhouse, which Betty declared “revolting,” or a bungalow in Levittown, a “homogenized suburbia” Betty admitted herself “too snobbish” to enjoy, though Bob liked the development quite a bit.65
当西屋电气公司打电话来，提出邀请他加入位于匹兹堡的晶体管部门，并立即加薪25%，且此后两年每年保证加薪10%时，诺伊斯动心了。他们可以在卡内基理工大学附近的好地段买房，而且这份工作听起来比他在菲尔科公司的工作更有意思。菲尔科公司则提出，愿意提供同样的加薪，并将管理职位转为永久职位。公司还抛出了调往兰斯代尔的诱人前景。贝蒂提醒鲍勃，是时候“开始考虑我们自己的永久住所了”，她认为在那里他们可以买“一栋小房子和一个大院子”。鲍勃为此纠结了一周，最终在一天凌晨两点决定留在菲尔科公司。66
When Westinghouse called with an offer to join the Pittsburgh-based transistor group at an immediate 25 percent raise, plus a guaranteed annual 10 percent raise for each of the two years thereafter, Noyce was tempted. They could buy a house in a nice neighborhood near Carnegie Tech, and the work sounded more interesting than what he was doing at Philco. Philco countered with an offer to meet the raises and make the management position permanent. The company also dangled the possibility of a transfer to Landsdale, where Betty, who reminded Bob it was time to “start thinking of a permanent site for ourselves,” thought they could buy “a little house and a big yard.” Bob wrestled with the decision for a week before deciding one morning at 2 AM to stay at Philco.66
1955年8月，诺伊斯写道：“我目前的资产包括：一套四居室公寓的家具，一辆价值700美元、有232美元抵押的汽车，约300美元现金，约650美元的股票和存款，以及一份有效期两年、现金价值260美元的2万美元人寿保险。除了每月约400美元的家庭日常开支外，我目前的负债为500美元的债务。我的妻子和孩子（预产期在10月）与我同住，完全依赖我的生活。”他的生活发生了多么翻天覆地的变化啊。67
In August 1955, Noyce noted, “My current assets are: household furnishings of a four-room apartment, a car valued at $700 with a lien of $232, about $300 cash on hand, stocks and savings of about $650, and a $20,000 life insurance policy two years in force with a cash value of $260. My current liabilities, other than monthly household running expenses of about $400, are debts to the extent of $500. My wife and children [a baby was due in October] live with me and are wholly dependent on me for their support.” How dramatically his life had changed.67
12月，征兵委员会送给诺伊斯一份迟来的28岁生日礼物——“无限期推迟入伍”。他不必再为征兵而担忧。新生儿，一个名叫佩妮的女孩，平安降生。小公寓里洋溢着温馨的气氛，天花板上挂着她的床铃，贝蒂用蔓绿绒装饰成的简易圣诞树倚靠在兔耳式调频天线上。但军营的工作仍在继续，搬到兰斯代尔的计划始终未能实现。到了1956年，鲍勃知道他最想做的就是“离开菲尔科公司，去别的地方重新开始”。68
In December, the draft board sent Noyce a belated twenty-eighth birthday present in the form of an “indefinite postponement of induction.” He would not need to worry about the draft. The new baby, a girl called Penny, had arrived safely. The little apartment looked downright cheerful with her mobile suspended from the ceiling and the philodendron Betty had decorated as a makeshift Christmas tree propped against the rabbit-ears FM antenna. But the military work continued, and the move to Landsdale never materialized. When the calendar turned to 1956, Bob knew he wanted nothing more than “to walk away [from Philco] and start over again somewhere else.”68
1956年1月19日，诺伊斯接起了响个不停的电话。电话那头的人只说了两个字：“我是肖克利。” 晶体管的发明者之一威廉·肖克利以为诺伊斯认识他，而他的猜测是对的。“那感觉就像拿起电话就跟上帝说话一样，”诺伊斯后来回忆道，“他绝对是半导体电子领域最重要的人物。” 而且他想让诺伊斯为他工作——在加利福尼亚。69
On January 19, 1956, Noyce answered his ringing telephone. The man at the other end of the line greeted him with two words: “Shockley here.” William Shockley, one of the inventors of the transistor, assumed Noyce knew who he was, and he was right. “It was like picking up the phone and talking to God,” Noyce recalled later. “He was absolutely the most important person in semiconductor electronics.” And he wanted Noyce to work for him—in California.69
3.
学徒制
3
Apprenticeship
威廉·肖克利拥有超过50项电子设备专利，据估计，在固态电子学领域最初的十几年里，他几乎贡献了该领域“一半有价值的创意”。他身材修长精瘦，额头宽阔，二十多岁时发际线就已开始后移，他是“五月花号”清教徒的直系后裔。肖克利先后就读于加州理工学院和麻省理工学院（1936年获得物理学博士学位），是一位技术天才，其工作态度与他的祖先如出一辙。二战期间，他在海军反潜作战小组工作，开发出的系统使美军对德国潜艇的成功攻击次数增加了三倍。他喜欢囤积物品，并且勤于记录，每天都用铅笔在笔记本上写下晦涩难懂的记录。他也是一位表演家和业余魔术师，据说他曾在发表科学论文时突然停下来，从讲台上变出一束鲜花。他的同事们有时甚至怀疑他是不是没睡觉。1953年，他的妻子琼被诊断出患有子宫癌。当时在贝尔实验室领导一个团队的肖克利，随即开始了对这种疾病的深入研究，他独自一人在家分析妻子的实验室切片，批注复杂的医学文章，并与世界各地的医生通信。1
William Shockley held more than 50 patents for electronic devices and by one estimate was personally responsible for nearly “half the worthwhile ideas in solid-state electronics” in the field’s first dozen years. Lanky and lean, with a wide forehead that began overtaking his hairline when he was still in his twenties, he was a direct descendent of Mayflower Puritans. Educated at California Institute of Technology and MIT—where he received his PhD in Physics in 1936—Shockley was a technical genius whose work ethic recalled that of his ancestors. During the Second World War, while working in the navy’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Group, he developed systems that quadrupled the number of successful American attacks on German subs. He was a pack rat and a vigorous note taker who filled notebook after notebook with cryptic, penciled records of the day’s events. He was also a showman and amateur magician who had been known to pause in the middle of delivering a scientific paper to conjure a bouquet of flowers from the lectern. His colleagues sometimes wondered if he slept. When his wife Jean fell ill with uterine cancer in 1953, Shockley, then overseeing a team at Bell Labs, launched an intensive oneman research effort into the disease, analyzing her lab slides at home, annotating complex medical articles, and writing to doctors around the world.1
肖克利于1954年离开贝尔实验室，大约在同一时间，诺伊斯也加入了菲尔科公司。他们的分手并不友好。贝尔实验室在1948年向全世界宣传的“晶体管三位发明家”的励志故事，掩盖了固态电路小组内部一场丑陋的内讧。世界上第一个晶体管——点接触晶体管，是由布拉坦和巴丁发明的，并没有得到他们的老板肖克利的帮助或认可。事实上，肖克利嫉妒得几乎要发疯，他把三位发明家叫到办公室，一边提高音量一边告诉他们，由于点接触晶体管建立在他早期的一些想法之上，他可以“为整个东西”申请专利。布拉坦回应道：“哦，见鬼，“肖克利！这足以让每个人都获得荣耀！”肖克利带着他的说法去找了贝尔实验室的专利律师。在调查他的说法时，律师们发现他所说的晶体管基础思想可能并非那么原创。稳妥的做法是不要在专利申请中署上肖克利的名字。2
Shockley had left Bell Labs in 1954, roughly the same time Noyce began work at Philco. It was not an amicable parting. The inspiring story of the “three inventors of the transistor” that Bell Labs had circulated around the world in 1948 whitewashed a nasty internecine conflict within the solid-state group. The point-contact transistor, the world’s first transistor, had been invented by Brattain and Bardeen without assistance or blessing from Shockley, who was their boss. Indeed, Shockley, nearly apoplectic with jealousy, had marked the transistor’s discovery by calling the inventors into his office to tell them, his voice rising with every word, that since the point-contact transistor built on some of his own early ideas, he could write a patent “on the whole damn thing.” When Brattain responded, “Oh hell, Shockley! There’s enough glory in this for everyone,” Shockley took his argument to the Bell Labs patent attorneys. In the course of investigating his claim, the attorneys discovered that the ideas he said were the foundation of the transistor might not be so original, after all. The safe route was not to include Shockley’s name on the patent application.2
甚至在得知这则对他个人而言毁灭性的消息之前，肖克利就已经开始着手独自研发晶体管。在得知巴丁和布拉坦的发明后几天，他就把自己关在芝加哥（当时他正在那里参加一个会议）的一家酒店房间里，疯狂地思考和写作。他始终没能创造出可以申请专利的装置，但他把这些想法藏在心里，生怕如果和布拉坦、巴丁分享，就不得不把他们列为他凭借纯粹的智慧和意志力创造出的任何装置的共同发明人。一月中旬，肖克利的秘密酝酿终于有了回报。他意识到，贝尔实验室一位同事的研究成果意味着，他在芝加哥酒店房间里构思的想法可以融合到一个可行的装置中：三明治结构的结型晶体管。这或许是肖克利对美国科学做出的最伟大的贡献。
Even before receiving this personally devastating news, Shockley had begun an effort to develop a transistor on his own. Within days of hearing of Bardeen and Brattain’s invention, he cloistered himself in a hotel room in Chicago (where he was attending a conference), thinking and writing furiously. A patentable device eluded him, but he kept his musings to himself, fearful that if he shared them with Brattain and Bardeen, he might have to list them as co-inventors of whatever device he planned to bring into being by sheer force of intellect and will. In mid-January, Shockley’s secret stewing paid off, when he realized that a Bell Labs colleague’s research findings meant that the ideas he had mapped out in his Chicago hotel room could be fused into a workable device: the sandwich-like junction transistor. It may be spite’s greatest contribution to American science.
与布拉坦和巴丁的冲突——尤其是在贝尔实验室规定任何“晶体管发明者”的合影都必须包含肖克利之后——仅仅是肖克利与其同事之间一系列争执和不和中的一个例子。到了1951年，贝尔实验室的高层管理人员再也无法忽视对肖克利古怪性格的抱怨，尤其是在布拉坦和巴丁告诉物理研究部负责人他们不再愿意向肖克利汇报工作之后。几天之内，该部门就进行了重组，肖克利原先的晶体管研究小组的大部分成员都被调到了其他人手下。
The conflict with Brattain and Bardeen—which only widened when Bell Labs decreed that any picture of “the inventors of the transistor” must include Shockley—represented merely one in a string of battles and hard feelings between Shockley and his colleagues. By 1951, Bell Labs senior management could no longer ignore complaints about Shockley’s prickly personality, especially after Brattain and Bardeen told the head of the Physical Research Department that they no longer wanted to report to Shockley. Within days, the department was reorganized, with most of Shockley’s old transistor group shifted to someone else.
肖克利的职业生涯显然开始停滞不前，于是他休假了一段时间。在母校加州理工学院任教一年后，他又在华盛顿特区工作了一年，担任五角大楼武器系统评估小组（一个由负责为军方武器规划流程提供建议的文职科学家和工程师组成的团队）的负责人。肖克利迫切希望做出改变。他与妻子琼离婚了，就在一年前，他还曾竭尽全力挽救琼的生命。之后，他搬到了加利福尼亚州。3
His career clearly beginning to stall, Shockley took a sabbatical. After a year spent teaching at his alma mater Cal Tech and another in Washington, D.C., where he headed the Pentagon’s Weapons Systems Evaluations Group (a cadre of civilian scientists and engineers charged with advising the military on the weapons planning process), Shockley was desperate for a change. He divorced Jean, whose life he had fought so valiantly to save only the year before. He moved to California.3
于是他决定创办一家晶体管公司。他预见到，晶体管终有一天会驱动从飞机到电视机的一切设备，而且他坚信，贝尔实验室及其制造部门西电公司（Western Electric）——当时他们仅仅把晶体管视为电话系统中真空管的潜在替代品——几乎构不成什么威胁。1955年夏天的大部分时间，他都在与雷神公司、德州仪器公司以及劳伦斯·洛克菲勒洽谈，试图筹集五十万美元来启动晶体管业务。然而，尽管开局良好，所有这些努力最终都停滞不前。4
And he decided to start a transistor company. He foresaw a day when transistors would power everything from airplanes to televisions, and he felt confident that Bell Labs and its manufacturing arm, Western Electric, which viewed the transistor as little more than a potential replacement for vacuum tubes in the telephone grid, would offer little competition. He spent most of the summer of 1955 in conversations with Raytheon, Texas Instruments, and Laurence Rockefeller, trying to secure half-a-million dollars to launch a transistor operation. After promising starts, all of these efforts stalled.4
然而，1955年8月，肖克利找到了愿意提供经济支持的百万富翁阿诺德·贝克曼。贝克曼是肖克利的加州理工学院校友，两人在前一年二月洛杉矶商会的一次盛装晚宴上重逢。贝克曼是一位分析化学教授，他那军人般的风度和秃顶让人想起德怀特·艾森豪威尔。贝克曼成功地从军工企业转型，而这正是肖克利梦寐以求的。
In August 1955, however, Shockley found a willing source of financial support in millionaire Arnold Beckman, a fellow graduate of Cal Tech with whom Shockley had become reacquainted during a black-tie dinner at the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce the previous February. A professor of analytical chemistry whose military bearing and bald pate recalled Dwight Eisenhower, Beckman had successfully made the leap to industry that Shockley longed to make as well.
贝克曼仪器公司的首款产品是一款能够电子测量橙子酸度的pH计。这款pH计很快在水处理厂、电镀和阳极氧化车间以及造纸厂等众多工业领域得到应用。公司的其他主要产品包括用于近炸引信导弹弹头的螺旋电位计，以及用于首次成功分离脊髓灰质炎病毒的超速离心机。贝克曼仪器公司总部位于加利福尼亚州富勒顿市一座低矮而美观的玻璃钢结构建筑内，并在美国、加拿大和德国设有十几个办事处。
Beckman Instrument’s first product had been a pH meter that could electronically measure the acidity of oranges. It soon found a number of industrial uses in water treatment plants, plating and anodizing operations, and paper factories. The company’s other major products included a helical potentiometer, used in the nose of proximity-fuse missiles, and an ultracentrifuge employed in the first successful separation of the polio virus. Headquartered in a low-slung, attractive glass-and-steel building in Fullerton, California, Beckman Instruments had offices in a dozen sites in the United States, Canada, and Germany.
1955年，贝克曼仪器公司财力雄厚。公司拥有2000多名员工，销售额超过2100万美元，利润超过130万美元，连续第二年创下业绩纪录，并在短短几个月内收购了两家小型公司。由于公司当时已分为多个独立的业务部门，每个部门都设有总经理和完整的运营机构，因此再增加一个独立的业务单元相对容易。5
Beckman Instruments was flush in 1955. With more than 2,000 employees, sales of more than $21 million, and profits in excess of $1.3 million, the company was in its second consecutive record-breaking year and had acquired two small firms within a few months. Since the firm was already organized into multiple autonomous divisions, each with its own general manager and complete operating organization, adding another independent business unit was relatively easy.5
作为一名前科学家，阿诺德·贝克曼对研发有着浓厚的兴趣，而肖克利的研究也正是归入这一范畴。贝克曼仪器公司定期将至少8%的销售额再投资于研发，其创始人称之为“防止技术过时的保险”。20世纪50年代中期，随着数据处理方法的改进和半导体技术的进步似乎将重塑贝克曼公司在军事和工业市场的未来，阿诺德·贝克曼决定在这两个领域的基础研究中占有一席之地。因此，在1955年初，贝克曼仪器公司启动了一项耗资巨大的研发项目，旨在探索数字化解读数据的最佳方法。肖克利提出的晶体管方案将使贝克曼仪器公司在半导体研究领域占据领先地位。6
As befitted a former scientist, Arnold Beckman was deeply committed to research and development, the heading under which he classed Shockley’s work. Beckman Instruments regularly reinvested at least 8 percent of sales in R&D, a move its founder called “insurance against obsolescence.” In the mid-1950s, when improved data-processing methods and advances in semiconductor technology seemed likely to shape the future of Beckman’s military and industrial markets, Arnold Beckman decided he wanted a stake in the basic research in both fields. Accordingly, in early 1955, Beckman Instruments launched an expensive R&D effort to investigate optimal methods of digitally interpreting data. Shockley’s proposed transistor efforts would give Beckman Instruments a leading position in semiconductor research.6
肖克利和贝克曼之间的谈判迅速而友好。贝克曼仪器公司将为该项目提供资金，但肖克利将拥有完全的管理控制权。作为新部门的董事兼总裁，他将获得3万美元的年薪以及购买4000股贝克曼仪器公司股票的期权。贝克曼和肖克利估计第一年的成本为30万美元，其中包括向贝尔实验室支付的2.5万美元晶体管专利许可费。1955年9月3日，他们签署了一项协议，“迅速而积极地开展与半导体相关的活动”。他们预测，一年之内……新成立的肖克利半导体部门每月销售额将达到 3 万美元。7
The negotiations between Shockley and Beckman were quick and friendly. Beckman Instruments would fund the operation, but Shockley would have complete managerial control. As a director and president of the new division, he would receive an annual salary of $30,000 and options to purchase 4,000 shares of Beckman Instruments stock. Beckman and Shockley estimated first-year costs at $300,000, including a $25,000 payment to Bell Labs to license patent rights for the transistor. On September 3, 1955, they signed an agreement to “engage promptly and vigorously in activities related to semiconductors.” They predicted that within a year the new Shockley Semiconductor division would generate monthly sales of $30,000.7
贝克曼原本想把半导体业务设在富勒顿，或者至少在大洛杉矶地区，但肖克利想把公司开在更北的地方——旧金山湾区。他从小在帕洛阿尔托长大，离斯坦福大学校园很近，他的母亲仍然住在那里，他对母亲的爱之深切甚至让一些熟人感到不安。他是一位狂热的登山爱好者和户外运动爱好者，湾区的地形多样性深深吸引了他。帕洛阿尔托仍然保留着肖克利童年记忆中那个半乡村大学城的氛围。在围绕大学大道（University Avenue）而建的小型市中心附近，最古老的街区以木瓦屋顶的房屋为主。这条街在斯坦福大学校园入口处被称为棕榈大道（Palm Drive）。再往南走一点，房屋呈现出鲜明的地中海风格，宽阔的林荫大道两旁种满了核桃树和橄榄树，这些大道以著名诗人和当地家族的名字命名。再往南半英里，俄勒冈大道（Oregon Avenue）以南，散落着一些奶牛场。帕洛阿尔托只有一个电话交换机，并且与邻近的山景城共用一名市政法院法官。8
Beckman would like to have situated the semiconductor operation in Fullerton or at least in the greater Los Angeles area, but Shockley wanted to start the company further north—in the San Francisco Bay Area. He had grown up in Palo Alto, near the Stanford University campus, and his mother, whom he adored with a devotion that unnerved some of his acquaintances, still lived there. He was an avid mountain climber and outdoorsman, and the topographical diversity of the Bay Area intrigued him. Palo Alto still had the feel of the semirural college town Shockley recalled from his boyhood. Wood-shingled houses dominated the oldest neighborhoods near the small downtown built around University Avenue, a street that was called Palm Drive at the entrance to the Stanford campus. Slightly farther south, where the houses took on a distinctly Mediterranean cast, walnut and olive trees lined the wide boulevards named for famous poets and local families. A half mile beyond, south of Oregon Avenue, lay scattered dairy farms. Palo Alto had one telephone exchange and shared a municipal court judge with the neighboring town of Mountain View.8
1955年，这个曾经宁静的乡村小镇迅速发展成为一座小城市。1950年至1960年间，其人口翻了一番多，从2.5万人增至5.2万人，土地面积也增加了两倍。自二战结束以来，开发商和建筑商每年都在奶牛场附近开发三个住宅区，他们用售价约9000美元的两居室和三居室平房吸引退伍军人和年轻家庭来到这里。广告宣称，每套6000平方英尺的地块都保证种植“六棵或更多结果实的果树”。镇上涌现出许多DIY商店和五金店，其中就包括斯坦福购物中心。这家高档购物中心于1956年开业，同年，镇上的第一个高尔夫球场也建成开放。为了满足该地区家庭的需求，帕洛阿尔托在 1948 年至 1956 年间建造了 15 所公立学校。9
The once quaint rural town was rapidly becoming a small city in 1955. Between 1950 and 1960, its population more than doubled, from 25,000 to 52,000, and its acreage tripled. Developers and builders, who had opened housing tracts among the dairy farms at a rate of three per year since the end of the war, enticed returning veterans and young families to the area with two- and three-bedroom bungalows that sold for roughly $9,000—monthly payments of only $60, advertisements touted—and included a guaranteed “six or more bearing-fruit trees” to each 6,000 square-foot lot. Do-it-yourself shops and hardware stores sprung up around town, including at the Stanford Shopping Center, an upscale mall that opened in 1956, the same year as the town’s first golf course. To accommodate the area’s families, Palo Alto built 15 public schools between 1948 and 1956.9
帕洛阿尔托曾是多家成功的科技公司起步的地方，肖克利无疑会乐于与这段辉煌的创业历史联系在一起。在本世纪初的几十年里，帕洛阿尔托是无线电和微波研究的温床，联邦电报公司的制造厂和626英尺高的发射塔就坐落于此，直到1932年，这家受经济大萧条影响的公司才将其业务迁至新泽西州。电子巨头惠普公司于1939年在帕洛阿尔托的一个车库里成立。1948年，两位斯坦福大学物理系的科学家创办了瓦里安联合公司，旨在将他们认为在雷达技术领域有用的创新成果商业化。到了1950年，小镇以南几英里处的工业区交通拥堵不堪，当地居民纷纷游说将狭窄的贝肖尔高速公路（绰号“血腥贝肖尔”）扩建为四车道。
Several successful technical companies had gotten their start in Palo Alto, and Shockley undoubtedly would have welcomed the opportunity to associate himself with this auspicious entrepreneurial history. A hotbed of radio and microwave research in the first decades of the century, the town was home to Federal Telegraph’s manufacturing plant and 626-foot transmitting tower until 1932, when the Depression-plagued company consolidated its operations in New Jersey. Electronics giant Hewlett-Packard was founded in a Palo Alto garage in 1939. In 1948, two scientists affiliated with Stanford’s Physics Department started Varian Associates to commercialize innovations that they believed would prove useful in radar technology. By 1950, traffic from the industrial districts a few miles south of town was so heavy that locals were lobbying to expand the narrow Bayshore Freeway (nicknamed “Bloody Bayshore”) to four lanes.
20世纪50年代，斯坦福大学的共同努力加速了帕洛阿尔托电子产业化的进程。斯坦福大学工程学教授（后任院长和教务长）弗雷德里克·特曼希望将斯坦福大学打造成为他所谓的“技术学者共同体”的中心——一个由学术界和产业界研究人员组成的网络，共同推进“尖端技术”的发展。特曼设想了一种互惠互利的关系：技术型企业支持斯坦福大学的前沿研究，同时受益于大量受过良好教育、对咨询工作感兴趣的毕业生和教授。他鼓励学生和教职员工——尤其是威廉·休利特、大卫·帕卡德和瓦里安兄弟——创办自己的公司，而不是回到东部为老牌企业效力。他率先推出了一项创新的“荣誉合作项目”，允许当地电子公司的员工兼职攻读高级学位。斯坦福大学资金匮乏，为了筹集资金，于1953年开设了研究园区。此后不久，特曼就开始积极争取那些与大学学术项目相关的“无烟产业”。他甚至向国防部的高层人士透露了一些当地企业，这些企业或许是理想的合同选择。10
A concerted effort by Stanford University accelerated Palo Alto’s trend towards electronics industrialization in the 1950s. Frederick Terman, professor of engineering (later dean and provost) at Stanford, wanted the university to serve as the center of what he called a “community of technical scholars”—a web of academic and industrial researchers that would work together to advance “sophisticated technologies.” Terman envisioned a symbiotic relationship in which technically oriented companies would support advanced research at Stanford while at the same time benefiting from a supply of well-educated graduates and professors interested in consulting work. He encouraged students and faculty—most notably William Hewlett, David Packard, and the Varian brothers—to start their own companies, rather than travel back East to work for established ones. He pioneered an innovative “Honors Cooperative Program” that allowed employees of local electronics firms to work part-time towards advanced degrees. Shortly after endowment-poor Stanford opened a research park in 1953 in an effort to raise funds, Terman began wooing “smokeless industries” whose work would be relevant to the university’s academic programs. He even alerted highly placed contacts at the Defense Department to the existence of local firms that might be logical contracting choices.10
当特曼得知肖克利希望将公司设在帕洛阿尔托时——两人同属几个专业协会——他写信向肖克利保证，斯坦福大学“非常欢迎这项活动落户斯坦福地区，我相信此举对双方都有利。” 特曼多年来一直在思考如何提升斯坦福大学在半导体领域的参与度。他告诉肖克利，斯坦福大学最近聘请了第一位专门研究半导体的教员，其他一些斯坦福大学的知名教授也已将晶体管技术融入到他们的课程中。他建议肖克利可以利用荣誉合作项目作为招聘工具，并盛赞斯坦福大学在电子工程研究生课程中培养的200名潜在员工。他总结道：“看到大学和技术界携手发展，互惠互利，这令人振奋。我们希望您能找到合适的途径参与其中。”11
When Terman learned of Shockley’s hopes to locate in Palo Alto—the two men belonged to several of the same professional societies—he wrote to him with assurances that the university “would heartily welcome this activity in the Stanford area, and I believe that its location here would be mutually advantageous.” Terman had been contemplating how to increase Stanford’s participation in the semiconductor field for several years. He told Shockley that Stanford had recently hired its first faculty member who specialized in semiconductors, and that other prominent Stanford professors were already incorporating transistors into their coursework. He suggested that Shockley might find the Honors Cooperative Program a useful recruiting tool and spoke glowingly of the 200 potential employees enrolled in graduate electrical engineering courses at Stanford. He concluded, “It is an exciting business to observe the University and the technical community grow cooperatively to the benefit of both. We hope that you will see your way clear to participate in it.”11
特曼寄出信后，代表肖克利联系了当地商会（但没有透露肖克利的身份），并获取了一份合适的工业用地和经验丰富的房地产经纪人名单，随后转发给了肖克利。他提出可以偶尔让肖克利使用“大学的设施”，并计划任命肖克利担任大学讲师这一无薪但颇具声望的职位。即使对特曼来说，这次“拉拢”也异常热烈。他兴奋地得知“肖克利和贝克曼正在玩一场豪赌”。12
After sending his letter, Terman contacted the local Chamber of Commerce on Shockley’s behalf (though without disclosing Shockley’s identity) and secured a list of appropriate industrial sites and knowledgeable real estate agents that he forwarded to Shockley. He offered occasional use of “the facilities of the University” and planned to name Shockley to the unpaid but prestigious post of university lecturer. Even for Terman, the courtship was unusually intense. He was excited by the knowledge that “Shockley-Beckman [are] playing for big stakes.”12
特曼的示好以及帕洛阿尔托毗邻斯坦福大学或许让阿诺德·贝克曼更倾向于选择帕洛阿尔托作为半导体工厂的选址。然而，这些因素不太可能对肖克利产生太大影响，他的选址几乎完全出于个人考量。斯坦福大学和弗雷德里克·特曼的近在咫尺固然是一大优势——肖克利在招募员工时也确实提到了这一点——但他无论如何都想把工厂设在北加州。
Terman’s overtures and the proximity to Stanford may well have served to make Arnold Beckman more comfortable with a Palo Alto site for the semiconductor operation. It is unlikely, however, that such attractions held much sway with Shockley, whose location plans were driven almost entirely by personal concerns. Having Stanford and Frederick Terman nearby was a nice bonus—and Shockley certainly mentioned it in recruiting workers to his company—but he wanted to come to Northern California regardless.
肖克利根据他在海军服役期间的业余时间所做的研究，制定了一套独特的公司人员配备方案。他对包括洛斯阿拉莫斯核武器实验室在内的一些美国最负盛名的实验室的研究人员撰写的科学论文进行了详细分析，这使肖克利确信，每个人都有一个“精神温度”，可以通过一系列测试和书面作品评估来客观地确定。思维越敏捷，精神温度就越高。肖克利推测，“精神温度仅仅提高一倍，就能使一个人的科学创造力提升百倍，就像高温引发的化学反应一样”，因此他决心为自己的公司招募世界上最顶尖的人才。13
Shockley had devised a unique plan to staff his company based on research he had conducted during his spare time while serving in the navy. Detailed analysis of scientific papers written by researchers at some of the nation’s most prestigious labs—including the nuclear weapons facility at Los Alamos—had convinced Shockley that every person had a “mental temperature” that could be objectively determined through a series of tests and evaluations of written work. The brighter the mind, the higher the temperature. Theorizing that “a mere doubling of mental temperature may jump a man’s scientific creativity a hundredfold, like a heat-triggered chemical reaction,” Shockley was determined to staff his company with the hottest minds in the world.13
在招募贝尔实验室科学家的尝试失败后——他的名声早已在外——肖克利在1955年底四处打电话给全国其他顶尖研究实验室和技术公司的同事，请求他们帮忙寻找具备各种专业技能的顶尖青年人才。他想复制贝尔实验室的分工模式。为此，他需要聘请多位实验物理学家和理论物理学家，以及化学家、冶金学家、电气工程师和机械工程师。
After his attempts to recruit Bell Lab scientists failed—his reputation preceded him—Shockley spent the end of 1955 phoning colleagues at other leading research labs and technical firms around the country, asking their assistance in finding the top young men with expertise for the various positions he sought to fill. He wanted to reproduce the division of labor at Bell Labs. To do so, he needed to hire several experimental and theoretical physicists, as well as chemists, metallurgists, and electrical and mechanical engineers.
最先加入肖克利团队的是斯穆特·霍斯利，一位来自摩托罗拉、衣着整洁、温文尔雅的40岁物理学家，拥有丰富的半导体行业经验；以及迪恩·克纳皮克，一位曾在西电公司工作的工程师，肖克利聘请他负责生产。贝克曼仪器公司在其1956年的年度报告中自豪地刊登了这三位男士的合影，并附上了阿诺德·贝克曼的一段话，这段话仿佛出自肖克利之口：“在科研领域，卓越无可替代。”14
First to join Shockley were Smoot Horsley, a clean-cut, mild-mannered, 40-year-old physicist from Motorola with extensive semiconductor experience; and Dean Knapic, an engineer who had worked at Western Electric and whom Shockley hired to head up production. Beckman Instruments proudly included a photo of the three men in its 1956 annual report, along with a comment from Arnold Beckman that could have been penned by Shockley himself: “In research there is no substitute for superiority.”14
1955年10月，肖克利飞往匹兹堡，参加由电化学学会主办的半导体研讨会，寻找该领域的顶尖人才。这场研讨会是会议组织者临时加设的，并未列入常规会议议程。由于收到了大量关于新兴半导体领域的论文，他们决定在一天之内举办一系列十分钟的专题报告。15
In October 1955, Shockley flew to Pittsburgh to hunt for hot minds at a semiconductor symposium sponsored by the Electrochemical Society. The symposium had been a last-minute addition to the regular meeting agenda, tacked on by the conference organizers. After receiving so many papers on the burgeoning new semiconductor field, they decided to sponsor a series of ten-minute presentations on the topic over the course of a single day.15
会议是一场典型的技术会议，多个分会场同时进行，午餐在气派的威廉·佩恩酒店的宴会厅举行，会议还组织了观光游览活动。此外，他还为候选人的妻子们安排了完整的“女士活动”，包括相识咖啡会、时装秀和购物之旅。肖克利始终专注于他的主要任务，没有让任何事情分散他的注意力。他把时间都花在了听讲座、评估候选人以及向匹兹堡大学的教授们询问他们最有前途的学生的情况上。他把这些感想一页又一页地记录在一个可以放进口袋的绿色小记事本里。
The meeting was the typical technical conference, with multiple sessions running simultaneously, luncheons in the grand ballroom of the stately William Penn hotel, conference-sponsored scenic drives and sightseeing, and a full “ladies program” of get-acquainted coffees, fashion shows, and shopping excursions for the wives. Shockley did not allow himself to be distracted from his primary mission. He spent his time attending lectures, assessing candidates, and grilling professors at the University of Pittsburgh about their most promising students. He wrote page after page of impressions in a small green memoranda book that fit in his pocket.
10月10日，肖克利写道：“诺伊斯——菲尔科公司；他对表面晶体管的见解很有见地。”鲍勃·诺伊斯曾在上届电化学学会会议上发表过一篇题为“N型和P型半导体沟道形成观察”的论文。他这次演讲的主题尚不清楚——半导体分会场的筹备非常仓促，以至于论文摘要没有被列入正式会议日程——但当时在菲尔科公司，诺伊斯正在研究著名的“穿通”问题，即电场会贯穿整个基区，导致基区在电学上消失，从而使晶体管失效。他在10月份会议上的十分钟演讲很可能与此有关。肖克利很快决定，诺伊斯是菲尔科公司唯一值得培养的科学家。16
On October 10, Shockley noted, “Noyce—Philco; has talked sense about surface transistor.” Bob Noyce had presented a paper on “Observations of Channel Formation on N- and P-Type Semiconductors” at the last Electrochemical Society conference. The subject of his talk this time is unknown—the semiconductor session was assembled so quickly that the paper abstracts were not included in the main program—but back at Philco, Noyce was investigating the well-known “punch-through” problem in which the electric field extends through the whole width of the base, which makes the base disappear electrically and causes the transistor to malfunction. His ten-minute talk at the October conference likely concerned this topic. Shockley quickly decided that Noyce was the only scientist worth pursuing at Philco.16
三个月过去了，肖克利忙着寻找办公楼、布置实验室、招募其他员工，并与贝克曼敲定最终协议，这时他才给身在费城的诺伊斯打了个电话。那时，这位著名物理学家已经清楚什么样的工作才能吸引他想要招揽的年轻研究人员。他承诺，肖克利半导体公司将开展最顶尖的科学研究，目标是打造一款畅销且盈利的产品。加入这家公司，不仅有机会与他共事，还能与业内最优秀的后起之秀一起，研发几十年来物理学领域最激动人心的技术之一——晶体管。（“你觉得在其他电子行业工作前景会更好吗？”他提醒自己要问问自己。）这也是一个来加州发展的机会。17
Three months passed before Shockley—busy finding a building, outfitting a lab, pursuing other recruits, and finalizing arrangements with Beckman—called Noyce in Philadelphia. By that time, the famous physicist knew what sort of work would appeal to the young researchers he wanted to attract. Shockley Semiconductor would conduct the finest scientific research, he promised, with an aim towards building a saleable, profitable product. A job at the company would be an opportunity to work not only with him, but also with the finest rising men in the business, on one of the most exciting technologies to appear in the field of physics for decades, the transistor. (“Is your future brighter in another electronics job?” he reminded himself to ask.) It was also a chance to come to California.17
当然，公司的地理位置对鲍勃·诺伊斯极具吸引力。从他小时候在爱荷华州严寒的冬天铲雪开始，他就一直梦想着加州巍峨的群山和阳光灿烂的海滩。“所有爱荷华人都觉得加州是天堂，”他曾这样说过。他的哥哥唐最近搬到伯克利，在大学化学系工作，这更增添了加州对他的吸引力。诺伊斯坦率地告诉肖克利，他一直在考虑离开菲尔科公司，并且非常想搬到加州——尤其是如果这意味着有机会再次从事基础研究的话。私下里，他发誓绝不会错过为威廉·肖克利工作的机会：“得到这份工作，”他告诉自己，意味着他“绝对能进入顶尖行列”。肖克利的电话也激发了他的竞争欲望。“我当时有点想看看自己能否在那样的竞争环境中脱颖而出，”他后来承认道。18
Certainly, the company’s location appealed to Bob Noyce. From his earliest years of shoveling snow through Iowa’s frigid winters, he had fantasized about the Golden State’s towering mountains and sunny beaches. “All Iowans think California is heaven,” he once said. His brother Don’s recent move to Berkeley for a job in the university’s Chemistry Department only added to the region’s attractions. Noyce frankly told Shockley that he had been considering leaving Philco and would love to move to California—especially if it meant a chance to engage in basic research again. Privately, he swore that he would not miss an opportunity to work for William Shockley: “Getting that job,” he told himself, meant he would “definitely be playing in the big leagues.” The call from Shockley had also gotten his competitive juices flowing. “I sort of wanted to see if I could stand up in that league of competition,” he later admitted.18
贝蒂·诺伊斯却没那么兴奋。尽管对鲍勃来说这是个绝佳的职业机会，但在贝蒂看来，肖克利这份工作的关键在于它位于加利福尼亚州。她的家族与新英格兰有着深厚的渊源。她在那里拥有广泛的人脉。她的父母也离那里只有几个小时的车程。要带着两个不到18个月大的孩子搬到美国东海岸，而且她人生地不熟，这让她感到十分不适应。诺伊斯承诺会在旧金山湾区买一套不错的房子，当时那里的房价比费城便宜，这让她动摇了——但并非完全被打动。她只同意在加州试用两年。诺伊斯承诺，如果两年后她不满意，他们就搬回东部。19
Betty Noyce was less excited. However wonderful the professional opportunity for Bob, the essential feature of the Shockley job in Betty’s mind was its location in California. Her family’s ties to New England ran deep. She had a network of friends there. Her parents were only a few hours away. The prospect of moving two children under the age of 18 months to the other side of the country, where she knew no one, did not appeal to her. Noyce’s promise that they would buy a nice house in the San Francisco Bay Area, which at the time was more affordable than Philadelphia, swayed her—but not entirely. She agreed only to a two-year trial period in California. He promised that if she was not happy at the end of two years, they would head back east.19
在肖克利带诺伊斯去加州面试之前，他要求诺伊斯先到纽约一家名为麦克默里-哈姆斯特拉的心理测试公司接受评估。诺伊斯在曼哈顿待了一整天，完成了一项标准的智商测试，描述了墨迹图，并玩了词语联想游戏。测试人员还问了他一个肖克利专门设计的问题，以评估他的创造性思维：127人参加一场淘汰赛制的网球锦标赛。由于参赛人数是奇数，所以第一轮必须有一名选手轮空。那么，要决出冠军，需要进行多少场比赛？20
Before Shockley would bring Noyce to California for an interview, he asked him to report to the offices of McMurry-Hamstra, a New York psychological testing firm, for evaluation. Noyce spent an entire day in Manhattan, where he completed a standard IQ test, described ink blots, and played word association games. The testers also asked a question specially devised by Shockley to gauge creative thinking: 127 people enter an elimination tennis tournament. Since it’s an odd number, one player must draw a bye in the first round. How many matches must be played to determine a winner?20
解决这个问题的标准方法是进行多步骤的除法和加法运算。（将126人两两配对，分成63组。将轮空的选手也算入这63名获胜者中，然后将这63人再分成32组，这样就能产生16名获胜者，以此类推。）肖克利想要的是一种更简单的解法，诺伊斯给了他一个。因为只有一个获胜者，所以必须淘汰126人。由于一个人只能通过比赛被淘汰，所以必须进行126场比赛才能产生获胜者。证毕
The standard approach to solving this question would be to chug through a multistep process of division and addition. (Pair the 126 people into 63 matches. Add to those 63 winners the player who drew the bye, and then split this group into 32 new matches, which would yield 16 winners, etc.) Shockley was looking for a much simpler sort of solution, one that Noyce gave him. There is only one winner, so 126 people have to be eliminated. Since a person can only be eliminated through a match, it must take 126 matches to come up with a winner. Q.E.D.
肖克利要求他招募的每一位高级人才都必须接受这种全面的测试。他们中很少有人觉得奇怪。事实上，有好几位都曾为其他雇主接受过类似的才能测试，甚至还有一位还专门修读过“员工测试评估”的大学课程。至少事后看来，真正让这些年轻人感到不寻常的是，测试中竟然如此直白地试图评估他们的性格。正如其中一位所说：“我觉得他们花了太多精力来问我喜不喜欢我母亲。” 测试过程中，测试人员给一位应聘者看了一幅线条画：一个男人紧握双拳，站在床脚，床上躺着一个闭着眼睛的女人。测试人员想知道，你会如何描述这个场景？这个男人刚刚杀了女人吗？他担心她生病了吗？她睡着了吗？他生她的气了吗？21
Shockley required this extensive testing of every one of his top-level recruits. Few of them thought it strange. Indeed, several had undergone similar aptitude testing for other employers, and one had even taken a college course on “Testing Evaluation for Employees.” What did strike the young men as unusual, at least in retrospect, was the overt attempt to gauge personality. As one of them put it, “They spent, I think, too much effort on whether I liked my mother or not.” At one point, the testers showed the recruit a line drawing of a man with clenched fists standing at the foot of a bed in which a woman lay with her eyes shut. How would you describe this scene, the testers wanted to know. Had the man just killed the woman? Was he worried that she was ill? Was she sleeping? Was he angry at her?21
肖克利为何要求进行心理评估，至今仍是个谜。他最近爱上了一位在精神病院任教的护士，这段恋情加深了他对人类心理运作机制的浓厚兴趣。或许他觉得，如果能找到一种方法深入了解员工的性格，探寻他们内心深处的想法，或许就能有所收获。想想看，为什么不试试呢？这样的知识或许能帮助他找到性格相投的科学家，维护实验室的和谐氛围。
Why Shockley required this psychological evaluation is a bit of an open question. He had recently fallen in love with a nurse who taught at a psychiatric facility, and this relationship deepened his already keen interest in the workings of the human mind. Perhaps he felt that if there were a way to gain insight into his employees’ personalities and access to their innermost thoughts, why not do it? Such knowledge might help him match scientists for personal compatibility and maintain harmony in the lab.
诺伊斯顺利完成了测试，麦克默里-哈姆斯特拉评估人员对他的表现非常满意。他很快接受了肖克利的邀请，带着贝蒂飞往旧金山参加现场面试。1956年2月23日，鲍勃和贝蒂·诺伊斯从寒冷的东海岸搭乘红眼航班飞往旧金山。他们早上6点抵达，正值湾区阳光明媚的秋日。鲍勃坚持要在午饭前找到实验室附近的房子——“先办正事，”他后来回忆说——之后才去参加面试。他成功获得了这份工作。22
Noyce completed the tests to the satisfaction of the McMurry-Hamstra evaluators, and quickly accepted Shockley’s offer to fly him and Betty to San Francisco for an on-site interview. On February 23, 1956, Bob and Betty Noyce left the frigid East Coast on a red-eye flight to San Francisco. They touched down at 6 AM to one of the Bay Area’s beautiful Indian summer days. Bob insisted that they find a house near the lab before lunch—“First things first,” he would later recall—and only then did he go to his interview. He got the job.22
肖克利迅速组建了一支团队。维克·琼斯，一位来自伯克利的年轻博士，专攻等离子体和核物理，三月份搬到了旧金山湾区。琼斯是一位威尔士人，浓眉大眼，长相俊朗，为人谦逊和蔼，以至于他常去的酒吧里的常客都不知道他是一位拥有博士学位的科学家。肖克利还从麻省理工学院新成立的固态物理项目挖来了杰伊·拉斯特，这位身材高挑的26岁年轻人看起来年纪太小，甚至还没到开车年龄，当时他甚至还没拿到博士学位。校园里流传着拉斯特能制造出比任何人都薄的晶体，他对自己“稳如磐石的手”引以为豪。肖克利给劳伦斯·利弗莫尔国家实验室打了一通电话，找到了戈登·摩尔，一位在约翰·霍普金斯大学应用物理实验室工作的27岁、性格内敛的物理化学家。摩尔出生于北加州海岸的一个小农场，在帕洛阿尔托以北几英里处长大。迪恩·克纳皮克雇佣了两位年轻人，他们曾在西部电气公司一起从事生产工作：朱利叶斯·布兰克，一位身材矮胖、操着浓重纽约口音的机械工程师，他认为这份工作可能是一次“冒险”；以及尤金·克莱纳，一位出身良好的维也纳难民，逃离了纳粹的恐怖统治，是一位技艺精湛的工具制造者。23
SHOCKLEY ASSEMBLED a team quickly. Vic Jones, a young PhD from Berkeley who specialized in plasma and nuclear physics, moved across the Bay in March. A Welshman with bushy eyebrows and boyish good looks, Jones was so genial and unassuming that the regulars at his favorite pub had no idea he was a scientist with a PhD. Shockley hired Jay Last, a rangy 26 year old who looked too young to drive, out of the new solid state physics program at MIT before he even completed his doctorate. Campus rumor held that no one built thinner crystals than Last, who was very proud of his “damn steady hands.” A call to Lawrence Livermore Labs led Shockley to Gordon Moore, a quiet 27-year-old physical chemist at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab who had been born in a small farm town on the Northern California coast and raised only a few miles north of Palo Alto. Dean Knapic hired two young men whom he worked with in production at Western Electric: Julius Blank, a portly mechanical engineer with a heavy New York accent who thought the job might be “an adventure”; and Eugene Kleiner, a well-born Viennese refugee from Nazi terror and an expert tool builder.23
麻省理工学院的一位教授将肖克利介绍给了冶金学博士谢尔顿·罗伯茨。罗伯茨对硅产生了浓厚的兴趣，并想离开陶氏化学公司的工作。后来，拥有两个博士学位的瑞士理论物理学家让·霍尔尼打电话给肖克利，想去贝尔实验室找份工作，肖克利便把他招到了自己的公司。维克·格里尼奇身材高挑纤瘦，留着比当时流行的寸头更长的卷发。他看到肖克利用代码编写并发表在科学期刊上的招聘广告，便前来应聘，目的是筛选掉那些智力不足的应聘者。格里尼奇来自斯坦福研究所，在那里他曾尝试用生长结晶体管驱动彩色电视机。（他成功地让视频部分正常工作，但始终没能实现音频功能。）24
A professor at MIT referred Shockley to a PhD metallurgist named Sheldon Roberts, who had developed an interest in silicon and wanted to leave his job at Dow Chemical. When Jean Hoerni, a Swiss theoretical physicist with two doctorates, called Shockley looking for a job at Bell Labs, Shockley lured him to his own company. Vic Grinich, tall and thin with curly hair he wore longer than the fashionable buzz cuts, responded to a want ad that Shockley had written in code and published in a scientific journal to screen out insufficiently intelligent applicants. Grinich came from the Stanford Research Institute, where he had tried to use grown-junction transistors to drive a color television. (He managed to get the video portion functioning, but never got the audio to work.)24
1956年上半年来到肖克利半导体公司的大约20名员工中，只有少数几人年过三十。有些人曾在私营企业工作过，但大多数人要么是刚获得博士学位不久，要么一直在学术界或政府实验室工作。几乎没有人直接从事过半导体相关工作，因为半导体当时还是个新兴行业。这些设备仍然被视为深奥的技艺。许多研究人员，例如戈登·摩尔（他曾因政府资助的研究而备受挫折，甚至计算过自己发表文章的纳税人成本），都被肖克利吸引，因为“真正制造并销售产品”的前景令人向往。在加州生活的机会也让他们兴奋不已。然而，在所有情况下，最大的吸引力还是肖克利本人。25
Only a handful of the roughly 20 men who came to Shockley Semiconductor in the first half of 1956 had passed their thirtieth birthdays. A few had worked in private corporations, but most had either recently received their doctorates or had been employed exclusively in academic or government labs. Almost no one had worked directly with semiconductors, which were still considered esoteric devices. Many of the researchers, such as Gordon Moore—who had been so frustrated by his government-funded research that he once calculated the taxpayers’ cost-per-word he published—were drawn to Shockley by the prospect of “actually making a product and selling it.” The chance to live in California excited them all. In every case, however, the biggest attraction was Shockley himself.25
肖克利计划将这些五花八门的专业知识整合到他自己的技术领导之下。他明确告诉他的年轻团队，他会把他们分配到他自己选择的项目上，并按照他的指示完成。“你可以讨论你的想法，你对如何完成这项工作的看法，”一位前员工回忆说，“但最终，肖克利的观点是，除非你的想法比他的更好，否则你必须按照他的方式去做。”26
Shockley planned to unify this hodgepodge of expertise under his own technical leadership. He made it clear to his young team that he would assign them to projects of his own choosing to be done as he directed. “You would be able to discuss your way, your thoughts about how you might do it,” recalls one former employee, “but at the end of the time, [Shockley’s] view was that unless your thoughts were better than his, you’d do it his way.”26
S·肖克利竭尽所能帮助这些年轻人。在航空旅行还不普及的年代，他安排他们和他们的妻子飞往加利福尼亚。他把他们安排在城里最好的酒店——里基酒店，那是一家装潢精美、绿树成荫的漂亮旅馆。他给他们的月薪超过800美元，比他们之前在其他工作中的收入高得多。他还推荐了一位房地产经纪人——他的姑姑——帮助这些年轻人和他们的小家庭安顿下来。甚至在天气方面，他还为此道歉。当时一股罕见的寒流袭来，导致几位三月份抵达的新兵——他们原本带着泳衣——却发现酒店房间门外的喷泉上挂满了冰柱。27
SHOCKLEY DID HIS BEST for the young men. He flew them and their wives to California at a time when flying was still relatively uncommon. He put them up at the nicest hotel in town, Rickey’s, a wood-paneled beauty of an inn with sumptuous landscaping. He hired them at salaries of better than $800 per month—substantially higher than they had been making in their other jobs. He recommended a real estate agent—his aunt—who could help the men and their young families settle into their new homes. He even apologized for the weather when an unusual cold snap meant that several recruits, who arrived in March with bathing suits in hand, instead found icicles on the fountains outside their hotel room doors.27
四月中旬，一批员工已经抵达，肖克利安排了一场欢迎派对。当时在菲尔科公司即将离职的诺伊斯决心参加，即便这意味着他要开着那辆开了四年的雪佛兰，后座堆满了行李箱，横跨美国。和往常一样，他又一次耽误了行程——事实上，他耽误的时间太长了，以至于庆祝活动当天早上才抵达盐湖城。他离开犹他州时正在下雨，到达旧金山湾区时更是下起了瓢泼大雨。他的雨刮器坏了一个，为了提神，他一路不停地抽烟。等他晚上十点找到派对时，庆祝活动已经进行得如火如荼了。他的出现给另一位新员工留下了深刻的印象：
A critical mass of employees had arrived by mid-April, and Shockley arranged a welcoming party. Noyce, then in his last weeks at Philco, was determined to attend, even though it meant driving across the country in his four-year-old Chevy, its back seat covered with suitcases. As was often the case with him, he ran behind schedule—so far behind in fact, that he had only gotten as far as Salt Lake City by the morning of the festivities. It was raining when he left Utah and positively pouring when he got to the Bay Area. One of the windshield wipers had given out, and he had smoked without stopping to keep himself awake. By the time he found the party, at 10 PM, the celebration was well under way. His appearance made an indelible impression on another recruit:
他没刮胡子，看起来像是在一个星期没脱下西装——而且他口渴了。桌上放着一大碗马提尼。诺伊斯拿起那碗马提尼，开始喝了起来。然后他就醉倒了。我心想：“这下可有意思了。”28
He hadn’t shaved, he looked like he’d been living in his suit for a week—and he was thirsty. There was a big goddamn bowl of martinis on the table there. Noyce picks up the goddamn bowl, and starts drinking [from] it. Then he passes out. I said to myself, “this is going to be a whole lot of fun.”28
与此同时，肖克利本人却丝毫没有感到疼痛。当晚后半段，他嘴里叼着一朵玫瑰，跳起了探戈。29
Meanwhile, Shockley was feeling no pain himself. He spent the latter part of the evening dancing the tango with a rose in his teeth.29
S ·肖克利在创办公司之初做出了两项关键的技术决策。首先，他决定用硅而不是当时主流的半导体衬底锗来制造晶体管。肖克利很早就开始倡导使用硅，早在1955年3月，当他得知贝尔实验室的研究人员成功生长出与锗晶体纯度相当的硅晶体时，就在几周之内迅速写了一封信，概述了硅的优势。虽然硅的熔点更高，使其比锗更活泼，因此更难加工，但硅（沙子的基本成分）是地球上含量第二丰富的元素，仅次于氧。更重要的是，与经常漏电且在高温或高湿环境下极易发生故障的锗器件不同，硅器件几乎可以在任何环境下可靠运行，无论冷热、干湿。由于世界上最大的潜在晶体管买家——美国国防部——愿意为稳定的设备支付高价，硅晶体管似乎预示着巨大的经济成功。30
SHOCKLEY MADE TWO KEY TECHNICAL DECISIONS when he started his company. First, he would build transistors from silicon, rather than from germanium, which was then the preferred semiconductor substrate. Shockley had been an early advocate of silicon, dashing off a letter outlining its benefits within weeks of learning, in March 1955, that researchers at Bell Labs had successfully grown silicon crystals as pure as germanium crystals. Although its higher melting point makes silicon more reactive and therefore harder to work with than germanium, silicon (the basic ingredient in sand) is the second-most abundant element on earth, after oxygen. Even more important, unlike germanium devices, which often leaked and had a debilitating tendency to malfunction at high temperatures or in high humidity, silicon devices would function reliably in almost any environment, hot or cold, wet or dry. Since the world’s largest potential transistor buyer, the Department of Defense, was willing to pay top dollar for stable equipment, silicon transistors seemed to promise financial success.30
第二个关键决定是采用贝尔实验室新近研发的扩散掺杂工艺来制造晶体管。扩散工艺是将半导体置于含有适当杂质（称为“掺杂剂”）的炉中加热，使杂质渗入硅中，其原理与山核桃木的香味渗入烧烤肉中类似。扩散工艺能够形成当时所有方法中最清晰的P区和N区，这意味着扩散晶体管的运行速度更快，工作频率也更高。这项工艺非常重要且新颖，以至于肖克利派诺伊斯和戈登·摩尔去参加贝尔实验室的研讨会，深入了解这项技术。31
The second critical decision was to build transistors using the new doping process called diffusion, recently developed at Bell Labs. In the diffusion process, a semiconductor is cooked in a furnace containing appropriate impurities (called “dopants”) that then seep into the silicon in much the same way that hickory flavor seeps into meat cooked in a barbecue pit. Diffusion resulted in the best-defined P- and N-regions of any method then available, which in turn meant that diffused transistors ought to be faster and capable of operating at a higher frequency than other devices. The process was important and new enough that Shockley had sent Noyce and Gordon Moore to a Bell Labs seminar to learn more about it.31
公司在位于南圣安东尼奥路391号的一栋由奎恩塞特式工棚改造而成的建筑里开始运作，这里地处工业区兼购物中心的中心地带——最近的邻居是一家西尔斯百货商店——距离斯坦福大学以南约五英里，步行即可穿过帕洛阿尔托的边界到达山景城。一位观察者将这栋建筑比作汽车零件仓库，其燃气和电力供应不足以满足实验室的需求，肖克利的新员工私下里担心他们的老板是否会为实验室配备合适的设备。事实证明他们的担心是多余的。肖克利购置了精良的科学仪器和工具，但他显然没有在美观方面投入任何资金，因为他计划在1956年秋季将办公室和实验室搬迁到斯坦福工业园，贝克曼公司当时正在那里建造一座工厂。32
The company set to work in a converted Quonset hut at 391 South San Antonio Road, in the heart of an industrial district-cum-shopping center—the nearest neighbor was a Sears store—roughly five miles south of Stanford and footsteps across the Palo Alto border into Mountain View. The building, which one observer likened to an auto-parts warehouse, had insufficient gas and power for a laboratory’s needs, and privately Shockley’s new employees worried about whether or not their boss would outfit the lab appropriately. Their concerns proved unfounded. Shockley bought good scientific apparatus and tools, though he certainly did not bother with any sort of investment in aesthetics, since he planned to move the offices and labs to the Stanford Industrial Park, where Beckman was building a facility, in the fall of 1956.32
整个肖克利半导体实验室都设在一间屋子里。实验台环绕着屋子四周，一张大办公桌摆在正中央。业务经理就坐在这里，最初就是肖克利本人——这有力地证明了业务是实验室运营的核心。小屋的一角被用作一个简易的机械加工车间。当时半导体制造业还处于起步阶段，尚未形成标准化的现成设备。33
The entirety of Shockley Semiconductor Laboratories was housed in a single room. Lab tables ringed the perimeter, and a big desk was planted smack in the middle. Here sat the business manager, who in the beginning was Shockley himself—tangible proof that business stood at the heart of the operation. One corner of the hut served as a modest machine shop for building models and equipment. Semiconductor manufacture was far too new to have generated standard, off-the-shelf equipment.33
从踏进奎恩塞特小屋的那一刻起，鲍勃·诺伊斯就成为了实验室的领导者，原因很简单：与其他大多数新员工不同，他是一位经验丰富的晶体管研究员。他在菲尔科公司的工作经历以及他对晶体管的长期兴趣，使他掌握了最新的半导体理论，并拥有丰富的器件操作经验。他对半导体实验室的运作方式几乎有着与生俱来的直觉。一位肖克利实验室的员工回忆说，诺伊斯在没有图纸的情况下，亲手吹制了一台真空泵。诺伊斯对这项技术的未来发展方向也有着清晰的构想。“在他的脑海里，他能预见到未来的发展方向，”另一位同事这样评价道。34
FROM THE MOMENT he stepped through the doorway of the Quonset hut, Bob Noyce was in a position of leadership at the lab, simply because he, unlike most of the other new hires, was an experienced transistor researcher. His work at Philco and his long-standing interest in transistors gave him an understanding of the most current theories about semiconductors and practical experience in working with the devices. He had an almost intuitive notion of how things should work in a semiconductor lab. One Shockley employee recalled Noyce building a clean vacuum pump without drawings—blowing the glass himself. Noyce also had clear ideas about how the technology could potentially develop in the future. “In his mind, he could see where it was all going,” observed another co-worker.34
诺伊斯到肖克利公司几周后，就领导了一个团队，成员包括六名资深科研人员，他们全部拥有博士学位。他还协助招聘，为新入职的技术人员设定薪资，并陪同重要来访者参观实验室。当肖克利想要估算公司每月应该能够处理多少晶体时，他向诺伊斯询问了菲尔科公司的生产速度。当他想了解公司应该订阅哪些技术期刊时，他也请诺伊斯帮忙收集信息。肖克利还注意到，在他加入公司初期，诺伊斯曾就扩散工艺提出过一些建议。35
Within weeks of his arrival at Shockley, Noyce was heading up a team that included six members of the senior scientific staff, all of them PhDs. He also helped with recruiting, set salaries for incoming technical employees, and escorted prominent visitors through the lab. When Shockley wanted to estimate how many crystals the company should be able to process per month, he asked Noyce about Philco’s run rate. When he wanted suggestions on technical journals the company should receive, he asked Noyce to gather the information. Shockley also noted several suggestions from Noyce about the diffusion process in his early days at the company.35
在同事眼中，诺伊斯平易近人，待人随和。“你可以走过去问他：‘你觉得这个怎么样？’”维克·琼斯回忆道，“他有一种非常沉稳的领导风格，一种朴实无华、亲切自然的农家子弟气质，非常吸引人。”诺伊斯的教学方式从不居高临下。例如，他不会只是简单地向负责光刻胶（一种用于将半导体图案转移到晶圆上的感光液体）的技术员下达指令，而是会和他聊聊应该搭配使用哪些类型的透镜。这些信息不仅有助于改进光刻胶，还能让技术员了解一些他之前可能并不熟悉的研发流程。诺伊斯的许多同事都觉得，他们从他身上学到的东西比从肖克利那里学到的还要多。36
To his peers, Noyce was approachable in a laid-back way. “He was somebody you went over to and said, ‘What do you think about this?’” recalled Vic Jones. “He had a very quiet leadership style, a gee-whiz-aw-shucks-farm-boy approach that was very attractive.” Noyce taught without condescension. For example, rather than simply handing orders to the technician in charge of photoresists—the light-sensitive liquid used in the process of transferring a semiconductor pattern onto a wafer—Noyce was likely to chat with him about the types of lenses that would be used in conjunction with the resists. Such information would not only result in better photoresists, it would teach the resists man a little bit about a part of the development process that perhaps he had not known before. Many of Noyce’s peers felt that they learned more from him than they did from Shockley.36
唯一一位知识和经验能与诺伊斯匹敌的员工是斯穆特·霍斯利，他是公司第一个招入的员工。霍斯利比其他员工年长十岁，他们都穿着衬衫上班——诺伊斯甚至有一次穿着短裤——而霍斯利则更喜欢他以前为摩门教传教时穿的那种细细的深色领带和白衬衫。霍斯利对肖克利忠心耿耿，年轻的科学家们把他视为老板的延伸，而不是同级。在背后，他们称他为“油嘴滑舌的霍斯利”。
The only other employee with knowledge and experience equivalent to Noyce was Smoot Horsley, the first man hired. Horsley was a decade older than the rest of the staff, and while they came to work in shirtsleeves—Noyce once even showed up in shorts—Horsley preferred the thin dark ties and white shirts he had worn for his mission work for the Mormon church. Horsley was intensely loyal to Shockley, and the young scientists saw him as an extension of the boss, not as a peer. Behind his back, they called him “Smooth Horsley.”
诺伊斯和肖克利关系也很密切。两人经常一起游泳，偶尔也会一起喝几杯。肖克利的新婚妻子，一位心理护士，和贝蒂成了朋友，经常去诺伊斯家聊天，或者陪孩子们玩，而贝蒂则忙着办事或继续她仍然热爱的创作。一些员工认为，在实验室里，只有诺伊斯的意见才能真正被他们的老板重视。肖克利把这个来自爱荷华州、思维敏捷、热爱表演的人，看作是自己年轻时的翻版。37
Noyce was also quite close to Shockley. The men would swim together and occasionally go for drinks. Shockley’s new wife, the psychological nurse, had become friendly with Betty and regularly stopped by the Noyces’ home to chat or to play with the children while their mother ran errands or worked on the creative writing she still enjoyed. Several employees thought that Noyce’s was the only opinion in the lab that mattered to their boss, who viewed the Iowan, with his quick mind and love of performing, as a youthful incarnation of himself.37
S ·肖克利安排这些年轻人根据各自的专长领域开展工作。谢尔顿·罗伯茨建立了一个分析实验室，以便更好地了解硅的特性。其他人也加入他的行列，致力于培育纯净的硅晶体。朱利叶斯·布兰克和尤金·克莱纳与迪安·克纳皮克合作，在实验室内部自行车削和加工了许多设备和测量仪器。（他们将最简单的设计交给当地的机械师。）他们还制造了用于生长硅锭的晶体拉制机。让·霍尔尼计算了扩散曲线，并提出了理论，研究了不同杂质在什么温度和浓度下需要多长时间才能扩散到半导体表面。戈登·摩尔在他参与建造的熔炉中对霍尔尼的理论进行了实验验证。
SHOCKLEY SET THE YOUNG MEN TO WORK according to their specific fields of expertise. Sheldon Roberts organized an analytical laboratory so he could better understand the properties of silicon. Others joined him in an effort to grow pure crystals. Julius Blank and Eugene Kleiner worked with Dean Knapic, lathing and jigging many of the lab’s rigs and measuring devices in-house. (They sent their simplest designs to local machinists.) They also built the crystal puller used to grow the silicon ingots. Jean Hoerni calculated diffusion curves, theorizing for how long, and at what temperatures and concentrations, different impurities should be diffused into the surface of the semiconductor. Gordon Moore empirically tested Hoerni’s theories in furnaces he had helped to build.
鲍勃·诺伊斯领导着一个专注于晶体管的研究小组，特别关注贝尔实验室关于扩散过程的研究成果。诺伊斯有很多机会从事他热爱的合作性科学研究，与同事们共同撰写了大量技术性很强的论文，主题包括“PN结空间电荷区中的载流子产生和复合”以及“局部辐射损伤作为间隙原子或空位的来源”。
Bob Noyce led a group focused on transistors, paying special attention to the work and results Bell Labs had reported on the diffusion process. Noyce had ample opportunity to do the collaborative good science he loved, preparing highly technical papers with his colleagues on topics such as “Carrier Generation and Recombination in the Space-Charge Region of a P-N Junction,” and “Localized Radiation Damage as a Source for Interstitials or Vacancies.”
1956年8月14日，诺伊斯在他的实验记录本中记下了一个关于“负阻二极管”的想法。大多数二极管的电流会随着电压的增加而增加——施加在器件上的电压越高，流过器件的电流就越大。然而，诺伊斯做出了一个惊人的预测。他设想在半导体中掺杂比标准浓度高出大约一千倍的杂质。诺伊斯预测，当施加在这个重掺杂二极管上的电压从零开始增加时，电流最初也会增加（就像其他二极管一样）。但是，他指出，随着电压进一步增加，“电流必然会下降”，因为高杂质浓度不仅会使电子，而且会使空穴也能穿过PN结——这种现象被称为隧穿效应。诺伊斯推测，如果在“负阻”阶段继续增加电压，流过器件的电流就会开始上升，二极管将恢复正常行为。38
On August 14, 1956, Noyce noted an idea for a “negative resistance diode” in his lab notebook. With most diodes, the current flow increases with increases in voltage—the more voltage applied to the device, the more current passes through it. Noyce, however, made a startling prediction. He imagined doping a semiconductor with roughly a thousand times more impurities than was standard. When the voltage applied to this heavily doped diode increased from zero, Noyce predicted, current would also initially increase (as in any other diode). But, he said, as the voltage increased even further, “current must drop” because the high impurity density would make it possible not only for electrons, but also for holes, to transfer across the P-N junction—a phenomenon called tunneling. If one continued to increase the voltage through this period of “negative resistance,” Noyce theorized, the amount of current passing through the device would begin to rise, and the diode would resume normal behavior.38
诺伊斯对负阻二极管的思考令他兴奋不已。这些思考表明，量子力学的一个重要概念——“隧穿效应”——原本仅存在于理论假设中的量子隧穿效应，如今却能在简单的PN结中得到验证。如果把半导体中的导电电子想象成撞击墙壁（由绝缘体或其他势垒构成）的球，那么量子隧穿效应就会预测，偶尔会有球不会从墙上反弹，而是直接穿过墙壁。39
Noyce’s musings about a negative resistance diode excited him. They indicated that an important concept of quantum mechanics—“tunneling,” which existed only as a theoretical postulate—could be demonstrated in a simple P-N junction. If one thinks of conduction electrons in a semiconductor as balls bouncing against a wall (a wall built from an insulator or other potential barrier), quantum tunneling would predict that every once in a while, a ball would not bounce off the wall but would instead tunnel right through it.39
诺伊斯带着他的实验记录去找肖克利，满心期待他会赞赏不已。然而，“老板对这个想法毫无兴趣”。实验室的设备不足以让诺伊斯的想法产生任何盈利价值，而且，肖克利也不喜欢员工自行探索研究方向。诺伊斯失望地合上实验记录本，“转而去做其他项目了”。他后来评论说，与肖克利的这次对话让他明白，“‘不感兴趣’确实是一种强大的打击动力。”40
Noyce brought his lab book entry to Shockley, fully expecting him to be impressed. Instead, “the boss showed no interest in the idea.” The lab was not equipped to do anything profitable with Noyce’s thoughts, and besides, Shockley did not like his employees to chart their own investigative paths. Disappointed, Noyce closed his lab book and “went on to other projects.” He later commented that this exchange with Shockley taught him that “the message of ‘no interest’ is certainly a powerful demotivator.’”40
诺伊斯或许放弃了对负阻二极管的想法，但这种器件很快又出现在他的生活中。1958年1月15日，几乎正好是诺伊斯提出这个想法17个月后，一位名叫江崎利夫的日本科学家在著名的《物理评论》上发表了一篇文章，描述了同样的负阻二极管。这篇文章在电子学界引起了轰动。江崎在一次国际物理会议上的报告会场座无虚席。41
Noyce may have given up his ideas about a negative resistance diode, but the device soon reappeared in his life. On January 15, 1958, almost exactly 17 months after Noyce noted his ideas, a Japanese scientist named Leo Esaki published an article in the prestigious Physical Review describing the same negative resistance diode. The article caused quite a sensation in the electronics community. The audience for Esaki’s presentation at an international physics conference was filled to overflowing.41
读完江崎的文章后，诺伊斯找到了他的朋友戈登·摩尔。诺伊斯的实验记录和江崎的奠基性论文惊人地相似——例如，他们使用的插图几乎完全相同。然而，两者之间存在一个重要的区别。诺伊斯预测了电流下降（隧道效应的证据）的出现。而江崎则实际制造了一个装置来验证他的想法，并证明了电流下降确实会发生。这一区别至关重要——许多好的想法在从脑海中到实验室的转化过程中就夭折了——这几乎可以肯定是由于威廉·肖克利在1956年对诺伊斯（一位本质上是实验主义者的科学家）的打击性评论直接导致的。诺伊斯感到恼火，主要是对自己没有在肖克利否定他的想法后继续深入研究感到懊恼。“如果我再进一步，”他告诉摩尔，“我就能成功了。”1973年，江崎因其在负阻二极管（或称隧道二极管）方面的工作而荣获诺贝尔物理学奖。42
After reading the Esaki article, Noyce found his friend Gordon Moore. Noyce’s lab book pages and Esaki’s foundational paper are strikingly similar—they use almost identical illustrations, for example. There was, however, one important difference. Noyce predicted the drop in current (the evidence of tunneling) would occur. Esaki, who actually built a device to demonstrate his ideas, showed that it would. This difference is crucial—many good ideas die en route from the mind to the lab bench—and it is almost certainly a direct result of William Shockley’s discouraging comments to Noyce, who was an experimentalist at heart, in 1956. Noyce was irritated, primarily with himself for not pursuing his ideas even after Shockley dismissed them. “If I had gone one step further,” he told Moore, “I would have done it.” In 1973, Leo Esaki shared the Nobel Prize for physics for his work on the negative-resistance, or tunnel, diode.42
除了摩尔之外，诺伊斯的同事们都不知道诺伊斯在隧道二极管项目上与成功失之交臂的事，但他们都亲眼目睹了他对半导体物理学的深刻理解，摩尔形容他的知识“相当于我们所有人加起来的总和”。诺伊斯在肖克利公司工作期间申请了四项专利；其中两项专利的共同发明人正是威廉·肖克利本人。当肖克利要求员工对公司资深成员的技术领导力进行排名时，诺伊斯位列榜首。43
None of Noyce’s colleagues aside from Moore knew about Noyce’s near-miss on the tunnel diode, but they had seen ample evidence of his advanced understanding of semiconductor physics, which Moore describes as “an equivalent amount of knowledge as the rest of us combined.” Noyce filed for four patents while he worked at Shockley; two of these patents listed William Shockley himself as Noyce’s co-inventor. When Shockley asked the staff to rank its senior members in terms of technical leadership, Noyce emerged as the top choice.43
肖克利的管理方式让他的员工颇感意外。他虽然仔细考察过新员工之间的合得来，但却没有人考察过他们与老板的合得来。肖克利在机修车间里花了几个小时，指导克莱纳和布兰克如何组装设备，甚至有一次，他连克莱纳想用在晶体拉拔器上的螺栓都重新设计了一遍，那台拉拔器是用来生长硅锭的。他把霍尼单独派到实验室附近的一间公寓里工作，表面上是为了避免他分心，但更有可能是因为他觉得这位才华横溢、口音尖细、拥有两个博士学位的年轻理论家对他构成了威胁。霍尼既愤怒又孤独，被“流放”几天后，他设法说服肖克利让他回到了奎恩塞特小屋。44
SHOCKLEY’S MANAGERIAL METHODS came as somewhat of a surprise to his employees. He had been careful to test his recruits for compatibility with each other, but no one had tested them for compatibility with their boss. Shockley spent hours in the machine shop telling Kleiner and Blank how to build the equipment, even going so far, in one case, as to redesign the bolts Kleiner wanted to use on the crystal puller used to grow silicon ingots. He sent Hoerni to work alone in an apartment near the lab, ostensibly because he did not want him distracted, but more likely because he felt threatened by the brilliant young theoretician with his clipped accent and pair of doctorates. Angry and lonely, Hoerni managed to talk his way back into the Quonset hut after only a few days’ banishment.44
那些才华横溢的科学家们所关注的是基础性的工作。物理、化学、光学、热力学、流体力学：所有这些学科都必须协同运作，才能制造出功能齐全的半导体器件。硅的许多基本特性当时仍未被充分理解。热量是如何从特定点扩散的？如果用氩原子轰击硅会发生什么？没有人知道如何大规模生产硅晶体管。哪种类型的炉子效果最佳？如何才能最好地测量制造过程中蚀刻在硅上的各层厚度？熔点低于硅的半导体效率如何？
The work preoccupying the hot minds was fundamental. Physics, chemistry, optics, thermodynamics, fluid mechanics: every one of these disciplines had to work in concert to build a functional semiconductor device. Many of the basic properties of silicon were still not well understood. How did heat diffuse off a specific point? What happens if silicon is bombarded with atoms of argon? No one knew how to build production quantities of silicon transistors. What type of furnace would work best? How best to measure the thickness of the layers etched on the silicon in the manufacturing process? How efficient were semiconductors with melting temperatures lower than silicon’s?
这些问题的答案将成为全球晶体管制造的基础，因为肖克利并非唯一一个预见到扩散硅晶体管未来发展前景的人。事实上，在肖克利半导体实验室开始运营时，贝尔实验室、德州仪器和菲尔科公司的研究人员已经在探索与肖克利团队相同的问题。而惠普公司也有一位员工在做着类似的研究。“我们过去常常拿着硅锭来回传递，就像互相借糖一样，”朱利叶斯·布兰克笑着说，“简直是盲人领路。”45
Answers to these questions would serve as the foundation for transistor manufacture throughout the world, for Shockley was not the only man to see the future in diffused silicon transistors. Indeed, by the time Shockley Semiconductor Labs began operation, researchers at Bell Labs, Texas Instruments, and Philco were already exploring the same issues that preoccupied the Shockley team. Closer to home, Hewlett-Packard had one man working in a similar vein. “We used to go back and forth with [silicon] ingots, like borrowing cups of sugar from one another,” laughs Julius Blank. “The blind leading the blind.”45
尽管肖克利实验室有一套正式的汇报结构，但实际上，在那个巨大的房间里，每个人都互相协作，不断比较结果并征求反馈。“这种做事方式怎么样？你觉得有什么不对劲吗？如果我造一个熔炉，你希望它做什么？你觉得我为什么会从这个实验中得到这样的结果？”这对诺伊斯来说是一个令人欣喜的改变，他已经习惯了菲尔科公司为履行军方合同而采用的正式管理层级和设备申请流程。有一次，在和朋友朱利叶斯·布兰克共进午餐时，诺伊斯开始勾勒他想要的那种设备的草图。“我需要一个钟形罩……我想把触点暴露出来……”仅此而已。几天后，布兰克递给他一个粗略的模型。“我们刚刚完成了……”“居然在这里说话！”诺伊斯惊讶地摇了摇头。“如果我们在菲尔科公司也想做同样的事情，那得花六个月时间！”46
Although there was some official reporting structure at Shockley, in reality, everyone worked with everyone else in the cavernous room, constantly comparing results and asking for feedback. What about this way of doing things? Do you see anything wrong? If I build a furnace, what do you want it to do? Any ideas about why I might have gotten this result from this experiment? It was a welcome change for Noyce, who was accustomed to the formal management hierarchy and equipment requisitioning procedures that Philco had adopted as part of its military contract work. At one point over lunch with his friend Julius Blank, Noyce started sketching out his ideas for a piece of equipment he wished he had. “I need a bell jar.… I want to expose the contacts …” Nothing more specific than that. A few days later, Blank handed him a rough model. “We just got through talking here!” Noyce shook his head in astonishment. “If we wanted the same thing at Philco, it would have taken six months!”46
科学家们自行组织了一些非正式的技术研讨会，每个人都向其他人介绍自己的专业领域。肖克利给他们每人一本他自己撰写的教科书，这本书被公认为是世界上最好的半导体物理教材。肖克利本人也是一位优秀的老师，他常常能在别人还没来得及阐述问题之前，就直击问题的核心。“肖克利有一种神奇的能力，他能追溯到基本原理，并做出正确的简化假设，这样你就能轻松地理解复杂的数学原理，”诺伊斯在1982年解释道，“如果你试图为固体材料中的每个电子都建立波动方程，你会陷入一团乱麻，什么都做不了。所以你必须找到易于处理的表示方法。”肖克利的物理直觉非常敏锐，以至于他的员工声称他真的能看到电子。即使是最专业的技术话题，他也能讲解得非常清晰透彻。例如，他最著名的半导体理论著作，开篇就将电子的运动比作汽车在满员的车库里寻找停车位。47
The scientists arranged informal technical seminars for themselves, each man familiarizing the others with his particular field of expertise. Shockley gave them each a copy of the textbook he had written, which was universally acknowledged as the world’s best semiconductor physics text. Shockley himself was an excellent teacher, regularly cutting to the heart of a problem in less time than it took other people to formulate it. “Shockley has this marvelous ability of going all the way back to first principles and making the right simplifying assumptions so you can wade through the mathematics and do it relatively simply,” Noyce explained in 1982. “If you were going to try to put wave equations down for every electron in a solid material, you would be in such a mess you couldn’t ever do anything. So you have to find representations that are manageable.” Shockley’s physical intuition was so great that his employees claimed that he could actually see electrons. He could speak on even the most technical topic with remarkable clarity. His best-known book on semiconductor theory, for example, starts by comparing the movement of electrons to cars looking for a parking space in a full garage.47
这些年轻人早上九点到公司，通常六点半左右下班。午饭时分，三五成群的人会去附近的柯克小餐馆吃汉堡，或者如果运气好，肖克利会开着他那辆绿色的捷豹敞篷车带他们去他最喜欢的有服务员点餐的餐厅——黑森林餐厅。他们当中有好几个都喜欢徒步旅行和登山。他们的妻子和孩子也成了朋友。总的来说，那是一段快乐的时光。48
The young men got to work by 9:00 and generally left around 6:30. At lunch time, groups of three or four would head for a burger at Kirk’s, the nearby greasy spoon, or if they were lucky, Shockley might take them to his favorite waiters-and-menus restaurant, the Black Forest, in his green Jaguar convertible. Several of the men shared an interest in hiking and mountain climbing. Their wives and children had become friends. In general, it was a happy time.48
1956年11月1日，星期四清晨，实验室里一片沸腾。当天早上七点刚过，威廉·肖克利接到电话，得知他与贝尔实验室的同事沃尔特·布拉顿和约翰·巴丁因发明晶体管而荣获诺贝尔物理学奖。工作日伊始，大家举杯香槟向肖克利致敬，尽管他当时还没到实验室。但这无关紧要。这些年轻人既为老板感到高兴，也为自己能与诺贝尔奖得主共事而感到荣幸。这个奖项印证了他们加入公司之前对自己的所有设想：他们的确已经跻身顶尖行列。阿诺德·贝克曼也同样感到无比激动，他特地从南加州飞来，亲自向他们表示祝贺。49
THE MORNING of Thursday, November 1, 1956, found the lab abuzz with excitement. Shortly after seven that morning, William Shockley had received a phone call notifying him that he, along with his Bell Labs colleagues Walter Brattain and John Bardeen, had won the Nobel Prize for Physics for their invention of the transistor. The workday began with champagne toasts to Shockley, who had not yet come into the lab. No matter. The young men were as much celebrating their own good fortune at working with a Nobel Prizewinner as they were happy for their boss. The award confirmed everything they had told themselves before they joined the company. They were indeed playing in the big leagues. Arnold Beckman, who certainly was feeling the same way, flew up from Southern California to offer his congratulations in person.49
当天晚些时候，肖克利中断了面试、电报（他收到了200多封）和电话，带着他四五十名员工前往里基酒店的餐厅。里基酒店是他们许多人面试期间的下榻之处。这是一顿高档午餐：洁白的桌布、鲜花和蜡烛点缀着餐桌，厚重的窗帘遮住了众人热烈的交谈声。喝完咖啡后，几位男士围坐在肖克利身边，他坐在其中一张桌子的主位上。闪光灯一闪。这张经常被翻印的照片闪闪发光：几个穿着敞领衬衫、笑容满面的年轻人举着酒杯，几乎是在拍着他们笑容灿烂的老板的背。诺伊斯站在照片中央，方下巴的侧脸清晰可见，英俊潇洒，他小心翼翼地拿着酒杯，以免挡住自己和邻座的脸。你仿佛能听到《他是个好伙伴》（For He's a Jolly Good Fellow）的旋律从这张黑白照片模糊的背景中传来。
Later that day, Shockley interrupted the rounds of interviews, telegrams (he received more than 200), and phone calls to take his staff—now 40 or 50 strong—to the restaurant at Rickey’s, the hotel where many of them had stayed during their job interviews. It was a luncheon in high style: white tablecloths, flowers, and candles graced the tables, while the heavy curtains lining the walls muffled the group’s animated chatter. After coffee, several of the men assembled around Shockley, who was seated at the head of one of the tables. A flashbulb popped. The oft-reprinted photo sparkles with raised wine glasses and grinning young men in open-neck shirts all but patting their beaming boss on the back. Noyce, standing in square-jawed profile at the center of the picture, is strikingly handsome, his wineglass held carefully to avoid blocking the camera’s view of his own or his neighbor’s face. You can almost hear strains of “For He’s a Jolly Good Fellow” rising from the blurred background of the black-and-white snapshot.
一个月后，肖克利在母亲和妻子艾米的陪同下前往斯德哥尔摩参加颁奖典礼。他比布拉坦和巴丁晚一天到达。布拉坦和巴丁与家人一同乘飞机抵达，并在飞机上庆祝了一夜，互相交流得知消息时的感受。布拉坦在贝尔实验室报到时，受到了全场起立鼓掌的欢迎。巴丁接到来自瑞典的电话时，惊讶得手一抖，手里的煎蛋锅都掉在了地上。50
A month later, Shockley left for the award ceremonies in Stockholm, accompanied by his mother and wife Emmy. He arrived a day after Brattain and Bardeen, who had flown together with their families and spent a celebratory night on the airplane catching up and exchanging stories of what happened when they got the news. Brattain had been greeted by a standing ovation when he reported for work at Bell Labs. Bardeen had been so surprised by the call from Sweden that he had dropped the pan of eggs he was cooking for breakfast.50
颁奖典礼盛况空前。在斯德哥尔摩优雅的音乐厅里，身着白色领结的男士和身着正式礼服的女士们全体起立，古斯塔夫六世·阿道夫国王为每位获奖者颁奖。巴丁、布拉坦和肖克利分别发表了简短的演讲。其他获奖者大多将发言内容限定在科学领域，而肖克利则在演讲结束时不忘宣传自己的远见卓识——他提醒听众，早在1950年他就预言了“晶体管电子学”的辉煌未来——以及他在加州新成立的机构。51
The award ceremony was a glorious affair. Men in white tie and women in formal gowns rose to their feet in Stockholm’s elegant concert hall as King Gustav VI Adolph presented each man with his award. Bardeen, Brattain, and Shockley each gave a short talk. While the other laureates limited their comments to science, Shockley ended his with plugs for his own prescience—he had predicted a great future for “transistor electronics” as early as 1950, he reminded his audience—and for his “new organization in California.”51
午夜刚过，肖克利和妻子漫步走进格兰德酒店那间雅致的酒吧时，发现布拉坦和巴丁已经在喝酒了。虽然这两位科学家已经五年多没和肖克利说过话了，但这次的场合太过特殊，他们不愿计较过去的恩怨。他们邀请肖克利加入他们。52
Shortly after midnight, when Shockley and his wife wandered into the elegant bar at the Grand Hotel, they saw Brattain and Bardeen already sharing a drink. Though the scientists had scarcely spoken to Shockley for more than five years, the occasion was too special to nurse old grudges. They invited him to join them.52
肖克利十二月底从斯德哥尔摩回来，兴致高昂，在同事们看来，他简直有点自大。他把实验室的人召集起来，发表了一番简短的讲话。他说，当他获得诺贝尔奖时，感觉自己就像丘吉尔一样。他还顺便补充道，他的贡献“早就该”得到应有的认可了。起初，年轻的科学家们以为他在开玩笑。但他却是认真的。53
SHOCKLEY RETURNED FROM STOCKHOLM at the end of December in spirits so high they verged on egomania in the eyes of his staff. He gathered the lab for a little speech. He said that when he received the Nobel Prize, he had felt like Churchill. He added, as an aside, that it was “about time” his contributions were appropriately recognized. At first the young scientists thought he was making a joke. He was quite serious.53
在获得诺贝尔奖前的几个月里，肖克利的行为变得越来越古怪。他从来就不是一个容易让人喜欢的人，即使他努力想讨人喜欢的时候也是如此。例如，当他给最年轻的科学家杰伊·拉斯特加薪时，他告诫拉斯特说……他当初就不该同意接受之前那675美元的薪水。“杰伊，这会让你长记性，以后别再为了蝇头小利出卖自己了。”肖克利似乎并不信任他亲自挑选的团队。他打电话给贝尔实验室，要求再次确认他对数据的解读，这让诺伊斯非常恼火。“我真的有必要待在这里吗？”诺伊斯自问。“如果他能打电话给贝尔实验室的朋友，就能得到我在实验室里努力解答的那些问题的答案，那我在这里的存在就显得无关紧要了。”54
Shockley’s behavior had grown increasingly erratic in the months leading up to his Nobel Prize. He had never been an easy man to like, even when he was trying to be likeable. When he gave a raise to Jay Last, the youngest scientist, for example, he did so with the admonishment that Last never should have agreed to work for the $675 he had previously been earning. “Jay, that will teach you never to sell yourself out cheap again.” Shockley seemed not to trust his hand-picked team. He infuriated Noyce by calling Bell Labs to double-check his interpretations of data. “Am I really needed here?” Noyce asked himself. “If he can call friends at Bell Labs and get answers to the same questions that I [am] trying to answer in the laboratory, my presence here isn’t that important.”54
肖克利坚信，在生活的几乎所有方面，最终都只能有一个赢家——而他想成为那个赢家。在1956年12月举行的精英云集的美国物理学会会议上，他把自己列为所有员工论文的共同报告人和共同作者。在斯坦福大学游泳池的午间锻炼对肖克利来说总是一场竞赛，如果发现有人游得更快或更远，他就会拼尽全力。他曾对一位员工说，虽然很多人可以合作撰写一篇论文，但专利应该只列出一位发明人，因为“只需要一个人点亮他的脑袋……其他人只是辅助者。”尽管如此，他还是把自己列为员工最重要的专利申请的共同发明人。55
Shockley strongly adhered to a belief that in almost every aspect of life, there could be but one winner—and he wanted to be it. He had himself listed as a co-presenter and co-author on every one of the papers given by his employees at the elite American Physical Society conference in December 1956. Lunchtime workouts in the Stanford pool were always races for Shockley, who pushed himself to exhaustion if it appeared another man was swimming faster or farther. He once told an employee that although many people could write a paper together, patents should officially list only one inventor because “there’s only one light bulb to go on in somebody’s head…. The other [people] are mere helpers.” He nonetheless listed himself as a co-inventor on his employees’ most significant patent applications.55
肖克利会毫不留情地攻击犯错的人——用一位前员工的话来说，他“几乎把人逼哭”。一位曾在其他场合与肖克利共事的人这样描述他的行为：“他有时也会帮上忙，但你得先经历一番屈辱。” 你在哪儿上学的？你确定你真的上过学吗？你怎么可能不知道这种事？有一次，肖克利当众解雇了一位秘书，因为她没有按照他的要求安排行程。其他员工都惊呆了。56
Shockley would attack people when they made mistakes—“reduce them almost to tears,” in the words of one former employee. One man who worked with Shockley in a different context described his behavior thus: “He could be helpful, but you had to go through a ritual humiliation first.” Where’d you go to school? Are you sure that you actually went to school? How could you not know something like this? In one instance, Shockley publicly fired a secretary who had not made travel arrangements in the manner he had specified. The other employees were horrified.56
杰伊·拉斯特回忆说，诺贝尔奖颁奖典礼后的几个月里，肖克利的行为愈发恶劣，以至于实验室简直像个“大型精神病院”。当他想让大家离开大楼时，肖克利不会简单地宣布一天的工作结束，而是会引用T·S·艾略特的《J·阿尔弗雷德·普鲁弗洛克的情歌》（“那么，你和我，我们走吧……”）。一位秘书的手被门上伸出的一小块金属划伤后，肖克利认定这是人为破坏。他通知实验室，他打算聘请一名私家侦探，并且所有人都要接受测谎，找出罪魁祸首。谢尔顿·罗伯茨花了将近一周的时间，借助显微镜向肖克利证明，那件罪魁祸首只不过是一枚掉了塑料保护头的图钉。57
In the months after the Nobel Prize ceremony, recalls Jay Last, Shockley’s behavior deteriorated to the point that the lab came to resemble “a big psychiatric institute.” When he wanted people to leave the building, Shockley would quote T. S. Eliot’s “Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” (“Let us go then, you and I …”) rather than simply announcing an end to the day. When a secretary cut her hand on a tiny piece of metal protruding from her door, Shockley convinced himself that it was deliberate sabotage. He informed the lab that he planned to hire a private investigator and that they would all need to undergo lie detector tests to find the culprit. Sheldon Roberts spent the better part of a week proving to Shockley, with the help of a microscope, that the offending object was simply a thumbtack that had lost its protective plastic head.57
杰伊·拉斯特就觉得情况越来越难以忍受。他和霍尼觉得和肖克利一起工作令人沮丧，几乎每个周末他们都会驱车南下几个小时，徒步跋涉一英里又一英里，一路抱怨，甚至“踢约书亚树”来发泄不满。拉斯特观察到诺伊斯和肖克利的关系似乎很牢固，有一天，拉斯特向诺伊斯倾诉了自己和老板之间的矛盾，并寻求建议。诺伊斯没能提供太多具体的改善方案，但拉斯特离开时感觉至少卸下了心中的重担。第二天，肖克利怒气冲冲地走到他面前，大声质问：“你到底跟诺伊斯说了什么？”拉斯特震惊了。“鲍勃说他觉得（告诉肖克利）是‘最好的处理方式’。但对我来说，这绝对不是什么好办法。”58
Jay Last, for one, thought things were becoming intolerable. He and Hoerni found working with Shockley so frustrating that nearly every weekend they would drive south for hours and hike, mile after mile, complaining and “kicking Joshua trees” to vent their frustrations. Last had observed that Noyce’s relationship with Shockley seemed strong, and one day he described to Noyce his own troubles with the boss and asked for advice. Noyce could not offer much in the way of concrete suggestions to improve the situation, but Last left feeling that at least he had unburdened himself of his concerns. The next day, Shockley barreled up to him and began shouting: “What the hell did you say to Noyce?” Last was shocked. “Bob said he thought [telling Shockley] was ‘the best way to handle it.’ It sure wasn’t best for me.”58
肖克利的强硬作风，以及他日益频繁的非理性行为，只是为他工作的年轻科学家们面临的众多压力之一。“我们总是担心‘肖克利会怎么看待这件事？’”维克·琼斯解释道。每一个想法，每一个可能令人兴奋的新工艺——都必须得到肖克利的认可，否则就无法继续进行。年轻的科学家们发现自己不得不压抑住自己的想法，生怕遭到肖克利的反对。更糟糕的是，肖克利是个夜猫子，他最出色的工作往往是在鸡尾酒的陪伴下完成的，而且他还希望他最亲近的人，包括诺伊斯，能和他一起去酒吧。
Shockley’s abrasive style, with its increasingly frequent dips into irrationality, was only one stress facing the young men working for him. “There was always this business about ‘how would Shockley respond to this?’” explains Vic Jones. Every idea, every potentially exciting new process—it all had to meet with Shockley’s approval, or it could not go further. The young scientists found themselves putting the brakes on their own ideas in anticipation of Shockley’s disapproval. It did not help that Shockley was a night owl who did some of his best work over cocktails and expected his favorites, including Noyce, to join him at the bars.
更糟糕的是，肖克利半导体公司非但没有像肖克利和贝克曼在起草商业协议时预期的那样赚得盆满钵满、产品源源不断，反而一直在亏损，而且至今没有任何产品售出。相比之下，贝克曼仪器公司在与肖克利半导体公司大致相同的时间资助的数据处理研究项目，已经开发出原型系统，并获得了杜邦、西屋电气、通用电气和通用汽车等领先企业的订单。59
To make matters worse, far from raking in the profits and churning out the products that Shockley and Beckman had anticipated when they drafted their business agreement, Shockley Semiconductor was losing money and had yet to sell anything. By contrast, the data-processing research that Beckman Instruments funded at roughly the same time as Shockley Semiconductor had already yielded a prototype system and orders from leading firms such as Dupont, Westinghouse, General Electric, and General Motors.59
问题的症结其实很简单。正如一位前员工所说，“肖克利经营公司是为了维护他的人格魅力和个人形象，而不是为了纯粹的经济利益。” 要想在商业上取得成功，就必须放弃对基础物理现象的探索，转而去做那些更为琐碎的工作——制造实用的产品。但肖克利害怕失去他作为世界顶尖固态物理学家之一的地位。只要有科学界的同事对他最近发表的论文略表惊讶，或者有人评论说他最近发表的论文不多，肖克利就会彻底改变公司的战略方向，命令员工停止手头的一切工作，开始撰写论文，准备在下一次重要的科学会议上发表。如果在公司进行基础科学研究的紧张时期，有外部人士询问公司在业务方面的情况，肖克利很可能会再次改变策略，让公司陷入一系列以产品为导向的活动中。60
The nub of the problem was simple. As a former employee put it, “Shockley ran the company for the benefit of his personality and his image, not for pure economic pay.” Succeeding as a businessman meant foregoing interesting explorations of basic physical phenomena for the more mundane task of building a usable product, but Shockley feared losing his status as one of the world’s leading solid-state physicists. One raised eyebrow from a scientific colleague or a few comments to the effect that he had not been publishing much lately, and Shockley would completely reorient his company, telling his employees to stop whatever they were doing and start writing up their findings for presentation at the next prestigious scientific meeting. If, in the course of one of these periods of intense work on basic science, someone from outside the company asked what was happening on the business front, Shockley was likely to reverse course again and throw the company into a flurry of product-oriented activity.60
雪上加霜的是，肖克利痴迷于他在贝尔实验室时期构思的一种装置——“四层二极管”。顾名思义，这种二极管比晶体管多一层扩散半导体。肖克利假设半导体扩散成四层结构。交替掺杂P型和N型元素的层状结构不仅可以起到晶体管的作用，还可以起到电阻器的作用。它比传统的二极管或锗晶体管速度更快、成本更低。肖克利非常肯定，西部电气公司会购买数千个这种四层二极管来取代电话网络中用于切换和连接呼叫的数十万个机械继电器，而且他认为计算机公司也会对这种产品感兴趣。诺贝尔奖颁奖典礼结束后不久，肖克利就从硅晶体管项目中抽调了六位资深科学家，转而研究这种四层二极管。61
Further adding to the troubles was Shockley’s obsession with a device he had conceived while still at Bell Labs, the “four-layer diode”—a diode that, as its name implies, has one more layer of diffused semiconductor than a transistor. Shockley hypothesized a semiconductor diffused in four alternating layers doped P and N could do the work not only of a transistor, but also of a resistor. It would also be faster and cheaper than either conventional diodes or germanium transistors. Shockley was quite certain that Western Electric would want to buy thousands of these four-layer diodes to replace the hundreds of thousands of mechanical relays that switched and connected calls across the telephone grid, and he imagined that computer companies would be interested in the product, too. Shortly after his return from the Nobel Prize ceremonies, Shockley pulled a half-dozen senior scientists off the silicon transistor project to work on the four-layer diode.61
四层二极管在理论上非常巧妙；它确实可以实现晶体管（放大电流）、电阻器（限制电流）和二极管（只允许电流单向流动）的所有功能。然而，问题出在生产上：四层二极管的制造难度极大，根本无法批量生产。肖克利公司的一些年轻人私下里怀疑，这种二极管对发明者最大的吸引力在于他独自获得了专利。62
The four-layer-diode was ingenious in theory; it could, indeed, perform all the functions of a transistor (which amplifies current), a resistor (which restricts the flow of current), and a diode (which allows current to flow in one direction but not in the other). The problem arose in production: the four-layer diode was fabulously difficult to build and proved impossible to manufacture in quantity. Several of the young men at Shockley privately suspected that the diode’s greatest appeal for its inventor was that he had patented it alone.62
诺伊斯的团队建议公司应该专注于不那么尖端但更实用的晶体管，或者至少应该先完善晶体管，然后再着手研究更复杂的二极管。诺伊斯、摩尔、拉斯特和霍尔尼已经克服了阻碍扩散硅晶体管生产的一些主要障碍，贝尔实验室和其他地方的研究人员也取得了类似的快速进展。这些年轻的科学家们坚信，他们不仅能够制造出他们认为自己受雇制造的扩散硅晶体管，还能将其出售。即使没有复杂的科研支持（肖克利实验室没有市场营销或业务拓展部门），他们也凭直觉，正如戈登·摩尔所说，知道扩散硅晶体管“会有很大的市场”。晶体管在助听器和收音机中越来越常见，而军方当然会为该团队确信能够制造出的可靠硅晶体管支付巨额费用。贝克曼自己的数据处理系统已经使用了原始的锗晶体管；事实上，在超过六个月的时间里，诺伊斯每个月都会花一天时间与数据系统操作人员一起工作，就他们在使用这些设备时遇到的问题向他们提供咨询。63
Noyce’s group suggested that the company should focus on the less cutting-edge, but more practical, transistor, or at the very least, that they should perfect transistors before moving on to the trickier diodes. Noyce, Moore, Last, and Hoerni had already overcome some of the major hurdles blocking production of the diffused silicon transistor, and researchers at Bell Labs and elsewhere were making similarly quick progress. The young scientists were convinced that they could not only build the diffused silicon transistors they thought they had been hired to build—they could also sell them. Even without sophisticated research to back them up (there was no marketing or business development group at Shockley), they knew in their guts, as Gordon Moore put it, that “there’d be plenty of market” for diffused silicon transistors. Transistors were increasingly common in hearing aids and radios, and the military, of course, would pay a small fortune for the reliable silicon transistor the group was sure they could build. Beckman’s own data-processing system already used primitive germanium transistors; in fact, for more than six months, Noyce had spent one day each month with the data systems operation, consulting with them on the problems they encountered in their use of the devices.63
肖克利不为所动。他组建了一个五人团队专门研究四层二极管，并将他们安排在另一栋楼里，自己则负责这项工作。这清晰地表明了公司的未来发展方向：研发一种连阿诺德·贝克曼都称之为“新型专用二极管”的器件。当贝克曼仪器公司的其他部门拒绝在其应用中使用四层二极管时，肖克利并未感到不安。他只是向他们发出了类似的邀请。IBM，但收效甚微。他花了数年时间研究他的四层二极管。那是他毕生的追求。64
Shockley was unmoved. He set up a team of five to work on the four-layer diode, assigned them to a different building, and put himself in charge of the effort. This sent a clear signal about the company’s future direction: research and development of a device that even Arnold Beckman called “a novel, special-purpose diode.” When other divisions of Beckman Instruments declined the opportunity to use four-layer diodes in their applications, Shockley was not disturbed. He simply extended similar offers to IBM, to little effect. He would pursue his four-layer diode for years. It was his white whale.64
与此同时，诺伊斯的团队开始自行其是。他们决定，当肖克利不在实验室时——他经常出差，一走就是好几个星期，尤其是在获得诺贝尔奖之后——他们将按照自己选择的方式研究晶体管。等他回来后，他们再按照他的指示去做。
Meantime, Noyce’s group took matters into their own hands. They decided that when Shockley was not at the lab—he traveled frequently and for weeks at a time, especially after becoming a Nobel laureate—they would work on transistors in the manner they chose. When he got back, they would do as he told them.
1957年上半年，该团队专注于研制一种名为“台面晶体管”的扩散硅晶体管。台面晶体管之所以得名，是因为在放大镜下，它们的形状酷似美国西南部平坦的山峰。这种晶体管的出现标志着半导体技术的重大突破，因为它只需在硅片的一侧进行掩膜、扩散和蚀刻即可制造。贝尔实验室首创了三步工艺来制造台面晶体管。首先，将掺杂剂扩散到硅片表面下方。然后，在硅片上滴一滴卡努巴蜡。最后，用强酸浸透整个表面，蚀刻掉表层，只保留蜡滴保护的部分。这种晶体管可以通过两根导线连接到其他器件上，这两根导线固定在顶部平坦的蜡滴上。65
Throughout the first half of 1957, the group focused on building a type of diffused silicon transistor called a “mesa” transistor. Mesa transistors, so named because under magnification they resemble the flat-peaked land masses of the Southwest, represented a solid breakthrough in semiconductor technology because they could be produced by masking, diffusing, and etching on only one side of the silicon. Mesa transistors were built in a three-step process pioneered by Bell Labs. First, dopants were diffused beneath the surface of a slice of silicon. Next, a drop of canuba wax was deposited on top of the wafer. Finally, the entire surface was doused with a strong acid, which etched away the top layer, except where the wax drop protected it. This transistor could be attached to other devices via two wires, which were affixed to the now-flat-topped wax droplet.65
科学家们按照肖克利最初为他们制定的方案组织工作。诺伊斯负责制定总体方向。他协作的风格为威廉·肖克利激烈的竞争提供了重要的替代方案。这些年轻人担心给肖克利留下好印象，但在诺伊斯面前，他们却可以坦然地犯错。“你可以和鲍勃交谈，不用担心他会发脾气，”维克·琼斯解释说，“你不会从鲍勃那里感受到任何狂躁和愤怒。”66
The scientists organized their work along the lines Shockley had originally specified for them. Noyce set the general direction. His collaborative style provided an important alternative to William Shockley’s fierce competitiveness. The young men worried about impressing Shockley, but they were comfortable making mistakes around Noyce. “Bob you could talk to and not expect to blow up,” explains Vic Jones. “You didn’t get any sturm und drang from Bob.”66
拉斯特专注于抛光晶片，他那双稳健的手将细小的蜡滴涂抹在晶体管表面。霍尔尼和摩尔则负责扩散工艺。很快，小组就制造出了简易的晶体管。小组其他成员都认为，诺伊斯已经获得了肖克利的正式许可——或者至少没有被明确禁止——来开展这项工作，但他们谁也没有仔细询问。当然，他们也知道，当诺伊斯为晶体管制造工艺的某个环节申请专利时，肖克利的名字——当然是在诺伊斯之前——被列为共同发明人。67
Last focused on polishing the wafers and put his steady hands to work applying the tiny droplets of wax to the surface of the transistor. Hoerni and Moore took charge of diffusion. In relatively short order, the group found themselves producing rudimentary transistors. Noyce, the other members of the group assumed, had gotten Shockley’s official approval—or at least had not been explicitly forbidden—to undertake the work, but none of them inquired too closely. Certainly they knew that when Noyce filed for a patent for one part of the process to build the transistor, Shockley’s name was listed—before Noyce’s, of course—as a co-inventor.67
尽管取得了这些成就，但肖克利的微观管理、对四层二极管的痴迷，以及晶体管研究断断续续、隐秘进行的特点，使得诺伊斯实验室的氛围几乎令科学家们难以忍受。他们的学术训练鼓励开放式探究，并高度重视该领域资深人士的专业意见。威廉·肖克利认为他们的工作即便不是二流的，也肯定是次要的，这种想法深深伤害了他们作为精英研究人员的自尊心。
Despite these successes, Shockley’s micromanagement and obsession with the four-layer diode, as well as the start-and-stop, covert nature of the transistor work, combined to make the atmosphere in the lab nearly unbearable for the scientists working with Noyce. Their academic training rewarded open inquiry and placed a high value on the professional opinions of senior people in the field. The sense that William Shockley considered their work if not second-class, then certainly of secondary importance, offended their views of themselves as elite researchers.
阿诺德·贝克曼感到沮丧还有其他原因。贝克曼仪器公司面临着艰难的一年。由于政府合同的巨额损失、整个行业的衰退，以及贝克曼委婉地提到的“内部组织和控制方面的某些不足”，公司净收入急剧下降——1957年公司收入不足20万美元，1958年则出现亏损。68
Arnold Beckman was frustrated for other reasons. Beckman Instruments was facing a difficult year. Net income was dropping precipitously—the company would earn scarcely $200,000 in 1957 and would lose money in 1958—due to substantial losses on government contracts, an industry-wide recession, and what Beckman obliquely referred to as “certain inadequacies in internal organization and controls.”68
1957年5月，贝克曼召集了公司各部门的高级研发经理开会。肖克利和霍斯利代表肖克利半导体公司出席了会议。贝克曼告诉他们，研发成本正在失控地飙升，如果不加以控制，预计到1958年将占销售额的近14%。这次会议似乎就是为了约束肖克利而专门安排的。除了肖克利所在的部门外，其他所有部门都汇报了他们用于评估项目提案并最终完成项目的筛选方法、开发进度安排和流程。肖克利没有任何正式的方法；所有此类决策都取决于他个人的意愿。贝克曼列出了八项“研发工作中需要警惕的危险”。肖克利几乎犯了每一项危险，但其中两项似乎尤其针对他：“6. 让孩子做成年人的工作”和“8. 未能定期客观地评估研发项目的进展。重要的是要认清那些已经失败的项目，并及时终止它们。”69
In May 1957, Beckman convened a meeting of senior research and development managers from every division of his company. Shockley and Horsley attended on behalf of Shockley Semiconductor. R&D costs were spiraling out of control, Beckman told them, and were projected to reach nearly 14 percent of sales by 1958 if they continued unchecked. The meeting seemed designed specifically to rein in Shockley. Every division but his offered presentations on the screening methods, development schedules, and procedures they used to evaluate proposed projects and bring them to completion. Shockley had no such formal methods; all such decisions rested on his personal whim. Beckman proposed a list of eight “dangers to be guarded against in development work.” Shockley had fallen victim to every danger, but two in particular seemed targeted at his efforts: “6. Using boys for men’s jobs” and “8. Failure to regularly assay progress of development programs objectively. It is important to recognize dead horses and bury them.”69
贝克曼决定亲自前往山景城，与肖克利的研发团队面谈。他阐述了自己的担忧，并提出了几项节约成本的措施。这些措施肖克利在之前的会议上都已耳熟能详，但仍然激怒了他。肖克利猛地站起身来，宣布如果贝克曼不满意他的经营方式，他就会带着团队另寻投资人。70
Beckman decided it was time to pay a visit to Mountain View and speak directly with Shockley’s research staff. He laid out his concerns and suggested several cost-saving measures, all of which were familiar to Shockley from the earlier meeting but nonetheless enraged him. Shockley jumped to his feet and announced that if Beckman did not like the way he was running his business, he would pick up his team and find another backer.70
肖克利的爆发令他的科学家们震惊不已。维克·琼斯早已厌倦了“把大量无谓的时间浪费在救火和阻止肖克利做坏事上”，在肖克利的默许下，他离开了公司，前往哈佛大学任教。其他几位员工也在考虑离职，没有人对为肖克利工作抱有任何幻想。他永远无法激励哪怕是他的高级员工——更不用说整个公司——跟随他去从事其他事业。“情况已经到了必须采取一些激烈的行动的地步，”诺伊斯在冲突发生几天后写信给父母说，“否则我们都可以收拾行李离开。” 这次会面后不久，诺伊斯、克莱纳、霍尼、格里尼奇、罗伯茨、摩尔和拉斯特一起去了黑森林餐厅吃午饭。当其中一人开始老调重弹地抱怨肖克利时，格林尼奇——一个伐木工的儿子，向来说话直来直去——开始大声喊道：“听着，该死的！我们要么得做点什么，要么就别再谈论这件事了！”71
The outburst astounded the scientists on Shockley’s staff. Already Vic Jones, frustrated with “spending so much unproductive time on putting out fires and trying to keep Shockley from doing awful things,” had left, with Shockley’s blessing, to teach at Harvard. Several other employees were considering departures, and no one had any illusions about what it was like to work for Shockley. He would never be able to inspire even his senior staff—much less the entire company—to follow him to another venture. “The situation was such that some drastic action was called for,” Noyce wrote his parents a few days after the confrontation, “or we could all pack our bags and leave.” Shortly after this meeting, Noyce, Kleiner, Hoerni, Grinich, Roberts, Moore, and Last went to lunch at the Black Forest. When one of them began running through the often-repeated litany of complaints about Shockley, Grinich, the son of a lumberman and never one to put things delicately, began to shout. “Look, goddammit! We either have to do something about this or stop talking about it!”71
小组一致认为，贝克曼需要知道肖克利的威胁是空洞的。他们一直很钦佩贝克曼，这位科学家中的科学家。他想找些功成名就的人，而且看起来对他们的意见很感兴趣。戈登·摩尔被选中去打电话。其他人围在他身边，他拨通电话，声音因焦虑而颤抖，请求安排与贝克曼私下会面。72
Beckman needed to know that Shockley’s threats were hollow, the group decided. They had always admired Beckman, a scientists’ scientist who had made it big, and he seemed genuinely interested in their opinions. Gordon Moore was chosen to make the phone call. The others clustered nearby as he dialed and asked, his voice quaking with anxiety, for an appointment to meet with Beckman in private.72
诺伊斯在接到电话后不久就给父母写了信。他解释说，贝克曼“对肖克利的背景了解得足够深入，完全意识到这种转变的可能性”。贝克曼从南加州飞来，在一家高级餐厅的包间里与这些年轻的科学家们会面。他们告诉贝克曼，肖克利并非领导者，而是硅晶体管研发过程中的一股“破坏力量”。他的技术非常出色，但他暴躁易怒、反复无常的性格正在摧毁这个曾经渴望与他共事的团队。“贝克曼向我们保证，如果真的能找到某种看似有合理成功可能性的方案，他会在摊牌中支持员工而不是肖克利，”诺伊斯告诉父母。接下来的一周，诺伊斯称之为“秘密的晚间会议”，员工们都在讨论这个问题，并绞尽脑汁地想出我们认为的最佳解决方案。五月底，他们再次秘密会见贝克曼，建议他“设法让肖克利接受一份学术职位，让他不再与实验室进行日常接触，但如果他愿意，可以随时与我们沟通”。贝克曼对他们的抱怨表示同情，也关心公司的利益，并致力于找到解决办法，于是邀请肖克利共进晚餐，向他讲述了实验室的不满情绪。73
NOYCE WROTE to his parents shortly after the call was made. Beckman “had gone far enough into Shockley’s background to be fully aware of the possibility of this sort of turn,” he explained. Beckman flew in from Southern California and met with the young scientists in a private room at a fine restaurant. The group told Beckman that Shockley was not a leader, but a “disruptive force” in the efforts to build silicon transistors. He was technically terrific, but his outbursts and unpredictability were destroying the group once so eager to work with him. “Beckman assured us that he would support the staff rather than Shockley in a showdown, if indeed some arrangement could be found which seemed to have a reasonable chance of success,” Noyce told his parents. The next week was occupied with what Noyce called “secret evening meetings of the staff, discussing the problem and thrashing out what we thought was the best solution.” At the end of May, they again met secretly with Beckman to suggest that he “try to get Shockley to accept an academic position, removing him from contact with the laboratory on a day-to-day basis, but consulting with us if he so desired.” Sympathetic to their complaints, concerned about the welfare of his company, and committed to finding a solution, Beckman took Shockley to dinner tell him about the discontent at the lab.73
这个消息让肖克利深受打击。他知道拉斯特不高兴，当然也知道琼斯已经离开了，但总的来说，他认为一切进展顺利。他把自己视为员工们仁慈而又严厉的领导，教他们本领域的基础知识，纠正他们的错误，给他们优厚的待遇，并让他们有机会与诺贝尔奖得主合作发表论文。如果他有时显得有些严厉，那是因为他就像一个训练营的教官，严格要求他的新兵，是为了他们好。与贝克曼共进晚餐后，肖克利直接上床睡觉了。74
The news devastated Shockley. He knew that Last was unhappy and, of course, that Jones had left, but overall, he thought things were progressing just fine. He saw himself as his employees’ benevolent-but-firm leader, teaching them the basics of his field, correcting their mistakes, paying them well, and offering them the opportunity to coauthor papers with a Nobel Prize winner. If he had been a bit harsh, it was because he was the intellectual equivalent of a boot camp drill sergeant, harassing his recruits for their own good. After his dinner with Beckman, Shockley went straight to bed.74
第二天早上，他把鲍勃·诺伊斯叫到办公室。肖克利的这次会议记录在一个螺旋装订的笔记本里，日期是1957年5月23日至6月10日，笔记本封面上他潦草地写着，似乎是在提醒自己：“努力想办法让大家都有好处。”“就像你在会议上那样，认真倾听。”
The next morning he called Bob Noyce into his office. Shockley’s notes from this meeting appear in a spiral-bound notebook dated 23 May–10 June 1957, on the front of which he has scrawled, as if to remind himself. “Try to work it out for the benefit of everyone,” “Like you did at meeting, listening.”
诺伊斯告诉肖克利，实验室就像一个大家庭，而现在，它正面临着“家庭矛盾”。肖克利注意到，诺伊斯“非常务实”，这位年轻人强调，他并非在和老板争论任何事实，而是想提出一个“不同的观点”。诺伊斯并没有打算离开，但他担心组织里几乎所有人都深感不满。肖克利诺伊斯告诉肖克利，他总是激怒并辱骂他的员工。“如果一个人没有马刺，”肖克利诗意地对自己写道，“批评真的会伤人。”诺伊斯提醒肖克利，球队“正在尽其所能”，并向他保证他们并非想要置他于死地。“我们不是要针对比尔——希望你能明白，”肖克利这样理解诺伊斯的话。75
The lab, Noyce told Shockley, was a family, and at this point, it was having “family troubles.” Noyce was “very factual,” noted Shockley, and the young man stressed that he was not disputing any facts with his boss, but rather was bringing to him a “different viewpoint.” Noyce was not particularly ready to walk out the door, but he was worried that almost everyone else in the organization was profoundly discontented. Shockley consistently angered and abused his staff, Noyce told him. “If a man has not spurs,” Shockley wrote to himself poetically, “criticism really hurts.” Noyce reminded Shockley that the team was “doing [its] best with [its] ability,” and assured him that they were not thirsting for blood. “We are not out to get Bill—hope you can see,” was Noyce’s message, as interpreted by Shockley.75
诺伊斯委婉地提到，员工们“对技术方面的情况有点失望”，显然是指四层二极管。他强调，去找贝克曼的决定既是出于勇气，也是出于无奈。“他们觉得没法跟W=S（肖克利对自己的简称）谈。”肖克利写道，“有些人试过了，会被开除的。”他还补充说，“瞒着我搞事可不容易。”
The staff was “a little disappointed on the technical situation,” Noyce mentioned diplomatically, presumably in reference to the four-layer diode, and he stressed that the decision to go to Beckman had been an act of courage tinged with desperation. “Felt they couldn’t talk to W=S [Shockley’s shorthand reference to himself].” “A few had tried. Would be fired,” Shockley wrote, adding, “It took a lot of doing to go behind my back.”
最后，诺伊斯说他的同事们认为“实验室里没有一丝稳定感”。他谈到了“一时兴起”和“个人反应”，并说了一些让肖克利明白“不稳定源于比尔（他自己）”的话。然后，就在肖克利似乎开始意识到“W=S”是他问题的根源时，他又在诺伊斯提出的观点基础上补充了两点。“12. 雷克斯·西特纳是摩托罗拉的销售经理。13. 我一直认为不给雷克斯（提供工作机会）是个错误。”换句话说，问题不在于肖克利，而在于他的下属。
Finally Noyce said that his colleagues believed there was “no feeling of stability in the lab.” He spoke of “whims” and “individual reactions” and said something that made Shockley understand “instability due to Bill [himself].” And then, just as it seemed Shockley might begin to see “W=S” as the source of his problems, he added two additional points to the ones made by Noyce. “12. Rex Sittner is sales mgr of Motorola. 13. Always thought it a mistake not to offer Rex [a job].” The problem, in other words, was not Shockley. The problem was the people working for him.
1957年5月的最后几周，肖克利、贝克曼和科研人员以各种组合形式会面。有一次，肖克利带了一个身份不明的人来；诺伊斯确信这是肖克利雇佣的一位精神科医生，目的是远程分析员工的情况。诺伊斯一次又一次地充当中间人。肖克利认为诺伊斯站在他这边。而除了拉斯特之外，其他科学家都认为诺伊斯站在他们这边。通过诺伊斯，持不同意见者建议肖克利放弃管理职位，转而担任顾问。肖克利对此深恶痛绝。“非领导职位是无效的，”他在概述自己对潜在解决方案的想法时写道，“如果这就是他们的意图，那就从现在开始着手裁员吧。”他承诺会为他的团队提供“更高的安全感和工作满意度”，并试图通过建议六个月内不允许任何人离开贝克曼的工资单来阻止任何大规模的辞职。76
Shockley, Beckman, and the scientific staff met in various combinations in the final weeks of May 1957. At one point, Shockley brought with him a man whom he did not identify; Noyce was convinced this was a psychiatrist Shockley hired to analyze the staff from afar. Again and again, Noyce was the intermediary. Shockley thought Noyce was on his side. The scientists, with the possible exception of Last, thought he was on theirs. Through Noyce, the dissidents suggested to Shockley that he forego management for an advisory role. Shockley detested this idea. “Non directing position is not effective,” he wrote in outlining his thoughts on potential solutions. “If this is the intention, let’s work out terminations starting now.” He promised that he would provide his team “increased security and work satisfaction,” and sought to forestall any mass resignations by suggesting that no one be allowed to go off the Beckman payroll for six months.76
他曾考虑过一种新的组织架构，让诺伊斯不仅负责研发，还要管理实验室。他还勾勒出一个不同的方案：由一个四人团队负责工作，诺伊斯也参与其中，同时诺伊斯还担任“独立决策者”。最终，肖克利决定不授予诺伊斯独立决策权，甚至连经理的职位也不给他。正如他告诉阿诺德·贝克曼的那样，他认为诺伊斯技术能力很强，但并非“积极进取的领导者”。他缺乏肖克利所谓的“推动力”，这大概是指诺伊斯对员工的督促力度没有达到肖克利的预期。77
He contemplated a new organizational structure, with Noyce not only heading R&D, but also managing the lab. He sketched out a different plan, in which work was administered through a team of four, including Noyce, with Noyce also serving as an “independent authority.” Ultimately, Shockley decided not to grant Noyce independent authority—or even the job as manager. He believed, as he told Arnold Beckman, that Noyce was good technically, but not an “aggressive leader.” He lacked what Shockley called “push,” by which he probably meant that Noyce did not drive his employees as hard as Shockley thought he should.77
肖克利对诺伊斯管理能力不足的评价最终被证明不无道理，但当时，他决定聘请一位未透露姓名的“成熟且经验丰富的经理来负责非技术性、非政策性决策”，这似乎确凿地证明了他不愿意赋予包括诺伊斯在内的员工任何权力。有人认为，如果肖克利任命诺伊斯为经理，公司或许就不会面临后来的种种问题，但这似乎不太可能。无论诺伊斯对肖克利有多大的影响力，几乎可以肯定的是，这都无法让他放弃四层二极管项目——而这个项目，以及人际冲突，加剧了年轻科学家们的不满情绪。
Shockley’s assessment of Noyce’s managerial shortcomings would ultimately prove to hold some truth, but at the time, his decision to bring in an unnamed “mature and experienced manager for non-technical, non-policy decisions” seemed conclusive proof that he was unwilling to give his employees, including Noyce, any power whatsoever. Some have suggested that if Shockley had named Noyce manager, the company might have never faced the problems it did, but that seems unlikely. Whatever Noyce’s pull with Shockley, it almost certainly could not have swayed him from the four-layer diode project—and this project, as much as interpersonal conflict, fed the young scientists’ dissatisfaction.
在贝克曼寻找成熟经理人的同时，他和肖克利组建了一个管理委员会，成员包括诺伊斯、斯穆特·霍斯利（当时负责四层二极管项目）以及另外两人。肖克利可以否决委员会的任何决定，但“所有决定和提案都会被记录在案”。这是一种脆弱的妥协；足以避免公司破产，但不足以帮助公司渡过危机。78
While Beckman hunted for his mature manager, he and Shockley arranged a managing committee made up of Noyce, Smoot Horsley (then heading the four-layer diode project), and two others. Shockley could overrule any decisions made by the committee, but “decisions and proposals [would be] a matter of record.” It was a tenuous compromise; enough to keep the company from falling apart, but not enough to push it past the crisis.78
临时管理委员会存在不到一个月，贝克曼就突然推翻了他之前对共同管理的支持，宣布肖克利掌权。这一转变背后的原因尚不清楚，但似乎是贝尔实验室或斯坦福大学的某人告诉贝克曼，削弱肖克利的权威将对这位诺贝尔奖得主的声誉造成无法挽回的损害。贝克曼真的认为一群名不见经传的年轻科学家的努力比威廉·肖克利的贡献更有价值吗？79
The interim management committee lasted less than a month, at which point Beckman abruptly reversed his previous support of shared management and declared that Shockley was in charge. The reasons behind this reversal are unclear, but it seems that someone at Bell Labs or at Stanford told Beckman that undercutting Shockley’s authority would irredeemably damage the Nobel laureate’s reputation. Did Beckman really believe that the scientific efforts of a group of young unknowns were more valuable than the contributions of William Shockley?79
贝克曼公司任命莫里斯·哈纳芬担任肖克利及其员工之间的缓冲人。哈纳芬曾在贝克曼仪器公司的Spinco离心机部门担任管理职务，表现出色。诺伊斯负责研发工作，手下有七名高级员工，他直接向哈纳芬汇报。“他是个非常优秀的人……他的存在大大提高了事情降温的可能性，”诺伊斯告诉父母。霍斯利领导着四层二极管项目，手下有五名高级员工；克纳皮克负责工程和生产，手下有三名高级员工，他们也都向哈纳芬汇报。80
Beckman tapped Maurice Hanafin, who had proved an able administrator in Beckman Instrument’s Spinco centrifuge division, to serve as a buffer between Shockley and his employees. Noyce, given charge of R&D with seven senior staff, reported directly to Hanafin. “He is a very good man … and the chances of things cooling down are much improved by his presence,” Noyce told his parents. Horsley, who led the four-layer diode project with five senior staff, and Knapic, who oversaw engineering and production with three senior staff, also reported to Hanafin.80
此时，诺伊斯宣称自己“对这项事业最终成功的信心比我来这里之后任何时候都更强”——正是这份信心促使他买下了他能找到的最大、最先进的冰箱。这算是送给贝蒂的一份礼物，贝蒂在三年内第三次怀孕的最后几周承认，“更大的冰箱应该能大大简化家务和育儿工作。”81
At this point, Noyce declared himself “more confident of the eventual success of the venture than I have been since I arrived”—a confidence that inspired him to buy the biggest, most modern refrigerator he could find. It was a gift of sorts for Betty, who, in the last weeks of her third pregnancy in as many years, admitted “the larger box ought to simplify housekeeping and childcare immensely.”81
诺伊斯的乐观态度并没有得到这群心怀不满的科学家的认同。哈纳芬到任后不久召开了一次员工会议，会上，他遭到了一系列极其直接的问题，这些问题都与“未来的技术决策权及其归属”有关。无论他们如何措辞，当被问及此事时，哈纳芬回应说，肖克利才是最终的决策者，房间里的气氛变得很糟糕。82
Noyce’s optimism was not shared by the group of disaffected scientists. At a staff meeting Hanafin convened shortly after his arrival, he was pelted with exceedingly direct questions about “future technical decision making and where it would reside.” When, no matter how they put the question, Hanafin responded that Shockley was the ultimate decision maker, the atmosphere in the room turned ugly.82
与贝克曼会面的大多数人都觉得一切又回到了原点。肖克利掌权；生产部门被严重忽视（研发部门的高级人员数量是工程和生产的四倍，经费也几乎是后者的两倍）；四层二极管项目依然进展顺利。肖克利成功地将实验室的领导权变成了一场只有一个赢家的竞争，而贝克曼则选择了站在肖克利一边。正如摩尔所说，这些年轻的科学家们“严重高估了自己的能力”。他们感到别无选择，只能离开。83
Most of the group that had met with Beckman felt that they were right back where they started. Shockley was in charge; production was given short shrift (research and development work received four times the senior staff and nearly twice the funding of engineering and production); and the four-layer diode project was alive and well. Shockley had succeeded in making the leadership of the lab into yet another competition with only one possible winner, and Beckman had cast his lot with Shockley. The young scientists had, as Moore put it, “grossly overestimated our power.” They felt they had no choice but to leave.83
朱利叶斯·布兰克、维克多·格里尼奇、让·霍尔尼、尤金·克莱纳、杰伊·拉斯特、戈登·摩尔和谢尔顿·罗伯茨（除两人外，其余七人新管理架构下均向诺伊斯汇报工作）决心离职。拉斯特、霍尔尼和罗伯茨是带头人。拉斯特当时已经收到另一份工作邀请，但他告诉其他人，他更愿意继续和他们一起工作。到六月中旬，这七人决定集体辞职。84
Julius Blank, Victor Grinich, Jean Hoerni, Eugene Kleiner, Jay Last, Gordon Moore, and Sheldon Roberts (all but two of whom reported to Noyce under the new management structure) were absolutely determined to go. Last, Hoerni, and Roberts were the ringleaders. Last already had another job offer, but he told the others that he would rather continue working with them. By mid-June, the group of seven had resolved to resign en masse.84
他们想让诺伊斯加入，但他兴趣不大。与那七人小组不同，诺伊斯拥有管理头衔，手下有员工向他汇报。他是肖克利的宠儿，肖克利认为哈纳芬或许能解决其他人眼中棘手的一些问题。此外，诺伊斯加入肖克利公司时就期望能在那里度过余生，他觉得自己有道义和职业上的义务让公司取得成功。“他是牧师的儿子，并不比我们其他人更纯洁，”一位肖克利的异议人士回忆道，“但他有时会担心，他父亲会怎么想，上帝会怎么想，他现在做的事算不算不忠？”诺伊斯家里刚添了个女婴，名叫波莉，是在肖克利、贝克曼和那些不满的科学家们开会期间出生的。此时此刻，考虑跳槽并不合适。85
They wanted Noyce to join them, but he was not particularly interested. Unlike the group of seven, Noyce had a managerial title and employees who reported to him. He was Shockley’s favorite, and he thought that Hanafin might solve some of the problems the others perceived as intractable. Moreover, Noyce had joined Shockley with the expectation that he would spend his career there, and he felt he had a moral and professional obligation to make the company successful. “He was the son of a minister and he was not any purer than the rest of us,” one Shockley dissident recalled, “but sometimes he worried, what would his father think, or what would God think, of what he was doing. Was it disloyal or not?” Noyce also had a brand-new baby at home, a little girl named Polly who had been born during the rounds of meetings among Shockley, Beckman, and the unhappy scientists. It was not the right time to contemplate a move.85
这群人当然可以不带诺伊斯就离开。但去哪儿却是另一个问题。最简单的办法是他们一个接一个地离开，去东海岸或南加州那些如雨后春笋般涌现的电子公司应聘。然而，这条捷径对他们来说毫无吸引力。这七个年轻人喜欢一起工作。他们互相尊重彼此的想法，也乐于交流思想。他们也意识到，鉴于他们各自的技能互补——肖克利的选人眼光非常明智——他们作为一个团队比各自为战更有价值。
The group could certainly leave without Noyce. Where to go was another question, however. Easiest would be for them to peel off, one by one, to be hired by one of the electronics firms popping up along the East Coast or in Southern California. The easy route was unappealing, however. The seven young men liked working together. They respected each other’s minds and enjoyed bouncing ideas around. They also had a sense that, given their deliberately complementary skills—Shockley had chosen wisely—they were more valuable as a group than separately.
他们还能继续待在一起吗？肖克利的异见者们并不确定。他们想做的工作风险太大，研究强度也太高，传统的银行贷款根本无法覆盖，而风险投资当时根本不存在。这些年轻人唯一能想到的继续在一起的方法就是一起找工作，并说服雇用他们的公司建立一个半导体部门。
Was it even possible to stay together? The Shockley dissidents were unsure. The work they wanted to do was much too risky and research intensive for traditional bank financing, and venture capital did not exist. The only way that the young men could envision staying together was to try to get hired as a group and convince the corporation that hired them to set up a semiconductor division.
他们一边在肖克利公司维持体面，一边开始寻找其他出路。很早，尤金·克莱纳就建议他们给他父亲开户的一家投资公司写封信。海登、斯通公司虽然规模不大，但在纽约投资银行界却享有盛誉，而且最近还为通用晶体管公司安排了融资。通用晶体管公司是第一家上市的独立晶体管公司，也是锗器件的制造商。或许这家银行家可以帮忙找到一家愿意集体聘用他们的公司。其他六个人都同意了这个计划。
They set about exploring their options while keeping up appearances at Shockley. Quite early on, Eugene Kleiner suggested that they write a letter to an investment firm where his father had an account. Hayden, Stone, and Company was a small firm, but it had a solid reputation among New York investment banks, and it had recently arranged the financing for General Transistor, the first publicly held independent transistor firm and a manufacturer of germanium devices. Perhaps the bankers could help find a company to hire the group en masse. The other six men agreed to this plan.
克莱纳给负责他父亲账户的人写了一封信。“我们团队经验丰富，成员背景多元，涵盖物理、电子、工程、冶金和化学等领域，”他写道。有了75万美元的资金用于支付工资和开支，“我们相信三个月内就能成立一家半导体公司。”克莱纳继续写道：“首批产品将是一系列设计独特的硅扩散晶体管，适用于生产高频和高功率器件。需要指出的是，生产这些半导体的复杂技术已经由我们团队详细研究完成，并且不受任何现有组织的约束。”这些年轻人觉得自己对晶体管的制造了如指掌，堪称世界一流。他们包揽了从基础科学研究到订购原材料、制造设备、监督小规模生产等所有环节的工作。86
Kleiner composed a letter to the person in charge of his father’s account. “We have an experienced and well-diversified group of men with background in the fields of physics, electronics, engineering, metallurgy, and chemistry,” he wrote. With $750,000 to cover salaries and expenses, “we believe that we could get a company into the semiconductor business within three months.” Kleiner continued, “The initial product would be a line of silicon diffused transistors of unusual design applicable to the production of both high frequency and high power devices. It should be pointed out that the complicated techniques for producing these semiconductors have already been worked out in detail by this group of people and are not restricted by any obligation to the present organization.” The young men felt they knew as much as anyone in the world about building transistors. Between them, they had done everything from basic scientific research to ordering supplies, to building equipment, to overseeing small-scale production runs.86
他们承认，为了让新雇主进入半导体行业，他们已经完成了大部分必要的准备工作——“耗资超过一百万美元”。他们还表示，预计将从肖克利半导体实验室（Shockley Semiconductor Labs）聘请几名训练有素的技术人员。私下里，他们或许讨论过，引进肖克利的技术和培训人员是否构成某种形式的知识产权盗窃，但最终他们认为这些技术是行业惯例，而且潜在的受聘人员始终可以选择留在肖克利继续工作。
They admitted they had already done much of the work—“at a cost of over a million dollars”—necessary to bring their new employer into the semiconductor business. They also said they expected to hire several highly trained technicians from Shockley Semiconductor Labs. Privately they may have discussed whether or not importing techniques learned and people trained at Shockley might constitute some sort of intellectual property theft, but they decided the techniques were common practice, and the potential hires would always have the option of staying with Shockley’s operation.
该团队面临两大紧迫问题。首先，他们需要从西电公司获得2.5万美元的许可费，以涵盖贝尔实验室的半导体专利——这笔费用已计入他们的预算支出。其次，他们承认需要“良好的管理”，因为团队中没有人“有志于担任高层管理职位”。克莱纳在信中承诺，尽管存在管理真空，“团队内部的横向联系紧密，并且拥有足够的技术领导力”。87
The group had two pressing concerns. First, they needed to obtain a $25,000 license from Western Electric to cover Bell Labs’ semiconductor patents—a cost they factored into their projected expenses. Second, they admitted they needed “good management,” for no one within the group “ha[d] ambitions as a manager at the top level.” Kleiner’s letter promised that despite the management vacuum, “the horizontal ties in the group are strong and adequate technical leadership is present within it.”87
信件的收件人客户经理已经离开了海登·斯通公司，所以这封信在办公室里辗转流传，最终落到了别人手中。在一位刚从哈佛商学院毕业的MBA学生亚瑟·洛克（Arthur Rock）的办公桌上，放着一封信。洛克自称是这家投资公司的“常驻科学专家”。他出生于纽约州罗切斯特市，父亲曾拥有一家糖果店。洛克身材健硕，一副跑步运动员的模样，但年纪轻轻，却有着异乎寻常的专注和热情。自从离开哈佛那天起，他就一直从事专业投资。他仔细阅读了这封信。信中的七个人听起来经验不足，但很有潜力。在洛克看来，这封信最吸引人的地方在于“肖克利选中了他们”——因为正如洛克从他对晶体管行业的研究中了解到的那样，“肖克利几乎可以挑选全国任何人”。88
The account manager to whom the letter was addressed had left Hayden, Stone, so the missive was passed around the office until it landed on the desk of a newly minted Harvard MBA, Arthur Rock, who describes himself as the investment firm’s version of a “resident scientific guru.” Rock, a native of Rochester, New York—his father had owned a candy store—had a runner’s build and an unusually intense manner for someone who was barely 30. He had been a professional investor since the day he left Harvard. He read the letter carefully. The seven men sounded inexperienced but promising. The letter’s strongest selling point, in Rock’s estimation, was “the fact that Shockley had chosen them”—for as Rock well knew from his research on the transistor business, “[Shockley] had the choice of almost anyone in the country.”88
通用晶体管公司早期融资报告的公布，更增添了他的兴趣，这些报告看起来前景非常光明。洛克知道他的老板阿尔弗雷德·“巴德”·科伊尔也对类似的投资感兴趣。洛克把信拿给科伊尔看，并表示他认为花一张机票钱去加州拜访这七位科学家是值得的。89
Adding to his interest were the early reports out of the General Transistor financing, which looked extremely promising. Rock knew that his boss, Alfred “Bud” Coyle, was interested in making similar investments. Rock showed Coyle the letter and said that he thought it was worth the price of a plane ticket to visit the seven scientists in California.89
几周后，六月下旬，科伊尔、洛克和七位肖克利科学家在旧金山的一张餐桌旁共进晚餐。经过一番了解，洛克认为这七位与他年龄相仿的男士“人都不错”。他和科伊尔愿意帮助他们，但并非帮他们寻找公司来雇佣他们并组建新的部门。银行家们力劝科学家们考虑向一家公司申请融资，以开展一项全新的业务，正如克莱纳信中所述。洛克和科伊尔还建议他们寻求超过一百万美元的资金，而不是他们之前认为所需的75万美元。90
A few weeks later, in late June, Coyle, Rock, and the seven Shockley scientists were seated around a dinner table in San Francisco. After a bit of probing, Rock decided that the seven men, all about his age, were “pretty good guys.” He and Coyle were prepared to help the group—but not in finding a company to hire them and start a new division. The bankers urged the scientists to consider asking a firm to finance an entirely new business along the lines detailed in Kleiner’s letter. Rock and Coyle further suggested they seek more than $1 million, not the $750,000 the group thought they needed.90
这次谈话激发了这些年轻人的无限遐想。想象一下，如果他们拥有100万美元，而且没有肖克利公司从中作梗，他们能做些什么！自主创业也意味着他们可以留在湾区。这样一来，他们就能更容易地吸引到在肖克利公司和其他本地公司结识的人脉。而且，这也会让他们个人感到非常快乐。他们都深深地爱上了这座新家，这里气候宜人，而且开车去山区、海边和旧金山都很方便。91
The conversation fired the young men’s imaginations. Picture what they could do with $1 million and no Shockley to thwart their efforts! Starting something on their own would also mean that they could stay in the Bay Area. That would make it easier to attract the people they had met at Shockley and other local companies. It would also make them happy personally. They had all grown deeply attached to their new home, with its glorious weather and easy driving distance to mountains, ocean, and San Francisco.91
然而，问题在于，正如该团体在信中所承认的，他们缺少一位领导者。科伊尔和罗克担心，如果无法在肖克利的叛逃者中树立一个明确的领导者，他们可能“很难向公司的其他银行家推销这件事”。于是，这七人向银行家们介绍了诺伊斯：“我们有一个领导者，但他对肖克利负有很重的责任。他拥有我们没有的头衔，而且他非常精明。他不会轻易放弃一切。”92
There was, however, one problem. As the group had itself admitted in its letter, they lacked a manager. Coyle and Rock were concerned they might “have a little problem selling this thing” to other bankers at the firm without being able to point to a clear leader among the Shockley defectors. The seven told the bankers about Noyce: “We have a leader, but he feels a lot of obligation to Shockley. He ha[s] a title that we don’t have, and he is also a very sharp guy. He is not going to give away the store.”92
在洛克和科伊尔的敦促下，他们决定再次尝试说服诺伊斯加入他们。谢尔顿·罗伯茨花了一整晚的时间和诺伊斯通电话，告诉他与银行家们的会面，试图说服他，这个团队可以继续在一起，做一些令人兴奋的事情。甚至还能赚钱。罗伯茨曾对诺伊斯说，肖克利给了他头衔，却没给他多少实权，简直是在耍他。罗伯茨指出，如果这群人离开，肖克利半导体公司将遭受重创——只有四层二极管项目还能保留下来。诺伊斯犹豫不决。一会儿他好像准备加入这七人，一会儿（用摩尔的话来说）又“临阵退缩”。他担心其他技术人员会误以为银行家们对快速获得佣金的兴奋，是真心相信这群年轻人能够建立一家可行的公司。他需要绝对的保证，确保这七人真的会离开，并且他们有切实的机会成功开展晶体管业务。他不会把自己的职业生涯押在美好的愿望和友好的情谊上。93
At Rock’s and Coyle’s urging, they decided to try again to convince Noyce to join them. Sheldon Roberts spent a long evening on the phone with Noyce, telling him about the meeting with the bankers, trying to convince him that the group could stay together, do something exciting, and even make money. At one point Roberts told Noyce that Shockley was playing him for a fool by giving him titles but little real authority. He pointed out that the group’s departure would eviscerate Shockley Semi-conductor—only the four-layer diode effort would remain intact. Noyce waffled. One minute he would sound like he was ready to join the seven; the next, he was (in Moore’s words) “chickening out.” He was concerned that his fellow technologists might have mistaken the bankers’ excitement at the prospect of a fast commission for a genuine belief that the young group could build a viable company. He wanted absolute assurance that the seven were going to leave and that they had a realistic chance of launching a successful transistor operation. He was not going to stake his career on high hopes and friendly feelings.93
诺伊斯最终同意参加第二天上午与科伊尔和洛克的会面。“我回顾了我来这里的两个主要原因——与肖克利共事以及来到西海岸，”他向父母解释道。“第一个原因的重要性已经大大降低，主要是因为最近的经历，但也因为我发现，伟大的人其实并不比普通人强多少。至于第二个原因，换个情况，或许还能继续保持。”94
At last Noyce agreed to come to the next meeting with Coyle and Rock, scheduled for the following morning. “I have looked back on my two primary reasons for coming out here—to work with Shockley and to come to the west coast [sic],” he explained to his parents. “The importance of the first has been considerably diminished, primarily by recent experience, but also by finding out that the great aren’t much better than the average. And the second can be maintained otherwise, in a different situation.”94
到了约定的时间，众人聚集在维克·格里尼奇家的车道上。看到诺伊斯，他们中的几个人都感到很惊讶：“我往后座一看，鲍勃就在那里，”朱利叶斯·布兰克回忆道。“‘很高兴见到你，’我说。他用他那低沉的声音回答说，‘很高兴见到你。’”一半人肩并肩地挤进罗伯茨家的旅行车，其余的人则坐进了另一辆车。他们既兴奋又紧张，驱车沿着半岛前往旧金山的克利夫特酒店。95
At the appointed time, the men converged in the driveway of Vic Grinich’s house. Several of them were surprised to see Noyce: “I looked in the back seat and there was Bob,” recalled Julius Blank. “‘Nice to have you here,’ I said. He replied in that deep voice of his, ‘Nice to be here.’” Half the group squeezed shoulder to shoulder in the Roberts family’s station wagon, the rest in another car. Excited and nervous, they headed up the Peninsula to the Clift Hotel in San Francisco.95
他们在历史悠久的酒店的红木厅会见了亚瑟·洛克和巴德·科伊尔。诺伊斯给亚瑟·洛克留下了深刻的印象，洛克感觉他是同辈中的佼佼者。诺伊斯和其他七人一样聪明能干，但他身上还散发着一种洛克在其他人身上从未感受到的自信和魅力。“他给人的感觉就像个领导者，大家都很尊敬他，”洛克说，“他成了发言人。”另一位持不同意见者则更加直白地描述了诺伊斯：“他一会儿桀骜不驯，一会儿又滔滔不绝。在那之后，我们其他人就都无话可说了。”96
They met Arthur Rock and Bud Coyle in the Redwood Room of the historic hotel. Noyce made an immediate impression on Arthur Rock, who sensed he was primus inter pares (first among equals). As bright and competent as the other seven, Noyce also exuded a confidence and charm that Rock had not sensed in the rest of the group. “What came through was that he was some kind of a leader and they looked up to him,” says Rock. “He became the spokesperson.” One of the other dissidents put things a bit more directly: Noyce, he said, “swung from being recalcitrant to becoming the big talker. The rest of us did not have anything to say after that point.”96
肖克利家的八名成员和两位银行家商定，他们将共同创办一家公司。科伊尔是一位面色红润、喜欢讲究礼节的爱尔兰人，他掏出十张崭新的一美元钞票，小心翼翼地放在桌上。“我们每个人都要在每张钞票上签名，”他说。银行家们告诉这八位年轻的科学家，这些签满名的一美元钞票就是他们彼此之间的合同。97
The eight Shockley men and two bankers agreed they would start their own company. Coyle, a ruddy-faced Irishman with a fondness for ceremony, pulled out ten newly minted one-dollar bills and laid them carefully on the table. “Each of us should sign every bill,” he said. These dollar bills covered with signatures, the bankers told the eight young scientists, were their contracts with each other.97
4
突破
4
Breakaway
几天后，这八个人和亚瑟·洛克一起翻阅了《华尔街日报》和纽约证券交易所的上市公司名单，圈出了那些可能对他们感兴趣的公司名称。只要是生产电容器、电池、电阻器——任何与电子产品沾边的公司——这些年轻人都觉得可以考虑。很快，洛克就在他的记事本上写下了大约30个名字。其中包括计算机制造商斯佩里·兰德公司、加法机巨头博勒斯公司、国家收银机公司和消费电子巨头麦格纳沃克斯公司，以及像通用磨坊公司和联合鞋业公司这样可能在升级生产工艺时需要使用晶体管的公司。洛克承诺，回到纽约后，他会开始打电话联系这些公司。1
Days later, the group of eight and Arthur Rock reviewed copies of the Wall Street Journal and lists of firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange, circling the names of companies that might, maybe, be interested in backing them. If a company made capacitors, batteries, resistors—anything that even hinted at an interest in electronics—the young men considered it fair game. Soon Rock had written some 30-odd names on his legal pad. Included were computer manufacturer Sperry Rand, adding-machine giant Burroughs, National Cash Register, and consumer electronics giant Magnavox, as well as companies such as General Mills and United Shoe that might want to use transistors when they upgraded their manufacturing processes. Rock promised that when he got back to New York, he would start calling around.1
与此同时，这群人应该继续在肖克利工作，并对未来充满希望。这并不难做到。年纪最大的克莱纳32岁，其他人都不到30岁。他们大多都有年幼的孩子。他们生活在这个国家历史上最繁荣、发展最快的地区之一。脚下的土壤极其肥沃，以至于每年春天，诺伊斯都要用水管冲洗他那七棵刚发芽的李子树，以免夏天果实累累。在这样的地方，专注于未来并不难。2
Meanwhile, the group should continue their work at Shockley and keep their thoughts on future good fortune. That was not hard to do. The oldest, Kleiner, was 32, and the rest were under 30. Most had young children. They lived in one of the fastest-growing, most beautiful spots in a country more prosperous than ever before in its history. The very soil beneath their feet was so fertile that every spring Noyce hosed down his seven budding plum trees to avoid a summertime deluge of fruit. In such a place, it was not difficult to focus on the future.2
这八人小组正身处冷战时期美国最激动人心、最具爱国情怀的产业之一的核心：电子业，太空时代的耀眼明星。十年前，太空旅行还只是一个幻想；而到了1957年，苏联和美国都宣布即将完成能够绕地球轨道飞行的火箭。如此尖端的技术依赖于当时最小、最快、最可靠的电子元件——也就是晶体管。1957年，晶体管的产量已超过350万个，比上一年增长了175%。同年，晶体管的销售额也飙升了105%，达到710万美元。贝尔实验室成立后的六年里，晶体管的销量持续增长。随着该器件授权许可的发放，贝尔实验室、休斯飞机公司、摩托罗拉和RCA等公司内部涌现出十几家新的晶体管公司。这些公司都向同一批客户销售产品：美国军方及其分包商，因为只有这些机构才有足够的财力和动力购买复杂的尖端电子产品。3
The group of eight was working at the heart of one of the most exciting and patriotic industries in Cold War America: electronics, glamour girl of the space age. At the beginning of the decade, space travel had been only a fantasy; now, in 1957, both the Soviets and the Americans had announced imminent completion of rockets that could orbit the Earth. Such sophisticated technology relied on the smallest, fastest, most reliable electronics available—and that meant transistors. Already in 1957, more than 3.5 million transistors had been produced, an increase of 175 percent over the previous year’s output. Transistor sales had zoomed 105 percent to $7.1 million in that same one-year period. In the six years after Bell Labs began licensing the rights to the device, some dozen new transistor firms emerged from within Bell Labs, Hughes Aircraft, Motorola, and RCA. These companies all sold to the same customers, the United States military and its subcontractors, the only organizations with sufficient financial resources and incentive to buy complex state-of-the-art electronics.3
这八人小团体也计划进军军工市场，但与其他年轻的晶体管创业者不同，他们的规模庞大，尤其相对于他们出身的肖克利公司而言，而且他们的融资计划也截然不同。肖克利公司一半的高级科研人员和近15%（八分之一）的员工都签署了价值一美元的合同。相比之下，像Transitron或Philco这样的公司，则是由一两个来自拥有数百名员工的大公司的“叛逆者”创立的。
The coterie of eight also planned to target the military market, but the group differed from other young transistor entrepreneurs in its large size, particularly relative to the size of the Shockley operation from which it came, and in its funding plan. Fully half of the senior scientific staff, and almost 15 percent (one in eight) of Shockley’s entire workforce had signed the one-dollar-bill contracts. By contrast, firms such as Transitron or Philco had been started by one or two rebels from firms with hundreds of employees.
大多数晶体管创业者都得到了家族资金或其他私人资本的支持。海登·斯通公司的亚瑟·洛克很快就明白了其中的原因。他代表这八位创业者接触的每一家公司都断然拒绝了他们的想法，甚至连见见这些创业者的机会都没有。有些公司可能觉得这封信的内容——请给一群年龄在28到32岁之间、自认为很了不起、无法忍受为诺贝尔奖得主工作的年轻人一百万美元——难以接受。即使有公司认为这个提议在理论上很有趣，但洛克和科伊尔建议的这种“公司中的公司”模式并没有标准的操作流程。会计程序会采用什么？投资公司怎么能允许这群名不见经传的年轻人按照他们自己制定的标准来运营，却不允许其他员工拥有同样的自主权呢？在20世纪50年代那种崇尚循规蹈矩的风气下，这种做法明显带有不体面的特权色彩。4
Most of the transistor entrepreneurs had been backed by family money or other private capital resources. Arthur Rock at Hayden, Stone soon came to appreciate why. Every company he approached on behalf of the group of eight turned the idea down flat, without even asking to meet the men involved. Some firms may have found the pith of the letter—please give a million dollars to a group of men between the ages of 28 and 32 who think they are great and cannot abide working for a Nobel Prize winner—unpalatable. Even if a firm thought the proposal was interesting in theory, no standard operating procedure existed for the company-within-a-company undertaking Rock and Coyle recommended. What accounting procedures would be used? How could the funding firm allow this group of unknown young men to run their own operation, according to criteria of their own devising, and not permit other employees the same autonomy? In the 1950s, with its ethos of conformity, this smacked of unseemly preferential treatment.4
巴德·科伊尔并未气馁，而是向花花公子、百万富翁兼发明家谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德提到了这些科学家。费尔柴尔德是一位六十多岁、一丝不苟的绅士，同时也是一位享乐主义者，经常出入纽约高档的21俱乐部，据《财富》杂志报道，他“每隔几天就换一个漂亮姑娘，就像戴一朵新胸花一样”。他的父亲曾是汤姆·沃森之前担任这家后来发展成为国际商业机器公司（IBM）的公司的首席执行官，而且由于继承权的差异（汤姆·沃森有几个孩子，而乔治·费尔柴尔德只有一个儿子谢尔曼），他成为了IBM的最大股东。5
Undaunted, Bud Coyle mentioned the scientists to playboy-millionaire-inventor Sherman Fairchild. A meticulous man in his sixties, Fairchild was a bon vivant who frequented New York’s posh 21 Club and wore “a fresh pretty girl every few days like a new boutonniere,” according to Fortune. His father had preceded Tom Watson as the chief executive of the company that would become International Business Machines, and thanks to the vagaries of inheritance (Tom Watson had several children, while George Fairchild had only Sherman), he was the largest shareholder in IBM.5
费尔柴尔德喜欢发明创造，并围绕自己的发明建立公司。他开发了一种高效的网球场照明方法，并创办了一家网球场公司。费尔柴尔德录音设备公司销售了他设计的几款音频产品。他最大的两家公司——费尔柴尔德航空和费尔柴尔德相机仪器公司——生产和销售飞机和航空相机，他拥有这些产品的重要专利。
Fairchild liked to invent and to build companies around his inventions. He developed an efficient method of lighting tennis courts and started a tennis-court company. Fairchild Recording Equipment Corporation sold several audio products of his design. His biggest companies, Fairchild Aviation and Fairchild Camera and Instrument, manufactured and sold planes and aerial cameras for which he held important patents.
谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德并不参与他旗下公司的日常运营，但他曾建议费尔柴尔德相机仪器公司的高层管理人员，公司可以探索一下西海岸的发展前景。总部位于纽约州赛奥塞特的费尔柴尔德相机仪器公司，资产约2300万美元，在1957年第三季度正处于转型期。销售额达到令人满意的4300万美元，但利润却只有微不足道的26.7万美元，而且公司行政机构臃肿不堪。谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德最近任命了37岁的约翰·卡特接管公司，卡特身材魁梧，面色红润，是康宁玻璃公司的副总裁。
Sherman Fairchild was not involved with day-to-day operations at his companies, but he suggested to the senior management at Fairchild Camera and Instrument that it might explore the prospects of the West Coast technologists. Headquartered in Syosset, New York, with roughly $23 million in assets, Fairchild Camera and Instrument was a company in transition in the third quarter of 1957. Sales were a satisfactory $43 million, but profits hovered at a negligible $267,000, and the company was suffering from administrative bloat. Sherman Fairchild had recently tapped 37-year-old John Carter, a burly, ruddy-faced vice president at Corning Glass, to assume the reins at the firm.
卡特体重250磅，嘴里叼着雪茄，一副典型的资本家模样。他对相机仪器公司专注于国防业务的做法感到不安，因为国防业务占了公司利润的80%。1957年第三季度，由于政府近期实施的财政紧缩措施，相机仪器公司向联邦机构提交的发票只能收到部分款项，这更加证实了他的不安。卡特立即削减了22%的行政人员，并出售了几个不盈利的部门。他认为收购是进入商业和工业市场最便捷的途径，因此在1957年夏天说服相机仪器公司的董事会收购了一家小型电传打字机公司。6
A 250-pound, cigar-chomping man who looked every inch the fat-cat capitalist, Carter was uneasy with Camera and Instrument’s focus on defense work, which accounted for 80 percent of profits. His discomfort was confirmed in the third quarter of 1957, when Camera and Instrument began receiving only partial payments on its invoices submitted to federal agencies, thanks to austerity measures recently instituted by the government. Carter immediately slashed administration by 22 percent and sold off several unprofitable divisions. He felt acquisitions offered the easiest entrée into commercial and industrial markets and convinced the board of Camera and Instrument to acquire a small teletype company in the summer of 1957.6
对于这家雄心勃勃、渴望扩张的公司而言，半导体是一个合乎逻辑的选择。这些器件正越来越多地应用于导弹、卫星、辐射电路以及侦察计算机等使用仙童相机仪器公司产品的领域。在卡特梦寐以求的工业市场，汽车制造商、炼油商和烟草生产商要么已经在自动化操作和测试功能中使用半导体，要么正在积极探索如何应用。在科伊尔联系仙童公司大约六个月前，相机仪器公司就已仔细研究过进军半导体领域的可能性，但该公司担心半导体业务需要巨额资本投入和多年的基础研究。首席执行官约翰·卡特认为，收购可以规避这个问题，但在肖克利团队出现之前，一直没有出现有希望的公司。正如诺伊斯所说，如果（肖克利叛逃者的）想法看起来可行，仙童公司的管理层“已经做好了准备，并且非常乐意配合”。7
Semiconductors were a logical choice for the expansion-minded company. The devices were increasingly making their way into the very missiles, satellites, radiation circuits, and reconnaissance computers that used Fairchild Camera and Instrument’s products. In the industrial markets Carter coveted, automobile manufacturers, oil refiners, and tobacco producers either already used semiconductors in their automated operations and testing functions, or were actively looking into how to do so. Camera and Instrument had closely studied the possibility of entering the semiconductor field about six months before Coyle contacted Fairchild, but the company feared the large capital investments and years of basic research that semiconductor work would require. Acquisition would circumvent the problem, CEO John Carter decided, but no promising firm had surfaced until the group from Shockley. As Noyce put it, Fairchild management was “primed and eager to go along if [the Shockley defectors’] ideas seemed practical.”7
卡特指派相机与仪器公司执行副总裁理查德·霍奇森调查西海岸的八人团伙。霍奇森是湾区人，斯坦福大学毕业生，曾在麻省理工学院和派拉蒙影业工作，他受聘于仙童半导体，任务是“带领公司进军电子领域”。霍奇森为人友善，技术精湛，仙童半导体的一位创始人曾评价他“正是我们需要的合作伙伴”。8
Carter charged Camera and Instrument executive vice president Richard Hodgson with investigating the West Coast group of eight. A Bay Area native and Stanford graduate who had worked at MIT and Paramount Pictures, Hodgson had been hired by Fairchild with the mandate “to get the company into electronics.” Hodgson was a likeable and technically capable man whom one Fairchild Semiconductor founder described as “just the right personality to work with us.”8
霍奇森很想见见当时仍在为肖克利效力的加州团队，但谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德首先坚持要求霍奇森亲自联系阿诺德·贝克曼，告知肖克利的资助人此事。为了了解事态发展并确认自己不会阻挠事态发展，贝克曼采取了宽容的态度，向霍奇森保证：“我绝不会因为费尔柴尔德带走这群人而反对他们。”随后，霍奇森飞往海登·斯通公司，与那些打算脱离肖克利阵营的人会面。这八人小组、银行家们和霍奇森就小组能做些什么以及他们需要哪些资金和支持进行了初步讨论。9
Hodgson was eager to meet the California group, who were still working for Shockley at the time, but Sherman Fairchild first insisted that Hodgson personally contact Arnold Beckman to let Shockley’s backer know what was happening and to confirm that he would not stand in the way of unfolding events. Beckman took the high road, assuring Hodgson that “there’s never going to be a problem from me against Fairchild for taking this group away.” Hodgson then flew out to visit with the would-be Shockley defectors and the men from Hayden, Stone. The group of eight, the bankers, and Hodgson talked in general terms about what the group could do and what they wanted in terms of funding and support.9
霍奇森会后十分满意，便邀请尤金·克莱纳和鲍勃·诺伊斯前往费尔柴尔德相机仪器公司位于赛奥塞特的总部。两人于八月下旬飞往纽约，正如诺伊斯写给父母的信中所说，此行的目的是“将公司卖给谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德，并敲定融资安排的原则”。诺伊斯对谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德以及他在曼哈顿的豪宅印象深刻。费尔柴尔德特意为豪宅的窗户配备了他自己设计的装置，可以电动控制百叶窗的开关，从那里可以俯瞰整个城市。10
Hodgson left the meeting satisfied enough to invite Eugene Kleiner and Bob Noyce to Fairchild Camera and Instrument’s Syosset headquarters. The two flew to New York in late August, with the purpose, as Noyce wrote his parents, “of selling the group [to Sherman Fairchild] and settling the principle of the financing arrangements.” Noyce was impressed with Sherman Fairchild and with his enormous townhouse in Manhattan, which offered commanding views of the city through windows Fairchild had specially outfitted with a gadget he designed to open and shut the blinds electronically.10
诺伊斯和克莱纳一回到加州，理查德·霍奇森就飞往旧金山，在银行家聘请的律师事务所与八位科学家以及洛克和科伊尔展开正式谈判。谈判进行得十分友好，也在意料之中。刚刚经历了三十多次拒绝的肖克利叛逃者们觉得自己没有底气讨价还价，但亚瑟·洛克和巴德·科伊尔很清楚他们想要达成的协议类型，确保了这些年轻人没有被宰。11
IMMEDIATELY UPON NOYCE’S AND KLEINER’S RETURN to California, Richard Hodgson flew to San Francisco to begin formal negotiations with the eight scientists and Rock and Coyle at the offices of a law firm hired by the bankers. The negotiations proceeded along a friendly and predictable path. The Shockley defectors, fresh from 30-odd “no-thank-yous,” felt that they were in no position to drive a hard bargain, but Arthur Rock and Bud Coyle, who had a good sense of the type of arrangement they sought, ensured the young men were not fleeced.11
讨论结束后，理查德·霍奇森带众人前往位于联合广场的圣弗朗西斯酒店庆祝，这家酒店是旧金山一家经典的连锁酒店。霍奇森身着纽约式商务西装，头戴一顶精致的礼帽，走向餐厅领班，看起来颇有几分黑手党成员的风范。“我叫霍奇森，预订了九人的位子。”他粗声粗气地说。领班看了看预订簿，然后叫来另一位身着燕尾服的男士，那人翻阅着预订簿，显得越来越不自在。两人低声商量了一会儿后，抬起头来。“先生，很抱歉，我们找不到您的预订。”
After the discussion ended, Richard Hodgson took the group to celebrate at the St. Francis, a classic San Francisco hotel on Union Square. Dressed in his New York business suit and a fine hat, Hodgson looked a bit like a Mafioso as he approached the maitre d’. “Hodgson is the name, reservation for nine,” he said gruffly. The maitre d’ looked at his reservation book and then called over another tuxedoed man who shuffled through pages, increasingly discomfited. After a whispered conference, the pair looked up. “I’m sorry sir, we cannot find the reservation.”
霍奇森开始生气，大发雷霆，露出了年轻人从未见过的一面。他低声嘟囔道：“我跟她说了多少遍让她订位了……”
Hodgson began to fume and fuss, showing a side the young men had not seen before. He muttered under his breath, “How many times did I tell her to make the reservation …”
餐厅工作人员看起来很紧张：“先生，我们马上为您安排一张桌子。”
The restaurant staff looked nervous: “We’ll make up a table for you right away, sir.”
很快，一行人就被领到一张位置极佳的角落桌子旁。他们刚一独处，霍奇森就笑了起来。“这招百试百灵。”12
In short order, the group was escorted to a fine corner table. As soon as they were alone, Hodgson began to laugh. “Works every time.”12
当诺伊斯和他的同伴们欢庆时，他的父母却担心这笔交易可能“不稳妥”。他对费尔柴尔德公司，或者说这些银行家，究竟了解多少呢？诺伊斯赶紧安抚他们说：“我们有超过一百万美元。”“这笔资金足以保障我们在没有任何销售收入的情况下维持大约18个月的运营，”他写道，并补充说，“我们已委托全国十大投资银行之一作为我们的代理人。” 他密切关注着谈判过程，并称整个过程“对我来说是一次非常有趣的学习经历！” 他的兴奋之情溢于言表：“协议将在几周内签署，此后不久，加州晶体管公司将正式成立，而我将担任研发总监。”13
WHILE NOYCE AND HIS PEERS CELEBRATED, his parents worried the deal might be “shaky.” What did he know about this Fairchild, or these bankers, for that matter? Noyce hastened to reassure them. “We [have] over a million dollars guaranteed which will keep us going for about 18 months without any income from sales,” he wrote, adding “we have acting as our agents in this one of the ten largest investment banking houses in the country.” He had paid close attention during the negotiations and declared the entire process “a very interesting education for me!” His excitement was palpable: “The agreement will be signed in a couple of weeks, and shortly therafter [sic] The California Transistor Corporation will spring into being, with yours truly as Director of R & D.”13
尽管诺伊斯趾高气扬，口口声声说着一大笔钱，但他其实一分钱积蓄都没有。当洛克和科伊尔告诉他们八个人，每人需要出资500美元才能获得新公司的股份时，这便成了个大问题。诺伊斯只好让父母去问问他奶奶——家里唯一有积蓄的人——能不能借给他这笔钱。他承诺会连本带利地还给她。
For all his bravado and talk of large sums of money, Noyce had no savings. This proved a problem when Rock and Coyle told the group of eight that they each needed to pay $500 for an ownership stake in the new company. Noyce asked his parents to inquire if his grandmother, the only member of the family with financial reserves, could lend him the money. He promised to repay her with interest.
与菲尔柴尔德相机和仪器公司的交易即将完成，这八个人需要把消息告诉威廉·肖克利。肖克利怀疑——或许是贝克曼在与霍奇森谈话后给他打的电话？——有一群员工计划离职。肖克利开始一个接一个地把研究人员叫到办公室，盘问他们有关即将发生的叛乱的信息。戈登·摩尔是第二个被叫来的人——第一个人不在被叫来的人当中——他告诉肖克利，他最好别再问了，因为摩尔要走了，研发实验室里几乎所有人都要走了。这个消息让肖克利崩溃了，几分钟后他就离开了大楼。
THE DEAL WITH FAIRCHILD Camera and Instrument now imminent, the eight men needed to break the news to William Shockley, who suspected—perhaps Beckman had called him after his conversation with Hodgson?—that a group of employees planned to leave. Shockley began summoning his researchers to his office one at a time, probing them for information about a brewing insurrection. Gordon Moore was the second man called—the first was not among the group—and he told Shockley he might as well stop questioning people because Moore was leaving and so was nearly everyone else in the R&D lab. The news devastated Shockley, who left the building a few minutes later.
摩尔惊讶地发现，肖克利的沮丧之情竟让他感到一丝悲伤。诚然，肖克利是个严厉的老板，他苛责年轻的员工，而且对经营企业一窍不通。然而，他却是一位优秀的导师。在加入肖克利的团队之前，这八个人加起来只有三年的晶体管经验——而且这些经验都集中在鲍勃·诺伊斯身上。他们中没有一个人接触过硅。然而，在肖克利手下工作不到18个月后，这八个人就具备了足够的能力，创办了一家公司，并在十年内售出了价值数亿美元的硅半导体器件。当然，这些才华横溢的年轻人通过日复一日地沉浸在技术及其相关文献中学习。他们在临时搭建的研讨会和日常的专业交流中互相学习，获益匪浅。但他们也从肖克利身上学到了很多。肖克利或许不是一个容易相处的老板，但他却有一种不可思议的能力，能够提出实验方案，并将复杂的概念简化。14
Moore found himself surprisingly saddened by Shockley’s obvious dismay. To be sure, Shockley was a martinet who browbeat his young employees and who knew nothing about running a business. And yet he was an excellent teacher. Before joining Shockley, the group of eight had, between them, three years of transistor experience—and all that experience resided in Bob Noyce. None of them had ever worked with silicon. After less than 18 months with Shockley, however, the eight were sufficiently competent to start a company that within the space of a decade sold hundreds of millions of dollars of silicon semiconductor devices. To be sure, these extremely bright young men learned from day-to-day immersion in the technology and the literature surrounding it. They gleaned much from each other in their makeshift seminars and daily professional banter. But they also learned from Shockley, who may not have been an easy man to work for, but who had an uncanny ability to suggest experiments and simplify complex ideas.14
成熟和距离感甚至让肖克利的一些管理技巧有了新的视角。例如，他拒绝为生产部门聘用技术人员。他说，生产如此重要，以至于他希望手下最顶尖的技术人员加入“博士生产线”，亲自参与器件的制造。这条生产线被认为是肖克利喜欢用远低于员工能力的工作来羞辱他们的证据，但他要求的核心——精准的生产技术是半导体制造成功的关键——如今已被普遍接受。此外，在20世纪60年代和70年代，“博士生产线”的一种变体是业内标准的故障排除方法：工程师会亲自将芯片“搬运”到生产线上，逐一排查生产问题，以确定生产问题的根源。15
Maturity and distance have even brought a new perspective on some of Shockley’s management techniques. He, for example, refused to hire technicians for manufacturing. Production, he said, was so important that he wanted his top technical men to serve on a “PhD production line” to build the devices themselves. This production line has been cited as evidence of Shockley’s fondness for humiliating his employees with work that was far below their training, but the kernel of his demand—the notion that precise production techniques lie at the heart of successful semiconductor manufacturing—is today universally accepted. In the 1960s and 1970s, moreover, a variant of the PhD production line was a standard troubleshooting method in the industry: engineers would personally walk chips through the production process in a “hand-carried run” to determine the root of production problems.15
鉴于这种影响力，肖克利未能从他的远见卓识中获益，令人感到惋惜。他精心挑选的年轻人组成的团队，起初都为能为一位真正的天才效力而欣喜若狂，并渴望取悦他，却最终未能使他的公司获得成功。得知团队即将离开后不久，肖克利便着手撰写一份简短的媒体声明。他告诉《电子新闻》的记者，这八人的离开“不会对肖克利实验室产生任何实际影响”。随后，他飞往慕尼黑，在那里聘请了一批德国科学家。这些科学家习惯于与学术导师建立更接近肖克利等级森严的管理风格的关系。他将公司迁至斯坦福工业园，公司几经更迭，却始终未能盈利。16
Given this influence, it is in some sense sad that Shockley never reaped the benefits of his vision, never made a success of his company staffed by carefully chosen young men who in the beginning had been overjoyed to be working for a bonafide genius and overeager to please him. Shortly after learning that the group would be leaving, Shockley set to work on a terse statement to the press. The departure of the eight would have “no real effect on the Shockley Lab,” he told a reporter from Electronic News. He subsequently flew to Munich, where he hired a passel of German scientists accustomed to a relationship with their academic advisers that more closely approximated Shockley’s hierarchical management style. He moved his operation to the Stanford Industrial Park, where it went through several permutations, but never turned a profit.16
肖克利以一种近乎自虐的姿态密切关注着他前雇员们的动向，甚至一度雇佣线人向他提供他们在新公司使用的生产方法等细节。他还试图通过为这些叛逃者在肖克利实验室笔记本中记录的几项创意申请专利来保护公司的知识产权。他想确保这些创意的许可费和功劳都归于肖克利半导体公司。在这些员工离开后，肖克利提交了四项专利申请，并将诺伊斯列为发明人。17
Shockley followed the fortunes of his former employees with masochistic attention, at one point even hiring an informant to provide him with details on the production methods used at their new company. He also sought to protect his firm’s intellectual property by filing for patents on several of the ideas the defectors had written in their Shockley lab notebooks. He wanted to be sure the licensing fees and credit for their work came to Shockley Semiconductor. After the group left, Shockley filed four patent applications that listed Noyce as the inventor.17
1963年，肖克利离开工业界，加入斯坦福大学电子工程系任教，并在那里执教了二十年。随着年龄增长，他曾经才华横溢的头脑逐渐被苦涩和偏执所吞噬。他成为了一位公开的优生学家，捐献精子时附加了一个条件：只能提供给门萨俱乐部会员。当他的门徒们实现了他赚取数百万美元、名声大噪的目标时，肖克利却鲜少离开斯坦福的家，在那里他撰写文章，宣扬黑人智力不如白人，并鼓吹对低智商人群实行节育措施。难怪肖克利被誉为硅谷的摩西——他带领人们走向了应许之地，自己却被拒之门外。18
In 1963 Shockley left industry to join the faculty of the Stanford Electrical Engineering Department, where he taught for the next two decades. As he aged, bitterness and paranoia came to dominate his once-brilliant mind. He became an outspoken eugenicist who donated his sperm with the stipulation it be supplied only to women who were members of Mensa. While his protégés achieved his goals of earning millions of dollars and seeing their names in the business press, Shockley rarely left his Stanford home, where he wrote articles on the intellectual inferiority of blacks to whites and the need to institute birth-control measures for people with low IQ scores. Small wonder Shockley has been called the Moses of Silicon Valley—he brought people to the Promised Land but was himself denied entrance.18
在团队正式出发前，阿诺德·贝克曼把他们叫到一间会议室。他神情悲伤，看着显然是事先准备好的笔记。作为一名律师，他提醒他们注意有关保密信息的规定，并建议他们尽量在与半导体无关的领域找工作，“以避免麻烦”。杰伊·拉斯特认真地做了笔记：
Before the group officially departed, Arnold Beckman called them into a conference room. Looking sad and reading from notes clearly drafted by an attorney, he reminded them of the rules surrounding confidential information and suggested they try to find work in fields unrelated to semiconductors “to avoid complications.” Jay Last took careful notes:
贝克曼认为我们以这种方式离职是一种不忠行为。个人更换工作的权利与有计划的集体行动截然不同。[我们的]行为是一种串谋行为，损害了雇主的利益。我们应该考虑我们的行为对雇主和留任员工的影响。
Beckman feels that our leaving in this manner is a disloyal act. The right of the individual to change employment is different from a planned concerted action. [Ours] is an act of conspiracy, prejudicial to the employer. We should consider the effect of our actions on employer and on remaining employees.
这对贝克曼来说是一笔巨大的经济损失。我们没有履行雇佣合同的精神。我们曾做出过默示承诺，会全力以赴，确保运营成功。现在我们却因为形势严峻而临阵脱逃。我们没有深思熟虑，因为我们年轻，也因为当时情绪激动。贝克曼因此损失了一百万美元。
This is a great financial loss [for Beckman]. We are not living up to the spirit of [our] employment contract. We have given an implied promise that we would come out and make the operations successful. We are running away because the going has gotten tough. We haven’t thought things through clearly, because we are young and because of the emotion-charged atmosphere. The cost to Beckman is a million bucks down the drain.
贝克曼感觉自己好像被好朋友背后捅了一刀……我们的新赞助商不道德。
… Beckman feels as if a good friend has stabbed him in the back…. Our new sponsor is not ethical.
我们应该考虑社区的反应。这会被视为一种可耻的行为。19
We should consider the community reaction. This will be looked on as a shameful act.19
就在诺伊斯放弃一家由知名实业家支持的成熟公司，转而与朋友们一起创办一家全新的企业的同时，诺伊斯家的开销也与日俱增。比利刚开始上幼儿园，佩妮也即将入学。鲍勃在肖克利家的形势一片大好时，给贝蒂买了一台豪华冰箱，现在也到了还款的时候了。贝蒂本来就因为钱的问题而哭泣，肖克利太太的最后一次来访更是让她心烦意乱。她只待了一会儿，就问了句：“你们怎么能一声不吭就这么做？”然后就扬长而去。“肖克利夫妇不再喜欢我们了。”比利告诉他的妹妹们。20
At precisely the same time that Noyce was abandoning an established firm backed by a known industrialist for a brand-new operation run by him and his friends, expenses in the Noyce household were rising. Billy had just started nursery school, and Penny would begin soon, too. There were payments due on the luxurious refrigerator Bob had bought for Betty when he thought the situation at Shockley looked promising. Betty, who already found herself in tears over money, was further rattled when Mrs. Shockley came for one last visit, staying only long enough to ask, “How could you possibly do this without telling me?” before sweeping out the door. “Mr. and Mrs. Shockley don’t like us any more,” Billy told his younger sisters.20
威廉·肖克利从未原谅诺伊斯的“背叛”。多年后，费尔柴尔德公司取得成功，两人在一次行业晚宴上相遇，肖克利只说了两个字——“你好，鲍勃”——然后就转身走开了。21
William Shockley never forgave Noyce for his “betrayal.” Years after Fairchild was a success, when the two men encountered each other at an industry dinner, Shockley said only two words—“Hello, Bob”—before turning his back and walking away.21
1957年9月19日，肖克利叛逃者、仙童相机仪器公司代表以及巴德·科伊尔和亚瑟·洛克会面，签署文件成立了仙童半导体公司。该公司注册成立时拥有1325股股票。海登和斯通持有225股，每股价格为5美元。每位创始人——包括诺伊斯（其祖母提供了资金）——都持有100股，价格相同。另有300股作为储备股，供尚未聘用的关键管理人员持有。相机仪器公司同意在18个月内向仙童半导体公司提供总计138万美元的贷款。作为交换，相机仪器公司通过投票信托控制该公司。母公司该公司拥有一项选择权，可以在仙童半导体连续三年净利润超过每年30万美元之前，随时以300万美元的价格收购仙童半导体的全部股份。如果相机与仪器公司等待超过三年，但在七年内完成收购，则需支付500万美元。正如一位创始人所说，这笔交易“对双方都非常有利”。22
ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1957, the Shockley defectors, representatives from Fairchild Camera and Instrument, and Bud Coyle and Arthur Rock met to sign papers establishing Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation. The firm incorporated with 1,325 shares of stock. Hayden, Stone owned 225 shares, purchased for $5 per share. Each of the founders—including Noyce, whose grandmother provided the money—owned 100 shares, purchased at the same price. Three hundred shares were held in reserve for key managers yet to be hired. Camera and Instrument agreed to loan Semiconductor a total of $1.38 million over a period of 18 months. In exchange, Camera and Instrument controlled the company through a voting trust. The parent firm received an option to buy all of Fairchild Semiconductor’s stock for $3 million at any point before Fairchild Semiconductor had three successive years of net earnings greater than $300,000 per year. If Camera and Instrument waited more than three years but bought within seven years, the company would have to pay $5 million for Fairchild Semiconductor. It was, as one founder put it, “a very good deal for both sides.”22
亚瑟·洛克和巴德·科伊尔在创立仙童半导体公司过程中所做的工作，在许多方面预示了风险投资家在未来硅谷初创企业运营中的角色，尽管当时“风险投资”一词尚未出现。这两位银行家帮助年轻的技术专家制定商业战略，确定资金需求，并寻找投资者。作为回报，科伊尔和洛克的公司不仅持有新公司的股份，还获得了一个董事会席位，从而可以影响投资结果。科伊尔和洛克只找到了一位投资者，只支持一家公司，而现代风险投资家则会组织外部投资者，支持他们选择的多家初创公司。但风险投资在北加州的根基——智慧与资金的结合——正是随着仙童半导体公司的创立而确立的。
Arthur Rock’s and Bud Coyle’s work in the establishment of Fairchild Semiconductor in many ways presaged the role of venture capitalists in future Silicon Valley startup operations, even though the term “venture capital” did not yet exist. The bankers helped the young technologists develop a business strategy, determine their funding requirements, and find investors. In return, Coyle’s and Rock’s firm took both a financial stake in the new company and a board seat from which they could influence the outcome of their investment. Coyle and Rock found only one investor to back only one company, whereas modern venture capitalists organize a pool of outside investors to back a number of startups of the financiers’ choosing, but the Northern California roots of venture capital—the pairing of brains and dollars—were established with the founding of Fairchild Semiconductor.
签约仪式结束后，一行人前往瑞奇餐厅庆祝。香槟美酒和热烈的祝酒声让人回想起不到一年前，在同一间餐厅里庆祝肖克利获得诺贝尔奖的盛况。然而，如今的焦点已转向未来。理查德·霍奇森凑近他们，低声说道：“我真心希望你们知道自己在做什么。否则，我就要丢掉饭碗了。”23
After the signing, the entire group went to Rickey’s for a celebration. The flowing champagne and rousing toasts recalled the festivities, held in the same room less than a year before, surrounding Shockley’s Nobel Prize. The focus now, however, was on the future, as Richard Hodgson firmly reminded them when he leaned in close and whispered loudly enough for them all to hear, “I hope to hell you guys know what you’re doing. Because if you don’t, I’m going to lose my job.”23
甚至在文件签署之前，已被任命为仙童半导体公司董事长的霍奇森就邀请诺伊斯担任新公司的总经理。由于霍奇森和相机与仪器公司的其他高管团队将留在纽约，总经理将负责组织半导体公司的启动工作，并在之后管理运营。总经理还将作为半导体公司的对外代表，并负责公司与相机与仪器公司管理层之间的沟通联络。
EVEN BEFORE THE PAPERS HAD BEEN SIGNED, Hodgson, who had been named chair of Fairchild Semiconductor, had asked Noyce to serve as general manager of the new company. Since Hodgson and the rest of the Camera and Instrument executive team would remain in New York, the general manager would organize Semiconductor’s launch and manage operations thereafter. The general manager would also serve as Semiconductor’s public face and its link to Camera and Instrument management.
诺伊斯心动了，但他担心自己没有能力管理整个公司。此外，想到将来有一天要对众多员工拥有最终决定权，他感到害怕，因为他能想象这些员工将来会为仙童半导体公司效力。从某种意义上说，他害怕自己有能力影响他人——这种恐惧源于他离开费城前不久发生的一起家庭事件。一位冰箱推销员说服他和贝蒂免费试用一台冰箱一周，并承诺如果他们决定不保留，也不会有任何麻烦。一周结束时，当推销员出现在他们家门口，说“你们当然想买这台冰箱”，诺伊斯告诉他，他们已经决定不要了，他应该把冰箱拉回去。
Noyce was tempted, but he feared himself ill prepared to oversee an entire company. Moreover, the prospect of having the final say over the many employees he could imagine one day working for Fairchild Semiconductor frightened him. He was, in a very real sense, afraid of his own ability to influence people—a fear with roots in a domestic incident that occurred shortly before he left Philadelphia. A refrigerator salesman had convinced him and Betty to try an icebox for a free week-long trial, promising no obligation and no problems should they decide not to keep it. At the end of the week, when the salesman appeared at their front door, saying “of course you want to buy the refrigerator,” Noyce told him they had decided they did not want it, and he should take it back.
“没有？出什么问题了吗？”
“No? Was there a problem?”
“不，我们就是不想买。”
“No. We just don’t want it.”
推销员似乎很沮丧，“但是你必须这么做，你看它的特点……”
The salesman seemed distraught, “But you must, you see the features …”
“我不买。拿回去。”
“I’m not buying it. Take it back.”
又过了几分钟，那人把冰箱装上卡车，离开了。几天后，诺伊斯在报纸上看到，那位推销员自杀了。诺伊斯始终无法摆脱对这起自杀事件的责任感，并发誓以后要避免再次因为说“不”而让别人陷入如此痛苦的境地。24
After a few more minutes of this, the man loaded the refrigerator on his truck and left. Several days later, Noyce read in the paper that the salesman had killed himself. Noyce could not shake his sense of responsibility for the suicide and vowed to avoid other situations in which saying “no” might drive someone to such distress.24
当然，诺伊斯并没有把这件事告诉霍奇森。他只是告诉他，他宁愿领导研发部门，也不愿管理公司。诺伊斯心想，至少在实验室里，正确的答案可以从书本上找到。
Noyce did not share this story with Hodgson, of course. He simply told him that he would prefer heading R&D to running the company. At least in the lab, Noyce thought to himself, the right answers can be found in a book.
霍奇森接受了诺伊斯的选择，但在寻找正式人选期间，仍然将他视为事实上的总经理。霍奇森几乎完全通过诺伊斯与外界沟通，并预付给他3000美元，“用于支付半导体业务筹建的必要开支，直至公司正式成立”。通过诺伊斯，霍奇森向新公司提供了相机仪器公司剩余的车间设备，并向创始人保证，仙童半导体公司的员工将享受仙童半导体公司的福利待遇。诺伊斯的收入高于其他创始人，并且是他们中唯一一位在仙童半导体公司董事会任职的人（尽管他没有在相机仪器公司董事会任职）。25
Hodgson accepted Noyce’s choice but nonetheless treated him as the de facto general manager while conducting the search for a permanent hire. Hodgson communicated almost exclusively through Noyce and advanced him $3,000 “to cover necessary expenditures in setting up the semiconductor operation until such time as the Corporation is formally organized.” Through Noyce, Hodgson offered the new company use of Camera and Instrument’s surplus shop equipment and assured the founders that Fairchild Semiconductor employees would be covered under the larger company’s benefits. Noyce earned more than the other founders, and he alone among them held a seat on the board of Fairchild Semiconductor (though not on Camera and Instrument’s board).25
费尔柴尔德相机仪器公司发布的新闻稿中提到了“诺伊斯和他的七位研究人员”。新闻稿大量引用了诺伊斯的话，但对其他七位创始人却只是简单地称他们“与诺伊斯博士共同创立了这家新公司”。对诺伊斯的关注并非无人察觉。尽管大多数创始人都意识到，他们邀请诺伊斯加入的明确目的是为了让他领导团队并提升团队的信誉，但其他人——尤其是促成诺伊斯脱离肖克利的拉斯特、霍尼和罗伯茨——却难以接受自己被一个在最后时刻才加入团队的人所掩盖。“鲍勃比我们更像个政治家，”一位创始人抱怨道。另一位创始人则认为问题很简单：“如果诺伊斯上了船，他永远都是船长。”当 Jay Last 负责整理员工名单时，他把所有创始人按字母顺序排列——除了 Noyce，他特意把 Noyce 放在名单的最后，以此提醒大家是谁，谁又不是这一切的创始人。26
The press release issued by Fairchild Camera and Instrument referred to “Noyce and his seven researchers.” It quoted Noyce at length but referred to the other seven founders simply as “associated with Dr. Noyce in the founding of the new company.” The attention to Noyce did not go unnoticed. Although most of the founders recognized that they had invited Noyce to join them explicitly to lead and provide credibility for the group, others—particularly Last, Hoerni, and Roberts, who catalyzed the defection from Shockley—found it hard to sit in the shadow of a man who had joined the operation at the last possible moment. “Bob was more of a politician than we were,” complained one. The problem, according to another founder, was simple: “If [Noyce] climbed in the boat, he would always be captain.” When Jay Last took charge of typing up the employee list, he put all the founders in alphabetical order—except Noyce, whom he deliberately put at the end of the list as a reminder of who had, and who had not, started this all.26
然而，兴奋和期待通常压倒了嫉妒。在找到办公楼之前，他们只能在彼此的家中办公，制定计划，与供应商洽谈，寻找办公室，并列出他们希望加入仙童半导体公司的肖克利员工名单。就在一小群创始人在维克·格里尼奇的车库里工作时，苏联发射了世界上第一颗轨道卫星——一个发出哔哔声的小型球体，名为“斯普特尼克”——的消息传来。诺伊斯和其他业余无线电爱好者可以用家里的收音机收听到它的信号。“斯普特尼克”的发射对这些年轻人来说简直是天赐良机，因为它让美国军方——当时他们已经在研究硅晶体管的用途——对用于导弹和卫星的更小、更高性能的电子元件产生了狂热的需求。然而，在10月4日那天，“斯普特尼克”的发射消息却给这家美国最新电子公司的创始人带来了焦虑。如果苏联能够将卫星送入轨道，他们就能发射核弹头，并将其瞄准美国城市。随着媒体反应愈演愈烈，近乎歇斯底里，艾森豪威尔总统宣布，到年底前，一颗美国卫星将绕地球运行。太空竞赛正式拉开帷幕。27
Excitement and anticipation usually overrode jealousy, however. Until they could find a building, they worked in each other’s houses, planning, talking to suppliers, trying to find an office, and making lists of the employees at Shockley whom they would like to join Fairchild Semiconductor. A small group of founders was working in Vic Grinich’s garage when news broke that the Soviets had launched the world’s first orbiting satellite, a small, beeping ball called Sputnik whose signal Noyce and other amateur radio buffs could hear on their home sets. Sputnik would prove a godsend to the young men’s fortunes, for it sent the United States military, already investigating the uses of silicon transistors, into a frenzy for smaller, higher-performing electronic components for missiles and satellites. On that October 4, though, the Sputnik announcement brought only anxiety to the founders of the country’s newest electronics firm. If the Soviets could launch a satellite into orbit, they could loft a nuclear warhead and aim it at an American city. As media reactions climbed towards hysteria, President Eisenhower announced that an American satellite would circle the earth by year’s end. The space race began in earnest.27
同月，仙童半导体公司与查尔斯顿路844号签订了一份为期两年、租金4.2万美元的租赁合同（该建筑后来因这里发生的事件而被列为加州历史地标）。这栋建筑面积仅1.5万平方英尺，当时还只是一个空壳，位于帕洛阿尔托南郊，距离肖克利实验室不远。对于这些年轻人来说，这空间显得格外巨大，他们之前甚至拒绝了一栋面积是它两倍的建筑，因为他们确信自己永远无法充分利用。1957年11月，他们开始搬进这栋建筑时，努力克制着内心的激动。前一秒他们还像孩子一样在楼里嬉戏打闹，或者安装杰伊·拉斯特从西尔斯百货买来的柜子；下一秒他们就忙着和水管工、电工讨论水电需求，或者小心翼翼地把实验台和设备从一个地方搬到另一个地方，直到找到他们认为最合适的布局。28
THE SAME MONTH, Fairchild Semiconductor signed a two-year, $42,000 lease on a building at 844 Charleston Road (later named a California historic landmark, thanks to the activities that transpired there). The building, little more than a 15,000-square-foot empty shell, sat near the southern border of Palo Alto, not far from Shockley Labs. The space seemed huge to the young men, who had turned down a building twice the size because they were certain they could never fill it. They worked hard to rein in their excitement as they began moving into the facility in November 1957. One minute they would be horsing around the building like kids, or installing the cabinets Jay Last had bought at Sears, and the next they were talking to plumbers and electricians about their water and power needs or carefully moving lab tables and equipment from one area to another until they settled on the configuration they thought best.28
为了寻找总经理，创始人最终找到了汤姆·贝，他曾是一位物理学教授，也曾在20世纪50年代初担任过仙童相机仪器公司的销售经理。贝英俊潇洒，嗜酒如命，举止优雅，风趣幽默，就连他那双翼尖鞋都透着一股老练的气质。尽管他与霍奇森共事已久，但贝的能力和显而易见的才智给仙童公司的高管留下了深刻的印象，以至于霍奇森推荐八人小组考虑让他担任总经理——这着实令人费解，因为贝本人也承认他对晶体管“一窍不通”。不过，面试他的诺伊斯显然认为贝学习这些微型器件应该不成问题。贝获得了少量股份，并于1957年12月加入仙童半导体公司，担任市场营销主管。29
The search for a general manager led the founders to Tom Bay, a former physics professor who had also worked as a sales manager for Fairchild Camera and Instrument in the early 1950s. A handsome, hard-drinking sophisticate, Bay was dapper, witty, and smart, down to his wing-tipped toes. Although it had been years since he worked with Hodgson, Bay’s competence and obvious intelligence had impressed the Fairchild executive enough to recommend the group of eight consider him for their general manager—a puzzling suggestion since Bay was the first to admit that he “didn’t know bupkis about transistors.” Clearly, though, Noyce, who interviewed him, thought Bay would have no trouble learning about the tiny devices. Bay was granted a small bit of stock and joined Fairchild Semiconductor in December 1957, as the head of marketing.29
接下来几周发生的一系列事件预示着仙童半导体公司对其母公司未来的重要性。1958年1月，相机与仪器公司接到通知，美国空军取消了该公司为B-58轰炸机开发侦察相机的合同。这份合同曾为该公司贡献了超过一半的销售额，如今却因军方对数字电子侦察系统的新需求而告终。“我们所熟知的照相侦察系统已经成为过去式了，”卡特对董事会说道。30
INCIDENTS IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS portended the importance of Fairchild Semiconductor to its parent company’s future. In January 1958, Camera and Instrument received word that the US Air Force had cancelled the company’s contract developing B-58 bomber reconnaissance cameras. This contract, which once provided the firm with more than half of its sales, had fallen victim to the military’s new desire for digital electronic reconnaissance systems. “Photo reconnaissance systems as we know it is [sic] a thing of the past,” Carter told the board.30
数字电子技术的兴起导致仙童相机仪器公司（Fairchild Camera and Instrument）的衰落，却成就了仙童半导体公司（Fairchild Semiconductor）。过去一年，美国空军开始引导其主要承包商放弃基于模拟计算机的系统——这些系统存在真空管易爆、活动部件繁多等问题——转而采用速度更快、精度更高的全数字系统。此外，空军还开始要求在其导弹和飞机的数字计算机中使用硅晶体管（与锗器件不同，硅晶体管能够承受高温和航空电子设备的剧烈震动）。31
The drive for digital electronics that spelled Fairchild Camera and Instrument’s loss was Fairchild Semiconductor’s gain. In the past year, the air force had begun shifting its major contractors away from systems based on analog computers—which suffered from easily blown vacuum tubes and a multiplicity of moving parts—towards all-digital systems, which were faster and more accurate than their analog counterparts. The air force had further begun requiring the use of silicon transistors (which, unlike germanium devices, could withstand high temperatures and avionic jostling) in the digital computers for its missiles and airplanes.31
在相机与仪器公司失去B-58轰炸机相机合同后不久，仙童半导体公司的市场经理汤姆·贝偶然看到一篇文章，详细描述了IBM联邦系统部门在为B-70（一种绰号“载人导弹”的远程战略轰炸机）研制导航计算机时遇到的困难。贝读到IBM当时面临的最紧迫的问题是缺少用于计算机的硅晶体管时，熟悉制导系统的贝立刻想到了谢尔曼·仙童与IBM的关系。贝和霍奇森敏锐地察觉到机会，说服谢尔曼·仙童安排贝和诺伊斯与在纽约州奥韦戈参与B-70计算机研发的IBM工程师会面。
Shortly after Camera and Instrument lost the B-58 camera contract, Fairchild Semiconductor marketing manager Tom Bay came across an article detailing the difficulties that IBM’s Federal Systems Division faced in its efforts to build a navigational computer for the B-70, a long-range strategic bomber nicknamed “the manned missile.” When he read that IBM’s most pressing problem was its lack of a silicon transistor for the computer, Bay, who was familiar with guidance systems, thought immediately of Sherman Fairchild’s connection to IBM. Sensing opportunity, Bay and Hodgson convinced Sherman Fairchild to arrange for Bay and Noyce to meet with the IBM engineers working on the B-70 computer in Owego, New York.
IBM需要一种能够承受高温且开关速度极快的晶体管。贝回忆说，规格要求这种器件能够在50兆赫兹的频率下切换150毫安的电流，并具备60伏的电压能力——比当时市面上任何硅晶体管都快，也比许多锗晶体管快。此外，IBM需要100个这样的器件。诺伊斯认真听取了工程师们的汇报，然后简单地说：“当然可以，我们能做到。”诺伊斯的自信——或者说是虚张声势？——既让汤姆·贝印象深刻，又让他感到惊讶。贝当时注意到，“鲍勃口才太好了，没人会质疑他。”他们成立仅三个月的公司甚至连一个基本的晶体管都没造出来，而诺伊斯却冷静地承诺要生产100个最先进的器件，贝认为他“从未怀疑过我们能做到”。或许诺伊斯认为仙童半导体公司此前从未生产过其他晶体管反而是个优势——没有既定的标准、流程、设备或培训，意味着无需为了IBM的设备而进行任何改动或重新调整。实际上，他们可以围绕IBM的需求来构建公司。32
IBM wanted a transistor that could withstand high temperatures and that could switch quickly. Bay recalls the specs called for a device that could switch 150 milliamps with 60-volt capability at 50 megacycles—faster than any silicon transistor then on the market and faster than many germanium devices, as well. Moreover, IBM wanted 100 of them. Noyce listened intently to the engineers and then said simply, “Sure. We can do that.” Noyce’s confidence—or was it bluffing?—both impressed and surprised Tom Bay, who at the time noted that “Bob is so articulate, no one questions [him].” Their three-month-old company had yet to build even a single basic transistor, and here was Noyce coolly promising 100 state-of-the-art devices, with “never a doubt in his mind that we could do it,” as far as Bay could see. Perhaps Noyce counted the fact that Fairchild Semiconductor had not built any other transistors a benefit—no established standards, practices, equipment, or training meant nothing to undo or retool for the IBM device. They could, in effect, build the company around IBM’s needs.32
诺伊斯的保证并未消除IBM工程师们对仙童半导体公司的疑虑。这家公司在业内名不见经传，唯一引人注目之处便是其创始人桀骜不驯的历史。尽管IBM没有其他供应商可以替代仙童（他们所需器件的最佳替代品——德州仪器的一款元件——在测试中失败了），但谢尔曼·仙童、迪克·霍奇森和IBM总裁小托马斯·沃森之间的一次私人会面——主题只有一个：你们最大的股东在这些人身上投资了超过100万美元，所以你们应该信任他们——最终说服了IBM联邦系统工程师们冒险选择仙童半导体。到1958年2月，这些年轻人拿到了100个硅晶体管的订单。IBM同意每个晶体管支付150美元，而当时基本的锗晶体管售价还不到5美元。仙童半导体公司就此成立。33
Noyce’s assurances did not overcome the IBM engineers’ immediate doubts about Fairchild Semiconductor, a complete unknown distinguished in the industry only by the rebellious history of its founders. Although IBM had no real alternative supplier to Fairchild (the best approximation of the device they needed, a Texas Instruments component, had failed in testing), it took a private meeting among Sherman Fairchild, Dick Hodgson, and IBM chief Thomas Watson, Jr.—a meeting with a singular theme: your largest shareholder has invested more than $1 million in these men, so you should trust them—to persuade the IBM Federal Systems engineers to take a chance on Fairchild Semiconductor. By February 1958, the young men had an order for 100 silicon transistors. IBM agreed to pay $150 for each transistor, this at a time when basic germanium devices were selling for less than $5. Fairchild Semiconductor was in business.33
IBM的订单催生了仙童半导体公司。IBM事无巨细，不仅详细规定了器件的电气参数，还明确了这家年轻公司在制造晶体管时应采用的封装和测试流程。诺伊斯和仙童半导体的其他科学家们一致认为，只有制造出双扩散硅晶体管——即由硅制成并具有两个PN结的器件——才能达到IBM所要求的可靠性和速度。他们将制造类似他们在肖克利半导体公司研究过的台面晶体管。唯一的问题是，这些晶体管应该是扩散型PNP还是NPN。团队决定将公司一分为二，分别尝试制造这两种器件：戈登·摩尔负责NPN器件的研发，而让·霍尔尼则负责PNP器件的研发。34
THE IBM ORDER made Fairchild Semiconductor. IBM left little to chance, carefully specifying not only the device’s electrical parameters, but also the packaging and testing procedures the young company should use in manufacturing the transistors. Noyce and the other scientists at Fairchild Semiconductor agreed they could only achieve the sort of reliability and speed that IBM wanted if they built double-diffused silicon transistors: devices, that is, built out of silicon and with two P-N junctions. They would build mesa transistors like the ones they had worked on at Shockley Semiconductor. The only question was whether the transistors should be diffused PNP or NPN. The group decided to split the company in two and try to build both devices, with Gordon Moore heading the NPN effort and Jean Hoerni leading the drive on a PNP device.34
由于半导体制造尚处于起步阶段，仙童半导体公司的员工正如戈登·摩尔所说，“在开发工艺的同时，也必须开发我们自己的设备”。他们在肖克利半导体公司做过这类工作，因此能够迅速承担起各自专业领域的责任。材料加工和冶金部门主管谢尔顿·罗伯茨负责硅锭的生长，将其切割成硬币大小的“晶圆”，并抛光至镜面般闪亮。最终，每片晶圆上都会蚀刻数十个晶体管，但首先需要对硅进行扩散——在高温炉中掺杂杂质，使硅晶圆的某些区域为P型，其他区域为N型。戈登·摩尔和让·霍尔尼负责监督扩散过程，霍尔尼负责理论研究（确定晶圆的扩散时间和温度），而摩尔则负责建造炉子的实际操作。摩尔的需求非常特殊，可供选择的材料又非常少，以至于他最终不得不从瑞典的一家公司订购所需的元件，并自己设计和建造熔炉。35
With semiconductor manufacturing still in its infancy, the Fairchild Semiconductor men “had to develop our own equipment as we developed the processes,” as Gordon Moore put it. They had done this type of work at Shockley and could quickly assume responsibility for their areas of expertise. Sheldon Roberts, section head for materials processing and metallurgy, took charge of growing the silicon ingots, slicing them into “wafers” approximately the size of a dime, and polishing them until they gleamed like mirrors. Ultimately, dozens of transistors would be etched onto each wafer, but first the silicon needed to be diffused—doped with impurities in high-temperature furnaces so that some areas of the silicon wafer were P-type and others N-type. Gordon Moore and Jean Hoerni oversaw the diffusion process, with Hoerni taking charge of the theory (determining how long to diffuse the wafers and at what temperature) and Moore overseeing the practical necessities of building the furnaces. Moore’s needs were so specialized, and the pickings so thin, that he ultimately had to order the elements he needed from a company in Sweden and design and build the furnaces himself.35
硅扩散完成后，就可以开始区分各个晶体管了。这需要用到一种叫做光刻的工艺，诺伊斯和杰伊·拉斯特在仙童半导体公司共同领导着这项技术。两人设计了一个图案，标明了每个晶体管在晶圆上的位置、电流流过晶体管的方式，以及晶体管连接到最终插入IBM系统的封装盒的位置。然后，这个图案会被连续缩小数百倍，直到小到可以在一块叫做掩模的小型玻璃板上并排排列多个副本。当诺伊斯需要制造一台能够缩小图案的相机时，他去了旧金山的一家摄影器材商店，在一堆16毫米电影摄影机镜头中翻找，最终找到了三个。虽然这些镜头并非完美无瑕，但可以通过某种方式进行对齐，使它们的误差不会影响图案的缩小过程。这台拼凑起来的机器成为了后来被广泛应用于整个行业的步进式相机的原型。36
Once the silicon was properly diffused, it was time to start differentiating the individual transistors. This was done through a process called photolithography, an area that Noyce and Jay Last led together at Fairchild. The two men created a pattern that showed where every transistor would appear on the wafer, how the current would pass through the transistors, and where the transistors would be attached to the canisters that would then be plugged into the IBM system. This pattern would then be shrunk hundreds of times in succession until it was so small that multiple copies could be lined up side by side on a small glass plate called a mask. When Noyce needed to build the camera that would reduce the pattern, he went to a photography store in San Francisco, where he rummaged through a bin of 16-mm movie camera lenses until he found three that, while not flawless, could be aligned in such a way that the errors on them did not affect the process of shrinking the pattern. This cobbled-together machine became the prototype of the step-and-repeat cameras used throughout the industry.36
为了将掩模上的图案转移到硅片上，诺伊斯和拉斯特需要用一种光敏树脂涂覆硅片表面。伊士曼柯达公司开发了一种树脂（用于印刷电路板），诺伊斯和拉斯特可以根据需要调整其化学成分。这种被称为“光刻胶”的树脂涂覆到晶圆上后，将掩模放置在涂覆后的晶圆上。然后，将晶圆和掩模暴露于光照、酸液和掺杂剂中，掺杂剂会在硅片表面增加一个PN结，同时蚀刻掉未被光刻胶覆盖的区域。这些工艺在整个晶圆表面进行，因此所有晶体管都是同时处理的，而不是逐个处理的。37
To transfer the patterns on the mask to the silicon, Noyce and Last needed to coat the surface of the silicon with a light-sensitive resin. Eastman Kodak had developed a resin (for use in printed circuit boards) whose chemical composition Noyce and Last could modify to meet their needs. After this resin, called “photoresist,” was applied to the wafer, the mask was placed on the coated wafer. Then the wafer and mask were exposed to light, acid, and a dopant that added one more P-N junction to the surface of the silicon wafer while also etching away areas that had not been covered by the photoresist. These processes happened over the surface of the entire wafer, so that all the transistors were processed simultaneously, rather than one at a time.37
硅片从光刻胶工艺中取出后，需要将晶体管切割并进行测试。并非所有投入生产的器件最终都能正常工作。例如，在一片晶圆上的100个晶体管中，能够正常工作的器件数量（称为“良率”）通常在10到50个之间。良率低的原因是任何形式的污染都会破坏器件的电气特性——尽管使用了塑料薄膜和其他一些简易的清洁措施，污染仍然十分普遍。此外，即使室内湿度发生轻微变化或灰尘过多，也可能导致器件失效。38
Once the silicon wafers emerged from the photoresist process, the transistors needed to be cut apart and tested. Not every device that started production worked by the end. Out of 100 transistors on a wafer, for example, the number of working devices (called a “yield”) would be somewhere between 10 and 50. Yields were low because contamination of any sort ruined the electrical characteristics of the device—and contamination was rampant, despite plastic sheeting and other rudimentary attempts to keep the lab clean. Moreover, even a slight change in the moisture in the room or a bit too much dust could cause a device to fail.38
维克托·格里尼奇（Victor Grinich）负责测试工作，他还参与制定了新产品的应用和评估方案。朱利叶斯·布兰克（Julius Blank）设计了制造工厂（简称“晶圆厂”），并与尤金·克莱纳（Eugene Kleiner）合作负责工厂工程。克莱纳还负责一般行政管理，因为他认识一位银行家。布兰克和克莱纳还负责监督那些负责切割晶体管、将它们装入管子并包装成品的女工（她们总是被称为“女孩”）。用于发货给客户。之所以雇用女性从事这些工作，是因为人们认为她们的小手和发达的精细动作技能非常适合操作微型设备和细小电线——而且她们的工资比男性低。39
Victor Grinich, who also helped to define product applications and evaluation protocols for new devices, took charge of testing. Julius Blank designed the manufacturing facililty (called the “fab”) and ran plant engineering in collaboration with Eugene Kleiner, who was also responsible for general administration since he had known a banker. Blank and Kleiner also supervised the women (invariably called “girls”) who cut the transistors apart, wired them into canisters, and packaged the finished product for shipment to customers. Women were hired for these jobs because it was believed that their small hands and well-developed fine-motor skills would ideally suit work with tiny devices and small wires—and they could be paid less than men.39
对创始人来说，这是一种非常平等的安排。“诺伊斯是实验室的技术负责人，组织结构就是这样，”一位创始人说。“我们其他人地位几乎相同。每个人都尽可能身兼数职。”40
For the founders, it was a very egalitarian arrangement. “Noyce was the technical head of the lab, and that was it for organizational structure,” according to one founder. “The rest of us were pretty much on equal footing. Everybody wore as many hats as possible.”40
该团队开始悄悄地从肖克利半导体实验室招募人才。肖克利那些能力出众的员工都知道，只要他们仔细阅读《帕洛阿尔托时报》，总有一天会在分类广告中看到自己目前的职位描述。“仙童半导体几乎把我们的名字都写在了广告上，”一位员工回忆道。不久，在肖克利工作的哈里·塞洛加入了仙童半导体，还有负责NPN晶体管研发的戴夫·艾利森，以及才华横溢的物理学家CT·萨赫。此外，还有一小部分技术人员也从肖克利跳槽到了仙童半导体。41
The group began quietly recruiting from Shockley Semiconductor Labs. Capable Shockley employees knew that if they read the Palo Alto Times carefully, they would at some point see their current job description listed in the classified advertisements. “Fairchild Semiconductor did everything but put our names on the ads,” recalls one employee. Soon Harry Sello, who worked at Shockley, joined, as did Dave Allison, who came to work on the NPN transistor, and C. T. Sah, a gifted physicist. A small contingent of technicians also came to Fairchild from Shockley.41
1958年2月，一位总经理加入公司。埃德·鲍德温曾是一名伞兵，在休斯公司负责二极管业务。休斯公司是一家大型军工分包商，也是美国领先的硅半导体生产商之一。鲍德温不仅拥有仙童半导体公司目标市场的经验，还拥有物理学博士学位，而且身材精干，气场强大。八位创始人提出给他相当于他们自己股份的股份——500美元换100股——但他拒绝了。私下里，鲍德温游说霍奇森给他股份，认为他的管理职位使他理应持有比创始人更多的股份。很快，大约十几位来自休斯公司的工程师加入了仙童半导体公司，他们大多是制造方面的专家——这正是八位创始人的弱项。42
A general manager joined the company in February 1958. Ed Baldwin was a former paratrooper who had managed the diode operations at Hughes, a major military subcontractor and one of the nation’s leading producers of silicon semiconductors. In addition to his experience in precisely the markets Fairchild Semiconductor targeted, Baldwin had a PhD in Physics and a presence as compact and sturdy as a cannon. The eight founders offered him a stake in the company equivalent to their own—$500 for 100 shares—but he did not accept. Privately Baldwin was lobbying Hodgson for stock, arguing that his managerial position justified his having a larger stake in the company than did the founders. Soon some dozen engineers from Hughes, most of them specialists in manufacturing—the eight founders’ weak point—were on the Fairchild Semiconductor payroll.42
鲍德温的工作并不轻松。在最初获得5万美元贷款后，相机与仪器公司仅将资金转给仙童半导体公司，用于报销有据可查的费用，实际上相当于给鲍德温及其团队发放津贴。虽然这为母公司提供了一种可行的成本核算方法，但也给仙童半导体公司增加了一层繁琐的官僚程序。43
Baldwin’s job was not easy. After an initial $50,000 loan, Camera and Instrument transferred funds to Semiconductor only to reimburse properly documented expenses, in effect keeping Baldwin and his team on an allowance. Although this did provide a workable method of cost accounting for the parent firm, it also created a burdensome layer of bureaucracy for Fairchild Semiconductor.43
鲍德温的口号或许应该是“胸怀大志，专注目标”。他告诉八位创始人，他们需要制定组织架构图。他们需要立即开始规划建设规模更大的制造工厂，即便他们当时还没有生产出任何产品。他们应该将工程部门与制造部门分开，并将这两者都与研发部门分开。这并非什么激进的建议；鉴于半导体行业本身就存在传统的运营流程，这些部门划分是完全合理的。鲍德温并不特别欣赏创始人身兼数职的能力。“做好一件事，然后……”“好好干，”他告诉诺伊斯。鲍德温希望一位仪器专家来搭建测试设备，并由一位有过产品量产经验的人来监督预生产工程。当汤姆·贝告诉他，他认为仙童半导体五年内的收入可能会达到1500万美元时，鲍德温命令他“把目标定得比这高十倍”。44
Baldwin’s slogan could have been “Think Big and Focus.” He told the eight founders that they needed to develop an organizational chart. They needed to begin planning—immediately—for a much bigger manufacturing facility, even though they had yet to build a product. They should separate engineering from manufacturing, and both of them from Research and Development. This was not a radical suggestion; inasmuch as there were traditional operating procedures for an industry as young as semiconductors, these sorts of divisions would qualify. Baldwin did not particularly admire the founders’ abilities to perform multiple jobs. “Do one thing and do it well,” he told Noyce. Baldwin wanted an instrumentation expert to build the test equipment and the preproduction engineering to be overseen by someone who had actually put products into production in the past. When Tom Bay told him that he thought Fairchild Semiconductor might have $15 million in revenues in five years, Baldwin ordered him to “shoot ten times that high.”44
尽管鲍德温贡献良多，但他始终游离于创始团队之外。他们八人之间的关系既充满活力又牢不可破。他们每天一起工作十到十二个小时，还不包括晚上去鲁珀特酒吧喝酒的时间。他们聚在一起时，常常会围成一个圈，肩膀几乎挨在一起，每个人都和左边的人聊着天，和右边的人聊着天（或许还会和圈对面的人聊上几句）。诺伊斯喜欢这种时刻，喜欢他们热烈交谈的氛围，也喜欢他们嘴里叼着的香烟的味道。如果他伸手去口袋里想抽烟，却发现烟盒空了，他会把包装纸揉成一团，扔在地上，然后从邻座的口袋里掏出一根烟（几乎不问，也不看），在腿上敲几下，塞进嘴里，让对方点燃。如果是过滤嘴的烟，诺伊斯就会嘟囔几句，说些娘娘腔之类的话。与此同时，他和同伴们还会继续进行两三场谈话。45
Despite his contributions, Baldwin was always outside the founding group. The rapport the eight of them shared was dynamic and impermeable. They worked together ten or twelve hours each day, not counting the trips to Rupert’s Bar, where they liked to go for drinks in the evening. They often found themselves standing in a circle when they were together, their shoulders nearly touching, each man holding one conversation with the man on his left and a different one with the man on his right (and perhaps a third with someone across the circle). Noyce loved these moments, loved the buzz of talk and the smell of the cigarettes many of them held between their lips. If he reached in his pocket for a smoke and discovered an empty pack, he would crumple the wrapper, toss it on the ground, grab a cigarette out of his neighbor’s pocket (without asking and almost without looking), pound it on his leg, and pop it in his mouth so the guy from whom he took it could light it. Were it filtered, Noyce would grumble something about sissies. All the while, he and the other fellows would maintain their end of two or three conversations.45
一张创始时期的正式照片暗示了这种融洽的关系。八位创始人围坐在桌旁，头顶撑着一把印花流苏伞。他们围成一圈，诺伊斯一如既往地坐在正中央。他们都穿着西装——其中大多数人只有一套西装——并系着领带，这让他们显得有些严肃，桌上散落的文件和书籍也加剧了这种氛围。但每个人脸上都挂着灿烂的笑容。他们显然正享受着人生中最美好的时光。
A formal photo from the founding period hints at this rapport. The eight founders sit around a table under a flower-print, fringed umbrella. They are seated in a circle with Noyce, as always, front and center. They all wear suits—most of them owned only one—and ties, which give them a serious air, as do the papers and books strewn across the table. But every man wears a smile big enough to be called a grin. They are clearly having the time of their lives.
到1958年5月，摩尔团队为IBM研制的NPN晶体管已准备好投入生产。初夏时，仙童半导体公司已将承诺的100台器件交付至纽约州奥韦戈。尽管诺伊斯并非一个感性的人，但他终其一生都珍藏着那笔交易的支票存根。同年8月，仙童半导体公司携其NPN晶体管参加了西海岸电子制造商协会主办的、已有六年历史的贸易展——威斯康（Wescon）。在展会上，公司的几位创始人（其中几位还共同发表了论文）欣喜地得知，他们的产品是市场上唯一一款双扩散硅晶体管。“我们抢占了先机！”展会结束后几天，诺伊斯向一群仙童员工欢呼道，“没有人准备好将这样的产品推向市场……而且在不久的将来，也没有人能阻挡我们。” 事实上，仙童半导体公司对这款器件的垄断地位保持了一年多。46
By May of 1958, the NPN transistor Moore’s team had built for IBM was ready to move into production. By early summer, Fairchild Semiconductor had delivered its promised 100 devices to Owego, New York. Though he was not one for sentiment, Noyce kept the check stub from the transaction for the rest of his life. In August, Fairchild Semiconductor brought its NPN transistor to Wescon, the six-year-old trade show sponsored by the West Coast Electronics Manufacturers Association. There the company’s founders, several of whom presented papers together, were elated to learn that theirs was the only double-diffused silicon transistor available on the open market. “We scooped the industry!” Noyce whooped to a group of Fairchild employees a few days after the show ended. “Nobody [is] ready to put something like this on the market … [and there is] no prospect of anybody getting in our way in the immediate future.” Indeed, Fairchild kept its monopoly on the device for over a year.46
5.
发明
5
Invention
仙童半导体公司成立初期无疑是诺伊斯一生中最具创造力的时期。他拥有的17项专利中有7项，包括最重要的集成电路专利，都出自公司成立后的18个月。当时，诺伊斯担任研发总监，负责仙童的研发工作。在此期间，他尽可能地将精力投入到自己的科研工作中。他曾在技术会议上就“扩散基极晶体管的开关时间计算”等主题发表演讲。他的脑海中充满了各种想法，以至于有时会在半夜趁着贝蒂和孩子们熟睡时起床，把它们记录下来。在办公室里，他一丝不苟地记录着实验笔记，笔记中充满了教学式的语气——“让我们来看一下下面的结构”，“我们可以设定这些标准”——仿佛是在一页又一页的笔记、图表、图形和示波器读数中对自己进行讲解。有时，他甚至会在整页纸上潦草地写下复杂的数学公式；在其他时候，他会放慢速度，花足够的时间制定“计算计划”，然后再开始进行数学运算。1
The infancy of Fairchild Semiconductor undoubtedly ranks as the most intellectually fertile time of Noyce’s life. Seven of his 17 patents, including his most important, for the integrated circuit, date from the 18 months after the company was launched, when Noyce served as the director of R&D and oversaw Fairchild’s research efforts. During this time, he focused as much attention as possible on his own scientific work. He spoke at technical conferences on topics such as “Switching Time Calculations for Diffused Base Transistors.” His mind was so filled with ideas that sometimes he would rise in the middle of the night to write them down while Betty and the children slept. In the office, he kept careful lab notebooks in which he adopted a highly didactic tone—“let us look at the following structure,” “we may set these criteria”—almost as if he were lecturing to himself in page after page of notes, charts, figures, and oscilloscope readings. Sometimes he scrawled complex mathematical equations over entire pages; at other points he slowed down long enough to draw up a “plan of calculation” before launching into the math.1
但说实话，科学严谨细致的工作——一丝不苟地进行实验并记录结果，每一次实验都与前一次略有不同——远不如灵感迸发的那一刻更能吸引诺伊斯。诺伊斯本质上是一个近乎强迫症式的创意制造者，一台永不停歇的思维机器。托马斯·爱迪生曾说过，天才是99%的汗水加上1%的灵感，但诺伊斯更喜欢尽可能多地沉浸在灵感迸发的阶段。
Truth be told, though, the brutally methodical labor of science—the careful working and recording of one’s way through experiment after experiment, each one only slightly different from the iteration that preceded it—interested Noyce far less than the moments when a new idea came to him. At his core, Noyce was an almost compulsive idea generator, a mental perpetual motion machine. Thomas Edison famously declared genius to be 99 percent perspiration and 1 percent inspiration, but Noyce preferred to spend as much time as possible in the inspiration stage.
有些科学家从事创造性工作的方式是从小处着手，逐步积累。例如，威廉·肖克利想要发明创造时，他喜欢搜集所有相关领域的文献资料。然后，他会将这些专利和论文摊开在桌子上，尝试在它们之间建立新的联系，或者寻找其他研究人员尚未涉足的潜在研究领域。2
Some scientists do their creative work by starting small and building up. When William Shockley wanted to invent, for example, he liked to pull out every publication he could find in the relevant fields. He would then spread the patents and papers across his desk and try to make novel connections among them or to identify potentially fruitful areas that had not yet been investigated by other researchers.2
这种流水线式的创新方式并不适合诺伊斯。与肖克利不同，他从不坐下来强迫自己发明创造才能重新振作。诺伊斯曾对一位朋友说，他的方法是先把科学知识烂熟于心，然后“忘掉它”。他不会苦苦钻研，也不会苦思冥想；他觉得灵感会自然而然地涌现。当他听到毕加索关于艺术创造力的名言——“我不寻找，我发现”——时，诺伊斯说他的发明创造方式也是如此。3
This assembly line inventiveness was not for Noyce. Unlike Shockley, he never sat down and told himself he needed to invent something before he could stand up again. His approach, Noyce once told a friend, was to know the science cold and then “forget about it.” He did not slog or grind his way to ideas; he felt they just came to him. When he heard Picasso’s famous line about artistic creativity—“I do not seek; I find”—Noyce said that he invented in the same way.3
诺伊斯的创造力往往需要一点启发，通常是同事提出的一个实际问题。一旦他被吸引，他不会从小处着手，也不会翻阅期刊或专利文件寻找灵感。相反，他会尝试“思考物理学的基本原理”——尽可能地从宏观的角度出发——并且拒绝去思考某个想法是否符合该领域最新的研究成果。在他看来，科学创新的早期阶段只有两个相关的问题：“为什么行不通？”以及“它会违反哪些基本定律？”如果一个想法在物理上看似可行，那么诺伊斯就认为它值得探索——至于该领域的传统观点，他根本不在乎。4
Noyce’s creativity often required a kick start, usually in the form of a practical question from a colleague. Once his attention was engaged, Noyce did not start small, and he did not turn to journals or patent files for ideas. Instead, he tried to “think about the fundamentals of the physics”—as big a starting point as possible—and he refused to ask himself whether or not an idea ought to work according to the most current research in the field. In his opinion, there were only two relevant questions in the earliest stages of scientific innovation: “Why won’t this work?” and “What fundamental laws will it violate?” If an idea seemed within the realm of physical possibility, then Noyce deemed it worthy of exploration—conventional wisdom on the topic be damned.4
诺伊斯勇于尝试各种方法，这在技术或数学天赋出众的思想家中并不罕见。这意味着他总是提出一些看似不切实际的想法，与其说是严谨科学的产物，不如说是灵光一闪的直觉。这些想法往往最终都以失败告终，但偶尔也会迸发出惊人的灵感。没有人比戈登·摩尔更了解这一点。摩尔是诺伊斯在实验室的副手，他善于筛选他所谓的“鲍勃的众多想法，其中一些确实不错”。摩尔擅长科学研究的艰苦工作，这使他成为诺伊斯理想的创意搭档。5
Noyce’s try-anything approach, by no means unusual among technically or mathematically gifted thinkers, meant he consistently generated ideas that seemed implausible, more flashes of intuition than products of careful science. Often these ideas proved dead ends, but occasionally they were brilliant. No one knew this better than Gordon Moore, Noyce’s second in command at the lab, and a deft screener of what he called “Bob’s many ideas, some of them good.” Moore excelled at the perspiration work of science, which made him an ideal creative complement to Noyce.5
诺伊斯的灵感得益于摩尔的辛勤努力，其中一个最令人难忘的例子发生在1958年。当时，摩尔正在研究IBM晶体管，他正在寻找一种方法，用单一金属来制作晶体管表面P型和N型硅的触点。（触点是连接晶体管和外壳的导线所连接的金属小点。）西电公司曾尝试使用两种不同的金属作为触点——P型硅用铝，N型硅用银——但他们的工艺过于复杂，成品率也极低，因此摩尔希望为仙童公司找到更好的方法。
One of the most memorable examples of Noyce’s inspiration working thanks to Moore’s perspiration came in 1958, when Moore, who was working on the IBM transistor, was searching for a way to use a single metal to make contacts to both the P- and N-type silicon at the surface of the transistor. (Contacts were little dots of metal to which the wires that connected the transistor to its canister were attached.) Western Electric had experimented with using two different metals for contacts—aluminum on the P-type silicon and silver on the N-type—but their process was so complicated, and their yields so dismal, that Moore wanted something better for Fairchild.
他开始和诺伊斯商量，诺伊斯出人意料地建议他尝试用铝来制作P型硅和N型硅的接触点。在20世纪50年代末的半导体行业，这几乎是一个荒谬的建议。人人都知道铝会形成P型杂质，这意味着虽然它是P型硅的理想接触材料，但却是N型硅的糟糕选择。事实上，铝与N型硅的接触往往会在电路中增加一个PN结。晶体管损坏，导致机器报废。在仙童公司所有人中，经验最丰富的诺伊斯本应更清楚这一点。6
He began talking things over with Noyce, who surprised him by suggesting he try using aluminum to make the contacts to both the P- and N-type silicon. In the semiconductor industry of the late 1950s, this was a nearly preposterous suggestion. Everyone knew that aluminum acts as a P-type impurity, which means that while it makes an ideal contact for P-type silicon, it is a terrible choice for contacts to N-type silicon. In fact, aluminum contacts to N-type silicon tended to add another P-N junction to the transistor, rendering it useless. Of all the people at Fairchild, Noyce, the most experienced, should have known better.6
诺伊斯毫不动摇，坚持认为如果摩尔采用同事让·霍尔尼开发的新工艺，那么铝应该也能作为N型硅和P型硅的接触材料。诺伊斯比摩尔更了解半导体表面，而半导体表面正是连接点所在，霍尔尼的工艺看起来很有前景。由于摩尔已经没有其他选择，他决定尝试使用铝作为唯一的接触金属，尽管他回忆说，“当时所有人都认为这行不通”。7
Noyce was unswayed, insisting that if Moore used a new process developed by their colleague Jean Hoerni, then aluminum should work as a contact for N-type silicon as well as P-type. Noyce knew more than Moore about the surface of semiconductors, which was where the connection would be made, and the Hoerni process looked promising. Since Moore was running out of alternatives, he decided to try using aluminum as the only contact metal, even though, he recalls, “all the conventional wisdom said it wouldn’t work.”7
接下来发生的事情完美地诠释了诺伊斯的发明理念。他把自己的想法交给摩尔，自己则转向新的方向。他开始构思一种半导体开关器件和一种扫描器件，这种扫描器件可以“用于许多与电子束器件相同的应用领域，例如显示器、摄像管、光束切换、行波放大器等等”。他为这两项发明都申请了专利。8
What happened next perfectly illustrates Noyce’s approach to invention. He left his idea in Moore’s hands and moved on to something new. He began sketching ideas for a semiconductor switching device and for a scanning device that could “serve in many of the same applications in which an electron beam device is used, such as display, camera tubes, beam switching, amplifiers of the traveling wave variety, etc.” He patented both of these ideas.8
与此同时，摩尔独自埋头钻研铝触点工艺的细节，偶尔会与诺伊斯、让·霍尔尼和谢尔顿·罗伯茨商讨。每当铝触点的一个问题看似解决后，另一个问题又会冒出来。连接到触点的导线会随意脱落。结（P型区和N型区的交界处）开始出现微小的反向漏电。金属与硅分离。在这些困境中，诺伊斯乐于为摩尔提供咨询。他试图设想如何将分离问题转化为优势，并建议摩尔尝试在晶体管背面镀镍来解决结漏电问题。但诺伊斯真正关心的是这个想法本身——为什么不试试铝呢？！——而不是将这个想法付诸实践的细节（用科学术语来说就是“将想法付诸实践”）。9
Meanwhile, Moore sweated out the details of the aluminum contact process, laboring alone and in occasional consultation with Noyce, Jean Hoerni, and Sheldon Roberts. Every time one problem seemed solved with the aluminum contacts, another arose. Wires connected to the contacts fell off indiscriminately. The junctions (the meeting points of the P- and N-type regions) began leaking a tiny bit of current in the wrong direction. The metal pulled away from the silicon. Noyce was a willing consultant to Moore in these travails. He tried to imagine how the pulling-away problem could be turned into an asset, and he suggested that Moore try plating the back of the transistor with nickel to solve the leaking junction problems. But it was the big idea—why not try aluminum?!—not the details of making that idea work (“reducing the idea to practice,” in scientific parlance) that Noyce cared about.9
1958年5月2日，摩尔的努力终于有了回报，他终于可以宣布“纯铝在NP-N型晶体管上各方面都表现出色”。铝触点与镀镍工艺相结合，使得晶体管具有牢固的结，并且触点尺寸足够大，既能最大限度地降低扩展电阻，又不会大到导致结间短路。诺伊斯和摩尔就此工艺申请了联合专利。这是仙童半导体公司早期最重要的专利之一，因为铝从此成为半导体行业触点的标准金属。10
Moore’s work paid off on May 2, 1958, when he could finally report that “pure Al[uminum] works very well on N-P-Ns in all respects.” The combination of aluminum contacts and nickel plating yielded transistors with hard junctions and contacts large enough to minimize spreading resistance but not so large that they shorted across the junctions. Noyce and Moore filed for a joint patent on the process. It was one of the most significant early patents at Fairchild Semiconductor, since aluminum became the standard metal for contacts in the semiconductor industry.10
在这种情况下，如同许多其他情况一样，仙童半导体的研究人员并不完全理解这项创新为何奏效。在学术界或贝尔实验室（一家受监管垄断企业的研究部门）这样的机构中，这个问题至关重要。然而，在仙童半导体，某项技术为何奏效远不如其本身重要。的确如此。对于一家刚刚成立、只有一家重要客户（IBM）的公司来说，纯粹为了科学而科学是一种难以承受的奢侈。因此，仙童半导体早期的研究几乎全部以工艺为导向，研发出可销售的产品是研究实验室的根本目标。诺伊斯和其他几位研究人员在他们的实验记录本中直接引用了IBM的规格说明，他们对性能目标的重视程度与实现这些目标所需的科学研究不相上下。诺伊斯认为“只有真正需要它的东西，才具有技术上的吸引力”，他是领导实验室这项工作的理想人选。11
In this case, as in many others, the Fairchild researchers did not understand precisely why this innovation worked. In an academic environment or at Bell Labs, which was the research arm of a regulated monopoly, this question would have been paramount. At Fairchild Semiconductor, however, why something worked was far less important than the fact that it did. In a newborn company with only one customer of any significance (IBM), pursuing science for its own sake was an ill-afforded luxury. Thus early research at Fairchild Semiconductor was almost all process oriented, with building a saleable product the fundamental goal of the research lab. Noyce and several of the other researchers directly refer to the IBM specifications in their scientific lab books, giving as much weight to performance targets as they did to the science they needed to reach those targets. Noyce, who believed that “the only thing that’s technologically exciting is something that has a need for it,” was the ideal man to oversee this work in the lab.11
在诺伊斯加入仙童半导体公司后的前18个月里，他提交了七项专利，其中最著名的是编号为2,981,877的“半导体器件及引线结构”专利。仙童半导体公司将基于这项专利（诺伊斯于1959年提交）开发的产品称为“单片集成电路”。多年后，晶体管的共同发明人约翰·巴丁称其为“堪比车轮”的发明。集成电路使电子设备比以往任何时候都更小、更快、更便宜。如今使用的每一台现代计算机、微波炉、飞机、交通信号灯、导弹、电话、自动取款机和汽车，其核心部件都直接源自诺伊斯在其器件及引线专利申请中描绘的集成电路。12
Of the seven patents Noyce filed in his first 18 months at Fairchild, the best known is #2,981,877 for “Semiconductor Device-and-Lead Structure.” Fairchild called the product developed on the basis of this patent, which Noyce filed in 1959, a “monolithic integrated circuit.” Years later, John Bardeen, co-inventor of the transistor, would call it an invention “as important as the wheel.” The integrated circuit made electronic devices smaller, faster, and cheaper than ever before. Every modern computer, microwave, airplane, traffic light, missile, telephone, ATM, and automobile in use today has at its center direct descendants of the integrated circuit Noyce sketched in his device-and-lead patent application.12
集成电路是一种完整的电子电路，它构建在一块小到蚂蚁都能搬动的硅芯片上。每个电子电路实际上都是由一系列相互连接的分立元件组成，这些元件各自承担特定的功能——电阻器用于控制电流，二极管用于阻断电流，晶体管用于放大电流。当这些分立元件串联起来时，最终形成的电路可以完成从计算数百万个数字到检测咖啡是否煮好等各种任务。在集成电路出现之前，这些元件需要手工逐个连接，这个过程充满了错误和故障。相比之下，有了集成电路，这些元件可以被印刷出来，并通过可靠的工艺同时连接在一起，最终形成一个完整的电路，其尺寸不会比任何一个单独的元件更大。
An integrated circuit is a complete electronic circuit built on a chip of silicon small enough to be carried off by an ant. Every electronic circuit is actually an interconnected series of discrete components that serve specific functions—resistors to control current, diodes to block it, transistors to amplify it. When these discrete components are strung together, the resulting circuit can do anything from adding millions of numbers to sensing when coffee is done brewing. Before the integrated circuit, these components were attached to each other one at a time, by hand, in a process fraught with errors and failures. With the integrated circuit, by contrast, the components could be printed and connected to each other simultaneously in a reliable process that resulted in a complete circuit no larger than any one of the components taken individually.
20世纪50年代，半导体公司在硅晶圆上并排制造数百个相同的独立元件（例如晶体管）。所有这些公司都采用与仙童半导体公司制造台面晶体管类似的工艺。在集成电路出现之前，生产流程的最后一步是繁琐的流水线作业。数百名身穿统一实验服的女工并排坐着，弓着身子，在放大倍率极高的显微镜前工作。显微镜放大晶圆，女工们用微型镊子将各个元件切割开来，并连接引脚和导线。然后，这些元件经过测试、封装，并运送给客户。客户再将各个元件重新连接起来，构建电路。
In the 1950s, semiconductor firms manufactured hundreds of identical discrete components (transistors, for example) side by side on a silicon wafer. All these companies used a process similar to the one Fairchild Semiconductor employed to build its mesa transistors. Before the integrated circuit, the last step of the production process was a painstaking assembly line affair. Hundreds of women attired in identical lab coats sat side by side hunched over high-powered microscopes that magnified the wafer so that the women could slice apart individual components and attach leads and wires to them using tiny tweezers. The individual components were then tested, packaged, and shipped to customers. The customers would then reconnect various components to each other to configure a circuit.
诺伊斯和电子行业的其他人一样，都知道这种先将元件切割开再重新组装的方法效率低下。理想的流程应该是在制造元件的同时将它们连接起来。然而，知道这一点和真正做到却是两码事。在显微镜下，用于连接分立元件的金属导线虽然比头发丝还细，却像巨大的圆木，足以压扁元件的精细结构。没有人能找到办法，在半导体晶圆表面沉积足够多的金属，既不会造成电路短路，又能将元件连接到封装、电源和其他设备。这就是为什么“女工们”在元件从晶圆上安全切割下来之后，还要手工连接这些金属的原因。
Noyce, along with everyone else in the electronics industry, knew that this method of cutting apart components only to reassemble them later was inefficient. The ideal procedure would be somehow to connect the components to each other at the same time that they were built. Knowing this and doing it were two very different exercises, however. Under a microscope, the metal wires used for interconnecting discrete components, while thinner than a human hair, nonetheless resembled huge logs capable of flattening a component’s delicate architecture. No one could figure out how to deposit this metal on the surface of the semiconductor wafer in amounts small enough not to short out the circuit, but large enough to connect the components to a package, power source, and other devices. This is why the “girls” made the interconnections by hand, after the components had been safely cut from the wafer.
这种繁琐的元件互连方式带来了一个额外的问题：即使元件本身可靠（这一点绝非理所当然），糟糕的互连也可能导致电路失效。每个元件都可以连接到许多其他元件，这意味着随着电路中元件数量的增加，互连的数量呈指数级增长，最终电路板可能看起来像是一群长着细刺的微型刺猬的巢穴。20世纪50年代的电路通常包含数百甚至数千个分立元件，人们预测，对“太空时代电子产品”的需求很快就会将元件数量推高到数十万，互连数量推高到数百万。
This cumbersome method of interconnecting components posed an additional problem: even if the components were themselves reliable, an accomplishment one could never take for granted, bad interconnections could render a circuit useless. Each component could be attached to many others, which meant that as the number of components in a circuit grew, the number of interconnections grew exponentially, until a circuit board could come to resemble a nesting ground for tiny wire-quilled hedgehogs. Circuits in the 1950s regularly consisted of hundreds, or even thousands, of discrete components, and people were predicting that the demand for “space-age electronics” would soon push the numbers of components into the hundreds of thousands, and the numbers of interconnections into the millions.
尽管实验室里的女性都是经过精心挑选的，但要完美焊接数百万个连接点，在物理上是不可能的。这意味着，对于一个足够庞大、互连数量足够多的系统，即使系统中每个组件的可靠性都高于99%，在运行的最初两分钟内，理论上也存在发生故障的可能性。这些互连，通常被简称为“数字的暴政”，是电子行业的阿喀琉斯之踵。如果这个问题无法解决，电子技术的真正进步将会停滞不前。13
Although the women in the lab were chosen for their dexterity, it was physically impossible for anyone to solder millions of connections perfectly. This meant that given a big enough system with enough interconnections, even if every component in a system had a reliability of better than 99 percent, failure was statistically possible within the first two minutes of operation. The interconnections, often shorthanded the “tyranny of numbers,” were the industry’s Achilles’ heel. If the problem could not be resolved, real progress in electronics would grind to a halt.13
军方迫切希望打破数量限制的桎梏。空军资助的一项计划尝试逐个原子地合成一块完整的金属，以实现完整的电路功能。另一项计划则尝试将导线直接集成到分立元件中，然后像儿童玩具的塑料珠子一样将这些元件组装起来。然而，这两项计划都未能实现商业化，制造微型电子管或构建几乎无需或完全无需导线连接元件的完整电路的尝试也同样失败。到20世纪50年代末，至少有20家公司，从小型元件制造商到大型设备制造商，都在致力于寻找解决互连问题的方案。14
The military desperately wanted to end the tyranny of numbers. One air force-sponsored effort tried to synthesize, atom by atom, a single piece of solid metal to achieve a complete circuit function. Another tried to build the wiring right into the discrete components and then snap the components together like a child’s plastic pop-beads. Neither effort proved commercially viable, nor did attempts to build tiny electron tubes or to grow a complete circuit with little or no wiring needed to interconnect the components. By the end of the 1950s, at least 20 companies, ranging from small component makers to huge equipment manufacturers, were on a quest to find a solution to the interconnections problem.14
鲍勃·诺伊斯和仙童半导体公司的其他任何人，最初都没有制定过解决数字束缚的宏伟计划，尽管集成电路最终确实做到了这一点。仙童集成电路的诞生历程充其量也只能说是扑朔迷离。各种发现和想法交织碰撞，最终又回到了原点。诺伊斯参与集成电路研发的进程在中途发生了戏剧性的变化，他被任命为总经理，并离开了实验室，基本上是永远地离开了。而“集成电路发明者”的称号给诺伊斯带来的名声，也让其他一些对这项发明做出贡献的人心生不满。为诺伊斯专利辩护的律师，以及仙童为确保其电路成为行业标准而采取的残酷定价策略，也都与集成电路的“发明”交织在一起。可以肯定的是：集成电路的基础是让·霍尔尼发明的平面工艺——没有平面工艺，就没有集成电路——而这项发明，就像仙童的许多其他发明一样，都是为了解决一个迫在眉睫的实际问题。
Neither Bob Noyce nor anyone else at Fairchild Semiconductor set out with a grand plan to resolve the tyranny of numbers, though the integrated circuit accomplished precisely that. The course of events that led to the Fairchild integrated circuit is murky at best. Discoveries and ideas wind past each other and double back. Noyce’s involvement with the integrated circuit changed dramatically halfway through, when he was named general manager and left his lab bench, essentially forever. And the fame that the moniker “inventor of the integrated circuit” brought to Noyce left some other contributors to the invention resentful. The lawyers who defended Noyce’s patent, and the cutthroat pricing strategies that Fairchild adopted to ensure that their circuit became the industry standard, are also woven into the “invention” of the integrated circuit. This much is certain: the integrated circuit rests on the planar process invented by Jean Hoerni—no planar, no integrated circuit—and that invention, like so many at Fairchild, came in an effort to solve an immediately pressing practical problem.
1958 年末，仙童半导体公司收到了几批因随机发生灾难性故障而退回的台面晶体管。实验室测试很快发现，只需用铅笔轻轻敲击仙童晶体管的侧面，就能使其停止工作。虽然并非所有晶体管都存在这个问题，但可靠性是仙童晶体管最重要的卖点，因此研发部门必须立即解决这个敲击问题。
In late 1958, several of Fairchild’s mesa transistors were returned to the company after random catastrophic failures. Tests in the lab soon revealed that it took nothing more than a sharp tap of a pencil against the side of a Fairchild transistor to make it stop working. The problem did not affect every transistor, but reliability was the single most important selling point of the Fairchild transistor, and so R&D had to solve the tap problem—immediately.
很难想象当时仙童半导体的研究人员所使用的技术和分析工具有多么粗糙。解决晶体管漏电问题意味着：拿起一个晶体管，用铅笔敲击它十次，记录它是否损坏；再用铅笔在桌子上敲击十次，再次记录结果；最后，拆开损坏的晶体管。戈登·摩尔的笔记本上会这样描述诊断结果：“每个晶体管的台面边缘都有一小块污垢（看起来像黄色的金属）。”15
It is hard to appreciate how crude the techniques and analytical tools available to the Fairchild researchers were at this stage. Troubleshooting the tap problem meant taking a transistor, tapping it ten times with a pencil, recording whether it failed, pounding it on the table ten times, again recording results, and then finally opening up the failed transistors, at which point the diagnoses would read something like this from Gordon Moore’s notebook: “They each showed a fleck of crud (it looked like yellow metal) on the top edge of the mesa.”15
最终，一位经验丰富的技术人员发现，在密封罐体的过程中，一小块金属脱落，在罐体内弹跳，最终导致晶体管短路。然而，在他发现这一问题之前，几位实验室的关键员工已经竭尽全力地尝试解决漏电问题。让·霍尔尼再次开始思考一个他最初在肖克利与诺伊斯和摩尔一起探索过的问题：如何在不污染晶体管结的情况下保护它们。显然，这个问题从仙童半导体公司成立之初就一直困扰着霍尔尼；1957年12月，公司成立仅两个月时，霍尔尼就提出“在晶体管表面形成氧化层……可以保护原本暴露的结免受污染，并防止因后续处理、清洁和罐装而导致的可能漏电”。“这种装置。”这在当时是一种不同寻常的想法。大多数人认为，半导体洁净表面上自然生长的氧化物需要被洗掉，以免杂质被困在氧化物和硅之间。而霍尔尼却在思考，氧化物是否能够保护表面——即使是像金属碎片这样巨大而危险的杂质也能抵御。在霍尔尼写下这篇日记大约六个月后，几位仙童半导体的研究人员参加了一个会议，会上他们得知贝尔实验室的一个研究小组已经证明，氧化层确实可以稳定半导体的表面。16
Eventually a skilled technician determined that during the process of sealing the cans, a tiny piece of metal was flaking off, bouncing about within the can, and eventually shorting out the transistor. Before he made this discovery, however, a few key lab employees launched a pull-everything-out-of-your-hats effort to solve the tap problem. Jean Hoerni began once again considering a subject that he had first begun to explore with Noyce and Moore at Shockley: how to protect a transistor’s junctions without contaminating them. The question had clearly preoccupied Hoerni since the very earliest days of Fairchild Semiconductor; in December 1957, when the company was scarcely two months old, Hoerni had proposed that “the building up of an oxide layer … on the surface of the transistor … will protect the otherwise exposed junctions from contamination and possible electrical leakage due to subsequent handling, cleaning, [and] canning of the device.” This was unusual thinking for the time. Most people thought that the oxides that grew naturally on the clean surface of a semiconductor needed to be washed away so they would not trap impurities between the oxide and the silicon. Hoerni instead wondered if the oxide might protect the surface—even from impurities as gargantuan and menacing as a rogue sliver of metal. About six months after Hoerni’s journal entry, several Fairchild researchers attended a conference where they learned that a group at Bell Labs had demonstrated that an oxide layer indeed could stabilize the surface of the semiconductor.16
在霍尔尼1957年12月的日记末尾，诺伊斯写道“已阅读并理解”，并加上了日期和签名。科学家们经常以这种方式请同行“见证”他们最重要的工作。将来，这份见证签名可以帮助记录研究人员首次提出想法的确切时间——这对于任何专利申请都至关重要。但是，尽管诺伊斯理解霍尔尼的想法，并且几乎肯定知道贝尔实验室关于氧化物的研究成果，但他和实验室里的其他人都没有特别关注霍尔尼关于氧化层的想法。相反，实验室团队专注于IBM晶体管以及随后出现的其他晶体管和二极管。解决那些能够直接带来更多销量、制造能够盈利的产品的问题，远比将仙童晶体管工艺优化到理想水平重要得多，而氧化层的目的正是如此。如果工艺没有出现严重的缺陷，仙童公司的人就认为没有必要去改进它。
At the end of Hoerni’s December 1957 entry, Noyce wrote “read and understood,” added the date, and signed his name. Scientists regularly asked their peers to “witness” their most important work in this way. In the future, the witnessed signature could help to document when precisely a researcher had first noted his ideas—an essential element for any patent application. But although Noyce understood Hoerni’s ideas and almost certainly knew of the Bell Labs oxide findings, neither he nor anyone else in the lab paid any special attention to Hoerni’s thoughts on oxide layers. Instead, the lab team focused on the IBM transistor and the other transistors and diodes that followed it. Solving the problems that led directly to more sales and building products that would make money was far more important than optimizing the Fairchild transistor process to an ideal level, which is what the oxide layer aimed to do. If it weren’t terribly broke, the Fairchild men saw no reason to fix it.
然而，晶体管的敲击问题表明，仙童半导体的工艺存在缺陷，或者至少，它生产的晶体管容易损坏。1959年1月的三个星期里，霍尼满脑子想的都是氧化层。想象一下，一块蛋糕竟然能自己长出糖霜。蛋糕的表面类似于半导体的表面；糖霜则类似于氧化层。贝尔实验室已经证明，氧化糖霜可以保护半导体表面。现在，霍尼想要开发一种方法，让糖霜生长得完全均匀，然后在糖霜和蛋糕之间进行操作——就在半导体至关重要的表面，也就是诺伊斯自博士论文研究以来一直关注的区域。霍尼需要要么掀起糖霜，要么钻穿它，才能到达蛋糕的表面。
The tap problem, however, made it apparent that the Fairchild process was broken, or at least, that it was producing breakable transistors. For three weeks in January 1959, Hoerni thought about nothing but oxide layers. Imagine a cake that somehow grows its own icing. The surface of the cake is analogous to the surface of the semiconductor; the icing is similar to the oxide layer. Bell Labs had shown that the oxide icing would protect the surface. Now Hoerni wanted to develop a way to grow a perfectly consistent icing and then work between it and the cake—right at the all-important surface of the semiconductor, the same area that had interested Noyce ever since his dissertation research. Hoerni needed either to lift up the icing or drill through it to get down to the surface of the cake.
一天早晨，霍尔尼在淋浴时突然“顿悟”，意识到他应该能够使用掩模在整个晶圆上形成一层氧化层，然后在氧化层中精确刻蚀出一个“窗口”，杂质可以通过这个窗口扩散形成基区。在第一次扩散的同时，可以在硅表面生长另一层氧化层。之后再刻蚀一个窗口，进行第二次扩散（这次是为了形成发射极结），然后再生长一层新的氧化层。1959年1月14日，霍尔尼撰写了一份两页的专利公开文件，详细描述了这一工艺。一周后，他又撰写了一份关于该工艺的公开文件。相关程序。诺伊斯目睹了第二次披露，几乎可以肯定他也目睹了第一次披露。17
After what he described as an “epiphany” in the shower one morning, Hoerni realized that he ought to be able to use a mask to create an oxide layer over the entire wafer and then engrave a precisely located “window” in the oxide through which impurities could be diffused to form the base. At the same time as this first diffusion, another layer of oxide could be grown on the surface of the silicon. Then another window, another diffusion (this time to form the emitter junction), and another new layer of oxide. On January 14, 1959, Hoerni wrote out a two-page patent disclosure of this process. The next week he wrote another disclosure on a closely related process. Noyce witnessed this second disclosure and almost assuredly saw the first, as well.17
在1959年1月那几周的特殊时期，诺伊斯开始构思集成电路，他将其归类为“隔离多个器件的方法”。他写道：“在许多应用中，人们希望在一块硅片上制造多个器件，以便在制造过程中实现器件间的互连，从而减小尺寸、重量等，并降低每个有源元件的成本。”诺伊斯设想用二极管制造一个加法器电路，并考虑使用PN结来隔离各个元件，以避免它们相互干扰彼此的电特性。（斯普拉格实验室的库尔特·莱霍维克的工作使诺伊斯了解到使用PN结隔离器件的可能性。）诺伊斯将这种电路的“重要特征”包括“使用二氧化硅层作为绝缘层，将接触条与下方的硅隔离”以及“用氧化层保护表面的PN结”。诺伊斯还提到“杂质通过氧化物中的孔洞扩散”。18
During these same remarkable weeks of January 1959, Noyce began sketching out his ideas about the integrated circuit, which he classed under the heading, “Methods of Isolating Multiple Devices.” He wrote, “In many applications now it would be desirable to make multiple devices on a single piece of silicon in order to be able to make interconnections between devices as part of the manufacturing process, and thus reduce size, weight, etc., as well as cost per active element.” Noyce imagined making an adder circuit from diodes and included thoughts on using P-N junctions to isolate components from each other so they would not interfere with one another’s electrical characteristics. (The work of Kurt Lehovec at Sprague had introduced Noyce to the possibility of using junctions to isolate devices.) Noyce included among the “important features” of such a circuit “use of the SiO2 [silicon dioxide] layer as an insulator to isolate contact strips from the underlying silicon” and “protection of junction at the surface with an oxide layer.” Noyce also refers to “impurities diffused through the holes in the oxide.”18
因此，诺伊斯关于集成电路的思考与霍尔尼的氧化物工艺有着直接且密不可分的联系。本质上，诺伊斯设想霍尔尼的工艺理论上可以将相对较大块的金属滴到半导体晶圆表面，正好落在蚀刻在晶圆表面的微小孔洞上。如果操作得当，适量的金属就能精准地接触到硅片上的特定位置，而任何恰好“悬垂”在孔洞上方的金属都会静静地停留在晶圆表面，不会影响电路的其他部分。19
Noyce’s thoughts on the integrated circuit are thus directly and inextricably linked to Hoerni’s oxide work. In essence, Noyce was imagining that Hoerni’s process would make it theoretically possible to drop a relatively large bit of metal onto the surface of the semiconductor wafer, on top of the tiny holes etched in the icing. If done properly, precisely the right amount of metal would touch the silicon in precisely the right place, and any of the metal that happened to “overhang” the hole would benignly sit on top of the icing, unable to affect the rest of the circuit.19
“我完全不记得有过‘砰！就是它了！’的灵光一闪，”诺伊斯后来谈到他的想法时说道。相反，他构思集成电路的过程是一个迭代的过程，他是这样描述的：“（我当时想，）如果我们能做到这个，我们就能做到那个。如果我们能做到那个，我们就能做到这个。（这是一个）逻辑顺序。如果遇到瓶颈，我就退后一步，然后在概念上找到一条通往终点的路径。（一旦找到这条路径），你就可以回头开始改进，一步一步地思考，最终到达目的地。当你看到山顶的轮廓时，你就知道自己可以到达那里了。”20
“I don’t have any recollection of a ‘Boom! There it is!’ light bulb going off,” Noyce later said of his ideas. Instead, he conceived of the integrated circuit in an iterative method he described thus: “[I thought,] let’s see, if we could do this, we can do that. If we can do that, then we can do this. [It was] a logical sequence. If I hit a wall, I’d back up and then find a path, conceptually, all the way through to the end. [Once you have that path], you can come back and start refining, thinking in little steps that will take you there. Once you get to the point that you can see the top of the mountain, then you know you can get there.”20
诺伊斯将他的想法记在实验笔记后，却什么也没做。他没有给任何人看过这份笔记——甚至没有找人见证——不仅没有告诉霍尔尼（他的研究很大程度上借鉴了霍尔尼的理念），也没有告诉实验室里的任何其他同事。二十五年后，诺伊斯这样解释他当时的无所作为：“我们当时还是一家新公司……连生存都成问题。这意味着要尽快把晶体管推向市场。集成电路看起来很有意思，也许将来能赚点钱，但那并不是一个……”“你有很多时间。” 这句话有力地解释了诺伊斯为何没有敦促实验室研究他的想法，但却无法解释他为何连提都没提一下。或许诺伊斯把自己的想法当作某种理论上的涂鸦——想想看，当他在实验记录本上写下霍尔尼的工艺时，它仅仅是一个有趣的想法。当时没有任何证据表明它真的可行。而如果它真的行不通，诺伊斯的集成电路构想也就失去了意义。21
After noting his ideas in his lab notebook, Noyce did … nothing. He showed the entry to no one—he did not even have it witnessed—and failed to mention it not only to Hoerni, on whose ideas it leaned so heavily, but also to any other co-worker in the lab. Twenty-five years later, Noyce explained his inaction thus: “We were still a brand new company … worried about basic survival. That meant getting transistors out the door. The integrated circuit seemed interesting, it was something that might make you some money somewhere down the road, but that was not a period when you had a lot of time for it.” This comment offers a compelling reason for why Noyce did not push the lab to work on his ideas, but it does not offer any insight into why he did not at least mention their existence. Perhaps Noyce considered his entry as some form of theoretical doodling—recall that when he made his lab book entry, Hoerni’s process was simply an intriguing idea. There had been no evidence that it would actually work. And if it had not worked, Noyce’s integrated circuit ideas would have been moot.21
创始团队的几位成员对诺伊斯的沉默提出了他们自己颇具争议的解释：这个想法太过显而易见，无需赘述。当然，如果氧化层能够稳定半导体表面，那么你肯定会想方设法在氧化层上互连各个元件。这个想法简直是显而易见的。22
Several members of the founding group offer their own provocative explanation for Noyce’s silence: the idea was too obvious to bother mentioning. Of course, you would want to try to interconnect components over the oxide layer if the oxide layer stabilized the surface of a semiconductor. The idea was positively self-evident.22
诺伊斯的笔记记录了实验室里几乎所有人如果认真思考都会想到的内容，但这丝毫不会降低他工作的价值。任何人在欣赏现代艺术作品时，都曾私下想过：“我也能做到。”或许如此，但关键在于，我们并没有做到，而艺术家做到了。
That Noyce’s notebook entry served to codify what virtually everyone in the lab would have said had they thought about it does not diminish the importance of his work. Anyone walking through a display of modern art has privately thought, “I could have done that.” Perhaps, but the relevant point is that we did not. The artist did.
就在诺伊斯在集成电路笔记本上写下笔记六周后，通过《华尔街日报》找到的总经理埃德·鲍德温宣布，他将离职组建自己的半导体公司，该公司将作为一家大型企业瑞姆制造公司的全资子公司运营。鲍德温可能原本没有计划在三月份离开，但理查德·霍奇森得知鲍德温与瑞姆的洽谈后，立即飞往山景城，并以一句名言将其解雇：“祝你好运——祝你倒霉透顶。”鲍德温并非独自离开。他带走了八名仙童半导体公司的高级运营人员，其中包括五名关键工程师，以及一份详细说明如何制造仙童公司台面晶体管的工艺手册。鲍德温离职后不久，便会见了威廉·肖克利的一名员工，该员工希望了解更多关于仙童半导体公司运营情况及其与肖克利实验室之间可能存在的联系的信息。23
JUST SIX WEEKS AFTER Noyce made his integrated circuit notebook entry, Ed Baldwin, the general manager found through the Wall Street Journal, announced that he was decamping to form his own semiconductor operation, which would operate as a wholly owned subsidiary of a larger firm, Rheem Manufacturing. Baldwin had probably not planned to leave in March, but Richard Hodgson, who had gotten word of Baldwin’s talks with Rheem, flew out to Mountain View and summarily fired him with the immortal words, “I wish you lots of luck—all of it bad.” Baldwin did not leave alone. He took with him eight senior Fairchild operations people, including five key engineers, and a process manual detailing how to build Fairchild’s mesa transistors. Shortly after his departure, Baldwin met with an employee of William Shockley who wanted to gather more details on Fairchild Semiconductor’s operations and their possible link to Shockley Labs.23
仙童半导体公司的创始人们，感同身受地体会到自己当初对待肖克利的方式是多么痛苦，他们意识到鲍德温的离开对这家成立不到两年的公司来说简直是“一场灾难”。鲍德温实际上扮演着公司首席执行官的角色，负责协调技术、制造和业务运营，并担任公司与母公司之间的官方联络人——在仙童半导体公司当时还在从《相机与仪器》杂志领取每月“津贴”的时期，这是一个极其重要的角色。24
The Fairchild Semiconductor founders, who felt the sting of having done unto them what they had done unto Shockley, recognized that Baldwin’s departure was “a disaster” for the company, not yet two years old. Baldwin had functioned as the firm’s de facto CEO, coordinating technical, manufacturing, and business operations, and serving as the official emissary to the parent company—an exquisitely important role at a time when Semiconductor was still receiving its monthly “allowance” from Camera and Instrument.24
诺伊斯显然是接替鲍德温的最佳人选。“天哪，他在业内鹤立鸡群，”汤姆·贝回忆道。“由此可见，当时，我们已经见过他们中的大多数人了。”如果诺伊斯担任总经理，摩尔完全可以胜任研发管理，贝伊掌控着市场营销，而克莱纳和布兰克则精通生产制造。此外，正如贝伊所说，即使在鲍德温还在公司的时候，“每个人都仍然会向鲍勃汇报工作”。诺伊斯不仅比任何人都更了解仙童公司内部的运作，而且他还精通公司政治，并且拥有其他创始人所缺乏的（甚至有些创始人对此感到十分反感）与非技术人员打交道的耐心。这项技能在与约翰·卡特和其他相机与仪器部门的高管合作时尤为重要。25
Noyce was the obvious choice to replace Baldwin. “God, he was head and shoulders above anybody in the business,” recalls Tom Bay. “By this time, we’d met most of them.” If Noyce were general manager, Moore could more than ably manage R&D, Bay had marketing under control, and Kleiner and Blank knew manufacturing. Furthermore, as Bay put it, “everybody had still reported what they did to Bob” even when Baldwin had been around. Noyce not only knew more than anyone else about what was happening at Fairchild, but he also had a flair for corporate politics and a patience for dealing with nontechnical people that the other founders lacked (and that a few founders found downright distasteful). This skill would be particularly important in working with John Carter and the other Camera and Instrument executives.25
和一年前一样，诺伊斯再次拒绝了管理岗位。他既没有制造业经验，也没有财务经验，甚至连资产负债表和损益表这类最基本的商业工具都不懂，而且他也不想离开实验室——在那里他灵感迸发，信心满满。自从在肖克利实验室工作以来，他的管理方式就没变过：他仍然倾向于提出建议（“你为什么不试试？”或“你有没有考虑过？”），而不是下达命令；他给人的感觉也和以前一样，与其说是管理其他人，不如说是顺便做些行政工作。他主持每周的实验室例会，但表面上看，这些会议几乎是自动进行的。他审阅六个研究小组每月提交的进展报告，并决定哪些创新足够新颖，且具有足够的潜在利润，值得花费1500美元的律师费和申请专利所需的时间。但他做这一切都与下属进行了非常密切的协商，以至于下属们觉得他们是在与他一起工作，而不是为他工作。26
As he had a year before, Noyce again resisted the move into management. He had no manufacturing experience, no financial experience, no sense of even rudimentary business tools such as balance sheets and profit-and-loss statements, and no desire to leave the lab, where he was on an inventive roll and “felt sure of [him]self.” He had not changed his managerial approach since his days at Shockley: he still displayed the same tendency to make suggestions (“why don’t you try” or “have you considered”) rather than to issue commands, and he offered the same impression that he was not really in charge of the other men so much as simply happening to do a bit of administrative work in addition to his bench work. He led the weekly lab meeting, but to all outward appearances, the meetings ran themselves. He reviewed monthly progress reports from each of the half dozen research groups and determined which innovations were sufficiently novel and potentially lucrative enough to merit the $1,500 in attorney’s fees and hours of work necessary to patent them. But he did all of this in such close consultation with his subordinates that they felt they worked with him, not for him.26
在实验室里，诺伊斯相信人们会履行承诺，他很少系统地跟进确认承诺的工作是否真的完成。“如果你在考察一个长期研究项目，通常来说，最能评估研究成果的是实际执行研究的人，而不是监督研究的人，”他说。“监督研究的人更依赖于他们判断他人的能力，而不是他们判断研究成果的能力。”诺伊斯相信，大多数人只要拥有足够的自由，都会选择做正确的事。他的父亲从小就灌输给他这种观念，而大学期间在公平保险公司（Equitable Insurance）被“流放”一个学期的经历更是强化了这种信念。他当时每天都埋头研究精算表，但他注意到，购买最多人寿保险的人往往比精算数据预测的寿命更短。诺伊斯将此解释为，人们似乎凭直觉就知道该做什么，应该让他们自己去做。27
In the lab, Noyce had trusted people to fulfill their commitments, and he rarely followed up in a systematic way to confirm that promised work was actually delivered. “If you’re looking at a long-term research program, in general, the people that are doing it [the research] are in the best position to evaluate it, not the people that are supervising it,” he said. “The people that are supervising it are more dependent on their ability to judge people than they are dependent on their ability to judge the work that is going on.” Noyce believed that most people, given enough freedom, will choose to do the right thing. This message had been etched in his mind by his father and was further reinforced during his semester’s banishment at the Equitable insurance company while in college. He had spent his days absorbed in actuarial tables, but he thought he noticed that the people who bought the most life insurance tended to die younger than the actuarial data predicted they should have. Noyce interpreted this to mean that somehow people just instinctively knew the right things to do and should be left alone to do them.27
诺伊斯一生都秉持着对同胞的信任，这使他给予员工充分的自主权。这种做法在仙童实验室尤其奏效，因为向他汇报工作的人——仙童的其他创始人以及几位精挑细选的新员工——既不需要也不想被告知具体该做什么或怎么做。事实上，正如让·霍尔尼所说，诺伊斯“是一位非常优秀的技术人员管理者”，正是因为他“随和”且“不干涉”研究人员的工作。在诺伊斯这种放任自流的实验室管理下，创造性的自由和协作蓬勃发展，而这对于这家年轻公司的技术成功至关重要。28
Such faith in his fellow man, which he maintained throughout his life, led Noyce to give his employees free rein. This approach worked particularly well in the Fairchild lab because the people reporting to him—the other Fairchild founders and a few choice newly hired employees—neither needed nor wanted to be told exactly what to do or how to do it. Indeed, Noyce was “a very good supervisor of technical people,” according to Jean Hoerni, precisely because he was “casual” and “didn’t interfere” with his researchers’ work. Creative freedom and collaboration, which proved crucial to the young company’s technical success, blossomed under Noyce’s laissez-faire management of the lab.28
然而，即便在管理实验室期间，诺伊斯也始终认为自己是一名科学家，而非商人。“我可以指导工作，确保各项工作得到妥善安排，所以从科学家到研发主管的转变并没有给我带来太大的个人创伤。但从领导一个研究项目到领导一个完整的商业项目，这转变却相当痛苦。”他补充道，“如果可以这么说的话，我当时非常害怕自己能力不足，才接受了管理职位”——事实上，这种恐惧如此强烈，以至于他只同意担任总经理六个月的试用期，之后就打算回到实验室。29
Even when he was managing the lab, however, Noyce thought of himself as a scientist, not a businessman. “I could direct the work and see that it was channeled properly, so there wasn’t any great personal trauma involved in that switch [from scientist to head of R&D]. The switch from directing a research program into directing a complete commercial program, however, was quite a traumatic one.” He added, “It was with a great deal of fear of inadequacy, if I can put it that way, that I got into [an] administrative role”—so much fear, in fact, that he would agree only to a six-month trial run as general manager, after which he planned to return to the lab.29
在这一试运营期间，诺伊斯监督推出了七款新型晶体管，在圣罗莎新建了一座二极管工厂，使公司的生产面积扩大了五倍，员工人数也增长了十倍，到1959年底达到1260人。仅研发部门的规模就相当于一年前整个公司的规模。他还批准提起两起诉讼：一起指控瑞姆窃取商业机密；另一起针对鲍德温个人，指控其“违反保密协议”。这两起诉讼均以庭外和解告终。30
During this trial period, Noyce oversaw the introduction of seven new transistors, the building of a new diode plant in Santa Rosa that quintupled the company’s manufacturing space, and a ten-fold increase in the size of the employee base, which reached 1,260 at the end of 1959. The R&D operation alone was now as big as the entire company had been only a year before. He also approved the filing of two lawsuits: one charged Rheem with theft of trade secrets; the other, against Baldwin personally, alleged a “breach of confidential relationship.” Both suits were settled out of court.30
除了负责公司内部的半导体事务外，诺伊斯还担任公司的对外代表。他曾与来此参加会议的日本电子公司代表会面，并在旧金山和纽约接受金融界人士的采访和演讲。他还参加了在赛奥塞特举行的几次会议，并声称“在重大事件发生前参与其中”对“满足我的虚荣心”很有帮助。31
Beyond his work on internal Semiconductor matters, Noyce served as the company’s public face. He met with representatives from Japanese electronics firms in town for a conference. He granted interviews and made presentations to the financial community in San Francisco and in New York. He attended several meetings in Syosset and declared “being in on major actions before they were taken” to be “good for my ego.”31
作为总经理，诺伊斯尽可能密切地关注着实验室的各项活动。研发部门的让·霍尔尼在1959年1月公开专利后的六周里，一直致力于将他关于氧化层的奇思妙想转化为硅基器件的现实。他请与他共用一间办公室的杰伊·拉斯特帮忙制作额外的掩模，以便在晶体管上涂覆一层二氧化硅。3月12日，也就是鲍德温离开一周后，霍尔尼邀请了几个人来观看他关于氧化层的精彩演示。他的实验台上放着一个用氧化层覆盖、尚未装入封装盒的晶体管。在显微镜下，这个晶体管……它与该团队之前制造的台面器件截然不同。霍尔尼的晶体管没有凸起的表面；它是扁平的，所有电活性区域都终止于同一平面上。它的形状像一个靶心，外环的一部分略微向外拉出，为导线留出空间——几乎像一滴泪珠。32
As general manager, Noyce tried to track the activities in the lab as closely as he could. Back in R&D, Jean Hoerni had spent the six weeks after his January 1959 patent disclosures attempting to translate his intriguing ideas about oxide layers into silicon reality. He asked Jay Last, with whom he shared an office, to build the extra masks he needed to coat transistors with a layer of silicon dioxide. On March 12, one week after Baldwin left, Hoerni invited several people to join him for a dramatic demonstration of his oxide ideas. On his lab table lay a transistor made with the oxide icing and not yet in its canister. Under a microscope, this transistor looked dramatically different from the mesa devices the group had been building. There were no elevated surfaces in Hoerni’s transistor; it was flat, with all the electrically active regions terminating in the same plane. Its shape resembled a bull’s-eye with one part of the outer ring pulled out a bit to make room for a wire—almost like a teardrop.32
霍尔尼环视着聚集在一起的众人，直接朝他、拉斯特和他们的技术人员花了数周时间打造的装置吐了口唾沫。简直是异端邪说！晶体管通常要在尽可能干净的房间里用镊子小心操作。然而，这台晶体管经受住了这番“洗礼”，毫发无损，连接的示波器证实了这一点。这真是不可思议。任何能够经受住唾液直接接触的装置，无疑也能承受铅笔轻轻敲击其外壳。众人议论纷纷，语气却出奇地平静：这台晶体管是侥幸，还是我们可以批量生产一百万台？因为如果我们能生产一百万台，就能彻底绕过这个敲击问题——而鲍德温被盗的工艺手册将会详细介绍如何制造一款即将过时的产品。
Eying the assembled group, Hoerni spat directly on the device he, Last, and their technicians had spent weeks building. Heresy! Transistors were handled with tweezers in rooms as clean as possible. This transistor, however, weathered its nasty baptism with no ill effects, as an attached oscilloscope confirmed. This was remarkable. Any device hardy enough to survive saliva directly on its surface could undoubtedly withstand a pencil tap on its canister. The buzz that arose from the assembled group was surprisingly matter of fact: is this transistor a fluke, or can we make a million of them? Because if we can make a million, then we can bypass this tap problem completely—and Baldwin’s stolen process manual will describe how to build a soon-to-be-obsolete product.
诺伊斯对此印象深刻，他将霍尔尼的氧化层比作“在二氧化硅茧内制造晶体管，使其永不被污染。这就像在丛林里搭建手术室。你把病人放在塑料袋里，在袋子里进行手术，这样就不会有丛林里的苍蝇落在伤口上。”新任研发主管戈登·摩尔则更为谨慎。一种带有另一层掩膜的新工艺——实施起来并不容易。良率肯定会低于台面器件。诺伊斯赞赏这种创新，而摩尔则预见到了其中的艰辛。33
A mightily impressed Noyce likened Hoerni’s oxide layer to “building a transistor inside a cocoon of silicon dioxide so that it never gets contaminated. It’s like setting up your jungle operating room. You put the patient inside a plastic bag and you operate inside of that, and you don’t have all the flies of the jungle sitting on the wound.” Gordon Moore, the new head of R&D, was more wary. A new process with another masking layer—that would not be easy to implement. Yields would definitely be lower than for mesa devices. Once again, where Noyce admired the inspiration, Moore foresaw the perspiration.33
霍尔尼的“丛林晶体管”显然值得申请专利。事实上，它值得两项专利：一项是针对其靶心状结构，另一项是针对制造工艺。它还需要一个名字。仙童相机仪器公司副总裁理查德·霍奇森立即赶到山景城查看该设备，并建议将这种近乎扁平的晶体管及其制造工艺命名为“平面晶体管”。他想为这个名称申请版权，但诺伊斯不同意。他解释说，如果业界普遍采用“平面晶体管”作为通用描述词，而仙童公司则可以在广告中强调该工艺是他们发明的，这样仙童公司就能获得更大的广告价值。霍奇森最终采纳了诺伊斯的意见。34
Hoerni’s jungle transistor clearly merited a patent. Two, in fact: one for the bullseye structure and one for the process to build it. It also needed a name. Fairchild Camera and Instrument vice president Richard Hodgson, who immediately came to Mountain View to see the device, suggested calling the nearly flat transistor and the process that produced it “planar.” He wanted to copyright the name, but Noyce disagreed, explaining that he thought Fairchild would get more advertising value if the industry adopted “planar” as a generic descriptor while Fairchild advertising stressed that the process was invented there. Hodgson deferred to Noyce’s opinion.34
接下来发生的事情尚不清楚。是什么促使诺伊斯在1959年3月重新翻出了他尘封已久的集成电路笔记？导火索可能是德州仪器公司在3月中旬宣布的“固态电路”突破性进展，该技术声称将整个电路集成在单个半导体芯片上——这正是诺伊斯在笔记中所描述的内容。
What happened next is unclear. Something motivated Noyce to dust off his integrated circuit notebook entry in March 1959. The precipitating event may have been Texas Instrument’s announcement, in mid-March, of a breakthrough in “Solid Circuits,” which purported to be an entire circuit on a single semiconductor chip—precisely what Noyce had described in his notebook entry.
1958年秋，一位名叫杰克·基尔比（Jack Kilby）的德州仪器公司年轻研究员着手制造集成电路。到1959年初，他已在一块锗基板上制造出了一个完整的电路。基尔比的电路设计极其精细。该装置由手工组装而成，各元件之间以金线连接。这些金线使得该装置无法批量生产，基尔比对此心知肚明，但他无疑发明了一种集成电路。专利申请提交后，德州仪器公司立即自豪地宣布了这项发明。
In the fall of 1958, a young Texas Instruments researcher named Jack Kilby set out to build an integrated circuit. By early 1959, he had built a complete circuit on a single germanium substrate. Kilby’s circuit was meticulously hand assembled with a network of gold wires connecting the components to each other. The wires precluded the device from being manufacturable in any quantity, a fact of which Kilby was well aware, but his was undoubtedly an integrated circuit of sorts. As soon as the patent work was filed, Texas Instruments proudly announced its invention.
不难想象，这一消息激起了诺伊斯的竞争怒火。他认为德州仪器的电路设计笨重——他用“不美观”来形容，这在崇尚简洁优雅解决方案的技术界，无疑是相当严厉的批评。相比之下，诺伊斯的笔记则极具“美感”。它无需导线即可连接芯片上的元件；省去了用镊子手工连接芯片的大部分工作；并且充分利用了平面工艺——半导体史上最精妙的突破之一。戈登·摩尔回忆说，诺伊斯曾专门召集了一次会议，讨论仙童公司对德州仪器电路的回应，正是在这次会议上，诺伊斯提出了他关于集成电路的想法。然而，其他人都记不起这次会议，也没有任何会议记录留存下来。35
It is not hard to imagine this announcement triggering Noyce’s competitive ire. He thought the Texas Instruments circuit was cumbersome—“not aesthetic” was his description, a fairly harsh criticism in a technical world that values elegant, clean solutions to messy problems. Noyce’s notebook entry, by contrast, was highly “aesthetic.” It required no wires to interconnect components on the chip; it eliminated much of the tweezers’ work of connecting chips to each other by hand; and it took advantage of the planar process, one of the most elegant breakthroughs in semiconductor history. Gordon Moore remembers that Noyce called a meeting specifically to discuss the Fairchild response to the Texas Instruments circuit, and that it was during this meting that Noyce introduced his ideas about integrated circuits. No one else remembers the meeting, however, and no record of it survives.35
另一种说法是，在霍尔尼演示平面工艺后不久，仙童公司的专利律师要求诺伊斯和几位关键技术人员尽可能广泛地思考该工艺的应用前景，以便撰写的专利能够涵盖尽可能多的潜在应用。这似乎是诺伊斯在三月份重拾集成电路想法的最合理解释。优秀的专利律师经常会向客户提出这类要求，而诺伊斯的集成电路研究几乎紧随平面工艺演示成功之后，时间点也合情合理。此外，如果律师的要求是诺伊斯重拾集成电路的动机，那么这也为诺伊斯的集成电路最终取得如此成功提供了一个关键解释。诺伊斯并非试图解决一个抽象的问题，而是在完成一项具体的任务：找到一种实用且有利可图的平面工艺应用方式。在发明创造的讨论中，动机往往被低估——技术创新的意外后果通常是研究人员最感兴趣的——但在集成电路的案例中，动机却至关重要。
A second version of events holds that shortly after Hoerni demonstrated the planar process, Fairchild’s patent attorney asked Noyce and a few key technical men to think as broadly as possible about how the process could be used, so that the patent could be written to cover the greatest number of potential applications. This seems the most likely explanation for Noyce’s having resurrected his integrated circuit ideas in March. Good patent attorneys often make these sorts of requests of their clients, and the timing, with Noyce’s integrated circuit work coming to light almost immediately on the heels of the successful planar demonstration, makes sense. Moreover, if the attorney’s request were the motivation, it would offer a key explanation for why Noyce’s version of the integrated circuit ultimately proved so successful. Noyce was not trying to solve an abstract problem. He was completing a specific task: determine a practical and profitable way to use the planar process. Motivation is often underplayed in discussions of invention—the unintended consequences of technological innovation are often of most interest to researchers—but in the case of the integrated circuit, motivation mattered.
德州仪器的基尔比当时问的是“如何制造集成电路？”，而诺伊斯则思考的是“如何利用这种平面工艺？”（诺伊斯说：“我当时试图解决一个生产问题，而不是制造集成电路。”）因此，诺伊斯从一开始就专注于生产；有了这样的思路，他很难认真考虑任何无法大规模生产的器件。而且，从构思之初，他就考虑过如何销售这款器件；他的笔记本中甚至记录了“每个有源元件的成本”。诺伊斯一生都认为集成电路本质上是一项工艺突破，而非科学成就。他的孩子们喜欢拿他最著名的发明开玩笑——他什么时候才能因此获得诺贝尔奖？他的回答总是千篇一律，总是带着他对抽象理论的轻蔑，而且总是面带微笑：“诺贝尔奖不颁给工程或实际工作。”36
Whereas Kilby at Texas Instruments asked “how can I build an integrated circuit?” Noyce wondered “how can this planar process be used?” (Noyce: “I was trying to solve a production problem. I wasn’t trying to make an integrated circuit.”) Noyce was thus focused on production from the beginning; with this intellectual launch pad, it would have been difficult for him to consider seriously any device that could not have been mass produced. He also thought about selling the device from the moment he conceived of it; his notebook entry considers “cost per active element.” For his entire life, Noyce saw the integrated circuit as essentially a process breakthrough, not a scientific achievement. His children loved to tease him about his most famous invention—when would he get his Nobel Prize for it? His answer was always the same, always tinged with his disdain for abstract theory, and invariably delivered with a smile: “They don’t give Nobel Prizes for engineering or real work.”36
诺伊斯于1959年7月30日提交了他的集成电路专利申请。根据专利描述，该装置的“主要目的”是“提供改进的器件和引线结构，以便与各个半导体区域进行电连接；使单元电路结构比以往更加紧凑，更容易制造成小尺寸；以及便于将众多半导体器件集成到单个材料中。”该专利申请还包含一张图，其中包含了现代复杂微芯片的所有基本元件。诺伊斯后来表示，这项发明的灵感并非源于需要，而是源于懒惰，他构思集成电路仅仅是因为他“不想再经历那些（手工互连元件的）工作了”。37
Noyce filed his integrated circuit patent on July 30, 1959. The “principal objects” of the device, according to the patent, were “to provide improved device-and-lead structures for making electrical connections to the various semiconductor regions; to make unitary circuit structures more compact and more easily fabricated in small sizes than has heretofore been feasible; and to facilitate the inclusion of numerous semiconductor devices within a single body of material.” The patent application also included a figure that contained within it all the basic elements of the modern complex microchips. Noyce later said that the mother of this particular invention was not necessity, but laziness, that he conceived of the integrated circuit simply because he did not “want to go through all that work [of interconnecting components by hand].”37
一项发明几乎同时出现在两个不同的地方并不罕见，基尔比和诺伊斯的发明就是如此。事实上，诺伊斯始终坚持：“我毫不怀疑，即使这项发明没有在费尔柴尔德公司出现，它也会在不久的将来出现在其他地方。这是一个时机成熟的想法，当时的技术已经发展到可以实现的程度。”诺伊斯的设计建立在当时行业主流技术的基础上——这也是它吸引人的地方之一。与制造新元素或逐个原子地生长器件（如国防部资助的项目所尝试的那样）相比，诺伊斯的设计更容易实现。38
It is not unusual for an invention to appear in two different places almost simultaneously, as happened with Kilby and Noyce. Indeed, Noyce always maintained, “There is no doubt in my mind that if the invention hadn’t arisen at Fairchild it would have arisen elsewhere in the very near future. It was an idea whose time had come, where the technology had developed to the point where it was viable.” Noyce’s design was founded on existing, mainstream efforts in the industry—and that was part of its appeal. Relative to manufacturing a new element or growing a device atom by atom (as attempted in the defense-sponsored efforts) Noyce’s design was easy to build.38
诺伊斯喜欢说，集成电路的真正推动力并非源于将所有这些器件集成到一块芯片上的想法，而是源于意识到这种想法是可行的。“这两点都必不可少。你必须先意识到达成某个目标的重要性，然后才能找到实现目标的方法，之后才能真正……全力以赴地投入其中。” 在他的平面工艺制造集成电路的计划中，诺伊斯将仙童半导体从理论上的“如果能实现就好了”的设想，转变为一个切实可行的“我们能做到”的发射平台。39
Noyce liked to say that the real impetus for the integrated circuit came from the realization not that it would be desirable to put all these devices on one chip, but that it was possible to do so. “Both of these are necessary. You’ve got to realize that it would be desirable to reach a given goal, and then you’ve got to have a method of getting to that goal before you can really … jump in with both feet and start dumping the effort into it.” In his plan to use the planar process to build integrated circuits, Noyce moved Fairchild from theoretical wouldn’t-it-be-nice musings to a practical we-can-do-this launch pad.39
1965年，诺伊斯说他“非常清楚地记得”，1959年底，他“召集了一群技术人员，说：‘你看，用平面工艺制造集成电路是可行的。现在，让我们探索除这种方法之外的所有可能方法。’”他继续说道：“从那时起，我们就制定了一个计划，继续推进这项工作。当时这是一个经过深思熟虑的决定。”这或许就是那次会议……摩尔回忆起德州仪器电路板发布时的情景。无论“放手去做”的信息是在这次正式会议上传达的，还是通过一系列非正式谈话传达的，关键在于信息已经发出，而且是诺伊斯发出的。40
In 1965, Noyce said that he could “recall very vividly” that at the end of 1959 he “call[ed] a group of technical people together and [said], ‘Look this [integrated circuit] is possible [using the planar process]. Now, let’s explore every possible way that we could do it besides this way.’” He continued, “From there on out, we laid out a program to go ahead and do it. It was a very conscious decision at that point.” This may be the meeting that Moore recalls in connection with the announcement of the Texas Instruments circuit. Whether the “go ahead and do it” message was transmitted in this single formal meeting or instead through a series of informal conversations, the key point is that the message was sent and it was Noyce who sent it.40
将集成电路从“可能”发展到“完成”的第三阶段，主要功臣是杰伊·拉斯特。1959年7月，诺伊斯走进研发实验室，告诉拉斯特，他认为德州仪器会在每年八月举行的重要行业会议Wescon上大肆宣传其集成“固态电路”。诺伊斯此举激发了拉斯特对集成电路的兴趣。他还表示，希望仙童公司也能在Wescon上展示某种集成电路。当时，要根据诺伊斯在专利中提出的理念制造任何复杂的集成电路都为时尚早。诺伊斯想要的是一种“展示旗帜”的电路，以此来对抗德州仪器在集成电子领域的霸主地位。
The man who bore the brunt of moving the integrated circuit to the third stage, from “it’s possible” to “it’s finished,” was Jay Last. Noyce kick-started Last’s interest in July of 1959, when he wandered into the R&D lab and told Last that he thought Texas Instruments would make much ado about its integrated “solid circuits” at an important industry conference called Wescon, held every August. Noyce said that he wanted Fairchild to demonstrate some sort of integrated device at Wescon, too. It was far too early to try to build any sort of complex integrated circuit using the ideas Noyce had outlined in his patent. Instead, Noyce wanted a “show the flag” circuit, a bulwark against Texas Instrument’s claims to primacy in the field of integrated electronics.
拉斯特拼凑了一个基本的触发器电路：他将四个晶体管放在一块陶瓷板上，用铅笔石墨制作电阻，用导线将所有元件连接起来，然后将陶瓷板封装在一个直径约半英寸的晶体管封装体中。这个装置展示了集成电路的基本概念——将完整的电路封装在一个封装体中——但仙童公司没有人认为它有产品潜力，甚至没有人觉得它特别有趣。这只是诺伊斯提出的一个防御性市场策略，由拉斯特开发和制造。41
Last cobbled together a basic flip-flop circuit by putting four transistors on a ceramic plate, making resistors from pencil graphite, interconnecting everything with wires, and putting the plate into a transistor package about a half inch in diameter. This item demonstrated the fundamental concept behind integrated circuits—a complete circuit in a single package—but no one at Fairchild considered it a potential product or even particularly interesting. It was a defensive marketing measure suggested by Noyce and developed and built by Last.41
在韦斯康公司之后，拉斯特立即开始认真研究他所谓的“微电路”。他聘请了曾在德州仪器公司工作的莱昂内尔·卡特纳，以及刚刚因制造微型电路而获得国防部奖项的吉姆·纳尔。来自仙童半导体公司其他部门的两名研究人员——鲍勃·诺曼和伊西·哈斯——也加入了拉斯特的团队。该团队发起了一场声势浩大的微电路制造运动。诺伊斯的专利并没有提供太多指导。他的专利指出，利用隔离技术和平面工艺制造集成电路是可行的。然而，它并没有说明如何实现。这正是拉斯特的团队需要解决的问题。没错，理论上可以用额外的结来隔离器件，但这究竟意味着什么？是通过扩散来实现吗？如果是，需要扩散多长时间？使用哪些化学物质？您是通过在晶圆背面蚀刻一条贯穿正面氧化层的隔离槽，然后用某种惰性隔离材料填充该槽来实现的吗？（我之前申请过这项技术的专利。）您是否需要制造专为集成电路优化的晶体管，还是可以使用为其他用途开发的晶体管？您会使用哪种金属来互连芯片上的各个组件？
Immediately after Wescon, Last began work in earnest on what he called “microcircuits.” He hired Lionel Kattner, who had worked at Texas Instruments, and Jim Nall, who had just won a Defense Department award for fabricating microminiature circuits. Two researchers from other parts of Fairchild—Bob Norman and Isy Haas—also joined Last’s group. The team mounted a ferocious campaign to try to build microcircuits. Noyce’s patent did not provide much guidance. His patent said that it ought to be possible to build integrated circuits using isolation techniques and the planar process. It did not, however, say how to do it. That was what Last’s group needed to figure out. Yes, it ought to be possible to isolate devices with extra junctions, but what did that mean? Did you do it by diffusion, and if so, for how long, and using which chemicals? Did you do it by etching an isolating groove through the back side of the wafer through to the oxide on the front and fill the groove with some sort of inert isolating material? (Last patented this idea.) Did you need to build transistors optimized for use on integrated circuits, or could you use the transistors developed for other purposes? What type of metal would you use to interconnect the components on the chip?
作为总经理，诺伊斯对微电路团队的主要贡献在于持续资助其研究并鼓励研究人员。包括伊西·哈斯在内的几位微电路团队成员都认为，诺伊斯在仙童公司决定继续研发集成电路的过程中发挥了关键作用，即便当时公司内部存在反对意见。而反对的声音确实很强烈。汤姆·贝和市场部担心集成电路会蚕食晶体管和二极管的销量。拉斯特的上司戈登·摩尔则认为，集成电路在很多年内都不会成为重要的产品。大多数简单的计算都会预测，集成电路的良率会非常低，以至于这项业务根本无法盈利。42
As general manager, Noyce’s primary contribution to the microcircuits group was continuing to fund its research and to encourage its researchers. Several employees, including Isy Haas, who worked on the microcircuits team, felt that Noyce was instrumental in Fairchild’s decision to pursue work on the integrated circuit, even in the face of opposition from within the company. And there was stiff opposition. Tom Bay and the marketing department worried that integrated circuits would cannibalize transistor and diode sales. Last’s boss, Gordon Moore, expected the device would not be a significant product for many years. Most straightforward calculations would have predicted yields on integrated circuits so abysmal as to render it impossible to make money from the business.42
此外，集成电路的价格几乎高得令人望而却步。一个用早期集成电路制造的简单门电路就要花费大约150美元，而功能相同但用分立元件制造的器件可能只需3美元。只有对尺寸和重量有极其严格要求，且对成本没有限制的客户——换句话说，就是美国军方——才会愿意支付如此高昂的价格。火箭每增加一磅重量，就需要额外消耗一吨燃料才能将其送入太空。因此，在这种情况下，即使有效载荷重量只减少几盎司，对军方来说也价值数千美元。43
Moreover, the integrated circuit was almost prohibitively expensive. A simple gate made with an early integrated circuit would have cost about $150, while another device, identical in function but built with discrete components, might have been $3. Only customers with extreme constraints on size and weight and no limits on cost—in other words, the United States military—would willingly pay such prices. Every additional pound added to the weight of a rocket required an additional ton of fuel to launch it into space. Reducing the payload weight by even a few ounces in this scenario was thus easily worth thousands of dollars to the military.43
尽管公司内部存在反对意见，诺伊斯在摩尔的默默支持下，仍然维持着集成电路小组的运转。摩尔认为集成电路是一个“有趣且令人兴奋”的前沿研究项目。诺伊斯本人对集成电路并没有特别的归属感，但他确实认为，创新实验室有义务允许研究人员“继续探索（想法），直到他们取得进展，或者证明自己无法取得任何进展为止”。44
Despite opposition within the company, Noyce kept the integrated circuits group alive with the quiet support of Moore, who believed the integrated circuit was an “interesting and exciting” advanced research project. Noyce did not feel especially connected to the integrated circuit, but he did believe that creative laboratories were duty-bound to allow a researcher to “go ahead and pursue [ideas] until either he does get somewhere or he proves to himself that he can’t get anywhere.”44
诺伊斯担任总经理六个月的试用期内，最特别的经历或许要数九月份仙童相机仪器公司行使期权，收购仙童半导体公司所有流通股了。此前九个月，仙童半导体公司仅售出价值650万美元的高速硅器件，每颗器件的制造成本仅为13美分，而售价却高达1.5美元，利润率高达87%。约翰·卡特预计，公司营收将在来年增长两倍，他希望将这些利润纳入相机仪器公司的资产负债表。45
Perhaps the singular experience of Noyce’s six-month trial run as general manager came in September, when Fairchild Camera and Instrument exercised its option to acquire all outstanding capital stock of Fairchild Semiconductor. In just the previous nine months, Fairchild Semiconductor had sold $6.5 million worth of its high-speed silicon devices, each of which cost 13 cents to build, for $1.50 apiece—an 87 percent profit margin. John Carter estimated that revenues would triple in the next year and wanted those profits for the Camera and Instrument balance sheet.45
1959年9月24日，诺伊斯收到西联电报，得知在一次免税换股交易中，仙童半导体公司的股票已换成了19901股相机仪器公司的股票（价值相当于两年前商定的300万美元收购价）。这大约2万股股票被分配给了八位创始人以及促成这笔交易的投资银行海顿·斯通公司。46
On September 24, 1959, Noyce received a Western Union telegram informing him that in a tax-free stock swap, the shares of Fairchild Semiconductor had been exchanged for 19,901 shares of Camera and Instrument stock (with value equal to the $3 million purchase price agreed upon two years earlier). These roughly 20,000 shares were split among the eight founders and Hayden, Stone, the investment bank that had brokered the original deal.46
诺伊斯翻过电报，快速算了算。他和所有其他创始人一样，现在都拥有价值约30万美元的股票。他可以还清学生时代的债务，还能偿还祖母借给他创办仙童半导体公司的500美元。他可以换掉那辆从费城一路开过来的雪佛兰，那辆车现在破旧不堪，以至于他的联合创始人让他把车停在后院，“因为停在前面会破坏大楼的美观”。他和贝蒂开始商量买新房子的事，还资助诺伊斯的父母去欧洲旅行。亚瑟·洛克和巴德·科伊尔在Trader Vic's餐厅为创始人及其妻子举办了一场派对。晚宴后，洛克送给每位男士一个饰有金马蹄铁的18K金钱夹。47
Noyce flipped over the telegram and did some quick math. He, like each of the other founders, now owned stock worth roughly $300,000. He could pay off his debts from school and reimburse his grandmother the $500 she loaned him to start Fairchild Semiconductor. He could replace the Chevy that had made the trek from Philadelphia and was now in such bad shape that his co-founders asked him to park it in the back lot “because it ruins the look of the building to have it parked in front.” He and Betty began talking about buying a new house, and they paid for Noyce’s parents to travel to Europe. Arthur Rock and Bud Coyle threw a party at Trader Vic’s for the founders and their wives. After dinner, Rock gave each of the men an 18-karat gold money clip festooned with a golden horseshoe.47
当诺伊斯打电话告诉父母这个消息时，他几乎无法掩饰自己的兴奋之情，尽管他很想表现得对这笔意外之财毫不在意。诺伊斯最初并没有指望费尔柴尔德公司会让他发财——正如杰伊·拉斯特在公司成立后不久写给父母的一封信中所说：“我们投身这项事业的动力在于有机会成为自己的老板，并按照我们认为正确的方式做事，而不是为了赚钱。” 但诺伊斯在费尔柴尔德公司很早就意识到自己确实有可能致富，这当然让他欣喜不已。然而，钱到手之后，也让他心中燃起了一丝不安。投入500美元，两年后却赚到30万美元，这感觉不太真实。付出和回报似乎不成正比。48
When he called his parents with the news, Noyce did not quite manage to contain his excitement, although he very much wanted to sound casual about his new wealth. Noyce had not originally thought Fairchild would make him rich—as Jay Last put it in a letter home to his parents shortly after the company was launched, “our motivation for going into this is the chance to be our own bosses and to do a job the way we think it should be done, rather than the financial aspects.” But the realization that he could indeed become wealthy dawned on Noyce quite early at Fairchild and was, of course, quite welcome. Once the money came, however, it also opened a tiny area of disquiet for him. To put in $500 and two years later emerge with $300,000 did not seem real. The reward seemed too much for the effort.48
相机与仪器公司的收购最终给了诺伊斯足够的信心，让他正式接受了总经理的职位。在纽约华尔道夫酒店举行的新闻发布会上，诺伊斯宣布了这一人事变动。尽管当时他只有32岁，是台上最年轻的人，比其他人都年长近25岁，但他依然轻松自如地回答了记者提问。他私下告诉理查德·霍奇森，他很享受总经理这个职位带来的权力——“以前人们做事是出于合作，我要求他们做；现在他们做事是因为我让他们做”——而且他很享受这份工作带来的多元化挑战：“这非常令人满足，尤其是我之前在研发部门工作，那里你只能关注一个狭窄的领域……突然间，你就像坐在一个气球里，从一个分支俯瞰到另一个分支……你第一次看到了整体。”49
The acquisition by Camera and Instrument gave Noyce the final confidence boost he needed to accept the general manager’s position permanently. At a press conference at the Waldorf Astoria in New York announcing the changes, he answered questions with ease despite being, at 32, the youngest man on the dais by at nearly a quarter century. He privately told Richard Hodgson that he enjoyed the power of the general manager’s position—“People used to do things I asked to be cooperative; now they do it because I tell them to do it”—and he reveled in the diverse work the job required: “It’s a very satisfying thing, particularly coming from a place [R&D] where you’re looking at a narrow field…. [S]uddenly you’re sitting in a balloon looking down from branch to branch and … for the first time you can see the whole.”49
诺伊斯对仙童半导体公司未来的发展方向有着清晰的构想。“我们绝不会坑害客户，”他曾告诫一位市场营销职位候选人，“我们会以诚信的方式经营仙童。”诺伊斯举例解释说，仙童计划对两种不同的晶体管产品收取相同的价格，尽管其中一种的性能远高于另一种。他的理由是什么？制造工艺的良率。两款晶体管的良率大致相同，因此高性能器件的生产成本对仙童公司来说并不比低性能器件更高。当候选人指出，定价应该由需求而非良率决定，仙童公司可以从高性能器件中获得更多利润时，诺伊斯几乎是咆哮着回应道：“这正是我们一直在讨论（避免的）的那种不正当手段！”诺伊斯的良率定价体系一直有效，直到低性能晶体管的大量库存开始在出货区积压，此时更受欢迎的晶体管的价格才被提高。50
Noyce had definite ideas about the type of company he wanted Fairchild Semiconductor to become. “We’re not ever going to screw a customer,” he warned a candidate for a marketing position. “We are going to run Fairchild in an honest way.” Noyce went on to explain, by way of example, that Fairchild planned to charge the same amount of money for two different transistor products, even though one was a significantly higher performance device than the other. His reasoning? The yields out of the manufacturing process were roughly equal for the two transistors, so the higher-performance device was no more costly for Fairchild to build than its lower-performance cousin. When the candidate pointed out that demand, not yield, should drive pricing, and that Fairchild could get more money for the higher-performance device, Noyce nearly growled in response: “That’s just the sort of shady practice we’re talking about [avoiding]!” Noyce’s yield-based pricing system prevailed only until large stockpiles of the lower-performance transistor began building up in the shipping area, at which point prices on the more desirable transistor were raised.50
诺伊斯上任总经理不久，便请尤金·克莱纳聘请的工商管理硕士杰克·耶尔弗顿帮忙，阐述他对“优秀公司应具备的素质”的理解，并将其转化为政策。耶尔弗顿曾负责撰写职位描述和制定薪酬准则。当耶尔弗顿开始与他讨论招聘或薪酬管理等问题时，诺伊斯不屑一顾地挥手打发他，说道：“你只是个读商学院的人，这些你自己搞定。” 耶尔弗顿很快意识到，诺伊斯想要的并非具体人事问题的细节，而是一种宏观的、以“人类学视角”构建公司的策略，一种有意识地发展如今所谓的“企业文化”的努力。51
Shortly after he became general manager, Noyce asked Jack Yelverton, an MBA whom Eugene Kleiner had hired to write job descriptions and establish salary guidelines, to help him clarify his thoughts about “what makes a good company” and codify them into policy. When Yelverton began talking to him about recruiting, or wage and salary administration, Noyce waved him away with a dismissive “you’re the guy who went to business school. You figure that out.” It soon became apparent to Yelverton that what Noyce wanted was not nitty-gritty detail on specific personnel issues, but a sweeping “anthropological approach” to company building, a conscious effort to develop what today is called “corporate culture.”51
诺伊斯的首要目标是防止仙童半导体变成肖克利半导体实验室那样的地方，他称之为“反面教材”。在大约三周的时间里，诺伊斯向耶尔弗顿解释了他有多么厌恶肖克利的心理战术、自上而下的管理方式以及他利用员工之间矛盾的习惯。在诺伊斯看来，最有害的是肖克利喜欢保守秘密。诺伊斯希望仙童半导体尽可能地公开透明。他想“如实讲述事实”，而不是任由谣言四起。他和耶尔弗顿讨论了一个“没有阶级之分”的员工餐厅——一个摆放着一排排桌子的大空间。他们还讨论了新员工入职培训，让每位新员工都能见到诺伊斯和各个部门的负责人。诺伊斯敦促耶尔弗顿想方设法鼓励“坦诚真挚的表达”，因为诺伊斯最希望的不是通过命令控制的方式领导，而是通过激发“积极分子的自愿合作”。这种理念与他童年时期在公理会接受的平等主义教义相呼应。
Noyce’s top objective was to keep Fairchild from becoming Shockley Semiconductor Labs, a place he called “the model of what not to do.” Over the course of about three weeks, Noyce explained to Yelverton how he loathed Shockley’s mind games, his top-down approach to management, and his habit of playing one employee off another. Most pernicious of all, in Noyce’s opinion, was Shockley’s love of keeping secrets. Noyce wanted Fairchild to be as open as possible. He wanted “to tell the story as it really is,” rather than let rumors run rampant. He and Yelverton talked about one employee lunch room with “no class distinctions”—just a big space with rows of tables. They talked about orientation sessions where every new employee could meet Noyce and the heads of the various departments. Noyce urged Yelverton to devise ways to encourage “frank and earnest expression” because above all, Noyce wanted to lead not through command-and-control methods but by inspiring the “voluntary cooperation of motivated people.” Such philosophy echoed the egalitarian teaching of his Congregationalist boyhood.
诺伊斯的管理方式非同寻常，尤其是在晶圆厂里那些被归类为“非技术工人”的“女工”群体，她们却是公司增长最快的员工群体。诺伊斯深知，仙童半导体的成功在很大程度上取决于其制造工厂的精准度和严谨性。然而，他认为，实现必要纪律的最佳途径并非严苛压榨低薪工人，而是尽可能地放权。晶圆厂的员工必须完成非常具体的工作。诺伊斯希望员工能够快速、高效地完成各项任务，但他更希望给员工的指示不仅仅是描述该做什么，还要解释装配流程中每一项工作与其他工作之间的关联。他希望费尔柴尔德公司各个层级的员工都能与他们的上司共进晚餐。他希望公司能够出版一份包含绩效和技术方面真实数据的员工通讯，并且他还希望组织小型会议，亲自告诉每位员工他们的工作对公司成功所做的贡献。
Noyce’s was an unusual approach to management, particularly since the “girls” in the fab, whose work would be classed as “unskilled labor,” comprised the fastest-growing group of employees in the company. Noyce well understood that the success of Fairchild Semiconductor would depend in no small measure on the precision and rigor of its manufacturing facility. He thought, however, that the best way to achieve the necessary level of discipline was not to clamp down on the lowest-paid workers but to open up as much as possible. Fab employees had to complete very specific tasks quickly and in a highly routinized manner, but Noyce wanted instructions for these workers to go beyond describing what to do to explaining how each job in the assembly process related to the others. He wanted Fairchild employees at every level to be able to eat with their bosses. He wanted the company to produce an employee newsletter with real data about performance and technology, and he wanted to organize small meetings in which he could personally tell each employee how his or her work contributed to the firm’s success.
诺伊斯和耶尔弗顿认为，这些“合乎道德”的举措也能改善公司的盈利状况，因为它们能增强员工对仙童公司的认同感，从而降低员工流动率，而员工流动率曾是公司面临的巨大难题。在20世纪50年代末和60年代初，制造半导体器件既是一门科学，也是一门艺术。即使是那些收入丰厚、炙手可热的电路设计师和工程师，也鲜有正规的培训课程，而且大多数知识都只能通过反复试验来获得，即便是在一位已经成功制造过半导体器件的人的指导下（尽管这种指导可能并不正式），也难以获得。操作人员会像检查蛋糕一样检查器件的“完成度”：观察颜色，如果觉得有必要，就把它放回炉子里再加热几分钟。在晶圆厂工作需要灵巧的双手和良好的手眼协调能力，而这些能力总是会随着练习而提高。例如，一名焊工每周要焊接超过5000根微小的导线。公司拥有一支经验丰富的员工队伍，意味着更低的生产成本和更好、更可靠的产品。52
Noyce and Yelverton felt that these “ethically right” actions would also improve the company’s bottom line by increasing employees’ identification with Fairchild and consequently reducing turnover, which posed enormous problems. Building a semiconductor device in the late 1950s and early 1960s was as much an art as a science. Even for well-paid and highly sought-after circuit designers and engineers, there were few formal courses and little knowledge that was not best gained directly through a process of trial and error, supervised, however informally, by someone who had already successfully built semiconductor devices. Operators would check a device’s “doneness” as they would a cake: looking at color and returning it to the furnace for a few more minutes if it seemed necessary. Work in the fab required dexterity and eye-hand coordination that invariably improved with practice. A single lead welder, for example, would weld more than 5,000 microscopic wires every week. An experienced workforce throughout the company meant lower production costs and better, more reliable products.52
善待员工——尤其是在制造车间——也有助于防止工人加入工会，并阻止工会进入仙童半导体公司。到了20世纪60年代初，有组织的劳工开始觊觎半导体行业收入最低的工人，他们似乎是组建工会的理想对象。他们从事高度重复性的工作，收入微薄，而且受到严格的纪律约束。一位当时在生产线上工作的女性回忆道：“我们不能穿裤子上班。仙童半导体公司给我们的绿色尼龙工作服里面必须穿裙子或连衣裙。除了两次短暂的休息和一次半小时的午餐时间外，我们在生产线上工作期间，无论任何原因都不能站起来。就连去洗手间都要举手示意，获得许可。有时，女工们会谎称头疼，只是为了能休息一下。”53
Treating employees right—particularly in the manufacturing fab—also helped to keep workers out of unions and unions out of Fairchild. By the early 1960s, organized labor had begun casting covetous eyes towards the semiconductor industry’s lowest-paid workers, who seemed perfect candidates for unionization. They worked at highly repetitive tasks for little money and were subject to tight discipline. Recalls one woman who worked on the line at this time: “We could not wear pants to work. We had to wear skirts or dresses under the green nylon smocks Fairchild gave us. Other than two short breaks and one half-hour lunch break, we couldn’t stand up during the time [we were on the line] for any reason. You even had to raise your hand and get permission to use the bathroom. Sometimes girls would say they had a headache just to get a break.”53
但这位员工仍然坚信仙童公司是个“好地方”。她有医疗保险和带薪假期。随着产量开始提升，仙童公司向装配工们提出了一项优惠方案：如果他们承诺每周六都到工厂上班，公司就保证他们的工作——工资是正常工资的1.5倍。公司很快就找到了愿意参与这项计划的人。
But this same employee felt strongly that Fairchild had been a “good place to work.” She had health insurance and paid vacation days. When production began to ramp up, Fairchild offered its assemblers a deal: if they committed to reporting to the fab every Saturday, the company would guarantee them work—at time-and-a-half pay. The company had no problem finding people eager to participate in the program.
山景城工厂为生产员工和管理人员举办了一系列早餐会。工长们可以参加由仙童公司高管授课的正式管理培训课程。仙童公司的另一家工厂每周举行一次“咖啡谈话会”，一位经理会邀请六名装配线工人一起享用“饼干、咖啡和谈话”。54
The Mountain View fab ran a series of breakfast meetings for production employees and managers. Foremen could participate in formal management-training classes taught by Fairchild executives. Another Fairchild plant held a weekly “coffee-conversation meeting” in which a manager invited six assembly-line workers for “cookies, coffee, and conversation.”54
带薪假期和加班费、持续的培训、医疗保健——这些人事福利待遇与通常通过工会谈判争取到的待遇不相上下，甚至更胜一筹。花一个小时与老板的老板聊天喝咖啡，让白领员工们感受到人情味，也模糊了传统上泾渭分明的“劳资”界限。1962年，当一个工会试图组织费尔柴尔德（Fairchild）的生产工人时，遭到了否决。这个结果想必令诺伊斯（Noyce）感到欣慰。他在菲尔科（Philco）工作时亲眼目睹的罢工给他留下了深刻的印象，而且他认为集体谈判从本质上来说会削弱个人奋斗。他坚信，与其让员工凭借资历或其他官僚要求晋升，不如让他们凭借才能获得晋升。
Paid holidays and overtime, ongoing training sessions, medical care—such personnel practices matched or bettered those usually won through union negotiations. An hour spent chatting and sharing coffee with your boss’s boss humanized the white-collar workers and blurred the traditionally sharp line between “labor” and “management.” When in 1962 a union attempted to organize Fairchild production workers, it was voted down. The result must have pleased Noyce. The strikes he witnessed when he worked at Philco had left a bad taste in his mouth, and he also thought that collective bargaining by definition undermined individual striving. He believed that it was far better to let a person rise on the basis of talent rather than due to seniority or some other bureaucratic requirement.
诺伊斯要求人力资源主管耶尔弗顿和一位名叫杰瑞·莱文的年轻人（诺伊斯雇佣他们负责“特殊任务”）将他们讨论的一些想法编纂成一本政策和程序手册。手册中的许多内容都不容商榷，例如签字和审批要求或汇报关系等细节。任何与军方相关的工作都必须遵守其特殊的程序，工厂里的每一个步骤也都被详细地规定了出来。然而，对于其他领域，耶尔弗顿和莱文则与所有部门和科室负责人进行磋商，希望制定出“一套运转顺畅且受其约束的人员参与制定的方案”，正如莱文所说。他们还与惠普、艾特尔-麦卡洛、瓦里安以及其他几家成熟且具有前瞻性思维的本地科技公司的经理们探讨了如何在自由和纪律之间取得平衡。
Noyce asked human resources chief Yelverton and a young man named Jerry Levine whom Noyce had hired to handle “special assignments,” to codify some of the ideas they had been discussing in a policy and procedures book. Much within this book was non-negotiable: the nitty-gritty around signature and approval requirements or reporting relationships, for example. Any work for the military was subject to its own special procedures, and every step in the fab was likewise spelled out in excruciating detail. For other areas, though, Yelverton and Levine consulted with all the department and section heads, hoping to devise “something that worked smoothly and that the people who were subject to it helped to create,” in Levine’s words. They also talked to managers from Hewlett-Packard, Eitel-McCullough, Varian, and a few other established and progressive-minded local technology companies about how to balance the tension between freedom and discipline.
诺伊斯家族的管理理念或许听起来有些理想化，但人道主义价值观早已深深根植于诺伊斯家所有男孩的心中。20世纪60年代初，拉尔夫即将大学毕业；唐是伯克利大学的化学教授；盖洛德当时是卫斯理大学的教授（不久后将前往耶鲁神学院任教），他曾参与反对种族隔离的“自由乘车运动”，并与其他几位同伴在南方腹地被捕。他当时正在向最高法院上诉，最终最高法院裁定他们胜诉。鲍勃·诺伊斯为盖洛德的勇气和理想感到无比自豪，他经常向孩子们夸耀盖洛德，甚至在一次偶然的机会下，在飞机上遇到马丁·路德·金时，还热情地介绍自己是“盖洛德的兄弟”。55
NOYCE’S MANAGERIAL INSTINCTS might sound idealistic, but humanitarian values were deeply ingrained in all the Noyce boys. In the first years of the 1960s, Ralph was finishing college; Don was a chemistry professor at Berkeley; and Gaylord, now a professor at Wesleyan University (soon to move to Yale Divinity School), had joined the Freedom Rides against segregation, gotten himself arrested in the deep South with several other riders, and was in the process of appealing his case to the Supreme Court, which would later rule in the riders’ favor. Bob Noyce took great pride in Gaylord’s bravery and ideals, bragging about him to his children and eagerly introducing himself as “Gaylord’s brother” when he once happened to meet Martin Luther King, Jr., on an airplane.55
总的来说，20世纪60年代初对诺伊斯而言无疑是一段令人兴奋的时期。他管理的公司以每月100名员工的速度增长，每年半导体销售额达数百万美元。他有八项专利申请正在审批中。到1960年底，仙童公司宣布了最早的量产集成电路测试成功案例，该集成电路将以“Micrologic”的名称进行销售。33岁的诺伊斯拥有的财富超过了他本人和家族中任何人的财富总和，多到他根本无法想象如何挥霍。而且，他没有任何真正的失败经历让他有所顾虑。
In general, the early 1960s were a decidedly heady time for Noyce. The company he managed was growing at a rate of 100 employees per month and selling millions of dollars worth of semiconductors each year. He had eight patent applications on their way to being granted. By the end of 1960, Fairchild had announced the earliest successful tests of a mass-producible integrated circuit, which would be sold under the name “Micrologic.” At 33, Noyce had more money than he or anyone else in his family had ever possessed, more money than he could ever imagine spending. And he had no real failures to make him cautious.
他开始因工作需要周游世界。1960年3月，他花了两个星期在英国和中欧考察，探索打入欧洲晶体管市场的可能性。贝蒂陪同他去了那里，但没有陪同他6月为期三周的日本之行，那次日本之行的目的是与日本公司洽谈潜在的许可协议。日本之行是诺伊斯第一次接触到截然不同的文化，他对这个国家的一切都非常满意，从“美味的生鱼片”到井然有序的街道。他离开时确信，日本半导体产业远落后于美国。日本的锗晶体管可以媲美美国中档产品，但他认为日本在硅晶体管方面落后美国好几年。由于他认为日本本质上是一个生产基于美国公司授权技术的器件的工厂，诺伊斯认为将部分仙童半导体的技术授权给几家日本公司并无坏处。56
He began traveling the world as part of his work. In March, 1960, he spent two weeks in England and Central Europe exploring possibilities for penetrating the European transistor market. Betty joined him on this trip, but not on his three-week jaunt to Japan in June to discuss potential licensing agreements with Japanese firms. The Japanese trip was Noyce’s first encounter with a radically different culture, and he enjoyed everything about the country, from its “delicious raw fish” to its orderly streets. He left reassured that the Japanese semiconductor industry significantly trailed the American. Japanese germanium transistors were comparable to a midgrade American device, but he felt the island nation was years behind in silicon. Since he thought Japan was essentially a factory for churning out devices built on ideas licensed from American firms, Noyce saw no harm in licensing select Fairchild technology to a few Japanese companies.56
九月，生活继续眷顾着诺伊斯，他和贝蒂迎来了他们的第四个孩子，一个名叫玛格丽特的女儿。不久之后，他们在洛斯阿尔托斯山买了一栋漂亮但不张扬的法式住宅，风景优美，每个孩子都有自己的卧室，后院大到足以养一匹马。诺伊斯“对买这栋房子有点愧疚”，他觉得父母不会赞同这样一笔“奢侈”的消费。他觉得，一般来说，像他这个年纪的男人“在经济上都比父母强，这让他们和父母之间有点疏远”。57
In September, life continued to smile on Noyce as he and Betty welcomed their fourth child, a girl named Margaret. Shortly thereafter, they bought a nice but not ostentatious French-style house in Los Altos Hills with lovely views, a bedroom for each child, and a backyard big enough for a horse. Noyce “felt a little guilty about buying the house” and imagined his parents would disapprove of such an “extravagant” purchase. In general, he thought, men of his age “financially outperformed their parents, which leaves them a little bit estranged from their parents.”57
尽管代际矛盾重重，诺伊斯还是生平第一次享受到了些许富裕。他有能力送大孩子们去贝蒂为他们挑选的私立学校。周末，一家人可以开车去太浩湖附近的山区，在那里他教孩子们滑雪，有时甚至会把其中一个孩子夹在两腿之间滑下山坡。诺伊斯买下了一架瑞安飞机的三分之一股份。由于没有飞行执照，他无法合法驾驶这架飞机，但他的一位合伙人——一位费尔柴尔德公司的员工，也是一位前海军飞行员——偷偷地教诺伊斯飞行，直到贝蒂告诉他，她不想在她去世后成为带着年幼孩子的寡妇。58
Despite this miasma of intergenerational tension, Noyce enjoyed having a bit of money for the first time in his life. He could afford to send his older children to the private school Betty selected for them. On weekends, the family could drive to the mountains around Lake Tahoe, where he taught the children to ski, making his way down the hill with one of them wedged between his legs. Noyce bought a one-third share in a Ryan airplane. He could not legally fly it because he did not have a pilot’s license, but one of his co-owners, a Fairchild employee and former Navy pilot, gave Noyce lessons on the sly until Betty told him she did not want to be left a widow with young children.58
诺伊斯家的生活中有着严格的分工。鲍勃负责挣钱和进行大型维修项目。贝蒂则全权负责孩子和家务。她对孩子们的要求非常高。孩子们。贝蒂觉得鲍勃一家有点粗俗——他妈妈竟然把面包蘸着汤吃，这让贝蒂感到震惊——她想方设法避免受到这种影响。诺伊斯家的孩子们从小就做家务、上音乐课，而且举止得体。贝蒂希望他们在上幼儿园之前就能熟练阅读，而他们也做到了。
A strict division of labor marked life in the Noyce home. Bob was responsible for income gathering and large fix-it projects. Betty had full charge of the children and the house. She maintained very high expectations of her children. Betty thought Bob’s family a bit crass—his mother dunked her bread in her soup, which appalled Betty—and she sought to counter this influence. The Noyce children had chores and music lessons and extremely good manners from very early ages. Betty wanted them to read well before kindergarten, and they did.
鲍勃对孩子们早期教育最重要的贡献，就是在老大比利七岁时，让他们停止一切宗教教育。诺伊斯认为孩子们在主日学校学到的圣经故事和神迹“并非真理”，而且比利和佩妮年纪太小，无法理解隐喻——而诺伊斯本人则倾向于用隐喻来理解宗教教义。1961年以后，除非是去拜访鲍勃的父母，否则他们一家再也没有参加过任何宗教活动。诺伊斯很少谈论宗教，不过他确实有一次指出圣诞故事中蕴含着创业和激励的信息。他欣赏这个故事，并非因为它讲述的是圣母玛利亚的奇迹诞生，而是因为它提醒人们“一件事，或者一个人，就能彻底改变历史的进程”。总的来说，他认为宗教使人们过于关注来世的奖赏，从而阻碍了他们在今生充分发挥自身潜力。59
Bob’s most significant contribution to the children’s early upbringing was to pull them from all religious education when Billy, the oldest, was seven. Noyce thought that the Bible stories and miracles that the children learned about in Sunday School were “not the truth,” and that Billy and Penny were too young to appreciate metaphor, which was how Noyce tended to view religious teachings. The family never attended religious services after 1961 unless they were visiting Bob’s parents. Noyce did not talk much about religion, though he did on one occasion point out the entrepreneurial and motivational messages latent in the Christmas story, which he appreciated not as a miraculous tale of a virgin birth but as a reminder that “one event, or one man, can substantially change the course of history.” In general, he thought that religion kept people from achieving all they could in this life by focusing their attention on the rewards they could expect in the life to come.59
诺伊斯年轻有为，收入不断增长，受过高等教育，还拥有了新家，他正是20世纪50年代末旧金山湾区变革浪潮的缩影。当时，每月有超过3000人涌入圣克拉拉县。有些人是为了电子行业的机遇而来，有些人则被斯坦福大学和伯克利大学，或是洛克希德、海军上将公司和凯撒工业等当地大型企业的工作机会所吸引。几乎所有人都是为了五年前吸引诺伊斯的原因而来：宜人的气候、靠近山脉和海洋的地理位置、便捷的旧金山交通，以及加州近乎神话般的魅力。由于诺伊斯家附近地区的移民大多年轻，而且受教育程度几乎与他不相上下，诺伊斯亲眼见证着他所在的社区和周边城镇随着时间的推移变得越来越年轻、富裕和受过更好的教育。60
With his young family, rising income, high education, and new home, Noyce was an avatar of the changes sweeping the San Francisco Bay Area at the end of the 1950s. More than 3,000 people moved into Santa Clara County every month. Some came explicitly for opportunities in the electronics industry. Others were drawn to the Bay Area by Stanford and Berkeley or by jobs at Lockheed, Admiral, or Kaiser Industries, among the area’s largest employers. Almost everyone made the trek for the same reasons that had attracted Noyce five years before: the weather, the proximity to the mountains and the oceans, the easy access to San Francisco, and the near-mythic allure of the Golden State. Because the immigrants to the areas closest to Noyce’s home tended to be young and nearly as well schooled as he was, Noyce could watch his neighborhood and the towns around him grow younger, wealthier, and better educated with each passing month.60
就连建筑本身也充满前卫气息，新颖现代，处处体现着理想主义。在半岛各地的城镇里，自由派开发商约瑟夫·艾希勒（Joseph Eichler）——他曾游说反对歧视性的住房政策——建造了宽敞明亮的社区中心，周围环绕着价格适中、设计理念新颖的住宅，这些住宅拥有开放式布局、平屋顶、玻璃中庭和辐射供暖系统。IBM位于圣何塞的新办公楼由现代主义建筑师约翰·S·博尔斯（John S. Bolles）设计，旨在鼓励员工进行沉思冥想。这座占地63,000平方英尺的建筑采用钢结构，落地窗外是郁郁葱葱的园林景观，窗外饰以黄、棕、灰三色长方形瓷砖带。61
Even the buildings were edgy, new, modern, and built on idealism. In towns up and down the Peninsula, Joseph Eichler, a liberal developer who lobbied against discriminatory housing practices, was building airy community centers surrounded by affordable, high-concept homes with open floor plans, flat roofs, glass atriums, and radiant heat. IBM’s new facility in San Jose, designed by modernist architect John S. Bolles to encourage workers’ contemplative activity, was 63,000 square feet of steel and floor-to-ceiling windows with views of the lushly landscaped grounds, banded with a frieze of rectangular yellow, brown, and gray ceramic tiles.61
1960年，半岛地区的电子产品销售额首次突破5亿美元大关。参与这项如今价值5亿美元的产业的公司中，有不少是……近三分之二的企业成立时间不足十年。一家测试设备公司诞生于帕洛阿尔托，一家印刷电路公司落户门洛帕克。一家位于帕洛阿尔托的新兴技术服务公司负责设计和制造原型元件，而位于山景城的一家晶体生长工厂（由另一位来自肖克利的“难民”创立）则专门生产纯硅锭。斯坦福工业园的租户数量在五年内增长了六倍。62
The year 1960 marked the first time that electronics sales on the Peninsula surpassed $500 million. Of the firms engaged in this now half-billion-dollar business, nearly two-thirds were less than a decade old. A test equipment company was born in Palo Alto, a printed circuit firm in Menlo Park. A new Palo Alto-based technical services operation designed and fabbed prototype components, while a crystal-growing facility in Mountain View (founded by another refugee from Shockley) specialized in the manufacture of pure silicon ingots. The number of tenants in the Stanford Industrial Park increased sixfold in five years.62
企业集中化使仙童半导体公司受益匪浅。该公司可以利用洛克希德公司的质谱仪，并委托旧金山湾区污染控制实验室进行一系列重要的氧化硅实验。仙童半导体公司还可以让门洛帕克的一家公司提供符合实验室清洗元件和混合化学品所需精确标准的去离子水。他们还可以让几英里外的一家公司研磨镜头。很难想象，仅仅两年前，摩尔还需要自己建造熔炉，而诺伊斯则不得不到相机店里四处搜寻光刻镜头。63
The concentration of firms benefited Fairchild Semiconductor, which could use the mass spectrometer at Lockheed and ask the Bay Area Pollution Control Lab to perform a series of important experiments on silicon oxide. Fairchild could have a Menlo Park firm deliver de-mineralized water, purified to the precise standards the lab required for washing components and mixing chemicals. They could have lenses ground at a company a few miles down the road. It was hard to believe that only two years before, Moore needed to build his own furnaces and Noyce had to scrounge for photolithography lenses at a camera shop.63
与电子技术无关的诸多发展也使仙童半导体公司和鲍勃·诺伊斯受益匪浅。加州农业机械化程度的不断提高，使成千上万的低技能工人得以进入电子组装厂工作。一项由州政府大力支持的基础设施建设热潮，改变了分区规划条例，并铺设了道路和污水管道网络，以吸引人口和产业落户加州。二战结束后的二十年间，加州还建立了由9所大学、19所学院和106所社区学院组成的综合教育体系，为高科技产业输送了高素质人才。64
Sweeping developments unrelated to electronics also benefited Fairchild Semiconductor and Bob Noyce. The increasing mechanization of agriculture in California freed up thousands of low-skilled workers for work in electronics assembly plants. An aggressive state-sponsored infrastructure-building spree changed zoning regulations and installed a network of roads and sewer pipes to attract people and industry to California. In the two decades after the end of the Second World War, the state of California also established its consolidated system of 9 universities, 19 colleges, and 106 community colleges, which could provide an educated workforce for high-tech industry.64
诺伊斯从未在任何地方像在加州这片土地上一样感到如此自在，这里的一切都如此新鲜，生活变化如此之快。随着英俊潇洒的约翰·F·肯尼迪当选总统，诺伊斯觉得，不仅是加州，整个国家都充满了无限的可能和希望。他说，他感觉“世界尽在掌握”。那是一个他真切相信“只要你想做，就能做到”的时代。65
Noyce had never before felt as at home in a place as he did in this patch of California, where so much was new, and life changed so quickly. With the dashing John F. Kennedy just elected in Washington, not just this state but the entire country, Noyce thought, seemed full of possibility and promise. He felt, he said, as if the “world were [his] oyster.” It was a time when he truly believed “you could do anything you wanted.”65
并非费尔柴尔德公司的每个人都像诺伊斯那样高兴。他升任总经理，摩尔也随之晋升为研发主管，这使得这两位创始人在公司层级中凌驾于其他六位创始人之上。只有被任命为研发副总监的维克·格里尼奇的管理职位，其责任程度勉强能与诺伊斯和摩尔相提并论。市场营销是公司的另一关键部门，由并非创始人之一的汤姆·贝掌管。查理·斯波克是一位直言不讳、作风强硬的领导者，他于1959年从通用电气加入费尔柴尔德公司，并超越尤金·克莱纳和朱利叶斯·布兰克，担任了制造部门的最高职位。几位创始人对这种新的等级制度感到不满，正如杰伊·拉斯特所说，这种感觉令人愤慨，感觉自己“就像是为别人的研究实验室里的另一个员工”。66
NOT EVERYONE AT FAIRCHILD was as happy as Noyce. His move to general manager and Moore’s accompanying promotion to lead R&D elevated these two founders above the other six in the corporate hierarchy. Only Vic Grinich, who was named associate director of R&D, held a management position even approaching the level of responsibility accorded Noyce and Moore. Marketing, another key part of the company, was under the control of Tom Bay, who was not one of the founders. Charlie Sporck, a blunt-talking pillar of a man who joined Fairchild from General Electric in 1959, had leapfrogged both Eugene Kleiner and Julius Blank for the top manufacturing position. Several of the founders chafed under the new stratification and resented feeling, as Jay Last put it, like “just another employee working in a research lab for somebody else.”66
每一位创始人，无论在新管理层中身居何位，都注意到随着仙童相机仪器公司利润占比的不断攀升，仙童半导体公司正逐渐从他们手中溜走。在仙童半导体公司内部，诺伊斯和他的下属决定着资源的分配、人员的招聘、客户的拓展、产品的研发以及上市时间。然而，仙童半导体的创始人对一些影响公司发展的重大决策却无能为力，因为仙童半导体如今已隶属于相机仪器公司，在母公司董事会中没有代表。约翰·卡特掌控着半导体公司的预算规模，决定着利润的用途，以及是否应该授予员工仙童股票期权。股票期权是一个极其敏感的领域。诺伊斯希望至少高级科学家、工程师和管理人员都能获得期权；谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德在东海岸接受教育，他信奉大公司那种在员工入职三十周年时赠送金表的福利制度，认为股票期权是“渐进式社会主义”。67
Every founder, regardless of his position in the new management order, noticed that Fairchild Semiconductor was slipping from his grasp as it contributed an ever-increasing portion of the profits of Fairchild Camera and Instrument. Within the boundaries of Fairchild Semiconductor, Noyce and the men who worked for him determined how to allocate resources, whom to hire, which customers to pursue, which products to build, and when to introduce them. But the Fairchild founders had no influence over some of the biggest decisions affecting their company because Fairchild Semiconductor now belonged to Camera and Instrument and had no representative on the parent company’s board. John Carter controlled the size of the Semiconductor budget. He determined how its profits were used and whether or not its employees should be granted options on Fairchild stock. Stock options were a particularly sensitive area. Noyce wanted them for senior scientists, engineers, and managers, at the very least; Sherman Fairchild, schooled in the East Coast, big company, gold-watch-on-your-thirtieth-anniversary-with-the-firm approach to benefits, considered stock options “creeping socialism.”67
仙童半导体公司的创始人只能眼睁睁地看着约翰·卡特误将半导体收购的成功解读为自己拯救陷入困境的技术企业的能力，几乎是肆意地扩张相机与仪器公司的业务。半导体公司的利润并没有再投资于该部门，也没有与员工分享；相反，这些利润被用来收购一家阴极射线管公司和一家生产胶印机及其他印刷耗材的公司。很快，相机与仪器公司的业务就扩展到了太空研究、示波器、办公设备、家用摄像机和印章机等领域。68
The Fairchild founders could only watch with dismay as John Carter, misinterpreting the success of the Semiconductor acquisition as evidence of his own ability to rescue struggling technical businesses, expanded Camera and Instrument’s operations almost willy-nilly. Profits from Semiconductor were not reinvested in the division or shared with its employees; instead, they went to buy a cathode tube company and a firm that manufactured offset printing presses and other printing supplies. In short order, Camera and Instrument expanded into space research, oscilloscopes, office equipment, home movie cameras, and stamp machines.68
最令费尔柴尔德公司创始人难以接受的是，谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德持有的股份数量大约是任何一位创始人的100倍。相机与仪器公司首席执行官约翰·卡特持有的股份数量几乎是这八位创始人总和的两倍。69
What was hardest for the men who started Fairchild to swallow was that Sherman Fairchild owned roughly 100 times more stock than any founder. Camera and Instrument CEO John Carter owned nearly twice as much stock as did the group of eight combined.69
到这时，诺伊斯的注意力几乎完全转移到了实验室之外。新的二极管工厂计划于1961年3月投产。诺伊斯仔细考虑了工厂经理的职责（“统筹管理、生产运营、市场联络、与总部保持良好关系”），并亲自面试了每一位候选人。与此同时，诺伊斯正努力说服IBM购买更多仙童半导体的产品。他精心策划了一场与IBM的会议，力求以最佳方式展现仙童半导体的形象。会议将包括关于集成电路的演示、关于实验室的演示，以及由查理·斯波克（Charlie Sporck）进行的第三场演示，旨在强调仙童半导体是一家冉冉升起的大规模生产商。（“年运行300万台设备，产能为2500万台/年”）。诺伊斯原本打算以仙童作为值得信赖的供应商来结束发言：我们“不会夸大其词，谈论根本不存在的产品”，他计划这样说。“其他人会模仿我们——一直以来都是如此。”然而，所有这些计划都落空了；除了购买仙童最初的100个晶体管之外，IBM从来都不是仙童的重要客户。70
BY THIS POINT, Noyce’s attention was focused almost entirely outside the lab. The new diode plant was slated to open in March 1961. Noyce gave a great deal of thought to the job responsibilities of plant manager (“o[ver-head] control, run prod[uction] show, marketing liaison, [good] relations [with headquarters]”) and personally interviewed every potential candidate for the job. At the same time, Noyce was trying to convince IBM to buy more Fairchild products. He orchestrated an elaborate meeting with IBM to feature Fairchild in the best possible light. There would be a presentation on the integrated circuit, another on the lab, and a third, by Charlie Sporck, to emphasize that Fairchild was an up-and-coming volume manufacturer (“running 3 M[illion devices]/yr [with] capacity of 25 M[illion]/ yr”). Noyce would close with a discussion of Fairchild as a trustworthy supplier: we are “not guilty of talking about non-existent products,” he planned to say. “Others will copy [us]—always have.” All this planning came to naught; aside from its purchase of Fairchild’s first 100 transistors, IBM was never an exceptionally important customer for Fairchild.70
与此同时，相机与仪器公司的一位高管听说诺伊斯和霍奇森希望有朝一日能让半导体公司在欧洲市场站稳脚跟。这位高管恰好认识意大利商业设备巨头奥利维蒂公司一位高管的叔叔。奥利维蒂公司刚刚与一家名为Telettra的新兴微波公司成立了一家名为Societa Generale Semiconduttori (SGS) 的合资企业。SGS在米兰东北郊一座现代化的玻璃幕墙工厂里生产锗晶体管、硅二极管和整流器。如果仙童半导体公司入股SGS，这家合资企业也将生产和销售仙童半导体公司的硅平面晶体管。仙童半导体公司无需投入任何资金，也无需从远大于欧洲新兴需求的美国市场抽调大量资源。事实上，这家美国公司只需要教会欧洲人如何制造硅平面晶体管。作为交换，美国公司将拥有在美国独家销售SGS锗晶体管的权利。71
Meanwhile, a senior Camera and Instrument executive had heard that Noyce and Hodgson wanted Semiconductor someday to gain a foothold in the European market. The Camera and Instrument man happened to know the uncle of an executive at Italian business machine giant Olivetti. Olivetti had just started a joint venture called Societa Generale Semiconduttori (SGS) with Telettra, a young microwave company. SGS built germanium transistors and silicon diodes and rectifiers in a modern glass-fronted factory located in a northeastern suburb of Milan. If Fairchild took a stake in SGS, the joint venture would build and sell Fairchild silicon planar transistors, as well. Fairchild Semiconductor would not need to put up any capital or divert significant resources away from United States markets, which were far larger than the fledgling European demand. In fact, all the American firm needed to do was teach the Europeans how to build silicon planar transistors. In exchange, the Americans would have exclusive rights to sell SGS germanium transistors in the United States.71
诺伊斯和贝伊很喜欢无需投入任何资本就能打入欧洲市场的想法，但他们不确定为了这个目标而放弃他们掌握的、关于费尔柴尔德实验室最新研发成果的专有尖端技术是否值得。不过，他们并没有正式反对这项计划，结果没过多久，费尔柴尔德相机仪器公司就签署了成立合资企业的协议。
Noyce and Bay liked the idea of penetrating the European market with no capital outlay, but they were unsure it merited trading their proprietary state-of-the-art knowledge about the most exciting development to emerge from Fairchild labs. They did not officially object to the plan, however, and the next thing they knew, Fairchild Camera and Instrument had signed the papers to establish the joint venture.
诺伊斯很快就发现，SGS公司是个棘手的难题，即使多次前往意大利也无法弥补。仙童公司不得不派遣几位顶尖的生产人员跨越大西洋，指导SGS的工程师如何制造硅平面晶体管——仙童公司对此损失颇深。与仙童公司独立运营相比，SGS的合资企业可能使其在欧洲市场领先两年，但作为合资公司董事的诺伊斯和霍奇森却难以左右SGS的决策，因为两家意大利公司的代表在董事会的许多议题上往往立场一致，反对仙童公司。
In very short order, Noyce found SGS a big headache for which even the trips to Italy could not compensate. Fairchild was obligated to send several top production people across the Atlantic to teach SGS engineers how to build silicon planar transistors—a loss Fairchild felt keenly. The SGS venture probably gave Fairchild a two-year lead in the European market relative to what the company could have achieved on its own, but Noyce and Hodgson, who served as directors of the joint-venture, had difficulty influencing decision making at SGS because representatives from the two Italian companies tended to vote together—and against Fairchild—on many issues before the board.
令诺伊斯担忧的还有与北美航空公司旗下的Autonetics公司签订的近800万美元的军方分包合同。Autonetics是空军“民兵”洲际弹道导弹项目的合作主承包商之一。Autonetics预计在该导弹项目中使用约1000个仙童公司生产的台面晶体管，并要求仙童公司为此设立一个可靠性评估部门（这将使仙童公司付出近100万美元的成本）。这将证明NPN晶体管的可靠性。公司这个专门负责可靠性的部门将完全独立于仙童半导体的其他部门运作，需要积累1.5亿小时的数据，以评估公司晶体管在类似于导弹发射时所承受的压力下的性能。诺伊斯试图说服Autonetics公司接受平面晶体管，而不是最初指定的台面晶体管，因为他预计平面晶体管的良率很快就会与台面晶体管的良率持平，鉴于平面器件更高的可靠性，他认为没有理由继续生产台面晶体管。72
Also preoccupying Noyce were nearly $8 million in military subcontracts with Autonetics, a division of North American Aviation, which was an associate prime contractor to the air force on the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile. Autonetics expected to use roughly 1,000 Fairchild mesa transistors on the missile contract and required Fairchild to establish a Reliability Evaluation Division (at a cost of nearly $1 million to Fairchild) that would demonstrate the reliability of the NPN transistors. This special reliability division of the company, which would be administered entirely separately from the rest of Fairchild, needed to accumulate 150 million hours of data on how the company’s transistors performed under stresses similar to those the devices would face in a missile shot. Noyce was trying to convince Autonetics to accept planar transistors instead of the mesa transistors originally specified, since he expected planar yields would soon match mesa yields and thus saw no reason to continue making mesa transistors given the greater reliability of the planar devices.72
在仙童半导体公司所有心怀不满的创始人中，没有谁比杰伊·拉斯特更加失望。他认为仙童半导体公司对他所研发的产品——集成电路——重视不足。1960年底，戈登·摩尔告诉他，计划大幅削减集成电路部门的人员。事实上，1961年1月中旬公布的研发预算中，唯一大幅裁员的部门是“微电路”部门。大约在同一时间，摩尔在一次研发人员会议上宣布：“好了，我们已经完成了集成电路的研发。接下来该做什么呢？”而拉斯特则认为他们的工作才刚刚开始。73
OF ALL THE DISCONTENTED FOUNDERS at Fairchild Semiconductor, none was more disillusioned than Jay Last. He thought Fairchild Semiconductor was giving the product on which he worked—the integrated circuit—short shrift. At the end of 1960, Gordon Moore had told him that he planned sizable cuts in the integrated circuits group. Indeed, the only significant personnel reductions in the R&D budget issued in mid-January, 1961, come from the “microcircuitry” group. It was at about this same time that Moore announced at an R&D staff meeting: “OK, we’ve done integrated circuits. What’s next?” Last, on the other hand, felt their work had barely started.73
杰伊·拉斯特还回忆起1960年11月的一次全体员工会议，会上汤姆·贝建议缩减或终止集成电路项目，“因为拉斯特已经在这个项目上浪费了一百万美元”。这个估计很可能被夸大了两倍，而且除了拉斯特所在的部门之外，其他部门也在集成电路上投入资金——贝本人甚至批准了集成电路的广告宣传、样品赠送和展会推广——但拉斯特说，当时没有人站出来为他辩护。主持会议的诺伊斯保持沉默。他不成文的规定是允许大家自由讨论分歧，自己不干预。有一次，在诺伊斯主持的一次员工会议上，一名员工为了强调自己的观点，猛敲桌子，结果摔断了手腕。74
Jay Last also recalls a general staff meeting in November 1960, at which Tom Bay suggested that the integrated circuit project be scaled back or shut down “since Last has already pissed away a million dollars on it.” That estimate was probably exaggerated by a factor of two, and divisions other than Last’s were spending money on integrated circuits—Bay himself had approved advertising, sample giveaways, and trade-show marketing for the integrated circuit—but Last says that no one came to his defense. Noyce, who was running the meeting, remained silent. His unwritten policy was to allow people to thrash out their disagreements without his intervening. An employee once broke his wrist banging on a table to make a point during one of Noyce’s staff meetings.74
他最后站起来，宣布他将立即休假，然后离开了。他尽可能地远离费尔柴尔德，横跨美国，回到母校麻省理工学院发表了一系列演讲。
Last stood up, announced he was taking a leave of absence—effective immediately—and walked out. He got as far from Fairchild as he easily could, traveling across the country to deliver a series of talks at his alma mater, MIT.
此时，曾帮助仙童公司获得初期融资的年轻银行家亚瑟·洛克重新回到了公司。洛克此前不久离开了纽约和海登·斯通，被斯坦福大学周围“充满活力的科学家们”所吸引，来到了加州。洛克和他的合伙人汤姆·戴维斯（曾任克恩县土地公司副总裁，负责克恩县的投资）刚刚成立了一家私人投资公司，并募集了500万美元的基金，计划投资新兴电子公司。这笔资金几乎全部来自洛克在东海岸金融界的朋友，但他同时也邀请了仙童公司的八位创始人进行投资。其中六位同意了。但诺伊斯和戈登·摩尔认为，根据他们的职位，在投资前必须征得Camera and Instrument公司的许可。Camera and Instrument公司立即禁止他们参与，理由是存在潜在的利益冲突。当时没有人注意到，戴维斯和罗克正在筹建西海岸第一支风险投资基金。75
At this point, Arthur Rock, the young banker who had helped with the initial Fairchild funding, re-entered the life of the company. Rock had recently left New York and Hayden, Stone, drawn to California by the “energetic scientists forming around Stanford.” Rock and a partner, Tom Davis, a former vice president of the Kern County Land Company who oversaw Kern’s investments, had just started a private investment company and raised a $5 million fund with plans to back new electronics companies. Almost all of this money came from Rock’s friends in the East Coast financial community, but he also invited the eight Fairchild founders to invest. Six agreed to do so immediately, but Noyce and Gordon Moore felt their positions required them to ask Camera and Instrument’s permission before investing. Camera and Instrument immediately forbade them from participating, citing potential conflict of interest. No one noted it at the time, but Davis and Rock were launching the first venture capital fund on the West Coast.75
洛克与杰伊·拉斯特成了挚友，因此了解拉斯特长期以来对仙童公司的不满。洛克还结识了亨利·辛格尔顿，这位拥有博士学位的工程师两年前离开了利顿工业公司的研究工作，创办了一家名为泰莱科技的高科技集团。辛格尔顿想在泰莱科技旗下成立一个部门，专门研发用于军事领域的先进半导体器件。换句话说，他想创办一家集成电路公司。
Rock had become a close friend to Jay Last and so knew of Last’s longstanding dissatisfactions at Fairchild. Rock had also made the acquaintance of Henry Singleton, a PhD engineer who had left his research job at Litton Industries two years before to start a high-tech conglomerate he called Teledyne. Singleton wanted to start a division of Teledyne to develop advanced semiconductor devices for military applications. In other words, he wanted to start an integrated circuits company.
后来成为全美顶尖企业牵线搭桥者的洛克，在过去的几个月里一直劝说拉斯特——拉斯特当时想负责一个完全专注于集成电路的业务——给辛格尔顿打电话。洛克也曾让辛格尔顿联系拉斯特，但两人都不愿先开口。最终，就在费尔柴尔德公司圣诞礼物交换当天——不知怎么的，拉斯特这个最讨厌这种场合的人，竟然被拉来扮演圣诞老人——洛克打电话来说辛格尔顿已经在电话旁等着了，拉斯特最好现在就给他回电话。
Rock, who would become one of the nation’s top corporate matchmakers, had spent the past few months urging Last, who wanted to oversee an operation devoted entirely to integrated circuits, to call Singleton. Rock had also asked Singleton to contact Last, but neither man wanted to make the first call. Finally, on the very day of the Fairchild Christmas gift exchange—somehow Last, who hated this sort of thing, had been roped into playing Santa—Rock called to say that he had Singleton waiting by the phone, and Last had better call him right now.
简短交谈后，拉斯特和辛格尔顿同意见面。杰伊·拉斯特说他会带让·霍尔尼一起去。霍尔尼觉得在费尔柴尔德公司晋升无望，因为研发总监的职位已被摩尔占据，她也渴望尝试新的工作。他和拉斯特驱车前往南加州——霍尔尼讨厌坐飞机——在1960年的最后一天，他们穿上最好的西装（他们称之为“谈判西装”），在西洛杉矶的泰莱达因公司办公室与辛格尔顿和他的联合创始人乔治·科兹梅茨基会面。会面持续了几个小时，最终结果令人满意，拉斯特和霍尔尼离开时几乎确信他们会为辛格尔顿工作。他们兴奋不已，驱车前往东莫哈韦沙漠深处，计划在新年那天攀登老妇人山。在日历翻到 1961 年之前，他们到达了露营地，站在繁星点点的夜空下，大声欢呼，鸣响汽车喇叭，迎接新年及其带来的新机遇。76
After a short conversation, Last and Singleton agreed to meet in person. Jay Last said he would bring Jean Hoerni to the meeting. Hoerni, who saw no hope for advancement at Fairchild with the R&D director’s slot now filled by Moore, was also eager to try something new. He and Last drove to southern California—Hoerni hated to fly—and on the last day of 1960, they donned their best suits (“negotiating suits,” they called them) and met with Singleton and his co-founder George Kozmetsky at the Teledyne office in West Los Angeles. The meeting lasted several hours and ended well enough that Last and Hoerni left feeling fairly certain they would go to work for Singleton. Restless with adrenalin, they drove far out into the East Mojave, where they had planned a New Year’s Day climb in the Old Woman Mountains. They arrived at their campsite just before the calendar flipped to 1961 and stood together under the star-pricked sky, shouting and honking the car horn to welcome the new year and its new opportunities.76
几天后回到山景城，莱斯特开始犹豫了。他感觉自己与仙童公司之间有着比之前意识到的更深的联系。他打电话给诺伊斯，询问公司集成电路业务的未来。诺伊斯却敷衍了事。他还没找到下个月就要开业的新二极管工厂的经理。而且，SGS的总经理接下来几天都在城里。诺伊斯希望与这位意大利高管建立关系，能在合资企业中为自己争取一些筹码。莱斯特能否等到这周晚些时候再谈？
Back in Mountain View a few days later, Last had second thoughts. He felt a deeper connection to Fairchild than he had known. He called Noyce to ask him about the future of integrated circuits at the company. Noyce put him off. He still had not found a manager for the new diode plant opening in less than a month. Moreover, the general manager of SGS was in town for the next few days. Noyce hoped a relationship with the Italian executive would give him some leverage at the joint venture. Could Last wait until later in the week to talk?
这个问题给了拉斯特想要的答案。1961年2月，他和霍尼以及谢尔顿·罗伯茨（罗伯茨很久以前就告诉过拉斯特和霍尼，如果机会合适，他会离开费尔柴尔德公司）一起从费尔柴尔德公司辞职，创办了泰莱达因公司的阿梅尔科分部。
The question gave Last the answer he needed. In February 1961, he, Hoerni, and Sheldon Roberts (who long ago had told Last and Hoerni that he would leave Fairchild if the right opportunity arose) resigned from Fairchild to start the Amelco division of Teledyne.
三位创始人的离职如同打开了仙童半导体的闸门。接下来的几个月里，一位关键研究员跳槽去了阿梅尔科公司。集成电路开发团队集体迁往桑尼维尔，在那里，他们与人事专家杰克·耶尔弗顿一起，利用三家投资银行（怀特韦尔德、雷曼兄弟和高盛）提供的100万美元启动资金，创办了一家名为Signetics的全集成电路公司。另一家集成电路公司Molectro也从仙童半导体剥离出来，戈登·摩尔的助手创办的一家为半导体公司制造熔炉的企业也同样如此。摩尔用他只对最亲密的同事才会展现的那种冷幽默告诉诺伊斯：“如果过去几周的人员扩张速度保持不变，我们最终可能只能达到60%的人员规模，而不是预期的60%。”77
The departure of three founders opened the floodgates at Fairchild. In the next few months, a key researcher left to join Amelco. The integrated circuits development team departed en masse to Sunnyvale, where they, along with personnel expert Jack Yelverton, started an all-integrated-circuits company called Signetics with $1 million in start-up funds from three investment banks (White Weld, Lehman Brothers, and Goldman Sachs). Another integrated circuits company, Molectro, spun out, as did an operation, started by Gordon Moore’s assistant, to build furnaces for semiconductor firms. Moore, with the dry wit he showed only to his closest associates, told Noyce, “If the personnel expansion rate of the last few weeks is maintained, instead of achieving a 60 percent expansion, we are likely to end up with about 60 percent of the personnel.”77
1962年1月，尤金·克莱纳的离职使仙童半导体公司只剩下创始团队的一半成员。这八位创始人此后只一起工作过一次，而且并非出于自愿。1963年平安夜，每位创始人都在家收到了一封挂号信。美国国税局向他们每人追缴了近25万美元的税款和罚款，这些税款和罚款与相机仪器公司收购仙童半导体公司有关。八位创始人共同聘请了一支顶尖的律师团队来应对这些指控。（“我很高兴这些费用可以抵税，”拉斯特说。“我很高兴这些费用可以分摊，”摩尔反驳道。）最终，此案以庭外和解告终，创始人们对此表示满意，但在此之前，他们都受到了不小的惊吓。78
Eugene Kleiner’s departure, in January 1962, left only half the founding team at Fairchild Semiconductor. The group of eight worked together as a group only one more time, and then not by choice. On Christmas Eve 1963, every founder received a registered letter at his home. The IRS had billed each of them nearly $250,000 in back taxes and penalties related to the acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor by Camera and Instrument. Together the group of eight hired a top-notch legal team to contest the charges. (“I’m glad these fees are deductible,” said Last. “I’m glad they are divisible,” Moore shot back.) The case was settled out of court to the founders’ satisfaction, but not before giving them all a good scare.78
这笔收购引起了美国国税局的注意，因为在1959年，一位年轻科学家在一年半内赚到超过25万美元似乎有些不妥。然而，对于那些1961年离开仙童半导体公司的人来说，这种前景不仅合情合理，而且具有潜在的可复制性。如果他们创办自己的公司，就可以掌控公司并持有多数股份。这与他们在仙童半导体公司的处境形成鲜明对比：他们没有管理控制权，没有晋升高级管理层的机会，也没有公司的大部分股份，尽管他们中的一些人对公司的成功做出了重要贡献。继续做一名雇员还是作为创始人另起炉灶，意味着要在每月两次的薪水和潜在的巨额财富之间做出选择，正如一位离职者所说，是在“仅仅是一份工作”和“尝到血的滋味”之间做出抉择。79
The acquisition had caught the attention of the IRS because it seemed somehow wrong in 1959 for a young scientist to make more than a quarter-million dollars in a year and a half. This prospect, however, struck the men who left Fairchild Semiconductor in 1961 as not only fair but also potentially reproducible. If they started their own companies, they could run them and hold the majority of stock. Contrast this with their situation at Fairchild, where they had no managerial control, no prospect of moving into senior management, and no significant stake in the company, even though some of these men had been instrumental in its success. To stay on as an employee or to start something new as a founder was a choice between a twice-monthly paycheck and a potential fortune, between what one person who left called “just a job” and “a taste of blood.”79
为什么要留下？市场显然在说离开。1958年，电子股的涨幅是道琼斯工业平均指数的两倍；一年后，它们的价值又增长了50%。全国各地，新的半导体公司纷纷从老牌企业中剥离出来。在南加州，Microsemiconductors从Pacific Semiconductors中剥离出来。在纽约，硅晶体管公司起诉了一家由其前员工创办的未具名公司。迪奥特兰太平洋公司从帕洛阿尔托的电玻璃公司（Electroglass）分拆出来，而梅尔帕公司则起诉了一群员工，指控他们在弗吉尼亚州创办了一家名为Scope的公司。据估计，到1961年底，在20世纪50年代中期存在的寥寥几家半导体公司的基础上，已经涌现出150到200家半导体企业。80
Why stay? The market certainly said to go. In 1958, electronics stocks had risen twice as fast as the Dow Jones industrial average; one year later, their value increased another 50 percent. Across the country, new semiconductor firms were spinning out of old. In Southern California, Microsemiconductors spun out of Pacific Semiconductors. In New York, Silicon Transistor filed suit against an unnamed firm started by its own former employees. Diotran Pacific emerged from Electroglass in Palo Alto, and Melpar sued a group of employees for starting a firm called Scope in Virginia. One estimate holds that by the end of 1961, between 150 and 200 semiconductor operations had emerged from the handful of companies that had existed in the mid-1950s.80
事实上，1960年和1961年电子产品热潮如此之大，以至于新公司能够以与老牌公司类似的条件筹集资金。美国证券交易委员会甚至不得不向消费者发出警告，提醒他们注意“太空时代股票发行和销售中的不当行为”。一家报纸报道称，经纪人几乎愿意为任何一家由“40岁以下的优秀电气工程师”管理的公司发行股票。81
Indeed, the frenzy for electronics was so great in 1960 and 1961 that new companies could raise capital on terms similar to those enjoyed by established firms. The Securities and Exchange Commission even felt obliged to issue a warning to consumers about “improper practices in the issuance and sale of space-age stocks.” One newspaper reported that brokers were willing to float an issue for almost any company managed by “a bright electrical engineer under 40 years of age.”81
在仙童公司从事集成电路工作的人员离开还有另一个原因。将微逻辑（集成电路）生产线从研发转向生产——在1961年分拆时，这一过程进展缓慢——暴露了公司这两个关键部门之间存在的巨大鸿沟，而这很容易被利用。从广义上讲，一个器件从概念到产品要经历三个截然不同的阶段。首先，研发部门确定某个设计的可行性，或者发现可能具有商业价值的主要效应。在开发阶段（也就是拉斯特团队工作的地方），对硅片进行掺杂、蚀刻和其他各种调整，直到能够成功制造出原型，然后生产出一小批器件。
The people who worked with integrated circuits at Fairchild had an additional motivation for leaving. Moving the Micrologic (integrated circuit) line from R&D to manufacturing—a process that was haltingly progressing at the time of the spinouts in 1961—had revealed a chasm between these two key parts of the company that could easily be exploited. In the broadest terms, a device passed through three distinct stages from concept to product. First, the R&D division determined the feasibility of a certain design, or else discovered a primary effect that might have some commercial value. In the development stage, which is where Last’s team worked, slivers of silicon were doped, etched, and otherwise tinkered with until a successful prototype, and then a small batch of devices, could be produced.
从研发到第三阶段——制造——的过渡，在某种程度上是半导体器件上市过程中最棘手的部分。在制造阶段，每周要在一个巨大的晶圆厂里生产数千个器件，由几十名女工操作——这与研发阶段截然不同，研发阶段是在受控的实验室环境中，几周内生产不到1000个器件。
The transition from development to the third stage, manufacturing, was in some sense the trickiest part of getting a semiconductor device to market. In manufacturing, several thousand devices were produced every week in a cavernous fab manned by dozens of “girls”—quite a different undertaking from the development stage, in which fewer than 1,000 devices were churned out over several weeks’ time in a controlled laboratory setting.
从研发到生产的转变笼罩着一层神秘的面纱。器件在研发阶段运行良好，并不意味着它就能可靠地进行大规模生产。工厂里会出现一些实验室里根本不存在的问题。有时，这些问题会莫名其妙地消失，然后又突然出现。曾经有效的解决方案，下次可能就失效了。半导体制造的许多环节当时都鲜为人知，因此遇到的问题都被赋予了诸如“紫色瘟疫”和“红色死神”之类的形象名称。科学家们在描述他们的工艺技术时，也经常使用“黑魔法”和“巫术”之类的词语。在半导体行业，将器件或技术转移到生产过程中，问题接踵而至的情况屡见不鲜，以至于一度……摩尔高兴地告诉诺伊斯：“没有出现新的重大问题，这算是一种进步。”82
A strangely mystical aura surrounded the move from development to manufacturing. The fact that a device worked in development did not automatically mean that it could be reliably manufactured in mass quantities. Problems appeared in the fab that simply had not existed in the lab. Sometimes the problems would disappear for no apparent reason, only to suddenly reappear. Solutions that worked one time might not work the next. Many elements of semiconductor manufacturing were so poorly understood that the problems encountered were given colorful names, such as “Purple Plague” and “Red Death.” Scientists routinely referred to “black magic” and “witches’ brew” in describing their process techniques. At Semiconductor, the appearance of one problem after another in transferring a device or technique to manufacturing was so common that, at one point, Moore was happy to tell Noyce, “No new significant problems have arisen, which is a kind of progress.”82
到1961年，仙童半导体公司的研发和生产部门不仅不在同一个办公楼，甚至分属不同的城市：研发部门搬到了帕洛阿尔托，而生产工厂则位于山景城。两地之间的矛盾根深蒂固，以至于摩尔向诺伊斯吐露心声：“我们的转移流程充斥着各种会议，每个人都必须参加，以保住自己的职位。”摩尔和研发团队对这些延误深感不满，因为Micrologic元件每耽误一天生产，研发试生产线就得花一天时间来生产Micrologic器件，而无法开展新的工作。当然，生产部门认为他们已经尽了全力推进项目，并抱怨研发部门不愿派人去山景城帮助生产部门解决工艺问题。83
By 1961, Fairchild Semiconductor’s R&D and manufacturing operations were not just in different buildings, but in different towns: R&D had moved to Palo Alto, and the manufacturing fab was in Mountain View. The tensions between the two sites ran so deep that Moore confided to Noyce that “our transfer procedure is plagued by meetings that must be attended by everyone to protect their positions.” Moore and the R&D team resented these delays because every day that the Micrologic elements were not coming out of manufacturing was another day that the development pilot line was occupied with building Micrologic devices instead of moving on to new work. Manufacturing, of course, felt that they were doing all they could to move things along, and they complained that R&D was unwilling to send anyone to Mountain View to help manufacturing get through process troubles.83
晚年，诺伊斯试图缓和研发部门与生产部门之间的紧张关系。他召集员工共同应对诸如此类的问题：
In later years, Noyce would try to ease the tensions between development and manufacturing. He pulled his staff together to tackle agendas like this one:
沟通渠道——如何缩短这些渠道？必须做出决定！
Communication lines—how can these be shortened? Decisions must be made!
反应时间——为什么我们做得这么差？
Reaction time—why are we doing so poorly?
新产品转移过程中会遇到哪些问题？
What are problems on transferring new products?
a. 足够的研发投入
a. Enough R&D
b. 足够的工厂努力84
b. Enough factory effort84
但在1961年，也就是仙童半导体公司第一次人员外流之前，诺伊斯似乎并没有采取多少措施来弥合研发部门和制造部门之间的鸿沟。或许他认为这种鸿沟及其带来的紧张关系是半导体行业的常态。毕竟，半导体行业的鼻祖贝尔实验室根本没有制造部门。制造工作是由一家独立但组织结构相关的公司——西电公司——负责的。或许诺伊斯认为，随着查理·斯波克接管制造部门，仙童半导体公司就能克服这些困难；或许诺伊斯想让斯波克和摩尔自己解决这些问题；又或许诺伊斯当时正忙于意大利、赛奥塞特和其他地方的事务，无暇顾及这些琐碎的冲突。
But in 1961, before the first exodus from Fairchild Semiconductor, Noyce seems to have done little to bridge the divide between his development and manufacturing groups. Perhaps he considered this gap and its attendant tensions to be a normal part of the semiconductor business. After all, Bell Labs, the granddaddy of the semiconductor industry, had no manufacturing division at all. Manufacturing was done at a separate, though organizationally related, company: Western Electric. Perhaps Noyce thought that Fairchild would outgrow these difficulties when Charlie Sporck settled into his new job at the helm of manufacturing, or perhaps Noyce wanted to let Sporck and Moore fix the problems themselves, or perhaps Noyce was too distracted with affairs in Italy, Syosset, and elsewhere to pay attention to such nitty-gritty conflicts.
无论研发与制造脱节持续存在的原因是什么，从半导体行业剥离出来的公司都利用了这一点。如果仙童公司无法生产自己研发的产品，那么研发团队就会成立自己的公司来生产这些产品——并试图从中获利。
Whatever the reason for the development-manufacturing divide’s persistence, the companies that spun out of Semiconductor used it to their own advantage. If Fairchild could not manage to build the products it developed, then the development teams would launch their own companies to build them—and try to make a bit of money in the process.
近一年来，几乎每个月都会传来新的分拆公司或关键人物离职的消息，诺伊斯似乎有些不知所措。他也感到很受伤，尤其是当他的创始伙伴们离开时。诺伊斯偶尔会和霍尼、罗伯茨、拉斯特以及阿特·罗克一起在周末去优胜美地国家公园的偏远地区攀岩或徒步旅行——这些活动非常消耗体力，以至于他们回家后不得不互相搀扶着下车。现在，这四人中的三位已经离开，还有第四位也加入了他们的行列。尽管如此，当诺伊斯能够将个人情感抛诸脑后时，他也能理解财富和管理权的诱惑。他保持着一种超然的态度，对于每一个宣布离职的人，他都面带微笑，并送上美好的祝愿。他还总是友好地告诫他们，不要在费尔柴尔德公司内部过度招人。他说，他不想把自己的朋友和前员工告上法庭。85
For nearly a year, when every month seemed to bring the announcement of another new spin-off or another key player’s defection, Noyce seemed a bit stunned. Hurt, too, particularly when his fellow founders left. Noyce had occasionally joined Hoerni, Roberts, Last, and Art Rock on weekend climbs or hikes in the Yosemite back country—excursions so physically draining that the men had to help each other out of the car when they got home. Now three of these men had left, with the assistance of the fourth. Nonetheless, when Noyce could push his personal feelings aside, he could appreciate the siren song of wealth and managerial control. He maintained a philosophical attitude and managed a smile and good wishes for anyone who said they were leaving. He also warned them, his tone always friendly, not to recruit too aggressively from the Fairchild ranks. He would rather not take his friends and former employees to court, he said.85
诺伊斯对同事们的离职感到难过，但仙童半导体公司在1961年的出色表现无疑缓解了他的悲伤。仅这一年，仙童半导体公司在全球半导体市场的份额和产品线规模就翻了一番。主要得益于仙童半导体公司的强劲增长，仙童相机与仪器公司也创下了利润（600万美元）和销售额（1.015亿美元）的双纪录，股价飙升，并在两年内第二次进行了1拆2的股票分割。到1962年底，销售额又增长了10%，利润增长了14%，半导体部门的员工人数达到了约3000人。86
Noyce’s sadness at his colleagues’ departures was certainly eased by the fantastic performance of Fairchild Semiconductor throughout 1961. In that single year, Semiconductor doubled both its share of the world semiconductor market and the size of its product line. Largely on the strength of Semiconductor’s growth, Fairchild Camera and Instrument boasted record highs in both profits ($6 million) and sales ($101.5 million), its share price soared, and the stock split two for one for the second time in two years. By the end of 1962, sales were up another 10 percent, profits 14 percent, and some 3,000 people worked for the Semiconductor division.86
6
一个古怪的小后起之秀
6
A Strange Little Upstart
诺伊斯曾说过：“管理者的职责是赋能，而非指令……如今，领导力的首要品质是指导而非指示。要扫清障碍，让人们发挥所长。” 他在管理实验室时就采用了这种方法，担任总经理后也延续了这一做法。他会给那些工作令他印象深刻的研究人员写亲笔信。他会亲自到员工办公室感谢他们的付出——而且他的感谢真诚到让一位受到赞扬的员工将这种体验比作“百分之百的加薪”。诺伊斯管理风格的许多要素逐渐渗透到基层。主管们往往把工作交给下属，让他们自行完成，很少提供指导，也很少进行系统的跟进来检查进度。1
Noyce once said that “the job of the manager is an enabling, not a directive job … coaching, and not direction, is the first quality of leadership now. Get the barriers out of the way to let people do the things they do well.” He had adopted this approach when he ran the lab, and as general manager, he continued it. He wrote personal notes to researchers whose work impressed him. He poked his head into employees’ offices to thank them for their work—and said it sincerely enough that one man so complimented compared the experience to “a hundred percent raise.” Many of the elements of Noyce’s managerial style trickled through the ranks. Supervisors tended to give the people who worked for them a job and let them do it themselves, with little guidance and often little systematic follow-through to check on progress.1
自1959年诺伊斯担任总经理以来，他对等级制度的蔑视就一直存在，并在五年内彻底渗透到公司的各个角落。1964年，一位访客描述了仙童公司大楼“缺乏装饰”，“这里氛围随意，办公室远不如摩托罗拉的豪华，摩托罗拉首席执行官的办公室大约是诺伊斯办公室的四倍大。”诺伊斯经常在半导体主楼里漫步，大声欣赏员工办公桌上的家庭照片。他会停下来与任何人闲聊，对员工的私生活了如指掌。诺伊斯喜欢召集一群见多识广的人，倾听他们的意见，理想情况下，在做出决定之前，他希望获得对下一步行动的广泛认可。他的团队——一小群经理——每周都会在当地一家名为Chez Yvonne的餐厅小酌。这与相机与仪器公司其他部门的会议形成鲜明对比，那些会议并非为了共同决策，而是为了将约翰·卡特的命令下达给下属。尽管1964年的来访者认为仙童半导体公司随意的氛围是“缺乏专业精神”的证据——“他们似乎只是在装模作样地参与其中。专业的管理团队……”“这种想法根本不存在”——对于诺伊斯来说，他秉持着平等主义思想，这让他感到自豪。2
Noyce’s disdain of hierarchy, present since he assumed the reins as general manager in 1959, was thoroughly imprinted upon the company within five years. A visitor in 1964 described the “lack of adornments” in the Fairchild building, the “informal feel to the place [with] offices nowhere near as plush as you’d find at a Motorola, where [the CEO’s] office was about four times the size of Noyce’s office.” Noyce would wander through the main Semiconductor building, admiring aloud the family photos that employees had on their desks. He would stop to talk to anyone about anything and knew many details of his employees’ personal lives. Noyce liked to gather a group of informed people in a room, listen to their opinions, and ideally, get a broad acceptance on the next steps before he made a decision. His staff—a small group of managers—met weekly over cocktails at Chez Yvonne, a local restaurant. This was in sharp contrast to meetings in other parts of the Camera and Instrument organization, which were held not to make joint decisions but to pass commands from John Carter down to his subordinates. Although the visitor in 1964 viewed the casual atmosphere at Fairchild Semiconductor as evidence of “a lack of professionalism”—“they seem to be playing at going into this. The professional management type of idea just isn’t there”—for Noyce, with his egalitarian notions, it was a point of pride.2
仙童公司的一份内部通讯曾列出公司经理们经常说的一些话，这些话后来都成了他们的标志性口号。斯波克的“高管表情”是一声悲观的哼哼；贝的则是心不在焉的“嗯哼”。而诺伊斯的口头禅则是：“今天有什么新鲜事儿？”诺伊斯总是着眼于未来及其技术前景。例如，1965年，他在一次金融分析师聚会上表示，他预计有一天会在“便携式电话、个人寻呼系统和掌上电视”中看到集成电路。大约在同一时期，他还预言“未来每个行业都会像现在拥有机械加工车间一样拥有自己的电子车间”。到了20世纪60年代末，诺伊斯热衷于思考如何制造出可以翻转到眼镜上方的超薄小型电视屏幕，方便观看。肯尼迪号召美国人登月，这令诺伊斯兴奋不已。他迫不及待地与所有愿意倾听的人探讨如何在登月计划中最佳地运用固态器件。他毕生致力于太空旅行，即使在突破地球大气层限制已成为常态之后，他仍然经常删除自己的电视采访录像，以便为各种发射升空的视频留出空间。3
The Fairchild company newsletter once listed the comments made so often by company managers that they had become signature taglines. Sporck’s “executive expression” was a bearish harrumph; Bay’s was a distracted mmmhmmm. For Noyce, the comment was, “Well, what’s new and exciting today?” Noyce forever looked to the future and its technical promise. In 1965, for example, he told a gathering of financial analysts that he expected one day to see integrated circuits inside of “portable telephones, personal paging systems, and palm-sized TVs.” Around the same time, he predicted that “the time will come when every industry will have its electronics shop just the way it has its machine shop right now.” At the end of the 1960s, Noyce enjoyed thinking about how he might build thin tiny television screens that could flip down over a pair of glasses for easy viewing. Kennedy’s call for Americans to land on the moon thrilled Noyce, who eagerly talked with anyone who would listen about how solid-state devices would best be deployed in the moon shot. He was a lifelong devotee of space travel who, well after it became commonplace to push beyond the confines of the earth’s atmosphere, regularly erased his own television interviews to make room for video recordings of various liftoffs.3
诺伊斯对未来和创新的关注激发了许多仙童半导体员工的创造力，并渗透到公司的各个角落。诚然，在20世纪60年代中期，仙童半导体并非一家典型的半导体公司。1963年加入公司的安迪·格鲁夫曾将仙童描述为“一家古怪的小创业公司”，这句话恰如其分地概括了这家公司的本质。诺伊斯非传统的管理风格只是仙童众多创新举措之一。在实验室里，公司非正式的政策允许“博士们在期待成果之前，先玩弄他们的‘玩具’（想法）大约一年”。如果某个想法吸引了研究人员——无论出于何种原因——他都可以自由地去研究。这种对“相关性”较为宽松的定义，使得仙童的研究人员在集成电路技术发展的最初二十年里，开发出了大约六分之一的重大创新成果。4
Noyce’s focus on the future and innovation appealed to the creative instincts of many Fairchild Semiconductor employees and permeated the company. To be sure, in the mid-1960s, Fairchild Semiconductor was not a typical semiconductor company. Andy Grove, who joined in 1963, once described Fairchild as “a strange little upstart,” a phrase that captures the essence of the organization. Noyce’s unorthodox management style was just one innovation launched at Fairchild. In the lab, informal company policy allowed “PhDs to play with their ‘toys’ [ideas] for about a year” before expecting results. If an idea appealed to a researcher—for whatever reason—he was free to pursue it. This rather loose definition of relevance led Fairchild researchers to develop roughly one-sixth of all major integrated circuit innovations during the technology’s first two decades.4
在诺伊斯的领导下，研发部门以外的其他部门也同样极具创新精神。1964年，半导体行业摒弃了传统的以产品为中心的营销模式，转而采用以应用为中心的销售方式。例如，仙童半导体不再设立二极管或晶体管销售经理，而是设立娱乐消费市场经理或军工市场经理。每件产品都附带一份技术手册，其内容之详尽远超竞争对手，以至于这些由仙童半导体工程师编写的手册本身也成为了产品的一部分。1961年，仙童半导体宣布其半导体产品不仅通过分销商（按佣金销售，代表传统销售渠道）销售，还将通过个人代表进行销售。他们会直接购买产品，然后转手出售赚取利润。这些库存代理商实际上成为了半导体公司的第二销售力量。1967年，该公司播出了世界上最早的“信息广告”之一——一档半小时的“集成电路简报”，旨在通过轻松有趣的讨论和生动的插图，向工程师们介绍集成电路的最新技术，并为他们带来娱乐。5
Divisions outside of R&D were likewise highly innovative under Noyce’s leadership. In 1964, Semiconductor replaced the industry’s traditional product-based marketing structure with an application-based selling approach. Instead of a diode or transistor sales manager, for example, Fairchild would have an entertainment-consumer market manager or a military market manager. Each product was shipped with a technical manual that was so much more informative and detailed than any competitor’s that the manuals, written by Fairchild engineers, became products themselves. In 1961, Fairchild announced that its semiconductor products would be available not only through distributors (who sold on commission and represented the traditional sales channel) but also via individual representatives who would buy products outright and sell them at a profit. These stocking representatives in effect became a secondary sales force for Semiconductor. In 1967, the company broadcast one of the world’s first “infomercials”—a half-hour “Briefing on Integrated Circuits,” designed to update and entertain engineers with chipper discussions and colorful illustrations of the state of the art in integrated circuits.5
自仙童半导体公司成立以来，公司一直专注于创新，因此拒绝了大部分直接的政府合同。当然，诺伊斯深知，如果没有政府——特别是国防部——仙童半导体公司根本无法生存。在公司成立的头两年，政府直接采购占仙童半导体公司销售额的35%，最终超过一半的产品都落入了政府手中。价值数百万美元的“民兵”导弹晶体管合同巩固了公司的成功，而仙童半导体公司早期的绝大多数客户都是航空航天公司，他们购买产品用于自身的政府合同项目。1960年，仙童半导体公司80%的晶体管用于军事用途，而公司早期生产的集成电路也全部用于国防领域。公司与军工承包商密切合作，共同设计和制造产品。即使到了 20 世纪 60 年代中期，当 Fairchild Semiconductor 努力开拓工业和商业市场时，其产品仍然可以在航天器的监视雷达和发射器中找到；在北极星、民兵和 Advent 导弹中；以及在 MAGIC 机载惯性制导计算机和 MARTAC 导弹控制计算机中。6
Ever since Fairchild’s inception, the focus on innovation had led the company to reject most direct government contract work. Of course, Noyce knew that without the government—specifically, the Department of Defense—Fairchild Semiconductor would not exist. In the company’s first two years, direct government purchases accounted for 35 percent of Fairchild Semiconductor’s sales, and well over half of the company’s products eventually found their way into government hands. The multimillion-dollar Minuteman contract for transistors cemented the company’s success, and the vast majority of Fairchild Semiconductor’s other early customers were aerospace firms buying products to use in their own government contract work. In 1960, 80 percent of Fairchild’s transistors went to military uses, and fully 100 percent of the company’s early integrated circuits were used in defense functions as well. The company worked closely with military contractors in designing and building its products. Even by the mid-1960s, when Fairchild Semiconductor assiduously courted the industrial and commercial markets, its products nonetheless could also be found in surveillance radar and transmitters for space vehicles; in Polaris, Minuteman, and Advent missiles; and in the MAGIC airborne inertial guidance computer, as well as the MARTAC missile-control computer.6
尽管诺伊斯欢迎政府成为客户，也理解联邦政府的强制性规定——例如1964年4月颁布的一项法令，要求所有电视机都必须配备超高频调谐器，这项法令实际上强制要求美国所有电视机都采用晶体管——能够使仙童半导体公司受益，但他认为用政府合同资金资助研发项目“几乎是不道德的”。1964年，他向一位来访者解释说：“政府资助研发会扼杀人们的积极性。他们知道（他们的工作）是为了政府，是由政府资金支持的，而且存在很多浪费。这不是进行创造性、创新性工作的方式。”他补充道：“完成某件事的最佳方法是对自己和你的团队有足够的信心，让他们自己动手。”7
Though Noyce welcomed the government as a customer and appreciated that federal mandates—such as one issued in April 1964, that required all televisions be equipped with UHF tuners, a law that effectively forced the introduction of transistors into every television in the United States—could benefit Fairchild Semiconductor, he believed there was something “almost unethical” about using government contract money to fund R&D projects. “Government funding of R&D has a deadening effect upon the incentives of the people,” he explained to a visitor in 1964. “They know that [their work] is for the government, that it is supported by government dollars, that there is a lot of waste. This is not the way to get creative, innovative work done.” He added, “The best way to get something done is to have enough confidence in yourself and your men to do it yourselves.”7
诺伊斯还对政府发布的招标邀请书感到不满，认为其“措辞仿佛所有投标者都是骗子”。他曾向年幼的儿子抱怨说：“他们不只是说想要某个结果，还要具体列出每一项测试，每一项结果。”这种官僚作风——以及投标公司必须遵守的官僚作风——在诺伊斯看来既浪费资源，也让他担心这种过于详细的要求会限制投标的可行性。实验室需要具备创造性的灵活性，去探索研究过程中可能意外出现的“有趣的副产品”。“一个年轻的组织，尤其是在电子行业，必须行动迅速，”他在1964年解释道，“政府项目单方面规定的方向会给它带来问题。” 到那时，公司已经相对成熟，诺伊斯回忆说：“我们是一群年轻、充满干劲、渴望成功的团队。[我们的态度是]‘伙计，我们才不在乎你[给多少钱]。我们要自己搞定。’” 戈登·摩尔也认同诺伊斯的理念。因此，尽管20世纪60年代初其他公司都将政府合同作为研发资金的主要来源，但1963年仙童公司只有不到10%的业务是直接来自政府的合同。“我们喜欢这样，”诺伊斯急忙告诉记者。8
Noyce also resented that the proposal requests issued by the government were “written as if everyone who bid was a crook,” complaining to his son, who was only a boy, that “it’s not enough to say they want a certain result; they specify every test to be run, every result they want to see.” The bureaucracy this represented—and required in the bidding company—seemed wasteful to Noyce, and he also worried that such specificity limited a lab’s creative flexibility to explore the “interesting slop” that might unexpectedly emerge in the midst of research. “A young organization, especially in the electronics industry has to be fast moving,” he explained in 1964. “It runs into problems with the unilateral direction mandated by government work.” By this point, the company was relatively well established, and Noyce reminisced, “We were a hard, young, hungry group. [Our attitude was] ‘We don’t give a damn what [money] you have [to offer], buddy. We’re going to do this ourselves.’” Gordon Moore shared Noyce’s beliefs. Consequently, while other firms in the early 1960s used government contracting as the primary source of R&D funding, less than 10 percent of business at Fairchild was contracted directly by the government in 1963. “And we like it that way,” Noyce hastened to tell a reporter.8
20世纪60年代初，仙童半导体开始拓展国际业务。1965年以前，除了少数例外（例如仙童半导体与奥利维蒂-泰莱特拉合资的SGS公司），美国半导体行业的研发、生产、组装、测试和销售全部半导体产品都在美国本土完成。仙童半导体打破了这一常规。1962年5月，诺伊斯的助手杰里·莱文（Jerry Levine）酷爱旅行，又极具商业头脑，他动用了三年积累的假期，自费前往香港，因为他认为仙童半导体应该考虑在那里建一座组装厂。莱文几个月来一直在谈论这件事。亚洲的劳动力成本低廉——每天1美元的工资就算很不错了——而且当地的劳动力完全有能力组装和封装面向娱乐市场的低性能晶体管，这些市场对产品的要求远不及军工或计算机市场那么高。
In the early 1960s, Fairchild began to internationalize its business. Before 1965, with only a few exceptions (among them, SGS, the Fairchild-Olivetti-Telettra joint venture), the United States semiconductor industry researched, developed, manufactured, assembled, tested, and marketed every semiconductor from a location on American soil. Fairchild broke the mold. In May 1962, Noyce’s assistant Jerry Levine, who had a penchant for travel and a nose for business, cashed in three years’ accumulated vacation days and paid his own way to Hong Kong because he thought Fairchild should consider building an assembly plant there. Levine had been talking about this for months. Labor costs were low in Asia—$1 a day was considered a good wage—and the workforce was certainly capable of assembling and packaging low-performance transistors destined for the entertainment market, which did not have the exacting standards of the military or computer markets.
几乎所有听到莱文想法的人都觉得他疯了，竟然设想仙童公司能把接近完成的半导体器件运送5000英里，跨越重洋，教一个文化迥异的人们如何组装和封装，然后再把器件运回加州进行测试。然而，诺伊斯却不认为莱文的想法行不通。多年来，美国的晶体管收音机一直在菲律宾和印度生产，而旧金山湾区的电子公司安培克斯在香港也拥有一家成功的小型低技能组装厂。“香港有空间。我应该安排好海外运营的组织工作。”诺伊斯在与莱文会面后写道。“这事儿就交给我了，”他补充道，意思是说他需要采取下一步行动。9
Nearly everyone who heard Levine’s idea thought he was crazy to imagine that Fairchild could send nearly finished semiconductor devices 5,000 miles across the ocean, teach people from a vastly different culture how to assemble and package them, and then ship the devices back to California for testing. Noyce, on the other hand, did not see why Levine’s idea should not work. American transistor radios had been fabricated in the Philippines and India for years, and the Bay Area electronics firm Ampex had a successful, small, low-skilled assembly operation in Hong Kong. “Space in Hong Kong. I should work out responsibilities for organization of o[ver]seas operation.” Noyce wrote to himself after his meeting with Levine. “My ball,” he added, meaning that he needed to take the next step.9
诺伊斯深知，支付给负责组装和测试仙童产品的员工的工资是公司最大的开支。德州仪器和摩托罗拉都已将部分低技能的测试和组装流程自动化以降低成本，但1960年仙童晶体管工厂进行的一次“半自动装配线”试验，却让诺伊斯和制造主管斯波克都信服了。自动化的前期成本令人望而却步，而且由于生产流程变化迅速，机器可能一年安装一次，第二年就需要重新改造，因此收益也难以预料。莱文首次访问香港一个月后，诺伊斯要求斯波克和担任设施经理的朱利叶斯·布兰克亲自前往香港考察。斯波克和布兰克回到加州后，确信莱文的想法值得一试。香港具备理想厂址的三大关键要素：低工资、低建筑成本，以及大量潜在的女性劳动力，她们的手指纤细灵活，这对于装配工作至关重要。此外，香港还有特殊的关税政策，允许将零部件运往海外进行组装的公司，以“低附加值”关税将零部件重新进口到美国进行测试和分销。10
Noyce knew that paychecks for people who assembled and tested Fairchild’s products were the single largest source of the company’s expenses. Texas Instruments and Motorola had both automated chunks of their low-skilled test and assembly processes to cut costs, but a brief experiment with a “semi-automatic assembly line” at a Fairchild transistor plant in 1960 had convinced both Noyce and manufacturing head Sporck that the upfront costs of automation were daunting, and the payoff uncertain since production processes changed so quickly that machines installed one year might need to be retooled the next. One month after Levine’s initial trip to Hong Kong, Noyce asked Sporck and Julius Blank, who served as facilities manager, to visit Hong Kong themselves. Sporck and Blank returned to California convinced that Levine’s idea was worth trying. Hong Kong offered the three key features of a good plant location: low wages, low building costs, and a large potential workforce of women whose small fingers and dexterity were considered critical for assembly work. Adding to the attraction were special tariff regulations allowing companies that shipped components overseas for assembly to re-import them into the United States for testing and distribution under a special “low-value-added” duty.10
但要说服相机与仪器董事会接受这个想法，却是另一回事。诺伊斯和理查德·霍奇森也与莱文会面，他们在1964年1月的董事会议上正式提议在香港建立一家组装厂，正如霍奇森所说，他们“几乎被赶出了会议室”。20世纪60年代初，香港正经历着大规模的开发，而拟建半导体新厂的选址当时完全被淹没——不久后政府将从海湾填海造陆。有人反对这项提议，认为风险和成本高昂，而且香港女性难以接受培训。诺伊斯和霍奇森坚持不懈，反复强调税收优惠和其他行业的先例。董事会最终同意进行小规模试验。11
Convincing the Camera and Instrument board to go along with the idea was another matter entirely. Noyce and Richard Hodgson, who also met with Levine, formally proposed a Hong Kong assembly plant at the January 1964 directors’ meeting and were “practically thrown out of the board room,” as Hodgson put it. Hong Kong was undergoing massive development in the early 1960s, and the site proposed for a new semiconductor facility was then completely under water—soon to be reclaimed from the bay by the government. Objections about risk and cost and the untrainability of the women in Hong Kong were aired. Noyce and Hodgson persisted, reiterating the tax benefits and precedents in other industries. The board ultimately agreed to a small-scale experiment.11
从1965年中期开始，仙童半导体公司将硅晶圆从山景城运往香港的一家工厂。这家工厂每周生产10万个平面晶体管，拥有约12名技术人员和135名生产员工，每人日薪仅1美元——比美国同行每小时的收入还要低。后来，当香港的日薪接近2美元时，仙童半导体公司又在韩国增设了生产设施，那里的日薪为80美分。12
Beginning in mid-1965, Fairchild shipped silicon wafers from Mountain View to a Hong Kong plant that would produce 100,000 planar transistors per week with the help of a staff of about 12 technical and 135 production employees, each of whom was paid one dollar per day—less than their American counterparts earned in an hour. Later, when wages in Hong Kong neared $2 per day, Semiconductor added production facilities in Korea, where the daily wage was 80 cents.12
香港工厂是仙童半导体公司在海外设立的六家组装厂中的第一家。到1965年，仙童半导体已在五个国家设有工厂——意大利（SGS）、香港、英国（伦敦的SGS工厂）、澳大利亚（墨尔本附近的一个小型实验室）和美国。到1968年，仙童半导体在美国以外的工厂拥有约4000名员工，厂房面积达14.5万平方英尺——比五年前增加了40倍，厂房面积增加了11倍。更令人瞩目的是，仙童半导体海外工厂的产量在五年内增长了约500倍。13
The Hong Kong facility was the first in a string of some half-dozen offshore assembly plants for Fairchild. By 1965, Fairchild had facilities in five countries—Italy (SGS), Hong Kong, England (an SGS plant in London), Australia (a small lab near Melbourne), and the United States. By 1968, Fairchild employed some 4,000 people in 145,000 square feet of plant space outside the United States—40 times more people and 11 times more building space than five years earlier. More impressive, production output at Semiconductor’s overseas facilities had jumped some 500 times in five years.13
包括摩托罗拉、菲尔科-福特、Signetics、Transitron 和雷神在内的其他主要半导体公司迅速效仿了这一离岸外包策略。不到五年时间，美国半导体产业就实现了跨国化。到 1974 年，占美国半导体产量 75% 的 32 家半导体公司在其他国家拥有 69 家组装厂。14
Other major semiconductor firms, including Motorola, Philco-Ford, Signetics, Transitron, and Raytheon, quickly imitated the offshore move. In less than half a decade, the American semiconductor industry went multinational. By 1974, the 32 semiconductor firms that together represented 75 percent of American production had 69 assembly plants in other countries.14
香港工厂完美地诠释了诺伊斯如何鼓励创新，并在仙童公司内部营造了一种欢迎新颖想法或非同寻常的解决方案的企业文化。虽然他并非这一想法的直接提出者，但他给予了员工充分的自由去探索，并承诺在员工想要讨论时，会得到积极的反馈。一旦诺伊斯自己也认同了这个想法，他便毫不顾忌地将其逐级上报，几乎不顾及这想法听起来有多么荒谬，或者会让他显得多么愚蠢。最终，这个曾经看似疯狂的想法成为了整个行业的标准操作流程。
The Hong Kong plant offers a perfect example of how Noyce encouraged innovation and built a culture at Fairchild that welcomed the novel thought or unusual solution. He was not directly responsible for this particular idea, but he gave an employee both the freedom to pursue it and the promise of a thoroughly engaged audience when he wanted to discuss it. Once Noyce believed in the idea himself, he pushed it up the corporate hierarchy with little concern for how foolish it might have sounded or made him appear. Later, the once-crazy idea became standard operating procedure for the entire industry.
诺伊斯营造的管理文化为半导体公司竞相招揽的那些年轻、聪颖、积极进取的精英人才提供了丰富的养分。对于这些刚毕业、渴望有所作为的年轻人来说，能够自由地按照自己认为最好的方式工作，无疑是一种莫大的奖励。而公司掌门人诺伊斯能够认真倾听他们的想法，这本身就令人兴奋不已。
The management culture Noyce inspired provided rich sustenance for the young, bright, self-motivated types that Semiconductor courted so feverishly. For these men, fresh out of school and eager to make their mark, the freedom to do their jobs in the way that they believed best was a fantastic reward. To have Noyce, the head of the company, listen carefully to their ideas was exciting in itself.
作为一名管理者，诺伊斯面对潜在的灾难却始终保持冷静，而其他人却惊慌失措。“我记得二极管工厂的工艺出了问题，”一位员工回忆道，“我们彻底崩溃了。就像面包突然从烤箱里拿出来，却完全塌陷了一样。它就是不行了……我跟鲍勃说，‘我的天哪，太可怕了。我的天哪，我们要完蛋了。’他说，‘哦，不会的。我们会想办法的。’……他对此完全放松；这让我感到欣慰和安心。”诺伊斯有时也极具竞争意识——据说他曾在一次行业展会上找到肖克利的展位，就为了告诉他以前的老板：“我们（半导体公司）会把你彻底击败”——但对他的团队成员来说，这反而是一种优势。15
As a manager, Noyce remained calm in the face of potential disasters that had others panicking. “I remember we lost the process at the diode plant,” said one employee. “We simply lost it. I mean, it’s like all of a sudden the bread came out of the oven and it was all flat. It just didn’t work any more…. I said to Bob, ‘My god, this is terrifying. Oh my god, we’re going die.’ He said, ‘Oh no. We’ll figure it out.’ … He was completely relaxed about it; it was wonderful [and] calming to me.” Noyce could also be brutally competitive—he reputedly sought out the Shockley booth at an industry tradeshow so that he could tell his former boss, “We [Semiconductor] are going to bury you”—but for people on his team, that was an asset.15
诺伊斯作为管理者的最大优势在于他能给予员工信心。这部分源于他自身无可辩驳的成功——他是一位技术出身的人，凭借过人的才智和独特的创意取得了巨大的成就——部分源于他给予员工的责任感和支持。对于半导体公司许多年轻人来说，诺伊斯就像是他们多年前在肖克利身上苦苦寻觅的指路明灯。
Noyce’s greatest strength as a manager was that he gave people confidence in themselves. Partly this came from the undeniable evidence of his own success—a technical man who made it big on the strength of raw intelligence and unusual ideas—and partly this derived from the potent combination of responsibility and support that he offered his employees. For many of the young men at Semiconductor, Noyce was the guiding light he had himself sought in Shockley many years before.
20世纪60年代中期，诺伊斯的工作异常繁忙。例如，在1965年9月和10月，他分别与七家电子公司、一家杂志社、三家经纪公司和一家军工分包商的代表举行了会谈。他还在日本待了十天，在赛奥塞特待了两天。他记录的内部会议数量远少于对外会议，可能是因为其中一些是例行会议，而更多的是在走廊和会议室举行的非正式非正式聚会。他确实记录了隔周星期一的员工会议，以及与贝的几次会面。诺伊斯还与斯波克以及摩尔和格里尼奇就专利保护问题进行了两次交流。诺伊斯曾面向技术听众和金融分析师发表演讲，也曾在工厂落成典礼上发表演讲（费尔柴尔德公司在 1960 年至 1967 年间开设了九家工厂），还曾面向两个青少年成就团体发表演讲。16
THE MID-1960s were a time of feverish work for Noyce. In September and October, 1965, for example, he held separate meetings with representatives from seven electronics companies, one magazine, three brokerage houses, and one military subcontractor. He also spent ten days in Japan and two more in Syosset. He recorded far fewer internal meetings, presumably because several were standing commitments and more were informal unscheduled gatherings in corridors and conference rooms. He did note a staff meeting on alternate Mondays, several meetings with both Bay and Sporck, and two with Moore and Grinich on patent protection issues. Noyce spoke to technical audiences and to financial analysts, at the inaugurations of plant sites—Fairchild opened nine between 1960 and 1967—and to two junior achievement groups.16
那时，诺伊斯在业内已小有名气。他的孩子们记得，他每天早上六点半就把他们叫醒，一起看他第一次上电视——那次亮相如此短暂，以至于没人记得当时的具体情况。无论面对怎样的观众，诺伊斯在演讲中总是表现得沉着冷静、和蔼可亲，而且学识渊博。然而，在家里，他却会为演讲而紧张不已。孩子们难得有机会看到他演讲，他们注意到，即使在观众看来他只是随意地倚靠在讲台上，父亲也会在讲台后面不自觉地抖腿或抖膝盖。
By this time, Noyce was well known within the industry. His children remember him waking them at 6:30 in the morning to watch him in his first television appearance, a debut so fleeting that no one recalls its context. Whatever the audience, Noyce’s demeanor in his talks was invariably calm, benignant, and irreproachably informed. At home, though, he sweated over his speeches, and on the rare occasions when his children saw him speak, they noted their father’s foot tapping or knee jiggling behind the lectern even while, to the audience, he appeared to be casually leaning against it.
四年间，他出国13次——主要是去欧洲为SGS公司工作，以及去香港和日本。诺伊斯的朋友兼仙童公司的首席律师罗杰·博罗沃伊邀请诺伊斯参与所有与日本的许可谈判。诺伊斯谈判技巧高超——他给自己的一张便条写道：“要价10%（许可费），最后7%成交”——但博罗沃伊认为，如果诺伊斯在场，仙童公司“可以从日本人那里争取到更多……诺伊斯在日本简直就是神。” 1964年至1967年间，诺伊斯每年都去日本，大多是与NEC公司有关，仙童公司已将旗下平面电路和集成电路专利的日本独家许可权授予NEC。1963年，诺伊斯和博罗沃伊就该合同进行了谈判。1965年的访问似乎是一种友好姿态。1966年，诺伊斯帮助NEC捍卫了其独家集成电路许可权。 1981 年 Fairchild 的日本许可证到期时，这些许可证已经为公司创造了超过 1 亿美元的收入。17
In four years, he made 13 trips out of the country—mainly to Europe for SGS and to Hong Kong and Japan. Roger Borovoy, Noyce’s friend and Fairchild’s lead counsel, asked Noyce to join in any Japanese licensing negotiations. Noyce drove a hard bargain—one note to himself says “ask for 10% [of licensing royalties], settle for 7”—but Borovoy believed Fairchild “could get much more out of the Japanese if I had Noyce with me…. Noyce is God in Japan.” Between 1964 and 1967, Noyce went to Japan every year, most often in connection with NEC, the firm to which Fairchild had granted exclusive Japanese licensing rights to Fairchild planar and integrated circuit patents. In 1963, Noyce and Borovoy negotiated the contract. The 1965 visit seems a goodwill gesture. In 1966, Noyce helped NEC defend its exclusive integrated circuit license. When Fairchild’s Japanese licenses expired in 1981, they had generated in excess of $100 million dollars for the company.17
在20世纪60年代上半叶，诺伊斯最紧迫的担忧之一是如何激励员工。自1961年那场可怕的经历（当时一半的创始团队成员离职）以来，从仙童半导体分拆出来的公司数量几乎没有减少。到1965年，至少有七家公司是由离开仙童半导体的人创办的——数量之多，以至于人们将这些分拆出来的公司统称为“仙童公司”。“我现在担心的是如何复制最初激励我们八个人的那种激励理念，”诺伊斯在1964年说道。“我们当初离开（肖克利）是出于职业发展的原因，但很快发现离开可以让我们变得非常非常富有，这本身就成了我们前进的动力。”由于赛奥塞特的管理层仍然拒绝大规模授予股票期权，并且控制着半导体部门的整体预算，诺伊斯感到束手无策。18
Among the most pressing of Noyce’s concerns during the first half of the 1960s was how to keep his employees motivated. The pace of companies spinning off from Fairchild had hardly abated since the horrible year of 1961, when half the founding team left. By 1965, at least seven companies had been started by people who had left Fairchild—so many that people collectively shorthanded the spinout firms the “Fairchildren.” “I’m concerned now with how to copy the original incentive idea that motivated the original eight [of us],” Noyce said in 1964. “We wanted to leave [Shockley] for professional reasons but soon discovered that [we] could become very, very wealthy by leaving, and that became its own motivation.” With management in Syosset still refusing any broad granting of stock options and controlling the overall budget of the semiconductor division, Noyce felt his hands were tied.18
诺伊斯再次将注意力转向集成电路，尽管此时他的兴趣已从器件的技术层面转移到其商业意义及其在电子市场中的地位。空军一项实验戏剧性地证明了集成电路的效率和性能优势。当时，军方对比了德州仪器公司生产的两台实验计算机。一台计算机包含8500个独立的离散元件，另一台则由587个集成电路组成。结果显示，集成电路计算机的性能与体积是其150倍、重量几乎是其50倍的离散元件计算机不相上下。19
Noyce also turned his attention again to the integrated circuit, though by now his interest had shifted from the technical aspects of the device to its business implications and its place in the electronics market. An air force experiment had dramatically demonstrated the efficiency and performance capabilities of integrated circuits when the military branch compared two experimental computers from Texas Instruments. One computer contained 8,500 separate discrete components, the other 587 integrated circuits. The integrated-circuit machine performed as well as the discrete model 150 times its size and almost 50 times its weight.19
1961年3月，仙童公司在纽约举办的行业大会上推出了其首款商用集成电路——触发器（计算机逻辑的基本存储元件）。在大会期间，仙童公司每天在圣莫里茨酒店的宴会厅举办两次研讨会，严格限制参会人员，只允许经过仔细筛选、排除与竞争对手公司存在潜在联系的少数精英参加。仙童公司宣布，这款集成电路仅仅是个开始；“微逻辑家族”的其他五款产品也正在研发中，这六款器件足以构建完整的计算机逻辑系统。20
Fairchild had introduced its first commercial integrated circuit, a flipflop (the basic storage element in computer logic), at an industry convention in New York in March 1961. Throughout that convention, Fairchild had conducted seminars twice daily in the ballroom of the St. Moritz Hotel, strictly limiting attendance to a select group of attendees who had been carefully screened for potential ties to rival firms. Fairchild announced that this circuit was just the beginning; five other members of the “Micrologic family” were in the works, and together the six devices were all anyone would need to build an entire computer logic system.20
自1957年首次向IBM出售计算机以来，计算机一直是仙童公司的重要市场。当时，计算机还是一种新鲜事物。1952年，哥伦比亚广播公司（CBS）使用UNIVAC 1计算机预测总统选举结果，公众才真正开始接触计算机。1954年，一家公司购买了第一台用于商业（而非纯粹科学）应用的计算机。分析人士当时预测，全球只有大约100家公司需要计算机。然而，在随后的几年里，对计算机的需求迅速增长。举例来说，1956年，美国联邦政府共有90台计算机。十年后，计算机数量达到7575台，计算机预算高达1.15亿美元。21
Computers had been an important market for Fairchild ever since its first sale to IBM in 1957. At that time, computers were still a novelty. The general public received its introduction to the computer in 1952, when CBS television used a UNIVAC 1 machine to predict the outcome of the presidential election. In 1954, a corporation bought the first computer to be used for business (rather than purely scientific) applications. Analysts marked the occasion by predicting that only about 100 corporations worldwide would ever need a computer. In the ensuing years, demand for the machines grew rapidly. To take but one example, in 1956, the federal government had a total of 90 computers. Ten years later, it would have 7,575 machines and a computer budget of $115 million.21
20世纪60年代初期，计算机还是被称为“大型机”的庞然大物，配备各种磁带驱动器、控制台、重达900磅（内存仅有可怜的2兆字节）的硬盘以及各种存储设备，加起来足足占满了整个房间。晶体管的发明为体积略小、可靠性显著提高的硅驱动计算机（而非真空管驱动）指明了方向。集成电路的出现将加速这一趋势。
In the earliest years of the 1960s, computers were hulking machines, called “mainframes,” with various tape drives, consoles, 900-pound hard drives (with a measly two megabytes of memory), and storage devices that together took up entire rooms. The invention of the transistor had shown the way to marginally smaller and significantly more reliable machines driven by silicon, not vacuum tubes. The integrated circuit would accelerate this trend.
1961年，仙童半导体推出的Micrologic器件引起了计算机专家和其他人士的极大兴趣。展会期间，仙童的展位总是人头攒动。Micrologic器件登上了会议期间发行的日报的封面，《纽约时报》刊登了两篇关于Micrologic的文章，而领先的半导体行业期刊也发表了五篇相关文章。Micrologic器件发布几周后，此前曾与仙童就平面晶体管授权事宜进行过洽谈的菲尔科公司（Philco）开始游说仙童，希望获得集成电路专利。诺伊斯和他的专利律师的回应只有一个字：“没门儿。”要么是平面晶体管，要么就什么都没有。仙童当时还不打算允许其他人来制造其最新的创新成果。22
Fairchild’s 1961 Micrologic introduction generated enormous interest among computer experts and others. The Fairchild booth was jammed throughout the show. The Micrologic devices graced the cover of the daily paper issued at the conference, the New York Times ran two articles on Micrologic, and the leading semiconductor industry journal ran five more. Within weeks of the introduction, Philco, which had been in discussions with Fairchild about acquiring a license for planar transistors, began lobbying for an integrated circuit patent instead. Noyce and his patent attorney had one word reply: “tough.” It was planar or nothing. Fairchild was not yet ready to permit anyone else to build its newest innovation.22
虽然反响令人欣慰，但并未转化为广泛的应用。到1961年底，仙童半导体公司Micrologic器件的销售额不足50万美元，而这些器件的单价约为100美元。另一家主要供应商德州仪器公司也面临着集成电路销售的困境，以至于在90天内将价格从435美元降至76美元。然而，此举收效甚微。23
The reaction was gratifying but did not translate into widespread adoption. By the end of 1961, Fairchild had sold fewer than $500,000 of its Micrologic devices, which were priced at about $100 apiece. Texas Instruments, the only other major supplier, was having such problems selling integrated circuits that it cut prices from $435 to $76 in 90 days. The move had little effect.23
客户对集成电路技术的反对之声不绝于耳。相对于分立元件而言，集成电路价格极其昂贵——性能相当的情况下，价格却高达分立元件的50倍，尽管封装尺寸更小。许多为仙童半导体客户工作的工程师、设计师和采购员都担心集成电路会让他们失业。几十年来，这些客户一直使用从仙童半导体等制造商处购买的现成晶体管、电阻器和电容器来设计所需的电路。如今，诺伊斯希望仙童半导体的集成电路团队能够设计和制造标准电路，并将其作为既成事实出售给客户。如果集成电路制造商自行设计和制造电路，客户公司的工程师该怎么办？此外，一位拥有25年经验的设计工程师为什么要购买由一家半导体制造公司30岁员工设计的电路？而且，虽然硅是制造晶体管的理想材料，但还有更好的材料可以用来制造集成电路中使用的电阻器和电容器。用硅材料制造这些其他元件可能会降低电路的整体性能。24
Customers’ objections to integrated circuit technology abounded. The devices were extremely expensive relative to discrete components—up to 50 times the cost for comparable performance, albeit in a smaller package. Many engineers, designers, and purchasing agents working for Fairchild’s customers feared that integrated circuits would put them out of work. For decades, these customers had designed the circuits they needed from off-the-shelf transistors, resistors, and capacitors that they bought from manufacturers like Fairchild. Now Noyce wanted to move the Fairchild integrated circuit team into designing and building standard circuits that would be sold to customers as a fait accompli. If the integrated circuit manufacturers designed and built the circuits themselves, what would the engineers at the customer companies do? Moreover, why would a design engineer with a quarter-century’s experience want to buy circuits designed by 30-year-old employee of a semiconductor manufacturing firm? And furthermore, while silicon was ideal for transistors, there were better materials for making the resistors and capacitors that would be built into the integrated circuit. Making these other components out of silicon might degrade the overall performance of the circuits.24
直到 1963 年春季，大多数制造商仍然认为集成电路在一段时间内不会具有商业可行性，他们在行业贸易展上告诉参观他们展位的游客，“这些产品将一直停留在研发阶段，直到技术取得突破，设计得到极大完善。”25
As late as the spring of 1963, most manufacturers believed that integrated circuits would not be commercially viable for some time, telling visitors to their booths at an industry trade show that “these items would remain on the R&D level until a breakthrough occurs in technology and until designs are vastly perfected.”25
但诺伊斯对这项尖端技术的前景感到兴奋。1961年10月，他称微电路是“迄今为止最重要的‘仙童首创’（公司内部对发明的称呼）”。一年后，诺伊斯在员工会议上要求“加大微电路（μckts）的研发力度”。下个月，他更是强调“微电路必须问世！”1962年，客户短暂的浓厚兴趣最终却令人沮丧，因为仙童公司根本无法大规模生产微电路。“所有[Micrologic]产品的库存都短缺，”诺伊斯在1962年5月非常恼火地写道，“积压了1.3万份订单。”他担心，如果客户需求真的出现，由原仙童集成电路团队创立的Signetics公司可能会抢占先机。他希望“找到 Signetics 侵犯 Fairchild 专利的证据”，大概是为了让 Fairchild 向他们发出措辞严厉的“停止侵权”函，从而将集成电路市场牢牢掌握在自己手中。26
But Noyce was excited by the prospects for this cutting-edge technology. In October 1961, he called the microcircuit “the most important ‘Fairchild First’ [the in-house term for invention] to date.” One year later, Noyce was asking for “more effort on μckts [microcircuits]” at his staff meetings. The next month, it was “μckts must be here!” A brief flurry of customer interest in 1962 proved little more than a frustration because Fairchild could not build circuits in any real quantity. “Inventory on all [Micrologic] short,” Noyce wrote with great irritation in May 1962, “13K [orders] backlog.” He worried that Signetics, the company started by the former Fairchild integrated circuit team, might be first in line to meet customer demand if it ever materialized in any serious way. He hoped to “find evidence of Signetics infringement [of Fairchild patents],” presumably so Fairchild could send them a nasty “cease and desist” letter and keep the integrated circuits market for itself.26
到 1962 年底，诺伊斯不得不承认，集成电路迄今为止对我们的传统销售额的影响“不到 10%”。他周末召集员工开会，讨论“如何加大对微型电路的投入”。27
By the end of 1962, Noyce had to admit that the integrated circuit had thus far had “less than a 10 percent effect on our conventional sales.” He called his staff together on a weekend to discuss “how to get more effort on micro ckts [circuits].”27
在集成电路问世后的最初几年里，仙童公司努力克服客户对这种器件的疑虑。为了让客户拥有一定的自主权，该公司（以及其他公司，例如摩托罗拉）允许买家使用与分立元件标准操作流程非常相似的方法，对电路进行定制设计。为了消除人们对可靠性的担忧，仙童公司加强了内部测试方法，并宣传集成电路在严苛条件下的可靠性。该公司还参与了联邦政府赞助的多项广为人知的可靠性测试，包括阿波罗计划的实验。仙童公司宣称，集成电路的高昂前期成本可以通过降低空间成本（最多可降低95%）、设计和组装成本（最多可降低90%）以及功耗成本（最多可降低75%）来弥补。仙童公司甚至在设计集成电路封装时，力求使器件的外观和手感与分立元件无异。28
Fairchild worked hard in the early years following the integrated circuit’s introduction to overcome customers’ objections to the device. To give customers some sense of control, the company (as well as others, such as Motorola) permitted buyers essentially to custom design the circuits using methods very similar to what had been standard operating procedure for discrete components. To counter concern about reliability, Fairchild stepped up its in-house testing methods and advertised the strenuous conditions under which the integrated circuits had already been proven to perform. The company also participated in several widely publicized reliability tests sponsored by the federal government, including experiments for the Apollo project. Fairchild advertised that the high up-front costs of integrated circuits might be recouped in reduced costs for space (up to a 95 percent reduction), design and assembly (up to a 90 percent reduction), and power (up to 75 percent reduction). Fairchild even designed its integrated circuit packages to make the devices look and feel like discrete components.28
1962年之后，开拓商用市场的需求变得更加迫切。当时，国防部长罗伯特·麦克纳马拉推行了军事采购改革和成本削减措施，导致集成电路的国防市场开始萎缩。（军方采购的集成电路数量从1962年全部减少到1965年的55%。）与此同时，仙童公司早期的衍生公司Signetics开始在高端商用市场取得一些成功，这既给仙童公司带来了希望，也带来了担忧。29
The need to crack the commercial market became more acute after 1962, when Defense Secretary Robert McNamara instituted changes in military procurement and cost-cutting measures that began shrinking the defense market for integrated circuits. (The military would move from buying 100 percent of integrated circuits produced in 1962 to 55 percent of those made in 1965.) Meanwhile, Signetics, the early Fairchild spinoff, began to have some success in the high-end commercial market, which provided equal doses of hope and fear to Fairchild.29
“推销新理念其实是一个工程问题，”诺伊斯曾说过。在他看来，尽管客户对集成电路还有其他一些所谓的担忧，但他们对这项新技术的主要反对意见显然是成本。难道其他问题都已经解决了吗？更花哨的营销方案也无法吸引更多客户购买集成电路。买家们的技术水平非常高。如果他们的技术顾虑都已消除，他们仍然不购买，那么问题必然出在价格上。30
“The selling of new ideas is really an engineering problem,” Noyce once said. To him it was obvious that despite their other purported concerns about the integrated circuit, customers’ primary objection to the new technology was its cost. Had not every other issue been handled? Nor would a glitzier marketing program turn more customers to the integrated circuit. The buyers were extremely technically sophisticated. If their technical objections had been met and they still were not buying, the problem had to be the price tag.30
因此，在1964年春天，诺伊斯做出了一个鲜为人知但至关重要的决定。仙童公司将以低于客户自行购买单个元件并组装的成本，以及低于仙童公司自身制造该器件的成本，出售其低端触发器集成电路。戈登·摩尔称此举为“鲍勃对半导体行业的默默贡献”，这一举动令大多数竞争对手震惊不已，他们起初都保持沉默，直到最终决定跟进价格。当仙童公司的分销商询问诺伊斯，如果将触发器的功能与……在一块集成电路上集成多个晶体管，然后以低于单个晶体管的价格出售该集成电路，这无疑是企业自取灭亡。诺伊斯只是微微一笑，表示他并不这么认为。31
Accordingly, in the spring of 1964, Noyce made a little-discussed but absolutely critical decision. Fairchild would sell its low-end flip-flop integrated circuits for less than it would cost a customer to buy the individual components and connect them himself, and less than it was costing Fairchild to build the device. Gordon Moore calls this move “Bob’s unheralded contribution to the semiconductor industry,” and it shocked most competitors into a frigid “no comment” until they made the decision to match prices. When a Fairchild distributor asked Noyce if combining the function of several transistors on one integrated circuit and then selling that integrated circuit for less than any one of the individual transistors was a sure path to corporate suicide, Noyce simply smiled in a way that made it clear he did not think so.31
实际上，诺伊斯是在拿仙童公司的盈利做赌注，赌上了他两个预判。他怀疑，如果集成电路能够进入市场，客户会更青睐集成电路而非分立元件，并开始围绕这些新器件设计产品。他还计算出，随着仙童公司生产的电路越来越多，经验曲线和规模经济最终将使公司能够以极低的成本生产电路，即使价格低得离谱，也能盈利。戈登·摩尔曾表示，诺伊斯通过降价来刺激需求，从而扩大产量并相应降低生产成本的决定，对整个行业而言，其重要性不亚于集成电路本身。“它为半导体行业建立了一种新技术，至今仍然适用，”他解释道。“每当出现问题时，你就降低价格。这对于仙童公司内部人员和客户来说，都是一个革命性的理念。”32
In effect, Noyce was betting Fairchild’s bottom line against two hunches. He suspected that if integrated circuits could make their way into the market, customers would prefer them to discrete components and would begin designing their products around the new devices. He also calculated that as Fairchild built more and more circuits, experience curves and economies of scale would enable the company eventually to build the circuits for so little that it would be possible to make a profit even on the seemingly ridiculously low price. Gordon Moore has said that Noyce’s decision to lower prices to stimulate demand so that the production volumes could grow and the cost of production be decreased accordingly was as important an “invention” for the industry as the integrated circuit itself. “It established a new technology for the semiconductor industry [that holds true] to today,” he explained. “Whenever there’s a problem, you lower the price. That was as revolutionary a concept to people within Fairchild as it was to the customers.”32
为了解释销量如何弥补价格下降带来的影响，诺伊斯喜欢用书籍印刷作比喻。一本书的第一本印刷成本极高，因为印刷商必须购买设备、排版、校样以及其他所有印刷前的准备工作。然而，一旦印刷流程完成，之后每增加一本就相对便宜了，因为第一本印刷所需的材料和设备投资是固定的。此外，印刷数量越多，每本的价格就越低，因为最初的投资可以分摊到更多本产品上。诺伊斯押注，一旦仙童公司人为地降低集成电路的价格，由此产生的需求量将会非常高，以至于他的“每本价格”实际上会低于仙童公司收取的价格。33
To explain how volume can more than make up for price cuts, Noyce liked to use a book-printing analogy. The first copy of a book, taken by itself, is extremely expensive because the printer must buy equipment, typeset, proof, and otherwise ready the document for printing. Once the process is in place, however, every additional copy is relatively cheap because the investment in materials and equipment for the original printing is fixed. Moreover, the more copies made, the lower the per-copy price, since the original investment can be amortized over more items. Noyce was betting that once Fairchild artificially lowered the price for integrated circuits, the resulting demand would be so high that his “per-copy price” would actually fall below the price they charged.33
“我怀疑诺伊斯是否真的确信降价是最佳方案，”戈登·摩尔说道，但诺伊斯从不畏惧经过深思熟虑的风险。仙童公司以其激进的定价策略而臭名昭著，而集成电路的价格在1964年春季就已经开始下降。诺伊斯对经验曲线的现实情况非常了解。例如，在1959年至1962年间，仙童公司低通高频晶体管的产量增长了660倍，而成本仅增长了5倍。晶体管的价格下降了90%，但收入增长了10倍，利润增长了3倍。诺伊斯认为，如果能够说服客户购买集成电路，类似的情况也会发生在集成电路领域。34
“I doubt if Noyce was very sure [price cuts were] the best way,” Gordon Moore says, but Noyce was never one to shy away from a calculated risk. Fairchild was already infamous for its aggressive pricing, and integrated circuit prices were already falling in the spring of 1964. Noyce had an intimate familiarity with the realities of the experience curve. Between 1959 and 1962, for example, Fairchild’s production of its LPHF transistor line increased 660-fold, with costs only quintupling. The price of the transistor fell by 90 percent, yet revenue grew ten-fold and profits tripled. Noyce suspected something similar could happen with integrated circuits if only he could convince customers to buy them.34
这种降价策略毫无技巧可言；相反，它是一种试图通过蛮力来开拓市场和降低成本的尝试。这种肆无忌惮的市场份额争夺战使仙童公司迅速超越了……在每年的电路销量方面，该公司一直稳居榜首。与此同时，整个集成电路市场也蓬勃发展。1964年初，业界预测1966年集成电路的销售额将达到5800万美元，即800万片，平均单价为7.25美元。在仙童公司引发的价格下跌发生后不到一年，这一预测就增长了150%以上，达到每年1.57亿美元——考虑到单价下降，这无疑是一个惊人的增长。35
There was nothing graceful or subtle in the price-cutting approach; it was, instead, an attempt to develop the market and reduce costs by means of brute force. This brazen play for market share leapfrogged Fairchild to the top position in number of circuits sold each year. At the same time, the entire market for integrated circuits took off. In early 1964, industry-wide integrated circuit sales for 1966 were projected to reach $58 million, or 8 million units at an average cost of $7.25 a unit. Within a year of the Fairchild-triggered price drop, estimates had been upped more than 150 percent, to $157 million annually—remarkable growth, given that the average price per unit had dropped.35
在大幅降价不到一年后，市场规模迅速扩张，仙童公司接到的一份订单（50万块电路板）就相当于前一年整个行业电路板产量的20%。一年后，也就是1966年，计算机制造商博罗公司向仙童公司订购了2000万块集成电路。此时，这些电路板已经开始应用于立体声接收机接收广播电台信号，并在当时最先进的助听器中放大声音。36
LESS THAN A YEAR after the dramatic price cuts, the market had so expanded that Fairchild received a single order (for half-a-million circuits) that was equivalent to 20 percent of the entire industry’s output of circuits for the previous year. One year later, in 1966, computer manufacturer Burroughs placed an order with Fairchild for 20 million integrated circuits. By this time, the circuits had begun pulling in radio stations on stereo receivers and amplifying sound in state-of-the-art hearing aids.36
集成电路在蓬勃发展的计算机商业市场中也扮演了关键角色。1964年，IBM推出了革命性的“System/360系列”计算机，该系列包含六款不同尺寸的计算机。为了研发、制造和销售System/360系列，IBM投入了50亿美元，是美国政府研发原子弹成本的两倍多。System/360计算机旨在共享软件和外围设备，例如打印机和磁带驱动器，其目标是成为“人们唯一需要的计算机”——这一标准化系统推动了计算机在全球商业和政府机构中的迅速普及。“电子女工”（一位当时的专家如此形容计算机）负责计算工资、为贷款公司计算抵押贷款还款额、跟踪库存和公用事业使用情况，以及处理账单记录。到1967年，美国约95%的银行都使用计算机来处理支票账户。37
The integrated circuit had also come to play a key role in the burgeoning commercial market for computers. In 1964, IBM introduced the revolutionary “System/360 family” of six different-sized computers. To research, develop, build, and market the System/360 series, IBM spent $5 billion, more than twice what it cost the United States government to develop the atomic bomb. The System/360 machines, designed to share software and peripherals such as printers and tape drives, were meant to be “the only computers anyone would need”—and this standardized system ushered in the rapid-fire proliferation of computers in business and government offices around the world. “Electronic Girl Fridays” (as one contemporary characterized computers) calculated payrolls, figured mortgage payments for loan companies, kept track of inventory and utility uses, and processed billing records. By 1967, some 95 percent of all banks in the United States would use computers to handle their checking accounts.37
这些新型机器中有很多是“小型计算机”，它们体积更小，采用集成电路技术，以远低于大型计算机的体积和成本，提供与大型计算机相媲美的计算能力。其中最受欢迎的是DEC公司推出的PDP-8型小型计算机，它的大小相当于几台冰箱，售价约为18,000美元。1966年，全球共有3,600台小型计算机投入使用，它们在很大程度上都依赖于集成电路技术。38
Many of these new machines were “minicomputers,” smaller machines that used integrated circuit technology to offer mainframe-competitive computing power at a fraction the size and cost of mainframes. The most popular of the minicomputers was an offering from DEC called a PDP-8, which was the size of several refrigerators and cost about $18,000. In 1966, there were 3,600 minicomputers in use worldwide, all of them dependent, to no small degree, on integrated circuit technology.38
随着集成电路需求的增长，仙童半导体和德州仪器的律师们继续在专利法庭上争夺专利权。1964年，专利局专利冲突委员会就集成电路专利的归属问题做出了裁决，将五项权利要求中的四项判给了德州仪器的发明人杰克·基尔比。双方都对裁决提出上诉，但他们也意识到，这意味着每家公司都需要获得对方的许可才能生产集成电路。1966年夏天，诺伊斯……霍奇森和仙童公司的律师博罗沃伊与德州仪器总裁马克·谢泼德及其律师马特·米姆斯会面。双方达成一致，两家公司将互相授予许可。他们还决定，任何其他想要制造集成电路的公司都需要分别与德州仪器和仙童公司协商许可事宜。通过这些协议，双方承认对方对集成电路的部分发明拥有所有权。
As the demand for integrated circuits grew, the lawyers for Fairchild and Texas Instruments continued their fight in the patent courts. In 1964, the patent office interference board split its decision on who owned the patent to the integrated circuit, awarding 4 of 5 claims to Texas Instruments’ inventor Jack Kilby. Both sides appealed the ruling, but they also recognized that it meant each company needed a license from the other in order to manufacture integrated circuits. In the summer of 1966, Noyce, Hodgson, and Fairchild counsel Borovoy met with Texas Instruments president Mark Shepherd and counsel Matt Mims. The group agreed that each company would grant the other licenses. They further decided that any other company that wanted to build integrated circuits would need to negotiate separate licenses from Texas Instruments and Fairchild. With these agreements, each side acknowledged the other’s claim to some part of the invention of the integrated circuit.
10月，诺伊斯和基尔比共同荣获富兰克林学会颁发的著名巴兰坦奖章，以表彰他们“对集成电路发展做出的重大而重要的贡献”。颁奖词指出：“集成电路革命的全部意义尚未完全显现：一个梦想，一个仅靠电子运动就能实现事物的梦想，已经成真，而梦想的实现是一件罕见的事件，其影响之深远，难以完全理解。”39
In October, Noyce and Kilby shared the prestigious Ballantine Medal of the Franklin Institute, presented to them “for their significant and essential contributions to the development of integrated circuits.” The citation noted, “The full extent of the [integrated circuit] revolution is not yet in sight: for a dream, the dream of doing things with electronic motion alone, has come true, and the coming to fruition of dreams is a rare event and full of implications difficult to comprehend completely.”39
仙童公司内部许多人反对基尔比的装置，认为它根本不是单片集成电路。与此同时，在德克萨斯州，人们抱怨诺伊斯只不过是将基尔比的想法应用于工业生产而已。一些曾帮助仙童公司实现集成电路的人不解，为什么诺伊斯再次独揽公司所有的功劳。诺伊斯的互连专利为何比霍尔尼的平面工艺、拉斯特的隔离技术，或是伊西·哈斯为制造用于集成电路的理想晶体管所做的耐心尝试更重要？如果没有这些贡献，集成电路根本不可能从仙童实验室诞生。此外，诺伊斯几乎没有参与该装置的制造，因为早在专利申请提交之前，他就升任总经理一职了。他被认定为仙童公司集成电路的唯一发明人，这让他的几位早期实验室同事感到十分武断。诺伊斯本人坦言，他的洞察力“源于对绝缘体、隔离、互连等相当模糊的概念……于是你运用各种技巧将这些元素组合起来，制造出集成电路。这并非灵光一闪。”40
Many at Fairchild objected that Kilby’s device was not a monolithic integrated circuit at all. In Texas, meanwhile, there was grumbling about Noyce having done nothing more than adapt Kilby’s idea for industrial use. A few people who had helped bring the integrated circuit to life at Fairchild wondered how it had happened that once again, Noyce seemed to get all the credit from their company. Why was Noyce’s interconnection patent any more important than Hoerni’s planar process or Last’s isolation work or Isy Haas’s patient attempts to build the ideal transistor for use in integrated circuits? Absent any of these, the integrated circuit would never have emerged from the Fairchild lab. Moreover, Noyce had almost nothing to do with building the device, since he moved to the general manager’s position even before the patent was filed. His designation as the lone inventor of the integrated circuit from Fairchild struck several of his early laboratory co-workers as arbitrary. Noyce himself freely admitted that his insight “was a question of having these rather vague concepts of insulators, of isolation, of interconnection … so that you drew on your bag of tricks to combine these elements to make the integrated circuit. There was no huge lightbulb flashing.”40
简单来说，是德州仪器公司（而非诺伊斯或仙童公司）而非仙童公司的其他人，将诺伊斯与基尔比共同列为集成电路的发明人。毕竟，是德州仪器公司声称诺伊斯关于互连器件的专利侵犯了杰克·基尔比的专利申请，该专利申请涵盖了在单个基板上放置多个器件。一旦这项侵权诉讼提起，仙童公司对任何可能价值连城的产品的任何部分的所有权都取决于诺伊斯和他1959年1月的实验记录。诺伊斯并没有主动争取成为仙童公司在与德州仪器的集成电路之争中的代表。是对方先拉拢了诺伊斯，然后又拉拢了他自己。该组织投入了大量时间和金钱来确保他取得成功。
On the most simplistic level, Texas Instruments, not Noyce or Fairchild, was responsible for Noyce, and not someone else at Fairchild, being named co-inventor of the integrated circuit with Kilby. It was Texas Instruments, after all, that claimed that Noyce’s patent for interconnecting devices infringed upon Jack Kilby’s application for a patent that covered putting more than one device on a single substrate. Once this interference was filed, the Fairchild claim to any part of a potentially enormously valuable product rested on Noyce and his January 1959, lab notebook entry. Noyce did not lobby to be the Fairchild representative in the integrated circuit debacle with Texas Instruments. The opposition drafted Noyce, and then his own organization devoted huge amounts of time and money to ensuring he prevailed.
此外，只要仔细审视几乎任何一项发明，几乎都会立刻发现，即使它被归功于某个人，也并非出自一人之手。发明最好被理解为团队合作的成果，最终被称为“发明者”的人，其地位与刚刚投出完美比赛的投手并无二致。外野手可能接住了十几个高飞球，一垒手可能为了抢在跑垒员之前踩上垒包而几乎扭断了脖子，捕手可能针对每个击球手的弱点精准地投出了球路，但记录簿上只会记载投手投出了一场完美比赛。
Moreover, if nearly any invention is examined closely enough, it almost immediately becomes apparent that the innovation was not the product of a single mind, even if it is attributed to one. Invention is best understood as a team effort, with the person ultimately called “inventor” occupying much the same space as the pitcher who has just had a perfect game. The outfielders might have caught a dozen fly balls, the first baseman might have nearly broken his neck to step on the bag an instant before the runner, the catcher might have called for pitches perfectly calibrated to each batter’s weakness, but the record books note only that the pitcher threw a perfect game.
多年前在仙童公司也是如此。实验室团队配合默契，诺伊斯也从不讳言，他对集成电路的构想很大程度上依赖于1958年和1959年“正在酝酿”的思想。如果没有霍尔尼、摩尔以及斯普拉格的库尔特·莱霍维克，诺伊斯永远无法以他的方式构想集成电路。如果没有拉斯特以及后来离开仙童公司创立Signetics公司的研发团队，诺伊斯的构想也永远无法转化为可销售的产品。1958年和1959年，全国各地的人们都在尝试集成电路，但没有人能够提供制造这种器件的实用方法。而诺伊斯在1959年1月潦草地记在专利笔记本上的想法，恰恰弥补了这一空白。正如诺伊斯集成电路的精妙之处在于它简化了现有元件之间的互连，他洞察力的精妙之处也在于他对已有思想的巧妙融合。他的笔记本条目只是拼图中的一块，但却是至关重要的一块，它在关键时刻出现，并且很容易就能滑入到位——它揭示了所有其他部分是如何拼凑在一起的。
So it had been at Fairchild all those years before. The lab team played beautifully, and Noyce never hesitated to admit that his ideas about integrated circuits relied heavily on ideas that were “in the air” in 1958 and 1959. Without Hoerni, without Moore, without Kurt Lehovec at Sprague, Noyce never would have imagined the integrated circuit in the way he did. Without Last or the development team that decamped to start Signetics, Noyce’s ideas would never have become marketable products. People all around the country were experimenting with integrated circuits in 1958 and 1959, but no one could offer a practical way to build the devices. That is what the ideas Noyce scribbled in his patent notebook in January 1959, provided. In the same way that the great beauty of Noyce’s integrated circuit was its simplified interconnections between existing components, so too did the elegance of his insight lie in its interconnection of ideas already in play. His notebook entry was but one piece of the puzzle, but it was an essential piece, the one that comes at the critical time and slides easily into place—the one that reveals how all the other parts of the picture fit together.
到了20世纪60年代中期，仙童半导体已成为美国发展最快的公司之一。1965年的前十个月，仙童半导体的股价飙升了447%，从27美元涨至144美元，仅10月份就增长了50点。这是当时纽约证券交易所上市股票中涨幅最快的。销售额和利润也再创新高。IBM通过一项利润丰厚的交叉许可交易获得了平面工艺的专利权。这项交易对诺伊斯来说至关重要，以至于在谈判的第一天，他就用黑色毡头笔在日历上用巨大的“IBM”字样做了标记，并圈出和划线。（几乎所有其他条目都是用铅笔写的。）到年底，只有德州仪器和摩托罗拉这两家老牌行业巨头的半导体器件年产量超过了仙童半导体。仙童半导体的工厂通宵运转。公司鼓励销售人员不要搬到他们的销售区域，以免家人分散他们的销售精力。41
BY THE MIDDLE OF THE 1960s, Fairchild was one of the fastest-growing companies in the United States. In the first ten months of 1965, Camera and Instrument’s share price ballooned 447 percent, shooting from 27 to 144, with a 50-point growth in the month of October alone. This was the fastest rise of any stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange at the time. Sales and profits hit another record high. IBM bought the rights to the planar process in a lucrative cross-license deal so important to Noyce that on the first day of the negotiation he blocked his calendar with a giant “IBM” that he wrote, circled, and underlined in black, felt-tip pen. (Nearly every other entry is in pencil.) By year’s end, only established industry giants Texas Instruments and Motorola manufactured more semiconductor devices per year than did Fairchild. Fairchild facilities ran throughout the night. Salesmen were encouraged not to move to their territories so their families would not distract them from the business of selling.41
对诺伊斯而言，那种活力和增长势头极具诱惑力。他曾对一位朋友说，带领仙童公司加速发展就像骑一匹骏马——既兴奋又恐惧，徘徊在失控的边缘却又始终保持着平衡。他的成功源于公司的成功，而公司的胜利也源于他的成功。42
For Noyce, the energy and growth were incredibly seductive. Piloting Fairchild through its acceleration, Noyce told a friend, was a bit like riding a fast horse—that same combination of exhilaration and fear and teetering on the edge of losing control but never quite doing so. He was a success because the company was a success, and it had triumphed because he had triumphed.42
然而，随着20世纪60年代下半叶的到来，仙童半导体公司内部开始出现一些隐患。半导体市场呈现出两极分化的格局：一端是成熟的产品，价格极低，产量巨大，但利润也很低。这些器件通常用于娱乐市场——例如作为收音机的零件——售价不到五美分。另一端是技术上优于旧器件的新型器件，产量较小，利润更高。这些器件用于军事应用以及蓬勃发展的计算机市场。包括仙童半导体公司在内的大多数新兴半导体企业都同时服务于市场的两端。因此，这些公司需要同时扮演精密研发机构和大规模制造商的角色。例如，1965年，仙童半导体公司销售了一种名为互补晶体管逻辑（CTL）的集成电路，销量达到50万片甚至更多。43
AS THE SECOND HALF of the 1960s opened, however, shadows began to form within Fairchild Semiconductor. A two-tiered market for semiconductors had emerged: at one end were mature products available at very low prices, manufactured in very high quantities, and with very low margins. These devices were often used in the entertainment market—as parts for radios, for example—and sold for less than a nickel apiece. On the other end were new devices, technically superior to the old, which were manufactured in smaller runs and sold at higher profits. These devices were used in military applications and also in the burgeoning computer market. Most firms in the young industry, including Semiconductor, served both ends of the market. As a result, the companies needed to function simultaneously as sophisticated research organizations and as mass manufacturer. In 1965, for example, Fairchild sold its integrated circuits of a sort called complementary-transistor logic (CTL) in quantities of a half-million units or more.43
在仙童公司每周出货数十万台设备的同时，其组织结构基本保持不变，与初创时期规模很小时几乎相同。所有生产部门都向生产经理汇报，所有工程部门向工程经理汇报，所有设计部门向设计经理汇报。正如研发和生产之间的脱节所揭示的那样，公司各部门之间缺乏有效的协调。公司没有产品经理来确保产品从概念到交付的整个流程高效顺畅。唯一负责多个部门的人是诺伊斯本人，而他的管理风格并不适合公司所需的精细化协调。44
At the same time that Fairchild was shipping hundreds of thousands of devices each week, it maintained essentially the same organizational structure it had developed as a tiny startup operation. All manufacturing reported to a manufacturing manager, all engineering to an engineering manager, all design to a design manager. As the gap between development and manufacturing revealed, the different divisions of the company did not readily coordinate operations. There were no product managers to ensure that a product moved efficiently from conception through shipping. The only person with responsibility for more than one division was Noyce himself, and his managerial style did not lend itself to the sort of detailed coordination the company needed.44
雪上加霜的是，诺伊斯被提拔为相机与仪器副总裁，这一任命使他的权力扩展到位于新泽西州克利夫顿的新仪器部门，该部门销售半导体测试设备。诺伊斯任命斯波克为半导体公司的新任总经理，并让市场营销主管汤姆·贝负责仪器部门。此举导致两位技能互补、与诺伊斯能力相得益彰的高管分道扬镳，在半导体公司的日常管理中留下了真空。
Adding to the troubles was Noyce’s promotion to vice president of Camera and Instrument, an assignment that extended his authority to a new instrumentation division, headquartered in Clifton, New Jersey, which sold semiconductor test equipment. Noyce tapped Sporck to become Semiconductor’s new general manager and asked marketing head Tom Bay to run the instrumentation division. With this move, the two men, whose skills had complemented each other’s and Noyce’s so well, were separated, leaving a vacuum within day-to-day management at Semiconductor.
在锡奥塞特举行的每月经理会议和仪器仪表部门的需求之间，诺伊斯开始将时间分配在……房子一半在仙童半导体公司办公室和纽约相机仪器公司总部之间。贝蒂·诺伊斯认为这是搬回东部的绝佳理由。加利福尼亚州开始在他们家附近修建一条新的高速公路。好几块芥菜地和杏地已经被犁平了，施工噪音淹没了贝蒂以前在院子里能听到的小溪潺潺流水声。她害怕以后每时每刻都要看到和听到车水马龙的景象。鲍勃提出要帮他们用围墙把房子围起来。45
Between the monthly managers’ meetings in Syosset and the requirements of the instrumentation division, Noyce began to split his time in half between the Fairchild Semiconductor offices and Camera and Instrument headquarters in New York. Betty Noyce declared this the perfect reason to move back east. The state of California had begun building a new freeway near their house. Already several fields of mustard and apricot had been plowed under, and the construction noise was drowning out the sound of a brook Betty used to hear from the yard. She dreaded the prospect of seeing and hearing traffic every minute of her life. Bob offered to enclose their property behind a wall.45
总之，那条高速公路只不过是贝蒂离开加州的一系列理由之一。鲍勃喜欢加州的一切——快节奏的生活、不断变化的环境、无需出身名门就能致富的机会、永不停歇的奋斗精神——她都厌恶。她更喜欢那种变化循序渐进的生活，人们住在世代相传的房子里，每个人都安分守己。尽管鲍勃在他们初到加州时曾信誓旦旦地保证，如果贝蒂想走，他们就会离开，但他还是拒绝搬家。
The freeway, in any case, was simply one in a string of justifications Betty offered for leaving the state. Everything Bob liked about California—the fast pace, the constant change, the opportunity to become wealthy without a family name or pedigree, the relentless drive to perform—she hated. She preferred a life where change was incremental, where people lived in homes that had belonged to their families for generations, and where everyone knew his or her proper place. Bob refused to move, despite his promise, sworn when they first arrived in California, that they would leave if Betty wanted.
随着结婚十周年纪念日的临近，鲍勃和贝蒂·诺伊斯夫妇性格上的根本差异显而易见。鲍勃喜欢结识的大多数人，而贝蒂则有着截然不同的标准。鲍勃总是急于购买任何新技术、任何新的音响设备或电子产品。贝蒂则收藏古董，并乐于从事传统的拼布工艺。贝蒂解决问题的方式是靠讽刺和恐吓；而鲍勃的做法，正如戈登·摩尔所描述的那样，是“花两个小时试图说服别人某件事应该怎么做，而不是花两分钟告诉他们该怎么做”。贝蒂在1963年寄给儿子比尔的一封信中，描述了查理·斯波克家的一次聚会，信中突显了这对夫妇之间的一些差异：“爸爸（鲍勃）去游泳了，大多数男人也去了，但女士们却很少去。他跳水跳得不错，还参加了一场水球比赛。他上岸穿好衣服后，三个男人把他扔回了泳池，觉得这很有趣。结果他们也被其他人扔了回去，这让我很想回家，但爸爸把衣服放进烘干机，半小时后就焕然一新了，而且看起来一点也不生气。他真是个好脾气的人！”46
As their tenth anniversary approached, it was apparent that Bob and Betty Noyce were fundamentally incompatible. Bob tended to like most people he met; Betty had different standards. Bob always rushed to buy any new technology, any new bit of stereo equipment or electronic gadgetry. Betty collected antiques and enjoyed the old-fashioned craft of quilting. Betty barreled her way through obstacles with sarcasm and intimidation; Bob’s approach, as described by Gordon Moore, was to “spend two hours trying to convince someone about the way something ought to be done, rather than [taking] the two minutes in which he could tell them [to do it].” Betty’s depiction of a party at Charlie Sporck’s house, which she sent to her son Bill in 1963, highlights a few of the differences between the couple: “Da [Bob] went swimming, as did most of the men but very few of the ladies, and did some nice diving and joined in a game of water polo. After he got out and got dressed again, three of the men threw him back in the pool, considering it a very funny joke. They in turn were thrown in by others, which made me want very much to come home, but Da put his clothes in the dryer and was good as new in half an hour, and appeared not to be angry. He’s a very good sport!”46
鲍勃和贝蒂偶尔还是会享受彼此的陪伴。他们一起设计图案，用瓷砖铺贴了厨房的一面墙。他们带孩子们去内华达山脉露营，还为全家做了配套的夹克。他们互相较劲，看谁的“汤姆·斯威夫特式幽默”更胜一筹。（贝蒂：“‘今天是我的生日，’汤姆随口说道。”鲍勃：“‘菠萝汁用完了，’汤姆沮丧地说。贝蒂：“‘这是我们最好的肉馅，’汤姆漫不经心地说道。”）每年圣诞节，他们都会邀请所有认识的孩子参加一个由鲍勃指挥的非正式乐队，在派对上演奏。那是他们的家。鲍勃滑雪摔断了腿，朋友寄给他一堆单只的袜子让他穿，他和贝蒂花了几个小时缝制袜子木偶，并给它们取名字。戴着月桂叶皇冠的木偶叫“袜子拉特斯”（Sockrates）。扎染的袜子配上绳子做的头发叫“袜子阿德利克”（Sockadelic）。他们还做了“袜子和范泽蒂”（Socko and Vanzetti）、“红鲑鱼萨姆”（Sam the Sockeye Salmon）、“袜子加维亚”（Sockajawea），以及一个用黑色长袜做的“袜子宗教家”（Sockreligious）木偶，贝蒂给它缝上了一个白色的牧师领。为了增加乐趣，贝蒂给每只袜子都贴上了标签，然后让孩子们把它们藏在邻居家。47
Bob and Betty did still occasionally enjoy each other’s company. They tiled a wall of their kitchen in a pattern they designed together. They took the children camping in the Sierras and made matching jackets for the entire family. They tried to top each other’s Tom Swifties. (Betty: “‘My birthday is today,’ Tom said presently.” Bob: “‘We’re all out of pineapple juice,’ Tom said dolefully. Betty: “‘This is our very best ground meat,’ Tom said off-handedly.”) Every Christmas, they invited all the children they knew to join in an informal orchestra that Bob conducted at a party in their home. When Bob broke a leg skiing and a friend sent him a collection of single socks to wear, he and Betty spent hours sewing sock puppets and naming them. The puppet with a laurel-leaf crown was Sockrates. The tie-dyed sock with string hair was Sockadelic. They made Socko and Vanzetti, Sam the Sockeye Salmon, Sockajawea, and a “sockreligious” puppet from a black stocking to which Betty attached a white clerical collar. To add to the amusement, Betty labeled the socks and had the children hide them in the neighbor’s house.47
这样的乐趣实在太难得了。即使不在工作岗位上，或者出差在外，鲍勃也总是尽可能多地待在家里。每周三，他指挥的十二人合唱团都会排练。他帮查理·斯波克组装烧烤架。他带比利去斯坦福大学帮忙调音钟琴，还带他去田野里放模型飞机。他甚至还安排周末聚会。
Such fun was too rare. Even when he was not at work or traveling for his job, Bob spent as much time as he could away from home. Every Wednesday, the 12-voice madrigal group that he directed met for rehearsals. He helped Charlie Sporck build his barbeque grill. He took Billy to help tune the carillon at Stanford and to fly model airplanes in a field. He scheduled weekend meetings.
他力劝贝蒂在太浩湖买一间滑雪小屋。“他无数次把我们从雪堆里抱起来，掸掉我们身上的雪，然后带着我们四个穿着配套橙色滑雪服的孩子们上山，”他的女儿佩妮回忆道，“他一直这样做，直到我们也能分享他的快乐。”每天滑雪结束后，他都会让孩子们等他，然后自己再滑最后一趟，全速前进，只为自己而滑。与此同时，贝蒂会在小屋里待上一整天。她喜欢山胜过喜欢滑雪，在太浩湖，她总觉得自己像个“旅店老板”，静静地等待着家人回来，为他们准备热可可和晚餐。48
He pushed Betty to buy a ski cottage at Lake Tahoe. “A thousand times he picked us up from a snowbank, dusted us off, and led us up the mountain, the four of us in our matching orange jackets,” recalled his daughter Penny. “He did this until we could share his exhilaration.” At the end of a day of skiing, he would have the children wait for him while he took one last run, at top speed, just for himself. Betty, meanwhile, would spend the day in the cabin. She liked the mountains more than she liked skiing, and she always felt like an “innkeeper” at Tahoe, biding her time until the family returned and she fed them hot cocoa and dinner.48
鲍勃收集了一批费尔柴尔德仪器，寄给格兰特·盖尔用于课堂教学。1963年，35岁的他加入了格林内尔学院的董事会，进一步加深了他对这所学院的贡献。董事会成员每四个月会回到母校几天。其他董事们亲切地称呼这位最年轻的成员为“小诺伊斯”，因为他们以为他听不见。
Bob assembled collections of Fairchild equipment to send to Grant Gale for use in his classes. He further extended his commitment to Grinnell College in 1963, when at the age of 35, he joined the board of trustees. The trusteeship took him to his alma mater for a few days every four months. His fellow trustees fondly called their youngest member “Boy Noyce” when they thought he could not hear them.
即使在家，诺伊斯也把自己关在地下室里。在那里，他制作了一架管风琴、一架大键琴、许多飞机模型，还有一台微波炉。地下室是他的避难所，一个不再从事太多科研工作的科学家的地下实验室，正如他儿子所说，诺伊斯可以在那里“做一些不会反抗的事情”。贝蒂怀疑他是在躲着她。49
Even when he was at home, Noyce sequestered himself in the basement. Here he built an organ, a harpsichord, many model airplanes, a microwave oven. The basement was his refuge, an underground lab for a scientist who no longer did much science, a place where, as his son put it, Noyce could “work on something that doesn’t fight back.” Betty suspected he was avoiding her.49
的确如此。贝蒂·诺伊斯对孩子的行为要求极高，而且她的惩罚方式也极具语言攻击性——她会对孩子们大吼大叫，甚至嘲讽他们——鲍勃担心她会伤害孩子们的心理健康。相比之下，孩子们对他们的“爸爸”的记忆则大多是温馨的——他会在夜里过来看看他们，他香烟的微光在黑暗中几乎难以察觉；当他们乘坐滑雪缆车时，他会把他们戴着手套的冰冷小手放在自己的衬衫和外套下面。他鼓励，有时也会引导他们的冒险精神。当13岁的佩妮想要……例如，在跳伞课上，他给她介绍了一个从头到脚缠满绷带的男人。“这个跳伞员的降落伞出了点问题，”诺伊斯解释说。然后他提出要付钱让她上滑翔伞课。“这招管用，”佩妮后来回忆说，“我虽然转移了注意力”——但仍然翱翔在天空中。的确，诺伊斯试图把自己的好胜心灌输给孩子们。他始终不明白为什么孩子们不想参加乡村俱乐部的游泳队比赛，也不想参加马术比赛。他会提出一些与成绩和金钱相关的诱人条件，比如：“我给你们每个A付40美分，A是中性的，你们每个B给我1美元”——然后鼓励孩子们根据自己预期的成绩单提出相应的条件。50
He was. Betty Noyce’s standards of behavior were so high, and her methods of reinforcement so verbally combative—she yelled at and even taunted the children—that Bob worried she was damaging the children’s psyches. The children’s memories of their “Da,” by contrast, are generally tender—his coming to check on them at night, the glow of his cigarette scarcely visible in the dark; his placing their cold mittened hands under his shirt and jacket as they rode the ski lift. He encouraged, and occasionally re-directed, their sense of adventure. When 13-year-old Penny wanted to skydive, for example, he introduced her to a man swathed head to toe in bandages. “This skydiver had a bit of trouble with his parachute,” Noyce explained. Then he offered to pay for hang-gliding lessons. “It worked,” Penny said later. “I was diverted”—but still soaring through the sky. To be sure, Noyce tried to imbue the children with his own competitive nature. He never understood why they did not want to race for the swim team at the country club or to show their horses competitively. He made elaborate offers related to grades and money, proposing for example, “I’ll pay you 40 cents for each A, an A–is neutral, and you pay me $1 for every B”—and then encouraged the children to counter with offers geared to their anticipated report cards.50
其中一位回忆说：“他想要的是有能力的孩子，而她想要的是举止得体的孩子。”51
“He wanted children who were empowered,” recalled one of them. “She wanted children who behaved properly.”51
无论鲍勃对贝蒂的育儿方式有何看法，他都尊重家里的分工。他很少干预孩子的事情，而且每次都以最温和的方式进行。有一次，他们三岁的孩子因为行为不端被赶出餐桌，却又不断回来激怒贝蒂。鲍勃站起身，既没有责备孩子，也没有让贝蒂停止吼叫，而是用椅子挡住门口，不让孩子进来。然后他坐下，继续默默地吃饭。还有一次，一个孩子总是不肯把左手放在腿上。每次她的手靠近桌子，她妈妈就会打她的手腕。最后，鲍勃站起身，解下皮带，把女儿的左手绑在椅子上。女儿对此感激不尽。她的手动不了，也就不会被打了。
Whatever Bob thought of Betty’s childrearing tactics, he respected the division of labor in the household. He intervened with the children only occasionally and then in only the most passive of ways. When their three-year old, who had been sent from the table for unacceptable behavior, kept returning to provoke Betty’s anger, Bob stood up, and without chastising the child or asking Betty to stop yelling, he blocked the door with a chair so the little one could not come in. Then he sat down and resumed eating in silence. Another time, a child had problems keeping her left hand in her lap. Every time her hand approached the table, her mother would slap her wrist. Finally Bob stood up, pulled off his belt, and strapped his daughter’s left hand to her chair. For this the daughter was grateful. She could not move her hand, so she could not be slapped.
贝蒂·诺伊斯当时处境艰难。在20世纪60年代的大部分时间里，妻子都被视为丈夫的延伸。事实上，自1953年以来，情况并没有太大改变。当时，威廉·肖克利在笔记本上潦草地写下“我不想找一个妻子对此感到不满的男人”，以此拒绝了一位潜在的应聘者。1966年，鲍勃几乎肯定读过一份主流电子行业通讯，该通讯指出“美国企业正在开始仔细考察（应聘者的妻子）”，并进一步将“理想的高管妻子”描述为“一种高级女童子军”，她不仅履行“标准的妻子职责”，而且还“为压力巨大的丈夫提供情感和心理上的慰藉”。52
Betty Noyce was in a difficult situation. Wives were seen as an extension of their husbands for most of the 1960s. Indeed, not much had changed since 1953, when William Shockley had dismissed a potential recruit with a jotted notation in his notebook that he “did not want a man whose wife was annoyed about it all.” In 1966, the leading electronics newsletter, which Bob almost certainly read, noted that “American corporations are adopting the practice of taking a careful look at [a man’s wife]” and went on to describe “the ideal executive wife” as “a kind of glorified Girl Scout” who not only performed “the standard wifely duties” but also “provides the emotional and psychological balm to relieve the pressures on her tension-ridden husband.”52
贝蒂·诺伊斯并不乐意扮演这样的角色。即使她竭力表现得端庄谦逊，也未能成功。例如，她曾对一位记者说：“我担心自己因为读书太多而疏于家务。”换句话说，她并非一个光鲜亮丽的女童子军，而是一位知识分子。她也拒绝将自己视为展示的对象，经常顶着一头湿漉漉的头发，穿着一位朋友戏谑地形容为“虽不及流浪汉，但也差不多”的服装去办事。53
Betty Noyce did not accede willingly to this role. Even when she tried her best to appear demure and self-effacing, she did not succeed. She told a reporter, for example, that “I fear I neglect my housekeeping as a result of all the books I read.” In other words, she was not a glorified Girl Scout; she was an intellectual. She also refused to think of herself as an object for display and regularly ran her errands with a head full of wet hair and attired in a sartorial style one friend affectionately described as “not bag-lady, but close.”53
贝蒂·诺伊斯对自己的处境感到愤恨：一个在塔夫茨大学受过教育的女人，有四个年幼的孩子，丈夫常年不在家，住在一个她厌恶的地方，远离她深爱的故乡。她讨厌做饭——她常说“做饭的时间不应该比吃饭的时间长”——她当着鲍勃的面问理查德·霍奇森：“如果我们这么有钱，为什么我还在洗碗？”此外，她认为自己在智力上与鲍勃不相上下，她讨厌在社交场合沦为他的附属品，所以尽可能地避免参加这些活动。54
Betty Noyce resented the situation in which she found herself: a Tufts-educated woman with four small children, a husband who was never home, and a life in a place she detested, far from the place she loved. She disliked cooking—“meals should not take longer to cook than to eat,” she often said—and she asked Richard Hodgson, in front of Bob, “Why is it, if we’re so damn rich, that I’m still washing dishes?” Moreover, she considered herself Bob’s intellectual equal and hated appearing as his appendage at social functions, which she avoided as much as she could.54
她从志愿工作中找到了精神寄托。她协助在洛斯阿尔托斯建立了一家图书馆，并主持了旧金山教育电视台的筹款活动。这些工作让她能够为她所关心的事业贡献力量，同时又能让她有时间陪伴孩子。贝蒂·诺伊斯也写作，总是使用笔名，但从未发表过作品。她还创作了精美的刺绣和拼布作品，其中一些作品细致地记录了家庭生活点滴。
She found an intellectual outlet in volunteer work. She helped to establish a library in Los Altos and chaired a fundraiser for the San Francisco educational television station. This work allowed her to exert considerable leverage in support of causes that mattered to her—but on a schedule that enabled her to be home for her children. Betty Noyce also wrote, always using a pseudonym, but she was never published. And she created beautiful needlepoint art and quilts, several of which elaborately chronicled the family’s activities.
她怀疑丈夫不忠。鲍勃·诺伊斯身处一个充满雄性荷尔蒙的世界，所有与他平起平坐的人都是男性，而所有女性都是他的下属。“公司里靠酒精和寻欢作乐维持运转，”杰伊·拉斯特回忆道。诺伊斯去日本出差时，总会有女性陪伴。销售员们在嘈杂的会议厅里公开拿身材丰满的金发女郎开玩笑。在宣布一条预生产线搬迁的公告结尾，仙童公司的一份简报会写道：“所有研发人员都会想念4200生产线上那些美丽年轻女孩的笑脸。”诺伊斯权势滔天，魅力十足，家庭生活并不幸福，他是个冒险家，信奉尽享人生，并且经常与那些“女孩”保持联系——这些女孩不仅在装配线上和前台工作，还会在下班后和科学家、工程师们一起喝酒。他很可能确实有过婚外情。55
She suspected that her husband was unfaithful. Bob Noyce functioned in a testosterone-drenched world in which all of his equals were men and every woman a subordinate. “The business ran on alcohol and playing around,” recalls Jay Last. Noyce’s trips to Japan included female entertainment. Salesmen openly joked about buxom blonds in noisy conference halls. At the end of an announcement that a pre-production line was changing buildings, a Fairchild newsletter could note that “all the R&D men will miss the smiling faces of the beautiful young girls in the 4200 line.” Noyce was powerful, attractive, unhappy at home, a risk taker who believed in grabbing as much from life as he could, and in regular contact with the “girls” who not only worked on assembly lines and behind reception desks but who also joined the scientists and engineers for drinks after work. He probably did have casual affairs.55
诺伊斯意识到自己正变得“与家人疏远”。他说他羡慕“那些在机修车间里的人，他们晚上可以回家安心入睡”。他震惊地发现，在费尔柴尔德待得越久，除了工作之外，他对其他任何事都提不起兴趣。“当这种情况发生时，你还算什么人？”他问道。然后他自问自答道：“你什么都不是。”56
Noyce knew that he was becoming “a stranger to [his] own family.” He said he envied “people out in the machine shop who could go home at night and sleep with no concern.” He was appalled to discover that the longer he stayed at Fairchild, the less he had any interest in anything except business. “What are you as a person when that happens?” he asked. Then he answered his own question: “You’re nothing.”56
办公室里的情况只会变得更糟。诺伊斯将注意力分散在半导体部门和仪器仪表部门之间，而新任半导体部门总经理查理·斯波克则按照宝洁公司著名的产品经理模式重组了公司。他任命了几位产品经理，他们都是工程师，负责协调各自产品的生产。这次重组并没有完全分散半导体部门的权力。由于市场营销和中央生产控制（决定设备生产数量）维持了集中化的运营模式，因此运营方式发生了显著变化。尽管如此，这与诺伊斯时期的组织结构相比，仍然是一个重大变革。57
MATTERS ONLY WORSENED at the office. While Noyce split his attention between Semiconductor and the instrumentation division, new Semiconductor general manager Charlie Sporck reorganized the firm along the product-manager model made famous by Procter and Gamble. He designated several product managers, all of them engineers, to coordinate production of their specific devices. The reorganization did not fully decentralize the Semiconductor operation, since marketing and central production control (which determined the volumes of devices to be manufactured) maintained centralized operations. Nonetheless, it was a significant change from the organization structure under Noyce.57
这些改变来得太晚了。到1966年底，仙童半导体公司开始无法按时交付承诺的产品，有时甚至只能满足客户约三分之一的订单。与此同时，由于研发到生产的转化效率低下，公司研发的新产品也未能成功推向市场，最终未能实现批量生产。事实上，仙童半导体公司在将自身发明推向市场方面遇到的困难众所周知，以至于业内流传着一句广为流传的俏皮话：“仙童半导体研发的第一批产品很可能是在桑尼维尔生产的。”而桑尼维尔正是Signetics公司的所在地。58
The changes came too late. By the end of 1966, Fairchild began to miss its promised deliveries, at times meeting only about one-third of its customer commitments. At the same time, the company failed to market new products developed in R&D because the transfer from development to manufacturing was so inefficient that the devices were never manufactured in volume. Indeed, Semiconductor’s difficulties in bringing its own inventions to market were so renowned that they generated an oft-repeated industry one-liner: “The first parts coming out of Fairchild R&D were probably made in Sunnyvale.” Sunnyvale was home to Signetics.58
到1966年底，半导体部门的困境已然显露无疑，就连局外人也看得一清二楚。第四季度，相机与仪器部门的利润甚至低于第三季度。尽管母公司公开将责任归咎于半导体部门，但华尔街并未被蒙蔽。基德公司的一位副总裁皮博迪的话代表了许多投资界人士的心声：“如果我能单独收购半导体部门，我或许会这么做，但我实在无法接受为仙童公司的管理层以及半导体业务中那些枯燥乏味的琐事支付溢价。”59
By the end of 1966, Semiconductor’s festering troubles had become apparent even to outsiders. In the fourth quarter, Camera and Instrument’s profits dropped below those of the third quarter. Although the parent company publicly blamed the semiconductor division, Wall Street was not fooled. One vice president of Kidder, Peabody spoke for many in the investment community when he said, “If I could just buy the semiconductor division, I might do it, but I can’t see paying a premium for Fairchild’s management and all the uninteresting stuff you have to take with semiconductors.”59
在相机与仪器部门的敦促下，半导体部门启动了“仙童71”计划，这是一项为期五年的规划工具，也是“集中开展工艺成本削减和机械化项目，并为扩张制定明确指导方针”的启动平台。削减成本的命令激怒了半导体部门的员工。多年来，他们的部门一直比公司整体盈利能力更强，而公司其他部门却一直在亏损，严重拖累了半导体部门的利润。尽管诺伊斯当时已担任副总裁，但半导体部门在母公司董事会中仍然没有正式代表。虽然公司另一位副总裁担任董事，但诺伊斯却不是。60
At the urging of Camera and Instrument, Semiconductor initiated “FAIRCHILD 71,” a five-year planning tool and the launch pad for “a concentrated program of process cost reduction and mechanization [that] established definitive guidelines for expansion.” A command to reduce costs infuriated the Semiconductor employees. For years, their division had been more profitable than the company as a whole, with other parts of the company losing money and serving as net drains from the Semiconductor bottom line. And even though Noyce now served as a vice president, the Semiconductor division still did not have a formal representative on the parent company’s board. Although another vice president of the corporation served as a director, Noyce did not.60
1967年3月，在Chez Yvonne餐厅，查理·斯波克（Charlie Sporck）与诺伊斯（Noyce）小酌时，愤愤不平地告诉诺伊斯，他即将离开仙童半导体公司，去担任奄奄一息的美国国家半导体公司（National Semiconductor）的首席执行官。与他一同离开的还有几位集成电路领域的关键人物。几个月来，斯波克一直抱怨仙童半导体公司难以吸引新工程师，因为竞争对手不仅能提供与仙童半导体公司相当的薪水，还能提供大约1000份股票期权。斯波克还愤愤不平地认为，相机与仪器公司（Camera and Instrument）“挥霍”了他在国家半导体公司辛辛苦苦赚来的钱。此外，他回忆起自己看着国家半导体公司那些衍生公司蒸蒸日上，不禁自问：“我为什么不也做这样的事呢？” 的确，为什么不呢？斯波克他一直想着离开仙童公司后，回老家纽约州北部开一家民宿，但国家半导体公司的邀请实在太诱人了。诺伊斯甚至懒得劝斯波克留在仙童公司。他理解朋友的沮丧。61
In March 1967, over drinks at Chez Yvonne, a disgusted Charlie Sporck told Noyce that he was leaving to take the job of CEO at the moribund National Semiconductor. Leaving with him were several key integrated circuits men. For months Sporck had been complaining about how hard it was to attract new engineers to Fairchild when competing firms could match a Fairchild salary and offer about 1,000 stock options. Sporck further resented that Camera and Instrument was “throwing away in various directions” money made by the sweat of his brow at Semiconductor. Moreover, he recalls watching the rising fortunes of Semiconductor’s spin-offs and wondering, “Why don’t I do that sort of thing?” Why not indeed? Sporck had long thought that he would run a bed-and-breakfast in his native upstate New York after he left Fairchild, but the offer from National Semiconductor was too attractive. Noyce did not even bother trying to convince Sporck to stay at Fairchild. He understood his friend’s frustrations.61
斯波克的离职对诺伊斯来说无疑是巨大的打击，他非常依赖这位得力的副手。“他走的时候，我几乎哭了，”诺伊斯说，“你知道，和自己喜欢的人一起工作，然后眼睁睁看着他们分道扬镳，这种感觉简直令人崩溃。”诺伊斯邀请研发主管戈登·摩尔担任总经理。摩尔在实验室快速发展的过程中一直保持着实验室的平稳运转。他要求研发部门的每个小组每周提交一份简短的进度报告。技术人员也开始撰写自己的报告，内容涵盖了从管道冲洗的重要性到纸巾和滤纸在晶圆干燥方面的优劣等各种问题。62
Sporck’s departure was personally very painful for Noyce, who leaned heavily on his strong second-in-command. “I suppose I essentially cried when he left,” Noyce said. “You know, working with people that you’re fond of, then having them break apart, was I would almost say devastating.” Noyce asked Gordon Moore, the head of R&D, to serve as general manager. Moore had kept the laboratory functioning smoothly throughout its dramatic growth. He had required every group within R&D to update him on their activities with a brief weekly progress report. The technicians had begun their own series of reports that covered issues ranging from the importance of flushing the pipes to the relative merits of paper towels versus filter paper for drying wafers.62
摩尔拒绝了总经理的职位。“除了研发部门之外，公司其他部门一团糟，我不知道该怎么办，”他后来解释说。诺伊斯随后任命他之前的市场营销副手汤姆·贝为半导体部门总经理，但此举并未缓解公司的困境。63
Moore declined the general manager’s job. “The rest of the company [other than R&D] was a mess, and I didn’t know what to do about it,” he later explained. Noyce then named Tom Bay, his former marketing lieutenant, as general manager of Semiconductor, a move that did not ease the company’s troubles.63
在斯波克叛逃后的几个月里，仙童半导体公司笼罩在一片令人不安的不确定性之中。没有人知道谁会留下，谁又在暗中策划离开。1967年3月底，诺伊斯和专利顾问罗杰·博罗沃伊，以及他们的妻子和诺伊斯的助手保罗·霍斯钦斯基前往维也纳，商讨一项许可协议。当诺伊斯夫妇和博罗沃伊夫妇意识到第二天是愚人节时，他们决定捉弄一下霍斯钦斯基。诺伊斯打电话给身在加利福尼亚的汤姆·贝，让他发一封电报。两对夫妇事先精心拟定了电报的措辞：
A disquieting uncertainty settled over Fairchild Semiconductor in the months after Sporck’s defection. No one knew who was staying and who was secretly hatching plans to go when at the end of March 1967, Noyce and patent counsel Roger Borovoy, along with their wives and Noyce’s assistant Paul Hwoschinsky, traveled to Vienna to negotiate a licensing agreement. When the Noyces and Borovoys realized that the next day was April Fools’, they decided to play a joke on Hwoschinsky. Noyce called Tom Bay in California and asked him to send a telegram. The two couples had carefully worked out the wording:
保罗。我刚得知两位半导体行业高级经理即将跳槽到美国国家半导体公司，而且我有理由相信鲍勃·诺伊斯也打算加入他们。请你谨慎地探听一下他的意图，然后迅速汇报。紧急。汤姆。
Paul. Have just learned that [two senior Semiconductor managers] are leaving for National and have reason to believe that Bob Noyce plans to join them. Delicately probe his intentions and report back. Urgent. Tom.
贝伊同意立即发送电报，这群人满怀期待地盼望着第二天早上的闹剧，然后就睡着了。
Bay agreed to send the telegram immediately, and the group, eagerly anticipating the next morning’s foolery, went to sleep.
他们聚在一起吃早餐时，霍辛斯基看起来很沮丧。显然他整夜没睡。布伦达·博罗沃伊回忆说：“我们的计划天衣无缝，我和丈夫贝蒂心照不宣地对视了一眼，等着好戏上演。然而，保罗刚清了清嗓子，鲍勃就脱口而出：‘开玩笑的。’我们感觉被骗了。他怎么能这样？但面对如此心烦意乱的人，鲍勃·诺伊斯还是老样子——一个善良、诚实、本质上很美好的人。”64
When they assembled for breakfast, Hwoschinsky looked miserable. It was clear he had been up all night. Recalls Brenda Borovoy, “Our scheme had worked perfectly, and Betty, my husband and I glanced at each other conspiratorially, waiting for the fun to begin. No sooner had Paul cleared his throat, however, than Bob blurted out, ‘It’s a joke.’ We felt cheated. How could he? But Bob Noyce, in the face of someone so troubled, could only be Bob—a nice, honest, and fundamentally good human being.”64
在欧洲的欢乐时光对诺伊斯来说是一次难得的喘息机会。“我当时感觉一切都在崩溃，”诺伊斯后来回忆起斯波克离职后的几个月时说道。诺伊斯很清楚，他不可能再在半导体公司留住那些高素质的员工了：外部的offer“实在太诱人了”，而半导体公司的处境又实在太糟糕了。65
The merriment in Europe was a welcome break for Noyce. “I just felt that things were falling apart,” Noyce would later say of the months following Sporck’s departure. Noyce knew that there was no way he could keep high-caliber employees at Semiconductor much longer: the offers from outside were simply “too enticing” and the situation at Semiconductor too dismal.65
诺伊斯是一位极富创造力的人，但到了1967年，他发现自己几乎完全处于被动应对的状态：疲于应付诉讼，被迫接受他原本并不想要的收购，还要与相机和仪器部门的管理层就股票期权问题争论不休。他在赛奥塞特开会的笔记几乎全是关于行政细节，这些细节令诺伊斯感到枯燥乏味：应收账款、广告预算、组织结构图、间接成本明细以及持续不断的人事问题。他甚至一度给自己写道：“想办法把东海岸的人赶走！”——显然，赛奥塞特的管理人员正试图精确地决定半导体部门每个小组的人员配置。66
Noyce was a highly creative man who by 1967 found himself functioning in an almost purely reactive mode: fighting lawsuits, assimilating acquisitions he did not want in the first place, and wrestling with Camera and Instrument management over stock options. His notes from meetings in Syosset deal almost exclusively with administrative details that Noyce would have found mind-numbing: accounts receivable, advertising budgets, organization charts, breakdown of overhead costs, and ongoing personnel issues. At one point, he wrote to himself, “Try to get East Coast out!”—apparently, managers in Syosset were trying to dictate precisely how many people should be assigned to each group within Semiconductor.66
除了霍奇森之外，诺伊斯对相机仪器公司的高层管理人员毫无尊重可言。他经常讲起自己在赛奥塞特醒来时发现暴风雪肆虐，以至于找不到出租车去相机仪器公司总部开会的故事。他一路嘟囔咒骂着走到大楼，结果发现根本没人来。他好不容易从大陆的另一端赶到，而相机仪器公司的那些人却懒得从家走几英里路过来。诺伊斯对这些人嗤之以鼻。
Noyce had no respect for senior Camera and Instrument management other than Hodgson. Noyce often told the story of waking up in Syosset to a snowstorm so severe that he could not find a cab to take him to his meeting at Camera and Instrument headquarters. He walked to the building, muttering and cursing to himself the whole way, only to discover that no one else was coming. He had managed to make it from the other side of the continent, but the men who ran Camera and Instrument could not be troubled to attempt the trip of several miles from their homes. Noyce had no use for these people.
到了20世纪60年代末，诺伊斯不仅与他的上司关系疏远，也与他十年前引以为傲的半导体公司的创新技术层面脱节了。尽管他仍然会收到研发部门的所有报告，但这仅仅是获取科学知识，而不是做出贡献。虽然他把实验记录本带到总经理办公室，但他将近三年都没有在上面写过任何东西——之后也只是偶尔写写。他怀念做科研的日子，即使半导体公司已经发展到拥有数万名员工，即使他已经多年没有坐在实验室的工作台前，诺伊斯每天上班时仍然会告诉家人他“要去实验室”。“就像从小就照顾孩子一样，你舍不得抛弃它，”他曾遗憾地对一位记者谈到仙童半导体实验室时说道。 “你当然希望保持联系，了解行业动态，但用于这方面的时间越来越少，而越来越多的时间却必须花在担心其他问题上——人、组织、生产、营销，以及所有构成一个行业而非科学本身的因素。”毫无疑问，就在这个时候，即将年满40岁的诺伊斯开始考虑离开半导体行业。67
By the late 1960s, Noyce was not only alienated from his bosses, he was also out of touch with the innovative, technical side of Semiconductor in which he had taken such pride a decade before. Although he continued to receive copies of all the reports from R&D, this was simply acquiring scientific knowledge, not contributing to it. And while he brought his lab notebook with him to the general manager’s office, he did not write an entry in it for nearly three years—and then he wrote only at very scattered intervals. He missed doing science, and even after Semiconductor had grown to tens of thousands of employees, even after it had been years since he sat at a lab bench, Noyce would tell his family that he was “going to the lab” when he left for work each day. “After growing up with a baby, you don’t like to abandon it,” he ruefully told a reporter about the Fairchild lab. “You’d rather keep in touch, to stay aware of what’s going on, but there is less and less time to do this and more and more time that must be spent worrying about other kinds of problems—people, organization, production, marketing, and all the rest of what makes an industry rather than what makes a science.” It was no doubt around this time that Noyce, who was nearing 40, began to consider leaving Semiconductor.67
诺伊斯私下里谋划着，同时敦促相机仪器公司采取措施，减轻斯波克离职对半导体公司其他员工的冲击——他知道其中一些员工正在动摇。相机仪器公司最终采取了果断行动。诺伊斯被任命为董事会成员，此后不久，董事们推动了股票期权计划的大规模民主化改革，授权额外发放30万股股票作为期权。此前仅偶尔召开会议的股票期权委员会开始每月召开一次会议，分配期权。近100名员工，其中许多是半导体公司的中层管理人员，获得了新的期权。这些员工中约有一半此前从未持有过期权。而对于另一半员工来说，新授予的期权使他们的持股总数增加了一倍多。68
While Noyce plotted privately, he urged Camera and Instrument to take steps to soften the blow of Sporck’s departure for the rest of the employees—some of whom he knew were wavering—at Semiconductor. Camera and Instrument finally took decisive action. Noyce was given a seat on the board, and shortly thereafter, the directors pushed through a vast democratization of the stock-option plan, authorizing 300,000 additional shares for options. The stock-option committee, which had met only sporadically in the past, began meeting monthly to distribute options. Almost 100 employees, many of them middle managers at Semiconductor, received new option grants. About half of these employees had never before held options. For the other half, the new grant more than doubled their total holdings.68
总之，一切都为时已晚，无法阻止半导体公司员工的大量流失。斯波克离职六个月后，约有35人跳槽到国民经济公司，追随他的脚步。员工们几乎从所有可能的出口逃离半导体公司。《商业周刊》写道： “突然之间，湾区所有半导体公司都能招到仙童半导体的专业人员了。”69
In any case, it was all too late to stanch what had become a hemorrhaging of employees from Semiconductor. Six months after Sporck’s departure, some 35 people had left to join him at National. Employees began fleeing Semiconductor from almost every possible exit door. “Suddenly,” wrote Business Week, “every semiconductor company in the Bay area was able to hire Fairchild professional people.”69
半导体公司的境况急转直下。1967年3月下旬，该公司宣布已克服了几个生产难题，但这一消息在铺天盖地的坏消息中几乎无人问津。整个行业消费者需求的意外下滑意味着许多客户不再需要他们订购的器件。10月份，半导体公司在其十年历史上第三次出现月度亏损。70
Semiconductor’s fortunes plummeted quickly. In late March 1967, the company announced that several production difficulties had been overcome, but the announcement went largely unnoticed in a tide of bad news. An unanticipated drop in consumer demand throughout the industry meant many customers no longer needed the devices they had ordered. In October, Semiconductor, for only the third time in its ten year history, reported monthly losses.70
由于半导体业务的业绩下滑，相机仪器公司1967年第三季度的盈利仅为13.7万美元，比上年同期300万美元的利润暴跌95.5%，远低于华尔街原本就持谨慎态度的预期。公司勉强收支平衡，股价也从年初的92美元跌至52美元。71
Due in large measure to Semiconductor’s slipping performance, Camera and Instrument’s earnings for the third quarter of 1967 were a paltry $137,000—down a staggering 95.5 percent from the preceding year’s third-quarter profit of $3 million, and a worse performance than an already leery Wall Street had expected. With the company barely breaking even, the stock price slid to 52 from 92 at the beginning of the year.71
在令人震惊的第三季度财报发布后，相机与仪器公司董事会罢免了生活奢靡的首席执行官约翰·卡特，并邀请理查德·霍奇森——正是他最初将肖克利叛逃者招至仙童半导体公司——兼任首席执行官一职。1981年，一位记者声称，诺伊斯促成了领导层的更迭，并在1967年卡特离职后不久，曾得意洋洋地对记者说：“既然要弑君，那就干脆一刀两断。 ” 诺伊斯的干预似乎并非空穴来风。鉴于其半导体业务的摇钱树显然陷入困境，而诺伊斯如今又是相机与仪器公司董事会成员，董事会很可能会采纳他提出的危机应对建议。毫无疑问，诺伊斯也会建议由霍奇森接替卡特。72
In the wake of the appalling third-quarter earnings report, the board of Camera and Instrument ousted the company’s high-living CEO, John Carter, and asked Richard Hodgson, the man who first lured the Shockley defectors to Fairchild, to add CEO to his title of president. In 1981, a reporter claimed that Noyce had forced the change of leadership and that in 1967, shortly after Carter’s departure, Noyce had proudly told the journalist, “When you set out to kill the king, you’d better kill him dead.” Noyce’s purported intervention seems plausible. With its Semiconductor golden goose so clearly in trouble, and Noyce now a member of the Camera and Instrument board, it is likely that the board would follow his suggestions about how to remedy the crisis. And Noyce undoubtedly would have suggested that Hodgson replace Carter.72
无论其缘由如何，霍奇森升任首席执行官当然并未立即产生效果。到年底，相机与仪器公司承认半导体部门的销售额占公司总销售额的一半以上，并公布了770万美元的亏损。其中约400万美元为资产减值，但剩余的350万美元亏损与上一年超过1200万美元的盈利形成鲜明对比。该公司将这一业绩解释为“有意将所有亏损集中起来，一次性承受损失”。73
Whatever its genesis, Hodgson’s elevation to CEO did not generate immediate effects, of course. By year’s end, Camera and Instrument, admitting that the semiconductor division accounted for well over half the company’s sales, reported a $7.7 million loss. Some $4 million of this were write-offs, but the remaining $3.5 million trail of red ink compared to a profit the previous year of more than $12 million. The company described the results as “a deliberate attempt to group all losses and take the beating at one time.”73
新年伊始仅几周，诺伊斯就意识到，相机与仪器公司董事会的其他成员对霍奇森的领导越来越不耐烦。如果霍奇森被赶下台，诺伊斯尊重的任何人都将无法继续留在管理层。诺伊斯需要考虑自己的选择。他决定去拜访戈登·摩尔。
Just weeks into the new year, it became apparent to Noyce that his fellow Camera and Instrument board members were losing patience with Hodgson’s leadership. If Hodgson were to be ousted, no one Noyce respected would remain in the executive suite. Noyce needed to consider his options. He decided to pay a visit to Gordon Moore.
“我正在考虑离开仙童公司，”诺伊斯用他惯常用来宣布重大消息的漫不经心的语气告诉摩尔。诺伊斯说，或许他会尝试创办一家公司，用集成电路制造计算机存储芯片。摩尔怎么想？诺伊斯很希望他能成为新公司的联合创始人。如果诺伊斯离开，摩尔会跟他一起走吗？74
“I’m thinking of leaving Fairchild,” Noyce told Moore in the offhanded tone he so often used to announce big news. Perhaps, Noyce said, he would try to start a company to build computer memory chips out of integrated circuits. What did Moore think? Noyce would love to have him as his co-founder of a new company. If he left, would Moore join him?74
诺伊斯肯定知道，制造基于半导体的存储器件的想法会吸引摩尔。事实上，就在几个月前，摩尔还告诉诺伊斯，他认为半导体存储器是“我很久以来见过的第一个可以让你创办公司的想法”。计算机市场正在飞速发展。在过去的两年里，小型计算机的数量增长了五倍。诺伊斯和摩尔对这个市场非常了解；据估计，到1968年，仙童半导体公司占据了集成电路计算机市场80%的份额。与此同时，半导体行业在将越来越多的器件集成到同一电路上方面取得的进展意味着，很快就能制造出足够复杂的集成电路，使其能够实际应用于计算机存储。仙童半导体公司自己也已经推出了可以执行类似存储器功能的双位触发器芯片。当时全球最大的计算机制造商IBM宣布，它已经开始研究半导体存储器，计划将其用作未来IBM计算机的主存储器。75
Noyce must have known the idea of building semiconductor-based memory devices would appeal to Moore. Just a few months before, in fact, Moore had told Noyce that he thought semiconductor memories were “one of the first ideas I’ve seen in a long time that you could probably start a company on.” The computer market was growing dramatically. In the past two years, the number of minicomputers had increased fivefold. Noyce and Moore knew this market well; some estimates contend that by 1968, Fairchild held 80 percent of the computer market for integrated circuits. Meanwhile, the semiconductor industry’s progress in squeezing ever more devices onto a circuit meant that soon it would be possible to build an integrated circuit complex enough to be practical for computer memories. Fairchild itself had brought to market two-bit flip-flop chips that could perform memory-like functions. IBM, by far the world’s dominant computer manufacturer, announced that it had begun researching semiconductor memories with the intent to use them as the primary memory in future IBM computers.75
在摩尔看来，诺伊斯在1968年1月提出的合伙创业的提议，又是他老板一贯的“何乐而不为”的灵光一闪——一个宏大的想法，而诺伊斯一如既往地需要摩尔的帮助来决定是否要继续推进。摩尔告诉诺伊斯，虽然他仍然相信计算机存储器的未来，但他喜欢在仙童实验室的工作。他可以置身于赛奥塞特的政治纷争之外，而且他负责着业内最优秀的商业研究部门。摩尔说他还没准备好离开仙童。诺伊斯没有试图改变摩尔的想法。
It seemed to Moore that Noyce’s proposal that they start a company together in January, 1968, was another one of his boss’s why-not mind flashes—a big idea that Noyce, as was so often his wont, needed Moore to help determine whether or not to take further. Moore told Noyce that while he still believed in the future of computer memories, he liked his job in the Fairchild lab. He was insulated from the Syosset politics, and he ran the finest commercial research operation in the industry. Moore said that he was not ready to leave Fairchild. Noyce made no effort to change Moore’s mind.
在诺伊斯向摩尔提出他的建议一个月后，相机和仪器公司董事会剥夺了霍奇森的权力，并告诉他向“首席执行官办公室”汇报工作，该办公室由四名相机和仪器公司董事组成：诺伊斯、沃尔特·伯克（谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德的私人投资顾问）、约瑟夫·B·沃顿（财务和税务顾问）以及谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德本人。
A month after Noyce floated his proposal to Moore, the Camera and Instrument board stripped Hodgson of power and told him to report to an “office of the chief executive,” which consisted of four Camera and Instrument directors: Noyce, Walter Burke (Sherman Fairchild’s personal investment advisor), Joseph B. Wharton (a financial and tax consultant), and Sherman Fairchild himself.
与此同时，董事会宣布开始寻找正式的首席执行官。半导体公司内部、业内以及华尔街的所有人都认为，作为最合适的内部候选人，诺伊斯会被任命为首席执行官。诺伊斯确实是该职位的候选人之一，但他惊讶地得知，董事会认为，虽然他“将来或许有成为总裁的潜质”，但40岁的他目前还不具备担任这一职务的条件。用摩尔的话来说，这个决定让诺伊斯“有点恼火”：之所以说是“有点”，仅仅是因为诺伊斯可能并不想要这份工作。但他当然希望有人能给他这个机会。这种轻视，再加上霍奇森的下台，证实了诺伊斯长期以来的怀疑：相机与仪器部门的董事会根本不知道自己在做什么，也丝毫没有意识到，多年来，半导体部门一直扮演着牵着鼻子走的角色。76
Meanwhile, the board announced a search for a permanent CEO. Everyone at Semiconductor, in the industry, and on Wall Street expected Noyce, the logical internal candidate, to be named CEO. Noyce was under consideration for the top spot, but he was surprised to learn that the board felt that while he might “be considered as presidential material someday,” he was not ready now, at age 40. The decision left Noyce, in Moore’s words, “kind of ticked off”: “kind of” only because Noyce probably did not want the job. But he certainly wanted it offered to him. The slight, coupled with the ousting of Hodgson, confirmed Noyce’s long-held suspicions that the Camera and Instrument board had absolutely no idea of what they were doing, and no appreciation of the fact that for years Semiconductor had been the tail wagging the corporate dog.76
根据一种说法，恼怒的诺伊斯亲自去找谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德递交了辞呈，但这位董事长（此时已近乎恐慌）请求诺伊斯留任，以便找到新的首席执行官。诺伊斯推荐了自己的人选——费尔柴尔德的劲敌摩托罗拉半导体部门的总经理C·莱斯特·霍根——甚至安排了相机和仪器部门主管沃尔特·伯克与霍根会面。然而，霍根对这个职位毫无兴趣。摩托罗拉位于凤凰城的半导体业务规模已经超过了费尔柴尔德，而且它并不像费尔柴尔德那样被航空相机和印刷耗材等业务所束缚。谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德亲自飞往亚利桑那州，试图说服霍根改变主意。霍根拒绝了。最终，诺伊斯飞往凤凰城，坦诚地谈到了公司的情况以及他自己离职的原因。他力劝霍根重新考虑这份工作。77
According to one version of events, an irritated Noyce went to Sherman Fairchild and resigned in person, but the chairman (who by now was on the verge of panic) asked Noyce to stay on long enough to find a replacement CEO. Noyce offered his own suggestion for the position—C. Lester Hogan, the general manager of the powerhouse semiconductor division at Fairchild’s arch rival, Motorola—and even arranged a meeting between Camera and Instrument director Walter Burke and Hogan. Hogan, however, had no interest in the position. Motorola’s Phoenix-based semiconductor operation was already bigger than Fairchild’s, and it was not encumbered with aerial cameras and printing supplies. Sherman Fairchild flew down to Arizona in an attempt to change Hogan’s mind. Hogan demurred. Finally Noyce flew to Phoenix and spoke frankly about the company and his own reasons for leaving. He urged Hogan to reconsider the job.77
霍根最终与仙童相机仪器公司谈判达成了一份极其优厚的薪酬方案——年薪约12万美元，外加1万股股票和一笔用于购买另外9万股股票期权的无息贷款——据说这份薪酬甚至被赋予了独特的计量单位“霍根”（Hogan）。（比如，“那家伙的身价最多也就半个霍根。”）除了一个人之外，他把摩托罗拉半导体部门的所有高级经理都带到了仙童公司。他甚至说服相机仪器公司将总部迁至旧金山湾区——这充分证明了半导体部门在公司中的关键地位。即便如此，霍根仍然坚持说：“如果不是鲍勃·诺伊斯（Bob Noyce）的鼓励，我是不会去的。我非常尊敬鲍勃·诺伊斯，他是一位杰出的销售员。”78
Hogan ultimately negotiated a compensation package from Fairchild Camera and Instrument so extraordinary—an estimated $120,000 annual salary, plus 10,000 shares of stock and an interest-free loan to buy options on another 90,000 more—that it was reputedly immortalized as a distinct unit of measure, the “Hogan.” (As in, “That guy can’t be worth more than half a Hogan.”) He brought with him to Fairchild every senior manager from Motorola’s semiconductor operation, save one. He even convinced Camera and Instrument to move the corporate headquarters to the Bay Area—tangible evidence of the pivotal role of the Semiconductor division in the corporation. Even given the spectacular deal he finessed, Hogan insists, “I wouldn’t have gone if Bob Noyce [had not encouraged me]. I had great respect for Bob Noyce and he’s a great salesman.”78
诺伊斯于1968年6月25日正式从费尔柴尔德公司辞职。他在简短的正式辞职信中附上了一封情真意切的两页信，写给谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德，费尔柴尔德在7月的董事会上当众宣读了这封信。“随着公司规模越来越大，我越来越不喜欢我的日常工作，”诺伊斯解释道，“也许部分原因是我成长于一个小镇，享受着小镇里所有的人际关系。而现在，我们公司的员工人数是我‘家乡’最大城镇人口的两倍。”79
Noyce formally resigned from Fairchild on June 25, 1968. He included with his brief formal letter of resignation a heartfelt two-page missive addressed to Sherman Fairchild, which Fairchild read aloud at the July board meeting. “As [the company] has grown larger and larger, I have enjoyed my daily work less and less,” Noyce explained. “Perhaps this is partly because I grew up in a small town, enjoying all the personal relationships of a small town. Now we employ twice the total population of my largest ‘home town.’”79
诺伊斯写道，他想找到或创办一家规模较小的公司，在那里他可以“再次接触到先进技术”，并享受“在打造新产品、新技术和新组织的过程中进行更多个人创作”。他反复表达了对职业归宿的渴望，希望找到一个与仙童半导体截然不同的地方：不是大规模生产企业，而是一家“致力于开发前所未有的产品或技术的小公司”；不是大型多元化企业的某个部门，而是一个能够“保持独立（且规模较小）”的地方。他承认“任何小公司的资源有限都会成为一种劣势”，但他声称自己“没有任何大规模的计划”。80
Noyce wrote that he wanted to find or start a smaller company, a place where he could “get close to advanced technology again” and enjoy “more personal creative work in building a new product, a new technology, and a new organization.” Again and again he expressed the desire for a professional home nearly completely opposite from Fairchild Semiconductor: not a mass manufacturer, but a “small company which is trying to develop some product or technology which no one has yet done”; not a division of a diversified large organization but a place that would “stay independent (and small).” He acknowledged that “the limited resources of any small company will be a handicap” but claimed to “have no large scale ideas.”80
诺伊斯将半导体公司困境的大部分责任归咎于仙童相机仪器公司的管理层。他写道：“公司缺乏必要的整体方向感和领导力。仅仅说我们的目标是发展和盈利是不够的——每个人都在努力实现这个目标。”他告诉谢尔曼·仙童，母公司发展失控且不负责任，没有给半导体公司提供留住员工所需的激励措施；缺乏“部门间的相互了解、支持和合作”；而且——最“令人沮丧”和“令人失望”的是——母公司挪用了半导体公司的利润来维持其他部门的运营，而不是将资金重新投入到半导体公司自身。“我认为这就是我们陷入困境的原因，”他说。他一贯谨慎，从未指明要追究个人责任的具体个人或群体，但很显然，在他看来，罪魁祸首是约翰·卡特和摄影器材与仪器公司的董事会。81
NOYCE PLACED A GOOD MEASURE of blame for Semiconductor’s troubles on the management of Fairchild Camera and Instrument. “The necessary overall sense of direction and leadership have been lacking,” he wrote. “It’s not enough to say simply that our objective is to grow and make a profit—everyone is trying to do that.” He told Sherman Fairchild that the parent company had grown erratically and irresponsibly, that it had denied Semiconductor the incentives it needed to keep employees; that it “lacked interdivisional awareness, support, and cooperation”; and—most “disabling” and “dishearten[ing]” of all—that it had commandeered Semiconductor’s profits to carry other divisions, rather than plowing the monies back into the division. “I believe this has caused our difficulties,” he said. He was characteristically careful never once to name a specific person or group of people whom he would hold personally responsible, but it is clear that the culprits, in his mind, are John Carter and the board of Camera and Instrument.81
“我接受我应承担的任何责任，”诺伊斯继续说道。而他确实必须为仙童半导体的衰落承担部分责任。正是他那和蔼可亲、乐于接受新思想的性格，成就了他作为领导者和企业家的成功，但也正是这种性格阻碍了他管理大型组织的能力。戈登·摩尔回忆说，作为一名经理，“鲍勃真的认为，他论证的逻辑就是他让组织运转所需的唯一工具。”曾在肖克利和仙童半导体工作过的哈里·塞洛回忆说：“他对太多人太好。”正如查理·斯波克所说，“你让他答应了某件事，然后下一个来的人也能让他答应，这就是鲍勃。”82
“I accept whatever part of the responsibility is mine,” Noyce continued. And he must indeed bear some responsibility for the decline of Fairchild Semiconductor. The very geniality and openness to new ideas that contributed to Noyce’s success as a leader and entrepreneur hampered his ability to manage a large organization. As a manager, Gordon Moore recalled, “Bob really thought that the logic of his arguments was the [only] tool he needed to make the organization work.” Recalled Harry Sello, who worked at Shockley and Fairchild, “He was too nice to too many people.” As Charlie Sporck put it, “You could get him to say yes on something and then the next guy who came in could get him to say yes too, and that was Bob.”82
诺伊斯倾向于提供总体指示而非跟进具体流程细节，这种管理方式非常适合指导极具创造性的技术工作——事实上，这正是他作为研发主管取得成功的原因——但这种管理风格并不适用于规模庞大、业务多元化的组织。此外，诺伊斯和半导体公司对创新的重视，虽然在公司早期阶段曾为公司带来巨大成功，但随着公司的发展成熟，却反而成了阻碍。这种重视催生了一种重研发轻制造的企业文化，并轻视诸如库存水平或订单状态等常规但重要的工作。正如商业史学家阿尔弗雷德·钱德勒精辟地指出：“仙童半导体的问题在于它培养的是企业家，而不是产品。”83
Noyce’s manner of offering general directives rather than following up on specific process details was ideal for supervising highly creative technical work—indeed, it was the source of his success as the head of R&D—but this management style did not translate well to large, multifaceted organizations. Moreover, Noyce’s and Semiconductor’s focus on innovation, which had served the company so well in its early years, proved debilitating as the firm matured. It contributed to a culture that privileged research over manufacturing and disdained such routine but important work as knowing inventory levels or the status of an order. As business historian Alfred Chandler has so aptly put it, “Fairchild’s problem was that it produced entrepreneurs, not products.”83
诺伊斯长期以来一直对自己的管理能力抱有隐隐的怀疑，而且他确实认为自己对半导体公司的衰落负有部分责任。他曾说过，离开半导体公司是“放弃尝试，重新开始”。后来他进一步解释道：“我在仙童公司学到的一件事……就是我不擅长管理大型组织。我缺乏那种自律性，也缺乏执行力……我的兴趣和技能在其他方面，仅此而已。我擅长的是把人们聚集在一起做事，但这只适用于小团队。”84
Noyce had long had his own secret doubts about his management ability, and he certainly held himself partially responsible for Semiconductor’s fall from grace. He once said that by leaving Semiconductor he “gave up and tried again.” He later elaborated: “One thing I learned at Fairchild … is that I don’t run large organizations well. I don’t have the discipline to do that, have the follow through…. My interests and skills are in a different place, that’s all. It’s getting people together to do something, but that only works for me in a smaller group.”84
7
创业
7
Startup
诺伊斯离开仙童半导体的消息令华尔街投资者和几乎所有半导体行业人士都感到意外。各种传言纷至沓来，填补了不确定性造成的空白：霍根会将半导体部门从相机和仪器部门剥离出来，成为一家独立的公司；不，半导体部门会与休斯飞机公司合并；不，会与杰伊·拉斯特在泰莱达因公司的半导体部门合并；不，会与Signetics公司合并；查理·斯波克会重返仙童半导体掌舵；不，诺伊斯计划加入斯波克在国民半导体公司的工作，打造一家新的半导体巨头；不，诺伊斯将单干。行业媒体将仙童半导体的故事渲染得如同一部扣人心弦的肥皂剧：“业界对这激动人心的故事津津乐道——读者们焦急地等待着最新的报道，纷纷猜测‘接下来会发生什么？’”1
The news of Noyce’s departure from Fairchild took Wall Street investors and nearly everyone in the semiconductor business by surprise. Rumors rushed in to fill the vacuum created by uncertainty: Hogan would spin off Semiconductor as its own company separate from Camera and Instrument. No, Semiconductor would merge with Hughes Aircraft—no, with Jay Last’s semiconductor group at Teledyne; no, with Signetics. Charlie Sporck would return to run Fairchild; no, Noyce planned to join Sporck at National to build a new semiconductor powerhouse; no, Noyce was going it alone. The trade press promoted the saga of Fairchild Semiconductor like a particularly juicy soap opera: “the industry has devoured each chapter in the exciting story—readers wonder, ‘What’s going to happen next?’ while they anxiously await the latest report.”1
“鲍勃现在处境艰难，但从长远来看，他会好起来的。”诺伊斯离开费尔柴尔德公司后不久，贝蒂写道。在他离职消息公开的那天，诺伊斯家的电话铃声甚至在太阳升起之前就开始响个不停。一位来自东海岸的猎头忘记了三个小时的时差，在一天工作日的开始就打来了电话——把诺伊斯从睡梦中惊醒，当时是凌晨五点。纽约一家公司表示愿意“为你领导的另一家电子公司提供资金支持”。南加州一家投资集团承诺“为你领导的任何项目至少投入20万美元”。诺伊斯接到了来自费尔柴尔德员工和竞争对手、记者、猎头、银行家以及所有关心他的人的电话。2
“Bob is having a harrowing time, but will come out all right in the long run,” Betty wrote shortly after Noyce left Fairchild. The day his departure was publicly announced, telephones began ringing at the Noyce house even before the sun had risen, when one East Coast recruiter, forgetting the three-hour time difference, placed a call at the very start of the work day—and startled Noyce out of bed at five in the morning. A firm in New York City offered “to back you financially in another electronics company which you would head.” A Southern California investment group promised to “commit ourselves to no less than $200,000 towards any venture you are heading.” Noyce fielded calls from Fairchild employees and competitors, reporters, headhunters, bankers, and well-wishers.2
大多数人认为诺伊斯拒绝了CEO的职位，而不是公司没有向他发出邀请。诺伊斯本人也并未试图消除这种印象，他试图对媒体隐瞒自己的未来计划，只承认自己不喜欢在费尔柴尔德公司“处理越来越多的文书工作”。谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德也坚持这种说法。当被问及为何诺伊斯没有成为公司的新任CEO时，费尔柴尔德说：“我觉得他不太喜欢管理。他一直都在和我们合作，但他更喜欢技术性的氛围。”3
Most people assumed Noyce had turned down the CEO job, rather than having not had it offered to him. Noyce did little to dispel this impression, and he tried to keep his plans for the future from the press, acknowledging only that he would not have enjoyed “pushing more and more paper” at Fairchild. Sherman Fairchild also hewed to this version of events. When asked why Noyce was not the company’s new CEO, Fairchild said, “I don’t think he likes management. He has been cooperating with us, but he prefers a technical atmosphere.”3
在诺伊斯辞职的喧嚣声中，另一桩离职事件却几乎无人察觉，正如其当事人所言。费尔柴尔德实验室主任戈登·摩尔于1968年7月3日辞职，他始终记得这个日期，因为公司拒绝支付他独立日假期的工资。媒体或许并未关注此事，但他辞职的时间——诺伊斯离职一周后——绝非巧合。今年五月，诺伊斯并未因摩尔此前对创办公司缺乏兴趣而气馁，再次尝试。这一次，诺伊斯的态度更加明确。他未能获得首席执行官的职位，而且他不会为费尔柴尔德的新任首席执行官效力。他将在六月底离职。他曾与亚瑟·洛克谈过，亚瑟·洛克在一番调侃之后——“早就该这样了！”——表示，如果诺伊斯和摩尔拿出一些自己的钱来启动一项新的半导体业务，他们“不会有任何问题”获得足够的额外资金来创办公司。4
In all the hubbub surrounding Noyce’s resignation, another departure went “practically unobserved,” according to its overlooked subject. Gordon Moore, head of the lab at Fairchild, resigned on July 3, 1968, a date he always remembered because payroll refused to compensate him for the Independence Day holiday. The press may not have paid attention, but the timing of his resignation—one week after Noyce’s departure—was no mere coincidence. In May, Noyce, undaunted by Moore’s previous lack of interest in starting a company, had tried again. This time Noyce had been much more definitive. He had been passed over for the CEO’s job, and he was not going to work for someone new at Fairchild. He was leaving at the end of June. He had talked to Arthur Rock, who after a bit of ribbing—“It’s about time!”—had said that if Noyce and Moore kicked in some of their own money to seed a new semiconductor operation, they “wouldn’t have any trouble” securing enough additional capital to launch the firm.4
那么摩尔对加入他有什么想法呢？
Now what did Moore think about joining him?
摩尔停顿了一下。他坚信半导体存储器的潜力。他不想冒险更换老板。虽然他和诺伊斯在工作之外并不算特别亲近——诺伊斯热衷于飞行和极限滑雪，而摩尔则喜欢清晨安静的垂钓之旅，正如一位朋友戏谑地形容的那样，“周末都用来粉刷窗户”——但由于他们技能互补，他们已经高效合作了十多年。诺伊斯着眼于大局，而摩尔则能洞察细节。诺伊斯擅长在仙童公司与外部各方（媒体、董事会、客户、供应商）之间建立牢固的关系，而摩尔则成为了公司内部的专家级领导者。1965年之后，诺伊斯很少再踏入实验室，但摩尔在研发部门却拥有一批忠实的追随者。他以一种温和的管理方式和沉稳随和的风格领导着研发团队，这种方式让人想起诺伊斯，但又增添了摩尔做事时特有的深思熟虑和审慎。5
Moore paused. He strongly believed in the potential of semiconductor memories. He did not want to take his chances on a new boss. And although he and Noyce were not particularly close outside of the office—while Noyce pursued flying and daredevil skiing, Moore enjoyed quiet early morning fishing trips and, as one friend affectionately put it, “weekends spent painting the windows”—they had worked together productively for more than a decade, thanks to their remarkably complementary skills. Where Noyce saw the big picture, Moore could discern detail. Where Noyce had honed his abilities to construct strong connections between Fairchild and various outside constituencies (the press, the board, customers, suppliers), Moore had become an expert leader within the company itself. Noyce rarely set foot in the lab after 1965, but Moore had an intensely loyal following in R&D, which he led with a light hand and a quiet, laid-back style that recalled Noyce’s approach but added the extra layer of deliberation and moderation that Moore brought to everything he did.5
尽管诺伊斯和摩尔表面上存在诸多差异，但他们却有一个共同的关键特质——强烈的竞争欲望，渴望把某件事做到极致。诚然，这种动力在摩尔身上比在诺伊斯身上更难察觉，但它确实存在。“戈登喜欢钓鱼，但他钓鱼不是为了放松或冥想，”一位朋友解释说，“他钓鱼是因为他想钓到鱼。”6
And for all their apparent differences, Noyce and Moore shared one key trait—a burning competitive desire to do something extraordinarily well. To be sure, this drive was harder to discern in Moore than in Noyce, but it was there nonetheless. “Gordon loves fishing, but he doesn’t do it for relaxation or mediation,” explains one friend. “He does it because he wants to get the fish.”6
摩尔同意离开费尔柴尔德公司，与诺伊斯共同创办一家新公司。
Moore agreed to leave Fairchild and launch a new venture with Noyce.
如果摩尔拒绝了诺伊斯的提议，他会怎么做？很难想象诺伊斯独自创办公司。在仙童公司的经历——尤其是斯波克的离职——让他深刻体会到拥有一支强大团队的重要性。此外，如果没有摩尔，诺伊斯……他很难吸引到他想要的顶尖费尔柴尔德科学家来组建新组织的骨干力量。
What would Noyce have done if Moore had said no? It is difficult to imagine Noyce starting a company alone. The experiences at Fairchild—particularly Sporck’s departure—had taught him the importance of having a strong team around him. Moreover, without Moore, Noyce would have had difficulty attracting the top Fairchild scientists he wanted for the backbone of a new organization.
如果摩尔没有同意加入，诺伊斯或许会涉足风险投资领域。到20世纪60年代末，旧金山湾区涌现出二十多家风险投资公司，其中许多都瞄准了半导体行业。在洛克身上，诺伊斯认识这个充满活力的新兴金融圈中最重要的人物。风险投资工作也符合诺伊斯对创业的热情，而且他拥有足够的财力，能够对新公司产生实质性的影响。事实上，早在诺伊斯离开仙童半导体之前，他就已经开始进行一些非正式的投资，给年轻的创业者提供小额资金，并偶尔接受他们公司董事会的席位。
Had Moore not agreed to join him, Noyce might have involved himself in some form of venture capital. By the end of the 1960s, more than two dozen venture capital firms had sprung up in the San Francisco Bay Area, many of them targeting the semiconductor industry. In Rock, Noyce knew the single most important player in this vibrant new financial community. Venture work would also have appealed to Noyce’s love of starting new things, and he possessed the financial reserves to make a material difference in new firms. Indeed, even before Noyce left Fairchild, he had begun to do a bit of informal investing on his own, giving young entrepreneurs small sums of money and accepting the occasional board seat in their companies.
在正式辞职前近一个月，诺伊斯和摩尔就开始在诺伊斯家里的书房里一起集思广益。这几周里，一些亲近的人也加入了他们的行列。安迪·格鲁夫是一位物理学家，他自称“崇拜”戈登·摩尔。摩尔刚告诉他要离开仙童半导体，他就主动提出要加入摩尔的“任何计划”。摩尔甚至来不及提及公司的计划或诺伊斯的参与，更别提正式向格鲁夫提供工作机会了——格鲁夫也不确定摩尔是否真的打算这么做。格鲁夫不仅精通一种名为MOS的新型半导体工艺，而且还雄心勃勃、一丝不苟，并且拥有不容置疑的强硬作风，正是这些特质让他一路晋升为研发助理总监。格鲁夫随后建议莱斯·瓦达兹加入团队。瓦达兹曾是仙童半导体集成电路开发的主要负责人，也是MOS领域的专家。当他从仙童辞职时，人力资源经理没有试图挽留他，而是问他如何才能加入诺伊斯和摩尔的公司。格罗夫还引进了吉恩·弗拉斯，他曾是仙童的制造主管，负责管理专有集成电路部门。7
Noyce and Moore had begun brainstorming together in Noyce’s study at home for nearly a month before they officially resigned. During these weeks, a few intimates joined the effort. Andy Grove, a physicist who by his own description “worshipped” Gordon Moore, had invited himself to join Moore in “whatever you’re planning to do” within seconds of Moore’s telling him he was leaving Fairchild. Moore had not even had time to mention the company’s plans or Noyce’s participation, much less officially offer Grove a job—something Grove is not sure Moore planned to do. Grove possessed not only expertise in a new semiconductor process called MOS, but also a surfeit of ambition, a fastidious eye for detail, and a take-no-bullshit attitude that had catapulted him to assistant director of R&D. Grove, in turn, suggested the addition of Les Vadasz to the team. Vadasz was an engineer in charge of big chunk of Fairchild’s integrated circuit development and another expert in MOS. When he resigned from Fairchild, the human resources manager, instead of trying to convince him to stay, asked how he could join Noyce and Moore, too. Grove also brought in Gene Flath, a former manufacturing foreman at Fairchild who had managed the proprietary integrated circuits group.7
诺伊斯邀请了鲍勃·格雷厄姆加入新公司。格雷厄姆是一位营销专家，曾在求职面试中力主基于需求的定价策略。参议员罗伯特·肯尼迪在洛杉矶遇刺身亡的当晚，格雷厄姆正在诺伊斯的书房里。诺伊斯认为，这场悲剧紧随马丁·路德·金遇刺之后，证明“我们的社会非但没有为了共同利益而团结人民，反而似乎正在分裂成对立的群体，彼此漠视对方的权利。” “共同利益”的概念——实现共同利益是社会的最终目标——仿佛直接出自拉尔夫·诺伊斯牧师的布道。对鲍勃·诺伊斯而言，这番话犹如一声行动的号召。没有人知道他还能在这个星球上停留多久。罗伯特·肯尼迪遇刺后，诺伊斯比以往任何时候都更加坚定了“把握当下”的决心。8
Noyce invited Bob Graham, the marketing expert who had argued for demand-based pricing in his job interview, to join the new company. Graham was in Noyce’s study on the evening after Senator Robert Kennedy was murdered in Los Angeles. Noyce thought the tragedy, following on the heels of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination, proved that “instead of drawing the people closer together for the mutual good, our society seems to be polarizing itself into antagonistic groups, each with little regard for the rights of the other.” The notion of a “mutual good,” the achievement of which was the ultimate goal of society, could have come straight from a sermon by Reverend Ralph Noyce. In Bob Noyce’s case, the message served as a call to action. No one knew how long he had allotted on this planet. After Robert Kennedy’s death, Noyce was more determined than ever to carpe diem.8
在计划跟随诺伊斯和摩尔离开费尔柴尔德的团队成员中，只有格罗夫对诺伊斯和摩尔的领导层抱有严重的怀疑。他不喜欢鲍勃·诺伊斯。格罗夫曾参加过诺伊斯主持的两次员工会议，他震惊地发现，诺伊斯竟然放任“人们像疯狗一样在会议桌旁互相撕咬”：“鲍勃就那样坐在那里（开会时）……他脸上带着痛苦的表情，嘴角挂着一丝不合时宜的微笑。他的眼神要么在说‘孩子们，你们能不能守规矩点’，要么在说‘我真想离开这里’——或者两者兼而有之。”诺伊斯拒绝接管指挥权激怒了格罗夫。格罗夫20岁时，曾躲藏在地下室以逃避纳粹的迫害；又逃离了匈牙利共产党的统治；横渡大西洋来到美国。几年后，他以优异的成绩从纽约市立大学工程系毕业，尽管他入学时甚至连“水平”和“垂直”的英语说法都不懂。格罗夫对诺伊斯颇为不屑，在他看来，诺伊斯“不争辩，只会默默忍受”。而诺伊斯大概也预料到自己不会与格罗夫有任何交集，因为格罗夫原本计划领导研发部门，直接向摩尔汇报工作。9
GROVE ALONE among the group planning to leave Fairchild with Noyce and Moore had serious doubts about its leadership. He did not like Bob Noyce. Grove, who had attended two of Noyce’s staff meetings, was shocked to see how Noyce let “people bite into each other like rabid dogs” around the conference table: “Bob just sat there [at his meetings]…. He wore a pained expression and a slight, somewhat inappropriate smile. His look said either ‘Children, would you please behave,’ or ‘I want to be anywhere but here’—or some combination of the two.” Noyce’s refusal to take charge irritated Grove, who had, by the time he was 20 years old, hidden in a cellar to elude the Nazis, fled the Communist takeover of Hungary, and crossed the Atlantic to the United States, where, a few years later, he graduated first in his engineering class at City University of New York despite having begun his coursework without knowing how to say “horizontal” or “vertical” in English. Grove had little respect for a man who, in his estimation, “did not argue [but] just suffered.” For his part, Noyce probably expected to have little to do with Grove, who was slated to head R&D and report to Moore.9
1968年7月18日，诺伊斯和摩尔正式成立了NM电子公司，罗克担任董事会主席，诺伊斯担任总裁，摩尔担任执行副总裁。“我们不在乎谁的头衔是什么，”诺伊斯告诉他的儿子，“（头衔）主要作用是帮助公司外的人了解你们的工作内容。”诺伊斯和摩尔都视彼此为合作伙伴和同事。“和地位基本相同的人一起讨论问题感觉很舒服，”摩尔在1994年解释说，“我和他共事多年，所以我们很习惯这样做。”与巴德·科伊尔为仙童半导体公司成立而精心策划的美元钞票签署仪式相比，这次公司成立要低调得多。诺伊斯、摩尔和罗克都不太看重象征意义或仪式。他们只签署了法律要求的必要文件，然后由他们聘请的律师提交给了州务卿。之后，他们便开始着手工作。10
Noyce and Moore officially incorporated NM Electronics on July 18, 1968, with Rock as board chair, Noyce as president, and Moore as executive vice president. “We don’t care who has what title,” Noyce told his son. “[Titles] are mainly useful for helping the people outside the company figure out what you do.” Both Noyce and Moore considered themselves partners and peers. “It’s very comfortable to have someone on essentially the same level to discuss problems with,” Moore explained in 1994. “He and I had worked together so long, we were very comfortable doing that.” The incorporation was a much more subdued affair than the ceremonial dollar-bill signing that Bud Coyle had choreographed to launch Fairchild Semiconductor. Neither Noyce, nor Moore, nor Rock assigned great value to symbolism or ceremony. They signed only legally required papers, which one of the attorneys hired to help with the incorporation then submitted to the secretary of state. Then they got to work.10
新公司注册成立时拥有两百万股法定股本。诺伊斯和摩尔原本打算每人投资五十万美元，但摩尔说：“我们俩一想到要投资这么多钱就有点吃不消。” 后来，两人各投资二十五万美元，这笔钱就容易接受了，尽管这仍然是他们个人财富中的相当一部分，而诺伊斯的个人财富几乎全部都集中在费尔柴尔德公司的股票上。诺伊斯在新公司三万美元的年薪比他在费尔柴尔德公司的收入减少了六十六倍，但他完全相信自己在新公司的股票足以弥补这部分收入缺口。11
The new company was incorporated with two million shares of authorized capital stock. Noyce and Moore had considered investing $500,000 apiece—but then, Moore says, “We both kind of gulped at that [much money].” Half that amount, a quarter of a million dollars apiece, was much more tolerable, though it still represented a sizable portion of their personal wealth, nearly all of which, in Noyce’s case, was concentrated in Fairchild stock. Noyce’s $30,000 annual salary represented a 66 percent cut from his Fairchild pay, but he fully expected his stock holdings in the new firm would cover the shortfall.11
诺伊斯和摩尔各自以每股1美元的价格购买了他们新公司24.5万股股票，洛克也以同样的价格购买了1万股。摩尔和诺伊斯预计，他们筹集的50万美元中，将有20万美元用于投资。这笔钱将用于购置设备和翻新他们租赁的办公楼。另外10万美元将用于研发支出，剩余部分则作为流动资金。诺伊斯和洛克还获得了一笔150万美元的贷款，以维持公司运营，直到洛克找到私人投资者。诺伊斯忍不住向母亲炫耀，公司能获得如此巨额的资金，很大程度上是靠他的名气，母亲对此几乎难以置信。12
Noyce and Moore each bought 245,000 shares in their new company at $1 per share, and Rock bought 10,000 at the same price. Of the half-million dollars thus raised, Moore and Noyce expected to spend $200,000 on equipment and improvements to whatever building they leased. Another $100,000 would go to R&D expenses, with the balance earmarked for working capital. Noyce and Rock also secured a $1.5 million loan to keep the company afloat until Rock could line up private investors. Noyce could not resist bragging to his mother that the company could secure this sort of money largely on the strength of his name, an idea she found almost impossible to believe.12
20世纪60年代末，半导体行业正处于近乎狂热的创业热潮之中。NM Electronics只是1968年和1969年间成立的二十多家半导体公司之一。其中十三家初创公司位于圣克拉拉谷，在这十三家公司中，八家是由仙童半导体公司（Fairchild Semiconductor）的离职员工创办的，还有几家获得了风险投资。硅供应商报告称，1968年中期至1969年中期，业务增长了40%。13
THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY was in the midst of a near-ecstatic flurry of entrepreneurial activity at the end of the 1960s. NM Electronics was just one of two dozen semiconductor companies launched in 1968 and 1969. Thirteen of these startups were founded in the Santa Clara Valley, and of these thirteen, eight were begun by refugees from Fairchild Semiconductor, and several had been financed with venture capital. Silicon suppliers reported a 40 percent increase in business between mid-1968 and mid-1969.13
1969年10月，《商业周刊》在一篇关于半导体的专题报道中，委托创作了一幅漫画，生动地展现了当时的时代精神。漫画的标题写道：“半导体行业正处于前所未有的狂热状态，各公司竞相争夺这块利润丰厚的市场。” 漫画最左侧是“集成电路公司”的总部大楼，这是一栋低矮的建筑，旋转门疯狂地旋转着，每层楼都挤满了互相碰撞的员工，还有一些员工正把电脑从窗户扔出去。旋转门已经人满为患，进出不去的人只能从窗户爬进大楼，或者从窗户跳到地面，跑到其他集成电路公司。一个男人正被一个安装在尚未建成的建筑外壳上的自动机械臂从墙上拽下来，建筑侧面贴着一块标语：“自己动手做集成电路”。有一家名为“Frontier IC”的商店，一个标有“Overnite Integrated Circuits Co.”字样的简易棚屋，以及一个规模只有热狗摊大小、自称为“Instant IC Co.”的作坊。
In October 1969, Business Week, as part of a special report on semiconductors, commissioned a cartoon that captured the spirit of the times. “The semiconductor industry is in a greater frenzy than ever before as companies vie for a slice of the lucrative market,” read the caption. At the far left of the drawing stands the headquarters of “Integrated Circuits, Inc.,” a low-slung building with a madly whirling revolving door, dozens of employees bumping into each other on every floor, and still other employees tossing a computer out a window. People who can’t fit in or out the revolving door (it’s quite full) are climbing into the building through windows, or else using the windows to jump to the ground and run to other integrated circuit companies. A man is being plucked from a wall by an automatic arm attached to the shell of a yet-to-be-built building that has a sign plastered to its side: “Roll Your Own Integrated Circuits.” There’s a shop called “Frontier IC,” a lean-to marked “Overnite Integrated Circuits Co.,” and an operation the size of a hot dog stand that calls itself “Instant IC Co.”
与此同时，在图纸的最右侧角落，销售员们正在激烈交锋。“想要一个现货的、采用MOS兼容DLT封装的、单价2.14美元、封装数量为10000K的梁引线MSI触发器芯片吗？”一位销售员问道。“那东西七月份就卖完了！”另一位销售员反驳道。“我们会给你……”身着西装的人们来回奔走；一架印有“Sky Hook集成电路有限公司”字样的直升机将员工从屋顶吊起，在空中快速穿梭；沉重的技术设备被吊装到建筑物的侧面。
Meanwhile, in the far right corner of the drawing, salesmen are at battle. “Want a beam-leaded MSI Flip-Flop Chip in MOS-Compatible DLT off-the-shelf for $2.14 the unit at 10,000K?” one asks. “That went out back in July!” counters another. “We’ll give you …” Business-suited people run back and forth; a helicopter emblazoned “Sky Hook Integrated Circuits, Inc.” pulls employees from rooftops and chop-chop-chops them through the sky; heavy technical equipment is hauled up the sides of buildings.
漫画中的人物看起来有点迷糊，但却无比快乐。对读者而言，这幅漫画描绘的是一片混乱，但对画中人来说，这简直就是天堂。14
The cartoon people look a little addled but perfectly happy. The comic depicts chaos to its readers, but for the folks in the picture, the scene is darn near heaven.14
创业热潮如此高涨，以至于1969年的主要行业贸易展开设了多个关于管理问题、创办公司等主题的研讨会。与风险投资家交谈。一场名为“新公司创业：工程师变身企业家”的会议打破了以往所有记录，近 1000 人挤在会议室里（许多人坐在地板上或站在后面），或者在一个闷热的八月下午观看闭路电视直播。15
Startup fever ran so high that the major industry trade show in 1969 offered several sessions on management problems, starting companies, and talking with venture capitalists. Attendance at a session called “New Company Start-ups: The Engineer Becomes Entrepreneur” broke all previous records, with nearly 1,000 people either squeezed into the conference room (many sat on the floor or stood in the back) or watching the closed-circuit television broadcast on a stifling August afternoon.15
正如业界对集成电路的殷切期望催生了早期的一批创业公司一样，1968-1969 年那一代人也深受鼓舞，他们坚信半导体即将迎来又一次意义重大的技术突破。1965 年，戈登·摩尔指出，集成电路上的晶体管数量每 18 个月就会翻一番。如果“摩尔定律”预测的这一趋势持续下去，那么集成电路的复杂程度将比几年前的同类产品高出几个数量级，这一天指日可待。摩尔在仙童半导体公司的研发团队已经将 1024 个晶体管集成到一块电路板上，这在当时是难以想象的。1968 年，这块电路板还只是实验室里的一个奇观，但当时普遍认为，到 1970 年，集成超过 1000 个元件的电路——即所谓的大规模集成电路——应该能够实现量产。16
Just as the industry’s high hopes for integrated circuits had launched the earlier gaggle of startup companies, the 1968–1969 generation was inspired by a belief that semiconductors were on the cusp of another dramatic technological breakthrough. In 1965, Gordon Moore had pointed out that every 18 months, the number of transistors on an integrated circuit doubled. If this trend predicted by “Moore’s Law” continued, the day was not far off when integrated circuits could be orders of magnitude more complex than their counterparts just a few years ago. Already Moore’s own R&D group at Fairchild had fit a once-unthinkable 1,024 transistors onto a single circuit. In 1968, this circuit was little more than a lab curiosity, but the general consensus held that circuits with more than 1,000 components integrated together—so-called Large Scale Integrated circuits—should be physically possible to mass produce by 1970.16
大规模集成电路（LSI）时代将催生出集成电路，这些集成电路不仅能以前所未有的速度和成本完成现有功能，还能实现以前被认为对半导体而言过于复杂或成本过高的任务，例如用作计算机存储器或重型机械的控制驱动器。LSI 还有望大幅提升半导体公司的利润，因为单个芯片集成数千种功能可以显著降低单功能成本，同时仍能保持市场领先地位。诺伊斯预测，LSI 的经济影响最终将与集成电路本身相媲美。17
This era of Large Scale Integration (LSI) would usher in integrated circuits that could not only perform their current functions more quickly and cheaply than ever before but could also do things that had previously been considered too complex or expensive for semiconductors, such as serve as memories for computers or as control drivers for heavy machinery. LSI also promised a boost for a semiconductor company’s bottom line because a single chip integrating thousands of functions could drastically cut the cost-per-function while still commanding top prices in the market. Noyce predicted that the economic impact of LSI would eventually rival that of the integrated circuit itself.17
20世纪60年代末成立的大多数新半导体公司，包括诺伊斯和摩尔的创业公司，其成立的初衷都是为了抢先一步将大规模集成电路（LSI）推向市场。事实上，诺伊斯和摩尔之所以选择计算机存储器作为首款产品，主要原因并非计算机市场正在增长（尽管这的确是一个令人欣喜的事实），而是因为存储器是最容易制造的LSI电路类型。存储器由一排排相同的晶体管组成，这些晶体管以网格状排列，其设计和制造远比逻辑电路中使用的复杂门电路和引线要容易得多。此外，这种规则的布局模式降低了互连和封装成本，而互连和封装通常是电路中最昂贵、最复杂的部分。用摩尔的话来说，1968年，LSI还是一项“正在寻找应用的技术”。也就是说：如果LSI技术要有所作为，那么它首先会应用于存储器领域。如果它在存储器领域取得成功，诺伊斯和摩尔就能预见到计算机制造商市场将会持续增长，并随时准备采购。18
Most of the new semiconductor companies formed at the end of the 1960s, including Noyce and Moore’s startup, were begun in hopes of bringing LSI circuits to market before anyone else. Noyce and Moore, in fact, had settled on computer memories as a first product not primarily because the computer market was growing—although that was a welcome reality—but because memories would be the easiest types of LSI circuits to build. Memories consist of row upon row of identical transistors, laid out in a gridlike pattern that was far easier to design and manufacture than the mazes of gates and leads used in logic circuits. Moreover, the regular layout pattern cut down on the interconnection and packaging costs that often represented the most expensive and complicated parts of a circuit. In Moore’s words, LSI was a “technology looking for applications” in 1968. Which is to say: if LSI technology was going to work anywhere, it would work first in memories. If it worked in memories, Noyce and Moore could anticipate an ever-growing market of computer makers ready to buy.18
“我不断意识到，你今天的办公室暂时设在家里，”诺伊斯的母亲哈丽特在1968年7月写道。她无疑觉得这与你在费尔柴尔德相机仪器公司的高管办公室相比，简直是天壤之别。“你一定已经对未来进行了大量的思考，构思了很多梦想，也尝试了很多想法。这是一个勇敢的决定。”她以她特有的方式补充道：“嗯，我们完全不知道你是如何组织创业的。我希望这对你来说既令人兴奋又令人振奋，也希望你不要在准备好之前就被迫或匆忙地组建公司。”19
“I KEEP REALIZING that today your office is at home for the present,” wrote Noyce’s mother Harriet in July of 1968. She no doubt imagined it quite a come-down from an executive suite at Fairchild Camera and Instrument. “What a lot of thinking about the future and dreaming and playing with a lot of ideas you must have done already. It is a courageous step.” In her inimitable fashion she added, “Well, we have no conception how you organize a start. I hope that it is exciting to you and in some way exhilarating, and that you don’t feel pushed or hurried into organizing a company before you are ready.”19
诺伊斯早已做好了充分准备。他全身心投入到这家新公司的筹备工作中，展现出多年未曾感受过的职业热情。他与银行家、律师、记者、房地产经纪人、设备供应商、潜在的董事会成员、建筑师、保险代理人以及潜在客户进行了洽谈。他还多次与自己的私人会计师会面。他乐于处理公司几乎所有事务，从制定商业计划（“规划、现金流、资金缺口有多大？资本设备、人员、收入、资产负债表估算”）到重新投入技术讨论，再到与一位为一家颇受欢迎的企业联赛组织垒球队的人士会面，以及为新公司撰写文件并申请税务识别号码。20
Noyce was more than ready. He threw himself into the launch of this new company with a professional enthusiasm he had not felt for years. He talked to bankers, attorneys, journalists, realtors, equipment suppliers, possible board members, architects, insurance agents, and potential customers. He met several times with his personal accountant. He was happy handling almost any aspect of the company, from drawing up a business plan (“planning, cash flow, how big a hole[?] Cap Equip, People, Revenue, Guess of balance sheet”), to re-immersing himself in technical discussions, to meeting with a fellow who organized softball teams for a popular corporate league, to typing documents and securing tax identification numbers for the new venture.20
在这个阶段，仙童半导体公司的人不断出现，而且不仅仅是诺伊斯研究小组的核心成员。当诺伊斯和摩尔找到一栋他们认为可能适合用作办公和晶圆厂的建筑时，当时仍在仙童半导体公司工作的朱利叶斯·布兰克前来帮忙评估场地。诺伊斯在即将搬离该厂址的半导体公司联系人是戴夫·比德林，他曾负责仙童半导体公司民兵导弹项目。比德林现在就职的公司是联合碳化物公司的半导体部门，该公司由让·霍尔尼在离开杰伊·拉斯特和阿梅尔科-泰莱达因公司后创立。仅在七月和八月，诺伊斯就记录了与十几位仙童半导体公司现任或前任员工的会面，其中大多数人都在寻找工作。很可能与仙童半导体公司其他许多人的会面都没有被记录下来。
People from Fairchild were continually resurfacing at this stage, and not just among the inner circle in Noyce’s study. When Noyce and Moore found a building they thought might work to house offices and a fab, Julius Blank, still at Fairchild, dropped by to help them evaluate the site. Noyce’s contact at the semiconductor company vacating the facility was Dave Beadling, who had once headed Fairchild’s work on the Minuteman missile. The company for which Beadling now worked, the semiconductor division of Union Carbide, had been started by Jean Hoerni after he left Jay Last and Amelco-Teledyne. In July and August alone, Noyce noted meetings with a dozen current or former Fairchild employees, most of them looking for jobs. Chances are high that meetings with many other Fairchild people went unrecorded.
西海岸半导体行业规模仍然很小，以至于几乎所有从事专业工作的人都彼此认识——通常是因为他们曾在仙童半导体公司共事。杰伊·拉斯特的Amelco-Teledyne公司从埃德·鲍德温的Rheem公司租用办公空间，而Rheem公司后来被雷神公司收购，雷神公司又是仙童半导体公司的衍生公司之一。多年后，雷神公司又与仙童半导体公司前首席执行官约翰·卡特合作，卡特当时已经创办了自己的新公司。业内人士常去的酒吧——Rudy's、Wagon Wheel、Dinah's、Chez Yvonne、Velvet Turtle——依然生意兴隆，即使两个人不再在同一家公司工作，也丝毫没有影响他们找个位子坐下，讨论那些会让公司律师头疼的话题。挖角成了一门高深的艺术，正如诺伊斯所说：“学校培养不出任何懂半导体的人，因此，唯一掌握相关知识的人才来源就是那些已经在该领域开展业务的公司。” 看来人们对整个行业的忠诚度远高于对任何特定公司的忠诚度。21
The West Coast semiconductor industry was still so small that it seemed as if nearly everyone in a professional position knew everyone else—often from having worked together at Fairchild. Jay Last’s Amelco-Teledyne rented space from Ed Baldwin’s Rheem, a company later bought by Raytheon, yet another Fairchild spin-off, which years later would hook up with former Fairchild CEO John Carter, who had started his own new company. The industry watering holes—Rudy’s, the Wagon Wheel, Dinah’s, Chez Yvonne, the Velvet Turtle—were as busy as ever, and the fact that two guys no longer worked at the same company did not keep them from grabbing a table and discussing subjects that would have given corporate attorneys fits. Raiding became a high art, for as Noyce put it, “the schools weren’t turning out anyone that knew anything about [semiconductors, and] consequently the only source of knowledgeable people were the companies that were already working in the field.” It seemed people had a greater sense of loyalty to the industry itself than to any particular company.21
诺伊斯在NM电子公司早期工作的关键部分，就是说服他认识的最有能力的工程师、技术人员和科学家加入公司。“我们只招最优秀的人，”诺伊斯在一个夏日的午后对他的大孩子们说，“一小群知道自己在做什么的人，比一大群不知道自己在做什么的人能取得更大的成就。”诺伊斯参加在旧金山举行的秋季联合计算机会议时，几乎被前来应聘和咨询的人团团围住。会议期间，他似乎安排了太多与仙童公司员工的会面，以至于他在日程本上干脆写了个“仙童马戏团”。22
A key part of Noyce’s early work at NM Electronics involved convincing the most capable engineers, technicians, and scientists he knew to join the company. “We are only going to hire perfect people,” Noyce told his oldest children one summer afternoon. “A small bunch of people who know what they are doing can accomplish much more than a big group of people who don’t know what they are doing.” When Noyce attended the Fall Joint Computer Conference in San Francisco he was nearly overrun by men wanting jobs and asking questions. At one point during the conference, he apparently had meetings scheduled with so many Fairchild employees that he simply noted in his datebook, “Fairchild Circus.”22
NM Electronics成立不到一个月，诺伊斯就奔赴东海岸，为他的新公司招兵买马。“他就像个魔笛手，”曾任仙童和英特尔律师的罗杰·博罗沃伊回忆道，“鲍勃要你来，你就得来。”早期的招聘广告要求应聘者“请将资质证明写在纸条上交给鲍勃·诺伊斯”，并漫不经心地补充道：“他还在负责我们的人事工作。”23
Within a month of launching NM Electronics, Noyce was on the East Coast, recruiting for his new venture. “He was like the Pied Piper,” recalled Roger Borovoy, attorney at both Fairchild and Intel. “If Bob wants you to come, you come.” Early recruiting advertisements requested that applicants “please drop a note with qualifications to Bob Noyce” adding oh-so-casually, “he is still doing our personnel work.”23
诺伊斯还在斯坦福大学物色人才。他的老朋友吉姆·安吉尔（Jim Angell）来自麻省理工学院和菲尔科公司，当时在斯坦福大学工程系任教。安吉尔邀请诺伊斯去他的学生那里演讲。诺伊斯还告诉安吉尔，他正在寻找“一位既懂电路又懂计算机系统的专家”。诺伊斯需要一位熟悉计算机的人来帮助他确定半导体存储器的最佳特性。安吉尔本人就是一位系统专家，他建议诺伊斯加入公司，但诺伊斯拒绝让他离开学术界。诺伊斯非常尊重教师，并认为安吉尔是他见过的最优秀的教师之一。于是，安吉尔建议诺伊斯与系里的一位博士后研究员谈谈。这位年轻人对计算机非常精通，安吉尔甚至敢说，他能通过显示屏上灯光的节奏来判断程序是否运行正常。24
Noyce also hunted for new talent at Stanford. Jim Angell, a friend from MIT and Philco who now taught in the university’s engineering department, invited Noyce to address his students. Noyce also told Angell that he was looking for “a good circuits guy who also knows [computer] systems.” Noyce needed someone familiar with computers to help determine the most desirable features of semiconductor memories. Angell, himself a systems expert, suggested that he join the company, but Noyce refused to consider pulling him from academics. He had a great respect for teachers and thought Angell was one of the best he had ever seen. And so Angell suggested that Noyce talk to one of the postdoctoral fellows in the department, a young man so gifted with computers that Angell swore he could tell whether a program was running properly by the rhythm of the lights on the display.24
泰德·霍夫，这位即将因发明微处理器而名扬天下的发明家，在诺伊斯和摩尔公司成立不久后，便来到诺伊斯的书房面试。霍夫之前就听过一些关于诺伊斯的传闻，其中最广为流传的莫过于仙童公司让他“成了百万富翁，或者至少接近百万富翁”。霍夫只看了一眼诺伊斯的房子，就确信了传闻的真实性。“如果你在学术界有所建树，只会得到一些赞扬，”霍夫一边想着，一边走向诺伊斯家的大门。“但在工业界，如果你有所建树，人们会慷慨解囊。”25
Ted Hoff, who would soon be known around the world as the inventor of the microprocessor, came for a job interview at Noyce’s study shortly after Noyce and Moore incorporated their company. Hoff had heard rumors about Noyce, the most persistent of which claimed that Fairchild had made him “a millionaire or close to it.” One look at Noyce’s house was enough to convince Hoff of the rumor’s veracity. “If you’re in academia and you do something good, you get a nice pat on the back,” Hoff thought, as he made his way to Noyce’s front door. “When you’re in industry and you do something good, people throw money.”25
诺伊斯领着霍夫来到书房，然后问了他面试的核心问题：他认为半导体行业的下一个重大发展领域是什么？霍夫脱口而出“存储器”，但他当时并不知道这正是诺伊斯和摩尔想要进军的领域。霍夫接着问诺伊斯，世界真的需要另一家半导体公司吗？仙童半导体公司之前的几家都以惨败告终，霍夫想知道为什么这家新公司不会重蹈覆辙。26
Noyce led Hoff to the study and then asked him the central question of the interview: what did he think would be the next big area for semiconductors? Hoff immediately answered “memories,” though he had no idea that this was the area Noyce and Moore sought to target. Hoff then asked Noyce if the world really needed another semiconductor company. Several of the Fairchildren had failed rather spectacularly, and Hoff wanted to know why this venture would not follow suit.26
诺伊斯也曾问过自己同样的问题。他曾短暂地想过，自己和摩尔的年纪——摩尔39岁，诺伊斯40岁——是否太老了，不适合创业。此外，尽管诺伊斯渴望“再次接触尖端技术”，但他担心自己“离开实验室太久了”，可能无法重新投入其中。然而，经过一番思考，他意识到，如果把年龄看作经验，他和摩尔的年龄反而是一种优势。正如他所说，“半导体行业的历史比我们涉足这个行业的时间还要长。没有人比我们更了解这个行业。”诺伊斯也相信，摩尔对尖端技术的熟悉程度足以弥补他自身知识上的不足。而且，尽管他几乎不愿承认，诺伊斯在仙童半导体公司担任管理职务期间积累的人脉和技能也具有自身的价值。此外，如果这家新公司因为某种原因失败了，诺伊斯认为他和摩尔可以把它卖给一家计算机公司。27
Noyce had asked himself the same question. He had briefly wondered if he and Moore were too old—Moore at 39, Noyce at 40—to start a company. Moreover, as much as Noyce longed to “get close to advanced technology again,” he was concerned that perhaps he had “been away [from the lab] too long” to jump back into the game. After a bit of thought, however, he had decided that his and Moore’s age, if reconsidered as experience, was an asset. As he put it, “the semiconductor business hadn’t existed longer than we’d been in it. There wasn’t anybody who knew the business better than we did.” Noyce was also confident that Moore’s familiarity with state-of-the-art advances in the technology more than compensated for his own relative lack of knowledge. And although he was almost loath to admit it, the contacts and skills Noyce had acquired in his managerial work at Fairchild had their own value. Besides, if for some reason this new firm faltered, Noyce figured he and Moore could sell it to a computer company.27
事实上，诺伊斯在霍夫的面试中告诉他，即使公司最终未能一炮而红，创始人及早期员工也能凭借手中的股票期权“赚得盆满钵满”。霍夫咨询律师，弄清股票期权究竟是什么，以及它是否具有潜在价值后，决定加入诺伊斯和摩尔的团队，担任“应用研究经理”这个定义模糊的职位。他的理由是：“我觉得自己还年轻，这不会是我最后一份工作。如果成功了，那就太好了。如果不行，以后还会有其他机会。”霍夫当时或许还太年轻，并不了解，但他这种漫不经心的态度，正是源于十多年前诺伊斯、摩尔和他们的六位联合创始人离开肖克利公司的决定。1957年，阿诺德·贝克曼或许会严肃地将离开一家成熟的公司去寻找更具吸引力的选择称为“不忠”和“可耻”。而如今，这已是司空见惯。28
In fact, Noyce told Hoff at his job interview, even if the company was not a runaway hit, the founders and early employees could expect to “do quite well,” thanks to the stock options they would all hold. After consulting an attorney to find out what, exactly, a stock option was and whether it was potentially valuable, Hoff decided to join Noyce’s and Moore’s team in the nebulously defined position of “manager of applications research.” His reasoning? “I felt I was young enough that this wouldn’t be my last job opportunity. If this panned out, great. If not, there would be other opportunities.” Hoff may have been too young to know it at the time, but this cavalier attitude was a direct outgrowth of Noyce, Moore, and their six co-founders’ decision to depart Shockley a little more than a decade before. In 1957, Arnold Beckman could seriously call leaving an established company for a more attractive alternative “disloyal” and “shameful.” Now it was routine.28
霍夫和诺伊斯交谈时，暑假已经开始了。诺伊斯家的孩子们还没跟母亲去东海岸进行一年一度的暑假之旅，他们到处都是——在屋里，在院子里，在池塘边荡着绳子，或者追着那匹小马跑，那匹小马似乎总在用蹄子拱开栅栏门，然后沿着街道小跑。除了这些，还有络绎不绝的访客和响个不停的电话铃声。当诺伊斯和摩尔觉得实在受不了的时候，他们就会在附近闲逛——他们他们住在洛斯阿尔托斯，彼此距离很近——甚至会占用邻居的门廊，希望能找到一个安静的地方交谈和思考。29
By the time Hoff and Noyce talked, summer vacation had begun, and the Noyce children, who had not yet left with their mother for their annual summer pilgrimage to the East Coast, were everywhere—in the house, in the yard, swinging on the rope over the pond, or chasing after the pony, who forever seemed to be nudging her gate open and cantering down the street. Added to these distractions was a near-constant stream of visitors and ceaseless ringing of the telephone. When it got to be too much for Noyce and Moore, they would wander through their neighborhood—they lived close to each other in Los Altos—or even commandeer a neighbor’s porch in hopes of finding a quiet place to talk and think.29
诺伊斯和摩尔花了不少时间考虑公司的名字。诺伊斯想要一个“有点儿性感”的名字，但NM Electronics和Moore-Noyce这两个早期候选名字都不符合这个要求。Moore-Noyce听起来像“噪音”，这对于一家电子公司来说显然不是个好联想。诺伊斯和摩尔考虑了California、Electronic、Computer和Technology这几个词的各种组合。由于这些选项都已被其他新公司注册（至少有四个），诺伊斯和摩尔列出了大约20个备选方案，包括“Electronic Solid State Computer Technology”（简称“Esscotek”）、“Electronic Computer”（简称“Tronicom”）和“Integrated Electronics”（简称“Intel”）。30
Noyce and Moore spent a good deal of time considering a name for the company. Noyce wanted a moniker that was “sort of sexy,” a criteria not met by NM Electronics, nor by Moore-Noyce, an early contender that suffered from the problem of sounding like “more noise”—not an ideal association for an electronics operation. Noyce and Moore considered various combinations of California, Electronic, Computer, and Technology. When none of these choices were available—at least four had recently been taken by other new companies—Noyce and Moore drafted a list of some 20 other possibilities, including “Electronic Solid [S]tate Computer Technology” (abbreviated to “Esscotek”), “Electronic Computer” (abbreviated to “Tronicom”), and “Integrated Electronics” (abbreviated to “Intel”).30
诺伊斯喜欢“英特尔”这个名字，他觉得它符合“有点儿性感”的标准，因为它“暗示着其他东西，而不仅仅是另一家公司”——至于具体暗示着什么，目前还不清楚，尽管它与“情报”的关联显而易见。律师们还找到了其他几家也叫“英特尔”的公司，包括俄亥俄州的一家酒店供应链公司和纽约的一家国际电视公司，但这些公司之间并没有什么利益冲突，都可以通过收购相关许可来解决。新公司将沿用“英特尔”这个名字。31
Noyce liked “Intel,” which he felt met the “sort of sexy” criteria because it “implied other things, rather than just another company”—precisely what other things remains unclear, although the association with “intelligence” was obvious. The attorneys found a few other “Intels,” including a hotel supply chain in Ohio and an International Television Company in New York, but there were no conflicts that could not be resolved by buying out a license. The new company would be called Intel.31
如果说诺伊斯和摩尔在英特尔的创立过程中还有第三位联合创始人，那就是金融家亚瑟·洛克。早在诺伊斯真正决定离开仙童公司之前，洛克就一直敦促他离开。当洛克开始着手英特尔的创立工作时，他与汤姆·戴维斯的合作关系刚刚结束，这是按照双方的合同条款进行的，而且非常成功。七年后，用这笔基金最初的300万美元（其余200万美元从未投资）进行的投资，如今价值近1亿美元，这主要归功于对泰莱公司和科学数据系统公司（一家早期的科学计算机公司）的股份。多年来，洛克一直专注于科技领域的投资，但他认为自己真正的专长在于识别那些有能力改变行业格局并渴望创造巨额利润的优秀团队。“这个人必须有杀手般的本能，”洛克说，“他必须知道游戏规则是什么——最终目标是盈利。”诺伊斯个人认为，洛克自身的竞争精神是他所投资的公司取得成功的关键因素之一。 “最重要的是，”诺伊斯解释说，“阿特喜欢赢。”诺伊斯本人也讨厌失败，他很欣赏洛克，而且与他合作得很好。32
IF NOYCE AND MOORE had a third co-founder in the launch of Intel, it was financier Arthur Rock, who had been urging Noyce to leave Fairchild long before Noyce actually decided to do it. When he began working on the Intel launch, Rock’s partnership with Tom Davis had just dissolved, under the terms of its own contract and with great success. Investments made with the first $3 million of the fund (the other $2 million were never invested) were now, seven years later, worth nearly $100 million, thanks in large measure to stakes in Teledyne and Scientific Data Systems, an early scientific computer company. Over the years, Rock had focused on investments in technology, but he considered his real expertise to be identifying good teams with the ability to change their industries and the desire to generate large profits. “The man has to have a killer instinct,” Rock said. “He has to know where the game is—on the bottom line.” Noyce personally thought that Rock’s own competitive intensity accounted for much of the success of the companies he funded. “The main thing is,” Noyce explained, “Art likes to win.” Noyce, who also hated to lose, admired and worked well with Rock.32
在英特尔成立后的最初几周和几个月里，两人几乎每天都通话。洛克决定以每股5美元的价格出售50万股股票来为公司筹集资金。正式的投资工具是250万美元的可转换债券。洛克曾在其他融资场合使用过可转换债券，它是一种复杂的借据。投资者享有与债权人相同的待遇。投资者会获得贷款利息——尽管英特尔免除了这部分利息支付——直到他们将债务转换为股权（股票）。如果公司破产，早期投资者将排在债权人名单的最后。另一方面，如果英特尔取得成功，首轮投资者将共同拥有公司一半的股份。33
The two men spoke daily in the first weeks and months of Intel’s existence. Rock had decided to fund the company by selling 500,000 shares in it at $5 apiece. The formal investment vehicle would be $2.5 million of convertible debentures. Convertible debentures, which Rock had used in other funding situations, are a sophisticated IOU. Investors are treated like creditors and are paid interest on their loan—though Intel waived such payments—until the investors convert the debt into equity (stock). If the company went under, the early investors were at the end of the line of creditors. If, on the other hand, Intel proved successful, the first-round investors would together own half the company.33
诺伊斯和摩尔希望所有潜在投资者都明白，公司计划同时为员工提供股票期权计划和股票购买计划。两位创始人认为，股权是保证员工忠诚度和创新能力的最佳途径。诺伊斯认为，利润分享能够激励员工坚持研发已被证明能够盈利的、安全可靠的产品，即使利润微薄。而持有股票则能激励员工去追求高风险、高回报的下一代产品——这正是英特尔希望培养的员工精神。34
Noyce and Moore wanted any potential investor to know that the company intended to fund both a stock option plan and a stock purchase plan for employees. The founders believed that stock ownership was the best guarantee of both loyalty and innovation. Noyce thought profit sharing encouraged employees to stick with safe products already proven to generate a profit, however small. Owning stock, on the other hand, gave employees an incentive to pursue high-risk, high-reward, next-generation products—precisely the attitude Intel hoped to foster.34
诺伊斯离开费尔柴尔德公司后，几天之内就开始着手制定英特尔的股票期权和股票购买计划，以此庆祝自己摆脱了费尔柴尔德关于“社会主义悄然蔓延”的低声咒骂。洛克也大力支持慷慨地分配股票期权。他职业生涯迄今为止最成功的公司——科学数据系统公司——几乎向所有员工都发放了期权。35
Noyce had celebrated his freedom from Sherman Fairchild’s muttered curses about “creeping socialism” by beginning to outline stock-option and stock-purchase plans for Intel within days of leaving Fairchild. Rock also strongly supported a generous distribution of stock options. Scientific Data Systems, the biggest hit of his career thus far, had given options to almost all employees.35
仙童半导体的解体促使诺伊斯、摩尔和洛克设计了一套股票期权计划，以阻止员工离职。“太多百万富翁在公司待了没多久就离开了，对公司毫无贡献，”洛克指出，并提议英特尔保留“购买短期内离职或被解雇员工股票的选择权”。洛克还建议英特尔“在授予任何股票期权前等待四到八周”，以应对瞬息万变的半导体技术人才市场。这些做法后来成为行业标准，是对仙童半导体和其他公司当时已采用的标准分阶段归属程序的重要补充。36
The dissolution of Fairchild convinced Noyce, Moore, and Rock to design a stock-option plan that discouraged employee defections. “There are too many millionaires who did nothing for their company except leave after a short period of time,” Rock noted before proposing that Intel reserve for itself the “option to purchase stock of an employee who quits the company or is fired within a short period of time.” Rock also suggested that Intel “wait four to eight weeks before granting any stock options,” just to be safe in the churning market for semiconductor expertise. Such practices, which became industry standards, were important additions to the standard incremental vesting procedure already in use at Fairchild and other companies.36
英特尔预留了10万股股票期权，以每股5美元的价格授予关键员工。1969年1月1日，一项股票购买计划生效，允许全职免税员工通过工资扣除的方式，以每股5美元的价格购买高达其工资10%的英特尔股票。在英特尔成立的第一年，所有符合条件的员工都选择参与该股票购买计划。到1968年底，已授予64,700股股票期权，英特尔还预留了另外25,000股供员工购买。37
Intel set aside options for 100,000 shares to be granted to key employees at a price of $5 per share. On the first day of 1969, a stock-purchase plan went into effect allowing full-time exempt employees to take up to 10 percent of their pay in Intel stock, at the same $5-per-share price through payroll deductions. For at least the first year of Intel’s existence, every eligible employee in the company elected to participate in the stock-purchase plan. By the end of 1968, options on 64,700 shares had been granted, and Intel had reserved an additional 25,000 shares for employee purchase.37
诺伊斯在七月底的大部分时间里都和洛克一起寻找潜在投资者。英特尔对银行、养老基金和保险公司来说风险太大，因为这些公司必须遵守“谨慎投资人”的原则，所以诺伊斯和洛克把目标转向了个人投资者。诺伊斯本人就收到了好几份主动提供的“经济援助”，金额相当于……虽然资金高达数十万美元，但他、洛克和摩尔决定将投资者范围限制在他们熟识的人当中。他们邀请了仙童半导体的其他六位创始人，以及迪克·霍奇森和亚瑟·洛克的老投资公司海顿·斯通（现由巴德·科伊尔担任主席），每人投资至多10万美元。洛克的两位同事——科学数据系统公司创始人马克斯·帕列夫斯基和洛克的商学院同学法耶兹·萨罗菲姆——也在投资者名单之列，还有雷切姆公司首席执行官保罗·库克，他最近曾邀请诺伊斯和摩尔将他们的公司作为这家材料科学公司的子公司来运营。诺伊斯建议也邀请洛克菲勒投资集团，他通过格林内尔学院的人脉认识了该集团的经理，以及杰拉德·柯里，后者曾联合创办了一家名为Data Tech的新兴公司，该公司在向军方出售的电路板中使用仙童半导体的电路。诺伊斯是Data Tech的董事，也是该公司的早期投资者。诺伊斯也曾考虑邀请谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德投资，但洛克或摩尔肯定反对，因为费尔柴尔德没有进入候选名单。38
Noyce spent a good part of the end of July working with Rock to identify potential investors. Intel was too risky for banks, pension funds, and insurance companies who had to abide by the “prudent man” rule of investing, and so Noyce and Rock targeted individuals. Noyce personally received several unsolicited offers of “financial assistance” equivalent to hundreds of thousands of dollars, but he, Rock, and Moore decided to limit the investor pool to people they knew well. They invited each of the other six Fairchild founders, as well as Dick Hodgson and Arthur Rock’s old investment firm Hayden, Stone (now chaired by Bud Coyle), to invest up to $100,000 each. Two associates of Rock’s—Max Palevsky (the founder of Scientific Data Systems) and Rock’s business school classmate Fayez Sarofim—were included on the investors’ list, as was Paul Cook, the CEO of Raychem who had recently offered Noyce and Moore the opportunity to start their company as a subsidiary of the materials sciences firm. Noyce suggested also including the Rockefeller investment group, whose manager he knew through Grinnell contacts, and Gerard Currie, who had co-founded a successful young firm called Data Tech that used Fairchild circuits in boards sold to the military. Noyce was a director of Data Tech and an early investor in the company. Noyce also considered inviting Sherman Fairchild to invest, but Rock or Moore must have objected, because Fairchild did not make the short list.38
诺伊斯还希望他过去两年担任董事会主席的格林内尔学院有机会投资。几年前，一位名叫约瑟夫·罗森菲尔德的德梅因富商，同时也是格林内尔学院的董事会成员，曾告诉诺伊斯，学院希望在他创办的任何新企业中占有一席之地。当洛克开始为英特尔寻找投资者时，罗森菲尔德和另一位对科技一窍不通的董事，各自以格林内尔学院的名义开了10万美元的支票。学院的捐赠基金也投资了10万美元。董事会希望对诺伊斯公司的投资能为学院的捐赠基金增加1000万美元，他们计划如果英特尔成功，就将股票捐赠给学院；如果公司失败，则由他们自己承担损失。即使是沃伦·巴菲特，在决定投资英特尔之前不久才加入格林内尔学院董事会，也愿意在这个特殊情况下放弃他的一条基本投资原则——只投资你了解的东西。正如巴菲特所说，“我们押注的是骑师，而不是马。”39
Noyce also wanted Grinnell College, whose board of trustees he had chaired for the past two years, to have a chance to invest. A few years earlier, Joseph Rosenfield, a wealthy Des Moines financier who served on the Grinnell board, had told him that the college would want a stake in any new venture that Noyce started. When Rock began lining up investors for Intel, Rosenfield and another trustee, neither of whom knew technology, each wrote $100,000 checks on Grinnell’s behalf. The college endowment invested another $100,000. The trustees, who hoped the investment in Noyce’s company would add $10 million to the college’s endowment, planned to donate the stock to the college if Intel were successful but to eat the losses if the company failed. Even Warren Buffett, who joined the Grinnell board shortly before the decision to invest in Intel was made, was willing to abandon one of his fundamental rules of investing—only put money into things you understand—in this particular instance. As Buffett put it, “We were betting on the jockey, not the horse.”39
为了避免投资者产生疑问，洛克让诺伊斯拟定了一份商业计划书。诺伊斯打印了三页，内容主要阐述了英特尔将尝试制造“与目前市面上的集成电路类型不同的”半导体，并且英特尔“将致力于把这项技术扩展到更高的集成度”。计划书中从未出现“存储器”一词。“坦白说，”诺伊斯说道，“我们不想让别人知道我们要做什么。我们认为这会很快吸引太多竞争对手。”40
In case an investor had questions, Rock had Noyce draw up a business plan, which Noyce did by typing up three pages, the meat of which said that Intel was going to try to build semiconductors “not of the types of integrated circuits now on the market” and that Intel “will seek to extend the technology to higher levels of integration.” The word “memory” never appeared in the plan. “Frankly,” said Noyce, “we didn’t want people to know what we were going to be doing. We thought it would attract too many competitors too soon.”40
计划书的内容究竟如何，其实并不重要。没有一位投资者要求查看。“大家都认识鲍勃，而且都准备投资这家公司了，”洛克解释道。从洛克正式开始联系投资者到最终达成协议，前后不到48小时。当所有需要的资金都已到位时，一切就绪。罗克承认，在1968年两天内筹集到250万美元是一项“非凡”的壮举，但他明确表示，如果这项筹款活动是在电子邮件和手机普及的时代发起，响应速度会更快。“那时候，”他解释说，“人们必须回电话。”41
What the plan did or did not say was irrelevant in any case. Not a single investor asked to see it. “People had known Bob and were kind of lined up to invest in the company,” explains Rock. Fewer than 48 hours elapsed between the moment Rock began formally calling investors and the moment every dollar needed had been committed. While Rock concedes that raising $2.5 million in two days was an “exceptional” feat in 1968, he makes it clear that had the search been launched in an age of email and cell phones, the response would have been even swifter. “Back then,” he explains, “people had to return calls.”41
想投资的人远比有机会投资的人多得多。由于一篇新闻报道刊登了诺伊斯和摩尔的家庭住址，贝蒂·摩尔接到了好几个电话，都是想投资她丈夫的公司的人打来的，尽管这些人根本不知道这家公司是做什么的。英特尔成立后的几年里，诺伊斯经常被一些“非常失望”的朋友找上门来，想知道为什么他们没有被邀请投资。他告诉他们，洛克负责公司启动的融资工作。42
Many more people wanted to invest than were given a chance to do so. Thanks to a news story that printed Noyce’s and Moore’s home addresses, Betty Moore received several calls at the house from people who wanted to put money into her husband’s company, even though the callers had no idea what it would do. For years after Intel’s founding, Noyce was approached by “keenly disappointed” friends wanting to know why they hadn’t been invited to invest. He told them Rock had been in charge of financing the launch.42
洛克向来不善于表达情感，但他对英特尔的热情却体现在他对英特尔的投资上：在最初投资1万美元的基础上，他又追加了30万美元。这使他成为继创始人之后，英特尔最大的个人投资者。多年后，在投资了数十家成功的公司（包括苹果电脑）之后，这些公司的总估值达到数十亿美元，洛克断言：“英特尔可能是我投资过的唯一一家我百分之百确定会成功的公司——这都归功于摩尔和诺伊斯。”43
Rock, never an emotionally expressive man, demonstrated his own excitement about Intel by augmenting his original $10,000 purchase by another $300,000. This made him the firm’s single largest investor after the founders. Years later, after he had funded dozens of successful companies (including Apple Computer) that together were valued at billions of dollars, Rock averred, “Intel is probably the only company I ever invested in that I was absolutely, 100 percent sure would be a success—because of Moore and Noyce.”43
英特尔的顺利创立与11年前为仙童半导体公司筹集资金的艰难尝试形成了鲜明对比。创始人过往的业绩是造成这种差异的部分原因。诺伊斯和摩尔曾创建并运营了一家市值1.5亿美元的企业，位列行业第三。此外，亚瑟·洛克也以慧眼识珠而闻名，他的认可至关重要。
THE EASE WITH WHICH INTEL WAS LAUNCHED offers quite a contrast with the frustrating attempt, just 11 years earlier, to fund Fairchild Semiconductor. The founders’ track records can be credited for some of the difference. Noyce and Moore had built and run a company that grew into a $150 million enterprise, third biggest in its industry. Arthur Rock, too, had developed a reputation for picking winners. His imprimatur meant a great deal.
然而，时机同样重要。当时美国经济蓬勃发展，电子行业也欣欣向荣。随着越南战争升级到前所未有的规模，军方在电子产品上的支出也创下历史新高。工业和消费市场同样充满活力。在诺伊斯和摩尔创立英特尔的两个月前，电子行业的公司倒闭率降至历史新低，制造商的平均倒闭率仅为五年前的三分之一。该行业已经足够成熟，建立了一个由供应商、员工、律师、广告公司和其他熟悉半导体的服务提供商组成的网络。与此同时，微电子领域仍然足够新兴，能够容纳新的进入者。正如一家杂志所说，那是“电子水瓶座时代”。44
As important, however, was timing. The American economy was booming—and the electronics industry was soaring. As the war in Vietnam escalated to once-unthinkable levels, the military spent record amounts on electronics. The industrial and consumer markets were also vibrant. Two months before Noyce and Moore launched Intel, failures of companies in the electronics industry dropped to record lows, with manufacturers failing on average only one-third as often as they had five years earlier. The industry was mature enough to have developed a network of suppliers, employees, lawyers, advertising firms, and other service providers familiar with semiconductors. At the same time, the microelectronics field was still new enough to support fresh entrants. It was, said one magazine, “the Age of Electro-Aquarius.”44
然而，这种理想的时机并没有持续太久。《商业周刊》宣布，鉴于日益激烈的竞争和不断上涨的资本成本，1969年是“开办集成电路业务并取得巨大成功的最后一年”。同年，国会将长期资本利得的最高税率从28%提高到49%——此举旨在让美国政府从风险投资中分一杯羹，却产生了意想不到的后果，重创了风险投资行业。到1970年，许多业内人士认为半导体市场已经完全饱和。45
This ideal moment would not last long, however. Business Week declared 1969 “the last year to start an integrated circuit operation … and make it big,” in light of increasing competition and rising capital costs. In that same year, Congress increased the maximum tax on long-term capital gains from 28 to 49 percent—a move aimed at getting a piece of the venture-capital pie for Uncle Sam and one that had the unintended effect of devastating the venture capital industry. By 1970, many people familiar with the industry believed the semiconductor market was fully saturated.45
然而，1968年夏天，大多数电子公司的日子都过得非常滋润，太平洋沿岸各地的公司财源滚滚，慷慨大方，急需员工，于是响应约翰逊总统的“向贫困宣战”计划，培训“来自弱势少数族裔的年轻人”和“长期失业者”。在欧洲，学生抗议活动演变成暴力事件。在芝加哥，警察在民主党全国代表大会上殴打反越战抗议者；而在华盛顿，美国陆军以全国各地“大量骚乱”为由，开始建造一座“紧急行动指挥部”，该指挥部的核心是一系列采用集成电路技术的计算机，旨在同时协调多达25个国内“热点地区”的军事行动。但在遍布旧金山半岛的电子实验室和制造厂里，却洋溢着一片无比乐观的气氛。46
In the summer of 1968, however, life was so good for most electronics companies that firms up and down the Pacific Coast, flush with success, feeling generous, and hungry for employees, trained “young people from disadvantaged minorities” and “hard-core unemployed” as part of President Johnson’s War-on-Poverty programs. In Europe, student protests turned violent. In Chicago, police clubbed Vietnam War protesters at the Democratic National Convention, while in Washington, the United States Army, citing the “large number of civil disturbances” around the country, began construction on an “emergency action headquarters” anchored by a series of computers running on integrated circuit technology and designed to coordinate military action at as many as 25 domestic “hot spots” simultaneously. But in the electronics labs and fabs dotting the San Francisco Peninsula, it was a time of unbridled optimism.46
诺伊斯和摩尔是最乐观的人之一。他们知道，在产能达到一定水平之前，英特尔会一直亏损，但他们的商业计划只假设亏损期为两年。实际上，诺伊斯和摩尔的意思是，他们的公司将在730天内设计出一种电路，建立一条生产线，大规模生产一种此前从未走出实验室原型阶段的技术，然后销售足够多的电路以实现盈利。这个计划处处体现着诺伊斯的风格。30年后，摩尔回顾说，这个计划“比我预想的要激进得多”。47
Noyce and Moore were among the most optimistic. They knew that Intel would lose money until production got up to speed, but their business plan assumed only two years of losses. In effect, Noyce and Moore were saying that in 730 days their company would design a circuit, build a production line, produce in mass quantities a technology that had never before gone beyond lab prototyping, and then sell enough of those circuits to turn a profit. The plan has Noyce’s fingerprints all over it. Looking back 30 years later, Moore said the agenda was “more aggressive than I had ever planned on.”47
八月初，诺伊斯离开了英特尔创业公司令人兴奋又忙碌的工作环境，回到缅因州与家人团聚两周。他的家人几乎整个夏天都待在那里。诺伊斯赶到时，正好赶上他们买下位于布雷门附近海岸的一栋房子，距离波特兰以北约一个半小时车程。房子本身并不起眼，但地段却非常棒，近30英亩的原始土地一直延伸到伸入大西洋的海岬尽头。从新家的门廊望出去，诺伊斯一家只能看到大海、天空和点缀在马斯康格斯湾的小岛。48
IN EARLY AUGUST, Noyce left the exhilaration and furor of the Intel startup to spend two weeks with his family, who had passed almost the entire summer in Maine. Noyce joined them in time to close on a house they bought on the coast near Bremen, about an hour-and-a-half north of Portland. The house was modest, but the property was fantastic, nearly 30 pristine acres that ended in a promontory jutting into the Atlantic. From the porch of their new summer home, the Noyces could see only ocean, sky, and the small islands dotting Muscongus Bay.48
这栋房子是鲍勃为了讨好贝蒂而买的，她一直希望鲍勃在波士顿创办英特尔。当时，圣克拉拉谷还以盛产李子而闻名，而波士顿128号公路沿线地区却已成为高科技制造业中心。英特尔创立之初，128号公路沿线聚集的小型计算机公司里的高科技从业人员，比半岛上那些低矮的半导体大楼里的还要多。诺伊斯曾认真考虑过东迁，至少认真到足以向迪克提出这个建议。他把霍奇森当作自己的导师，询问他对这个想法的看法。霍奇森立刻否决了这个想法。“英特尔的整个理念都是围绕着仙童半导体、你的声誉以及（半岛上的）人脉建立起来的。波士顿跟这些比起来有什么优势呢？”49
The house was a concession to Betty, who had wanted Bob to start Intel in Boston. The region around Boston’s Route 128 had become a center of high-tech manufacturing when the Santa Clara Valley was still best known for plums. When Intel was started, more high-technology workers could be found in the minicomputer companies clustered along Route 128 than in the low-slung semiconductor buildings on the Peninsula. Noyce had briefly considered a move east at least seriously enough to ask Dick Hodgson, on whom he had come to rely as a mentor, what he thought of the idea. Hodgson immediately shot it down. “The whole concept of Intel is built around Fairchild, and your reputation and the people [on the Peninsula]. What’s Boston got to offer compared to this?”49
于是，缅因州的小屋就此建成。当然，诺伊斯不可能坐在门廊上，眼睁睁地看着时光流逝。他给加州打了电话。他建了个码头，买了些船，多次进城采购生活用品和工具，结识了邻居，尝试在海里游泳，还和家人一起扬帆出海。阳光洒在他的背上和肩膀上，而不喜欢弄湿衣服的贝蒂则小心翼翼地穿着救生衣坐在船上。
And so, the Maine cottage. Noyce, of course, could not sit on the porch and watch the days meander by. He called back to California. He built a dock, bought several boats, made multiple trips into town for provisions and tools, met the neighbors, tried to swim in the ocean, and sailed with the family, the sun beating on his back and shoulders while Betty, who disliked getting wet, sat carefully in her life vest.
贝蒂·诺伊斯终于如愿以偿，至少在她位于大陆“另一边”的这两周里，她感到无比幸福。多年来，她一直渴望在东海岸拥有一处房产，就连她那位不愿与她分享任何私事的婆婆也知道她的这个梦想。“所以，贝蒂在海岸的房子终于实现了，”哈丽特在给鲍勃的信中写道。哈丽特觉得这种奢侈享受有点罪恶。她不公平地认为贝蒂让鲍勃对金钱过于执着，但她话里话外都流露出自己内心的真实想法：现在，也许她会让你清静清静了。50
Betty Noyce, at long last and at least for those two weeks on “her side” of the continent, was happy. She had wanted a home on the East Coast for so many years that even her mother-in-law, with whom Betty preferred to share nothing, knew of her dream. “So Betty’s home on the coast is a reality,” wrote Harriet, who thought such luxuries mildly sinful, in a letter to Bob. Harriet rather unfairly believed that Betty had made Bob overly interested in money, and she left unsaid what she clearly was thinking: now maybe she’ll give you some peace.50
诺伊斯从缅因州回来后不久，英特尔就开始搬进联合碳化物公司大楼。这座位于山景城米德尔菲尔德路365号的工厂占地3万平方英尺，距离原仙童半导体公司总部不远。大楼内部布置极其简陋：就连那些“大佬们”（诺伊斯笑着称呼管理团队）的办公室，摆放的家具也都是从前任租户那里淘汰下来的。这些办公室沿着大楼前部排列，空间狭小拥挤，诺伊斯估计，每个人之间最多也就相隔20步——近到可以大声喊叫来召集会议。这与诺伊斯在仙童半导体的办公室截然不同，仙童半导体的管理层坚持要请室内设计师为他的办公室进行专业装修。英特尔的办公室布局完美地体现了这家年轻公司高管们将要扮演的角色。诺伊斯的办公室就坐在离前门最近的位置。研发总监格罗夫的办公室靠近大楼中央，就在研究区附近。摩尔的办公室就在他们两人之间。51
Shortly after Noyce returned from Maine, Intel began moving into the Union Carbide building, a 30,000-square-foot manufacturing facility at 365 Middlefield Road in Mountain View, not far from the original Fairchild Semiconductor headquarters. The building was a distinctly Spartan arrangement: even the offices of the “high muckety-mucks” (as Noyce laughingly referred to the management team) were rooms appointed with furniture cast off from the previous occupant. These offices, which lined the front of the building, were so small and crammed together that Noyce estimated that nobody was ever more than 20 steps away from another person—close enough to call meetings by hollering. It was quite a change from Noyce’s office at Fairchild, which Syosset management had insisted on having professionally decorated by an interior designer. The arrangement of the offices of Intel perfectly reflected the roles that the young company’s executives would play. Noyce sat nearest the front door. R&D director Grove sat closest to the middle of the building, near the research area. Moore’s office was between these two.51
英特尔的第一个正式通讯中心是一张长桌，桌面上并排摆放着三部电话（每部电话都有自己的号码）。公司“餐厅”则是一个简陋的房间，里面大约有六张桌子、二三十把椅子、几台自动售货机、一块公告板和一个水槽，水槽后面还有一个放咖啡杯的架子。52
Intel’s first official communications center was a long table with three telephones (each with its own number) lined up across the top. The corporate “cafeteria” was a bare room with about six tables, a couple dozen chairs, a few vending machines, a bulletin board, and a sink with a rack behind it for coffee cups.52
联合碳化物公司尚未完全搬离位于大楼后部的制造厂区域，英特尔计划对该区域进行升级改造，并将其用作自己的制造工厂。旧的联合碳化物公司设备以奇怪的角度和随意的位置散落在巨大的空间里。管道从天花板上伸出来。电线从墙上垂下来。瓷砖地板上的洞比瓷砖还多。地板下面，情况更糟。通往街道的污水管道已被联合碳化物公司从水槽里冲进来的酸性物质彻底腐蚀殆尽。53
Union Carbide had not entirely moved out of the fab area in the back of the building that Intel intended to upgrade and use as its own manufacturing facility. Old Union Carbide equipment punctuated the cavernous space at odd angles and in random locations. Pipes poked from the ceiling. Wires drooped from the walls. The tile floor had more holes than tiles. Below the floor, things got even worse. The sewer pipe running out to the street had been completely eaten away by the acids Union Carbide had washed down the sinks.53
这要么是一场灾难，要么是一个机遇。吉恩·弗拉斯认为，这场混乱给了他完全的自主权，让他可以精确地选择英特尔所需的工厂选址和建造方式。他开始着手制定计划。近十年前，诺伊斯曾邀请拉斯特在Wescon展会上演示一种简易的集成电路。当Wescon在洛杉矶开幕时，弗拉斯带着“相当于支票簿”的资金前往。弗拉斯径直来到Wescon的供应商和设备制造商展位，直接在展台上订购英特尔工厂所需的设备：“我要一台这个，两台那个，三台这个。”一排熔炉，一台蒸发器，一台光刻机。那些习惯于耗时数周的讨价还价的销售员们目瞪口呆，只能在随手可得的纸张背面匆匆写下临时的采购订单。54
It was either a disaster or an opportunity. Gene Flath decided the disarray gave him carte blanche to choose precisely where and how to build the fab that Intel needed. He began drawing up a plan. When Wescon, the annual trade show for which almost a decade earlier Noyce had asked Last to demonstrate a rudimentary integrated circuit, opened in Los Angeles, Flath attended, “with the equivalent of a checkbook” in hand. Flath went straight to the suppliers and equipment manufacturers’ booths at Wescon and proceeded to order equipment for the Intel fab right off the show floor: “I’ll have one of those, two of those, three of these.” A bank of furnaces, an evaporator, a lithography machine. The astonished salesmen, far more used to wooing and haggling that could stretch weeks, were writing makeshift purchase orders on the backs of random sheets of paper.54
英特尔第一次圣诞派对举办时，公司规模还很小，30名员工及其配偶都能挤进戈登·摩尔的客厅。他们畅饮着一种甜美多汁的波士顿鱼屋潘趣酒，这种酒劲儿恐怕只有像摩尔这样的化学家才能调制出来。戈登和贝蒂·摩尔很少举办派对，但贝蒂·诺伊斯早在之前的一次小型聚会上就宣布，她再也不打算参与在仙童公司时那种商务社交活动了。她的声明在许多人看来都有些无礼，但贝蒂一直觉得肤浅的谈话——尤其是和那些只知道她是“鲍勃的妻子”的人——令人倍感压力。在她看来，作为制定规则的男人的妻子，她只是在行使自己的权利，不再让自己陷入那种境地。55
When it came time for the first Intel Christmas party, the company was still small enough that all 30 employees and their spouses could fit into Gordon Moore’s living room, where they drank themselves silly on a sweet, fruity Boston Fish House Punch brewed with a potency only a chemist like Moore could devise. Gordon and Betty Moore rarely hosted parties, but Betty Noyce had already announced at an earlier and smaller gathering that she was never again planning to engage in the sort of business socializing that had been expected of her at Fairchild. Her announcement had struck many as rude, but Betty had always found superficial conversation—particularly with those who knew her only as “Bob’s wife”—stressful. In her own mind, she was simply exercising her prerogative, as the wife of the man who made the rules, not to put herself into that situation again.55
在那年十二月的那个夜晚庆祝的30名员工中，除了财务主管、接待员和来自仙童半导体公司的高级秘书琼·琼斯之外，其余都是技术人员。琼斯之所以同意帮忙，是因为公司承诺她只需要兼职。几位新员工——来自斯坦福的霍夫、来自西尔瓦尼亚的迪克·博恩、来自德州仪器的斯基普·费尔以及来自ITT的鲍勃·奥黑尔——此前并不认识英特尔的创始人，但他们欣然接受了与他们共事的机会，原因与诺伊斯和摩尔当年想为肖克利效力的原因相同。“他们绝对是业界的神，”一位早期员工这样解释道，他的措辞几乎与诺伊斯所说的“接到肖克利的第一个电话就像接到上帝的声音”如出一辙。尽管诺伊斯和摩尔堪称业界的“小神”，但他们并没有最终的招聘决定权。安迪·格鲁夫有权否决任何技术人才的聘用。56
Every one of the 30 employees who celebrated that December night was technically oriented with the exception of a Controller, a receptionist, and a senior secretary from Fairchild, Jean Jones, who agreed to help out after being promised that she would only need to work part-time. Several of the newest hires—Hoff from Stanford, Dick Bohn from Sylvania, Skip Fehr from Texas Instruments, and Bob O’Hare from ITT—had not personally known the Intel founders, but had jumped at the opportunity to work with them for the same reason Noyce and Moore had wanted to work for Shockley. “They were absolutely the gods of the industry,” explained one early employee, using language almost identical to Noyce’s claim that the first call from Shockley was like hearing from God. Minor deities though Noyce and Moore might be, they did not have the final word on hiring. Andy Grove had the power to veto any technical hire.56
加入英特尔并非一开始就能获得丰厚的回报。英特尔工程师的平均月薪为 1000 美元，外加其他福利。1000股股票的期权。这份薪酬方案很有竞争力，但并不算特别诱人——正如一位早期员工所说，诺伊斯和摩尔很清楚，英特尔“坦白讲，确实很有吸引力”。这位员工回忆说，他当时对团队以及他们正在挑战的“技术难题”印象深刻：“这些人似乎掌握着挑战的主动权，并引领着未来。”57
A move to Intel was not an immediately lucrative proposition. Intel engineers were brought over at an average salary of $1,000 per month, plus options on 1,000 shares. This package was competitive, but not spectacular—Noyce and Moore knew, in the words of one early employee, that Intel “really had, frankly, a lot of sex appeal.” This employee recalls being impressed with the team and the “technical challenge” they were pursuing: “These guys seemed to be holding the challenge in their hands and steering the future.”57
如果诺伊斯希望仙童公司成为肖克利的反面，那么英特尔就是仙童公司的反面。诺伊斯将英特尔的架构设计成他所谓的“双头怪兽”，权力在他和戈登·摩尔之间平分，这一决定直接源于诺伊斯在仙童公司遭遇的管理局限。英特尔的董事会成员包括罗克、诺伊斯、摩尔、理查德·霍奇森以及来自多家计算机公司的高级管理人员，他们能够将客户的视角带入董事会讨论。这种董事会的组成正是诺伊斯有意为之，旨在应对仙童公司董事会成员对半导体一无所知的困境。58
IF NOYCE HAD WANTED Fairchild to be the anti-Shockley, then Intel was the anti-Fairchild. The decision to structure Intel as what Noyce called “a two-headed monster,” with power split evenly between him and Gordon Moore, was a direct result of Noyce’s having confronted his own managerial limitations at Fairchild. Intel’s board of directors, which included Rock, Noyce, Moore, Richard Hodgson, and senior executives from several computer companies who could bring a customer’s perspective to board deliberations, was an intentional response to Noyce’s experiences with the Fairchild trustees who had been unburdened with any knowledge of semiconductors.58
仙童半导体的阴影也深深笼罩着英特尔的日常技术运营。由于仙童半导体在将器件从研发到生产的过渡过程中困难重重，英特尔的创始人彻底抹去了研发和生产之间的界限。其他公司通常会设置一条生产线用于原型开发，另一条用于批量生产，而英特尔则采用单一生产线。研发部门开发的工艺流程会使用与商业生产相同的设备进行测试和优化。通过这种研发和生产的“一体化”模式，摩尔和诺伊斯希望确保英特尔不会浪费时间开发那些无法实现的高概念器件。为了进一步加强研发和生产的整合，诺伊斯和摩尔将生产的整体责任交给了拥有理论和研究背景的安迪·格鲁夫。
The ghost of Fairchild cast long shadows over technical day-to-day operations at Intel, as well. Because the difficulties in transferring devices from development to manufacturing at Fairchild were legion, the Intel founders completely erased the distinctions between the two divisions. Where other companies had one line for developing prototypes and another for mass-production runs, Intel had a single line. Processes developed in R&D were tested and fine-tuned with the same equipment used for commercial manufacturing. By “co-locating” development and manufacturing in this way, Moore and Noyce hoped to ensure that Intel did not waste its time developing high-concept devices that could not be built. Noyce and Moore further ensured the integration of R&D and manufacturing when they gave overall responsibility for production to Andy Grove, who had a theoretical and research background.
诺伊斯和摩尔决定让英特尔的产品组合与仙童芯片截然不同。仙童芯片大量生产相对容易制造、利润微薄的芯片，并因此陷入价格战和激烈的竞争；而英特尔则专注于率先将尖端产品推向市场，这些产品能够卖出高价，从而获得丰厚的利润，并将这些利润再投入研发。等到其他公司进入市场并压低价格时，英特尔就会推出下一代产品，再次占据高价位，直到其他公司加入竞争，然后新一轮的循环又会开始。59
Noyce and Moore decided to orient Intel 180-degrees away from Fairchild in product mix. Where Fairchild built huge volumes of relatively easy-to-manufacture, low-margin chips and engaged in the price cutting and trench warfare that this approach necessitated, Intel would be tightly focused on being first to market with state-of-the-art devices that could command high prices and generate high profits that could be plowed back into R&D. By the time other firms entered the market and drove prices down, Intel would pull from its quiver a next-generation device that would once again command high prices until other companies could join the fray and the cycle would begin again.59
保密对于诺伊斯和摩尔的计划至关重要。英特尔的科学家们不会发表任何可能对竞争对手有利的演讲，也不会发表技术论文。这一点也与当时的文化截然相反。在仙童半导体公司以及大多数半导体公司和研究实验室，博士们会在会议上或发表文章公开讨论他们的研究成果。仙童实验室里唯一的通行证是科学声望，但在英特尔，研究人员拥有的是股票，他们知道如果泄露秘密，这些股票就会变得一文不值。
Secrecy was essential for Noyce and Moore’s plan to work. Intel scientists did not give talks that could benefit competitors. They did not publish technical papers. This, too, was in direct opposition to the culture at Fairchild, and at most semiconductor companies and research labs, where PhDs openly discussed their findings at conferences or in print. The only currency in the Fairchild lab had been scientific prestige, but at Intel, the researchers had stock, which they knew would be worthless if they spread secrets around town.
在更深层次的哲学层面上，诺伊斯也希望英特尔成为仙童公司的反面。他说，仙童公司陷入了“群体思维”的管理模式，扼杀了创新。他承认，自己对共识的执着追求在一定程度上导致了“群体思维”的出现，他是这样定义“群体思维”的：“任何支持新产品创新的决策都必须经过一道严格的关卡。一张反对票就可能扼杀一个项目，而一张赞成票的价值几乎为零。”他曾公开质疑，如果倡导一种“只需一张赞成票就能启动行动”的政策，是否会更好。60
On a more philosophical level, too, Noyce wanted Intel to be the anti-Fairchild. Fairchild, he said, had come to be managed by “group think,” which killed innovation. He admitted that his personal drive for consensus was partially responsible for “group think,” which he defined this way: “any decision to go along with a new product innovation had to pass through a narrow gate. A single negative vote could kill a project, and one positive vote was worth approximately zero.” He wondered aloud if he would do better to champion a policy in which “a single ‘yes’ could initiate action.”60
在仙童半导体过去几年步履蹒跚之际，诺伊斯和摩尔希望英特尔能够迎头赶上。“用钱买时间，因为钱比时间便宜，”诺伊斯告诉吉恩·弗拉斯，弗拉斯当然也实践过这种理念，他直接从展会上购买设备。在20世纪60年代末炙手可热的半导体行业，抢占市场先机将使英特尔处于戈登·摩尔所说的“步枪手”的位置，就像“一个射向空白墙壁的步枪手，找到弹孔，然后围绕弹孔画出靶心”。第一个进入市场的公司总是能击中靶心，因为它可以围绕自己的射击位置画出靶心。任何后来者都会发现靶心早已被占据，市场已被他人定义。61
Where Fairchild had lumbered in the last few years, Noyce and Moore wanted Intel to race. “Use money to buy time because money is cheaper than time,” Noyce told Gene Flath, who had, of course, put this philosophy into practice when he bought equipment off the trade show floor. In the white-hot semiconductor industry of the late 1960s, being first to market would put Intel in the position of what Gordon Moore called “a rifleman who shoots at a blank wall, finds the bullet hole, and then paints the target around it.” The first company in the market always hits the bull’s eye because that company can draw the target around its own shot. Any late arrivals find the target already in place, the market defined by someone else.61
“我们要做的一切就是把半导体存储器的成本降低一百倍，”在英特尔成立的最初几个月里，诺伊斯经常这样提醒他的员工。问题不在于竞争对手销售的半导体存储器价格远低于英特尔，而在于当时计算机使用的存储技术——一种被称为“磁芯存储器”的电磁结构——售价仅为大多数人预期半导体存储器价格的4%左右。诺伊斯希望将半导体存储器的成本降至每比特一美分左右——甚至低于同等磁芯存储器的成本。62
“ALL WE [HAVE] TO DO is reduce the cost [of semiconductor memories] by a factor of one hundred,” Noyce enjoyed reminding his employees in the first few months of Intel’s existence. The problem was not that a competitor was selling semiconductor memories far cheaper than Intel. The problem was that the existing storage technology for computers, an electromagnetic arrangement called “magnetic core memory,” sold for about 4 percent of what most people expected semiconductor memories would cost. Noyce wanted to get the cost of semiconductor memory down to about a penny per bit—even less than the cost of comparable core storage.62
磁芯存储器就像一叠叠微小的方形网球拍头，用金属丝而不是羊肠线串起来。每两根金属丝交叉处都放置着一个针头大小的铁环。电流通过金属丝时，可以使铁环沿特定方向极化——磁化或不磁化——从而表示二进制的0或1。换句话说，每个铁环可以存储一位信息，并通过一系列晶体管传输到计算机。磁芯存储器可靠、廉价，完全能够满足20世纪60年代末计算机的存储需求。即使在当时计算机市场相对有限的情况下，磁芯存储器为拥有该专利的麻省理工学院带来了数十万美元的专利费。63
Magnetic core memories resembled stacks of tiny square tennis racket heads strung with wire instead of cat gut. Iron donuts, each about the size of a pinhead, sat at every intersection of two pieces of wire. Currents sent through the wires could polarize the little doughnut in a particular direction—magnetized or not—to represent a binary one or zero. In other words, each donut could store one bit of information, which was transmitted to the computer through a series of transistors. Magnetic core memories were reliable, cheap, and perfectly adequate for the storage needs of late-1960s computers. Even with the relatively limited computer market of that era, core memories had netted hundreds of thousands of dollars in royalties for MIT, which held the patent.63
然而，磁芯存储器也有其缺点，而诺伊斯和摩尔正是从中看到了英特尔的潜在立足点。磁芯并非一种特别快速的数据存储方式。计算机的电子脉冲必须沿着大约10平方英尺的导线传输才能存储1000比特（0或1）的信息。这种传输距离会降低处理速度，随着计算机性能的提升和存储需求的增长，处理和访问数据的等待时间将变得越来越难以接受。此外，磁芯存储器是手工制造的。每一个铁质磁环都是由工厂里的女工（很可能在亚洲）单独串在导线上的。诺伊斯和摩尔深知，这种劳动密集型的生产方式对于呈指数级增长的计算机市场来说是不可持续的，正如他们十年前就意识到手工焊接的分立元件无法满足爆炸式增长的太空时代电子产品市场一样。64
Magnetic cores had their shortcomings, however, and in these Noyce and Moore had seen a potential foothold for Intel. Cores were not a particularly fast means of storing data. The computer’s electronic pulses had to travel along about 10 square feet of wire to store 1,000 bits (zeroes or ones) of information. This traveling distance slowed processing, and as computers became more powerful and their storage needs grew, the wait to process and access data would become increasingly unacceptable. Moreover, the core memories were built by hand. Every one of those iron donuts was individually strung on a wire by a woman in a factory, most likely in Asia. Noyce and Moore knew that this labor-intensive means of production was not sustainable for a computer market growing exponentially, just as they had known a decade earlier that hand-wired discrete components could not serve the exploding market for space-age electronics.64
摩尔和诺伊斯也清楚，磁芯的问题对大多数计算机工程师来说无关紧要，他们不会花时间去思考十年后如何制造机器。这些工程师只关心他们的计算机现在能否正常工作，因此，半导体存储器的成本优势必须非常显著，工程师们才会考虑放弃笨重但可靠的磁芯。诺伊斯和摩尔或许再次感到似曾相识，因为他们最初将集成电路推向市场时也面临着类似的障碍。诺伊斯是仙童公司决定以低于成本的价格销售集成电路以在分立元件市场站稳脚跟的决策者，他押注类似的策略也能在半导体存储器领域奏效。因此，他们奉行着这样的信条：“我们只需要降低成本。”
Moore and Noyce also knew that the problems with cores were irrelevant to most computer engineers, who did not spend time thinking about how they would build their machines ten years in the future. These engineers cared that their computers work now, and so the cost advantages of semiconductor memory would have to be overwhelming before the engineers would consider abandoning the clunky, but reliable, magnetic cores. A sense of déjà vu may have again struck Noyce and Moore, who faced a similar obstacle when they initially brought the integrated circuit to market. Noyce, the architect of Fairchild’s decision to sell integrated circuits below cost to get a foothold in the discrete components market, was betting a similar strategy would work for semiconductor memories. Hence the mantra: “all we have to do is reduce the cost.”
当然，这并非他们全部的工作。首先，他们必须制造存储器。由诺伊斯、摩尔、格鲁夫、霍夫、格雷厄姆以及偶尔两三位其他成员组成的小组，于1968年8月开始制定正式的产品计划。他们决定采取三管齐下的策略。来自西尔瓦尼亚公司、才华横溢、思维敏捷的研究员迪克·博恩，拥有多项双极型晶体管领域的关键专利，他将领导双极型存储器件的研发工作。这将是一款速度极快的芯片，用于驱动计算机中的其他存储设备。双极型晶体管技术早在仙童半导体公司成立之初就已出现，其制造工艺在半导体行业几乎是驾轻就熟。但此前从未有人像英特尔那样，在双极型电路中集成如此多的晶体管。65
But, of course, that was not all they had to do. First they had to build the memories. A group consisting of Noyce, Moore, Grove, Hoff, Graham, and occasionally two or three others, had begun developing formal product plans in August 1968. They decided to take a three-pronged approach. Dick Bohn, a mercurial, brilliant, intense researcher from Sylvania who held several key patents in the bipolar field, would lead the effort to build a bipolar memory device. This would be a very fast chip that would drive other memory devices in a computer. Bipolar techniques had been around since the earliest days of Fairchild, and building them was as close to rote as anything in the semiconductor industry. But no one had squeezed as many transistors on a bipolar circuit as Intel proposed to do.65
安迪·格鲁夫和莱斯·瓦达兹另辟蹊径，尝试采用一种名为MOS（金属-氧化物-硅）的新型技术来制造存储器。与双极型电路相比，制造MOS集成电路所需的步骤更少，而且MOS器件可以集成更多晶体管，这使其成为复杂芯片的理想选择。至少理论上是这样。实际上，MOS器件比其他半导体器件速度更慢、更不稳定，而且更依赖于“黑科技”。MOS电路当时尚未实现量产，主要存在于实验室中。英特尔计划从小规模入手，先开发一款小型存储器，用于处理那些对核心来说过于简单的功能。66
Andy Grove and Les Vadasz would open up a second line of attack by trying to build a memory built with a much newer technique called MOS (metal-oxide-silicon). It takes fewer steps to build MOS integrated circuits than bipolar circuits, and MOS devices could be much more densely packed with transistors, which made them the logical choice for complex chips. That, at least, was the theory. In reality, MOS devices were slower, more temperamental, and even more dependent on “black magic” than other semiconductor devices. MOS circuits had yet to be produced in volume and existed primarily as lab curiosities. Here Intel planned to start slow, building a small memory targeted to serve functions too simple for cores.66
第三组研究人员尝试将四个小型存储芯片组装成一个模块，使其能够作为容量大但价格低廉的存储器。这种存储器被称为“多芯片”，有时也称为“倒装芯片”，因为在组装过程中需要将其翻转过来。倒装芯片引起了诺伊斯的兴趣，尤其因为它有可能省去存储芯片制造过程中的一个键合步骤。他将实验室的研究重点放在芯片贴装机上，该机器负责拾取芯片、将其放入封装中，并轻轻向下按压芯片以将其贴合到封装上。制造一台在整个过程中不会压碎或损坏芯片的机器并非易事。67
A third group attempted to assemble four small memory chips into a single module that would function as a large-but-cheap memory. This memory was called the “multichip” or sometimes the “flip chip” because it was turned over, front to back, in the assembly process. The flip chip intrigued Noyce, not the least because it offered the possibility of eliminating one bonding step from the process of building memory chips. He focused his lab efforts on the die attacher that picked up the chip, placed it into a package, and slightly pressed down on the chip to attach it to the package. It was not easy to build a machine that did not crush or crack the chip at some point during this process.67
诺伊斯和摩尔制定了三管齐下的策略，其前提是如果一种方法行不通，或许另一种方法会奏效。此外，双极型和MOS工艺可以共享许多技术和设备，这意味着公司在购买设备和制定晶体生长、晶圆切割、洁净度维护等操作规程方面的投入，并不像乍看之下那样分散。如果理想情况下，不止一种工艺都取得了成功，那么每种工艺都针对不同的市场，并与其他工艺协同运作。68
Noyce and Moore developed the three-pronged attack on the assumption that if one approach did not work out, maybe another one would. Moreover, the bipolar and MOS approaches could share many techniques and facilities, which meant that the company’s effort, when it came to buying equipment and developing operating procedures for growing crystals, cutting wafers, maintaining cleanliness, and the like, was not as fractured as might appear on first blush. If, in the best-case scenario, more than one process yielded success, each was targeted to serve a different market and to work in tandem with the other processes.68
诺伊斯在英特尔的第一年待在实验室的时间比他在仙童公司八年加起来都多，但他并没有提出任何能与他之前在集成电路领域的构想相媲美的见解，也没有提出任何如他预期般行之有效的超前建议——尽管他确实有一个想法，即利用烧毁的二极管制造一种存储器件，最终促使泰德·霍夫获得了一项相关的专利。诺伊斯在倒装芯片键合机方面的工作更像是实践课上的任务，而不是物理实验室里的工作。正如他所担心的那样，诺伊斯离开实验室的时间确实太长了，以至于无法做出任何有意义的技术贡献。69
Noyce spent more time in the lab during the first year at Intel than he had in the previous eight years at Fairchild, yet he offered no insights that approached the level of his integrated circuit ideas and no far-out suggestions that worked in the way he anticipated—though he did have one idea, for using blown diodes to make a type of memory device, that eventually led Ted Hoff to a related patent. Noyce’s work on the flip-chip bonder was more a shop-class than physics-lab type of job. As he had feared, Noyce had indeed been gone from the lab too long to make a meaningful technical contribution.69
但他的技术直觉依然非常出色。“他的问题总是那么敏锐，”泰德·霍夫回忆道，“无论你深入研究到什么程度，他总能跟上，甚至超越你。可惜的是，他作为商人如此成功，以至于远离了技术层面。”莱斯·瓦达兹说：“他当时会挑战你。为什么我们不能这样做？为什么我们做不到？那这个呢？……他真的会激励你不断突破自我。如果你在讨论512位内存，诺伊斯会问，为什么不是1K？如果你说这个速度，他会问，为什么不是这个速度？他不断地追问，不断地推进。即使他可能并不了解他所推进领域的具体细节，但他拥有足够的理论基础。”我明白他把你逼到了不得不质疑自己得出结论的依据的地步。我认为这对我们所有人都产生了影响。70
But his technical instincts were still excellent. “His questions were so perceptive,” recalls Ted Hoff. “No matter how deep you went, he was right there, always caught up and then racing ahead. It is kind of a shame he was so successful as a businessman that it kept him away from the technical side.” Says Les Vadasz, “He challenged you at the time. Why can’t we do this? How come we do this? What about this? … He really pushed you to push yourself. If you were talking about a 512-bit memory, [Noyce would ask] why not 1K? If you’d say this speed, he’d say, why not this speed? He just pushed and pushed and pushed. Even though he may not have known the details about the area he was pushing, he had enough conceptual understanding that he pushed you to the point where you had to question your own basis for why you’re coming up with a conclusion. I think that had an impact on all of us.”70
被诺伊斯这样“鞭策”并非全然愉快。这感觉就像被一层层剥开，冷酷而高效地剥离，直到诺伊斯触及他认为问题的核心。被诺伊斯“鞭策”的人离开时，会莫名地感到精神焕发，仿佛摆脱了所有多余的保守思想和传统观念——他现在可以去做诺伊斯让他相信自己能够做到的事情。
To be “pushed” by Noyce in this way was not an altogether pleasant experience. It was a bit like being peeled, coolly and efficiently stripped down, layer by layer, until Noyce reached what he considered the heart of the matter. The person whom Noyce “pushed” would leave the conversation strangely invigorated by a sense that he had sloughed off all superfluous accretions of conservative thinking and conventional wisdom—and that he could now do what Noyce had somehow convinced him it was possible to do.
在观察了威廉·肖克利如何运用简化假设来加速公司的研究后，诺伊斯逐渐意识到，科学家们可以采用两种截然不同的方法开展工作。研究人员可以采用“精细”的方法，投入大量时间和精力开发一种技术或仪器，以便通过精确测量来验证他们的想法，从而得出最终的确定性答案。或者，研究人员也可以尝试“快速而粗糙”的方法，一旦一个相当粗略的测试表明某个想法可能有效，就立即推进研究。诺伊斯认为，快速而粗糙的方法“在10%的时间内就能得到90%的答案”。他鄙视精细的方法，认为这“就像告诉一个足球运动员，除非你已经精心瞄准了完美的射门角度，并且知道该用多大的力气，否则永远不要踢球。等你找到那个机会的时候，90分钟可能都过去了。”71
After observing William Shockley’s methods of using simplifying assumptions to speed up his company’s research, Noyce had come to believe that scientists could approach their work in two very different ways. Researchers could adopt the “pretty” approach, in which they devote a great deal of time and effort to developing a technique or machine that will allow them to test their ideas with exact measurements that yield final definitive answers. Or a researcher could try the “quick and dirty” way, moving forward with an idea as soon as a rather rudimentary test indicates it will probably work. Noyce believed that the quick-and-dirty method generated “90 percent of the answer in 10 percent of the time.” He disdained the pretty method as “a bit like telling a soccer player never to kick the ball until you have an ideal shot all carefully lined up and know exactly how hard to kick the ball. Ninety minutes may be over before you locate that opportunity.”71
这种快速而粗略的研究方法，被摩尔戏称为“诺伊斯最小信息原则”，在英特尔盛行。英特尔和它的创始人一样，总是行色匆匆。即使以英特尔的速度，设计一个新电路也需要五六个人年的时间。摩尔认为，遵循诺伊斯原则还有另一个好处。公司衍生公司很少，“因为它产生的想法不会超过它实际需要的数量。”72
The quick-and-dirty research method, which Moore nicknamed “the Noyce principle of minimum information,” prevailed at Intel, which was, like its founders, forever in a hurry. Even at Intel speed, it took five or six man-years to design a new circuit. And there was another benefit to operating on the Noyce principle, according to Moore. The company produced few spin-offs “because it does not generate a lot more ideas than it can use.”72
安迪·格鲁夫是贯彻诺伊斯“最小信息原则”的理想人选。诺伊斯称他为“鞭子”，曾对一位朋友说，他很高兴格鲁夫加入英特尔的众多原因之一是：“对我来说，做那些棘手的事情很难，但对安迪来说却轻而易举。”一位早期员工回忆说，要想在格鲁夫手下取得成功，最重要的是“要有所作为……不要反思，不要无所事事。[格鲁夫]就像汉尼拔穿越阿尔卑斯山一样，让一切保持运转，不要让大象们屈服。”73
Andy Grove was the ideal man to implement the Noyce principle of minimum information. Noyce, who called him “the whip,” once told a friend that one of the many reasons he was happy to have Grove at Intel was that “it is tough for me to do the hard things, but it’s not tough for Andy.” To succeed with Grove, an early employee recalled, one needed, above all, “to do something…. No soul-searching, no thumb twiddling. [Grove was] keeping it moving, Hannibal through the Alps, keep the elephants moving, don’t let them go down on their knees.”73
格罗夫很快就从实验室主任晋升为运营经理，负责研发和生产的各个方面。他事无巨细地追踪，不信任任何人和事，为了达到目的不惜大声咆哮、破口大骂，把别人逼到忍无可忍的地步，以至于他们也只能无奈地抱怨。他会明确表达自己的观点，并坚持要求员工——通常以书面形式——清楚地说明他们要做什么以及何时完成。而且，格鲁夫总是会跟进确认员工是否履行了承诺。后来，他要求所有在他负责区域内早上8点后到岗的员工签署一份“迟到名单”，这份名单随后会分发给经理和主管。他曾将一项计划称为“自避孕药问世以来最伟大的发明”。这项计划旨在用严格的高温高压测试程序来测试英特尔已完成、即将发货的产品，而大多数公司通常只对首批芯片使用这种程序。74
Grove quickly moved from directing the lab to overseeing all aspects of research and manufacturing as manager of operations. He tracked everything, trusted nothing and no one, yelled and cursed to get his point across, frustrated others to the point that they yelled and cursed to get their points across, and insisted that people state—often in writing—exactly what they were going to do and when. And always, always, Grove followed up to confirm people kept their commitments. In later years, he would require all employees in his area of responsibility who arrived at work after 8 AM to sign a “Late List,” which was then circulated to managers and supervisors. He once called a plan to test Intel’s finished, ready-to-ship product with the rigorous high-temperature, high-voltage procedures that most companies used only for the first batches of chips “the best thing since the Pill.”74
他和诺伊斯简直截然不同。他们迥异的思维方式让格罗夫比诺伊斯更加恼火。格罗夫是个线性思维者，他很难理解诺伊斯的思路，诺伊斯的思路就像“蝴蝶在各种想法间跳跃”。有时，这些想法确实足够有趣，能让格罗夫分心，无法专注于自己设定的工作；但更令人恼火的是，它们还会分散员工的注意力，格罗夫有时会发现，员工们为了追寻诺伊斯那些引人入胜的灵感，而偏离了原本的工作。而诺伊斯本人则对两人在商业理念上的差异并不在意。他认为，公司要想成功，“必须将产品和发展方向的视野保持得非常精准，同时又要对影响业务的市场力量保持非常广阔的视野。”诺伊斯负责提供必要的宏观视野，而格罗夫则负责提供同样必要的精准聚焦。
He could not have been more different from Noyce. Their divergent approaches caused more irritation for Grove than for Noyce. Grove, a linear thinker, found it hard to follow Noyce’s thinking, which reminded him of “a butterfly hopping from thought to thought.” Occasionally these ideas were intriguing enough to distract Grove from the work he had set for himself, but even more maddeningly, they would distract his employees, whom Grove would occasionally find had launched themselves on a tangent to chase down one of Noyce’s more tantalizing mind flashes. For his part, Noyce had little problems with the differences between his and Grove’s approaches to business. Noyce believed that for a company to be successful, it “must keep the vision of product and direction very narrow, while keeping the peripheral vision of market forces affecting the business very broad.” Noyce would provide the necessary wide ranging vision and Grove would provide the equally necessary precision focus.
事实上，在英特尔的早期，格鲁夫和诺伊斯几乎没有交集。诺伊斯经常在办公室外奔波，与媒体、潜在客户、投资者和求职者交流。一位1970年1月入职的高管说：“我好几个月都没跟鲍勃说过话，甚至都没见过他。他总是匆匆忙忙地赶来。”诺伊斯的大多数直接下属很快就找到了可以寻求日常反馈的“代理老板”。一位员工沉思道：“我名义上是向鲍勃汇报的，但实际上我是向安迪和戈登汇报的。”另一位员工解释说：“实际上没有人直接向鲍勃汇报。名义上有些人同时向鲍勃和戈登汇报，但戈登总是在现场，而鲍勃却总是不见踪影。”75
In truth, Grove and Noyce had little to do with each other in the earliest days of Intel. Noyce was outside of the office as much as he was in it, talking to the press, potential customers and investors, and job candidates. One executive hired in January 1970 says, “I don’t think I talked to, or even met, Bob for months. He was always just whipping through.” Most of Noyce’s direct reports soon found surrogate bosses to whom they could turn for daily feedback. “I guess I officially reported to Bob,” mused one such employee, “but I really reported to Andy and Gordon.” Explained another, “Nobody actually reported to Bob. Nominally some people did report to both Bob and Gordon, but Gordon was always on the scene, and Bob was never there.”75
诺伊斯将注意力转向外部，而格鲁夫则专注于英特尔的内部运作，关注日常运营的细枝末节。摩尔则弥合了两人之间的鸿沟，权衡诺伊斯从外部发出的信号与该领域的研究成果以及格鲁夫从内部汇报的信息。一位熟悉这三人的人士这样描述他们的角色：“诺伊斯会说，‘总有一天我们会用半导体来完成[某项惊人的任务]。’然后摩尔会说，‘要做到这一点，我们需要克服Y和Z这两个技术难题。’格鲁夫则会说，‘这意味着我们需要招募更多工程师，并将良率提高X倍。’百分比和植物空间 Y 英尺。他们的优势正好相互平衡。”在许多人看来，他们的角色还可以更简洁地描述为：外在先生（诺伊斯）、内在先生（摩尔）和执行先生（格罗夫）。76
With Noyce turning his attention outward, Grove focused on the inner workings of Intel, the essential minutiae of day-to-day operations. Moore bridged the gap between the two, weighing Noyce’s signals from the outside against research in the field and Grove’s reports from the inside. One person familiar with the trio described their roles this way: “Noyce would say, ‘Some day we will use semiconductors to perform [some outrageous job].’ Then Moore would say, ‘To do that, we would need to transcend technical problems Y and Z.’ And Grove would say, ‘That means we’ll need to get however-many-more engineers and increase yields by X percent and plant space by Y feet.’ Their strengths just balanced each other so well.” Their roles, in many peoples’ opinions, could be described even more succinctly: Mr. Outside (Noyce), Mr. Inside (Moore), and Mr. Implementation (Grove).76
对格鲁夫而言，英特尔的意义与对摩尔或诺伊斯而言截然不同。诺伊斯曾说过，他创办英特尔的部分原因是为了“看看我们能否再次成功；看看（仙童的成功）是否只是运气好”。诺伊斯和摩尔已经在仙童证明了自己的价值。英特尔则代表着格鲁夫再次证明自己的机会。格鲁夫曾说过，他眼睁睁看着仙童研发部门的“杰出成果”在研发和生产之间停滞不前，长达数月之久，“这让我充满了自我怀疑，甚至开始怀疑我们所做的工作是否真的像我想象的那样出色”。在仙童的最后一年，格鲁夫甚至确信西蒙和加芬克尔的热门歌曲《假装》（Faking It）就是写给他的。77
Intel meant something different for Grove than it did for Moore or for Noyce, who once said he started Intel, in part, to see “whether [we] could do it again; whether [Fairchild’s success] was just plain dumb luck the first time around.” Noyce and Moore had already proven their worth at Fairchild. Intel represented Grove’s chance to do the same. Grove has said that the months he spent watching Fairchild R&D’s “outstanding work” languish in the purgatory between development and manufacturing “fill[ed] me with self doubts to the point that I was wondering if the work we were doing was as good as I thought it was.” In his last year at Fairchild, Grove had been convinced that the Simon and Garfunkel hit song “Faking It” was directed at him.77
格鲁夫和市场经理鲍勃·格雷厄姆一直意见不合。格鲁夫认为格雷厄姆只是在尽职尽责——格雷厄姆每天都会去设计师的办公室“查看产品进度”——而且，格鲁夫觉得市场营销“几乎没用”。格鲁夫认为，只要英特尔打造出优秀的产品（这当然是他的职责），客户就不需要太多劝说就会购买。78
Grove and marketing manager Bob Graham were at constant loggerheads. Grove thought Graham was trying to do his job—every day, Graham went down to the room where the designers worked to “check on the progress of the product”—and besides, Grove had “almost no use” for marketing. Grove figured that if Intel built an excellent product (his responsibility, thank you very much) the customers would not need too much convincing to buy it.78
格雷厄姆则认为，格鲁夫几个月前还是一名研究科学家，对生产制造了解不足，不适合负责运营。更令格雷厄姆恼火的是，格鲁夫对他解释客户对英特尔产品的期望置若罔闻。格雷厄姆还觉得，格鲁夫明明“对市场营销不感兴趣”，却花大量时间对格雷厄姆提出的广告和新闻稿措辞吹毛求疵。79
For his part, Graham thought Grove, a research scientist until a few months before, did not know enough about manufacturing to be running operations. It further incensed Graham that Grove paid no attention to his explanations of customers’ expectations for Intel products. Graham also thought that for someone who had “no use” for marketing, Grove spent a great deal of time nitpicking the wording on Graham’s proposed advertisements and press releases.79
然而，格雷厄姆和格鲁夫之间的真正问题远比他们之间那些细致入微的指责要根本得多。这两人中只能有一人成为创始人的二把手。对格雷厄姆和格鲁夫来说，事关重大，他们无法容忍对方在公司长期存在。英特尔成立几个月后，这两位最高领导人之间的敌意就威胁到了整个公司的人际关系。80
The real problem between Graham and Grove was far more fundamental than their fine-pointed accusations, however. Only one of these two men could be the second-in-command to the founders. Too much was at stake for both Graham and Grove for them to tolerate each other’s presence in the company for long. Within months of Intel’s founding, the enmity between these top two lieutenants threatened to poison relationships throughout the company.80
8
起飞
8
Takeoff
诺伊斯在英特尔的头三年是他职业生涯中最激动人心的时光之一。他很享受重拾在仙童公司早期那种身兼数职的“万事通”角色。他经常参加技术评审，主持每周一次的高管会议和每两周一次的产品规划会议，帮助一位技术人员开发她认为可以简化工作的工具，会见有潜力的应聘者，在管道破裂时亲自拖地，并在技术和商业会议上就“大规模集成电路（LSI）的现状”等主题发表演讲。他和摩尔每周都会抽出一个午餐时间与几组员工共进午餐，每月还会抽出一个上午与行业分析师交流。
The first three years that Noyce spent at Intel were among the most exhilarating of his career. He enjoyed his return to the jack-of-all-trades he had been in the early days of Fairchild. He regularly sat in on technical reviews, led the weekly executive staff meeting and a product planning session every two weeks, helped a technician build a tool she thought would make her work easier, met with promising recruits, mopped the floor when a pipe broke, and delivered a number of lectures at technical and business conferences on topics such as “What Happened to LSI?” He and Moore set aside one lunch hour each week to eat with small groups of employees, and a morning every month to talk to industry analysts.
在英特尔成立的最初几个月里，诺伊斯与潜在客户的互动主要围绕着确定市场需求。他与博罗、霍尼韦尔和优尼瓦克的几家公司的高级管理人员进行了交流，这些公司都对用于其计算机的半导体存储器很感兴趣；他还与美莫瑞克斯公司进行了沟通，该公司执行副总裁吉姆·古兹（Jim Guzy）最近加入了英特尔董事会。诺伊斯偶尔会解释英特尔正在研发的产品，并征求改进技术方案的建议。诺伊斯认为，获得反馈的必要性远比客户可能将英特尔的计划泄露给竞争对手的风险更为重要，这完全符合他与生俱来的对人的信任以及他致力于打造真正受消费者欢迎的产品的决心。1
Noyce’s interactions with potential customers in the first months of Intel’s existence revolved around determining market needs. He spoke with senior managers at Burroughs, Honeywell, and Univac, firms interested in semiconductor memories for the computers they were building, and at Memorex, whose executive vice president, Jim Guzy, had recently joined the Intel board. Occasionally Noyce would explain what Intel was trying to build and ask for suggestions for improving their technical plan. That Noyce believed the need for feedback overrode the risk that a customer might share Intel’s plans with competitors is perfectly consistent with his instinctive trust in people and his determination to build products that people would actually buy.1
诺伊斯在家书房里接听的电话络绎不绝，取而代之的是络绎不绝的访客涌向他在山景城的办公室。正如格罗夫回忆的那样，“业内人士，无论跳槽、创业，还是做任何事，都必须先拜见鲍勃，得到他的祝福。除此之外，还有客户、银行家、董事、融资人员……真是热闹非凡。这么多西装革履的人来来往往。诺伊斯成了当天的‘万事通’。”2
The steady stream of phone calls Noyce had fielded from his study at home became a constant rush of visitors to his Mountain View office. As Grove recalls it, “nobody in the industry would move from a job, or start a company, or do much of anything, without paying homage to Bob and getting his blessing. On top of this, there were customers, bankers, directors, people connected with the financing…. It was funny. All these people in suits, coming and going. Noyce was the ‘go-to person’ of the day.”2
就连他的家人也察觉到了他的兴奋。诺伊斯有时会在周末带着孩子们来办公室。他把许可证放在一边他的白色美洲狮新车上贴着“INTEL”的车牌。有一天，全家人一起帮忙切割红宝石胶片，这种红色的、类似玻璃纸的薄片，操作员会把它铺在电路图的纸样上，然后根据纸样进行切割。（切割好的红宝石胶片会被缩小到合适的尺寸，用来制作电路的掩模。）孩子们——现在都已是青少年了——玩得不亦乐乎，挥舞着美工刀，“帮着爸爸”干活。爸爸和贝蒂也在灯箱前忙碌着。晚饭时，诺伊斯经常会谈起英特尔的奋斗历程和辉煌成就，孩子们也觉得自己是公司的一份子。有一次，爸爸告诉佩妮，英特尔的第一块内存芯片测试成功了，佩妮兴奋地冲进邻居家，大喊：“他们做出来了！他们做出来了！”3
Even his family picked up on his excitement. Noyce would at times bring the children with him to the office on weekends. He put license plates that read “INTEL” on his new car, a white Cougar. One memorable day, the entire family helped to cut rubylith, the red cellophane-like sheets that operators laid over a paper design of a circuit and cut according to the paper pattern. (The rubylith would then be shrunk to the proper size and used to make the mask for the circuit.) The children—now young adolescents—enjoyed a fine few hours wielding exacto knives and “helping Da,” who was also hard at work over the light table, along with Betty. At dinner, Noyce would often talk about Intel’s struggles and successes, and the children felt enough a part of the company that Penny burst into a neighbor’s house shouting “They made one, they made one!” after her father told her that Intel’s first memory chip had been successfully tested.3
1969年底，诺伊斯和洛克开始商讨英特尔上市事宜，甚至考虑将股票拆分为四股和七股，以期将股价控制在大多数投资者青睐的20至30美元区间。然而，两人都十分担忧，对于一家年轻的公司而言，上市意味着要承受股东对短期利润的苛求，而英特尔当时正需要投资于长期发展。诺伊斯还有另一个顾虑。他认为，公众对半导体股票的狂热追捧会不切实际地推高公司的市值，从而切断员工工作与公司价值之间的任何清晰联系。“一家价值500万美元的公司，可能会被一些缺乏经验的竞标者在市场上抬价到5000万美元，”他解释道。诺伊斯表示，如果公司的价值不能“与其实际增长相符”，那么“员工的股票期权价值就无法与其业绩挂钩”。换句话说，他担心员工会因为股市泡沫而暴富，从而打击士气。4
TOWARD THE END OF 1969, Noyce and Rock began to talk about taking Intel public, going so far as to split the stock four for seven in an attempt to get the price per share in the $20–$30 range most investors preferred. Both men, however, had significant concerns that taking a young company public would mean subjecting it to stockholders’ demands for short-term profits at a time when Intel needed to invest for long-term growth. Noyce had another worry. He thought that the public’s voracious appetite for semiconductor issues would unrealistically inflate the firm’s market cap, and thereby sever any clear connection between the employees’ work and the value of the company. “A company worth $5 million could be bid up on the market by unsophisticated bidders to $50 million,” he explained. If the value of the company did not “follow the real progress of its growth,” Noyce said, “the value of the employees’ stock options would not correspond to their performance.” In other words, he worried that employees would find it demoralizing to get rich from a stock bubble.4
1969年，洛克和诺伊斯成功安排了第二轮和第三轮私人融资，融资价格与市场利率相当，且避免了上市带来的种种麻烦。诺伊斯与洛克密切合作，寻找并吸引那些足够成熟的投资者，他们能够理解自身承担的风险以及耐心等待的重要性。他奔波于各大银行、金融家、希望增持股份的现有投资者以及新投资者之间，其中大多数都是诺伊斯、洛克或摩尔的私人关系人。第二轮和第三轮融资为英特尔带来了220万美元的额外资金。5
Rock and Noyce managed to arrange a second round of private financing in 1969, and then a third in 1970, at prices that rivaled market rates without introducing the hassles of public ownership. Noyce worked closely with Rock to identify and entice investors sophisticated enough to understand the risks they were taking and the need for patience. He attended meeting after meeting with banks, financiers, current investors wanting to increase their participation, and new investors, most of them again personal acquaintances of Noyce, Rock, or Moore. These second and third rounds of funding brought another $2.2 million into Intel.5
这笔资金也增强了诺伊斯对公司未来的信心。1969年通过飞行员考试后不久，他就买了一架属于自己的飞机——一架单引擎的飞马飞机。他对飞行的态度异常认真谨慎，每次进入驾驶舱前都会仔细检查飞机，而且起飞前至少24小时滴酒不沾。在空中，他也出奇地小心。“这真是一个有趣的转变，”戈登·摩尔回忆道。“和诺伊斯一起开车就像把命交到手里一样——他开车根本不专心。但坐他的飞机：哎，他可就完全是公事公办了。”6
The funding also boosted Noyce’s confidence in the company’s future. He bought his own plane, a single-engine Pegasus, shortly after passing his pilot’s exam in 1969. He approached flying with an uncharacteristic seriousness and deliberation, always thoroughly examining the plane before climbing in the cockpit and not touching alcohol for at least 24 hours before he was scheduled to take off. In the air, too, he was surprisingly careful. “It was an interesting transformation,” recalls Gordon Moore. “Driving with [Noyce] in a car was like taking my life in my hands—he didn’t pay much attention to his driving. But flying in his airplane: boy, he was nothing but business.”6
到那时，鲍勃·诺伊斯几乎已不见踪影。当年，他因为害怕失败而拒绝了仙童半导体总经理的职位。离开仙童时，诺伊斯还对自己不擅长细节管理略感歉意；而英特尔成立两年后，他却近乎桀骜不驯。“我并不热衷于看到事物以最高效率和最大程度的控制运转，”他说，“控制意味着工厂员工或管理层（就此而言）会失去个人自由。一旦你设定了投资回报率或税前利润的基本规则，你就突然失去了一些原本可以做出的选择……我想说的是，对我来说，管理中的风险承担部分，而不是控制部分，更有乐趣。” 他略带讽刺地补充道：“这种‘不成熟’的管理方式比那些试图进入半导体行业的成熟管理方式要成功得多。”7
By this time, almost no trace remained of the Bob Noyce who had turned down a general manager’s job at Fairchild because he feared he might fail. Where Noyce had been almost apologetic about not being a particularly good details manager when he left Fairchild, by the time Intel was two years old, he was nearly defiant. “I don’t get my kicks out of seeing things run at the highest level of efficiency with the greatest degree of control,” he said. “Control immediately means a loss of personal freedom for either the people in the factory or, as far as that goes, for the management. Once you’ve set down the ground rules for return on investment or earnings before taxes, you’re suddenly cut off from some of the choices you could have made…. I guess what I’m saying is that the venture part of management[,] rather than the control part of management[,] is more fun for me.” He added a bit pointedly: “This ‘immature’ management has been much more successful than the mature management that tried to get into the [semiconductor] business.”7
英特尔于1969年5月推出了其首款产品——64位随机存取存储器（RAM）。这款双极型器件由博恩领导的团队研发，其开发过程远比英特尔预想的要容易得多。然而，竞争对手也很容易制造出类似的存储器，这意味着德州仪器和仙童半导体几乎与英特尔同时推出了各自的64位存储器。因此，1969年，这款双极型RAM为英特尔带来的收入微乎其微，正如有人所说的“涓涓细流”。8
INTEL INTRODUCED ITS FIRST PRODUCT, a 64-bit random access memory (RAM) in May 1969. This was the bipolar device from the group run by Bohn, and its development had proven far easier than Intel could have imagined. The memory was also easy for competitors to build, however, which meant that Texas Instruments and Fairchild introduced their own 64-bit memories at nearly the same time as Intel. As a result, the bipolar RAM generated little more than what one person called a “revenue trickle” for Intel in 1969.8
另一方面，多芯片存储器项目也面临着同样的困境。英特尔在制造单个存储芯片方面没有遇到任何问题，但却无法将它们可靠地连接到陶瓷基座上。此外，良率极低，功耗很高，英特尔也找不到有效的测试方法，而且很难想象如何才能将封装尺寸缩小到足以吸引客户的程度。当戈登·摩尔试图通过跌落测试一款接近完成的器件的抗震性能时，几乎所有芯片都从陶瓷基座上脱落，散落在地上。9
At the other end of the spectrum was the multichip memory effort. Intel had no problem building the individual memory chips but could not reliably attach them to their ceramic base. Moreover, yields were terrible, power dissipation was high, Intel could not determine how to test the devices efficiently, and it was difficult to imagine ever shrinking the package enough to make it appealing to customers. When Gordon Moore tried to test an almost-finished device for shock resistance by dropping it, nearly every chip popped off the ceramic base and clattered across the ground.9
显然，MOS器件的成败将决定公司的命运。如果说三管齐下的策略正如戈登·摩尔所说，就像“金发姑娘的故事”一样——多芯片存储器制造难度过高，而双极存储器又过于简单，几乎人人都能做到——那么MOS器件就必须证明自己“恰到好处”：既要便于英特尔制造，又要难于其他厂商。
Clearly the MOS device would make or break the company. If the three-pronged effort was, as Gordon Moore liked to put it, “like Goldilocks,” with the multichip memory too hard to build and the bipolar memory so easy that anyone could do it, the MOS device needed to prove itself “just right”—easy for Intel to build and hard for everyone else.
这绝非易事。瓦达兹和格罗夫当时正试图制造采用硅栅极而非金属栅极的MOS晶体管。在仙童半导体公司，格罗夫和瓦达兹曾是研究团队的成员，该团队负责跟进……贝尔实验室一项引人入胜的研究表明，硅栅极或许能够降低MOS器件的污染风险并提高良率。就在Grove和Vadasz离开仙童半导体公司，并试图为英特尔开发硅栅极MOS器件时，他们的这项研究正在进行中。
It certainly was not easy to build. Vadasz and Grove were trying to make MOS transistors that would have silicon, rather than metal, gates. At Fairchild, Grove and Vadasz had been members of a research team following up on intriguing Bell Labs research that indicated that silicon gates might reduce the risk of contamination and improve the yields in MOS devices. The Fairchild research was underway when Grove and Vadasz left the company and resurfaced trying to build silicon-gate MOS devices for Intel.
1969年3月，仙童公司要求诺伊斯与公司总法律顾问会面，进行一次非正式的取证，以确定仙童公司是否有理由就硅栅极工艺相关的商业秘密侵犯或恶意挖角起诉英特尔。尽管这次取证是非正式且友好的——仙童公司的两位律师都是诺伊斯家族的社交好友，其中一位后来还加入了英特尔——但事关重大。在仙童公司，莱斯·霍根希望阻止未来出现分拆，而起诉像英特尔这样声名显赫的初创公司，既能证明他的决心，也能拖慢这家公司的发展速度。尽管英特尔目前还构不成威胁，但未来可能会成为威胁。诺伊斯则坚称，英特尔的硅栅极技术并非窃取知识产权，而是对“其他地方的研究人员讨论过但从未真正投入生产”的研究成果进行的“渐进式改进”。10
In March 1969, Fairchild requested that Noyce meet with the company’s general counsel for an informal deposition to determine whether or not Fairchild had grounds to sue Intel for violations of trade secrets related to the silicon gate process, or for corporate raiding. Although the deposition was informal and friendly—both of the Fairchild attorneys were social friends of the Noyces, and one later came to work for Intel—the stakes were high. At Fairchild, Les Hogan wanted to discourage future spinouts, and suing a startup as prominent as Intel would both prove he was serious and could also slow down a company that, while no threat at the present, might become one later. For his part, Noyce insisted that Intel’s silicon gate work represented not stolen intellectual property, but “evolutionary improvements” on efforts “discussed by researchers in other locations, but … never really brought into production.”10
仙童公司从未对英特尔提起诉讼。知识产权诉讼很难取证，因为仙童的研究并未超出贝尔实验室发现的验证范围，而且仙童的实验记录本、工艺手册和掩模等资料也并无遗漏。此外，除了仙童和英特尔之外，其他几家公司的研究人员也在进行硅栅极的研究。提起挖角诉讼对仙童来说更是难上加难。过去一年，该公司从摩托罗拉挖走了60多名专门负责霍根项目的员工，这意味着如果摩托罗拉提起挖角诉讼，仙童本身就是被告。仙童的律师很难解释他们为何有资格指控另一家公司在这方面存在可疑行为。
Fairchild never filed a suit against Intel. An intellectual property case would have been hard to prove, since Fairchild research had not gone much beyond confirming the Bell Labs findings, and since no lab books, process manuals, or masks were missing from Fairchild. Moreover, researchers at several companies other than Fairchild and Intel were also pursuing silicon gate research. A raiding suit offered even less hope for success for Fairchild. The company had hired more than 60 Motorola employees devoted to Hogan in the past year, which meant Fairchild was itself the defendant in a raiding suit brought by Motorola. The Fairchild attorneys would have been hard pressed to explain why they were in any position to charge another firm with questionable practices on this front.
此外，费尔柴尔德公司的律师罗杰·博罗沃伊（Roger Borovoy）叹了口气解释说，他原本以为他们或许有胜算，但他和费尔柴尔德公司的其他人都不愿意起诉诺伊斯：“我们当时就想，‘管它呢。’谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德（Sherman Fairchild）当时还在公司里，他不可能起诉鲍勃·诺伊斯……谢尔曼的一切成就都来自鲍勃·诺伊斯。是鲍勃·诺伊斯一手缔造了费尔柴尔德。所以，何必再浪费时间在这种（诉讼）的事情上了呢？”11
Moreover, as Fairchild counsel Roger Borovoy, who thought they might have had a case, explains with a sigh, neither he nor anyone else at Fairchild relished the prospect of suing Noyce: “We just said, ‘The hell with it.’ There was no way Sherman Fairchild, who was still active, would sue Bob Noyce…. All the up Sherman ever had was from Bob Noyce. Bob Noyce made Fairchild. So why screw around with this [talk of a suit] any more?”11
格罗夫、瓦达兹和英特尔实验室的MOS团队觉得他们可能从仙童半导体的硅栅极研究中获益匪浅的想法简直荒谬可笑。想想实验室研究和实际生产之间的区别。仙童半导体的研究从未走出实验室。仙童半导体的生产线上没有生产过采用硅栅极的晶体管，更不用说集成电路了。加入英特尔的MOS团队确实将他们关于硅栅极的所有知识都归功于在仙童半导体的经历，但他们花了整整一年时间才将这种理论知识转化为实际应用。在硅片领域。英特尔1968年11月的一份进度报告称，该工艺“停滞不前，步履蹒跚”。一位员工回忆道：“这有点像剥洋葱。每次我们解决了一个问题，就会发现另一个问题。我担心最后一层会一无所获。就我们所知，硅栅极工艺可能根本行不通。” 大约在同一时期，格鲁夫在谈到MOS工艺时写道：“结果：今天一切顺利，明天就停滞不前。”12
Grove, Vadasz, and the MOS team in the Intel lab found the notion that they might be significantly benefiting from Fairchild’s silicon gate research laughable. Recall the difference between lab work and production. Fairchild’s work had never left the lab. There were no transistors rolling off the lines with silicon gates at Fairchild and certainly no integrated circuits. The MOS team that went to Intel did indeed owe all their knowledge about silicon gates to their experiences at Fairchild, but it took them a year to translate this familiarity with a theory into a reality etched in silicon. An Intel progress report from November 1968, claims that the process is “off and limping.” Recalls one employee, “It was a little bit like peeling an onion. Every time we would fix a problem, we’d uncover another one. I was afraid the last layer was going to be nothing. For all we knew, the silicon gate process was no good.” About this same time, Grove wrote of the MOS effort: “Results: one day ho, the next day hum.”12
1969年3月，就在诺伊斯作证几天后，英特尔生产出了第一个可用的硅栅MOS存储器。MOS团队把公司全体员工叫到餐厅，一起享用了几瓶香槟。然而，诺伊斯并没有参加庆祝活动。他当时正在阿斯彭的一家医院里，滑雪时摔断了腿，腿骨五处骨折。当摩尔打电话告诉他MOS电路成功时，诺伊斯称之为“我听过的最好的消息”，并立刻因为自己没能在英特尔见证这一里程碑时刻而感到深深的愧疚。13
Intel produced its first working silicon-gate MOS memory in March 1969, just days after Noyce’s deposition. The MOS team called the company into the cafeteria to share several bottles of champagne. Noyce, however, did not attend the celebration. He was in a hospital in Aspen, where he had broken his leg in five places when he fell while skiing. When Moore called to tell him about the working MOS circuit, Noyce called it “the best news that I’ve ever gotten” and was immediately swamped with guilt for not having been at Intel when the milestone was met.13
诺伊斯始终坚持认为，任何关于半导体产品的成功思考的“起源”都“不应该是‘我们有了这个产品，该怎么处理掉它？’，而是‘这是一个至关重要的产品’。” 诺伊斯更感兴趣的是技术本身，而不是对这项技术的需求。他这样解释这种区别：“公司必须走出去，找到客户想要什么。需求在哪里？机会在哪里？……需求不是五十万个1/4英寸的钻头，而是有一千万个1/4英寸的孔需要钻。” 即使客户认为自己需要的是钻头，在诺伊斯看来，英特尔的职责是认识到真正的需求是钻孔，然后找到最佳的钻孔方法。14
NOYCE ALWAYS MAINTAINED that the “genesis” for any successful thinking about semiconductor products “must not be ‘we have this product, how do we get rid of it?’ but ‘this is a critical product.’” The technology itself interested Noyce less than the need for the technology, a distinction that he explained thus: “A company must go out and find what the customer wants. Where is the need? Where is the opening? … The need is not for, say, half a million ¼-inch drill bits. The need is that there are ten million ¼-inch holes that need to be drilled.” Even if a customer thinks he needs a drill bit, it was Intel’s job, in Noyce’s estimation, to recognize that the real need was to make a hole, and then to find the best way to make it.14
英特尔秉持这一理念最著名的例子莫过于该公司在1969年至1970年间研发的微处理器——即所谓的“芯片上的计算机”。关于微处理器的传说数不胜数，而真相却难以考证，因为几乎所有原始文档——图纸、进度报告、合同、英特尔内部人员之间或英特尔与使用该微处理器的公司之间的通信记录——都已遗失。换句话说，任何相关记载都很大程度上依赖于参与者的记忆。15
The most storied example of Intel’s commitment to this approach is the company’s development of the microprocessor—the so-called computer on a chip—in 1969 and 1970. The legends surrounding the microprocessor are many, and the reality is especially hard to pinpoint because almost none of the original documentation—drawings, progress reports, contracts, communications among people at Intel or between Intel and the companies that used the microprocessor—survives. In other words, any account depends a great deal on the memories of the participants.15
依赖人类记忆，尤其是对超过35年前事件的记忆，始终存在风险。在这种情况下，风险尤其高，因为事关重大。微处理器是20世纪最重要的发明之一。地球上每一台计算机和每一件“智能电子产品”都依赖于微处理器技术，许多并不被认为特别智能的东西，例如内燃机和汽车刹车，也同样如此。微处理器是一个价值数十亿美元的产业。这些设备也使英特尔成为全球领先的半导体公司，因此，在公司内部获得微处理器方面的认可，无疑是一项极具吸引力的荣誉。
A dependence on human recall, particularly of events more than 35 years old, is always risky. It is particularly so in this case because the stakes are so high. The microprocessor is one of the most important inventions of the twentieth century. Every computer and piece of “smart electronics” on the planet depends on microprocessor technology, as do many things not considered particularly intelligent, such as internal combustion engines and automobile brakes. Microprocessors are a multi-billion-dollar industry. The devices have also made Intel the world’s dominant semiconductor company, which makes receiving credit for it within the company a particularly appealing prize.
高风险和缺乏原创信息相结合，导致了一个并不出人意料的结果，那就是，就像每个上了年纪的人似乎都记得在 1960 年总统选举中投票给肯尼迪一样，尽管尼克松几乎赢得了那场选举，几乎所有参与英特尔微处理器研发工作的人都记得自己在开发和推广该设备方面发挥了关键作用，尽管该公司曾放弃研发数月，认为它无关紧要，将权利转让给了其他人，然后在重新获得这些权利后，几乎完全没有将微处理器推向市场。
The combination of high stakes and little original information has led to a not-unexpected result, namely that in the same way that everyone of a certain age seems to recall voting for Kennedy in the 1960 presidential election even though Nixon almost won that contest, nearly everyone involved with Intel’s work on the microprocessor remembers himself as playing a crucial role in developing and promoting the device, even though the company abandoned its development for several months, considered it unimportant enough to assign the rights to someone else, and then, after securing these rights back to Intel, almost did not market the microprocessor at all.
当然，还有几十位从未在英特尔工作过的人，他们也完全有资格对微处理器的发明提出异议。曾负责英特尔微处理器市场营销的比尔·戴维多夫（Bill Davidow）本人也对微处理器有着独到的技术见解，他曾半开玩笑地说，微处理器的发明者多达500人。在英特尔着手研发微处理器的同时，仙童半导体（Fairchild）、IBM、Signetics、Four-Phase和RCA等公司也在研发类似微处理器的设备。英特尔于1973年申请了第一项专利，但一家名为Microcomputer的小公司早在1970年就申请了一项通用逻辑器件的专利，而德州仪器（Texas Instruments）则在1971年申请了一项类似微处理器的器件的专利。16
And then, of course, there are dozens of people who never worked at Intel who can make legitimate claims on the invention of the microprocessor. Bill Davidow, who oversaw microprocessor marketing at Intel and who himself had some strong technical ideas on the subject, has said, only partly in jest, that there are 500 inventors of the microprocessor. Fairchild, IBM, Signetics, Four-Phase, and RCA were also working on microprocessor-like devices at the same time Intel was tackling the project. Intel filed for its first patent in 1973, but a small company called Microcomputer had filed for a patent on a general logic device in 1970, and Texas Instruments applied for a patent on a microprocessor-like device in 1971.16
就像诺伊斯和基尔比分别独立展示集成电路之前，互连元件的概念就已经“酝酿”多年一样，通用逻辑器件的概念也同样“酝酿”多年，直到英特尔的工程师们开始着手研发后来被称为微处理器的器件。“微处理器的情况很特殊，”戈登·摩尔解释道，“从技术意义上讲，它并没有真正的发明。它的突破在于人们终于意识到，我们终于可以实现大家一直以来所说的总有一天能够实现的事情了。”17
In the same way that ideas about interconnecting components were “in the air” for years before Noyce and Kilby independently demonstrated their integrated circuits, so too were ideas about a general-purpose logic device “in the air” for years before anyone at Intel began working on what would come to be called microprocessors. “This is a funny deal with the microprocessor,” explains Gordon Moore. “There was no real invention [in a technical sense]. The breakthrough was a recognition that it was finally possible to do what everyone had been saying we would some day be able to do.”17
在这一切混乱和不确定性之中，一个事实却出人意料地清晰地浮现出来——鲍勃·诺伊斯对英特尔微处理器的研发和成功至关重要。他鼓励微处理器的研发；他积极游说公司推出微处理器；他预见了微处理器未来的重要性；他不知疲倦地在公司内部和客户面前推广微处理器。运营经理格鲁夫、主要发明人霍夫和董事会主席罗克都曾以不同的方式表示：“如果没有鲍勃，英特尔就不会研发出微处理器。”18
In the midst of all this confusion and uncertainty, one fact emerges with surprising clarity—Bob Noyce was absolutely essential to the microprocessor’s development and success at Intel. He encouraged its development; he lobbied for its introduction; he dreamed of its future importance; he promoted it tirelessly within the company and to customers. The operations manager (Grove), the key inventor (Hoff), and the board chair (Rock), have each independently said, in one way or another that “the microprocessor would not have happened at Intel if it had not been for Bob.”18
英特尔的微处理器故事始于1969年春季，大约在摩尔致电身在阿斯彭的诺伊斯，告知他MOS团队已经研制出可用的硅栅存储器前后。一家名为Busicom的日本计算器公司的经理联系了鲍勃·格雷厄姆或诺伊斯，询问该公司是否正在计划开发一系列高性能计算器。英特尔曾拥有一家为客户定制芯片的小公司，如今它希望能够生产用于计算器的芯片组。当时，世界各地的计算器公司都在寻找半导体公司为其产品代工芯片，诺伊斯表示，英特尔几乎是唯一一家尚未与计算器公司达成合作协议的制造商。对于年轻且名不见经传的英特尔，以及比它早成立十年但尚未站稳脚跟的Busicom公司来说，合作是顺理成章的选择。19
INTEL’S MICROPROCESSOR STORY opens in the spring of 1969, around the time that Moore called Noyce in Aspen to tell him that the MOS team had a working silicon-gate memory. A manager from a Japanese calculator company called Busicom, which was planning to build a family of high-performance calculators, contacted either Bob Graham or Noyce to ask if Intel, which had a small business building custom chips designed by customers, would like to manufacture the chip set that would run the calculator. Calculator companies around the world were seeking out semiconductor companies to build the chips for their machines, and Noyce said that Intel was nearly the only manufacturer left who had not already agreed to work with a calculator company. It made sense for Intel, young and unknown, and Busicom, ten years older but still not well established, to work together.19
日本电子巨头夏普公司的高级经理佐佐木正解释说，促成英特尔和Busicom公司合作的并非偶然，而是他本人。佐佐木表示，他一直对仙童公司和鲍勃·诺伊斯心怀感激，因为仙童公司发表的平面集成电路研究成果对他的职业成功起到了至关重要的作用。此外，他的一位研究员在1968年提出的一个想法也深深吸引了他——那就是未来有一天，或许可以在单个芯片上构建一个完整的计算器。佐佐木说，1968年底，诺伊斯和格雷厄姆曾来拜访他，试图为英特尔争取业务，但夏普公司当时已有的合同使得他们无法向英特尔下达哪怕是小额订单。佐佐木说，为了帮助诺伊斯，他安排了一次晚宴，出席者包括他本人、诺伊斯、格雷厄姆以及Busicom公司总裁小岛义雄（小岛义雄是佐佐木的大学同学）。佐佐木还向 Busicom 输送了大约 4000 万日元，条件是这笔钱必须用于与英特尔签订的合同，用于制造芯片计算器。20
Tadashi Sasaki, a senior manager with Japanese electronics giant Sharp, explains that it was he, not serendipity, that brought Intel and Busicom together. Sasaki says he had long felt great gratitude to Fairchild and Bob Noyce because the planar and integrated circuit research published by Fairchild had contributed to Sasaki’s own professional success. Sasaki had also been intrigued by an idea one of his researchers had proposed in 1968—that it would one day be possible to build an entire calculator on a single chip. Sasaki says that Noyce and Graham visited him at the end of 1968 trying to drum up business for Intel, but that Sharp’s existing contracts made it impossible to give even a small order to Intel. Sasaki says he then tried to help Noyce by arranging a dinner that included Sasaki, Noyce, Graham, and Yoshio Kojima, president of Busicom and a university classmate of Sasaki’s. Sasaki also funneled roughly 40 million yen to Busicom, with the stipulation that it be used in a contract to Intel to build a calculator on a chip.20
诺伊斯的日记中没有记录他与佐佐木或夏普的会面，但他很可能在那个时期去过日本。英特尔于1969年在日本设立了销售办事处，而诺伊斯在日本的声望使他成为促成此事的最佳人选。几位曾与诺伊斯一同前往日本的人都提到，他在日本备受推崇。罗杰·博罗沃伊形容诺伊斯在日本人眼中如同“神明”。英特尔第二任市场营销副总裁埃德·格尔巴赫回忆说，他当时对诺伊斯在日本新兴电子行业的影响力感到“敬畏”。“（日本高管）会走过来对他说，‘我们之所以把这个（英特尔芯片）设计到我们的产品中，完全是因为您，诺伊斯博士。’在日本，（诺伊斯）凭借一己之力，对英特尔芯片的引入产生了最为深远的影响。”因此，我们没有理由怀疑佐佐木对诺伊斯的评价。他鼓励Busicom公司联系英特尔的做法也合情合理。 “Busicom 就像凭空出现的一样，”摩尔回忆道。21
Noyce’s datebooks do not note any meeting with Sasaki or Sharp, but it seems likely that he did travel to Japan around this time. Intel established a sales office in the country in 1969, and Noyce’s prestige among the Japanese made him the logical person to have facilitated the process. Several people who traveled with Noyce to Japan have commented on how greatly he was admired there. Roger Borovoy described Noyce as “a god” to the Japanese. Ed Gelbach, Intel’s second marketing vice president, recalls being “in awe” of Noyce’s influence in the young Japanese electronics industry. “[Japanese executives] would come up to him and say, ‘we designed this [Intel chip into our product] just because of you, Dr. Noyce.’ In Japan, [Noyce] had single handedly the most significant impact on getting Intel parts designed in.” There is thus no reason to doubt Sasaki’s feelings about Noyce. His encouraging Busicom to contact Intel also seems plausible. “Busicom kind of appeared out of the blue,” Moore recalls.21
然而，可以肯定的是，Busicom公司并没有要求英特尔在单个芯片上制造计算器。事实上，标准计算器通常使用大约六个芯片，每个芯片包含600到1000个晶体管，而Busicom公司当时正在设计一款特别复杂的计算器，因此他们需要一套包含十二个专用芯片的组件，每个芯片包含3000到5000个晶体管。Busicom公司计划派遣一个工程师团队前往英特尔公司现场设计这些芯片，并支付英特尔10万美元用于制造其计算器芯片组。Busicom公司预计总共需要向英特尔支付约每生产一套，英特尔支付50美元，并承诺至少购买6万套。英特尔同意了这项协议。22
It is certain, however, that Busicom did not request that Intel build a calculator on a single chip. In fact, where the standard calculator used about six chips, each with 600–1000 transistors, Busicom, which was designing a particularly complex calculator, wanted a set of a dozen specialized chips with 3,000 to 5,000 transistors each. Busicom planned to send a team of engineers to Intel to design the chips on-site and would pay Intel $100,000 to manufacture its calculator chip sets. Busicom expected to pay Intel about $50 for each set manufactured and promised to buy at least 60,000 of them. Intel agreed to this arrangement.22
六月底，三位Busicom工程师抵达加州，到了七月初，他们就成了英特尔大楼的常客。诺伊斯邀请英特尔的计算机专家泰德·霍夫担任Busicom团队的官方联络人。包括诺伊斯在内，谁也没想到Busicom项目会需要霍夫投入太多精力。他们的想法很简单，就是让Busicom团队有个可以随时咨询或寻求帮助的联络人。
Three Busicom engineers arrived in California towards the end of June, and by the first week of July, they were a fixture in the Intel building. Noyce asked Ted Hoff, Intel’s resident computer expert, to serve as the official liaison to the Busicom team. No one, including Noyce, expected that the Busicom project would require much attention from Hoff. The idea was simply for the Busicom team to have someone specific to whom they could turn with questions or requests for assistance.
“我原本没有参与这个项目的设计工作，但很快我就插手了一些不该管的事情，”霍夫回忆道。“通常情况下你不会这么做，但英特尔当时是一家初创公司，我们很多人都对它的财务成功寄予厚望，所以我不想让大量的精力白费在一件灾难性的事情上。”23
“I had no design responsibilities for the project, but soon I was sticking my nose where it didn’t belong,” recalls Hoff. “Normally you wouldn’t do that, but [Intel] was a start-up company, and a lot of us had hopes for its financial success, so I didn’t want to let major effort go into something disastrous.”23
霍夫很快就“震惊于事情的复杂程度”，他确信以商定的价格制造芯片是不可能的。而且他越想越觉得，自己知道一种更好的方法来制造布西康公司想要的计算器。24
In short order, Hoff, “kind of shocked at how complex this was,” became convinced that it would be impossible to build the chips at the agreed-upon price. And the more he thought about it, the more strongly he believed that he knew a better way to build the calculator Busicom wanted.24
Busicom公司当时需要一批逻辑芯片——这些芯片负责处理数据而非仅仅存储数据——每颗芯片只能执行一项特定的功能：一颗芯片执行计算，另一颗控制打印，第三颗负责显示，以此类推。霍夫认为，与其使用专用的逻辑芯片，英特尔可以制造一种通用的单一逻辑芯片，实际上它就是一台简易的计算机，被编程为像计算器一样运行。关键在于简化这种芯片（后来被称为微处理器）的指令集，尽可能多地将指令卸载到存储芯片上——而存储芯片，当然，正是英特尔的专长所在。25
Busicom was requesting a number of logic chips—the chips that manipulate data rather than just storing it—each of which could do precisely one thing: one chip performed calculations, another controlled the printing, a third handled the display, and so on. Hoff thought that instead of using specialized logic chips, Intel could build a single, general-purpose logic chip that in effect would be a rudimentary computer programmed to act like a calculator. The secret would be to simplify the instruction set for this chip, which came to be called a microprocessor, by offloading as many of the instructions as possible to a memory chip—and memory chips, of course, were Intel’s specialty.25
霍夫认为他的想法无可辩驳地正确。但当他试图让Busicom团队接受他的观点时，他们却毫无兴趣。“细节做得不够好，”Busicom团队成员岛正俊回忆道。岛指出该方案“缺乏系统概念、缺乏十进制运算、缺乏键盘界面、缺乏实时控制等等”。26
To Hoff his ideas seemed irrefutably right. But when he tried to convert the Busicom team to his vision, they showed no interest. “The detail was not so good,” recalled Masatoshi Shima, a member of the Busicom team. Shima cited the plan’s “lack of system concept, lack of decimal operations, lack of interface to the keyboard, lack of real-time control, and so on.”26
霍夫感到沮丧，于是去找诺伊斯。“我觉得我们可以想办法简化一下，”霍夫说，“我知道这能做到。我们可以让它模拟一台计算机。”霍夫勾勒出他的想法，只需要一个微处理器和三个其他芯片（两个存储器和一个移位寄存器）。诺伊斯从未声称自己懂计算机，但他却不断地追问霍夫，一个接一个地问问题，所有问题都如此基础，以至于诺伊斯几乎要为自己的无知而道歉了。“嗯，你能告诉我计算机操作系统有哪些功能吗？”制造一台像计算器一样工作的计算机究竟意味着什么？芯片究竟需要做什么？这就像苏格拉底式的提问一样。正如瓦达什所说，这是一种强迫人们“通过辩论让自己明白一些明智的事情”的方法，这种方法在实验室里非常有效。27
Frustrated, Hoff went to Noyce. “I think we can do something to simplify this,” Hoff said. “I know this can be done. It can be made to emulate a computer.” Hoff sketched out his thoughts, which would have required only one microprocessor and three other chips (two memories and a shift register). Noyce, who never would have claimed to know anything about computers, kept pushing Hoff, asking question after question, all of them so basic that Noyce was almost apologizing for his lack of knowledge. “Um, can you tell me the functions of a computer operating system?” What did it mean, precisely, to build a computer that acted like a calculator? What was it, exactly, that the chip would need to do? It was the same Socratic method of forcing people to “argue ourselves into some smart things,” as Vadasz put it, that had worked so well in the lab.27
谈话结束时，诺伊斯对霍夫说：“你为什么不继续推进这些想法呢？有个备选方案总是好的。”28
At the end of the conversation, Noyce told Hoff, “Why don’t you go ahead and pursue those ideas? It’s always nice to have a backup position.”28
诺伊斯看似随意的一句话，就指示了一位并非正式向他汇报的人（霍夫说他“其实倾向于向诺伊斯汇报”）去做一件超出其职责范围的事情——事实上，这件事与客户代表的意愿背道而驰——而当时公司尚未盈利，其核心技术人员也根本无暇顾及其他。诺伊斯这么做仅仅是因为他觉得霍夫的想法很有意思。这是对诺伊斯指示霍夫放手一搏的一种解读。如果换作安迪·格鲁夫，他当时也会这么想。
With this single seemingly casual remark, Noyce directed someone who did not officially report to him (Hoff says he nonetheless “tended to report to Noyce”) to do something that was not in his job description—something that ran counter, in fact, to what the customer’s representatives wanted—at a time when the company had yet to generate revenue and when its key technical employees could ill-afford distractions. And Noyce did this simply because he thought Hoff’s ideas were intriguing. That is one take on Noyce’s telling Hoff to go ahead. It would have been Andy Grove’s take at the time.
第二种解释是这样的：诺伊斯之所以鼓励霍夫坚持自己的想法，正是因为霍夫对公司至关重要。在肖克利公司，诺伊斯亲眼目睹了老板的漠不关心如何阻碍他自己的工作，使公司错失重要创意，并摧毁了年轻研究人员对公司的忠诚度。他不想让霍夫也经历同样的命运。
A second interpretation would look like this: Noyce told Hoff to pursue his ideas precisely because Hoff was so important to the company. At Shockley, Noyce had seen how a boss’s lack of interest stunted Noyce’s own work, cut the company off from important ideas, and devastated his young researchers’ commitment to the firm. He was not going to risk doing the same thing to Hoff.
第一种解释当然有其道理。即使是诺伊斯本人在1969年也会承认，Busicom芯片的研发工作与英特尔制造半导体存储器的主营业务是完全无关的。而当时英特尔的半导体存储器业务发展并不顺利。摩尔兴奋地打电话给诺伊斯，当时诺伊斯正在阿斯彭的病床上休息，这未免有些操之过急。此后几个月，硅栅MOS存储器的良率徘徊在每片晶圆两颗左右，不到公司预期成功所需良率的10%。每当哪怕只有一颗合格的存储器下线，硅栅MOS团队都会通过公司内部广播系统宣布。MOS芯片经历了近20次设计变更。工程师和设计师们更换了瓶装水的品牌，调整了酸洗液的配方，甚至对一家名为Mostek的竞争对手公司（该公司是从德州仪器分拆出来的）的芯片进行了逆向工程。他们还在蒸发器上挂了一只橡胶鸡，希望它能带来好运。29
The first interpretation certainly has merit. Even Noyce would have admitted in 1969 that work on the Busicom chip was orthogonal to Intel’s primary business of building semiconductor memories. And that business was not going particularly well. The excited call Moore placed to Noyce’s Aspen hospital bed was a bit premature. For several months afterwards, yields on the silicon-gate MOS memory hovered around two working chips per wafer, less than 10 percent of what the company thought it needed to be successful. Every time even a single good memory came off the line, the silicon-gate MOS team announced it over the company intercom. The MOS chip underwent nearly 20 design changes. The engineers and designers altered the brand of bottled water they used. They varied the acid dips. They reverse engineered a competing chip from a company called Mostek, which had spun out of Texas Instruments. They hung a rubber chicken over an evaporator to serve as a good-luck talisman.29
1969 年末，突破性进展出现了，当时有人再次更改了酸洗液的配方。突然间，每片晶圆的良率从两片跃升至 25 片。负责分拣良品和次品的员工惊呼：“我的天哪，看看发生了什么！”人们纷纷从办公室涌出，敦促 MOS 团队测试另一片晶圆，然后又测试另一片。当确定关键在于酸洗液的配方时，一位员工回忆道：“莱斯·瓦达斯兴奋极了，他跳上跳下，用他那浓重的匈牙利口音大喊：‘每片晶圆多出 25 片！’‘每片晶圆多出 25 片！ ’一遍又一遍。有人听到了他的喊声，回去在酸液容器上做了标记：‘超级浸渍液’。所以，即使那不是一个精确的化学配方，那个贴着“超级蘸酱”标签的容器就那样放了一年多。30
The breakthrough came in late 1969, when someone changed the formula of the acid dip yet again. Suddenly the yield went from two chips per wafer to 25. The employee in charge of sorting good dice from bad started yelling, “Holy hell, look what’s going on here!” People came pouring out of their offices, urging the MOS team to test another wafer, and then another. When it was ascertained that the key change was the acid dip, an employee recalled, “Les [Vadasz] was so excited he started jumping up and down and yelling, ‘It’s a sooper dip,’ with his Hungarian accent, ‘It’s a sooper dip, it’s a sooper dip,’ over and over again. Someone heard him and went back and marked the container of acid, ‘Super Dip.’ So even though it wasn’t a precise chemical formula, for over a year that container just sat there with that label ‘Super Dip’ on it.”30
1969年9月，英特尔推出了MOS芯片，一款名为1101的256位存储器。但这并非英特尔所期望的“完美”解决方案。这款芯片速度太慢，而且价格高达每比特20到60美分（取决于购买数量），对于大型机而言，取代每比特成本约为4美分的内核过于昂贵。即使英特尔将该芯片的初始价格降低了75%，销量依然低迷。只有当英特尔将基本的MOS结构应用于移位寄存器（一个已成熟的市场）时，硅栅极技术才开始为公司带来利润，尽管利润微薄。但这种亦步亦趋的商业模式并非诺伊斯和摩尔为英特尔制定的计划，也不是实现长期持续增长的战略。31
In September 1969, Intel introduced its MOS chip, a 256-bit memory called the 1101. It was not the “just right” solution Intel had hoped for. The chip proved too slow and, priced from 20 to 60 cents per bit (depending on the quantity purchased), too expensive to replace cores, which cost about four cents per bit, as a mainframe memory. Even when Intel reduced its initial price on the part by 75 percent, sales were sluggish. Only when Intel applied the basic MOS structure to shift registers, an already established market, did silicon-gate technology make a profit, albeit a small one, for the company. But this me-too business was not what Noyce and Moore had planned for Intel, nor was it a strategy for extended long-term growth.31
与此同时，泰德·霍夫一直在为Busicom公司研发新型通用逻辑芯片。他利用业余时间进行这项工作，他的“正职”是管理应用研究。霍夫之前从未设计过MOS电路，因此需要经常咨询MOS团队。除了MOS团队之外，诺伊斯是他在Busicom项目上的主要联系人。（霍夫回忆说：“他总是非常鼓励我，总是非常乐于助人，总是能提出很多想法。”）摩尔也对霍夫的设想很感兴趣，尽管他承认“我的热情有时可能并不那么明显”。八月下旬，一位名叫斯坦·马佐尔的工程师开始协助霍夫研发处理器芯片。有了马佐尔的加入，两人在两周内就完成了芯片架构的框图。在此期间，Busicom的工程师们也在进行他们自己的设计。32
Meanwhile, Ted Hoff had been working on the novel general-purpose logic chip for Busicom. He did this in the time not spent on his “real” job managing applications research. Outside of the MOS team, with whom Hoff, who had not previously designed an MOS circuit, needed to consult fairly regularly, Noyce was his main contact on the Busicom project. (“He was always very encouraging, always very helpful, always had an idea,” Hoff recalls.) Moore was also intrigued by Hoff’s vision, though he admits “my enthusiasm may not [have been] so obvious at times.” In late August, an engineer named Stan Mazor began helping Hoff with the processor chip. With Mazor on board, the two men completed a block drawing of the architecture within two weeks. Throughout this time, the Busicom engineers were working on their own design.32
8月，诺伊斯给Busicom总裁小岛义雄发了一封信，警告他“这台机器电路的复杂性”意味着“即使是最简单的套件，我们也不可能以50美元/套的价格生产出来”。诺伊斯估计，如果英特尔按照Busicom的设计生产计算器，最终每套的成本将在300美元左右。（他赶紧补充道：“我并非批评……计算器的设计。”）诺伊斯最后提出了一个问题：“基于这个设计继续开发是否合理，还是应该放弃这个项目？”小岛肯定立即回复说他希望继续保持某种合作关系，因为9月16日，鲍勃·格雷厄姆又写了一封信，再次强调了Busicom芯片组的复杂性，并提出了一个建议：为什么不尝试不同的设计，实际上是英特尔的设计呢？33
In August, Noyce sent a note to Busicom president Yoshio Kojima, warning him that the “complexity of the circuits for this machine” meant that there was “no possibility that we could manufacture these units for $50/kit, even for the simplest kit.” If Intel built the calculator set according to Busicom’s design, Noyce estimated that the final cost per kit would be around $300. (He hastened to add, “I do not criticize the design of the … calculator.”) Noyce ended with a question: “Is it reasonable to proceed with this development on the basis of this design, or should the project be abandoned?” Kojima must have immediately responded that he wanted to continue some sort of relationship, because on September 16, Bob Graham followed up by letter, again emphasizing the complexity of the Busicom chip set and ending with a proposal: why not try a different design, an Intel design, in fact?33
1969年10月，Busicom公司的两位高管来到英特尔公司，商讨采用哪种芯片组——霍夫和马佐尔的方案，还是Busicom工程师的方案。英特尔的方案需要四颗芯片，其中最复杂的芯片约有1900个晶体管，每套成本约为155美元。而Busicom的方案成本是英特尔方案的两倍，需要12到15颗芯片，每颗芯片约有2000个晶体管。最终，Busicom的高管选择了英特尔的方案。通用逻辑芯片取代了他们自己工程师的设计——泰德·霍夫称这一决定“有点儿像一次政变”。34
In October 1969, a pair of Busicom executives came to Intel to decide which chip set to pursue—Hoff and Mazor’s or the Busicom engineers’. The Intel design required four chips, with about 1,900 transistors on the most complicated chip, at a cost of roughly $155 per kit. The Busicom design would cost twice that and require 12 to 15 chips with about 2,000 transistors each. The Busicom executives chose the Intel design with its general-purpose logic chip over their own engineers’ designs—a decision Ted Hoff declared “a bit of a coup.”34
Busicom团队返回日本。但那时已是1970年2月，两家公司之间的协议尚未正式签署。从10月到次年2月，霍夫将注意力转向了为控制终端公司（Control Terminal Corporation）开发中央处理器的合同，英特尔公司内部无人负责Busicom芯片组的研发工作。或许芯片组项目无人问津并不奇怪，因为英特尔内部对该项目最感兴趣的两个人——诺伊斯和霍夫——都更喜欢提出想法而不是付诸实践。1970年3月，Busicom公司的一位高管给诺伊斯写了一封措辞委婉的信，询问为何迟迟没有收到关于计算器芯片组的任何消息。他要求提供最新进展和具体的进展情况。35
The Busicom team returned to Japan. But it was February 1970, before the agreement between the two companies was formally signed. From October to February, Hoff turned his attention to a contract for a central processor for Control Terminal Corporation, and no one at Intel was designated to lead the work on the Busicom chip set. Perhaps it is not surprising that the chip set lingered untended, since both Noyce and Hoff, the two men within Intel most excited by it, enjoyed coming up with ideas more than implementing them. In March 1970, a Busicom executive sent a gently worded letter to Noyce wondering why he had heard nothing about their calculator chip set. He requested an update and specific signs of progress.35
这封信起了作用。英特尔聘请了仙童半导体公司的MOS工艺专家弗雷德里科·法金来负责Busicom芯片的研发工作。法金立即着手改进霍夫的架构，并将设计实现到芯片上，同时与Busicom的工程师们密切合作，这些工程师们特地飞越太平洋来协助这项工作。
The letter got results. Intel hired Frederico Faggin, an MOS process expert from Fairchild, to work on the Busicom chips. Faggin immediately began refining Hoff’s architecture and implementing the design into silicon, working in close consultation with the Busicom engineers, who had flown back across the Pacific to assist with the effort.
诺伊斯还走进安迪·格鲁夫的办公室，坐在他办公桌的一角，这一举动立刻引起了格鲁夫的怀疑。每当诺伊斯装出一副漫不经心的样子，格鲁夫就知道他肯定没安好心。诺伊斯与其说是正眼看格鲁夫，不如说是斜眼瞥他。“我们要启动另一个项目，”诺伊斯笑着说。格鲁夫记得当时心里想的是：“走开，走开，我们没时间管这些。”哪家公司会在生死攸关之际启动新项目？36
Noyce also went into Andy Grove’s office and sat down on the corner of his desk, a move that immediately raised Grove’s suspicions. Any time Noyce affected a faux-casual air, Grove knew he was not going to like the message. Noyce looked at Grove more from the corner of his eyes than face-on. “We’re starting another project,” Noyce said with a little laugh. Grove remembers thinking, “Go away, go away, we don’t have time for this.” What kind of company started new projects when its very survival was at stake?36
英特尔当时确实举步维艰。一份公司内部时间线用“管理层近乎恐慌”来概括1970年的前几个月。尽管公司几乎所有人都参与了下一代硅栅MOS器件的研发，而且英特尔还与计算机制造商霍尼韦尔合作，以提高制造出具有理想特性的MOS存储器的成功率，但这款器件的制造难度仍然不亚于1101。第二季度末，英特尔裁员约20人，并缩减了其最雄心勃勃的扩张计划——“这对于诺伊斯来说，或许比对摩尔来说更加痛苦，”一份当时的记录解释道。37
Intel was indeed struggling. One internal company timeline shorthands the first months of 1970 with the phrase, “Management Near Panic.” The next-generation silicongate MOS device was proving as difficult to build as the 1101, even though almost everyone in the company had been assigned to work on it, and even though Intel was collaborating with computer manufacturer Honeywell to increase its chances of building a MOS memory with desirable features. At the end of the second quarter, Intel laid off about 20 people and reined in the most ambitious of their expansion plans—“probably a more painful task for Noyce than for Moore,” explained one contemporary account.37
20世纪60年代末期的活力和乐观情绪已然消退，只留下过剩的库存和无事可做的员工。1970年7月，一份行业通讯的单页头条新闻赫然写着：“雷神公司季度利润下滑”、“GT&E公司季度净利润暴跌；西尔瓦尼亚公司暴跌63%”、“Itek公司季度收益下滑30.5%”。1970年即将结束之际，英特尔公司几乎亏损了200万美元。38
The energy and optimism that ended the 1960s had cratered under their own weight, leaving only surplus inventory and employees without work to do. Headlines on a single page of an industry newsletter in July 1970 read “Raytheon Profits Off in Quarter,” “GT&E Quarter Net Slumps; Sylvania Nosedives 63%,” “Itek Earnings Skid 30.5% for Quarter.” The year 1970 threatened to end with Intel almost $2 million in the red.38
亚瑟·洛克对英特尔的未来感到一种紧迫感——甚至是迫在眉睫的灾难——但他并不确定管理层和董事们是否也有同样的感受。“洛克一位董事会成员回忆道：“他很擅长把情况描述得非常严重，以此让人们更现实地看待问题。诺伊斯和摩尔都不是那种精打细算、斤斤计较的人。洛克在这方面可是个狂热分子。”洛克说，英特尔急需一个重要的收入来源。他们需要尽快将下一代硅栅MOS存储器投入生产，即使它并不完美。10月，英特尔正式发布了1103，这是其第二款采用硅栅工艺制造的存储芯片，并刊登了一整版广告，标题赫然写着：“终结：核心芯片在价格战中败给了新芯片”。1103的存储容量是1101的四倍。它也是第一款可以量产的半导体存储器，因此也是第一款真正能在价格上挑战核心芯片的产品。39
Arthur Rock felt a sense of urgency—even impending disaster—about Intel that he was not certain the management and directors shared. “Rock was quite comfortable making [the situation] sound quite severe and bad in order to make people be more realistic,” recalled one board member. “Noyce and Moore weren’t good penny-pinching, pencil-pushing types. Rock was a fiend of that sort.” Intel needed a source of significant revenue, Rock said—and quickly. They needed to put the next-generation silicon-gate MOS memory into production, even if it was not perfect. In October, Intel officially introduced the 1103, its second memory chip built using the silicon gate process, with a full-page ad blaring, “THE END: Cores lose Price War to New Chip.” The 1103 held four times more data than the 1101. It was also the first semiconductor memory that could be made in volume and thus the first that could really challenge cores on price.39
诚然，这款设备远非完美。英特尔已知的1103型存储器的诸多缺陷之一，正如安迪·格鲁夫所说，“在某些不利条件下，它根本无法记忆”——这对存储器而言是个大问题。有些1103型存储器在摇晃后会失效。少数存储器内部的玻璃密封层会渗入水汽。很多时候，没有人知道这些设备停止工作的原因。这些问题促使泰德·霍夫撰写了一份长达28页的备忘录，详细解释了1103型存储器的工作原理和各种怪癖。40
To be sure, the device was far from perfect. Among the 1103’s many failings known to Intel was the fact that, in Andy Grove’s words, “under certain adverse conditions the thing just couldn’t remember”—a problem for a memory. Some 1103s failed when they were shaken. A few developed moisture inside the glass used to seal them. Often no one knew why the devices would stop working. The problems inspired Ted Hoff to write a 28-page memo explaining the 1103’s operation and quirks.40
安迪·格鲁夫曾做噩梦，梦见成箱成箱的1103处理器因为缺陷被退回公司，最终彻底毁掉英特尔。而戈登·摩尔则在想，1103的问题是否在某种程度上反而更容易说服客户使用这款设备。专攻磁芯存储器的工程师们在1103上看到了类似的缺陷。两者都存在电压和模式敏感性问题，这意味着它们的性能会受到附近其他电子设备的影响。1103每千分之一秒就会“刷新”一次，这种操作经常会引发问题；磁芯也会进行类似的操作，称为“破坏性读取”。“所有这些都让1103对（客户公司的）工程师来说更具挑战性，也更不容易构成威胁，”摩尔解释道。“我们并非有意如此，但我认为，如果（1103）开箱即用就完美无缺，我们就会遭到客户更大的抵制。”41
Andy Grove had nightmares that boxes and boxes of 1103s would be returned to the company for defects—and would ruin Intel entirely. Gordon Moore, on the other hand, wondered if, in some perverse way, the 1103’s problems made it easier to convince customers to use the device. Engineers who specialized in core memories recognized analogs in the 1103. Both suffered from voltage and pattern sensitivity, which means that their performance was affected by other nearby electronic devices. The 1103 “refreshed itself” every thousandth of a second, an operation that regularly caused problems; cores did something similar called “destructive read.” “All these things made the 1103 more challenging and less threatening to engineers [at customer companies],” Moore explains. “We did not plan it to happen this way, but I think that if [the 1103] had been perfect out of the box, we would have had a lot more resistance [to it] from our customers.”41
尽管存在一些问题，1103 仍然代表着一项真正的技术突破。正如史蒂夫·乔布斯曾经说过的那样，当电灯泡被发明出来时，人们并没有抱怨它太暗。贝尔加拿大公司的制造部门——微系统国际有限公司 (MIL) 曾与英特尔接洽，希望成为 1103 的“第二供应商”。客户们意识到，制造尖端半导体是一项充满变数的工作，因此没有客户愿意将重要的订单完全交给单一供应商。他们需要一个官方认可的替代供应商。42
Even with its problems, the 1103 represented a real technical breakthrough. As Steve Jobs once said, when the light bulb was invented, people did not complain that it was too dim. A firm called Microsystems International Limited (MIL), the manufacturing arm of Bell Canada, approached Intel about serving as a “second source” on the 1103. Customers recognized that building state-of-the art semiconductors was a temperamental business, and so no customer was willing to leave an important order in the hands of only one supplier. They wanted an officially sanctioned alternative source of product.42
诺伊斯告诉MIL公司，如果该公司想寻找1103型设备的第二供应商，只需“支付我们全部的净资产，我们就会把我们所知道的都教给你们”。这基本上就是MIL公司同意的安排。作为交换……英特尔将支付150万美元（大致相当于当时英特尔的净资产），外加MIL公司1972年底之前的销售特许权使用费，作为交换，英特尔将提供生产1103芯片所需的技术诀窍、技术信息和许可。英特尔还将派遣一个团队前往渥太华，帮助MIL公司建立晶圆厂来生产这些器件。如果MIL公司的新晶圆厂达到一定的生产目标，MIL公司将再向英特尔支付50万美元。诺伊斯告诉英特尔的投资者：“根据协议，MIL公司的付款将大幅改善我们本已良好的现金状况，而且，对我们卓越工艺的认可也将为我们带来宝贵的市场推广优势。”诺伊斯后来表示，与MIL公司的这笔交易是他职业生涯中最喜欢的交易之一，因为“你不是每天都有机会让自己的净资产翻一番”。43
Noyce told MIL that if the company wanted to second source 1103s, all it had to do was “pay us our net worth and we’ll all teach you what we know.” This is essentially the arrangement to which MIL agreed. In exchange for $1.5 million (roughly Intel’s net worth at the time), plus royalties on MIL sales until the end of 1972, Intel would provide the know-how, technical information, and licenses necessary to produce 1103s. Intel would also send a team to Ottawa to help MIL set up a fab to build the devices. If the new MIL fab met certain production goals, another $500,000 would be transferred from MIL to Intel. Noyce told Intel’s investors that “[MIL’s] payments under the agreement will substantially improve our already good cash position, [and] the implied endorsement of our process excellence will also be a valuable marketing aid for us.” Noyce later said that the MIL deal was one of his favorites of his career because “it’s not every day you get a chance to double your net worth.”43
运营经理安迪·格鲁夫得知此事后勃然大怒，因为诺伊斯并未就第二供应商计划咨询过他。“我们当时每片1103晶圆上只有一两颗能用的芯片。这款产品的情况糟透了，简直难以形容。[这项军工合作意味着]我必须在没有制造经理或首席技术官的情况下提高良率，”而这两位原本都会参与向渥太华转移技术的团队。格鲁夫简直不敢相信诺伊斯会考虑这样的提议，他曾多次试图劝阻诺伊斯放弃这个计划。春去夏来，交易似乎即将达成时，格鲁夫再次尝试。他走进诺伊斯的办公室，发现诺伊斯正在和摩尔交谈。格鲁夫立即开始“尽我所能地”反对这项计划——而我的反对力度非常大。他坚持认为，英特尔不可能在加拿大只有一半员工的情况下，既提高1103的良率，又维持晶圆厂的正常运转，既满足客户需求，又能开拓新的市场。“这将是英特尔的末日！”他一度大喊：“我们会拿到那150万美元，然后我们就完蛋了。”44
Operations manager Andy Grove, whom Noyce had not consulted on the second source plan, was irate when he learned of it. “We were seeing one or two [working] dies per wafer of 1103s. It’s hard to describe what shit we were in with that product. [This MIL deal meant] I would have to improve yields without a manufacturing manager or chief technologist,” both of whom would be part of the team transferring technology to Ottawa. Grove, who could not believe Noyce would even consider such a proposal, had tried several times to dissuade him from this plan of action. When spring turned to summer, and the deal seemed imminent, Grove tried again. He went into Noyce’s office and found him there, talking with Moore. Grove immediately began arguing against the plan “as aggressively as I was capable—which was very.” He insisted that Intel could not increase the 1103 yield, maintain the fab, satisfy customers, and find new prospects with half the staff in Canada. “This will be the death of Intel!” he yelled at one point. “We’ll get the $1.5 million, and then we’ll sink.”44
诺伊斯等到格鲁夫说完，然后目光锐利地看着这个年轻人。“我们已经决定这么做了，”诺伊斯缓缓说道，“你需要集中精力去想办法实现这个目标。”格鲁夫可以尽情地吹嘘，但此时英特尔的掌舵人是诺伊斯。格鲁夫正如他自己所说，“夹着尾巴灰溜溜地”离开了。MIL的交易在7月签署，1970年底，英特尔收到了来自这家加拿大公司的第一笔款项——50万美元——这使得英特尔当年的亏损减少到100万美元。45
Noyce waited until Grove finished. Then he looked at the younger man, his eyes hard. “We have decided to do this,” Noyce said slowly. “You need to put your energies into figuring out how to do this.” Grove could bluster all he wanted, but Noyce ran Intel at this stage. Grove left, as he put it, “with my tail between my legs.” The MIL deal was inked in July, and at the very end of 1970, Intel received its first payment from the Canadian firm—$500,000—which lowered Intel’s losses for the year to $1 million.45
最终，与MIL的合作安排堪称完美，即便英特尔事先写好了剧本也不可能做得更好。最初的技术转让非常成功，为英特尔赢得了50万美元的激励奖金，并让转让团队得以在1971年春季返回家乡。英特尔支付了转让团队成员及其妻子的机票，前往夏威夷参加为期三天的庆祝活动。诺伊斯及时赶到，与庆祝者们在考艾岛冲浪酒店享用了一顿丰盛的夏多布里昂牛排晚餐，并畅饮了大量的酒水。在欣赏了几个小时的爵士乐队表演后，他加入了一群脱到只剩内裤准备下海游泳的人。诺伊斯以他标志性的姿势，一头扎进了水中。他兴致勃勃地往前走，却发现潮水已经退去了。他浑身是擦伤地从浅水中爬出来，一边咒骂一边大笑。46
In the end, the arrangement with MIL could not have gone better if Intel had scripted it. The initial technology transfer was successful enough to earn Intel the $500,000 incentive bonus and allow the transfer team to return home in the spring of 1971. Intel paid for the transfer team members and their wives to fly to Hawaii for a three-day party. Noyce arrived in time to share a fancy dinner of chateaubriand and copious volumes of liquor with the celebrants at the Kauai Surf Hotel. After a few hours listening to the jazz band, he joined a group stripping to their undershorts for a quick swim at the beach. Noyce threw himself headfirst into the water with characteristic vigor—only to discover the tide had gone out. He emerged from the shallow waters covered in scrapes, cursing and laughing.46
跳入大海的举动颇具诺伊斯风格。他一如既往地努力融入团队，试图成为“普通人”中的一员。任何形式的等级制度——尤其是让他身居高位的等级制度——都会让他感到不安。他曾说过，他喜欢牧歌演唱的原因在于它将多个声音融合在一起，没有哪个声音占据主导地位：“你的部分取决于其他人的部分，而且它总是支持其他人的部分。”在社交场合被问及职业时，他会说自己是物理学家。在英特尔，诺伊斯谈到“等级权力”和“知识权力”，并坚信在技术决策方面，知识最渊博的人的意见应该优先于职称更高的人的意见。英特尔的董事会会议并非那种长达两小时、机械地通过决议的例行公事。诺伊斯坚持让运营经理向董事会汇报——既是为了让董事们了解情况，也是为了让运营人员学习如何应对棘手的问题并提出令人信服的论点。47
The dive in the ocean is vintage Noyce. He was trying, as he always did, to be “just one of the guys.” Any sort of hierarchy—but particularly one that placed him at the top—made him nervous. He once said that what he loved about madrigal singing was its blend of multiple voices into one, with no single voice dominating: “Your part depends on [the others’ and] it always supports the others.” When asked in social situations about his profession, he would say that he was a physicist. At Intel, Noyce spoke of “hierarchy power” and “knowledge power” and firmly believed that when it came to technical decisions, the word of the person with the most knowledge ought to trump the opinion of the one with the higher title. Intel board meetings were not the typical two-hour drone of rubber-stamp motions and resolutions. Noyce insisted that operating managers present to the board—both to keep the directors informed and to teach the operating staff how to field tough questions and make compelling arguments.47
当一位早期员工想看看英特尔的组织结构图时，诺伊斯在圆心画了一个“X”，然后在圆周上又画了七个“X”。这位员工惊讶地看着，诺伊斯接着把圆心的“X”与圆周上的其他七个“X”连接起来，使整个图看起来像一个车轮。诺伊斯说，圆心的“X”代表了提问的员工。他还补充道，其他七个“X”代表“我、戈登、安迪、莱斯·瓦达斯、鲍勃·格雷厄姆、吉恩·弗拉斯以及其他你将来会接触到的人”。诺伊斯的意思是，他期望所有员工之间都存在一种互惠互利的关系——从中心到边缘，再回到中心——而正式的汇报结构和层级在很大程度上无关紧要。48
When an early employee wanted to see Intel’s organization chart, Noyce drew an X in the middle of a circle, and then drew seven more Xs along the perimeter of the circle. As the amazed employee looked on, Noyce proceeded to connect the center X to each of the other Xs in the system so the drawing resembled a wagon wheel. The X in the center, said Noyce, was the employee asking the question. He added, the other seven Xs “are me, Gordon, Andy, Les [Vadasz], Bob [Graham], Gene [Flath] and other people you’ll be dealing with.” Noyce’s point was that he expected a reciprocal relationship between all employees—from the center to the perimeter, and back again—and that formal reporting structures and hierarchies were largely irrelevant.48
“你从没听他说过‘我做了这个，我做了那个’，”莱斯的妻子朱迪·瓦达兹回忆道，“他总是说‘我们一起做了这件事’。”英特尔影响深远的股票期权计划可以被视为诺伊斯民主倾向的体现，而摩尔也持有同样的观点。创始人在这方面的信念还促使他们拒绝为高管预留停车位，并在20世纪70年代中期英特尔搬迁到新办公楼时决定，所有人——包括创始人——都应该在几乎完全相同的隔间里工作。49
“You never heard him say, ‘I did this, I did that,’” recalls Judy Vadasz, who is married to Les. “It was always, ‘we did this.’” Intel’s far-reaching stock-option plan can be seen as a reflection of Noyce’s democratic tendencies, which were also shared by Moore. The founders’ beliefs on this matter further led them to refuse to set aside parking spaces for executives, and to decide, when Intel moved to a new building in the mid-1970s, that everyone—including the founders—should work in essentially identical cubicles.49
在创办英特尔几个月后，诺伊斯告诉一位记者：“我之所以想建立这个双头公司，其中一个原因就是这样我和戈登都可以安心离开，而不用担心留下未完成的工作。”诺伊斯“离开”是为了带领他的合唱团进行周三晚上的排练。在滑雪季，他允许自己利用周末远离英特尔，并和家人一起度过一周的假期。他和贝蒂卖掉了她不喜欢的滑雪小屋。取而代之的是，他们开始每年举办一次活动。每年冬天，他们都会租下太浩湖附近阿尔卑斯草甸度假村的整栋小木屋，邀请近二十位朋友一起住上几天，这已成为他们的传统。诺伊斯还曾担任三家初创公司的董事，其中包括尤金·克莱纳创办的昙花一现的Cybercom公司，该公司设计和制造打印机、显示终端等计算机外围设备。这三家公司每月都会召开一次会议。50
A FEW MONTHS AFTER STARTING INTEL, Noyce told a reporter, “One of the reasons I wanted to set up this two-headed monster is so that either Gordon or I can feel free to take off without severe guilt feelings about leaving a job undone behind us.” Noyce “took off” to lead Wednesday evening rehearsals for his madrigal group. He permitted himself long weekends away from Intel during the ski season and a week-long family vacation. He and Betty sold the ski cottage she disliked. Instead they began an annual tradition of renting the entire lodge at Alpine Meadows near Lake Tahoe for several days every winter and inviting nearly two dozen people to join them. Noyce also served on the boards of three startups—including Eugene Kleiner’s short-lived company, Cybercom, which designed and manufactured computer peripherals such as printers and display terminals—each of which held monthly meetings.50
1967年，诺伊斯是相干辐射公司（Coherent Radiation）的创始董事之一。该公司开发和制造用于科学仪器和工业应用机床的激光器。诺伊斯是从洛克菲勒家族投资部门的查尔斯·B·史密斯那里了解到这家公司的。史密斯表示，如果能在西海岸找到一位“能负责监督公司运营的人”，洛克菲勒家族就愿意投资这家公司。51
In 1967, Noyce was a founding director of Coherent Radiation, a company that developed and manufactured lasers for use in scientific instruments and as machine tools in industrial applications. Noyce had learned about the company from Charles B. Smith, an associate with the investment arm of the Rockefeller family, who were willing to invest in the company if Smith could find a “man on the West Coast to keep an eye on things.”51
在与公司创始人之一吉姆·霍巴特会面后，诺伊斯同意加入相干公司董事会。他还以每股约1.40美元的价格购买了大约22500股股票。“我不确定诺伊斯为什么想加入，”霍巴特承认，“也许他只是想尝试一些与半导体行业不同的东西。”
After meeting with one of the company’s founders, Jim Hobart, Noyce agreed join the Coherent board. He also purchased roughly 22,500 shares of stock for about $1.40 per share. “I’m not sure why Noyce wanted to come on board,” admits Hobart. “Maybe he just wanted to try something different [from semiconductors].”
作为一位经验丰富的企业家，诺伊斯在相干公司扮演了稳定军人的角色。“诺伊斯对公司最大的贡献，”霍巴特回忆道，“就是他总是说，‘别感情用事。让我们冷静下来，好好想想，讨论一下，辩论一下，认真思考一下。’”诺伊斯还力劝霍巴特将股票期权作为激励工具。霍巴特原本就计划向所有技术人员发放期权，但诺伊斯更加积极地推广了这一做法。他认为霍巴特应该采用他所谓的“常青期权”计划——他曾在英特尔推行过这项计划——即每年向员工授予新的期权，以此来保持员工对公司的忠诚度。
As an experienced entrepreneur, Noyce served as a stabilizing force at Coherent. “Noyce’s biggest contribution to the company,” Hobart recalls, “was [to say], ‘Let’s not be emotional. Let’s figure this out. Let’s discuss it, debate it, think about it.’” Noyce also pushed Hobart to use stock options as an incentive tool. Hobart had already planned to distribute options to all technical employees, but Noyce promoted their use even more aggressively. He thought that Hobart should use what Noyce called an “evergreen” program—one that he would implement at Intel—in which employees are given a new options grant every year in an effort to keep the staff loyal to the company.
1970 年 5 月，相干辐射公司上市，诺伊斯从中获利约 25 万美元。他一直持有股票，并在董事会任职 13 年。
When Coherent Radiation went public in May, 1970, Noyce made roughly $250,000. He held onto his stock and served on the board for another 13 years.
诺伊斯还曾担任四相系统公司（Four-Phase Systems）的董事，该公司是由仙童半导体MOS电路设计团队负责人李·博伊塞尔（Lee Boysel）创立的仙童半导体衍生公司。四相系统的目标是制造一款基于MOS电路、采用固态存储器和硅基逻辑芯片的计算机。当然，英特尔当时也在研发固态存储器和逻辑芯片。但诺伊斯和博伊塞尔都没有意识到诺伊斯担任四相系统董事存在任何潜在的利益冲突。博伊塞尔的公司并不打算销售任何组件——只销售成品计算机——因此不会在任何市场上与英特尔竞争。
Noyce also served on the board of Four-Phase Systems, a Fairchild spinout founded by the leader of Fairchild’s MOS circuit design group, Lee Boysel. Four-Phase aimed to build an MOS-based computer with solid-state memory and a logic chip built from silicon. Intel, too, of course, was building solid-state memory and logic chips. But neither Noyce nor Boysel saw any potential conflict of interest in Noyce’s decision to serve as a director of Four-Phase. Boysel’s company was not going to sell any components at all—only finished computers—and so would not compete with Intel in any market.
诺伊斯向四相公司投资了约5万美元。这只是几笔数额较小的个人投资之一；主要投资方康宁玻璃公司（该公司也曾投资过仙童半导体的衍生公司Signetics）投资了50万美元。诺伊斯很可能对四相公司的未来发展并不抱太大希望。博伊塞尔为公司制定的目标，诺伊斯都乐于参与那些风险极高、近乎大胆的行动。他对四相计算机项目也十分着迷，或许正是早期接触博伊塞尔关于通用逻辑芯片的理念，才使他如此容易接受霍夫在这方面的观点。52
Noyce invested about $50,000 in Four-Phase. His was one of several fairly small investments by individuals; the major backer, Corning Glass (which had also backed Fairchild spinout Signetics) invested $500,000. Noyce most likely did not have high hopes that Four-Phase could accomplish the goals Boysel laid out for the company, but Noyce enjoyed involving himself with operations risky enough to sound almost audacious. He was also fascinated by the Four-Phase computer effort, and it may have been his early exposure to Boysel’s ideas about general-purpose logic chips that made him so receptive to Hoff’s thoughts on the subject.52
对诺伊斯而言最重要的董事会并没有给他带来任何收入，而且会议地点设在爱荷华州的格林内尔。每年，诺伊斯都会前往格林内尔学院四到六次，1970年，他即将完成担任董事会主席的第四年，也是最后一年。他热爱这份工作。他的一个侄子就读于这所学院，诺伊斯总是会去侄子的宿舍和学生们聊天，“感受一下学院的氛围”。诺伊斯主持格林内尔学院董事会会议时，总是带着一种漫不经心的神态，这与他主持其他会议时如出一辙。他似乎更热衷于理解同事们的想法，而不是表达自己的观点。然而，一位学院院长回忆说，他提出的问题却总能巧妙地引导人们接受他的观点。“不知怎么的，他们最终总是会得出鲍勃想要他们得出的结论。你根本不会觉得他是在引导他们。”53
THE BOARD THAT MATTERED MOST to Noyce netted him no income and met in Grinnell, Iowa. Four or six times each year, Noyce traveled to Grinnell College, where he was completing his fourth, and final, year as board chair in 1970. He loved this job. One of his nephews attended the college, and Noyce always stopped by his dormitory to talk to the students and “get a sense of the place.” Noyce led the Grinnell trustees meetings with the same air of apparent nonchalance he brought to all his meetings, seemingly more interested in understanding his colleagues’ ideas than in expressing his own. And yet the questions he asked had a way of bringing people around to his point of view, one of the college presidents recalled. “Somehow they usually reached the conclusions Bob wanted them to reach. You just never had a sense he was leading them there.”53
1970年5月，诺伊斯接到格林内尔学院院长格伦·莱格特的电话。在俄亥俄州肯特州立大学，由于校园内爆发大规模抗议活动，反对越南战争和入侵柬埔寨，州长调动国民警卫队镇压，导致四名手无寸铁的学生丧生，另有九名学生受伤。莱格特告诉诺伊斯，格林内尔校园正经历着前所未有的骚乱——而该校近期的历史也曾促使联邦调查局发布报告，称“这所学院在中西部地区以极端自由主义著称”。1968年，格林内尔的学生曾抗议海军陆战队征兵官的来访，他们将校园改造成临时军人墓地，草坪上插满了数百个十字架。 1969年，《花花公子》杂志的一名代表来到校园，宣传一项允许异性在宿舍内互访的新政策。然而，十名裸体学生举着写有“ 《花花公子》是肉体圣殿里的金钱兑换商”的标语迎接了他们——诺伊斯将这场抗议归咎于“外部煽动者”。此外，格林内尔学院在过去一年里也几乎持续不断地爆发了反战抗议活动。54
In May 1970, Noyce received a call from Grinnell College president Glenn Leggett. At Kent State University in Ohio, members of the National Guard, called in by the governor in response to massive campus protests against the war in Vietnam and the invasion of Cambodia, had killed four unarmed students and wounded nine others. Leggett told Noyce that the Grinnell campus was in an uproar unlike any in its history—and its recent history was the sort that inspired an FBI report stating “this College has a widespread reputation in the Midwest as being of the ultra-liberal type.” In 1968, Grinnell students had protested a Marine recruiter’s visit by transforming the campus into a makeshift military graveyard, complete with hundreds of crosses dotting the lawns. In 1969, a representative from Playboy, on campus in connection with a new policy allowing opposite-sex visits in the dormitories, had been greeted by ten naked students carrying signs reading, “Playboy is a Money Changer in the Temple of the Body”—a protest Noyce attributed to “outside agitators.” Grinnell had also seen near-continual anti-war protests for the past year.54
但校方对肯特州立大学事件的反应毫无准备。来自爱荷华州各大学的学生开始聚集在格林内尔学院，其中许多人正如莱格特所说，是“大城市的孩子”。莱格特收到了有关校园内将爆发“暴力行动”的威胁。学生们向正在召开特别会议的教职工递交了一份决议，宣布肯特州立大学的暴行是“官方镇压行为”，既“不道德”又“不理智”。教职工投票决定停课两天，这一举动让数百名情绪激动的学生有时间组织临时抗议活动。研讨会和抗议活动层出不穷。雪上加霜的是，校园的糟糕状况也加剧了这种近乎失控的混乱感：自四月中旬以来，楼宇和后勤人员一直在罢工，破坏者推翻了系里的休息室家具，涂鸦了图书馆的墙壁，并在草坪上倾倒垃圾。正如莱格特所说，“肯特州立大学枪击案之后，每时每刻，气氛都在升温。”55
But nothing had prepared the administration for the reaction to Kent State. Students from universities all over Iowa began to congregate at Grinnell, many of them “big city kids,” as Leggett put it. Leggett received threats of “violent action” planned to erupt on campus. The student body sent a resolution to the faculty, which was meeting in special session, declaring the Kent State atrocity an “act of official repression” both “immoral” and “irrational.” The faculty voted to suspend classes for two days, a move that left hundreds of agitated students with time to stage impromptu teach-ins and protests. Adding to the sense of barely contained chaos was the physical condition of the campus: the buildings and grounds employees had been on strike since mid-April, and vandals had overturned furniture in department lounges, defaced the library walls, and dumped garbage on the lawns. As Leggett put it, “The temperature was rising every minute of every day after Kent State.”55
莱格特想知道，作为董事会主席的诺伊斯对于学校因学生安全而停课有何感想。诺伊斯告诉莱格特：“我们（董事会）对学生会怎么做一无所知。那是你们的问题。尽你们所能，我们会支持你们。”56
Leggett wanted to know how Noyce, as chair of the board of trustees, felt about the school shutting down for the safety of the students. Noyce told Leggett, “We [trustees] don’t know anything about what the students will do. That’s your problem. Do what you can about it, and we will support you.”56
5月14日，莱格特要求诺伊斯立即前往格林内尔。他决定不仅取消课程，还取消原定于两天后举行的毕业典礼和校友聚会。许多家长、校友，甚至一些学生都对此感到愤怒。镇上的居民，他们的收入很大一部分来自为参加这些活动的家庭和校友提供服务，对此更是义愤填膺。
On May 14, Leggett asked Noyce to come to Grinnell immediately. He had decided to cancel not only classes but also the commencement exercises and reunions scheduled for two days hence. Many parents and alumni—and some students, as well—were furious. The people in town, a fair portion of whose income came from serving families and alumni attending these functions, were even angrier.
在原本应该是毕业典礼的那个周末，整整三天，诺伊斯都坐在格林内尔楼的客厅里。格林内尔楼是格林内尔学院十几位校长的官邸，现在主要用于招待贵宾。诺伊斯总是叼着烟，和每个进来投诉或咨询的人交谈。或者更准确地说，诺伊斯一贯的作风是，他听得多说得少。
For three days, straight through the would-be commencement weekend, Noyce sat in the living room of Grinnell House, the campus home of a dozen Grinnell College presidents and now used primarily for entertaining distinguished guests. Cigarette always in hand, Noyce talked to anyone who came in to register a complaint or get more information. Or, to be more precise, Noyce characteristically listened more than he talked.
诺伊斯认为肯特州立大学事件的悲剧性是可以预见的，是年轻愤怒的学生与年轻武装士兵在高度紧张的局势下混杂在一起的几乎不可避免的结果。私下里，以及与其他校董的讨论中，诺伊斯都担心格林内尔学院过于迎合学生，对每个学生的心理和兴趣都过于敏感。学院教职工几乎取消了所有毕业要求，称之为“迈向自由开放课程领域的开拓性冒险”。学生运动员开始拒绝参赛，因为他们“不相信竞争”。诺伊斯认为这一切都荒谬至极。学生必须明白，世界并非总是迎合他们的每一个心愿。他担心格林内尔学院未能履行其教育责任，未能教会学生如何取得成功。肯特州立大学事件和格林内尔学院事件几年后，戈登·摩尔谈到英特尔团队时说：“我们才是当今世界的真正革命者——而不是几年前那些留着长发和胡子、破坏学校的年轻人。”诺伊斯无疑会同意这一点。57
Noyce felt that the events at Kent State were tragically predictable, the near-inevitable outcome of mixing young angry students with young armed troops and high tensions. Privately, and in discussion with other trustees, Noyce worried that Grinnell was pandering to its students, overly sensitive to every individual psyche and interest. The faculty had dropped nearly all graduation requirements as part of what was called “a pioneering adventure into free and open curricular territory.” Student athletes had begun refusing to compete because they “didn’t believe in competition.” Noyce thought this was all absurd. Students had to learn that the world did not always accommodate every whim. He was concerned that Grinnell was failing in its educational responsibility to teach students how to succeed. A few years after Kent State and the events at Grinnell, Gordon Moore said of the team at Intel, “We are really the revolutionaries in the world today—not the kids with the long hair and beards who were wrecking the schools a few years ago.” Noyce undoubtedly would have agreed.57
当然，诺伊斯并没有向前来格林内尔之家与他交谈的家长、校友、学生和社区成员透露这些想法。在人群中，诺伊斯更像是一块海绵，而不是一个发言者——他的目光始终集中在说话的人身上，微微侧着头，似乎在认真思考。以及理解。莱格特校长一直认为，诺伊斯沉稳的举止以及他与小镇和学院的长期联系，帮助化解了一场可能爆发的冲突。
Noyce, of course, shared none of these thoughts with the parents, alumni, students, and community members who came to speak to him at Grinnell House. Among this crowd, Noyce was more sponge than speaker—his gaze always focused on the person talking, his head cocked in deliberation and understanding. President Leggett has always felt that Noyce, with his calm demeanor and longstanding affiliations with both the town and the college, helped to defuse a potentially explosive situation.
回到英特尔后，诺伊斯将大量精力投入到提升英特尔的信誉上。当时的大多数潜在客户都是大型计算机公司，他们更倾向于与德州仪器、摩托罗拉或仙童半导体等老牌供应商合作。众多小型初创公司紧随这些巨头之后，却未能给习惯于成熟供应商的高管们留下深刻印象。诺伊斯为英特尔提供了使其在众多新兴公司中脱颖而出的最佳工具。“诺伊斯曾执掌仙童半导体，拥有丰富的经验和深刻的理解，这对我们大有裨益，”英特尔市场营销副总裁解释道，“我们可能是唯一一家有实力与客户建立联系的年轻公司，而鲍勃（诺伊斯）做到了这一点。”客户之所以愿意给英特尔一个机会，部分原因在于他们相信诺伊斯所说的这家小公司能够有所作为。从某种意义上说，诺伊斯对英特尔的作用，正如当年谢尔曼·仙童为诺伊斯和他的七位仙童半导体联合创始人向IBM担保一样。 “除了我，没人能做到这一点（让英特尔成为大型供应商之外的可靠选择）。”这位副总裁断言，“安迪做不到，我做不到，也没做到。是鲍勃做到的。”58
BACK AT INTEL, Noyce focused a good deal of his energy on trying to build Intel’s credibility. Most potential customers at this point were large computer companies comfortable working with established suppliers like Texas Instruments, Motorola, or Fairchild. The plethora of little startups nipping at these big players’ heels did not impress executives accustomed to more mature suppliers. Noyce offered Intel’s best tool for standing out from the other upstarts. “It helped that Noyce could come in having run Fairchild, with that understanding and experience,” explains Intel’s marketing vice president. “We were the only [young company] that maybe could count, and Bob [did that].” Customers gave Intel a chance in part because they believed Noyce when he said that this little operation could perform. In some sense, he could play the same role for Intel that Sherman Fairchild had played for Noyce and his seven Fairchild Semiconductor co-founders when Mr. Fairchild vouched for them with IBM. “Nobody else could have done that [made Intel a credible alternative to big suppliers],” the vice president averred. “Andy couldn’t have done that. I couldn’t do it and didn’t do it. Bob did it.”58
1971年2月初，诺伊斯在日本待了两周，力劝日本企业将1103芯片集成到他们的产品中。这个岛国最终占到了英特尔1972年销售额的约15%。访问日本期间，诺伊斯在Busicom公司待了一天，这家计算器制造商正是霍夫为其开发微处理器的公司。诺伊斯当时一定对这个项目充满信心。事实证明，弗雷德里科·法金的加入堪称神来之笔。法金加入英特尔仅仅九个月后，就生产出了整套计算器的工作样品——这是一项了不起的成就。Busicom总裁小岛秀夫也一定对芯片组的进展感到满意。但他心中却萦绕着一个新的问题。计算器市场的竞争比预想的要激烈得多。尽管Busicom才刚刚开始收到英特尔的产品，小岛秀夫还是希望英特尔能够降低价格。59
In early February 1971, Noyce spent two weeks in Japan encouraging Japanese firms to design the 1103 into their products. The island nation would come to account for about 15 percent of Intel’s 1972 sales. During his visit to Japan, Noyce spent a day at Busicom, the calculator manufacturer for whom Hoff had developed the microprocessor. Noyce must have been feeling good about the project. Frederico Faggin had proven an inspired hire. Only nine months after he joined Intel, Faggin produced working samples of the entire calculator set—a remarkable accomplishment. Busicom president Kojima, too, must have been pleased with the progress on the chip set. But he had a new issue on his mind. The calculator market was proving more competitive than expected. Even though Busicom was only beginning to receive shipments from Intel, Kojima wanted Intel to reduce their prices.59
诺伊斯回到加州后，问霍夫，如果有机会重新谈判与Busicom的合同，英特尔的首要任务应该是什么。霍夫坚持说：“如果无法争取到其他让步，那就争取到向其他公司销售的权利。”弗雷德里科·法金回忆说，他也曾向诺伊斯提出过同样的要求。Busicom当时只把微处理器当作计算器，但诺伊斯、摩尔以及芯片背后的技术人员意识到，它同样可以很容易地被编程去做其他事情。诺伊斯认为，可编程的通用逻辑器件可以成为“标准的2x4或在电子行业，六便士钉子（6 便士钉子）指的是电子元件。当时，计算机公司的工程师们设计了系统中用到的每一块木板和每一颗钉子的等效物。60
When Noyce returned to California, he asked Hoff what Intel’s top priorities should be if a chance arose to re-negotiate the Busicom contract. Hoff was insistent: “If you can’t get any other concession, just get the right to sell to other people.” Frederico Faggin recalls making the same request to Noyce. Busicom cared about the microprocessor only as a calculator, but Noyce, Moore, and the technical men behind the chip saw that it could just as easily be programmed to do other things. A programmable, general-purpose logic device, Noyce thought, could be the “standard 2-by-4 or 6-penny nail” in the electronics industry. As things stood now, engineers at computer companies designed every plank and nail equivalent used in their systems.60
在Busicom公司选择霍夫的架构作为其计算器设计方案后不久，诺伊斯便悄悄地开始了自己关于“通用逻辑编程方式”的市场调研。（当时“微处理器”一词尚未出现。）当他拜访那些要求定制电路以实现某些简单逻辑功能的客户时，诺伊斯总会不经意地问一句：为什么客户不直接买一台电脑然后自己编程来完成这项任务呢？答案总是千篇一律：我可以做到，但这太贵了。这项研究进一步印证了诺伊斯自己的直觉：如果价格合适，微处理器可以应用于数十种潜在领域——不仅限于计算机，还可以应用于微电子技术尚未涉足的领域，例如汽车和家用电器。61
Shortly after Busicom chose Hoff’s architecture for their calculator, Noyce had quietly begun his own private version of market research on “a general purpose way of programming logic.” (The term microprocessor had not yet come into use.) When he visited customers who were requesting custom circuits for certain simple logic functions, Noyce made sure at some point to ask, in an offhanded way, why the customer did not just buy a computer and program it to do the task. The answer was always the same: I could do that, but it’s too expensive. This research further reinforced Noyce’s own hunch that the microprocessor could be used in dozens of potential applications—not only in computers, but also in areas largely untouched by microelectronics, such as cars and home appliances—if the price was right.61
霍夫认为，在1969年和1970年，诺伊斯几乎是公司高层中唯一一个对微处理器充满热情的人。摩尔则坚持认为，尽管“霍夫认为正是诺伊斯阻止了微处理器项目被扼杀，但这个项目根本不可能被扼杀！微处理器正是我们为下一代产品所寻找的那种产品。”安迪·格鲁夫希望放弃微处理器项目。鲍勃·格雷厄姆则认为，公司光是销售内存芯片就已经够忙的了，他们怎么可能再去卖微处理器呢？而且，既然格雷厄姆估计英特尔每年最多只能卖出2000个微处理器，他们又何必去卖呢？这只会分散公司的精力，而且几乎没有任何盈利潜力。62
Hoff believes that Noyce was almost alone among senior management in his excitement about the microprocessor in 1969 and 1970. Moore insists that although “Hoff thinks it was Noyce who kept that from being killed, [there was] no way that project was going to be killed! The microprocessor was an example of exactly the kind of product that we were looking for for the next generation.” Andy Grove wanted the microprocessor to go away. Bob Graham felt the company already had enough to do just selling memory chips. How could they sell microprocessors? And why would they want to, since Graham estimated Intel could expect to sell, at best, 2,000 units per year? It would just be a big distraction with little potential for income.62
或许正是这种反对意见解释了诺伊斯为何没有立即回应Busicom提出的重新谈判价格的要求。他当时肯定还有其他事情要处理。6月份，公司计划搬进位于圣克拉拉一处占地26英亩的废弃梨园里的新办公楼，该办公楼位于原山景城总部以南约10英里处。这座办公楼已建设一年多，是英特尔斥资1500万至2000万美元打造的办公及制造综合体的第一步，英特尔预计该综合体最终将占地近40万平方英尺。股东大会定于4月举行，在此之前，诺伊斯计划前往纽约参加由IEEE主办的电子研究会议，然后启程前往欧洲进行为期十天的密集访问。在巴黎，他计划向大约100人发表关于“微电路”的演讲，其中大约三分之一是潜在客户，三分之一是竞争对手，三分之一是潜在投资者。在布鲁塞尔，他将与英特尔首个欧洲销售办事处的负责人会面。诺伊斯和鲍勃·格雷厄姆（他陪同诺伊斯进行了部分行程）还会见了潜在客户和分销商，以推广 1103 和英特尔的其他产品。63
Perhaps this opposition explains why Noyce did not act immediately on the Busicom request to renegotiate prices. He certainly had other things on his mind. In June, the company was scheduled to move into a new building on a 26-acre abandoned pear orchard in Santa Clara, about ten miles south of the original Mountain View headquarters. The building had been under construction for more than a year and represented the first step in a $15–$20 million office and fab complex that Intel expected would eventually occupy nearly 400,000 square feet. The shareholders meeting was scheduled for April, and before that, Noyce planned to attend an electronics research meeting sponsored by the IEEE in New York and then leave for a packed ten-day trip to Europe. In Paris, he planned to speak on “microcircuits” to about 100 people, roughly one-third of whom were potential customers, one-third competitors, and one-third potential investors. In Brussels, he would meet with the head of Intel’s first European sales office. Noyce and Bob Graham, who joined him for part of the trip, also met with potential customers and distributors to promote the 1103 and Intel’s other products.63
陪同诺伊斯出差的霍夫，至今仍珍藏着一段难忘的回忆。“一天早上我下楼吃早餐时，遇到了（英特尔欧洲销售经理）。他看起来就像被火车撞了一样。鲍勃似乎想熬夜聊天喝酒，而那位销售员犯了个错误，试图跟上他的节奏。正当我担心鲍勃会变成什么样子时，他却精神抖擞地走了下来。要知道，销售员才是应该负责喝酒作乐的人啊！”64
Hoff, who accompanied Noyce on this trip, treasures one memory from it. “When I came down for breakfast one morning, I met [the Intel Europe sales manager]. He looked like he had been run over by a train. It seems that Bob had wanted to stay up talking and drinking, and the salesman made the mistake of trying to keep up with him. Just as I was wondering what condition Bob was going to be in, he came downstairs as fresh and chipper as anything. And the salesmen are the ones who are supposed to be the ones who can do all the drinking and such!”64
诺伊斯刚从欧洲回来，摩尔就离开公司一周。这种轮班工作在英特尔早期并不罕见。只要对方在家“照看公司”，诺伊斯和摩尔都乐意离开。
As soon as Noyce returned from Europe, Moore left town for a week. These sorts of oscillating schedules were not at all unusual in the early years at Intel. As long as the other was home to “mind the store,” both Noyce and Moore were comfortable going away.
1971年整个春夏两季，诺伊斯都在为英特尔秋季的首次公开募股（IPO）做准备。1103处理器开始展现出突破性成功的潜力。它不仅达到了诺伊斯设定的每便士的目标，而且超过了目标价格。除了使用专有设备的IBM之外，所有主要的计算机大型机制造商都已承诺生产该产品，或者已经完成了1103的原型机研发。这一消息有助于将英特尔定位为一家充满潜力的新兴企业——投资者最喜欢的公司类型。诺伊斯和洛克希望英特尔上市的另一个原因是，他们认为应该让员工有机会在公开市场上出售部分股票，尤其是那些最早获得股票期权的员工，他们的期权价值已经翻了近五倍。此外，英特尔也需要资金。搬迁到新大楼导致7月和8月亏损超过40万美元，虽然9月份的情况有所好转，但诺伊斯警告员工：“一只知更鸟并不能带来整个春天，竞争形势依然严峻。”65
Throughout the spring and summer of 1971, Noyce was also preparing for Intel’s initial public offering of stock, slated for the fall. The 1103 was beginning to look like a breakaway success. It had met and then passed Noyce’s penny-a-bit target and every major computer mainframe manufacturer other than IBM (which used proprietary devices) had committed to the product or had the 1103 in prototype. This news helped position Intel as a promising upstart bursting with potential—investors’ favorite type of company. Noyce and Rock also wanted to take Intel public because they felt that it was time to give the employees, the earliest of whom had seen the value of their stock options nearly quintuple, a chance to sell some of the stock on the public market. Plus, Intel could use the cash. The move to the new building generated losses of more than $400,000 for July and August, and while September was looking more promising, Noyce warned employees that “one robin doesn’t make a spring, and the competitive situation remains severe.”65
为了筹备IPO，诺伊斯咨询了律师和银行家，审阅了招股说明书草稿，会见了审计师，签署了发行所需的证书，给员工和现有投资者撰写了说明信，邀请员工以“公司之友”的身份购买股票，并与罗克以及承销此次IPO的投资银行CE Unterberg Towbin的高管进行了数十次会面。到了8月份，诺伊斯几乎每天的日程都至少包含一项与IPO相关的安排。66
In preparation for the IPO, Noyce consulted with attorneys and bankers, reviewed drafts of the prospectus, met with auditors, signed the certificates necessary for the offering, wrote explanatory letters to employees and current investors, invited employees to buy stock in the offering as “friends of the company,” and met dozens of times with Rock and with executives from C. E. Unterberg, Towbin, the investment bank that was underwriting the offering. By August, most of Noyce’s days included at least one IPO-related appointment.66
美国证券交易委员会（SEC）关于上市公司发行的规定要求英特尔取消公司成立之初设立的股票购买计划。诺伊斯曾设想用期权包取代该计划，并将期权包分发给每位员工，“包括清洁工”。但他担心，教育程度有限的人是否能够理解股票期权的概念以及市场的波动性。他和摩尔最终决定，一旦制定出符合SEC对上市公司指导方针的计划，英特尔就应该重新为非专业员工实施股票购买计划，而不是期权。员工。根据这项于1972年实施的计划，每位员工最多可以领取相当于基本工资10%的英特尔股票，购买价格比市场价低15%。这项股票购买计划实现了诺伊斯和摩尔的目标，即让员工持有公司股份，而无需他们掌握与股票期权相关的复杂金融知识。67
SEC rules for public offerings required Intel to cancel the stock-purchase plan set up at the company’s establishment. Noyce dreamed of replacing this plan with options packages that would be distributed to every employee, “including janitors.” He worried, though, if people with limited educations could understand what a stock option was and how volatile the markets could be. He and Moore finally decided that once a plan could be developed that met SEC guidelines for publicly held companies, Intel should re-institute a stock-purchase plan, rather than options, for nonprofessional employees. Under this plan, which was implemented in 1972, every employee would be allowed to take up to 10 percent of base pay in Intel stock, which could be bought at 15 percent below market rates. The stock purchase plan met Noyce and Moore’s goals of giving employees a stake in the company without requiring the sophisticated financial knowledge associated with stock options.67
诺伊斯的工作量雪上加霜的是，格雷厄姆和格罗夫之间的紧张关系在1971年夏天达到了白热化阶段。5月，格罗夫怒气冲冲地走进摩尔的办公室，告诉他，他觉得自己可能需要离开英特尔，因为正如他后来所说，“一边在工作中做着我必须做的事情，一边还要和鲍勃·格雷厄姆斗争，这让我太痛苦了。” 听到这个消息，摩尔开始摆弄桌上的回形针——对于了解他的人来说，这无疑是压力过大的表现。鲍勃·格雷厄姆是摩尔的挚友，他们经常一起钓鱼。68
Adding to Noyce’s workload were the tensions between Graham and Grove, which reached a breaking point in the summer of 1971. In May, Grove had marched into Moore’s office and told him that he thought he might need to leave Intel because, as he later put it, “it was far too painful for me to continue to do what I needed to do at work and fight Bob Graham.” Faced with this news, Moore had begun to fiddle with a paper clip on his desk—a sure sign of stress to those who know him. Bob Graham was a close personal friend of Moore’s. They often fished together.68
格鲁夫离开摩尔的办公室时，担心老板不会采取任何行动，但摩尔几乎立刻就走到诺伊斯的办公室，关上了门。不久之后，诺伊斯就开始面试市场营销岗位的候选人。尽管诺伊斯和格鲁夫在英特尔的管理方式截然不同，但诺伊斯渐渐开始欣赏格鲁夫——更重要的是，他意识到格鲁夫对公司的价值。诺伊斯亲眼目睹了仙童公司内部的斯波克离职后发生的事情。他绝不能让悲剧重演。
Grove left Moore’s office worried that his boss was not going to do anything, but Moore almost immediately walked over to Noyce’s office and shut the door. Shortly thereafter, Noyce began interviewing candidates for the marketing job. Although Noyce and Grove had very different approaches to management at Intel, Noyce had grown to like Grove—and more importantly, to appreciate his value to the company. Noyce saw what had happened at Fairchild when his detail-man Sporck left. He could not let that happen again.
到了六月，诺伊斯找到了一位令他印象深刻且他认为能与格罗夫共事的市场营销候选人：埃德·格尔巴赫，一位来自德州仪器、留着浓密胡须、说话直率、技术娴熟、精于数据分析的市场营销专家。为了保险起见，诺伊斯和摩尔坚持要求格罗夫在正式录用格尔巴赫之前先面试他。格罗夫对格尔巴赫印象深刻，不仅批准了他的聘用，还开始蓄起了自己的胡子。格尔巴赫上任后立即展现了他的谈判技巧，为自己争取到了一份非常丰厚的股票期权。69
By June, Noyce had found a marketing candidate who impressed him and who he thought could work with Grove: Ed Gelbach, a luxuriously mustachioed, straight-talking, technically trained, number crunching marketing expert from Texas Instruments. Just to be safe, Noyce and Moore insisted that Grove interview Gelbach before they offered him a job. Grove came away so impressed by Gelbach that he not only approved his hiring but also began growing his own mustache. Gelbach immediately demonstrated his negotiation skills by securing a very rich stock-options package for himself.69
格尔巴赫在甲板上，摩尔则去钓鱼了——摩尔说，这是一次事先计划好的休假，“让我轻松多了”——七月初，诺伊斯走进鲍勃·格雷厄姆的办公室，坐了下来。“糟了，”诺伊斯开门见山地说，“我们之间情况不合适，你得走了。”格雷厄姆打电话回家告诉妻子他丢了工作，妻子只说了一句：“谢天谢地。”与格罗夫的争斗已经把他们所有人都折磨得精疲力竭。70
With Gelbach on deck and Moore away on a fishing trip—a planned absence that “just made it a lot easier for me,” Moore says—Noyce walked into Bob Graham’s office in early July and sat down. “Shit,” Noyce said, cutting straight to the point. “We have an incompatible situation here, and you’re going to have to go.” When Graham called home to tell his wife that he had lost his job, all she said was, “Thank God.” The battles with Grove had been destroying them all.70
格雷厄姆很可能是诺伊斯亲自解雇的第一个人，考虑到诺伊斯担任高级经理已有十多年，这种情况实属罕见。解雇格雷厄姆对诺伊斯来说一定非常痛苦，因为他认为格雷厄姆聪明且善于与客户打交道。在费尔柴尔德公司，这种看法，再加上诺伊斯本人不喜欢与人发生冲突，可能会让他做出这样的决定。这些理由足以让格雷厄姆继续留任。但诺伊斯已经吸取了教训。他需要格罗夫在英特尔的“鞭策”。“诺伊斯当时肯定付出了巨大的代价，”格罗夫多年后感慨道，“这简直就像是割掉了他的肝脏。”71
Graham was probably the first person that Noyce personally fired, a remarkable situation given that Noyce had been a senior manager for more than a decade. Firing Graham must have been excruciating for Noyce, who thought he was smart and good with customers. At Fairchild, those feelings, coupled with Noyce’s own dislike of personal confrontation, would have been reasons enough to keep Graham on board. But Noyce had learned his lesson. He needed the Grove “whip” at Intel. “What that must have taken for Noyce to do,” Grove mused aloud years later. “It must have been like cutting out his liver.”71
埃德·格尔巴赫加入英特尔后，立即对公司在Busicom计算器套装中处理器芯片的研发策略产生了影响。格尔巴赫的前东家德州仪器公司当时正致力于开发通用逻辑芯片，而格尔巴赫和诺伊斯、霍夫一样，都看到了这类芯片的潜力。他坚信英特尔必须找到办法，获得他们为Busicom开发的微处理器的专利权。
ED GELBACH’S ARRIVAL AT INTEL had an immediate effect on the company’s approach to the processor chip in the Busicom calculator set. Texas Instruments, Gelbach’s previous employer, was trying to build a general-purpose logic chip, and Gelbach, like Noyce and Hoff, saw the promise in the devices. He absolutely thought Intel needed to find a way to get the rights to the microprocessor they were building for Busicom.
格尔巴赫的热情重新聚焦了诺伊斯对这台设备的思考。格尔巴赫到任不到一周，诺伊斯就开始在他几乎随身携带的那本薄薄的黑色封面记录本上记录关于微处理器的想法。这些想法远远超出了计算器的范畴：“销售点——库存控制”、“数据检索概念”、“电子结账”、“超市——三大市场——1. 硬件，2. 用于管理的数据处理，3. 来自波动基数的市场调研数据”。他设想了可能对微处理器感兴趣的客户：“NCR、Litton、RCA、Pitney Bowes、AC Nielson、时代公司”。他甚至能想象出这些设备在“交通控制——红绿灯”或“加油泵”中的应用场景。72
Gelbach’s enthusiasm refocused Noyce’s thoughts on the device. Within a week of Gelbach’s arrival, Noyce began jotting down ideas about microprocessors in the thin, black-covered record book he carried with him nearly all the time. The pages are peppered with ideas that ranged far beyond calculators: “point of sale—inventory control,” “concept for data retrieval,” “electronic checkout,” “Supermarket—3 mkts [markets]—1. hardware, 2. processing of data for mgmt [management], 3. market research data from volatile base.” He imagined customers who might be interested in microprocessors: “NCR, Litton, RCA, Pitney Bowes, AC Nielson, Time Inc.” He could picture the devices used in “traffic control—stop lights” or in “gas pumps.”72
8月，诺伊斯要求英特尔总法律顾问调查与该微处理器相关的“独占权”问题。这很可能就是英特尔正式开始与中国方面谈判，争取将该微处理器的所有权的过程。9月21日，诺伊斯在日本会见了小岛先生，很可能就是在那天，双方达成了最终协议。谈判过程相当随意。“日本人进行这类谈判时通常不会聘请律师；美国人则倾向于这样做，”诺伊斯后来解释说。“所以（Busicom公司）派了一个人……只是把我们达成的协议条款记录下来，我们就坐在办公室里谈；协议非常简单明了……就是简单地写下‘你同意这样做，我们同意那样做’。”谈判结束后，英特尔获得了将该芯片用于非计算器应用领域的权利。大约在同一时间，出于对潜在利益冲突的担忧，诺伊斯辞去了Four-Phase公司董事会的职务。Four-Phase公司当时正在围绕一款通用逻辑芯片开发计算机。73
In August, Noyce requested that Intel’s general counsel investigate “exclusivity” issues related to the microprocessor. This is probably when the process of negotiating the rights to the microprocessor back to Intel began in earnest. Noyce met with Mr. Kojima in Japan on September 21, most likely the date that the negotiations, which were quite casual, were finalized. “The Japanese don’t use lawyers for these kinds of negotiations; the Americans tend to,” Noyce explained later. “So [Busicom] had a guy … who was just writing down the terms of what we agreed on, sitting there talking in the office; very nice simple agreements…. It was just simply writing down, ‘You agree to do this, we agree to do that.’” When the discussions concluded, Intel had secured the right to sell the chip for non-calculator applications. Around this time, concerns about a potential conflict of interest led Noyce to resign from the board of Four-Phase, the company building a computer around a general-purpose logic chip.73
然而，英特尔并没有立即行使其销售这款微处理器的权利。诺伊斯告诉霍夫：“我们抓住了把柄，但我们还没准备好发布这款产品。我们还没准备好做决定。”此时，诺伊斯和摩尔并不担心微处理器是否有市场，但他们不确定这款微处理器是否“足以满足市场需求”（用诺伊斯的话说）。“我们是否应该等待更好的产品？”一些董事会成员担心……微处理器可能会将公司推向系统业务领域。与大多数其他半导体公司一样，英特尔销售的是单个电路，客户会将这些电路插入到他们自己设计的系统中。但霍夫设计的这款四芯片微处理器系列本身就是一个完整的系统。一些董事会成员担心，将微处理器推向市场会使英特尔陷入与自身客户竞争的境地，这种担忧与仙童半导体公司推出集成电路时所面临的担忧如出一辙。诺伊斯创立英特尔的初衷是，半导体公司终有一天也会制造使用其电路的计算机系统——事实上，这也是诺伊斯聘用霍夫的原因之一，因为霍夫在计算机系统方面拥有丰富的经验——但这远非普遍认同的观点。74
Intel did not, however, immediately exercise its right to market the microprocessor. Noyce told Hoff, “We have a tiger by the tail, but we’re just not ready to announce the product. We’re not ready to make a decision.” At this point, Noyce and Moore were not concerned about whether a market existed for a microprocessor device, but they were unsure whether this particular microprocessor was, in Noyce’s words, “adequate to serve that market. Should we wait to get something better?” A few board members feared that the microprocessor might push the company into the systems business. Intel, like most other semiconductor companies, sold individual circuits that customers would plug into systems of their own design. But this four-chip microprocessor family Hoff had designed was already a system in itself. Some board members worried that a move to market the microprocessor would put Intel in the position of competing with its own customers, a fear that echoed those faced by Fairchild Semiconductor when it introduced the integrated circuit. Noyce had begun Intel with the expectation that the day would come when semiconductor companies would also build the computer systems that used their circuits—that is, in fact, one reason why Noyce hired Hoff, with his expertise in computer systems—but this was far from a universally accepted opinion.74
当诺伊斯向霍夫解释完他并不确定英特尔是否会在短期内将这款微处理器推向市场时，霍夫几乎要崩溃了。“你们每拖延一次（微处理器的公开发布），就等于在做决定！”他说道，“你们是在做不发布的决定。肯定会有人抢先一步。我们会错失良机。”75
When Noyce finished explaining to Hoff that he was not certain Intel would bring the microprocessor to market any time soon, Hoff was almost beside himself. “Every time you delay [a public announcement of the microprocessor], you are making a decision!” he said. “You’re making a decision not to announce. Someone is going to beat us to it. We’re going to lose this opportunity.”75
最终，少数董事会成员的反对意见根本无法撼动诺伊斯、摩尔、格尔巴赫以及阿瑟·洛克对这款新设备的鼎力支持。（格鲁夫说：“微处理器对我来说毫无意义。我当时一心只想着内存的两个良率点。”）英特尔大概是在十月份决定将这款微处理器推向市场的。76
In the end, the few board members’ objections had no hope of succeeding against the force of the support Noyce, Moore, and Gelbach—as well as Arthur Rock—expressed for this new device. (Grove says, “Microprocessors meant nothing to me. I was living and dying on two points of yields in memory.”) It was probably October when Intel decided to market the microprocessor.76
然而，在1971年秋季，微处理器远非诺伊斯议程上最重要的事项。10月13日，公司上市，以每股23.50美元的价格发行了近30万股股票。这在公司中所占比例并不大。英特尔的早期员工和董事们（在股票拆分后）共持有220万股股票，平均每股价格为4.04美元。此次上市取得了巨大的成功：认购踊跃，立即为英特尔筹集了近700万美元。77
Yet the microprocessor was far from the most important item on Noyce’s agenda in the fall of 1971. On October 13, the company went public, offering nearly 300,000 shares at $23.50 apiece. This was not a large slice of the company. Early employees and directors of Intel held a combined 2.2 million shares (after stock splits), for which they had paid an average of $4.04. The offering was a smashing success: oversubscribed and immediately raising nearly $7 million for Intel.77
诺伊斯飞往纽约参加英特尔的首次公开募股，作为这家上市公司的掌门人，他第一天的大部分时间都在城里四处走动，每隔几个小时就停下来，在公用电话亭给亚瑟·洛克打电话，询问英特尔的最新交易情况。
Noyce had flown to New York for the IPO, and he spent most of this first day as head of the publicly traded Intel walking the city, stopping every few hours at a pay telephone to call Arthur Rock for the latest word on how Intel was trading.
与诺伊斯一同漫步在曼哈顿摩天大楼间的，是英特尔MOS部门的一名掩模设计师芭芭拉·马内斯。马内斯28岁，容貌姣好，有着一头长长的稻草色头发和清澈的蓝眼睛。她是英特尔的43号员工。她和诺伊斯从1969年夏天就开始了一段婚外情。那年夏天，诺伊斯带着妻子和孩子在缅因州待了三个月，期间他邀请马内斯共进晚餐。78
Walking with Noyce among the skyscrapers of Manhattan was Barbara Maness, a mask designer in Intel’s MOS group. Maness was 28 and attractive, with long, straw-colored hair and clear blue eyes. She was employee number 43 at Intel. She and Noyce had been engaged in an affair since the summer of 1969, when Noyce, his wife and children in Maine for three months, invited Maness to dinner.78
作为一名掩模设计师，马内斯是英特尔收入最高的女性之一。掩模是任何类型集成芯片的详细蓝图。电路图。在20世纪60年代末，它们通常由成千上万个方块、X形标记、虚线、点线、粗线、细线组成——每个图案都用不同的颜色编码，并尽可能小地手工绘制，每个图案都代表一个晶体管、二极管或电路中元件之间的特定连接方式。工程师们传统上会自己绘制掩模，但在1966年，仙童公司决定培训一批精选的女性，教她们如何将工程师的图纸转化为掩模设计。
As a mask designer, Maness was among the most highly compensated women at Intel. Masks are the detailed blueprints for any type of integrated circuit. In the late 1960s, they regularly consisted of thousands of squares, Xs, dashed lines, dotted lines, fat lines, thin lines—each color-coded and hand-drawn as small as possible, and each symbolizing a transistor or a diode or particular type of connection among the components in a circuit. Engineers had traditionally drawn their own masks, but in 1966, Fairchild had decided to teach a select group of women how to translate the engineers’ plans into mask designs.
1966年，玛内斯在仙童公司做模具装配工，上夜班。（她当时并不认识仙童公司的诺伊斯。）她刚离婚不久，前夫对她的三个年幼的孩子不闻不问。她住在高速公路附近，在她形容为“圣何塞的糟糕地段”，住在一辆移动房屋里，这是她唯一的选择，因为大多数公寓房东都不愿意把房子租给单身母亲。她长期处于精疲力竭的状态，午夜下班，凌晨去保姆家接孩子，自己也只能睡几个小时，孩子们就醒了需要她。当仙童公司的一位工程师建议她去争取参加首届掩模设计培训班时，她欣然接受了这个机会，因为薪水更高，工作时间也更合理。她参加了必要的考试，成为六名被录取的女性之一。她离开仙童公司加入英特尔，仅仅是因为她最密切的同事接受了英特尔的工作，并邀请她一起去那里。
In 1966, Maness worked for Fairchild as a die attacher on the swing shift. (She did not know Noyce at Fairchild.) She was recently divorced from a man who provided no support for her three young children. She lived near the freeway in what she described as a “bad part of San Jose,” in a mobile home that was the only option available to her because most apartment landlords did not want to rent to single mothers. She existed in a state of permanent exhaustion, getting off work at midnight, picking up her children at a sitter’s in the wee hours of the morning, and sleeping only a few hours before the children awoke and needed her. When one of the Fairchild engineers suggested that she try to win a spot in the inaugural mask-design class, she jumped at the chance for a bigger paycheck and more reasonable hours. She took the required tests and was one of six women admitted to the class. She left Fairchild for Intel only because the engineer with whom she worked most closely had accepted a job at Intel and asked her to work for him there.
在英特尔，马内斯与诺伊斯的关系早已是公开的秘密。许多人认为贝蒂宣布她要去缅因州过暑假是在“公开邀请鲍勃去找别的女人”。婚外情虽然总被认为有些见不得光，但却十分普遍，甚至衍生出了一套专属词汇。那些女人被称为“女朋友”，那些情侣被称为“约会”。诺伊斯和马内斯经常与其他半导体公司高管及其女友聚会。79
Maness’s presence in Noyce’s life was an open secret at Intel, where many people considered Betty’s announcement that she was going to live in Maine for the summers “an open invitation for Bob to find another woman.” Extramarital affairs, while always considered a bit shady, were common enough to have generated their own lexicon. The women were called “girlfriends.” The couples were “dating.” Noyce and Maness regularly spent time with other semiconductor executives and their girlfriends.79
芭芭拉·马内斯和贝蒂·诺伊斯一样聪明，但与贝蒂不同的是，她年轻、充满冒险精神、不拘小节，而且对诺伊斯忠贞不渝。诺伊斯喜欢和她一起做那些他和妻子永远无法一起做的事情。他可以和她畅谈英特尔及其产品的技术细节。她欣然陪他去夏威夷扬帆远航，去阿斯彭滑雪，并在他们沿着加州海岸线飞行时，坐在他飞机的副驾驶座上观看独立日烟火。诺伊斯出钱让马内斯学习飞行——“如果我出了什么事，我希望你知道如何降落飞机”——她非常喜欢飞行。他在飞机后部放了一辆可折叠摩托车，他和马内斯经常在飞机降落后骑车去偏远的地方。然后他们会背着背包徒步几个小时，有时甚至会走到雪线以上。之后，他们会喝着“紫色耶稣”（葡萄味唐饮料加伏特加）放松身心，诺伊斯会把这种饮料放在雪里冰镇。
Barbara Maness was every bit as bright as Betty Noyce but, unlike Betty, she was also young, adventurous, undemanding, and unquestionably devoted. Noyce enjoyed doing with her things he never could have done with his wife. He could talk with her at length about Intel and the technical aspects of its products. She happily joined him to sail in Hawaii, to ski in Aspen, and to watch the Independence Day fireworks from the copilot’s seat of his plane as they flew down the California coast. Noyce paid for Maness to take flying lessons—“If something happens to me, I want you to know how to land the plane”—which she adored. He kept a collapsible motorcycle in the back of his plane, and he and Maness would often ride to remote locations after they landed. Then they would backpack for hours, sometimes above the snow line. Later they would unwind with cups of “Purple Jesus”—grape Tang and vodka—that Noyce chilled in the snow pack.
马内斯完全自给自足。她独自抚养三个孩子，还设法攒够了钱，在圣克鲁斯山脉买了一块地，打算在那里盖房子。诺伊斯很欣赏她的独立精神。“你会做得很好，”他钦佩地对她说，“我就在一旁看着。”
Maness was entirely self-sufficient. While singlehandedly raising three children, she also managed to save enough to buy a parcel of land in the Santa Cruz Mountains, where she intended to build a home. Noyce found her independence attractive. “You’ll do well,” he told her admiringly, “and I’ll just stand by and watch.”
诺伊斯最喜欢这段禁忌恋情的一点，就是他所谓的“阴谋”。他向来喜欢冒险，乐于让自己的家人和玛内斯近距离接触。他出钱让玛内斯的孩子们去参加夏令营，这样在家人外出度假的暑假，她就可以和他一起住在他家。他喜欢在和贝蒂通电话时，玛内斯也在场。女儿的狗生了小狗后，诺伊斯让玛内斯假扮成在公司公告栏上看到出售信息的英特尔员工，去贝蒂家买一只。玛内斯“吓得要死”，但她还是去了。如果诺伊斯一家去英特尔切割红宝石时戴的面具是玛内斯设计的，也并不奇怪。
One of Noyce’s favorite parts of their illicit romance was the element he called “intrigue.” Always a risk taker, he reveled in bringing his family and Maness into close proximity with each other. He paid for Maness’s children to attend sleep-away camp so that she could live in his house with him for the summers while his family was away. He enjoyed having Maness with him when he talked to Betty on the phone. When his daughter’s dog had puppies, Noyce asked Maness to come to the house to buy one from Betty, posing as a random Intel employee who had read about their sale on a company bulletin board. Maness was “scared to death,” but she did it. It would not be surprising if Maness had designed the mask that the Noyce family followed when they came to Intel to cut rubylith.
诺伊斯在工作中也玩着类似的把戏。英特尔公司买了一批话剧票，他弄到两张，把其中一张给了马内斯，然后把她送到离剧院几个街区远的地方。马内斯坐在一个空位旁边，直到灯光暗下来，他才溜进去和她坐在一起。灯光再次亮起之前，他立刻离开了。有一次出差，他故意当着一位同事的面买了一条漂亮的珍珠项链，这位同事几乎肯定会在公司圣诞晚会上看到马内斯戴着这条项链。他还让马内斯陪他去和一位英特尔的重要访客共进晚餐，第二天早上，他特意安排这位访客从正在设计稿的马内斯身边经过。这种“耍花招”的感觉让他无比得意。而马内斯则通常保持沉默。“我很保护他，”她解释说，“我不会到处炫耀。”80
Noyce played the same sorts of games at work. When Intel bought a block of tickets for a play, he obtained a pair and gave one to Maness, whom he dropped off a few blocks from the theater. She sat next to an empty seat until the lights went down, at which point he ducked in and joined her. Immediately before the lights came up again, he left. On a business trip, he made a show of buying a stunning pearl necklace in front of a colleague who would be almost certain to see it around Maness’s neck at the company Christmas party. He had Maness accompany him to a dinner with an important visitor to Intel, and the next morning went out of his way to lead this man past Maness as she worked on her design. This notion of “pulling one over on people” delighted him to no end. For her part, Maness generally kept quiet. “I was very protective of him,” she explains. “I didn’t go bragging about.”80
在公司上市当天，诺伊斯漫步在纽约街头，特意带马内斯去了自由女神像——那是他少年时期在格林内尔学院读书时梦寐以求的地方。如今他梦想成真，成为举足轻重的人物，身边还有一位佳人相伴——而他最后一次给洛克打的电话，也让他得知自己已经身价十万。81
Walking through the streets of New York City on the day his company went public, Noyce made sure to take Maness to the Statue of Liberty, the very place he had only dreamed of seeing he was a teenager in Grinnell. Now he was here, an important man with a beauty at his side—and his last phone call to Rock informed him that he was also a millionaire ten times over.81
诺伊斯回到加州后几乎立刻就开始学习喷气式飞机飞行员执照课程。他每天的日程表上都详细记录着：“注意——5000英尺高度，保持500英尺/分钟的爬升——平飞并检查地平线——65%功率巡航，速度5-7，高度保持500和1000英尺——高速……”他还开始寻找小型喷气式飞机，并参加飞机所有者和飞行员协会的会议。在公司上市后，诺伊斯一家的生活并没有发生什么明显的变化。他担心，如果家庭拥有巨额财富，“就很难教导孩子正确的价值观”。他曾对朋友说：“在贫穷的父亲的熏陶下长大要容易得多——因为你得努力奋斗——而不是在富有的父亲的熏陶下长大。”他和贝蒂尽可能地对孩子们隐瞒家里的经济状况。82
ALMOST IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS return to California, Noyce began lessons for certification as a jet pilot. He kept detailed notes in his daily calendar: “Watch—at 5000 flatten to get 500’min—level air plane and check horizon—at 65% power for cruise 5-7 speed altitude and main[tain] for 500 and 1000—hi speed….” He also began shopping for small jets and attending meetings of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. At home, the Noyces’ family life registered few visible changes after the IPO. Noyce worried that it was “tough to teach values” when a family had great sums of money. “It’s much easier to be raised with a father who is poor—[because] you have to hustle—than it is with a father who is wealthy,” he told a friend. He and Betty kept knowledge of the family’s financial situation hidden from the children as much as possible.82
1971年11月15日，也就是公司上市近一个月后，英特尔发布了其微处理器，并刊登了一则醒目的广告，宣称“集成电子的新时代已经到来——芯片上的微可编程计算机！”超过5000人写信到广告底部的地址，索取更多信息——这是英特尔产品发布以来最热烈的反响。当时，诺伊斯正在拉斯维加斯参加秋季联合计算机会议，他很可能参与了英特尔展厅的人员安排，展厅很快就被想要了解“芯片上的计算机”的客户挤满了。83
Almost exactly a month after the IPO, on November 15, 1971, Intel announced its microprocessor with a bold advertisement proclaiming the arrival of “a new era of integrated electronics—a micro-programmable computer on a chip!” More than 5,000 people wrote to the address at the bottom of the advertisement, requesting more information—the most dramatic response to a product announcement Intel had ever experienced. Noyce was attending the Fall Joint Computer Conference in Las Vegas at the time of the announcement, and he almost certainly helped to staff the Intel suite, which was soon overrun with customers wanting to know more about “this computer on a chip thing.”83
要使用微处理器，客户必须转变思维方式。在微处理器出现之前，英特尔客户公司的设计师们通过在电路板上配置各个集成电路来构建系统，每个集成电路都具有不同的专用功能。更改系统需要改变集成电路的物理布局，也就是硬件。英特尔的新型微处理器系统则截然不同——它不再通过移动物理对象来实现更改，而是通过重新编程存储在程序存储器中的指令来实现。换句话说，微处理器将软件引入了半导体行业。这样做也给客户带来了新的要求，而这些客户大多是经验丰富的硬件设计师，他们并不熟悉如何使用计算机程序来解决系统问题。84
To use the microprocessor, customers had to change their thinking. Before the microprocessor, designers at Intel’s customer firms built their systems by configuring individual integrated circuits, each with a different dedicated function, on a board. Changing the system required changing the physical arrangement of the integrated circuits, or hardware. Intel’s new microprocessor systems required something very different—changes made not by moving physical objects, but by reprogramming the instructions stored in program memory. The microprocessor, in other words, brought software to the semiconductor industry. In doing so, it placed new demands on customers, most of whom were experienced hardware designers unfamiliar with using computer programs to solve their systems problems.84
1971 年末，英特尔聘请了市场营销和公共关系专家雷吉斯·麦肯纳 (Regis McKenna)，他这样总结了英特尔微处理器面临的问题：“如果人们不知道这些东西是什么，你就无法推广它们。” 这方面的挑战非常严峻，以至于盖尔巴赫 (Gelbach) 专门设立了一个独立的微处理器营销部门，与市场营销部门的其他部分分开。公司为 4004 微处理器编写了大量的技术文档——仅用户手册就超过 100 页，而当时其他英特尔芯片的包装盒里只有一份十页的数据手册。英特尔为 4004 微处理器出货的手册数量甚至超过了实际的处理器数量。“很多人都想了解微处理器，无论他们是否购买，”盖尔巴赫聘请的负责微处理器营销的比尔·戴维多 (Bill Davidow) 解释道。85
Regis McKenna, a marketing and public relations expert hired by Intel late in 1971, summarized the problems facing Intel’s microprocessors thus: “You couldn’t promote the things [if] people didn’t know what they were.” The challenges faced on this front were daunting enough that Gelbach set up an independent microprocessor marketing operation, separate from the rest of the marketing division. The company developed voluminous written technical documentation for the 4004—the owner’s manual alone ran well over 100 pages at a time when other Intel chips were boxed with only a ten-page data sheet. Intel shipped more manuals for the 4004 than actual processors. “There were just lots of people who wanted to read about microprocessors, independent of whether they were buying any,” explained Bill Davidow, whom Gelbach had hired to run microprocessor marketing.85
英特尔开发并销售了用于简化微处理器编程的硬件工具。EPROM 是一种专用的只读存储器芯片，可以通过电信号编程，并用紫外线擦除。这使得微处理器的重新编程变得非常容易。名为“Intellec”的开发辅助工具是硬件仿真环境，它们是简单的单板计算机，包含模拟中央处理器运行所需的所有电路。设计人员可以在确定具体的微处理器程序之前，使用这种开发辅助工具进行原型设计。EPROM 和 Intellec 系统以软件的形式运行，但外观与设计人员熟悉的硬件类似。
Intel developed and marketed hardware tools to facilitate programming the microprocessor. The EPROM, a specialized read-only memory chip, could be programmed electrically and erased with ultraviolet light, which made it possible to reprogram the microprocessor very easily. Development aids, marketed under the name “Intellec,” were hardware simulation environments, simple single-board versions of a computer with all the proper circuitry to emulate the functioning of a central processor. A designer could use this development aid in prototype before committing to a specific microprocessor program. The EPROM and Intellec systems functioned as software but looked like the hardware familiar to designers.
正如戴维多夫所说，英特尔还赞助了一系列关于微处理器的技术研讨会，以此作为“降低与工程师对抗程度”的持续努力的一部分。1971年和1972年，英特尔的高级工程师以惊人的速度主持了这些研讨会。典型的行程安排是：一天在康涅狄格州，第二天在新泽西州，第三天在费城，第四天在罗切斯特，然后经过一个周末的休息，又前往明尼阿波利斯、芝加哥、安娜堡、休斯顿和达拉斯。这些会议对演讲者以及听众都大有裨益，演讲者们在会上获得了关于处理器架构和性能的精辟见解。86
Intel also sponsored a series of technical seminars on the microprocessor as part of the ongoing attempt to “lower the confrontation level with the engineers,” as Davidow puts it. Senior Intel engineers led seminars at a bruising rate in 1971 and 1972. A typical schedule found them one day in Connecticut, the next in New Jersey, the next in Philadelphia, the next in Rochester, and then, after a weekend of rest, in Minneapolis, Chicago, Ann Arbor, Houston, and Dallas. These meetings were as helpful to the presenters, who received pointed commentary on the processors’ architecture and performance, as they were to the audience.86
早期的大多数微处理器都被用作控制设备，而不是计算机。雷吉斯·麦肯纳 (Regis McKenna) 于 1972 年编写了一本应用手册，旨在解释“人们如何使用微处理器”，其中列举了机场的“大麻嗅探器”（用于在行李中查找违禁毒品）、一种可以同时冲洗一排厕所所有马桶以节约用水的装置、血液分析仪、交通信号灯控制器、简易测试仪和机床控制器等应用。当格尔巴赫 (Gelbach) 将这份清单提交给董事会时，一位董事转向他问道：“难道你就没有任何值得骄傲的客户吗？”87
Most of the early microcprocessors were used as control devices, not in computers. An applications book that Regis McKenna developed in 1972 to explain “how people use microprocessors” included an airport “marijuana sniffer” to find illlicit drugs in luggage, a device to flush all the commodes in a bank of toilets simultaneously to save water, blood analyzers, traffic light controllers, simple testers, and machine tool controls. When Gelbach presented this list to the board, one director turned to him and asked, “Don’t you have any customers you could be proud of?”87
1971年末，诺伊斯花费了大量时间来安抚那些购买了大量 1103 处理器却因设备问题而感到沮丧的客户。1969 年加入英特尔市场营销部门的迈克·马克库拉回忆起诺伊斯是如何化解问题的：“鲍勃为人非常坦诚，从不试图掩盖问题。他会说，‘我们知道问题出在哪里。我们正在解决。这是我们预计的修复时间。我们正在尽一切可能满足您的要求——是的，我们犯了错。’你知道，当你如此诚实坦率时，客户很难继续生气。” 马克库拉曾多次看到诺伊斯用这种方法安抚 Burroughs 公司，该公司在其一台计算机中使用了这款性能不稳定的 1103 处理器。“如果没有鲍勃多次的沟通，双方的关系早就破裂了。” 马克库拉说道。 “没有他的帮助，我们根本不可能把所有事情都处理好。[诺伊斯]会问，‘好，你们想让我跟这些人说什么？’然后我们会把所有背景信息、所有内幕消息都告诉他，他就会去[跟他们谈]。他在这方面真的很擅长。”罗杰·博罗沃伊也赞同道：“如果你遇到不满意的客户，最好的办法就是派诺伊斯去。首先，他就像一块海绵，能迅速吸收信息。他会坐下来和任何人交谈，他可能是个市场营销人员，或者别的什么人，十分钟之内就能把所有细节都记在脑子里。然后他出去把这些细节处理得天衣无缝，他什么都知道，看起来就像诺伊斯——这位伟大的诺伊斯——对客户的问题了如指掌一样。”88
NOYCE SPENT MUCH OF THE END OF 1971 trying to placate customers who had bought large numbers of 1103s and were frustrated by the device’s problems. Mike Markkula, who joined Intel’s marketing group in 1969, recalls how Noyce often defused problems: “Bob was just so straightforward and didn’t try to sweep things under the carpet. He’d say, ‘We know what the problem is. We’re fixing it. Here’s when we’ll get it fixed. We’re doing everything humanly possible to meet your requirements—and yeah, we goofed up.’ You know, when you’re that honest and that straightforward, it’s hard [for the customer] to continue to be angry.” Markkula saw Noyce use this approach several times with Burroughs, which was using the temperamental 1103s in one of its computers. “Without Bob’s interaction on many occasions, that relationship would have died,” Markkula says. “There was no way that we could keep the whole thing together without his help. [Noyce] would say, ‘Okay, what do you want me to tell these guys?’ And we’d give him all the background, all the scoop, and he would go [talk to them]. And he was really good at it.” Concurs Roger Borovoy, “If you have a disgruntled customer, the best thing you can do is send Noyce. First of all, he’s an instant sponge. Sits down with whomever, the marketing guy or whatever, and instantly absorbs every detail in his head in ten minutes. And then he goes out there and beautifully massages [the details], and he knows everything, and it looks like Noyce—this great god Noyce—is intimately involved in this customer’s problem.”88
诺伊斯为自己能安抚态度恶劣的顾客而感到自豪，但他最喜欢的工作内容是他所谓的“传教工作……传播微处理器的理念”。他对微处理器驱动的未来世界抱有近乎宗教般的热情，并且乐于在最意想不到的地方谈论它。1972年，他和贝蒂为父母准备了一个惊喜，带他们游览了旧金山，庆祝结婚五十周年，所有亲戚都参与其中。诺伊斯一家乘坐鲍勃和贝蒂包的巴士，诺伊斯走到车前，面对着坐在车里的家人。“各位，”他说，“我想让你们看看这个。”他举起一块直径约三英寸的硅片，上面印有微处理器。 “这将改变世界。它将彻底改变你们的家庭。在你们自己的家里，”他继续说道，显然是沉浸在自己的世界里，“你们都会有电脑。你们可以获取各种各样的信息。你们不再需要钱了。一切都将通过电子方式进行。”他小心翼翼地把薄片递给离他最近的人，然后坐了下来。车上至少有一位乘客，诺伊斯侄子的未婚妻，对这位准叔叔的炫耀感到惊讶，并对她认为其中蕴含的傲慢感到震惊。她记得当时心想：“这家伙真以为自己能预见未来。这永远不会发生。”89
Noyce was proud of his ability to calm hostile customers, but his favorite part of his job was what he called the “missionary work … to spread the word about microprocessors.” He certainly adopted a bit of a religious zeal about the microprocessor-driven world-to-come and was happy to talk about it in the most unlikely places. In 1972, he and Betty surprised his parents with a fiftieth anniversary tour of San Francisco that included the entire extended family. The Noyce clan was riding in a bus Bob and Betty had chartered when Noyce made his way to the front and faced his seated family. “Everybody,” he said, “I want you to see this.” He held up a silicon wafer about three inches in diameter and printed with microprocessors. “This is going to change the world. It’s going to revolutionize your home. In your own house,” he continued, clearly caught up in the moment, “you’ll all have computers. You will have access to all sorts of information. You won’t need money any more. Everything will happen electronically.” He carefully handed the wafer to the person nearest to him and sat back down. At least one person on the bus, the fiancée of Noyce’s nephew, was surprised by her would-be uncle’s showboating and appalled at the arrogance she thought it implied. She remembers thinking, “This guy really thinks he can see the future. This will never happen.”89
诺伊斯即将成为侄女的那位女士所表达的怀疑态度，与当年许多人听诺伊斯谈及英特尔微处理器时的反应相比，只是略有夸张。诺伊斯早期的“传教工作”可以理解为在公众舆论中播下微处理器的种子。当时的舆论环境十分恶劣，需要清除的障碍也很多。1971年，计算机已经从占据整个房间、价值百万美元的庞然大物缩小到冰箱大小、售价数万美元的设备。但诺伊斯试图让人们明白，计算机可以小到几块芯片就能握在手中。 1973年加入英特尔担任微处理器营销主管的比尔·戴维多夫表示，在大多数客户看来，“微处理器只是个玩具，而（计算机）是拥有海量存储空间的庞大机器。而诺伊斯却预言，有朝一日微处理器将成为一切的中央处理器。这是一个巨大的进步。”90
The skepticism expressed by Noyce’s soon-to-be niece was an only slightly exaggerated version of the response Intel’s microprocessor provoked in many people who heard Noyce speak about it. Noyce’s early rounds of “missionary work” can best be understood as preparing the soil of public opinion for the planting of the microprocessor. The ground was hard, and the debris to be cleared away was thick. Computers in 1971 had shrunk from room-sized million-dollar behemoths to refrigerator-sized units costing tens of thousands of dollars. But Noyce was trying to make people understand that a computer could be as small as a few chips you could hold in your hand. Bill Davidow, who joined Intel in 1973 as head of microprocessor marketing, says that in most customers’ minds, “the microprocessor was just a toy, and [computers] were these massive machines with massive amounts of storage. And here was Noyce predicting that someday this [microprocessor] would be the central processor for everything. That was a big step.”90
不少人还记得诺伊斯在1970年面向普通商界人士发表的一次演讲。演讲中有人问他：“假设我的[IBM] 360电脑真像您说的那么小，万一它掉进地板缝里怎么办？”诺伊斯脱口而出：“您不会在意的，换一台新的也就几美元。”这番话引来不少人难以置信的笑声。泰德·霍夫回忆起一位同样心存疑虑的听众问他关于微处理器维修的问题——芯片坏了该送到哪里去修，他们会在显微镜下修理吗？霍夫解释说，坏的芯片直接扔掉买个新的就行了。91
Several people remember a talk Noyce gave to a general business audience in 1970 in which he was asked, “Well, let’s just say my [IBM] 360 computer could be as small as you say. What if it fell through a crack in the floor?” Noyce’s quick response—“You wouldn’t care. It would just cost a few dollars to replace it”—sparked more than a few disbelieving laughs. Ted Hoff recalls a similarly unconvinced audience member asking him about microprocessor repairs—where would you take the chip to have it fixed, and would they do it under a microscope? Hoff explained that you would just throw away the chip and buy a new one.91
诺伊斯曾这样评价英特尔开拓微处理器市场的努力：“这是一场意见之争。” 1972年，其他几家公司也相继推出各自的微处理器，这场竞争更是愈演愈烈。92
“It was a battle of opinion,” Noyce once said of Intel’s bid to foster the microprocessor market. The battle only heightened when several other companies introduced their own microprocessors in 1972.92
为了提高高管们对微处理器的认识，诺伊斯拜访了他和戴维多夫认为未来可能成为重要客户的高层管理人员。这项工作并不轻松。这需要推广一种与现有技术现实几乎毫不相干的未来愿景。当诺伊斯向通用汽车的一群高管提出，公司未来或许可以使用计算机来控制发动机的油耗或防滑刹车时，这些管理人员并不买账。上次他们在概念车上安装计算机控制的防抱死制动系统时，计算机的成本几乎是汽车本身的两倍，而且几乎占据了整个后备箱空间。如果他们真的像诺伊斯推广的那样，把汽车后备箱塞满计算机，那司机该把购物袋放在哪里呢？93
In an attempt to raise senior executives’ awareness of the microprocessor, Noyce visited high-level managers at customers that he and Davidow thought might one day become major accounts. This was not particularly easy work. It required promoting a vision of the future that corresponded in only the most tenuous ways to the realities of the available technology. When Noyce suggested to a team of General Motors executives that the company might one day use computers to control the fuel consumption of engines or nonskid brakes, the managers were unconvinced. The last time they had installed computer-controlled, antilock brake equipment in one of their concept cars, the computer had cost nearly twice as much as the car and taken up nearly all of the trunk space. If they filled the trunk of a car with these computers Noyce was promoting, where would the drivers store their grocery bags?93
换句话说，通用汽车的高管们几乎无法相信一小块硅片就能完成计算机的工作——而诺伊斯几乎肯定在1971年告诉过他们，他们的怀疑并非毫无道理。没人会希望4004型芯片控制量产车的刹车系统；这套设备速度太慢，功能也太原始，无法广泛应用。而它的继任者8008型芯片（于1972年4月推出）也好不到哪里去。94
In other words, the GM executives found it nearly impossible to believe that a slice of silicon could do the work of a computer—and in 1971, Noyce almost certainly told them, their skepticism was well grounded. No one would want the 4004 controlling the brakes in production cars; the device was too slow and too rudimentary for general use. And its successor, the 8008 (introduced in April 1972), was not much better.94
但诺伊斯并非试图向通用汽车推销4004或8008微处理器。他只是开启了一些对话，他预料这些对话要几年后才会结出硕果。他深知自己面对的是根深蒂固的思维模式和长达数年的设计周期。他坚信，等到这些客户准备好尝试微处理器时，这项技术早已发展到足以满足他的设想。事实也的确如此。1974年，汽车制造商召开了首届汽车电子大会，大约在同一时期，微处理器开始应用于量产车辆。但在1972年，通用汽车只允许英特尔在其概念车上安装4004微处理器，作为防滑制动系统的控制器。诺伊斯一如既往地庆祝了微处理器的安装，他戴上头盔，驾驶着这辆车在通用汽车那条倾斜度极大的赛道上兜了一圈又一圈。95
But Noyce was not trying to sell 4004s or 8008s to General Motors. He was starting conversations that he expected would only bear fruit years later. He knew he was contending with entrenched ways of thinking and years-long design cycles. He felt confident that by the time these customers were prepared to experiment with microprocessors, the technology would have caught up to his visions for it. As indeed it did. It was 1974 when automobile manufacturers held their first Conference on Automobile Electronics and around this same date that microprocessors began to make their way into production vehicles. But in 1972, GM would only allow Intel to install a 4004 to serve as a controller for the nonskid brake system in its concept car. Noyce, true to form, celebrated their installation by donning a helmet and racing the car around and around the steeply banked GM track.95
9
几乎不可能的边缘
9
The Edge of What’s Barely Possible
安迪·格鲁夫在1972年的大部分时间里都忧心忡忡。2月份，他写道：“我们的情况糟透了！势头被打断，刷新问题（1103芯片的问题）依然存在，双极芯片的良率仍然（或者说再次）毫无起色！”他密切关注着英特尔的竞争对手，注意到德州仪器订购的4000台1103芯片并没有交付给他们的计算机部门，并公布了德州仪器分拆出来的Mostek公司在特定季度的半导体存储器出货量。12月份，他感到担忧，因为在审查他为1973年制定的运营计划的高管会议上，大家的发言“寥寥无几，充斥着长时间的沉默和叹息”。1
Andy Grove spent much of 1972 worrying. In February he wrote, “We are not doing well at all! Momentum broken, refresh [problem with the 1103] still with us, bipolar yield still (or again) nowhere!” He kept detailed tabs on Intel’s competition, noting that the 4,000 1103s ordered by Texas Instruments were not going to their computer group, and announcing how many semiconductor memories had been shipped by TI-spinout Mostek in a given quarter. In December, he was concerned because the comments offered at the executive meeting to review the operations plan he laid out for 1973 were “brief, between long periods of silence and sighs.”1
另一方面，诺伊斯则着眼于更广阔的视野，并且对1972年的大部分时间里所看到的景象感到满意。英特尔每年生产约10万颗1103芯片，仍然无法满足市场需求。到年底，1103已成为全球最畅销的内存芯片。由于其逆向工程难度极大，除了官方的第二供应商MIL之外，英特尔在一年多的时间里几乎没有竞争对手。当英特尔增大晶圆尺寸，而MIL试图效仿时，这家加拿大公司彻底失去了这项技术。这使得英特尔几乎垄断了1103芯片市场。事实上，英特尔1972年2340万美元的收入几乎全部来自这款芯片的销售。2
Noyce, on the other hand, took a wider view and liked what he saw for most of 1972. Intel was building about 100,000 1103s each year and still could not keep up with demand. By year’s end, the 1103 was the best-selling memory chip in the world. It was so terribly difficult to reverse engineer that Intel had almost no competitors, outside of its official second source MIL, for more than a year. When Intel increased the size of its wafers and MIL tried to follow suit, the Canadian company lost the process entirely. This left Intel with a near-monopoly on the 1103. Effectively all of Intel’s $23.4 million revenue in 1972 came from sales of this one device.2
为客户构建完整内存系统的初步尝试取得了丰厚的利润。微处理器为英特尔带来了数百家新客户，其中大多数是订单量较小的公司，但这一趋势仍然预示着美好的未来。诺伊斯预计，一旦英特尔能够制造出更强大的微处理器，市场将会腾飞。而英特尔当时正在研发这款处理器。公司正在圣克拉拉园区建设新设施，在加州利弗莫尔建设一座晶圆厂，并在马来西亚槟城建设一座组装厂。诺伊斯曾考虑在圣克拉拉园区增设一个日托中心，以此吸引晶圆厂中以女性为主的员工，但他与英特尔多位员工进行的一系列非正式讨论最终都未能取得实质性进展。3
A tentative foray into building complete memory systems for customers was proving very profitable. The microprocessor had brought Intel hundreds of new customers, most of them small firms with small orders, but the trend nonetheless augured well for the future. Noyce expected that once Intel could build a more powerful microprocessor, the market would take off. And Intel had that processor under development. The company was building new facilities on the Santa Clara campus, a fab in Livermore, California, and an assembly operation in Penang, Malaysia. Noyce was considering adding an on-site day care center to the Santa Clara campus as a way to attract the largely female workforce for the fabs, but a series of informal discussions he held with various Intel employees never really went anywhere.3
7月，英特尔以约200万美元的价格收购了一家名为Microma的六人数字手表公司。诺伊斯和摩尔预测，未来五年内，全球数字手表销量将达到2亿块。每一块手表都需要Microma或英特尔擅长的元件：液晶显示屏、精细组装工艺以及一种名为CMOS的MOS芯片。英特尔秉承其不成文的策略，力图在其他公司注意到这块市场之前将其抢占先机。诺伊斯预计，未来几年英特尔将销售价值约2000万美元的手表模块，其中20%将用于Microma的手表，其余部分将出售给其他手表制造商。4
In July, Intel acquired a six-man digital watch company called Microma for roughly $2 million. Noyce and Moore predicted that in the next five years, some 200 million digital watches would be sold around the world. Every one of them would require elements in which either Microma or Intel was expert: liquid crystal displays, detailed assembly, and a type of MOS chip called CMOS. Intel, true to its unwritten policies, was going to try to capture this market before it attracted attention from anyone else. Noyce expected Intel would, in the next few years, sell some $20 million in watch modules, 20 percent of which would go into Microma watches. The rest would be sold to other watch manufacturers.4
11月，诺伊斯邀请格林内尔学院的一位理事萨姆·罗森塔尔参观了新的芯片制造厂，并独立评估学院这项投资的价值。“诺伊斯先生带我们参观了圣克拉拉的工厂，”罗森塔尔在给其他理事的信中写道，他用了大家对诺伊斯的亲切昵称。“这对我来说是一次既有趣又令人费解的经历。有趣是因为这是一个极其复杂精巧的制造过程，令人费解是因为我并没有完全理解其中的原理，尽管鲍勃尽力向我解释。”罗森塔尔对制造设施感到震惊，他说，其中一些地方“让我想起了医院的手术室，因为员工们穿着白色工作服和帽子（为了避免污染芯片），但他们的脚却没有防护。”他的结论是：“我对工厂和制造过程印象非常深刻。[诺伊斯]对商业仍然一如既往地乐观。”5
In November, Noyce invited one of the Grinnell trustees, Sam Rosenthal, to tour the new fab and independently assess the merits of the college’s investment. “Boy Noyce showed [us] through the plant at Santa Clara,” Rosenthal wrote to his fellow trustees, using their affectionate nickname for Noyce. “It was a most interesting and baffling experience for me. Interesting, because it is a most complicated and ingenious manufacturing process[,] and baffling, because I didn’t understand very much of it, though Bob did his best to inform me.” Rosenthal was astonished by the manufacturing facilities, parts of which, he said, “reminded me of a hospital operating room, for the employees were dressed in white outfits and hats [to avoid contaminating the chips], but their feet were not protected.” His conclusion: “I was most impressed by the plant and the manufacturing process. [Noyce] is as optimistic as ever about business.”5
到1972年12月，诺伊斯的乐观预测被证明是正确的。英特尔完全摆脱了债务，收入翻了一番多，利润增长了两倍。仅仅一年后，正值英特尔成立五周年之际，恰逢行业蓬勃发展，公司的收入和利润再次翻了三倍，员工人数和生产规模也随之扩大。英特尔的税前利润率高达40%（税后为25%）。6
By December of 1972, Noyce’s optimism had proven well founded. Intel was entirely debt free and had more than doubled revenues and tripled profits. Just one year later, when Intel’s fifth anniversary coincided with a boom in the industry, the company’s revenues and profits again tripled, and so, too, did the number of its employees and its manufacturing space. Intel’s pretax profit margin was a remarkable 40 percent (25 percent after tax).6
在幕后，诺伊斯精心运作，确保英特尔的财务数据在华尔街看来光鲜亮丽。例如，1973年，英特尔的利润如此之高，以至于公司加快了研发步伐，提前启动了原定于1974年开展的项目，希望以此降低净利润。“鲍勃非常担心公司盈利会剧烈波动，每个季度的业绩都比上一季度和去年同期都要好，”格林内尔学院的理事乔·罗森菲尔德说道。7
Behind the scenes, Noyce worked carefully to ensure Intel’s financial figures looked good to Wall Street. In 1973, for example, Intel’s profits were so high that the company accelerated its research, starting work on projects originally slated for 1974, in hopes of reducing its net income. “Bob [is] very anxious that the earnings not fluctuate erratically up and down and that each quarter make a favorable showing with both the preceding quarter and [the] corresponding quarter of a year ago,” reported Grinnell trustee Joe Rosenfield.7
他还补充说，诺伊斯曾建议格林内尔学院或许应该趁着英特尔股票价格高企之际出售一些。诺伊斯本人在1972年情人节通过飞行考试后不久，就卖掉了一部分股票，买了一架小型喷气式飞机。罗森菲尔德不同意诺伊斯出售股票的建议，事实上，他认为诺伊斯之所以提出这个建议，只是因为他觉得自己对学院负有“深切的责任”，所以才采取保守的做法。沃伦·巴菲特对此表示赞同：“虽然你比我更了解电子产品，”他写信给罗森菲尔德说，“但我认为英特尔是我们目前拥有或将来可能拥有的最佳工具，能够使我们的捐赠基金实现质的飞跃。”董事会决定维持原有持仓。8
He added that Noyce had suggested that Grinnell might want to sell some of its Intel stock, while the price it could command was so high. Noyce had himself sold a bit of his stock to buy a small jet shortly after passing his flight test on Valentine’s Day, 1972. Rosenfield disagreed with Noyce’s suggestion to sell and believed, in fact, that Noyce had made it only because he felt a deep “responsibility to the College” to be a bit conservative. Warren Buffett agreed: “While you know much more about electronic widgets than I,” he wrote to Rosenfield, “Intel seems to me to be the best vehicle we have, or are likely to have, to gain a quantum jump in our endowment.” The board decided to keep their position intact.8
4月份英特尔股票进行三比二拆股后，诺伊斯收到了公司1000名员工的大量询问，询问拆股对他们期权的影响。他写了一封措辞谨慎的信，开头写道“只是为了让各位放心”，向这群对股票期权仍然不太了解，但却非常看重这些期权的员工解释了拆股的意义。到1973年底，英特尔的市值超过1.6亿美元，摩尔表示，未来唯一可能限制公司增长的因素是能否招到足够的工程师和科学家。9
When Intel’s stock split three for two in April, Noyce was bombarded with questions from many of the company’s 1,000 employees about the effects of the split on their options. He wrote a careful letter, beginning “just to put your minds at rest,” explaining the split’s implications to this group still largely unfamiliar with the stock options they had nonetheless come to value greatly. By the end of 1973, Intel was worth more than $160 million, and Moore was saying that the only thing that might limit its growth in the future was its ability to hire enough engineers and scientists.9
诺伊斯一向“接收外部信息”，但他还有另一项担忧——并非那种令人焦虑、恐慌不已的忧虑，而只是他雷达屏幕上边缘出现的一丝不悦。10月份，欧佩克因以色列赎罪日战争而实施了石油禁运。几周之内，加利福尼亚州宣布需要实行电力配给，并宣布计划要求工业用户将用电量削减至比去年同期减少10%。如果这项自愿减量10%的计划无效，电力公司可能会采取轮流停电的方式来节约电力。
Noyce, always the “receiver of messages from the outside,” had another concern—not a nagging, panic-inducing worry, but a bit of unpleasant noise that registered on the periphery of his radar screen. In October, OPEC had embargoed exports of oil in the wake of the Yom Kippur War in Israel. Within weeks, the state of California had declared the need to ration electricity and announced plans to ask industrial customers to cut their power consumption to levels 10 percent below those of the corresponding month a year earlier. If the voluntary 10-percent plan did not work, then the utilities companies might resort to rolling blackouts to conserve power.
轮流停电的前景令诺伊斯感到担忧，他坦言半导体行业在设计工艺和设备时“假定石油化工产品和电力都是免费且充足的”。平均而言，晶圆厂的用电量是同等规模商业办公楼的30倍，并且消耗大量的二甲苯、丙酮和二异丙醇，这些都是石油化工产品的衍生物。10
The prospect of rolling blackouts alarmed Noyce, who readily admitted that the semiconductor industry had designed its processes and equipment “assum[ing] that petrochemicals were free and available and that power was free and available.” The average wafer fab used 30 times as much electricity as a commercial office building of the same size, and consumed large quantities of xylene, acetone, and disopropyl alcohol, all petrochemical derivatives.10
得知州政府的计划后，诺伊斯立即指示英特尔公司内部启动节能和回收工作。他还让公司向西海岸电子制造商协会（WEMA）组织的政治行动委员会捐款。1973年12月，他还与其他半导体行业高管一起出席了加州公共事业委员会的听证会。诺伊斯告诉委员们，快速发展的半导体行业需要更多电力，而不是更少——他还特意提醒他们，去年半导体行业贡献了圣克拉拉县约40%的就业增长。在陈述中，他向委员们描绘了一系列灾难性的情景：如果英特尔被迫将产量降至去年的水平，将裁员40%；如果由于突如其来的停电导致晶圆厂无法使用通风系统，有毒气体将泄漏到大气中；如果……，不到一个小时就会损失价值一百万美元的产品。电力突然中断。“第三次停电之后，”他说，“我们就辞职关厂。”诺伊斯和其他电子行业高管力推一项法案，该法案旨在禁止停电，并赋予电子公司在全州用电等级中更高的优先权。但该法案最终未能通过。11
Immediately upon learning of the state’s plans, Noyce had Intel start conservation and recycling efforts in-house. He had the company contribute to a political action committee organized by WEMA, a trade association of West Coast electronics manufacturers. He also joined a contingent of semiconductor executives testifying before the California Public Utilities Commission in December 1973. Noyce told the commissioners that the fast-growing industry needed more, not less, power—and he pointedly reminded them that during the past year, the semiconductor industry accounted for an estimated 40 percent of Santa Clara County’s employment growth. During his presentation, he offered the commissioners a variety of doomsday scenarios: 40 percent layoffs if Intel was forced to slow production to last year’s levels, poisonous gases escaping into the atmosphere if the fabs could not use their ventilation systems due to unannounced power shutdowns, a million dollars’ worth of product lost in less than an hour if electricity were shut off unexpectedly. “After a third power blackout,” he said, “we’d quit and close the factory.” Noyce and the other electronics executives pushed for passage of a bill that would prohibit blackouts and grant electronics companies a high priority in the state-wide hierarchy of users. The bill failed.11
诺伊斯更担心能源危机对半导体行业与政府关系的长期影响，而非其对英特尔的潜在直接影响。他一直很重视与政府合作的必要性。1970年，他曾说过：“这确实是一个受控的社会，由华盛顿控制。如果你想在纷繁复杂的社会中穿梭，最好听从政府的指示。顺势而为，不要逆流而上。如果一家公司在正确的时间进入了正确的行业，那么整个社会就会裹挟着它——前提是它确实为社会提供了有益的服务。否则，它将处处碰壁，最终走向失败。”12
The energy crisis worried Noyce more for its long-term implications about the semiconductor industry’s relationship with the government than for its potential immediate effects on Intel. He had always been sensitive to the need to work in tandem with the government. In 1970 he said, “This really is a controlled society, controlled out of Washington, and if you’re trying to steer around in all the traffic out there, you’d better listen to what the cop is telling people. Go with the tide, not against it. If a company is in the right business at the right time, then the whole society sweeps it along [—] if it is truly providing some useful service to the society. If it’s not, it’s going to be fighting everybody in sight all the way, and eventually will fail.”12
然而，直到20世纪70年代中期，诺伊斯才真正意识到，政府的交通警察可以决定在高峰时段封锁街道。电力配给的威胁让他意识到，他和摩尔以及英特尔的所有人，即便能够打造出最好的产品，并以各种方式“真正为社会提供一些有用的服务”，最终，政府也有权让这些努力付诸东流。“我认为我们所有人都正面临着政府对我们生活影响越来越大的局面，”诺伊斯在作证后向一家行业期刊的记者抱怨道，“我们过去认为的商业基本前提，现在都被政府接管了。”13
What Noyce had not sufficiently understood until the mid-1970s, however, was that the government traffic cop could decide to block a street midway through rush hour. The threatened electricity rationing awakened him to the reality that he and Moore and everyone else at Intel could build the best possible product and in any number of ways “truly provide some useful service to society”—but ultimately, the government had the power to render such efforts moot. “I think all of us are getting into the position where government is affecting our lives more and more,” Noyce groused to a reporter from an industry trade journal after his testimony. “The things that we used to think were the basic prerequisites of business have been taken over by the government.”13
总而言之，诺伊斯表示，他对1973年的结束感到“非常乐观”。1974年除夕夜，他自豪地告诉一位记者，英特尔始终“游走在几乎不可能的边缘”。他表示，假设能源问题能够得到解决，“电子应用领域似乎拥有无限的潜力”。14
All in all, however, Noyce said he was ending 1973 feeling “very optimistic.” On New Year’s Eve 1974, he proudly told a reporter that Intel was forever “teetering on the edge of what’s barely possible.” Assuming the energy issue could be resolved, he said, “electronic applications appear to be unlimited.”14
诺伊斯还有其他值得高兴的事。到1973年，仅他持有的英特尔股份——他和摩尔当时各自仍持有英特尔16%的股份——就价值2600万美元。到1974年中期，这些股份的价值翻了一番。15
Noyce had other reasons to feel cheerful. By 1973, his Intel holdings alone—he and Moore each still owned 16 percent of Intel’s stock—were valued at $26 million. By the middle of 1974, they were worth double that.15
他和贝蒂匿名为他们避暑别墅附近的城镇建造了一座新图书馆，并向加州的图书馆和教育电视台捐赠了大量资金。诺伊斯还参与了在低收入的东帕洛阿尔托市建立一家银行的项目。他非常清楚自己所处的优越地位，但他并不认为这仅仅是源于他超凡的才智。当他的一个孩子公开质疑自己的成功究竟是源于自身能力还是源于他女儿的身份时，他反问道：“你觉得如果我是黑人或女人，我还能做到我所取得的成就吗？”他认为肤色、贫困或性别会剥夺人们的潜能。这让他很恼火。他对格林内尔学院的忠诚，很大程度上是因为学院没有让他的家庭因经济拮据而失去受教育的机会。他并非激进分子，但他曾担任“大哥哥大姐姐”项目的理事，并且一直对费尔柴尔德公司在新墨西哥州一个印第安人保留地建造的工厂感到格外自豪。在20世纪60年代中期，这家工厂一度使费尔柴尔德公司成为美国最大的非政府印第安人雇主，拥有300名纳瓦霍族员工。他在所谓“社会正义”领域的行动，让人想起他关于优秀管理者“扫除障碍，让人们发挥所长”的言论。16
He and Betty anonymously built a new library for the town near their summer home and gave large sums to libraries and educational television in California. Noyce helped with an effort to build a bank in low-income East Palo Alto. He was acutely aware of his own privileged position, which he did not ascribe simply to the blessings of an unusually capable mind. When one of his children wondered aloud whether her successes came from her own skills or from her status as his daughter, he asked, “Do you think I could do what I’ve done if I had been black or a woman?” The notion that skin color, poverty, or gender deprived people of their potential annoyed him. He felt committed to Grinnell in no small measure because it had not permitted his family’s lack of resources to keep him from an education. He was no radical, but he served on the board of Big Brothers and Big Sisters, and he always took particular pride in a fab that Fairchild built on a Native American reservation in New Mexico, which for a time in the mid-1960s made the company, with 300 Navajo employees, the largest nongovernmental employer of Native Americans in the United States. His actions on what might loosely be termed the “social justice” front bring to mind his comments about good managers “getting the barriers out of the way to let people do the things they do well.”16
1973年，诺伊斯参与了一项他参与过的最为特殊的慈善活动。他得知奥杜邦协会制定了一项计划，旨在通过从纽芬兰空运幼鸟到东蛋岛，来重振缅因州濒临灭绝的海鹦种群。他们希望这些幼鸟能在那里长大，建立新的栖息地。这个项目似乎正是为诺伊斯量身打造的。从他家就能看到东蛋岛。复兴海鹦种群的计划虽然风险很大，但切实可行——这正是诺伊斯最感兴趣的项目类型。当时谁也不知道海鹦能否经受住飞机飞行的考验，更别提在新的地方安家落户了，但这似乎并非不可能。帮助奥杜邦协会还能让诺伊斯有机会体验飞行，因为该协会真正需要的是一架私人飞机，用来运送奥杜邦团队前往纽芬兰，然后再将团队和一些幼鸟送回缅因州。
In 1973, Noyce involved himself with the most unusual of his charitable efforts. He learned that the Audubon Society had developed a plan to reinvigorate Maine’s nearly extinct population of puffins by flying chicks from Newfoundland to Eastern Egg Island, where it was hoped they would mature to build a colony. The project seemed tailor-made for Noyce. He could see Eastern Egg Island from his home. The plan to resurrect the puffin colony was risky but feasible—Noyce’s preferred type of operation. No one knew if the puffins could even survive an airplane flight, much less establish themselves in a new location, but it seemed possible. Helping the Audubon Society would also provide Noyce with an excuse to fly, for what the group really needed was a private plane to transport an Audubon team to Newfoundland and then fly the team and a few chicks back to Maine.
诺伊斯欣然提出用他的新喷气式飞机并亲自担任飞行员。不出所料，他还主动要求加入研究人员的行列，一同沿着150英尺高的悬崖行进。这处悬崖耸立于海面之上，是300多只海鹦的家园。奥杜邦协会的团队和诺伊斯花了几个小时在成年海鹦挖掘的洞穴中寻找幼鸟，同时还要躲避那些在悬崖峭壁上守护巢穴的、发出刺耳尖叫的大黑背鸥的攻击。
Noyce was thrilled to offer his new jet and himself as a pilot. True to form, he also asked to join the researchers as they made their way along the 150-foot cliff that jutted over the ocean and served as a home to more than 300 puffins. The Audubon team and Noyce spent several hours searching for puffin chicks in burrows dug by the adult birds, all the while dodging attacks by screaming great black-back gulls protecting their own nests in the cliff’s ledges.
将海鹦空运到缅因州的行动取得了成功，诺伊斯于1974年再次自愿参与（当时转移了54只海鹦幼鸟）。在接下来的两年里，他也承担了飞机飞行的费用。此后，海鹦种群稳定下来，诺伊斯便将注意力转移到了其他方面。17
The puffin airlift to Maine proved a success, and Noyce again volunteered his services in 1974 (when 54 puffin chicks were moved). He paid for the plane flights for the next two years, as well. After this, the colony was well established, and Noyce turned his attentions elsewhere.17
鲍勃和贝蒂始终不愿与孩子们谈论家族财富。他们很少外出就餐，如果外出，诺伊斯总是点最便宜的特价菜。贝蒂·诺伊斯不爱买衣服，也不疯狂购物。他们俩都不开豪车。即使诺伊斯的净资产接近1亿美元，他还是曾步行好几个街区去杂货店买一盒彩色铅笔，只为了避免在一家美术用品专卖店支付他认为过高的价格。他觉得这种行为与他毫不犹豫地购买飞机完全不相称。年轻的诺伊斯做家务挣的钱少得可怜，如果他们抱怨，诺伊斯就会说：“你们……”少干活少挣钱，多干活多挣钱。18
Bob and Betty maintained their reluctance to discuss the family wealth with their children. If they dined out, which they did quite infrequently, Noyce tended to order the lowest-priced dinner specials. Betty Noyce did not indulge in clothes or shopping sprees. Neither of them drove luxury cars. Even when Noyce’s net worth approached $100 million, he once walked several blocks to buy a box of colored pencils at a grocery store to avoid paying what he considered exorbitant prices at a specialty art supplier. He did not think this at all incongruous behavior for someone who bought airplanes with nary a second thought. The young Noyces were paid a pittance for chores, and if they complained, Noyce would say, “You do a little work for a little money. You need to do a lot of work for a lot of money.”18
但鲍勃和贝蒂也在悄悄地为他们的继承人培养应对巨额财富所带来的责任感。他们设立了一个信托基金，作为孩子们接受教育的途径。这些孩子们当时都已是十几岁的青少年，他们亲自审核拨款申请，并决定资助哪些项目。年轻的诺伊斯一家完全胜任这项工作。比尔高中毕业后即将前往达特茅斯学院深造，他在全州物理考试中名列前茅。佩妮被评为“全国杰出的英语高中生”之一，即将前往法国提升她的法语水平。波莉聪明、美丽、活泼。玛格丽特性格泼辣、大胆无畏，正值青春期。诺伊斯对她们每个人都说过同样的话：“钱可以用来做很多事情：可以用来消费，可以用来赚钱，也可以用来创造未来。”19
But Bob and Betty were also quietly preparing their heirs for the responsibility that came with great wealth. They set up a trust to serve as an educational vehicle for the children, who were all now teenagers and who personally reviewed grant applications and determined which projects to fund. The young Noyces were more than up to the task. Bill was on his way to Dartmouth college after a high school career that included a top ranking in a statewide physics exam. Penny had been named one of the “outstanding high school students of English in the country” and was off to France to improve her fluency in la belle langue. Polly was bright, beautiful, and vivacious. Margaret was feisty and daring, on the cusp of adolescence. To all of them Noyce said the same thing: “Money can be used to do lots of things: it can be spent, it can be used to make more money, or it can build a future.”19
20世纪70年代初，随着记者们开始报道加州的“硅谷”，诺伊斯开始受到主流媒体的关注。这个名称最早出现在1971年1月《电子新闻》的一篇文章中，当时远未普及。但无论旧金山半岛上的这片电子公司聚集地被称为“硅谷”、“半导体之乡”、“加州128号公路”还是“加州伟大的工业摇篮”，全国性的商业媒体都开始关注它以及诺伊斯本人。20世纪70年代初，《商业周刊》和《财富》杂志关于半岛半导体公司的文章都重点介绍了英特尔，并由此引申出了诺伊斯和摩尔。20
NOYCE BEGAN TO GARNER ATTENTION from the general press in the early 1970s, when journalists started writing about California’s “Silicon Valley.” The name, which had first appeared in January 1971, in an Electronic News article, was far from ubiquitous, but whether the cluster of electronics firms on the San Francisco Peninsula was called “Silicon Valley,” “Semiconductor Country,” “California’s Route 128,” or “California’s great breeding ground for industry,” the national business press was beginning to take notice of it and of Noyce. In the early 1970s, Business Week and Fortune articles on the Peninsula’s semiconductor companies prominently featured Intel, and by extension, Noyce and Moore.20
诺伊斯的演讲安排也开始反映出一种更广泛的关注点。他的大部分演讲都是面向半导体行业的技术会议或分析师，但他也在一场创新会议上发表了主题演讲，并在爱荷华科学院与《人口爆炸》的作者保罗·埃利希同台演讲。只要有机会，诺伊斯就会谈到微处理器。当时大多数微处理器设备还只用于交通信号灯、电梯、肉秤和其他相对简单的控制功能，但在1973年，诺伊斯预测，在全世界所有可用的电子技术中，“我们将看到影响最大的将是微型计算机（微处理器）几乎渗透到所有领域的应用。”两年前，他对微处理器将如何改变世界曾有过更为具体的描述：“未来的控制设备将允许家庭主妇告诉烤箱把烤肉烤到三分熟，而不是设定一个具体的温度——而且它真的会做到。驾驶员可以控制汽车以每小时55英里的速度行驶。用户可以提醒电话他要去邻居家，然后电话就会自动转接到邻居家。”他的儿子在听完这些话后……1973年在麻省理工学院的一次演讲中，比尔说他父亲“在预测新兴市场领域时最激动，比如汽车、计算器、手表、电话”。演讲结束后，比尔写信给他的姐妹们说：“（我和爸爸）一直聊到午夜，讨论诸如费马大定理之类的话题。”21
Noyce’s speaking schedule also began to reflect a more general sort of attention. Most of his speeches were addressed to technical gatherings or analysts who specialized in the semiconductor industry, but he also keynoted a conference on innovation and shared a stage at the Iowa Academy of Science with Paul Ehrlich, author of The Population Explosion. Whenever he had the opportunity, Noyce talked about the microprocessor. Most of the devices were still used only in traffic lights, elevators, butcher scales, and other relatively rudimentary control functions, but in 1973 Noyce predicted that of all the electronics technology available anywhere in the world, “the thing that we will see make the most difference will be the extension of the microcomputer [microprocessor] into just about everything.” Two years before, he had been even more specific about how the microprocessor would change things: “Control gadgetry of the future will permit a housewife to tell her oven to cook a roast rare rather than at a specific temperature—and it will. The motorist will direct his auto to travel at 55 miles an hour. A subscriber will remind his telephone he will be at the neighbors and calls will be transferred there.” His son, after hearing one speech at MIT in 1973, said his father was most animated “when he got to predictions of new market areas: cars, calculators, watches, telephones.” After the talk, Bill wrote to his sisters, “[Da and I] stayed up till about midnight talking about such things as Fermat’s last theorem.”21
总而言之，诺伊斯先生风度翩翩，尤其对于习惯了科技界缺乏魅力人士的媒体而言更是如此。一篇特别吹捧的报道写道：“诺伊斯博士抽出时间去斯阔谷滑雪，还在缅因州海岸扬帆出海。他说：‘我们有六艘船——如果算上那艘划艇的话——家里每个人都有一艘。’” 一家面向电子行业工程师和管理人员的报纸也发表了类似的评论：“在很多方面，罗伯特·N·诺伊斯博士正是每位父母都希望自己才华横溢的儿子能够成为的那种人：为人友善，技术精湛（拥有十几项专利），养育了四个聪明的孩子，并在商界取得了成功。”22
All in all, Noyce cut a rather dashing figure, especially for a press used to less charisma from the technical sector. Reported one particularly fawning account: “Dr. Noyce finds time for skiing at Squaw Valley and sailing off the Maine Coast. ‘We have six boats—if you want to count the row boat—one for each member of the family,’ he says.” In a similar vein came this comment from a newspaper aimed at engineers and managers in the electronics industry: “In many ways, Dr. Robert N. Noyce is just what every parent hopes his technically talented son will become: a thoroughly nice guy, technically brilliant (he holds more than a dozen patents), who raises four bright kids and becomes a success in business.”22
然而，在看似完美的成功表象之下，却暗流涌动。英特尔收购的数字手表公司Microma问题重重，与其说是技术问题，不如说是它迫使英特尔首次面对商业产品的挑战。诺伊斯、摩尔、格尔巴赫和格鲁夫发现，他们讨论的不再是良率和比特，而是礼品盒、表带、商店展示架和珠宝制作工具包。Radio Shack也推出了一款名为Micronta的数字手表，这让顾客感到困惑。而且，这些手表本身的可靠性也远谈不上好。董事会会议的开场白竟然是收集董事们需要维修的手表。就连诺伊斯的弟弟唐，这位对即将见到人生第一块数字手表而兴奋不已的人，私下里也告诉孩子们，“鲍勃叔叔的新式手表”上的显示屏几乎无法辨认。23
Much was cracking beneath the veneer of unqualified success, however. Microma, Intel’s digital-watch acquisition, was proving problematic, less for technical reasons than for its forcing Intel to contend with a commercial product for the first time. Noyce, Moore, Gelbach, and Grove found themselves discussing not yields and bits but gift boxes, watch bands, store displays, and jewelers’ kits. Radio Shack put out a digital watch under the name Micronta, which confused customers. And the watches themselves were far from reliable. The Board of Directors meetings began by collecting those of the directors’ watches that needed to be repaired. Even Noyce’s brother Don, who was thrilled by the prospect of seeing his first digital watch, privately told his children that the display on “Uncle Bob’s new kind of watch” was almost impossible to read.23
在家附近，佩妮因哮喘发作严重入院，被送进了重症监护室。（鲍勃和贝蒂戒不掉每天两包烟的习惯，所以没有在她的卧室里抽烟。）佩妮在1972年写道，她父亲非常担心她，“我确信，如果我提出最简单的要求，英特尔的下属就会以最快的速度赶来。”诺伊斯的一架双引擎塞斯纳飞机在内华达州坠毁，机上四名租用飞机的男子全部遇难。诺伊斯并没有过错，但他在飞机归还后不久就把它卖掉了。24
Closer to home, Penny had been hospitalized for asthma attacks so severe she landed in the intensive care ward. (Bob and Betty, unable to break their two-pack-a-day habits, refrained from smoking in her bedroom.) Her father was so worried about her, Penny wrote in 1972, that “I’m convinced that if I made the simplest request, a motorcade of Intel underlings would arrive at utmost speed.” One of Noyce’s planes, a twin-engine Cessna that he enrolled in a small charter service at the San Jose airport, crashed in Nevada and killed all four men who had been leasing it for the day. Noyce was not at fault, but he sold the plane shortly after it was returned to him.24
此外，席卷美国的青年运动的整体氛围也让诺伊斯感到不安。比尔的头发长到了肩膀，他从大学寄来的信里也提到和女友共度良宵。越南战争给曾经光鲜亮丽的技术行业蒙上了一层阴影。对于习惯了人们认为他的工作“有价值且重要”的诺伊斯来说，这种转变难以接受。诺伊斯后来回忆说，在战争期间和战后不久，技术突然变成了一种邪恶的东西，“制造凝固汽油弹，烧死婴儿，“而且还污染了环境。”例如，在与埃利希的对话中，诺伊斯意识到听众中的大多数学生都认为他和他在科技行业的同事是“坏人”，这让他既愤怒又受伤。几年后，他解释说：“这就是让我感到害怕的地方。[我们]和保罗·埃利希相比确实很糟糕，而埃利希实际上是在主张我们以后不应该取得任何进步……这简直太荒谬了！”25
Moreover, the general tenor of the youth movement sweeping the United States made Noyce uneasy. Bill was growing his hair to his shoulders, and his letters from college referred to spending the night with his girlfriend. The Vietnam War had cast a shadow over the image of the once-glamorous technical industries. For Noyce, who was accustomed to people considering his work “worthwhile and important,” this change was difficult. During and immediately after the war, Noyce later recalled, technology suddenly became an evil thing that “made napalm, burned babies, and polluted the environment.” At his talk with Ehrlich, for example, Noyce had been angry and hurt to realize that most of the students in the audience considered himself and his colleagues in technology-based industries “bad people.” He explained a few years later, “That’s what scared me. [We were] bad compared to Paul Ehrlich, who was essentially arguing we should have zero progress from here on out. … How ridiculous can you be?”25
“我觉得我父亲在20世纪70年代真的迷失了方向，”佩妮·诺伊斯说道。“那是一个到处都在变化的时代，自由化盛行，规则也变得宽松。”十年后，诺伊斯谈到这段时期时说：“我不喜欢当时的自己。”他说他试图“改变”，比如留起了盖尔巴赫式的胡子，但“一点用都没有”。26
“I think my father really lost his compass [in the 1970s],” Penny Noyce has said. “It was a time of such change everywhere, such liberalization, such a relaxing of rules.” Ten years later, Noyce said of this period in his life, “I didn’t like myself the way I was.” He said that he tried to “switch” by, among other unspecified things, growing a Gelbach-style mustache, but “it didn’t help at all.”26
贝蒂开始在东海岸待的时间越来越长，不再像以前那样在学年开始时返回加州。相反，她会从五月底一直待到十月底。她觉得鲍勃的工作和英特尔冉冉升起的新星地位，让她在加州“罗伯特·诺伊斯太太”这个二等公民的身份更加根深蒂固。她本可以像一些朋友那样，尝试走出家门，开始工作。尤金·克莱纳的妻子罗斯就打算重返校园攻读研究生学位。但贝蒂坚信“只有不称职的母亲才会不在家照顾孩子”。她绝不会背离自己对“应有位置”的期望。27
Betty had begun spending more and more time on the East Coast, no longer returning to California when the school year began. Instead, she would stay in Maine from the end of May through the end of October. She felt that Bob’s work and Intel’s rising star further chained her to the second-class status of “Mrs. Robert Noyce” in California. She might have dealt with this by following some of her friends who were taking tentative steps into employment outside the home. Eugene Kleiner’s wife Rose was heading back to school for a graduate degree. But Betty felt very strongly that “only bad mothers weren’t home for their children.” She would never have strayed from her own expectations of her proper place.27
贝蒂·诺伊斯的第二个选择或许是效仿许多英特尔高管的妻子们的态度。朱迪·瓦达兹在谈到英特尔的早期岁月时说：“这有点像打仗。你待在家里做好自己的事，好让那些战士们去建造神庙。”朱迪·瓦达兹、伊娃·格罗夫和其他年轻的“英特尔太太们”有着共同的经历：她们都有年幼的孩子，丈夫经常不在家，而且都拥有了一笔新获得的财富。她们白天经常聚在一起，但很少互相抱怨自己在英特尔“战争”中扮演的角色。瓦达兹说，她们认为自己是“伟大事业的一部分”。“我想，你的角色就是牺牲你的丈夫，你孩子的父亲。”28
A second alternative for Betty Noyce might have been to adopt the attitude assumed by many of the wives of senior Intel executives. Judy Vadasz said of the early years of Intel, “It was kind of like the war effort. You stayed home and did your thing so the warriors could go and build a temple.” Judy Vadasz, Eva Grove, and other young “Intel wives” shared common ground in their young children, frequently absent husbands, and new-found wealth. They would often get together during the day, but they rarely complained to each other about their role in the Intel “war effort.” They saw themselves as “a part of something big,” Vadasz said. “Your part was, I guess, sacrificing your husband, your kid’s father.”28
然而，贝蒂·诺伊斯与这些女性却鲜有共同之处。她比她们年长十岁。她的孩子们即将离家，而不是刚上小学。她早已经历过一夜暴富的时代。此外，她绝对不会从鲍勃忙于奔波而她则在家照料家务的画面中获得慰藉。“我家的人都太有领导才能了，”佩妮·诺伊斯解释道，“（我母亲）很擅长指挥和组织别人。”贝蒂的朋友都是她认识了几十年的老朋友，那时鲍勃还只是“一个总是提着公文包的普通丈夫”，正如一位知己所描述的那样。这些朋友倾向于认为鲍勃“只是个普通人，而不是天才”，而贝蒂则像个精力充沛、忙碌不停的旋风。她的一切都远超所需。公共电视台举办拍卖会时，贝蒂用优美流畅的文字撰写了目录文案，耗费了她数小时之久。她的刺绣和拼布作品也越来越精致复杂——其中一些最终被博物馆收藏。然而，在加州，她却始终活在鲍勃的阴影下，痛苦不堪。随着时间的流逝，她常常忍不住大喊大叫或痛哭流涕。29
Betty Noyce, however, had little in common with these women. She was a decade their senior. Her children were leaving the house, not starting elementary school. She had already been through the instant-wealth phenomenon. Moreover, she most definitely would not have found solace in the image of tending the hearth while Bob fought the battles. “There was too much executive ability in my family,” explained Penny Noyce. “[My mother] was good at bossing people around and organizing them.” Betty’s friends were people whom she had known for decades, back when Bob was “just another husband always carrying a briefcase,” as one confidante described him. These friends tended to view Bob as “a normal human being and not a genius” and Betty as a bit of a whirling dervish, always doing everything at a level far beyond the necessary. When the public television station held an auction, Betty wrote the catalog copy in beautiful, literate prose that took her hours to compose. Her needlepoint and quilts had become increasingly elaborate and detailed—several would eventually hang in a museum. She was, nonetheless, miserable in Bob’s shadow in California. She often found herself yelling or crying as the days passed.29
她早就怀疑诺伊斯有外遇。她和鲍勃一起外出时，两人之间的紧张气氛显而易见。他们俩饭后抽完一整包烟是常有的事。他们拒绝妥协彼此的差异，这令人震惊。贝蒂觉得丈夫对刺激和变化的渴求近乎病态。他要么对她喜爱传统事物漠不关心，要么根本不在乎，竟然送给她一辆亮橙色的高科技马自达转子发动机汽车作为生日礼物——这可是最早一批下线的车型之一。她当然讨厌这辆车。而鲍勃则因她的拒绝而恼怒不已。30
She had long suspected Noyce was having a serious affair. When she and Bob went out together, the tension between them was palpable. It was not uncommon for each of them to go through an entire pack of cigarettes after dinner. Their refusal to accommodate their differences was astonishing. Betty thought her husband’s need for stimulation and change bordered on pathological. He either had so little regard for or paid so little attention to her love of things old and traditional that he gave her a birthday gift of a bright orange and very high-tech Mazda rotary car—one of the first to come off the line. She, of course, hated it. He, in turn, was angered by her rejection.30
大约就在这个时候，诺伊斯和一位朋友在与家人共进晚餐后独自散步。他直视前方，几乎是自言自语地说：“唉，有时候坐飞机去纽约比回家还容易。”后来他告诉女儿，他过去常常每天晚上在英特尔的停车场里待上五到十分钟，让引擎空转，心里想着要是能有个地方可以去，而不是待在洛约拉大道上的那栋房子里就好了。31
About this time, Noyce and a friend took a walk alone after eating dinner with Noyce’s family. Staring straight ahead, Noyce said, almost to himself, “Boy, sometimes it’s simpler to get on a plane to New York than to come home.” He later told his daughter that he used to sit in the Intel parking lot for five or ten minutes every evening, idling the motor and wishing there was somewhere he could go that was not the house on Loyola Drive.31
他加速了与马内斯关系的恶化——正如他女儿所说，他正在迅速走向“婚姻自杀”。他会故意把马内斯孩子的物品留在车里，贝蒂几乎肯定会发现。1973年春天，诺伊斯外出吃饭——当时贝蒂在缅因州——他让马内斯从敞开的卧室窗户爬进来，到床上和他见面。就在那里，他的一个孩子发现了那些东西。
He accelerated the risk in his relationship with Maness—rapidly committing “marital suicide,” as one daughter put it. He would deliberately leave items belonging to Maness’s children in his car, where Betty was almost certain to find them. In the spring of 1973, Noyce went out to dinner–Betty was in Maine—and instructed Maness to climb in through his open bedroom window and meet him in bed. It was here that one of his children discovered them.
鲍勃的罪行确凿无疑，诺伊斯夫妇糟糕的婚姻状况更是让这个家庭分崩离析。大女儿们逃往常春藤盟校，小女儿则被送往东海岸的一所寄宿学校。十九岁的比尔宣布他打算在一年内结婚，这番话让诺伊斯感到不安，他显然担心比尔会重蹈覆辙，于是给儿子写了一封异常真挚的信。他在信中劝比尔不要为了“排除竞争”而结婚，说他想在婚姻中寻求安全感，但他永远无法得到；他认为同居比仓促结婚要好；他的儿子不必在未婚妻完成学业期间承担她的经济负担；总而言之，他不确定任何年轻人是否真的准备好承担婚姻的责任。三十多年后，比尔……他仍然与自己的少年恋人幸福地生活在一起，略带讽刺地回答说：“我不害怕婚姻的责任；难道你对婚姻了解的比我想象的还要多吗？”32
THE UNDENIABLE EVIDENCE OF BOB’S TRANSGRESSIONS and of the deplorable state of the Noyces’ marriage blew the family apart. The oldest daughters escaped to Ivy League colleges. The youngest was sent to a boarding school on the East Coast. Nineteen-year-old Bill announced his intention to marry within the year, a declaration that propelled Noyce, who clearly feared Bill would relive his own mistakes, to write an unusually heartfelt letter to his son. He told Bill not to marry to “shut out competition,” that he was looking for a security in marriage that he would never be able to find, that living together unmarried was preferable to a hasty match, that his son should feel no obligation to support his fiancée while she finished school, and that, in general, he was not sure any young person was ready for the responsibility of marriage. To which Bill, who more than 30 years later remains happily married to his teenage love, rather acidly replied, “I’m not afraid of the responsibility of marriage; is there that much you know about it that I can’t envision?”32
总的来说，诺伊斯应对危机的方式就是不断地给孩子们送礼物，每一份礼物都饱含着愧疚和无声的请求原谅。一个孩子向他要钱，他寄来了一张支票，金额是孩子要求的两倍。另一个孩子写道：“你们不停地给我送东西，我感到不知所措、敬畏，还有点害怕。你们真的不必这样做。”还有一个孩子请求诺伊斯把礼物限制在学费支票上。“我不是不知感恩，”这个孩子写道，“我只是想证明自己是有价值的。”33
In general, Noyce dealt with the crisis by giving and giving to his children, each gift soaked with guilt and an unspoken plea to forgive him. A child asked for money; he sent a check for twice the request. Another wrote, “I am overwhelmed, awed, a little frightened by the way you people keep giving me things. You don’t have to do that, you know.” Another asked that Noyce restrict his gifts to a tuition check. “I’m not ungrateful,” this child wrote. “I just want to prove to myself that I’m worth something.”33
贝蒂对鲍勃婚外情的反应是分阶段的，她在1974年4月写给母亲的一封意味深长的信中详细描述了这一切，但这封信最终没有寄出。当然，她坚持要求鲍勃结束这段婚外情，而鲍勃几乎立刻就通过电话结束了这段关系。马内斯心碎不已，但并不感到意外。她认为，早在他们的婚外情被发现之前，诺伊斯就已经对这段关系失去了兴趣。或许正是因为如此，至少在潜意识里，他才会提出这样一段危险的婚外情。一旦被发现，两段关系就会同时结束，而他无需主动结束任何一段关系。34
Betty’s reaction to Bob’s affair came in stages, which she detailed in a remarkable letter to her mother written in April 1974, but never sent. Of course she insisted that Bob end the affair, which he did, over the telephone, almost immediately. Maness was heartbroken but not too surprised. She thought Noyce had been losing interest even before they were discovered. Perhaps that was why, at least unconsciously, he had proposed such a dangerous liaison in the first place. Getting caught would simultaneously end two relationships without his actively needing to terminate either one himself.34
贝蒂·诺伊斯在得知丈夫出轨后的几天内就咨询了离婚律师。律师表示乐意协助她，但建议她先“尝试和解”。她的心情十分复杂。她确信鲍勃已经结束了这段关系，但她仍然嫉妒他对这段关系的记忆，她认为鲍勃拒绝向她或他们开始接受的婚姻咨询师透露细节，是为了保护这段记忆。“（鲍勃）拒绝谈论他和芭芭拉的关系，因为他想珍藏这段回忆，维护芭芭拉的形象，而且他觉得这根本不关别人的事，”她写道。 “鲍勃还是老样子，一副‘我不想谈，所以我们别谈了’的傲慢态度，他经常说‘都过去了，让我们忘了吧’——他几乎一边说着这句话，一边又因为我脾气暴躁或在烹饪方面疏忽大意，或者对我的一些历史遗留问题大加指责。”
Betty Noyce had consulted a divorce lawyer within days of learning about her husband’s affair. The attorney told her that he would be happy to work with her, but suggested that she first “try for a reconciliation.” Her emotions were complicated. She felt confident that Bob had ended the relationship, but she was nonetheless jealous of his memory of it, which she believed he was protecting by refusing to share details of it with her or the marriage counselor they had begun seeing. “[Bob] refuses to discuss his relationship with Barbara because he wants to cherish his reminiscences and keep her image inviolate, and because he feels it’s nobody’s business anyway,” she wrote. “[It is Bob’s] same old ‘Let’s not talk about it because I don’t want to’ lordly attitude, often expressed by his saying, ‘it’s all in the past let’s forget it’—a statement he makes in almost the same breath in which he belabors me for having been short-tempered or remiss in the culinary department, or with some such historical gripe.”
她写道：“为了同时扮演他的两个女人，我放下了自尊，推迟（或许是取消）了许多自己的愿望。”然而，仅仅几行之后，她又怒火中烧，愤怒地指责鲍勃显然认为她对这段婚外情负有部分责任，因为每当家人去缅因州度假时，他都会感到“被抛弃”和“被遗弃”。贝蒂怀疑鲍勃根本没有这种感觉，“他并不真的相信自己是我虐待的无辜受害者，但他仍然自负地对自己说，‘如果她抓到我，我就告诉她都是她的错。’”她补充道，“他看不清，因为撒谎让他感到难过，所以他一直耿耿于怀，耿耿于怀。”他对我的不满——这种不满使我哪怕最轻微的缺点在他看来都是严重的缺陷（当然，这些缺陷在他心中对芭芭拉和贝蒂的比较中，就成了对我不利的得分！）。
She wrote, “I’ve swallowed my pride and postponed (and maybe cancelled) many of my own wishes in order to be both women to him.” Just a few lines later, however, she is enraged again, furious that Bob clearly thought she bore some responsibility for the affair because he felt “abandoned” and “deserted” when his family went to Maine every summer. Betty suspected that Bob felt no such thing, that “he was not really convinced that he was an innocent victim of my mistreatment but was nonetheless egotistically able to say to himself, ‘I’ll tell her that she’s to blame, if she ever catches me at it.’” She added, “He can’t see very clearly that, because his lying made him feel bad, he cherished a constant sense of grievance against me—a dissatisfaction which made my slightest shortcoming a serious flaw, to his way of thinking (flaws serving as strikes against me in his mental scoring of Barbara vs. Betty, of course!).”
1974年4月，贝蒂告诉鲍勃她已经和离婚律师约好再次见面时，鲍勃勃然大怒。哈丽特和拉尔夫·诺伊斯夫妇一直告诫他们的儿子们：“离婚是错误的——是丑闻，不仅仅是个人的痛苦。” 但据贝蒂说，诺伊斯对离婚的愤怒很快就消退了，她宣称自从得知预约后，两天半的时间里，他“（莫名其妙地？）变得和蔼可亲”。毕竟，这正是他想要的，即使他自己还没有承认这一点。35
When Betty told Bob that she had scheduled another appointment with a divorce lawyer in April 1974, he grew angry. Harriet and Ralph Noyce had impressed upon their sons that “divorce was wrong—a scandal, not just a personal pain.” But very soon Noyce’s fury at the prospect of a divorce began to recede, according to Betty, who declared him “(inexplicably?) easy and affectionate in the two and a half days since [learning of the appointment].” This was, after all, what he wanted, even if he had not yet admitted it to himself.35
当诺伊斯的婚姻走向破裂，孩子们也渐渐疏远他时，他的事业却取得了巨大的成功。几乎就在贝蒂写信给母亲的同时，诺伊斯宣布了英特尔1974年第一季度的业绩，几乎在所有方面都创下了纪录。仅这一季度的净利润就相当于上一年总利润的72%。英特尔发展迅猛，其60%的厂房面积和70%的员工都是在过去一年加入的。技术进步同样迅猛：1959年仙童半导体推出的硅晶体管售价20美元，如今（在英特尔1103芯片中）只需不到十分之一美分就能买到。令人难以置信的是，第二季度的业绩更加亮眼：利润率接近20%，季度净利润达到670万美元。36
While Noyce’s marriage was disintegrating and his children spinning away from him, his work life was proving to be an unqualified success. At almost precisely the moment Betty wrote to her mother, Noyce announced Intel’s first-quarter performance for 1974, which was record setting in almost every possible way. Net income for this quarter alone was equivalent to 72 percent of the total profits for the previous year. Intel was growing so quickly that 60 percent of its plant space and 70 percent of its employees had joined the company in the last year. The technical progress had been equally rapid: a silicon transistor that cost $20 when Fairchild introduced it in 1959 now could be bought (inside an 1103) for less than one-tenth of a penny. The second quarter, incredibly, would be even brighter: almost 20 percent profit margins and quarterly net income of $6.7 million.36
四月份，英特尔股票再次拆股，三股拆二，诺伊斯的持股总数接近一百万股。英特尔1103的出货量达到每月十亿比特。同月，该公司推出了第三代微处理器8080。它的性能大约是前代产品的十倍，零售价为360美元。终于出现了一款功能强大的芯片，能够超越基本的控制功能，实现真正的计算。数字设备公司（DEC）宣布将在其计算机中使用8080。其他公司也推出了另外18款微处理器，但到1975年，8080已经成为同类产品的标杆，就像1103之于1K半导体存储器一样。37
In April, the stock again split three for two—bringing Noyce’s total holdings to nearly a million shares. Intel was shipping 1103s at a rate of a billion bits per month. In that same month, the company introduced the 8080, the third-generation microprocessor. It offered about ten times the performance of its predecessors and retailed for $360. Finally here was a chip powerful enough to go beyond rudimentary control functions into true computing. Digital Equipment Company (DEC) announced it would use the 8080 in its computers. Other companies had brought another 18 microprocessors to market, but by 1975 the 8080 had become the defining standard for its class in the same way that the 1103 had done for 1K semiconductor memories.37
回到诺伊斯家后，鲍勃和贝蒂在鲍勃出轨被发现后的一年多时间里，磕磕绊绊地度过争吵和咨询期。这段婚姻最终在1974年夏天走到了尽头。鲍勃决定去缅因州陪贝蒂待几个星期。他或许是想努力挽回这段婚姻。鲍勃带着奥杜邦协会的团队飞往纽芬兰采集更多的海鹦幼鸟时，贝蒂也加入了他的行列。而鲍勃则放弃了在悬崖边探险的机会，陪贝蒂游览了历史悠久的圣约翰斯小镇。38
Back in the Noyce household, Bob and Betty muddled their way through fights and counseling sessions for more than a year after the discovery of Bob’s affair. The end came in the summer of 1974. Bob decided to spend several weeks in Maine with Betty. He may have planned to try hard for a reconciliation. Betty joined him when he flew the Audubon team to Newfoundland to gather more puffin chicks, and he in turn skipped the cliffside adventures in order to accompany Betty on a tour of the historic town of St. John’s.38
但这并非一个充满月光漫步和促膝长谈的夏日。夏末时分，朋友们前来拜访，却目睹了鲍勃和贝蒂之间“一场公开的战争”。一位访客回忆起一个特别的夜晚：“整个晚上，贝蒂都在对鲍勃大发雷霆。他只是低着头默默忍受，但那天晚上他脑子里似乎有什么东西被触动了，因为第二天早上他就宣布要离婚。贝蒂震惊不已。”朋友们匆匆离开，鲍勃也跟着他们走了。他以最快的速度回到了英特尔办公室的“安全港湾”。39
But it was not a summer of moonlit walks or heartfelt conversation. When friends came up to visit towards the end of the summer, they entered a scene one described as “outright warfare between Bob and Betty.” The visitor recalled one night in particular: “All evening long, Betty was hammering at Bob. He was just bowing his head and taking it, but some switch must have flipped in his mind that night, because the next morning he announced that he wanted a divorce. Betty was stunned.” The friends made a hasty exit, and Bob left with them. As quickly as he could, he returned to the safety of his Intel office.39
诺伊斯知道离婚会给他带来巨大的经济影响。由于加州实行夫妻共同财产制，夫妻二人的财产会自动平分。但确定这些财产却是个难题。诺伊斯从未费心请会计师编制个人资产负债表。
Noyce knew divorce would have significant financial implications for him. Because California was a community-property state, the couple’s assets were automatically split 50-50. But determining those assets would prove a challenge. Noyce had never bothered to have an accountant draw up a personal balance sheet.
他请费尔柴尔德公司的助理保罗·霍斯钦斯基（Paul Hwoschinsky）帮忙估算诺伊斯家族资产的总价值。霍斯钦斯基长期专攻金融，并且拥有一些不同寻常的特质。他拥有哈佛大学的工商管理硕士学位，曾在费尔柴尔德公司与诺伊斯共事时教过他会计和金融方面的知识。在成为一名成功的商人的同时，霍斯钦斯基还研习瑜伽，并走在新时代思想的前沿。他后来写了一本畅销书《真正的财富》（True Wealth），旨在提醒读者“金钱只是构成幸福感的整体系统的一部分。真正的挑战在于为了生活而赚钱，而不是为了赚钱而生活。”40
He asked his assistant from Fairchild, Paul Hwoschinsky, to try to calculate the total value of the Noyces’ holdings. Hwoschinsky had long specialized in finance, and he possessed an unusual combination of character traits. He had an MBA from Harvard and had taught Noyce about accounting and finance when they were both at Fairchild. At the same time that he was a successful businessman, Hwoschinsky also studied yoga and was in the vanguard of New Age thinking. He would one day write a bestselling book called True Wealth to remind readers that “money is just one part of a total system that produces a feeling of well-being. The challenge is earning money to live life rather than living life to earn money.”40
霍辛斯基也是少数几个积极抵抗诺伊斯影响的人之一。“如果你跳下悬崖，所有人都会跟着你，”霍辛斯基曾对诺伊斯说，“但我不会。” 看到老板一脸惊讶，霍辛斯基继续说道：“我的意思是，你的魅力很可怕。要明智地运用它。” 霍辛斯基怀疑，诺伊斯之所以让他评估自己的资产——后来又让他管理诺伊斯子女的信托基金——正是因为他知道霍辛斯基能够在可能充满情绪波动的情况下保持客观。41
Hwoschinsky was also one of the few people who actively fought against falling under Noyce’s spell. “If you walk off a cliff, everyone else will follow you,” Hwoshinsky once told Noyce. “But I will not.” When his boss looked startled, Hwoschinsky continued, “What I’m saying to you is that your charisma is scary. Use it wisely.” Hwoschinsky suspects that Noyce asked him to determine his assets—and later, to administer the Noyce children’s trusts—precisely because he knew that Hwoschinsky could remain objective in situations that had the potential to be quite emotionally fraught.41
霍斯钦斯基同意帮助诺伊斯清点他的资产。“绝大部分是英特尔的股票，”霍斯钦斯基回忆道，“但还有在加州和缅因州的房产，以及诺伊斯空军（鲍勃的飞机）。” 和解协议签署后，鲍勃获得了加州的房子，贝蒂获得了缅因州的房产，英特尔的股票则平分，鲍勃和贝蒂各获得约50万股，价值近2500万美元。42
Hwoschinsky agreed to help Noyce determine his assets. “By far the bulk of it was Intel stock,” Hwoschinsky recalls. “But there were also the properties in California and Maine and the Noyce Air Force [Bob’s planes].” When the settlement agreement was signed, Bob got the house in California, Betty got the Maine estate, and the Intel stock was split down the middle, with Bob and Betty each receiving roughly a half-million shares worth nearly $25 million.42
在霍什钦斯基进行计算的某个时刻，诺伊斯有些不好意思地递给他一个鞋盒。“这是什么？”霍什钦斯基问道。43
At some point while Hwoschinsky was doing his calculations, Noyce rather sheepishly handed him a shoe box. “What’s this?” Hwoschinsky asked.43
霍辛斯基打开了盒子。盒子几乎装满了欠条和法律文件，这些文件授予诺伊斯在他投资的几家初创公司中的股份。“诺伊斯不能让他的钱闲置着，”霍辛斯基解释说，“他想用这些钱去开创新的事业。他与一些在社交场合认识的人达成了各种各样的小交易。他就是喜欢做项目，喜欢和人打交道。”
Hwoschinsky opened the box. It was filled nearly to the lid with IOUs and legal paperwork granting Noyce shares in various young companies in which he had invested. “Noyce could not just let his money sit,” Hwoschinsky explains. “He wanted to use it to stir up new adventures. He was in all sorts of little deals with people whom he had met socially. He just loved doing projects, loved people.”
如果一位创业者向诺伊斯寻求资金，用于一个他认为有趣、实用且技术上并非不可能的项目，他通常都会同意帮忙。“他是个非常慷慨的人，”英特尔的莱斯·瓦达兹解释说，“他并不为钱发愁，而且……即使他并不真心想投资，他可能也会想，‘好吧，那又怎样？反正也有点好处。’他不会把投资看得太重。”44
If an entrepreneur asked Noyce for money for a project that struck him as interesting, practical, and not technically impossible, he would usually agree to help. “He was a very generous person,” explains Intel’s Les Vadasz. “He did not have money worries, and … even if his heart wasn’t in [an investment], he probably felt, ‘Well, so what? There’s some upside.’ He didn’t take it so seriously.”44
诺伊斯当年从事的那种私人投资，如今在高科技圈被称为“天使投资”。这种投资模式起源于20世纪30年代的美国，当时像劳伦斯·洛克菲勒这样的富豪资助他们的门徒创办新公司。天使投资在硅谷出现的时间大约与威廉·肖克利创办公司的时间重合。例如，到了20世纪60年代初，十几位惠普公司的高管成立了一个以商业为基础的“饮酒俱乐部”。每位成员都承诺对电子行业的创业者保持开放的态度，并每月缴纳约100美元的“会费”。在每月一次的“聚会”上（聚会地点通常在某位成员的家中），大家会喝几杯，任何听说过令人兴奋的投资机会的人都会分享相关信息。然后，大家会决定是否投资，以及投资金额。六年之后，这个名为“Page Mill Partners”的小型饮酒俱乐部瓜分了约3000万美元的利润。45
The type of private investing in which Noyce engaged is today called “angel investing” in high-technology circles. It took root in the United Sates in the 1930s, when wealthy benefactors such as Laurence Rockefeller helped their protégés to start new companies. Angel investing appeared in Silicon Valley around the time William Shockley started his company. By the early 1960s, for example, a dozen Hewlett-Packard executives set up a business-based “drinking club.” Each man promised to keep his door and ears open to electronics entrepreneurs and paid monthly “dues” of about $100. At the monthly “meeting,” held at one or another fellow’s home, the group would share a few drinks, and anyone who had heard of an exciting investment opportunity would talk about it. The group would then decide how much, if any, of their pooled money to invest in the company. After a half-dozen years, this little drinking group—which adopted the name “Page Mill Partners”—split roughly $30 million in profits.45
霍沃辛斯基很快发现，这些回报远远超过了诺伊斯那些用鞋盒装起来的创业项目。盒子里塞着AMD（Advanced Micro Devices）的文件——这家公司由仙童半导体（Fairchild）的推销员杰里·桑德斯（Jerry Sanders）创办，诺伊斯曾少量投资——但除此之外，霍沃辛斯基对这些公司的大部分业务都闻所未闻，它们的名字如今已湮没在历史长河中。他只能根据自己见过的最糟糕的账目记录，来估算诺伊斯持有的股份价值以及它们的增值幅度。
Such returns were far beyond those of Noyce’s shoe box startups, Hwoschinsky soon learned. Paperwork from Advanced Micro Devices (AMD)—a successful company started by Fairchild salesman Jerry Sanders in which Noyce had invested a small amount—was stuffed in the box, but otherwise, Hwoschinsky had never heard of most of these operations, whose names are at this point lost to history. He had to determine the value of Noyce’s holdings and how much they had appreciated, based on some of the sloppiest record keeping he had ever seen.
他从盒子里随手抽出一张纸。“诺伊斯，你花了多少钱买这批股票？”
He grabbed a random sheet of paper from the box. “Noyce, how much did you pay for this stock?”
“每股16.95美元。”
“$16.95 a share.”
“你怎么记得的？你有作废的支票吗？”
“How do you remember? Do you have a canceled check?”
“保罗，是16.95美元。”
“Paul, it was $16.95.”
霍辛斯基找到了名单上出现的每一位企业家。与企业家见面时，霍辛斯基还仔细核对了诺伊斯回忆的股票购买价格。创始人的文件。诺伊斯的计算总是准确的。“他简直是个活宝，”霍斯钦斯基说。“我从未见过这样的人。他能记住任何事，无所不知。”
Hwoschinsky tracked down every entrepreneur whose name appeared in the box. When he met with the entrepreneur, Hwoschinsky also double-checked Noyce’s recollection of the price he paid for the stock against the founder’s paper work. Always, Noyce’s numbers were right. “He was a bloody elephant,” says Hwoschinsky. “I’ve never seen anything like it. He could remember anything and everything.”
“时不时地，”霍辛斯基回忆道，“我会接到另一个电话：‘呃，保罗？我又找到一个鞋盒。’”
“Every now and again,” Hwoschinsky reminisces, “I’d get another call: ‘Uh, Paul? I found another shoe box.’”
诺伊斯一家于九月正式开始分居两地。“爸爸有点难过，但他似乎已经下定决心了，”佩妮写信给母亲，这恰如其分地描述了诺伊斯当时的情绪状态。在决定与贝蒂分居后不久，他与父母、兄弟和其他几位亲戚共进晚餐。在晚餐上，他开始用一种家人从未听过的低沉而脆弱的语气说话。诺伊斯说，他的父母和祖父母绝不会让自己陷入他如今的境地。他担心这段婚姻及其破裂会对孩子们造成影响。他的小女儿已经被迫选择由哪位家长参加学校的家长周末活动。“我之前所做的一切都不重要了，”他说，“因为我作为父亲是失败的。”他一生都在寻找能够以创新方式解决的问题。而这个问题他却无能为力——事实上，他还是造成这个问题的推手之一——他担心孩子们会为他的失败付出代价。46
THE NOYCES OFFICIALLY BEGAN LIVING ON OPPOSITE COASTS in September. “Da is a little sad, but he seems resolved,” Penny wrote to her mother, an apt description of Noyce’s emotional state. At a dinner with his parents, brothers, and a few other relatives shortly after the decision to split from Betty, he started talking in a quiet, vulnerable tone no one in the family had heard before. His own parents and grandparents would never have gotten themselves into the situation in which he found himself, Noyce said. He was concerned about the effects of this marriage and its dissolution on his children. Already his youngest daughter was forced to choose which parent would attend parents’ weekend at her school. “Nothing else I’ve done matters,” he said, “because I’ve failed as a parent.” He had spent his life finding problems he could solve in innovative ways. This one he could not solve—he had helped to create it, in fact—and he worried that his children would pay the price for his failure.46
雪上加霜的是，英特尔的处境也发生了翻天覆地的变化。短短三个月内，半导体行业便陷入了崩溃。英特尔及其竞争对手上半年取得的亮眼业绩，部分原因在于客户出于对能源危机的担忧而大量囤积半导体存储器。但到了第三季度中期，随着全球经济开始陷入衰退，电子产品需求迅速下降，这些客户已不再需要购买更多半导体。
Adding to his woes was the situation at Intel, which had changed dramatically. Over the course of three months, the semiconductor industry had fallen apart. Some portion of the excellent results Intel and its competitors had posted for the first half of the year could be traced to customers’ stockpiling semiconductor memories in the wake of concerns about the energy crisis. But by the middle of the third quarter, with the world economy beginning to spiral into recession and demand for electronics dropping rapidly, these customers had no need to buy more semiconductors.
1974年7月，英特尔股价一夜之间暴跌30%，从63.5美元跌至44.5美元。诺伊斯在股价暴跌后的第二天上班时得知，几位在股价60美元左右行使期权的英特尔员工，由于期权行使流程的低效，未能赶在股价暴跌前卖出股票。诺伊斯认为这极其不公平。这些员工损失了三分之一的股票，并非因为他们错过了最佳交易时机，而是因为美国证券交易委员会（SEC）规定的繁琐的股票期权交易流程延误了他们的出售。他不禁思考，是否有可能改变这一制度。47
IN JULY 1974, the share price of Intel stock fell 30 percent—from 63½ to 44½—overnight. When Noyce arrived at work on the day after the precipitous drop, he learned that several Intel employees who had exercised their options when the price was in the sixties had not been able to sell their stock before the price drop due to inefficiencies in the option-exercising process. This struck Noyce as profoundly unfair. The employees would be short by one-third not because they timed the market wrong but because the elaborate stock-option protocol required by the SEC had delayed their sale. He wondered if it was possible to change the system.47
在20世纪70年代中期，将股票期权兑换成现金是一个漫长而繁琐的过程。例如，在英特尔公司，员工首先要到公司内部的期权交易台提交一份表格和一张支票，金额相当于期权的行权价格乘以出售的股票数量。例如，一名员工行使了行权价格为5美元的期权，出售1000股股票，那么……例如，提交一张 5,000 美元的支票。1974 年 7 月初，英特尔股票价格为 63.5 美元时，这样做的英特尔员工预期将从出售中获得 63,500 美元（1,000 股，每股 63.50 美元），从而获得 58,500 美元的利润（63,500 美元减去行使期权支付的 5,000 美元）。
Converting stock options to cash in the mid-1970s was a drawn-out, tedious process. At Intel, for example, employees first went to the on-site options desk to submit a form and a check for an amount equivalent to their strike price times the number of shares they were selling. An employee exercising an option to sell 1,000 shares with a $5 strike price, for example, would hand in a $5,000 check. Intel employees who did this in early July 1974, when the stock was at 63½, expected to receive $63,500 from the sale (1,000 shares at $63.50), thereby clearing a profit of $58,500 ($63,500, less the $5,000 paid to exercise the options).
但提交表格和支票并不意味着股票立即售出。只有当员工在纸质股票证书背面签字后，交易才能完成。这些证书由英特尔的过户代理机构——位于旧金山的富国银行保管，该银行在支票兑现后才会发放证书。从员工在英特尔行使期权到收到股票证书并签字完成股票出售，可能需要一周时间。股票的成交价格是证书签署当日的价格，而不是期权行使当日的价格。
But submitting the form and check did not immediately sell the stock. The sale would be completed only when the employee signed the back of a paper stock certificate. These certificates were held by Intel’s transfer agent, Wells Fargo Bank in San Francisco, which did not release them until it had cashed the check. A week could easily pass between the time the employee exercised the options at Intel and the time he or she received the stock certificate and, by signing it, sold the stock. The sale was processed at the price on the day the certificate was signed, not at the price on the day the option was exercised.
一般来说，文件在英特尔、富国银行和员工之间流转的一周延误并不会造成什么问题。但如果股价一夜之间下跌30%，那么上述例子中的员工就会因此损失近2万美元。当然，员工可以选择行权并持有股票直到股价回升，但任何急需用钱的人就只能自认倒霉了。
In general, the weeklong delay while paperwork traveled among Intel, Wells Fargo, and the employee was not problematic. But when the stock dropped 30 percent overnight, that delay would have cost the employee in the example above nearly $20,000. Of course, an employee could choose to exercise and hold the stock until the price recovered, but anyone who needed the money immediately was out of luck.
诺伊斯很快就联系上了他的经纪人，迪安·维特公司的鲍勃·哈灵顿。“我们有五位高管上周行使了期权，但还没能卖掉股票（因为他们还没收到股票证书），”诺伊斯解释说。“其中两位原本打算用这笔钱支付房子的首付。现在股价下跌了近三分之一，交易也即将完成。您有什么办法可以帮助他们吗？”
Noyce soon was on the phone with his broker, Bob Harrington of Dean Witter. “We had five execs who exercised options in the last week but haven’t been able to sell the stock yet [because they had not received the certificates],” Noyce explained. “Two of these guys were planning on using the money for down payments on houses. Now the stock is down nearly one-third, and escrow is closing. Do you have any ideas about how we might help these guys?”
哈灵顿对此深有同感。为了招揽经纪业务，他开始每天早上在硅谷当地的一家电台播报股票行情。许多人告诉他，他们从不错过他早上7点57分的“半导体行情报告”。他们坐在车里，认真聆听，心里默默计算着自己持有的股票当天的价值。
Harrington could sympathize. To drum up business for his brokerage services, he had begun broadcasting stock reports every morning on a local Silicon Valley radio station. Many people had told him that they never missed his 7:57 “semiconductor report.” They sat in their cars, listening attentively and mentally calculating how much their stock was worth that day.
哈灵顿总是惊讶于他的听众对股票期权的感受有多么真实。如果一个人持有某公司5万股股票的期权，而哈灵顿报道该公司股价为每股20美元，那么这个人就会觉得自己成了百万富翁！他完全不顾及这些期权可能尚未完全生效，或者他可能没有足够的现金支付行权的预付款，又或者股价可能下跌让他血本无归。人们只有在一切都按照最乐观的设想进行时，才会认为自己已经拥有了本该属于自己的财富。虽然诺伊斯提到的英特尔高管们无疑比他的许多听众更精明，但哈灵顿知道，对他们来说，情况也必然如此。资金短缺30%对他们来说无疑是个打击。哈灵顿告诉诺伊斯，他会和法务部门核实后再回复他。
Harrington was always surprised at how real the stock seemed to his listeners with stock options. If a man held options on 50,000 shares in a company and Harrington reported that company trading at $20 per share, then by golly, the person considered himself a millionaire! Never mind that this fellow’s options might not be fully vested, or that he might not have the cash to pay the upfront costs of exercising shares, or that prices might drop and leave him with nothing. People thought of themselves as already possessing the money that was theirs only if everything went according to the most optimistic scenario. Although the Intel executives Noyce mentioned to Harrington were certainly more sophisticated investors than many of his listeners, Harrington knew that for them, too, it must have been a blow to find themselves 30 percent short. Harrington told Noyce that he would check with the legal department and get back to him.
不到一个小时后，迪安·维特证券公司的证券律师告诉哈灵顿，尽管英特尔可以向员工提供贷款来弥补资金缺口，但该公司对此情况无能为力。
Not more than an hour later, Dean Witter’s securities attorney told Harrington that the brokerage house could do nothing about this situation, although Intel could offer loans to its employees to cover the shortfall.
但哈灵顿想到了一个办法：如果有一种方法可以在行使期权后立即出售股票，那么就不会有人再陷入这种困境了。如果行使期权的员工可以签署一份承诺书，保证在实际收到纸质股票证书后立即将其交出，那么这份承诺书本身是否可以作为已签署股票证书的临时替代品呢？而且，为什么就此止步呢？如果承诺书可以代替股票证书，为什么不能代替支票呢？为什么不直接在承诺书上添加一条，规定从出售股票所得款项中扣除行使期权的成本呢？这样一来，员工就不需要持有大量现金来行使期权了。
But Harrington had an idea: if there were some way to sell stock immediately upon exercising, no one would ever get caught in this bind again. If an employee exercising options could sign a note promising to turn over the paper stock certificate just as soon as it was in his or her physical possession, could that promissory note itself not serve as the temporary equivalent of the signed stock certificate? And why stop there? If a promissory note could stand in for a stock certificate, why couldn’t it stand in for a check? Why not simply add a line to the promissory note directing that the cost of exercising the options be deducted from the proceeds of the sale? This way an employee would not need to have large amounts of cash on hand in order to exercise options.
在哈灵顿设想的方案中，上述例子中的员工无需向英特尔提交5000美元的支票。他也无需等待收到股票证书即可出售股票。相反，他一旦签署了本票，他的期权就会被行使，股票就会被出售，而行使期权所需的5000美元将自动从他应得的63500美元中扣除。换句话说，他签署本票后几乎立即就能收到58500美元。
In the scheme Harrington imagined, the employee in the above example would not submit the $5,000 check to Intel. He would not need to wait to receive the stock certificate before selling his stock. Instead, as soon as he signed a promissory note, his options would be exercised, his stock would be sold, and the $5,000 needed to exercise the options would be automatically deducted from his $63,500 payout. In other words, he would sign the promissory note and almost immediately receive the $58,500 coming to him.
哈灵顿联系了一家律师事务所，他们共同从美国证券交易委员会获得了“不采取行动保证”。实际上，美国证券交易委员会表示，如果一家公司想要承担接受本票而非支票或股票证书的责任，只要该公司在其年度报告中对此作出通知，就可以这样做。
Harrington contacted a law firm, and together they secured an “assurance of no action” from the Securities and Exchange Commission. In effect, the SEC said that if a company wanted to assume the liability of accepting promissory notes in the place of checks or stock certificates, a firm could do so, as long as it provided notice of these actions in its annual report.
哈灵顿告诉诺伊斯，他计划为企业客户推出一项“期权行权——立即出售”计划。英特尔注册了这项服务，几个月后，英特尔的财务副总裁报告说，几乎所有行使期权的英特尔员工都使用了“一日内完成股票买卖”的服务。48
Harrington told Noyce that he planned to start an “Option Exercise—Immediate Sale” program for corporate clients. Intel signed up for the service, and within a few months Intel’s finance vice president was reporting that “virtually all” of the Intel employees exercising options used the “1-day stock buy/sell turnaround.”48
哈灵顿原本希望将这个项目保密，但这个想法太好了。它迅速在迪安·维特公司内部传播开来，然后遍及全国。“这个项目让成千上万人的生活变得更轻松，”哈灵顿解释说，“而它的种子源于鲍勃·诺伊斯提出的一个简单的问题：‘难道没有更好的办法吗？’”49
Harrington had hoped to keep the program proprietary, but the idea was too good. It spread rapidly through Dean Witter and then around the country. “That program made life easier for tens of thousands of people,” Harrington explains, “and the seed for it came from Bob Noyce asking a simple question: ‘Isn’t there a better way?’”49
1974年下半年，诺伊斯生活中为数不多的亮点之一便是当日销售创新。当时，他在缅因州的婚姻正走向破裂，而加利福尼亚州的半导体公司却开始蓬勃发展。裁员。仅在7月份，Intersil就有50人失业，Signetics裁员100人，AMI裁员230人。为了避免英特尔裁员，摩尔和格鲁夫在诺伊斯的同意下，决定在7月4日和劳动节前一周关闭两家生产工厂，暂时解雇600名员工，并只支付他们正常工资的一半。50
The same-day sales innovation was one of very few bright spots in Noyce’s life in the second half of 1974. While his marriage was suffering its death throes in Maine, semiconductor companies in California began laying off workers. In July alone, 50 people lost their jobs at Intersil, Signetics laid off 100 workers, and AMI cut 230 jobs. In an attempt to avoid layoffs at Intel, Moore and Grove—with Noyce’s assent—decided to close two production facilities for a week before both July 4th and Labor Day, temporarily furloughing 600 employees, who were granted only half their normal pay.50
这些努力未能挽救英特尔的颓势。在经济衰退中，内存市场几乎消失殆尽。Microma手表业务也岌岌可危，1974年税前亏损超过150万美元——几乎是年初管理团队预测的两倍。英特尔的4K内存产品迟迟未能上市，以至于公司不得不从竞争对手那里采购第二供应商的产品。唯一亮点是内存系统和微处理器业务，这两个业务的销售额在两个季度均有所增长，但这些业务规模太小，不足以对整体业绩产生显著影响。英特尔第三季度的总销售额下降了5%，利润下滑了48%，第四季度又下降了9%。尽管英特尔的表现优于许多竞争对手——AMD在1974年240万美元的净利润在1975年转为250万美元的亏损；Signetics则从盈利1000万美元转为亏损400万美元； Mostek 的利润从 400 万美元骤降至 120 万美元亏损——利润下降 48%，对于一家习惯于每年收入翻三倍的公司来说，这是一个毁灭性的业绩。51
Such efforts could not save Intel’s bottom line. The memory market had essentially disappeared in the recession. The Microma watch business was well on its way to disaster and would post losses of more than 1.5 million pretax dollars in 1974—nearly double the hit projected by the executive team at the beginning of the year. Intel’s 4K RAM was so late that the company began second-sourcing a competitor’s product. The only bright spots were the memory systems and microprocessor businesses, whose sales had increased both quarters, but these were too small to have a significant effect on overall results. Intel’s total sales dropped 5 percent in the third quarter—earnings slipped 48 percent—and would fall another 9 percent in the fourth. Although the company did better than many of its competitors—AMD’s $2.4 million net income in 1974 evaporated into a $2.5 million loss in 1975; Signetics went from $10 million profits to $4 million losses; and Mostek fell from $4 million profits to $1.2 million losses—a 48 percent fall in profits was a devastating performance for a company accustomed to tripling its revenues annually.51
10月，诺伊斯签下了他职业生涯中最艰难的一封信。“致所有英特尔员工，”他写道，“持续低迷的业务环境迫使我们今天不得不裁员……我们曾试图通过在公司内部调动员工到受经济影响较小的部门来避免裁员。我们原本希望8月份削减开支和定期缩短工时足以应对产品需求疲软，直到经济复苏。我们这样做是基于业务目前应该有所好转的预期。不幸的是，情况并非如此。”52
In October, Noyce signed his name to one of the most difficult letters of his career. “To all Intel Employees,” he wrote. “Continued reduced business conditions have made it necessary for us to have a reduction in our work force today. … We have tried to avoid such reductions in force by instituting transfers of people within the Company into areas which have not been seriously affected by the economy. We hoped that our overhead reduction in August and periodic reduced work weeks would be sufficient to cope with the slackening product demand until the economy recovered. This was based upon the hope that business would be improving by now. Unfortunately, it is not.”52
在与贝蒂正式分居两天前签署的这封信中，诺伊斯解雇了英特尔约2500名员工中的30%，其中大部分是生产人员。他对此举深感沮丧，并痛苦地向一位朋友倾诉：“为了华尔街那该死的几个点，我们竟然要毁掉别人的生活。”53
With this letter, signed two days before his legal separation from Betty, Noyce terminated roughly 30 percent of Intel’s 2,500 employees, most of them in production. He found the move profoundly upsetting and miserably confided in a friend, “For a few goddamned points on Wall Street, we have to ruin peoples’ lives.”53
他在给员工的信中承诺：“一旦业务好转，我们的首要任务就是召回受此次裁员影响的员工。”但他预计至少六个月内不会有任何变化。他在纽约证券分析师协会的一次会议上表示，英特尔正在为进一步裁员以及“巨大的价格损耗”做好准备。感恩节期间，英特尔再次关闭了部分业务，并且没有支付员工工资。长周末期间，惠普、仙童半导体、国民半导体、Signetics 和 AMI 等公司也采取了同样的做法，其中一些公司还让员工在圣诞节和新年之间的一周内休假。54
His letter to employees promised, “When business does improve, our first action will be to recall employees affected by this cut,” but he did not anticipate any changes for at least six months. He told a meeting of the New York Society of Security Analysts that Intel was bracing for more layoffs as well as “tremendous price attrition.” When Thanksgiving came, Intel again closed part of its operations—and did not pay workers—during the long weekend. Hewlett-Packard, Fairchild, National, Signetics, and AMI did the same, some of them also furloughing employees for the week between Christmas and New Year’s.54
到1974年底，硅谷半导体行业近20%的蓝领工人被解雇。行业的失业潮以及非自愿无薪休假引发了约125名生产工人和支持他们的大学生在西部电子制造商协会（WEMA）年会外的抗议活动。诺伊斯在会上获得了1974年WEMA成就奖章——该奖章授予“对电子技术进步做出最杰出贡献的人”。颁奖词称诺伊斯是“旧金山半岛半导体产业发展中的主导力量”，但会场外的抗议者却对他另有看法。在“拒绝缩短工时！”、“仙童员工团结起来！”和“7万名电子工人拒绝无薪休假！”等标语中，还有一条写着“英特尔员工祝诺伊斯消化不良”。在1974年糟糕的第四季度末，这对他来说无疑是雪上加霜。55
By the end of 1974, nearly 20 percent of the semiconductor industry’s blue-collar workers in Silicon Valley had been laid off. The industry’s job losses and involuntary and unpaid sabbaticals sparked a protest by about 125 production workers and supportive college students outside the annual Western Electronics Manufacturing Association (WEMA) meeting at which Noyce received the 1974 WEMA medal of achievement—granted “to those who have made most significant contributions to the advancement of electronics.” The citation called Noyce “a dominant force in the development of the semiconductor industry on the San Francisco Peninsula,” but the protesters outside the meeting had other thoughts about him. Among the signs reading “No Short Work Week!” “Fairchild Workers Unite!” and “70,000 Electronics Workers Say No Vacations Without Pay!” was one wishing “Indigestion to Noyce from Intel Workers.” This was the last thing he needed at the end of the horrible fourth quarter of 1974.55
在决定裁员势在必行后不久，诺伊斯告诉摩尔，他想辞去英特尔总裁的职务。亚瑟·洛克推测，裁员是导致诺伊斯离开英特尔日常管理岗位的最后一根稻草，但摩尔早在当年第一季度和第二季度公司业绩辉煌之时，就已察觉到诺伊斯渴望改变的迹象。1974年初，诺伊斯告诉摩尔，他曾建议查理·斯波克将国家电信和英特尔合并。“他经常不事先征求我的意见就和别人谈论一些事情，”摩尔后来解释道，语气中并无明显的怨恨。摩尔同意与斯波克会面，但最终决定“想先尝试执掌英特尔一段时间”，而不是与国家电信合并。56
SHORTLY AFTER DECIDING THE LAYOFFS WERE NECESSARY, Noyce told Moore that he wanted to leave his position as Intel’s president. Arthur Rock conjectures that the layoffs were the final stress that led Noyce to leave daily management at Intel, but Moore had seen signs of Noyce’s desire for a change even during the glorious first and second quarters of the year. Early in 1974, Noyce told Moore that he had suggested to Charlie Sporck that they merge National and Intel. “It was not unusual for him to talk to people about things without consulting me first,” Moore later explained, without apparent rancor. Moore agreed to meet with Sporck but ultimately decided that he would “like to try running Intel for a while” rather than merging forces with National.56
摩尔和诺伊斯一致认为，如果诺伊斯离开，安迪·格鲁夫应该得到晋升，这样他和摩尔就可以组成团队共同管理英特尔，延续创始人开创的传统。格鲁夫多年来一直渴望承担更多责任。英特尔董事理查德·霍奇森解释说：“安迪·格鲁夫想要更多，而且是好事。你根本无法限制他。”戈登·摩尔喜欢说“安迪已经不再执着于博士学位了”，他确信，如果诺伊斯转任董事会主席，而他自己接任总裁兼首席执行官，格鲁夫将是一位出色的执行副总裁。他早已超越了仅仅执行创始人计划的范畴，开始完善、补充，甚至说服摩尔和诺伊斯修改这些计划。格鲁夫最初以科学家的身份加入英特尔，迅速转型为运营经理，毫无疑问，他完全有能力胜任综合管理职位。57
Moore and Noyce agreed that if Noyce left, Andy Grove should be promoted so that he and Moore could run Intel as a team, continuing the tradition set by the founders. Grove had been pushing for more responsibility for several years. Explained Intel director Richard Hodgson, “Andy Grove wanted more and more and more—in a good way. You just couldn’t contain him.” Gordon Moore, who liked to say that “Andy had gotten over his PhD,” was certain that if Noyce moved to board chair and Moore stepped in as president and CEO, Grove would make an excellent executive vice president. Already he had moved beyond simply implementing the founders’ plans to refining, supplementing, and even convincing Moore and Noyce to change them. Grove had arrived at Intel a scientist, rapidly transformed himself into an operations manager, and would no doubt be capable in a general management role.57
事实上，格鲁夫所代表的对硬数据和正式流程的重视，至少在一年前就已经在公司内部兴起。自从1103处理器的成功使英特尔的成功取决于能否批量生产这款设备以来，这种重视就一直存在。从1972年开始，每周的员工会议议程不再是开放式的，而是以五周为一个周期，每周讨论不同的主题——“1. 订单、发货、组织架构、人事；2. 上月业绩（财务、销量和收入、生产到成品、业务指标）；3. 主要客户（诺伊斯唯一强调的主题）和新业务；4. 定价审查/成本报告、新老产品的排期和定价；5. 杂项。”58
In fact, the attention to hard data and formal processes that one associates with Grove had been ascendant in the company for at least a year, ever since the success of the 1103 had made Intel’s success dependent upon the ability to manufacture this device in quantity. Beginning in 1972, agendas for the weekly staff meetings, which were once open-ended, ran on a five-week cycle that addressed a different set of topics each week—“1. Bookings, shipments, organization, personnel; 2. Prior months’ performance (financial, unit sales and revenue, production to finished goods, business indicators); 3. Key customers [the only subject Noyce underlined] and new activities; 4. Pricing review/Cost reports, new and old product scheduling and pricing; 5. General.”58
格尔巴赫说，早在1972年，“鲍勃就提供建议，但安迪和戈登才是实际掌管公司的人。”另一位员工解释说，虽然从表面上看“鲍勃在管理公司”，但在英特尔工作几周后，“就发现安迪才是公司的真正掌权者”。59
As early as 1972, says Gelbach, “Bob gave advice but Andy and Gordon ran it.” Another employee explains that although from the outside it appeared “Bob was running the company,” it only took a few weeks at Intel to “discover that Andy was running the company.”59
这种安排——诺伊斯提供咨询，摩尔和格罗夫负责管理——在1974年秋天正式确立。当时，诺伊斯和摩尔邀请格罗夫到桑尼维尔一家偏僻的餐馆共进午餐。“我觉得我不能把这么多时间花在英特尔身上了，”诺伊斯对格罗夫说，“我们该如何让你做好承担更多责任的准备呢？”格罗夫一向沉着冷静，他只停顿了一下就回答说：“你们可以把这份工作交给我。”60
This arrangement—Noyce giving counsel and Moore and Grove managing—was formalized in the fall of 1974, when Noyce and Moore asked Grove to join them for lunch at an out-of-the way restaurant in Sunnyvale. “I don’t think I can spend so much time on Intel,” Noyce said to Grove. “How can we get you ready for more responsibility?” Forever unflappable, Grove paused only an instant before he answered, “You can give me the job.”60
12月，英特尔宣布，从1975年4月起，格鲁夫将接替摩尔担任执行副总裁，摩尔将接替诺伊斯担任总裁兼首席执行官，而诺伊斯将出任董事会主席，接替亚瑟·洛克，洛克则将升任副董事长。为了顺利完成过渡，诺伊斯和格鲁夫计划在10月至次年4月期间几乎每周五共进午餐。媒体对此次人事变动的报道主要集中在诺伊斯和格鲁夫身上，格鲁夫的名气不如两位创始人，很容易被贴上“才华横溢却桀骜不驯”的标签。正如常有的情况一样，摩尔并没有得到他应得的关注。61
In December, Intel announced that come April 1975, Grove would move into Moore’s position of executive vice president, Moore would take Noyce’s president/CEO slot, and Noyce would become board chair, replacing Arthur Rock, who would move to vice chairman. Noyce and Grove planned to meet for lunch nearly every Friday between October and April to ease the transition. Press coverage of the changes focused on Noyce and on Grove, who was less well known than the founders and could be easily slotted into the role of brilliant enfant terrible. As was so often the case, Moore did not get the attention he deserved.61
诺伊斯是英特尔理想的创始总裁人选，因为他本质上就是摩尔所说的“狂野的扩张主义者”。诺伊斯擅长且乐于从事的工作——策划新产品、集思广益、凭空创造市场——与英特尔作为一家年轻公司的需求完美契合。他曾说过，他喜欢领导一家“游走在灾难悬崖边”的公司，时刻关注着下一个机遇。62
NOYCE HAD BEEN AN IDEAL FOUNDING PRESIDENT for Intel because he was, at his core, what Moore called “a wild expansionist.” The jobs Noyce enjoyed and excelled at—plotting a new product, brainstorming new ideas, establishing a market from thin air—meshed perfectly with Intel’s needs as a young company. He loved, he said, leading a company “walking the thin line next to the cliff of disaster,” his eyes always scanning for the next opportunity.62
诺伊斯领导公司的秘诀在于他清楚自己想要去哪里，并假定其他人会想办法实现目标。1983年，当被问及英特尔在成立初期是否制定了长期规划时，他谈到了“我们五年内的目标，我们对此讨论了很多，那就是实现5000万美元的销售额。” 这当然算不上什么计划，也并非循序渐进的方法。计划中充满了循序渐进的目标和细致入微的思考。但在诺伊斯看来，实现目标本身就是计划。63
Noyce led by knowing where he wanted to go and assuming someone else would figure out how to get there. When asked in 1983 if Intel had developed a long-range plan in its first few years of operation, he spoke of “our five year goal, one that we talked about a great deal, to do $50 million [in sales].” This, of course, was not a plan, not a step-by-step approach bristling with incremental target goals and detailed thinking. But in Noyce’s mind, achieving the goal was the plan.63
仙童半导体和英特尔的首席法律顾问罗杰·博罗沃伊解释说：“诺伊斯的计划理念是高喊‘拿下山头！’，然后用他自身的魅力和智慧激励他的团队，让他们都追随他，虽然没有人确切知道自己的职责，但每个人都朝着同一个方向前进，朝着同一个目标努力。诺伊斯和摩尔发现了半导体存储器这块山头，并带领公司登上了顶峰。接下来，他们又在霍夫的构想中发现了微处理器这块山头，然后是数字手表这块山头，公司各部门也纷纷冲向这些领域，力图将其拿下。”64
Explains Roger Borovoy, chief counsel at both Fairchild and Intel: “Noyce’s idea of planning was to yell, ‘Let’s take the hill!’” and then so inspire his troops with his own charisma and intelligence that they all began running behind him, no one exactly sure of his responsibilities, but everyone heading in the same general direction with the same general end in mind. Noyce and Moore spotted the semiconductor memory hill and led the company to the top of it. Next they spotted the microprocessor hill in the ideas Hoff had sketched, and then the digital watch hill, and flanks of the company rushed to secure those, too.64
在决定辞去总裁一职前不久，诺伊斯试图为英特尔再添一块阵地：个人电脑市场。1974 年末，一家位于新墨西哥州阿尔伯克基的年轻公司 MITS 宣布即将开始销售一款基于英特尔 8080 微处理器的自组装电脑套件。这些名为“Altair”的机器是世界上最早的个人电脑之一。尽管它们相当简陋——使用者需要会使用电烙铁——但它们却以仅 5000 美元的价格提供了价值 2 万美元的小型计算机的处理能力。更简单的 Altair 电脑套件售价甚至低至 500 美元。
Shortly before he decided to resign as president, Noyce tried to stake out one more hill for Intel: the personal computer business. In late 1974, a young Albuquerque, New Mexico, company called MITS announced it would soon begin selling a build-your-own-computer kit, which ran on an Intel 8080 microprocessor. These “Altair” machines were among the world’s first personal computers. Although they were quite rudimentary—anyone using them needed to know how to use a soldering iron—they offered the processing power of a $20,000 minicomputer at a cost of only $5,000. Less sophisticated Altair computer kits would sell for as little as $500.
诺伊斯很可能是在1974年初了解到Altair处理器的，当时英特尔同意为其提供处理器。与此同时，英特尔正在构建微处理器开发系统，方便客户调试他们为微处理器编写的软件。这些开发系统实际上可以作为简易计算机使用。它们可以被编程来模拟各种各样的环境，从控制车床到运行收银机。
Noyce must have learned about the Altair in early 1974, when Intel agreed to provide the processor. At this same time, Intel was building microprocessor development systems that made it easy for customers to debug the software they wrote for the microprocessor. These development systems in effect functioned as rudimentary computers. They could be programmed to simulate any number of environments, from controlling a lathe to running a cash register.
“鲍勃看了看Altair，又看了看微处理器开发系统，（发现它和Altair非常相似），”安迪·格鲁夫说道。诺伊斯灵感迸发，和埃德·格尔巴赫坐下来商量，用格鲁夫的话说，“他们开始着手进军个人电脑行业。”格尔巴赫设计了一个“很棒的展示台”，并在墙上挂满了这款“功能齐全、售价300美元的电脑”的模拟广告。65
“Bob looked at the Altair, looked at the microprocessor development system, and [saw something very similar],” said Andy Grove. His imagination fired, Noyce sat down with Ed Gelbach, and, in Grove’s words, “they began marching along, heading into the personal computer business.” Gelbach developed a “great display” and hung mocked-up print advertisements for this “fully functional $300 computer” on his wall.65
个人电脑，无论多么简陋，都深深吸引了诺伊斯。他给儿子比尔买了一台。比尔是个电脑迷，他和高中好友一起编写了一个分时PDP-8小型计算机程序，用作电脑交友服务。“你肯定猜不到这是什么，所以我告诉你吧，”比尔·诺伊斯在收到自己的电脑后不久，兴奋地给奶奶写信说，“其实，它只是一台非常安静的打字机。你敲击键盘，字母就会出现在屏幕上。”比尔回忆道：“（我父亲）认为，在大学教室或银行的后台摆放几台大型计算机不会给世界带来多大改变。但当电脑普及到人们手中时，改变就变得难以预料了。”他过去常说，当电力仅仅用于驱动现有的电机——例如工厂里的大型电机——时，它对社会并没有带来多大改变。但当功率较小的电机（例如缝纫机、电风扇和电动工具）普及到人们手中时，就发生了真正的变化。”66
The personal computer, however rudimentary, fascinated Noyce. He bought one for his son Bill, a computer buff who along with his high school friends had programmed a timeshare PDP-8 minicomputer to serve as a computer dating service. “You’ll never guess what this is, so I’ll tell you,” Bill Noyce wrote excitedly to his grandmother shortly after receiving his own machine. “Actually, it’s just a very quiet typewriter. When you type on the keyboard, letters appear on the screen.” Recalls Bill, “[My dad] didn’t think that a bunch of big computers in the middle of university classrooms or back rooms of banks would make much of a change in the world. But with computers in the hands of the people, changes were not anticipatable. He used to talk about how when electricity was used only to drive existing motors—the big motor in a mill, for example—it didn’t do much to change society. But when the fractional horsepower motor was put into people’s hands [in the form of sewing machines, electric fans, and power tools], there was a real change.”66
1974 年的一次员工会议上，诺伊斯漫不经心地以一句“既然我们现在涉足计算机行业了”开头。戈登·摩尔看起来很惊讶，他继续听下去，接下来发生的事情几乎闻所未闻：摩尔勃然大怒。“我当时觉得他要么要晕过去，要么要打我，”格尔巴赫回忆道。摩尔紧紧抿着嘴唇，嘴唇几乎泛白，终于开口说道：“我们的产品不是——跟我重复一遍——通用微型计算机。”诺伊斯看到的是英特尔成为一家大型计算机制造商的可能性，而摩尔看到的却是英特尔更有可能成为一家失败的计算机制造商。他只需要看看 Microma（这家公司最终在 1977 年被出售，耗费了英特尔 1500 万美元）的例子，就能明白进军一个完全未知的消费市场的风险有多大。67
At a staff meeting in 1974, Noyce casually began a sentence with the phrase, “Now that we are in the computer business.” Gordon Moore looked surprised, and as he listened further, something almost unheard of occurred: Moore became positively furious. “I thought he was going to either faint or hit me,” recalls Gelbach. His lips thin and almost white from pressing them together, Moore finally managed to speak. “Ours is not—repeat after me—a general purpose microcomputer.” Where Noyce saw the possibility of Intel becoming a major computer manufacturer, Moore saw the far more likely possibility of Intel becoming a failed computer manufacturer. He needed to look no further than Microma (which ultimately cost Intel $15 million before it was sold in 1977) to appreciate the risks of attacking an entirely unknown consumer market.67
诺伊斯并没有和摩尔争论，尽管几个月后，他半开玩笑地告诉《财富》杂志的记者，英特尔是“世界上最大的计算机制造商”。格尔巴赫把广告从墙上取下来，把“板上的计算机”重新定位为设计辅助工具。摩尔说的或许没错。英特尔当时已经够忙了，没必要再去挑战世界主要的计算机制造商。68
Noyce did not argue with Moore, although a few months later he did tell a Fortune interviewer, “only half in jest,” that Intel was “the world’s largest computer manufacturer.” Gelbach pulled the advertisements off the wall and repositioned the “computer on a board” as a design aid. Moore was probably right. Intel had enough to do without trying to take on the major computer manufacturers of the world.68
但Altair事件或许让诺伊斯再次意识到，英特尔已永远告别了初创时期。“创业阶段并未完全结束，”诺伊斯在宣布出任董事会主席时说道，“但重点正在转向控制。”成立六年时，英特尔已是全球领先的半导体存储器制造商，也是全球第六大半导体公司。它无需开辟新的市场，只需巩固已有的市场地位。这意味着大规模生产，并在现有技术上进行渐进式改进。69
But the Altair episode may have given Noyce yet another indication that Intel had left its youth forever. “The entrepreneurial phase is not entirely over,” Noyce said when he announced his move to board chair, “but the emphasis is shifting to control.” At age six, Intel was the world’s leading manufacturer of semiconductor memories and the sixth largest semiconductor company in the world. It did not need to be capturing new hills. It needed to build on the hills already occupied. That meant manufacturing in massive quantities and making incremental improvements in existing technologies.69
英特尔未来需要的不是勇于冒险的勇气，而是有条不紊、稳步推进的纪律。它需要的不是凭“直觉”领导，也不是诺伊斯所谓的“人脉关系”领导，而是依靠冷冰冰的数字进行管理。它需要的不是诺伊斯，而是安迪·格鲁夫。格鲁夫在1974年曾表示，他希望将英特尔打造成麦当劳的模式。格鲁夫说，这家汉堡连锁店已经将标准化提升到了一个极高的水平，值得英特尔效仿。英特尔需要开始将自己视为“高科技软糖”的制造商，其产品要像麦当劳的包装盒和印有金色拱门的纸质包装一样，统一、标准且可预测。甚至有人为格鲁夫设计了一个印有“麦英特尔”（McIntel）字样的汉堡盒。他一直把它放在办公桌上。70
What Intel needed going forward was not the courage to take great leaps ahead but the discipline to take orderly steps in a controlled fashion. Not leadership by “gut feel” or what Noyce called “personal contact” but management by hard, cold numbers. It needed not Noyce but Andy Grove, who in 1974 said he hoped to model Intel on McDonalds. The hamburger chain, Grove said, had taken standardization to a level that Intel would do well to copy. Intel needed to start thinking of itself as a maker of “high technology jelly beans” as uniform, standard, and predictable as the products served in clamshell boxes and paper wrappers emblazoned with the golden arches. Someone even mocked up a hamburger box emblazoned with “McIntel” for Grove. He kept it on his desk.70
诺伊斯知道“掌控”是一项重要的工作，但他并不想做。英特尔在宣布诺伊斯、摩尔和格鲁夫新职位时发布的新闻稿中曾保证，即使担任董事会主席，“诺伊斯仍将继续积极参与公司的运营管理”。但安迪·格鲁夫曾表示，一旦这几位男士在新岗位上站稳脚跟，“鲍勃就几乎销声匿迹了”。71
Noyce knew that “control” was important work. But he did not want to do it. The press release announcing Noyce, Moore, and Grove’s new positions at Intel had included an assurance that even as board chair, “Noyce will continue to take an active role in the operating management of the company.” But Andy Grove has said that once the men were established in their new jobs, “Bob practically disappeared.”71
诺伊斯一生中第一次需要休息。他解雇了三分之一的员工，家庭分崩离析，股票价值暴跌，还结束了一段他曾经深爱的恋情。1975年初的大部分时间，他都在重整旗鼓，几乎不停地出差，通常是为了英特尔公司，而且几乎每次都会延长行程，超出原本的商务活动。他在欧洲待了两周，在希腊待了一周，在以色列（英特尔在那里设有一个小型分支机构）又待了一周，在日本待了十天。他多次去阿斯彭滑雪，还去了布加布山脉（他称之为“老年运动员的训练营”），在那里，直升机把他送到山顶，然后他再滑雪下山，外套上别着一个应答器，以防在雪地里迷路。
FOR ONCE IN HIS LIFE, Noyce needed a break. He had laid off one-third of his employees. His family had disintegrated. The value of his stock had plummeted. He had ended an affair with a woman for whom he had once cared deeply. He spent most of the early part of 1975 regrouping, traveling nearly constantly, usually for Intel and almost always extending his stay beyond the end of his business commitments. He spent two weeks in Europe, a week in Greece, another in Israel (where Intel had a small operation), and ten days in Japan. He skied in Aspen several times and in the Bugaboos (“the camp for aging athletes,” he called it) where a helicopter dropped him on the mountaintops to schluss his way down, a transponder clipped to his jacket in case he got lost in the snow.
诺伊斯环球旅行期间到访过的一个地方颇为出人意料：内布拉斯加州的克里特镇，人口仅有4500人。诺伊斯夫妇宣布离婚后不久，鲍勃决定向他父亲的母校——位于克里特镇的杜安学院捐赠5万美元。他和兄弟们告诉父亲，在他1975年5月举行的六十周年同学聚会上，将会有一个巨大的惊喜。72
One of the places Noyce visited in his world travels was quite unlikely: Crete, Nebraska, population 4,500. Shortly after the Noyces announced their decision to divorce, Bob decided to donate $50,000 to his father’s alma mater, Doane College in Crete. He and his brothers told their father to expect a big surprise at his sixtieth reunion, to be held in May 1975.72
到了约定的周末，身在日本的诺伊斯安排他的朋友兼飞行教练吉姆·拉弗蒂驾驶鲍勃的新飞机，将老诺伊斯夫妇和鲍勃的大哥唐从他们当时居住的加州奥克兰送到克里特岛。盖洛德和拉尔夫则会在内布拉斯加州与父母会合。鲍勃会尽力从东京赶来，参加晚宴，并宣布由于鲍勃的慷慨捐赠，校园里的一座小教堂将被命名为“诺伊斯教堂”，以纪念诺伊斯牧师。73
When the appointed weekend arrived, Noyce, who was in Japan, arranged for his friend and flight instructor Jim Lafferty to fly the senior Noyces and Bob’s oldest brother Don from Oakland, California, where they were now living, to Crete in Bob’s new plane. Gaylord and Ralph would meet their parents in Nebraska. Bob would do his best to fly in from Tokyo in time to make the dinner banquet announcing that thanks to Bob’s generosity, a small campus chapel would now be designated the Noyce Chapel in Reverend Noyce’s honor.73
这个周末是81岁的拉尔夫·诺伊斯一生中最难忘的时刻。吉姆·拉弗蒂用儿子的私人飞机接他和妻子哈丽特飞往内布拉斯加州。“对我们乘客来说，这架飞机和民航客机一样舒适，”哈丽特自豪地写道，并补充说克里特机场的工作人员说这是降落在那里的最大飞机。当诺伊斯牧师得知教堂的新名字，当他在落成典礼上聆听盖洛德关于“小即是美”的演讲，当他看到四个成年的儿子肩并肩地坐在教堂的长椅上时，他百感交集。“我不知道该如何表达我内心的感动，”他写信给鲍勃说，“我不知道儿子还能怎样更好地敬重父亲。”74
The weekend was the highlight of 81-year-old Ralph Noyce’s life. Jim Lafferty flew him and Harriet to Nebraska in their son’s jet. “It is as comfortable for us passengers as a commercial plane,” Harriet wrote, proudly adding that the airport attendant in Crete said it was the largest plane ever to land there. When Reverend Noyce learned of the chapel’s new name, when he listened to Gaylord speak on the topic “Small is Beautiful” at the dedication, when he saw his four grown sons sitting shoulder to shoulder in the pews, he was overcome. “I just don’t know how in the world to let you know how deeply it moves me,” he wrote to Bob. “I don’t know how a son could honor a father more.”74
即便那个周末充满了兴奋，对哈里特·诺伊斯来说，“鲍勃的到来（在宣布教堂落成典礼的宴会开始前几分钟）”“那是激动人心的时刻。”她解释说，“鲍勃在东京结束了一周的商务旅行后，搭乘的飞机准时抵达了旧金山。他赶上了唯一一班飞往奥马哈的航班，这样他才有时间从奥马哈飞回克里特岛。紧凑的行程安排最终成功了。这简直就是个奇迹，不可能的事情竟然变成了现实。”她补充道，“我独自一人在这里记录这一刻，不禁热泪盈眶，擤着鼻子，哽咽难言，这种感觉在整个意义非凡的周末里我都从未有过。”
Even with all the excitement of that weekend, for Harriet Noyce “Bob’s arrival [minutes before the banquet announcing the chapel dedication] was the high moment.” She explained, “The plane that Bob had boarded in Tokyo after a week’s business trip had arrived in San Francisco on time. He had caught the only plane to Omaha that could possibly give him time to fly his own plane back from Omaha to Crete. The tight schedule had worked out. It seemed nothing short of a miracle that the impossible had come true.” She added, “I find myself crying and blowing my nose here alone as I record the moment, choked up now as I never was during the whole momentous weekend itself.”
对哈丽特来说，诺伊斯教堂不仅仅是一份慷慨的礼物。它象征着她那即将离婚、周游列国、身价百万的儿子并没有完全忘记他在教会和中西部的根基。它肯定了他即便误入歧途，依然尊重父亲和家族的教诲。诺伊斯教堂让她燃起了希望，或许，或许，这个浪子终有一天会回头。
For Harriet, the Noyce chapel was more than a generous gift. It was a sign that her jet-setting, millionaire, soon-to-be-divorced son had not entirely forgotten his roots in the church and in the Midwest. It was an affirmation that even though he had strayed, he honored his father and his upbringing. The Noyce Chapel offered her hope that maybe, just maybe, the prodigal might return.
10
续期
10
Renewal
在关于多恩学院周末活动的笔记结尾，哈丽特·诺伊斯写道：“我们离开机场时，儿子鲍勃正在一个电话亭里和安约好共进晚餐。”安指的是安·鲍尔斯，英特尔公司的人事主管，也是半导体行业为数不多的女性高管之一。她37岁（比诺伊斯小十岁），身材娇小，思维敏捷，说话直率，给人一种非常自信的感觉。她后来成为了诺伊斯的第二任妻子。
At the end of her notes about the weekend at Doane College, Harriet Noyce wrote, “As we left the airport, son Bob was at one telephone booth making a date for Ann to meet him for dinner.” Ann was Ann Bowers, Intel’s head of personnel, and one of the only female executives in the semiconductor industry. She was 37 (ten years younger than Noyce) and physically small, with a quick mind and blunt manner of speaking that lent her a distinctly assertive air. She would become Noyce’s second wife.
鲍尔斯在宾夕法尼亚州的奥克蒙特长大，那是匹兹堡郊外一个蓝领小镇，经济主要依靠一家油漆厂和一家轧钢厂。她的母亲出生在奥克蒙特，父亲是铝业巨头美国铝业公司的专利律师，之所以同意住在那里，是因为奥克蒙特位于美国铝业公司总部和研发实验室之间。鲍尔斯出身于受过良好教育的家庭，加上她自己性格内向，让她在童年的大部分时间里都感到格格不入。她是个爱读书的女孩，但镇上唯一的一所高中以职业教育为主，从不要求学生写超过一段的文章。她最盼望的就是夏天，那时她会在长岛海峡附近的亲朋好友家待上几个星期。在那里，她学会了帆船、游泳，还学会了弹钢琴伴奏，而家里的女主人则用她那低沉浑厚的女低音唱着充满戏剧张力的音阶。
Bowers had grown up in Oakmont, Pennsylvania, a small blue-collar town outside of Pittsburgh whose economy was anchored by a paint factory and a rolling mill. Her mother had been born in Oakmont, and her father, a patent attorney for aluminum production giant Alcoa, agreed to live there because it was located midway between Alcoa’s headquarters and its R&D labs. Bowers’s educated family and her own reserved demeanor left her feeling rather out of place for most of her childhood. She was a bookish girl, but the town’s one high school, which focused on vocational education, never required its students to write anything longer than a paragraph. She lived for the summers, when she spent weeks with family friends near Long Island Sound. There she learned how to sail and swim and play accompaniments on the piano while the family matriarch sang dramatic scales in a throaty contralto voice.
1955年，鲍尔斯离开奥克蒙特前往康奈尔大学，四年后毕业，获得了英语和心理学双学位。在选择职业时，鲍尔斯决定申请梅西百货的管理培训生职位。她喜欢时尚，但更重要的是，她注意到零售业是为数不多的几个女性能够真正掌握话语权的行业之一。在面试中，她明确表示只接受加州的工作，因为自从高中毕业前短暂游览西海岸后，她就一直梦想着在那里生活。1959年，她前往旧金山，在联合广场的梅西百货门店工作。几年后，她搬到半岛地区，负责帕洛阿尔托斯坦福购物中心新店开业的人事工作。
In 1955, Bowers left Oakmont for Cornell, from which she graduated four years later with a double major in English and Psychology. When it came time to choose a career, Bowers decided to apply for a position as a management trainee at Macy’s. She liked fashion, but more importantly, she had noticed that retail was one of the few businesses in which women wielded any real authority. At her job interview, she made it clear that she would only accept a job in California, where she had wanted to live ever since she took a quick visit to the West Coast as a high-school senior. She went to San Francisco in 1959 to work at the Macy’s store on Union Square. A few years later, she moved to the Peninsula to head personnel at the store opening in the new Stanford Shopping Center in Palo Alto.
在梅西百货的工作之后，她曾在圣何塞一所经济萧条的高中担任了两年教师——“我厌倦了梅西百货的‘白花日’（每月一次的促销活动），并被公民公益的理念所吸引”——之后又在一家小型激光和医疗设备初创公司担任了三年人事主管。1
The Macy’s jobs were followed by a two-year stint as a teacher at an economically depressed high school in San Jose—“I was tired of White Flower Days [monthly sales at Macy’s] and got caught up in the idea of civic good”—and three years as the head of personnel at a small laser and medical equipment startup company.1
1969年，鲍尔斯得知英特尔正准备招聘第一位人事经理。“我对英特尔了解不多，”她说，“鲍勃·诺伊斯和戈登·摩尔对我来说毫无意义。”但几位同事鼓励她去应聘，一位朋友也劝她去试试，这位朋友告诉她，她曾经和鲍勃·诺伊斯共事过，“他非常棒。”
In 1969, Bowers learned that Intel was preparing to hire its first personnel manager. “I didn’t really know a lot about Intel,” she says. “Bob Noyce and Gordon Moore meant nothing to me.” But several colleagues encouraged her to apply, as did a friend, who told her that she had once worked with Bob Noyce, “and he was wonderful.”
第一次面试，对象是英特尔首席财务官约翰·科布，进展顺利，于是又安排了第二次面试。在这次面试中，鲍尔斯大胆地告诉科布（他也是她未来的上司），她想向戈登·摩尔或鲍勃·诺伊斯汇报工作——“那时我已经做了一些调查，[了解到]他们才是值得效力的人”——而不是向他汇报。经过一番协商，英特尔同意调整汇报结构，鲍尔斯接受了这份工作。“我父亲，”她回忆说，“听说我又要换工作，差点儿崩溃了。在我们那儿，这种事根本不可能发生。” 上任几周后，鲍尔斯和许多后来者一样发现，虽然名义上她向诺伊斯和摩尔汇报，但实际上她是向格鲁夫汇报的。她对此并不介意。她觉得格鲁夫是个好老板。
The first interview, with Intel finance chief John Cobb, went well enough to lead to a second. During this meeting, Bowers had the gall to tell Cobb, who was also slated to be her supervisor, that she wanted to report either to Gordon Moore or to Bob Noyce—“by that point, I had done some research, and [learned that] they were the ones to work for”—not to him. After a bit of negotiation, Intel agreed to change the reporting structure, and Bowers accepted the position. “My father,” she recalls, “almost lost it when he heard I was going changing jobs again. You just did not do this where I came from.” Within a few weeks on the job, Bowers learned, as would so many after her, that although she nominally reported to Noyce and Moore, she in fact reported to Grove.” This was fine with her. She found Grove to be a good boss.
在她加入英特尔的头四年里，公司员工人数从200人增长到2500人。作为人事主管，鲍尔斯不仅招募了许多新员工，还确保他们获得具有竞争力的福利和薪酬待遇、有用的培训以及有意义的绩效考核。她安排研讨会，向新员工讲解股票期权。她的办公室常常是那些对上司或下属不满的人的首选。她与格鲁夫密切合作，格鲁夫以其一贯的严谨态度对待管理工作。他希望在英特尔建立一种高度自律、以绩效为导向的企业文化，并每周周末阅读一本管理书籍，从中汲取灵感。他通常周一就迫不及待地来到公司，将新学到的理念付诸实践。格鲁夫研读《恐吓式管理》之后的那一周，对鲍尔斯来说尤其难忘。
In her first four years at Intel, the company grew from 200 to 2,500 employees. As head of personnel, Bowers not only recruited many of these workers but also ensured they received competitive benefit and salary packages, useful training, and meaningful performance reviews. She arranged seminars to teach new employees about stock options. Her office was often the first stop for people unhappy with their bosses or subordinates. She worked closely with Grove, who approached his management duties with characteristic rigor. He wanted to develop a highly disciplined, measurement-based corporate culture at Intel and read a management book every weekend for hints and ideas. He usually arrived on Mondays eager to put his newly acquired ideas into practice. The week following his study of Management by Intimidation was particularly memorable for Bowers.
鲍尔斯还负责监督了英特尔1971年的小规模裁员和1974年的大规模裁员。她始终无法对工作中这最艰难的部分麻木起来。两次裁员期间，她的口腔溃疡都非常严重，以至于说话都疼痛难忍。
Bowers also oversaw the small layoff at Intel in 1971 and the big one in 1974. She never managed to harden herself to this most difficult part of her job. During both layoff periods she developed canker sores so severe that it hurt to talk.
鲍尔斯的聪颖和坚韧几乎立刻就吸引了诺伊斯。即使在他与贝蒂·诺伊斯结婚并与芭芭拉·马内斯交往期间，他也曾多次请求鲍尔斯……商务会议结束后，他会陪鲍尔斯一起喝酒。有一次，他甚至安排秘书在公司活动上把鲍尔斯安排在他旁边。鲍尔斯知道自己被追求了，但她拒绝上钩。“他已婚，而且名义上是我的老板，”她解释说，“我不想和他有任何瓜葛。”鲍尔斯也知道诺伊斯和马内斯的婚外情。一位员工曾私下问鲍尔斯，她是否可以做些什么来结束这段关系，因为这位员工担心这会对公司造成负面影响。鲍尔斯拒绝干预，但她对这段婚外情的了解让她更加不容易受到诺伊斯的追求。
The strength of Bowers’s intelligence and the steel in her spine attracted Noyce almost immediately. Even while he was married to Betty Noyce and seeing Barbara Maness, he had several times asked Bowers to join him for drinks after business meetings. At one point, he arranged for his secretary to seat Bowers next to him at a corporate event. Bowers knew she was being pursued, but she refused to take the bait. “He was married, and he was my nominal boss,” she explains. “I wanted nothing to do with this.” Bowers also knew about Noyce’s affair with Maness. An employee had confidentially asked Bowers if she could do anything to end the relationship, which the employee feared would have negative repercussions for the company. Bowers had declined to intercede, but her knowledge of the affair made her even less susceptible to Noyce’s advances.
但这并非意味着她觉得诺伊斯没有吸引力。“我一直觉得他魅力非凡。他有一种独特的气质，难以言喻，却又无比真实。很难不被他吸引——无论男女。”她继续说道，“我从未见过这样的人。我不认识任何电影明星，但也许他们当中有些人也有类似的气质。他有一种独特的眼神，仿佛能看穿你的灵魂，让你觉得他真的很在乎你。”
Which is not to say that she found Noyce unappealing. “I always found him phenomenally attractive. He had this aura. It was undefinable but very tangible. And it was very hard not to be affected by it—men were as well as women.” She continues, “I had never met anybody like that. I don’t know any movie stars, but maybe some of them have that same kind of aura. He had a way of looking right at you, like he’s looking right into you, like he really cared about you.”
他们第一次长时间交谈时，诺伊斯突然打断了他们关于英特尔的谈话，问鲍尔斯：“你是怎么变成现在这样的？”鲍尔斯一脸惊讶，他又补充道：“我有个女儿，我希望她能像你一样。”鲍尔斯愣住了——“我记得当时我想，‘你根本不了解我，怎么能问我这种问题？’”——但她也对他的关心感到受宠若惊。后来，她开始注意到诺伊斯的其他一些特点。“他是个很有气势的人，从他的举止就能看出来。他坐着的时候，肩膀宽阔，看起来比实际身高要高大得多。每次他站起来，我都觉得很惊讶。他应该有六英尺高才对。”但她还是和他保持着距离。“如果我们在一群人中，有人开始慢慢走开，”她笑着说，“我肯定也会跟着慢慢走开。”
The first time they spoke at any length, Noyce interrupted their conversation about Intel to ask Bowers, “How did you get to be the way you are?” When she looked startled, he added, “I have a daughter, and I’d like her to be like you.” Bowers was taken aback—“I remember thinking, ‘You don’t even know me; how can you ask me that?’”—but she was also flattered by his interest. Later she began to notice other things about Noyce. “He was a physical being, you could tell by the way he moved. When he was sitting down, with his swimmers’ shoulders, he seemed much bigger than he was. I always was surprised when he stood up. He should have been six feet tall.” But she kept her distance from him. “If we were in a group and people started to amble off,” she laughs, “I would be sure to amble off, too.”
1974年秋天，大约在鲍勃和贝蒂·诺伊斯正式分居前后，诺伊斯邀请鲍尔斯加入一群英特尔员工的晚餐聚会，地点是位于北部约半小时车程的热门餐厅“坚果树”（Nut Tree）。由于这是集体活动，鲍尔斯决定参加。然而，晚餐后，她却恼火地得知，由于拼车安排出了差错，她不得不独自一人搭诺伊斯的车回家。她爬进诺伊斯的“美洲狮”（Cougar）轿车，立刻挪到副驾驶座车门附近，尽可能舒服地坐下。
In the fall of 1974, around the time Bob and Betty Noyce officially separated, Noyce invited Bowers to join a group of Intel employees heading to dinner at the Nut Tree, a popular restaurant about a half-hour’s drive north. Since this was a group activity, Bowers decided to join in. After dinner, however, she was irritated to learn that a mixup with the carpools meant that she would need to ride home with Noyce, alone. She climbed into his Cougar and immediately scooted as close to the passenger-side door as she could comfortably sit.
他们沿着半岛向鲍尔斯家驶去，诺伊斯开始用英特尔人人都知道的那种漫不经心的语气说话，这种语气意味着他要说些重要的话。“我想你应该知道我要离婚了，”他说。鲍尔斯对此毫不知情。她努力装作对这个消息毫不在意，但她内心深处有个声音说：“哦，这下一切都变了。”
As they headed down the Peninsula towards Bowers’s house, Noyce started talking in the casual tone that everyone at Intel knew signaled an important statement. “I presume you know that I’m getting a divorce,” he said. Bowers had not known. She tried to appear nonplussed by the news, but a little voice inside her head said, “Well. That changes everything.”
十个月后，诺伊斯在雅典一家餐厅的露台上向鲍尔斯求婚。他们曾谈及诺伊斯的婚外情，而鲍尔斯……她确信这样的事不会再次发生。她曾与他的父母共进周日晚餐，感觉很受欢迎。就连她见过的诺伊斯家的两个孩子似乎也勉强接受了她。然而，诺伊斯在离婚手续正式办完前一个月向她求婚，这让鲍尔斯感到意外。她之前有过一段短暂的婚姻，如果能和诺伊斯一起生活，她也会感到很幸福。但他认为，为了孩子们，他最好还是结婚，而不是继续过着这种“罪恶”的生活。鲍尔斯仔细考虑了一下，觉得诺伊斯说得对。
Ten months later, Noyce proposed to Bowers on the terrace of a restaurant in Athens. They had talked about Noyce’s affair, and Bowers was confident it would not happen again. She had spent Sunday dinner with his parents and felt welcome. Even the two Noyce children whom she met seemed grudgingly accepting of her. And yet, Noyce’s proposal—a month before his divorce was finalized—surprised Bowers. She had briefly been married once before and would have felt happy just to live with Noyce. But he thought it would be best for his children if he were married, rather than living in proverbial sin, and after she thought about it a bit, she decided he was right.
鲍尔斯含泪答应嫁给诺伊斯几天后，她也向他提出了自己的提议。他希望她去考个飞行员执照，这样他们就可以一起飞行了。她说，如果他戒烟，她就答应。她还暗暗发誓：等她确信他真的彻底戒掉了烟瘾，她就把自己的姓改成诺伊斯。
A few days after Bowers tearfully agreed to marry Noyce, she offered him a proposal of her own. He wanted her to get a pilot’s license so they could fly together. She said that she would do it if he quit smoking. And she made a pledge to herself: when it was clear to her that he truly had kicked the habit for good, she would change her last name to Noyce.
他答应会努力戒烟。鲍尔斯开始学习飞行。诺伊斯却依然吞云吐雾。鲍尔斯拿到飞行员执照后，依然是个烟民。他知道自己应该戒烟。每当他滑雪滑到特别难的雪道，或者试图加快每天早晨游泳的圈数时，他都会感到肺部酸痛。早在1965年，卫生局局长就开始在香烟盒上贴上警告标签。诺伊斯尝试购买低焦油或低尼古丁香烟，但他总是会掰掉过滤嘴，或者干脆抽得更多。一位在医院工作的朋友特意给诺伊斯看了一块属于吸烟者的病变肺组织。“太神奇了，”诺伊斯盯着肺泡原本所在的空洞说道。但他仍然抽着骆驼牌香烟。鲍尔斯禁止他在屋里抽烟。他只好搬到门廊去抽。她尝试用她所谓的“中国水刑”式的方法来劝他戒烟，一遍又一遍地温和地提起这件事。但毫无效果。她试着大声呵斥，但毫无作用。她安排他去见一位斯坦福大学的医生，这位医生是尼古丁成瘾方面的专家。诺伊斯离开时，对尼古丁成瘾的复杂性有了更深刻的认识，同时也更加渴望吸烟。鲍尔斯甚至考虑过拒绝和诺伊斯一起坐飞机——毕竟，他没有遵守约定——但她太喜欢和他一起抽烟了，舍不得放弃。而且，她也知道，她的抵制几乎肯定不会对他戒烟起到任何作用。
He promised that he would try to give up cigarettes. Bowers began flying lessons. Noyce puffed on. When Bowers became a licensed pilot, he was still a smoker. He knew he ought to quit. When he skied a particularly challenging run or tried to speed up the laps he swam every morning, he felt his lungs straining. The surgeon general had been slapping warning labels on his cigarette packs since 1965. Noyce tried buying low tar or low nicotine cigarettes, but he would always break off their filters or just smoke more. A friend who worked in a hospital pointedly showed Noyce a piece of a diseased lung that had belonged to a smoker. “That’s amazing,” Noyce said, staring at the holes where the alveoli should have been. But still he smoked his Camels. Bowers forbid him to smoke in the house. He moved to the porch. She tried what she called “the Chinese water torture” approach to the topic, gently bringing it up time and again. No effect. She tried yelling. No better. She arranged for him to meet with a Stanford doctor who was an expert in nicotine addiction. Noyce left the meeting with an intellectual appreciation for the complexity of his addiction and a desire for a cigarette. Bowers even considered refusing to fly with Noyce—after all, he had not held up his end of their deal—but she enjoyed it too much to give it up, and besides, she knew her boycott almost certainly would have no effect on his smoking.
诺伊斯最接近戒烟的一次是在他结婚几年后，当时他的一群滑雪伙伴向他发出了鲍尔斯所说的“男人的挑战”：“如果你戒烟，我们就出钱请你和我们一起去布加布山脉滑雪。但我们觉得你做不到。”诺伊斯立刻掐灭了香烟。将近一年时间里，他都没再碰过烟。就在鲍尔斯开始考虑改名的时候，诺伊斯在停车场里讨了一支烟，立刻又开始抽烟了。那一年，他不得不自费去布加布山脉滑雪。
The closest Noyce came to quitting was a few years after his marriage, when a group of his ski buddies issued what Bowers called “a man’s challenge”: “If you quit, we’ll pay for you to ski with us in the Bugaboos. But we don’t think you can do it.” Noyce immediately stubbed out his cigarette. He did not pick up another one for nearly a year. Just as Bowers began to think about changing her name, Noyce bummed a cigarette in a parking lot and immediately returned to his smokestack ways. He had to pay his own way to the Bugaboos that year.
吸烟似乎能让诺伊斯平静下来。每当他被迫静坐不动时——比如打电话、开会、乘坐商业客机——这些仪式感吸烟（把烟盒重重地摔在桌子上，挑出一支烟，叼在嘴里，用一只手拢住烟嘴点燃，深深地吸一口）让他有事可做。当他忧虑或生气时，他几乎不停地抽烟，用嘴里剩下的烟头点燃另一支。其他时候，他则沉浸于吸烟带来的感官愉悦之中。即使“好彩”香烟的广告语早已停用几十年，他仍然记得它的字样——“如此圆润，如此坚挺，如此饱满”。包括诺伊斯的一个女儿在内的几个人推测，诺伊斯内心深处认为自己是不朽的。自从他驾驶滑翔机从格林内尔谷仓的屋顶一跃而下后，诺伊斯从未在悬崖边停下脚步，而是全速冲下悬崖，奔向未知的深渊。他对待想法、公司、滑雪、开车、女人和发明创造都是这种态度。像香烟这样平凡琐碎的东西，怎么会要了他的命呢？2
Smoking somehow steadied Noyce. At times when he was forced to sit still—on the telephone, in a meeting, on a commercial jetliner—the rituals of smoking (banging the pack on a table, selecting a cigarette, putting it between his lips, lighting it with one hand cupped around the flame, inhaling deeply) gave him something to do. When he was worried or angry, he smoked almost constantly, lighting a new cigarette from the stub of the one still in his mouth. At other times, he reveled in the sensual pleasures of smoking. He could recall the advertising slogan for Lucky Strike cigarettes—“so round, so firm, so fully packed”—decades after it had been retired. Several people, including one of Noyce’s daughters, have conjectured that somewhere deep within himself, Noyce thought that he was immortal. From the moment he leapt with his glider from the roof of a Grinnell barn, Noyce never stopped at the edge of a precipice but instead ran, at full speed, right over the edge and into the unknown. This had been his approach with ideas, with companies, with skiing, with driving, with women, and with inventing. How on earth could something as mundane and trivial as a cigarette kill someone like him?2
当贝蒂·诺伊斯第一次得知鲍勃打算迎娶安·鲍尔斯时，她以她一贯的尖刻幽默回应道，此举将使她成为英特尔最大的“单一”股东。华尔街对贝蒂·诺伊斯的举动自然是密切关注。1976年，当几乎所有其他半导体公司的股价都在上涨时，英特尔的股价却因传言她计划出售10万股股票而短暂下跌。3
WHEN BETTY NOYCE FIRST LEARNED of Bob’s plans to marry Ann Bowers, she reacted with her characteristic biting wit. She told him that this move would make her the largest “single” stockholder in Intel. To be sure, Wall Street watched Betty Noyce’s actions quite closely. In 1976, when the stock of nearly every other semiconductor company was rising, Intel’s temporarily fell on rumors that she planned to sell 100,000 shares.3
在缅因州定居并摆脱了鲍勃·诺伊斯的影响后，贝蒂·诺伊斯将她从英特尔那里分得的一半财富用于慈善事业。她发展出一种充满活力、富有创业精神且低调的“催化式慈善”方式，创办了一家银行，拯救了一家濒临倒闭的面包店，资助了一家儿童医院三分之一的建设费用，修复了多栋建筑，并在波特兰市中心开设了一家市场。当她想向缅因州公共广播公司捐赠100万美元时，她并没有简单地开一张支票。她建造了五栋房屋（因此雇佣了数十人），并将房屋出售所得全部捐赠给了该机构。1996年去世时，她向她所居住的缅因州人民捐赠的7500万美元使她跻身缅因州历史上最慷慨的慈善家之列。4
Once permanently settled in Maine and out from Bob’s shadow, Betty Noyce put her half of the Intel money to good use. She developed a dynamic, entrepreneurial, low-profile approach to what she called “catalytic philanthropy,” starting a bank, rescuing a floundering bakery, underwriting one-third of the cost of a children’s hospital, restoring several buildings, and launching a market in downtown Portland. When she wanted to donate $1 million to Maine Public Broadcasting, she did not simply write a check. She built five houses (thereby employing dozens of people) and donated the money from the homes’ sales. At the time of her death in 1996, the $75 million she had given to the people of her adopted state ranked her among the most generous philanthropists in Maine’s history.4
鲍勃·诺伊斯和贝蒂·诺伊斯于1975年8月12日正式离婚。11周后，也就是11月27日，感恩节当天，也是安·鲍尔斯38岁的生日，诺伊斯和鲍尔斯在诺伊斯家中举行了婚礼。在此之前，他们几乎对所有同事都隐瞒了这段恋情。双方的家人都不知道诺伊斯和鲍尔斯已经订婚，只以为他们只是来参加婚礼当天的感恩节晚餐。晚餐后，鲍尔斯打开了两个盒子。每个盒子里都装着一束花，一束是给她自己的，另一束是给她五岁的小侄女的，小侄女将担任婚礼的花童。
Bob and Betty Noyce’s divorce was final on August 12, 1975. Noyce and Ann Bowers were married 11 weeks later, on November 27, Thanksgiving Day and Bowers’s 38th birthday, at Noyce’s home. Until that time, they had kept their relationship a secret from nearly everyone at work. Their families, who had no idea Noyce and Bowers were even engaged, thought they were simply coming to Thanksgiving dinner on the day of the wedding. After the meal, Bowers opened two boxes. Each held a bouquet, one for her and another for her five-year-old niece, who would serve as a flower girl.
“Why do you think we have these?” Bowers asked the little girl.
孩子的眼睛瞪得大大的。“因为有人要结婚了吗？”
The child’s eyes grew wide. “Because someone is getting married?”
诺伊斯和鲍尔斯对视了一眼。“那说的就是我们，”诺伊斯说。
Noyce and Bowers looked at each other. “That would be us,” Noyce said.
晚宴上的宾客开始尖叫。哈丽特·诺伊斯哭了起来，因为鲍勃的父亲中风后身体虚弱，无法主持婚礼。牧师躲在壁橱里，走到台前为这对新人证婚。鲍尔斯事先删去了所有与上帝有关的环节。“鲍勃同意了。我们俩都无法决定是否信上帝，”鲍尔斯说。“我记得鲍勃说过，‘有些信上帝的人是好人，有些信上帝的人不是好人。那你该如何看待上帝呢？’他环顾四周，认为宗教是世间诸多苦难的根源。”诺伊斯总是挑战既定认知的界限，他告诉鲍尔斯，他最反感有组织的宗教的一点是“人们在教堂里不思考”。
The dinner guests began shrieking. Harriet Noyce started to cry because Bob’s father, who had suffered a debilitating stroke, was unable to perform the ceremony. The minister, who had hidden himself in a closet, stepped forward to marry the couple in a ceremony from which Bowers had excised every reference to God. “Bob agreed to that. Neither of us could decide about God,” Bowers says. “I remember Bob saying, ‘Some people who believe in God are good, and some people who believe in God are not good. So where does that leave you?’ He had [also] looked around and decided that religion is responsible for a lot of trouble in the world.” Noyce, always pushing against the limits of accepted knowledge, told Bowers that what bothered him most about organized religions was that “people don’t think in churches.”
尽管诺伊斯一直坚持“道德生活才是最重要的”，但他并不想要世俗婚礼。当他的兄弟盖洛德无法飞来主持仪式时，诺伊斯说：“好吧，我们得在这里找个牧师。”他根本没考虑过民事婚礼。
But for all his insistence that “an ethical life is what really matters,” Noyce did not want a secular wedding. When his brother Gaylord could not fly in to perform the service, Noyce said, “Well, we’ll have to find a minister here.” There was no thought of a civil ceremony.
婚礼后的星期一，鲍尔斯去拜访了安迪·格鲁夫。“我和鲍勃周四结婚了，”她说，“我觉得我应该辞职。”格鲁夫不同意。她几乎从英特尔创立之初就在那里工作。任何人都能看出，她的职位并非靠裙带关系得来的。“现在谁都能看出来，”鲍尔斯纠正道，“但一两年后，这对英特尔来说将非常不利。”格鲁夫仍然反对。“让鲍勃辞职吧，”他建议道。他可不是在开玩笑。5
On the Monday after her wedding, Bowers went to see Andy Grove. “Bob and I got married on Thursday,” she said. “I think I should resign.” Grove disagreed. She had been at Intel almost since its founding. Anyone would be able to see that she had not gotten her job through nepotism. “Anyone can see that now,” Bowers corrected him. “But in a year or two, this will start to look very bad for Intel.” Still Grove protested. “Let Bob resign,” he suggested. He was not at all joking.5
最终，鲍尔斯同意留在英特尔，直到找到并培训接替她的人选。找到合适的人选一直持续到四月份。五月份，就在鲍尔斯准备离开的时候，戈登·摩尔请求她不要走——至少现在不要走——因为工会正试图组织英特尔的员工。
In the end, Bowers agreed that she would stay at Intel long enough to hire and train her replacement. Finding someone took until April. In May, just when Bowers was ready to leave, Gordon Moore asked her not to go—at least not yet—because a union was attempting to organize Intel’s workers.
5月的第一周，国际操作工程师工会第39分会提交了一份请愿书，要求为英特尔位于圣克拉拉总部的清洁工举行代表选举。美国国家劳工关系委员会很快驳回了该请愿，理由是“工会未能向国家劳工关系委员会证明，在合适的谈判单位中，有足够数量的英特尔员工希望由该工会代表”。但英特尔并未就此松一口气。6月4日，国际卡车司机兄弟会第296分会提交了一份请愿书，要求代表英特尔的某些“仓库工人、司机、收发货员、TWX操作员、PBX操作员和邮件服务人员”。6
In the first week of May, the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 39 filed a petition seeking a representation election for the janitorial staff at Intel’s Santa Clara headquarters. The National Labor Relations Board soon dismissed the petition with an explanation that “the union has failed to demonstrate to the NLRB that a sufficient number of [Intel] employees in an appropriate bargaining unit desired representation by this union.” But Intel could not breathe easy. On June 4, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local #296, filed a petition seeking representation of certain Intel “warehousemen, drivers, shipping and receiving clerks, TWX operators, PBX operators, and mail service personnel.”6
摩尔在宣布卡车司机工会努力的信中部分内容如下：“如果您对英特尔管理层在员工工会代表问题上的立场有任何疑问，我希望……”重申一遍，任何员工群体的工会化都会对英特尔的所有运营产生严重影响。我们希望通过英特尔的发展，继续为每位员工寻求发展和成长机会。要实现这一目标，最佳途径是确保每位员工都能继续自由地与公司内的其他任何人直接沟通，以解决问题、寻求帮助或信息。” 这番话比摩尔强烈的反工会立场要温和一些，而包括诺伊斯在内的几乎所有英特尔高管都持有类似观点。
Moore’s letter announcing the Teamsters’ efforts read, in part: “In case you have any questions regarding the position of Intel’s management with respect to union representation of any of our employees, I would like to reiterate it. Union representation of any group of employees would have a serious impact on all of Intel’s operations. We wish to continue to seek development and growth opportunities for each employee through the growth of Intel. This goal can best be achieved if each individual continues to be free to communicate directly with anyone else in the company to solve problems or to seek help or information.” This is a muted version of Moore’s strong anti-union sentiments, which were shared by nearly all of Intel’s senior management, including Noyce.
英特尔团队并非孤军奋战。1973年，英特尔所属的行业协会WEMA（诺伊斯积极参与其中）为“非工会企业且希望保持非工会状态的企业”举办了一场为期两天的研讨会。研讨会由一位专攻劳动法的律师主持，模拟了工会组织活动，让参与者有机会在真实情境中练习决策。WEMA（1977年更名为美国电子协会[AEA]）不仅为面临工会挑战的企业提供法律援助，还高效地作为电子行业工会活动信息交流中心。正如一位工会组织者所说：“每当组织者在一个工厂散发传单，两三天之内，硅谷所有人力资源总监的办公桌上都会出现一份。”7
The Intel team was not alone in their beliefs. In 1973, WEMA, an industry association to which Intel belonged and in which Noyce actively participated, offered a two-day seminar for “companies that are non-union and wish to remain so.” Led by an attorney who specialized in labor law, the seminar featured a simulated union organizing drive, so participants could practice making decisions in realistic scenarios. WEMA (which changed its name to the American Electronics Association [AEA] in 1977) also provided legal aid to companies facing union drives and furthermore served as a highly efficient clearinghouse for information about union activity throughout the electronics industry. As one union organizer explained, “Whenever organizers passed [out] leaflets in one plant, a copy of the leaflet would be on the desk of every human resources director in the Valley within two or three days.”7
半导体行业的普遍观点认为，无论公司的工资和福利待遇多么优厚，如果公司内部有工会，运营成本将增加25%。1968年4月，硅谷仅有的三家拥有工会的电子公司（而非半导体公司）——安培克斯（Ampex）、伦库特电气（Lenkurt Electric）和达尔莫-维克多（Dalmo-Victor）——的5000名工人举行罢工，这更加强化了当时普遍存在的对工会的偏见。罢工持续了一周多。如果这一漏洞出现在一家快速发展的半导体公司，将会使其在竞争中处于极其不利的地位。8
Conventional wisdom within the semiconductor industry held that no matter how rich a company’s wages and benefits package, it would cost 25 percent more to operate the business with a union in house. A strike in April 1968, by 5,000 workers at Ampex, Lenkurt Electric, and Dalmo-Victor—the only three unionized electronics (not semiconductor) companies in Silicon Valley—reinforced the prevailing bias against unions. The work stoppage stretched more than a week. Had this lacuna hit a company in the fast-moving semiconductor industry, it would have put the firm at a significant competitive disadvantage.8
英特尔长期以来一直采用许多与仙童半导体时期成功遏制工会类似的先发制人的人事策略。英特尔的计时工享有医疗保险、牙科保险、带薪假期和病假。他们还可以以优惠价格购买英特尔股票。公司每月还会召开会议，由主管解答员工提出的问题，这些问题既可以当面提出，也可以匿名书面提交。自仙童半导体早期以来，硅谷半导体公司普遍采用此类做法，而美国电子工程师协会（AEA）也大力提倡这种做法。AEA的一位代表曾警告说：“阻止工会的办法就是让它们变得没有必要。而做到这一点的方法就是假装工厂里真的有工会。”9
Intel had long employed many of the same preemptive personnel tactics that had kept unions at bay at Fairchild. Hourly workers at Intel had health care, dental care, paid vacations, and sick leave. They could buy Intel stock at a reduced price. The company also held meetings each month at which supervisors answered questions from employees, either asked in person or submitted anonymously in writing. Such practices, common in Silicon Valley semiconductor firms since the early Fairchild days, were widely encouraged by the AEA, one of whose representatives warned, “The way to thwart unions is to make them unnecessary. And the way you do that is to think as though you really had a union in the plant.”9
英特尔公司制定了旨在阻止工会的人事政策，但在1975年和1976年，随着行业摆脱1974年的低迷状态，英特尔恢复了迅猛增长，政策与实践出现了分歧。到第二年1976年第四季度，随着工会化运动的展开，市场对英特尔最新一代内存产品的需求超过了产能。这促使公司在俄勒冈州波特兰附近新建了一座晶圆厂，并在加利福尼亚州圣克鲁斯设立了一家测试中心，同时还在西印度群岛的巴巴多斯开始建设一座组装厂。与此同时，英特尔正以惊人的速度招聘员工。1975年下半年，公司新增员工超过1250人，平均每月超过200人。这种迅猛的增长势头一直延续到1976年，当年又有2700名员工加入公司。
Intel had union-thwarting personnel policies on the books, but policy and practice diverged in 1975 and 1976, when the industry pulled out of the 1974 downturn and Intel resumed its dramatic growth. By the second quarter of 1976, when the unionization efforts began, demand for Intel’s latest-generation memory devices exceeded production capacity. This led the company to open a new fab near Portland, Oregon and a testing facility in Santa Cruz, California, while also beginning construction on an assembly plant in Barbados, West Indies. At the same time, Intel was hiring at a furious rate. More than 1,250 new employees joined the company in the last half of 1975—a rate better than 200 each month. This breakneck growth continued into 1976, which saw another 2,700 employees join the company.
在这一切忙碌之中，英特尔的每个人都感到压力倍增，不得不加班加点。就连安迪·格鲁夫也没有注意到，英特尔某工厂的一位工头给所有员工都发放了相同的绩效加薪。这简直是不可饶恕的。英特尔一贯坚持绩效加薪。公司声称这项政策奖励的是个人努力；而劳工运动则认为，这项政策的主要后果是扼杀了工人的任何集体意识。
In the midst of all this activity, everyone at Intel felt pressured to put in ever-longer hours, and even Andy Grove did not notice that a foreman at one of Intel’s facilities had given every employee identical merit increases. This was anathema. Intel always awarded performance-based increases. The company said this policy rewarded individual effort; the labor movement claimed its primary effect was to discourage collective thinking of any sort among workers.
总之，英特尔未能遵守自身政策，导致公司内部有人主动联系了卡车司机工会，或者在工会接洽时认真倾听。“我觉得工会化问题是我们咎由自取，”鲍尔斯解释说，“如果我们遵守了自己的政策，这一切就不会发生。”
In any case, Intel’s failure to follow its own policies led someone at the company either to contact the Teamsters or to listen carefully when approached by them. “I felt we brought the unionization problem on ourselves,” Bowers explains. “If we had followed our own policies, it never would have happened.”
英特尔的失误恰逢硅谷工会组织活动激增之际。1974年，美国电气工人联合会（UE）专门成立了一个组织委员会，旨在动员硅谷的劳动力。许多劳工运动人士认为，在经历了1974年的大规模裁员之后，工人们可能会更愿意接受集体谈判，尤其是如果有人指出，随着时间的推移，越来越多的半导体生产工作岗位转移到了海外。
The timing of Intel’s misstep coincided with a spike in union-organizing activity throughout Silicon Valley. In 1974, the United Electrical Workers (UE) created an organizing committee specifically to target the Silicon Valley labor force. Many in the labor movement thought that workers might be more open to collective bargaining after the massive 1974 layoffs, especially if someone pointed out to them that with every passing year, more semiconductor production jobs moved offshore.
半导体生产工作日益严苛和冷冰冰的环境，或许加剧了工人的不安全感。就连英特尔的制造主管吉恩·弗拉特也承认，到20世纪70年代中期，半导体晶圆厂已经变得越来越“令人恐惧”。英特尔位于加州利弗莫尔的Fab 3晶圆厂于1973年4月竣工，其规模是前两座晶圆厂的两倍，其设计初衷就是成为一台“大型1103型机器”。这座耗资200万美元、占地1万平方英尺的洁净室内，每一处表面都闪闪发光，许多墙上都挂着巨大的警告标志，上面写着“小心”或“酸性”。在这里，英特尔的员工们第一次被要求穿上从头到脚的“兔子服”，包括帽子、护目镜、长袖、长裤和手套。他们被禁止化妆。这些防护服和清洗过的脸与其说是为了保护工人，不如说是为了保持生产环境不受污染——即使是一小片人类皮肤碎屑或睫毛膏也会造成问题。10
A worker’s sense of insecurity may have been heightened by the increasingly austere and antiseptic nature of semiconductor production work. Even Intel’s head of manufacturing, Gene Flath, admits that semiconductor fabs had become increasingly “scary places to work” by the mid-1970s. Intel’s Fab 3, completed at Livermore, California, in April 1973, was twice the size of its predecessors and specifically designed to be “a big 1103 machine.” Every surface in its $2 million, 10,000-square-foot clean room gleamed, and hanging on many walls were huge warning signs reading CAUTION or ACID. Here Intel employees, who had once worn lab coats that they embroidered and shortened into minidresses, were required, for the first time, to don head-to-toe “bunny suits” with hats, goggles, long sleeves, pants, and gloves. They were forbidden to wear makeup. The suits and scrubbed faces were designed less to protect the workers than to keep the manufacturing climate uncontaminated—even a wayward flake of human skin or mascara caused problems.10
部分原因是经验丰富的制造技术人员认为防护服没有必要，因此 Fab 3 工厂特意聘用了一些行业经验不足的人员。一位早期员工回忆道，他 16 岁时被聘用，时薪 2.30 美元：“我们当时吓坏了，因为这是一项如此庞大、如此重要的工程，而且洁净室里的环境非常可怕。所有东西都挤在一起，过道也很窄……所有东西都在黄色灯光下，我们吓得魂飞魄散。”11
In part because experienced fab technicians thought the bunny suits were unnecessary, Fab 3 was deliberately staffed with people with little experience in the industry. Recalls one early employee, hired at age 16 for $2.30 per hour: “We were just petrified because this was such a big job, such an important job, and it was so scary in the clean room. Everything was crammed so closely together. The aisles were very narrow. … Everything was under yellow lights, and we were petrified.”11
英特尔发现，许多新员工入职仅几天就辞职了，正如弗拉斯所说，“他们太紧张了，晚上回家后都会发抖，因为他们不知道自己将要面对什么。”洁净室的陌生感令工人们感到恐惧，但也给了工会组织者希望。事实上，英特尔面临的最重大的工会化挑战就发生在20世纪70年代末的Fab 3工厂。12
Intel found that a number of its new employees were quitting after only a few days on the job because, as Flath put it, “they were just so nervous they’d go home and shake at night because they [hadn’t known] what they were going to get into.” The strangeness of the clean room that terrified workers gave union organizers hope. Indeed, the most significant unionizing effort Intel faced was at Fab 3 the late 1970s.12
但这项努力也失败了，就像20世纪70年代末和80年代初所有其他试图在半导体行业组建工会的尝试一样。那些年，工会组织者们如同逆流而上。1970年至1988年间，加州工会成员的比例从36%下降到22%。到70年代末，近四分之三的半导体生产工人是女性，近一半是少数族裔（主要是西班牙裔或亚裔）。女性和少数族裔历来都不是工会的积极成员。此外，随着行业形势的好转，这部分劳动力流动性极强——1979年，硅谷组装工人的年流动率超过50%——这使得组织工会变得异常困难。13
But that effort failed, too, as did every other attempt to unionize the semiconductor industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Union organizers in these years were swimming against the tide. Between 1970 and 1988, the percentage of California workers represented by a union dropped from 36 percent to 22 percent. By the end of the 1970s, nearly three-quarters of semiconductor production workers were women and almost half were members of minority ethnic groups (mostly Hispanic or Asian). Neither women nor minorities had traditionally joined unions in large numbers. Moreover, as soon as the industry’s fortunes improved, this workforce proved so mobile—in 1979, turnover rates among Silicon Valley assembly workers topped 50 percent annually—that it was difficult to organize.13
在宣布卡车司机工会要求在英特尔举行选举一个月后，摩尔告知员工，工会已撤回请愿书，据推测是因为工会领导人认为英特尔员工不会支持公司成立工会。“我们之所以没有工会，是你们作为英特尔员工选择公开自由沟通、共同解决问题，不受外界干预的直接结果，”摩尔提醒员工，“我们希望继续保持这种状态。”14
A month after he announced the Teamsters’ request to hold an election at Intel, Moore informed employees that the union had withdrawn its petition, presumably because its leaders decided that Intel workers would not support a union at the company. “Our non-union status is the direct result of your choice as Intel employees to have open and free communication and to solve our problems together, without outside intervention,” Moore reminded his employees. “We want to keep it that way.”14
工会风波过后几周，安·鲍尔斯悄然离开了英特尔。不久后，她创办了一家人力资源咨询公司。她还联合创办了加州电子协会——该协会致力于帮助小型电子公司制定人事政策、寻找保险、与信用社签订合同以及培训员工。
A few weeks after the union scare passed, Ann Bowers quietly left Intel. She soon established a human-resources consulting business. She also co-founded the California Electronics Association—an organization that helped small electronics companies to develop personnel policies, find insurance, contract with credit unions, and train their employees.
与此同时，诺伊斯仍然在公司投入大量时间。就连戈登·摩尔也认为安迪·格鲁夫关于诺伊斯“几乎消失”的说法“过于夸张”。诺伊斯每月主持董事会会议，这项工作需要他定期与摩尔和格鲁夫沟通。只要在城里，他就会参加高管会议。他在英特尔的新总部大楼里保留了一间办公室，而那栋楼里的所有办公室都是隔间。很快，他就发现自己被拉去参加各种会议……他经常出入公司，甚至在鲍尔斯的咨询公司征用了一间办公室，“这样我才能有所作为”。（然而，他很快就太想念英特尔了，又回到了那里的办公室。）他出席英特尔的销售会议和工厂开业典礼。他作为公司发言人出席各种会议，尤其是一些与微处理器或汽车电子相关的会议。他通过与通用电气的经理们探讨“新型电子产品”，以及与孟山都的高管们探讨“创新管理”，来建立客户关系。他向分析师们做了许多演讲，包括在英特尔成立十周年之际向纽约证券分析师协会发表的重要演讲。诺伊斯还继续进行着他担任首席执行官时擅长的与客户的高层谈判。15
Noyce, meanwhile, continued to spend a good bit of his time at the company. Even Gordon Moore says Andy Grove’s comment about Noyce “practically disappearing” is “too strong.” Noyce chaired board meetings every month, work that required regular check-ins with Moore and Grove. He attended executive staff meetings whenever he was in town. He maintained an office at Intel’s new headquarters building in which all offices were cubicles. He in short order found himself pulled into meetings at the company so often that he also commandeered an office at Bowers’s consulting firm “so I can get something done.” (He soon missed Intel too much, however, and returned to his cubicle there.) He attended Intel sales meetings and plant openings. He stood as the company’s spokesman at conferences, particularly those having to do with the microprocessor or automotive electronics. He built customer relationships by speaking to General Electric managers on “new electronics” and to Monsanto executives on “managing innovation.” He made many presentations to analysts, including an important talk to the New York Society of Security Analysts on Intel’s tenth anniversary. Noyce also continued the high-level negotiations with customers that had been his specialty as CEO.15
这些年间，在英特尔走廊里偶遇诺伊斯的员工都觉得与他的交流依然令人兴奋。“我记得大约在1976年，我碰到了诺伊斯，”一位当时正在研发一种特殊存储设备（称为EPROM）的员工回忆道，这款设备是英特尔最畅销的产品之一。“我对诺伊斯说，‘我敢打赌，你晚上肯定睡不着觉，因为我负责EPROM，它可是你们三分之一的利润啊。’他看着我说，‘是的，我睡不着；我想不出还有谁比你更适合负责这个项目。’这让我感觉很好。我说，‘是的，也许他说得对。’”16
Intel employees who encountered Noyce in the halls during these years found their interactions with him as stimulating as ever. “I remember I ran into Noyce [in about 1976],” recalls one employee, who at the time was working on a special memory device (called an EPROM) that was one of Intel’s best sellers. “I said to Noyce, ‘I’ll bet you can’t sleep at night knowing that [I am] in charge of the [EPROM], which is a third of your profit.’ He looked at me and he said, ‘Yes, I can; I can’t think of a better guy to run the thing.’ And that made me feel good. I said, ‘Yes, maybe he’s right.’”16
然而，作为董事会主席，诺伊斯确实比担任总裁时有更多的时间投入到英特尔以外的兴趣爱好中。其中一项爱好就是投资年轻的创业公司。诺伊斯喜欢重新播种孕育了英特尔和其他仙童家族企业的土壤。
AS BOARD CHAIR, however, Noyce did have more time to devote to interests outside Intel than had been the case when he was president. One of these interests was investing in young startup companies. Noyce liked the notion of reseeding the soil that had produced Intel and the other Fairchildren.
诺伊斯在费尔柴尔德公司工作期间就做过一些零星的投资，但到了1973年，他决定与保罗·霍斯钦斯基合伙创办自己的小型投资公司。不久之后，霍斯钦斯基还会帮他处理与贝蒂离婚后的财务事宜。“我一直私下里做了很多风险投资，但都失败了，”诺伊斯曾这样说道，他指的是那些规模很小的创业公司。“如果你愿意和我一起成立这个投资合伙公司，我会出资，然后给你一点薪水（负责管理）。你可以从我们赚到的钱中抽取一定比例的分成。亏损我来承担。”17
Noyce had done a small bit of seat-of-the-pants investing while he was at Fairchild, but in 1973, he decided to establish his own small investment business with Paul Hwoschinsky, who soon would also help him with the financial aspects of the divorce from Betty. “I’ve been doing a lot of venture stuff personally, out of my back pocket, and it’s not working,” Noyce had said, referring to the shoebox startups. “If you’ll start this investment partnership with me, I’ll put up the money and pay you a small salary [to manage it]. You’ll get a percentage of any money we make. I’ll eat the losses.”17
经过一番讨论，霍斯钦斯基同意通过一个他建议命名为“卡拉尼什基金”的合伙企业来监管诺伊斯的天使投资。卡拉尼什是苏格兰一座类似巨石阵的建筑，一些人认为它代表了古代对二进制逻辑的应用。
After a bit more discussion, Hwoschinsky agreed to oversee Noyce’s angel investing through a partnership that Hwoschinsky suggested they call the Callanish Fund. Callanish is the name of a Stonehenge-like structure in Scotland that some believe represents an ancient use of binary logic.
诺伊斯用大约100万美元创立了卡拉尼什基金。霍斯钦斯基在沙丘路租了一间办公室，月租70美元。办公室里只有一张桌子和一把椅子，但沙丘路的地址才是最重要的。过去几年里，沙丘路的办公楼群——距离主要高速公路仅咫尺之遥，却坐落在环绕硅谷的最高山丘之一的山顶上，掩映在美丽的树木之中——已成为该地区风险投资行业的中心，到 1975 年，该行业已拥有约 150 家公司。
Noyce established the Callanish Fund with about $1 million. Hwoschinsky rented an office on Sand Hill Road for $70 per month. The office held nothing more than a desk and chair, but it was the Sand Hill Road address that was important. Over the past few years, Sand Hill Road office complexes, a stone’s throw away from a major highway but nestled among lovely trees atop one of the highest hills rimming Silicon Valley, had become the epicenter of the region’s venture capital industry, which by 1975 included some 150 firms.
卡拉尼什基金的新邻居之一是尤金·克莱纳，他于1972年与一位名叫汤姆·帕金斯的工程师出身、后获得哈佛MBA学位的企业家合作，创办了一家名为克莱纳·帕金斯的风险投资公司。克莱纳在费尔柴尔德公司的经历让他确信，对企业家来说，尽可能长时间地保持独立是最佳选择。在目睹了戴维斯和罗克在七年间扶持独立企业家所取得的丰厚回报后——克莱纳曾担任罗克风险投资公司的顾问——克莱纳确信，作为一名风险投资家，他也能赚到可观的利润。20世纪70年代初期是融资者的市场：资本利得税的提高吓跑了许多普通投资者，但并未显著减少寻求融资的企业家数量。
Among the Callanish Fund’s new neighbors was Eugene Kleiner, who in 1972 partnered with an engineer-turned-Harvard-MBA named Tom Perkins to launch a venture capital company called Kleiner Perkins. Kleiner’s experiences at Fairchild had convinced him that it was best for entrepreneurs to remain independent for as long as they could. And after seeing the returns Davis and Rock achieved after seven years of supporting independent entrepreneurs—Kleiner had worked as a consultant to Rock’s venture capital business—Kleiner was convinced that he could make a decent amount of money as a venture capitalist. The early 1970s were a funders’ market: the increase in the capital gains tax had scared away many casual investors but not significantly shrunk the pool of entrepreneurs looking for funding.
凯鹏华盈的第一支基金规模为800万美元，其中一半来自匹兹堡钢铁大亨亨利·希尔曼，另一半来自多位有限合伙人，诺伊斯很可能就是其中之一。这些有限合伙人仅仅是资金来源。公司的管理合伙人——在本例中是凯鹏华盈和珀金斯——负责选择投资标的公司（资金由有限合伙人提供），并决定每家公司的投资比例。作为回报，普通合伙人可以获得所谓的“收益分成”——即基金整体收益的固定百分比。18
The first Kleiner Perkins fund was $8 million, half of which came from Henry Hillman, a Pittsburgh steel magnate, and half from various limited partners, Noyce most likely among them. These limited partners were simply sources of money. The firm’s managing partners—in this case, Kleiner and Perkins—chose the companies in which to invest the fund’s assets (provided by the limited partners) and decided how much to allocate to each company. In exchange for this work, the general partners earned what is called a “carry”—a fixed percentage of the fund’s overall returns.18
就像亚瑟·洛克帮助诺伊斯和摩尔注册成立英特尔公司并制定商业计划一样，凯鹏华盈力求超越尤金·克莱纳曾形容的传统投资者模式——“投入资金，然后听天由命”。凯鹏华盈以及其他很快效仿其做法的硅谷风险投资公司，代表其支持的公司（称为“投资组合公司”）进行招聘，帮助这些公司签订会计和法律合同，促成与潜在客户的对接，并赞助各种交流活动，让各投资组合公司的首席执行官们能够探讨共同面临的问题和挑战。凯鹏华盈还在其内部“驻场企业家”或“企业孵化”部门的协助下，开发商业创意。这些创意随后被转化为投资组合公司，并由风险投资家进行投资。19
In much the same way that Arthur Rock had helped Noyce and Moore incorporate Intel and draw up a business plan, Kleiner Perkins sought to go beyond the traditional investor’s approach that Eugene Kleiner once described as “putting in money and then hoping for the best.” Kleiner Perkins and the other Silicon Valley venture capital firms that soon followed its example recruited on behalf of the companies they supported (called “portfolio companies”), helped the firms contract for accounting and legal work, facilitated introductions to potential customers, and sponsored networking events in which the CEOs of various portfolio companies could discuss common problems and concerns. Kleiner Perkins also developed business ideas in-house with the assistance of “entrepreneurs in residence” or “business incubation” divisions. These ideas were then spun into portfolio companies in which the venture capitalists invested.19
凯鹏华盈首支800万美元基金的回报超过40倍。如今，凯鹏华盈已成为全球首屈一指的风险投资公司，管理资产规模超过10亿美元。20
Kleiner Perkins’s first $8 million fund returned more than 40 times over. Today, Kleiner Perkins Caufield and Byers is the world’s premier venture capital firm, with assets worth more than $1 billion under management.20
诺伊斯并未参与决定其他风险投资家将他的资金投向何处，但他为卡拉尼什基金做出的投资决策遵循着一种理念，他的合伙人霍斯钦斯基将其概括为：“这是一项不可能完成的任务。但我们要做。”诺伊斯喜欢说：“你最多只会损失100%。”百分比，但上涨的倍数非常惊人。”从某种意义上说，霍辛斯基最重要的工作是保护诺伊斯——他确实想赚钱——免受他自己“放手一搏”的本能影响。21
NOYCE PLAYED NO ROLE in deciding where other venture capitalists invested his money, but his own investment decisions for the Callanish Fund were guided by a philosophy that his partner Hwoschinsky summarized as “That’s an impossible task. Let’s do it.” Noyce liked to say, “You can only lose 100 percent, but the multiples on the up side are fantastic.” In some sense, Hwoschinsky’s most important job was to protect Noyce—who did want to make money—from his own “let’s do it” instincts.21
卡拉尼什的第一笔重大投资是在1974年，金额约为5万美元，用于支持一位物理学家和一位商人，他们相信可以利用计算机来寻找水下石油储量。此前，几家大型公司已经投入数百万美元进行这项“测量井钻探”项目，但均以失败告终。这令霍辛斯基感到担忧，但物理学家诺曼·麦克劳德向诺伊斯展示了两页联立方程组，解释了他的想法为何可行，这给诺伊斯留下了深刻的印象。霍辛斯基将麦克劳德实验室的风险等级评为“11”（满分10分），诺伊斯则评为6分，卡拉尼什最终决定为其提供资金。在这笔资金注入之后，诺伊斯很少参与公司的运营，但霍辛斯基帮助创始人度过了一段艰难时期，最终将麦克劳德实验室出售给了石油服务巨头Core Labs。这笔交易为霍辛斯基带来了丰厚的利润，他最终收购了诺伊斯在公司中的股份。22
Callanish’s first significant investment, in 1974, was roughly $50,000 to support a physicist and a businessman who believed that they could use computers to find underwater oil reserves. Several large companies had already plunged millions of dollars into this “measurement well drilling” effort without success. This alarmed Hwoschinsky, but Noyce was impressed by two pages of simultaneous equations that the physicist, Norman MacLeod, showed him to explain why his ideas ought to work. Hwoschinsky rated MacLeod Labs “an eleven” on a one-to-ten scale of risk; Noyce gave it a six, and Callanish funded it. Noyce had little to do with the operation after this influx of dollars, but Hwoschinsky helped the founders weather a rough period and then sell MacLeod Labs to oil services giant Core Labs. The transaction netted Hwoschinsky, who eventually bought Noyce’s stake in the company, a good profit.22
卡拉尼什支持了形形色色的小公司：计算机软件公司Siderial和Dynabyte；步进电机软件公司Compumotor；将轮椅改装成街道车辆的项目Benz；以及第一台利用微处理器平衡汽车轮胎的机器Nortron。卡拉尼什还投资了纳帕谷的索诺玛-库特勒酒庄，并曾短暂拥有加州第二大桃园，该桃园拥有托卢姆河宝贵的河岸权。通过卡拉尼什，诺伊斯投资了圣克鲁斯附近的一家鲑鱼渔场，戈登·摩尔也持有该渔场的股份。卡拉尼什的几乎每一笔投资规模都很小——不超过5万美元——旨在将纸上谈兵的想法转化为商业现实。诺伊斯很少投资种子轮之后的项目；他最喜欢的是帮助新事物诞生。卡拉尼什基金虽然没有像凯鹏华盈那样取得巨大成功，但它盈利颇丰，满足了诺伊斯对新思想和新方法的渴望。
Callanish supported an eclectic congeries of small companies: computer software companies Siderial and Dynabyte; Compumotor, a software company for stepper motors; Benz, a project to convert a wheel chair into a street vehicle; Nortron, the first machine that balanced automobile tires using microprocessors. Callanish also backed Sonoma-Cutrer winery in Napa and for a brief time owned the second-largest peach orchard in California, which had valuable riparian rights to the Tolumne River. Through Callanish, Noyce invested in a salmon fishery near Santa Cruz in which Gordon Moore also had a stake. Almost every Callanish investment was small—no more than about $50,000—and targeted to move an idea from a paper proposal to a commercial reality. Noyce rarely invested beyond this “seed stage”; it was helping to start something new that he loved best. The Callanish Fund was not a success on the scale of a Kleiner Perkins, but it was profitable, and it satisfied Noyce’s hunger for new ideas and novel approaches.
但有一项投资尤其令诺伊斯着迷：Caere（发音为“care”），这家公司开发了OmniPage，这是首款成功的计算机扫描仪软件。诺伊斯对这家公司的投入如此之深，时间又如此之长——该公司在上市前已经存在了13年，以至于诺伊斯略带遗憾地称其为“世界上最古老的创业公司”——以至于继仙童半导体和英特尔之后，有人将其称为“诺伊斯的另一家公司”。23
But one investment particularly captivated Noyce: Caere (pronounced “care”), the company that built OmniPage, the first successful software for computer scanners. Noyce was involved with the firm so intensely and for so long—it existed for 13 years before it went public, leading Noyce, rather ruefully, to call it “the world’s oldest startup”—that some described it as “Noyce’s other company,” after Fairchild and Intel.23
1974年，Caere公司（当时名为TypeReader）的创始人兼总裁布莱恩·埃尔夫曼联系了卡拉尼什基金会。埃尔夫曼希望获得启动资金，用于开发一种手持式读码器，其工作原理类似于如今遍布全球的条形码扫描器。然而，TypeReader读码器无需特殊的编码线路即可工作；相反，它可以电子读取简单的字母数字文本——实际上就是打字。以及用途。埃尔夫曼认为这根魔杖将大大简化库存控制和销售跟踪。
In 1974, Brian Elfman, the founder and president of Caere (which was then called TypeReader), contacted the Callanish Fund. Elfman wanted seed money to build a hand-held wand that would operate much like the bar-code scanners that today can be found throughout the world. The TypeReader wand, however, would not need specially coded lines to function; instead, it could electronically read simple alphanumeric text—typing, for all intents and purposes. Elfman believed that this wand would greatly simplify inventory control and sales tracking.
诺伊斯感兴趣的与其说是埃尔夫曼的库存控制理念，不如说是字体识别这一宏大概念。诺伊斯一直认为，除非消除将数据输入电脑这一繁琐且容易出错的工作，否则机器永远无法充分发挥其在速度、效率、准确性和功能方面的潜力。TypeReader产品提供了一种绕过键盘的方法。诺伊斯投资了3万美元。他对TypeReader的兴趣如此浓厚，以至于他还接受了TypeReader董事会的一个席位。
Noyce was intrigued, less by Elfman’s vision for inventory control than by the broad concept of type recognition. Noyce had long thought that until the tedious and error-prone task of typing data into computers was eliminated, the machines would never achieve their potential for speed, efficiency, accuracy, or power. The TypeReader product offered a way around the keyboard. Noyce invested $30,000. His interest was sufficiently piqued that he also accepted a seat on the TypeReader board.
公司在技术上举步维艰。诺伊斯每个月都投入少量资金，以维持TypeReader的运营。一年过去了，技术进展甚微，董事会采纳了诺伊斯的建议，从仙童公司聘请了一位新总裁和两位顶尖工程师。
The company struggled technically. Every month, Noyce invested another small amount of money so that TypeReader could continue to operate. After a year passed with little technical progress, the board, on Noyce’s recommendation, hired a new president and two top-flight engineers from Fairchild.
人事变动帮助公司（此时已更名为Caere）实现了几个关键里程碑。到1976年底，JC Penney同意在部分门店测试扫描棒。这一进展使Caere得以筹集到1000万美元的风险投资。时任董事会主席的诺伊斯(Noyce)在本轮融资中又追加了13万美元，并说服了几位在风险投资界和格林内尔学院(Grinnell College)的朋友进行投资。24
The personnel changes helped the company, which by now had changed its name to Caere, to hit several key milestones. By the end of 1976, J. C. Penney had agreed to test the scanning wands in select stores. This progress enabled Caere to raise a $10 million round of venture financing. Noyce, who was now board chair, invested another $130,000 in this round and also convinced several of his friends in venture capital and at Grinnell College to invest.24
1977年，凯尔公司推出首款产品时，曾预期其手持式扫描仪的市场会迅速增长。然而，他们很快发现这款扫描仪性能不稳定，难以使用。只有收银员以极其精准的方式握持扫描棒，才能准确读取标签上的数字和字母。
When Caere shipped its first product in 1977, the company fully expected the market for its handheld scanner to ramp up quickly. They soon discovered, however, that the scanner was too temperamental to be useful. It could accurately read the numbers and letters on a tag only if the clerk held the wand in precisely the right way.
凯尔迅速将扫描仪改造成条形码阅读器。该设备现在运行良好——读取一系列线条比读取文本要简单得多——但条形码阅读器市场已经成熟，并被惠普、IBM 和 Recognition Equipment Incorporated 等几家大型公司所主导。
Caere quickly retooled the scanner as a bar-code reader. The device now worked well—it is a far less complex thing to read a series of lines than text—but the bar-code reader market was already mature and dominated by a few huge companies such as Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and Recognition Equipment Incorporated.
Caere公司一直勉强维持运营，盈利微薄。诺伊斯开始提前参加董事会会议，以便与Caere的员工，特别是工程师和技术经理们交流。他乐于询问他们的工作进展和遇到的问题，并且总是毫不犹豫地提出自己的技术建议。他的想法或许并不十分实用，但诺伊斯的关注无疑极大地鼓舞了Caere员工的士气。能得到硅谷最成功公司之一的创始人兼Caere董事会主席的关注，的确令人兴奋不已。
Caere chugged along, never making more than a small profit. Noyce took to arriving early for board meetings so he could talk to the Caere employees, especially the engineers and technical managers. He enjoyed asking them to update him on their progress and problems, and he never hesitated to offer technical suggestions of his own. It is unlikely that his ideas proved particularly useful, but the morale boost that the Caere employees received from Noyce’s attention was substantial. To have the founder of one of the Valley’s most successful companies and chairman of the Caere board take an interest in one’s work was heady stuff indeed.
1979年，凯尔公司总裁离职，诺伊斯决定公司不应急于寻找继任者。他想等待合适的候选人，在此期间，他将亲自管理公司。他与凯尔公司财务副总裁鲍勃·特雷西搭档。在他们担任联席总裁的最初几天，诺伊斯把特雷西叫到他在凯尔公司开始使用的办公室。诺伊斯问道：“你觉得我们应该怎么做？”
In 1979, Caere’s president left and Noyce decided that the company should not rush into hiring a replacement. He wanted to wait for the right candidate, and in the meantime, he would manage the company himself in tandem with Bob Teresi, Caere’s vice president of finance. On one of their first days as co-presidents, Noyce called Teresi into the office that Noyce had begun using at Caere. Noyce asked, “What do you think we should do?”
特雷西认为，在竞争激烈的扫描仪市场，公司前景黯淡。他说：“我认为我们应该放弃，申请破产。”
Teresi thought the company’s future in the highly competitive scanner market looked bleak. He said, “I think we should let it go, file for bankruptcy.”
“绝对不行，”诺伊斯斩钉截铁地说。“我们有大约30名员工。我们必须继续营业。我们对员工及其家人负有责任。”
“No way,” Noyce said emphatically. “We have people [about 30 employees]. We need to keep it open. We have a responsibility to the employees and their families.”
诺伊斯随后拿出支票簿，撕下一张支票。“抬头写凯尔公司，”他写道。然后他签上了自己的名字。支票其余部分他留空，递给了特雷西。“金额不要超过一百万美元，”诺伊斯说，“我那个账户里就只有一百万美元。”25
Noyce then took out his checkbook and ripped out a check. “Pay to the order of Caere Corp.,” he wrote. Then he signed his name. He left the rest of the check blank and handed it to Teresi. “Don’t write it for more than a million dollars,” Noyce said. “That’s all I have in that account.”25
特雷西保留了支票，但没有兑现。在担任联合总裁大约九个月后，特雷西和诺伊斯聘请了新的首席执行官吉姆·达顿。达顿问诺伊斯的第一个问题显而易见：“你为什么要在凯尔公司瞎折腾？你本来可以做任何事的。”
Teresi held on to the check but did not cash it. After roughly nine months as co-presidents, Teresi and Noyce hired a new CEO, Jim Dutton. One of Dutton’s first questions to Noyce was the obvious one. “Why are you screwing around with Caere? You could be doing anything.”
诺伊斯很快做出了回应。“这算是我对这个体系的一种回报吧，”他说。他的意思是：正是这种回报让他重获新生，也让他的成功得以实现。“此外，”诺伊斯补充道，“我知道，如果我们能找到让它运转起来的方法，这将是一项非常有用的技术。它能为人们节省大量精力。”26
Noyce’s response came quickly. “It’s kind of my way of just paying back the system,” he said. By which he meant: it was how he reinvigorated the environment that had made his own success possible. “Besides,” Noyce added, “I know that if we can figure out how to make this work, it’s a useful technology. It will save people a lot of work.”26
达顿加入凯尔公司后不久，他和首席财务官特雷西就决定是时候兑现诺伊斯的空白支票了。两人坐在一起，琢磨着该在诺伊斯签名上方的空白处填上多少数字。“有趣的是，正因为鲍勃信任我们，相信我们会做出正确的判断，不会拿走超过我们实际需要的金额，这反而让我们不得不接受比我们原本预期更少的金额，”达顿解释道。“我们知道他当初提供这笔钱绝非轻率之举，我们一定要确保不辜负他的信任。”最终，特雷西填上了六位数——达顿估计大概在25万到35万美元之间——并将支票存入了凯尔公司的账户。这笔钱足以让公司再维持一段时间。与此同时，诺伊斯没有告诉任何人，甚至连他的投资伙伴霍辛斯基也没有。27
Shortly after Dutton joined Caere, he and CFO Teresi decided that the time had come to cash Noyce’s blank check. The two of them sat together for a long time, trying to determine what numbers to write in the space above Noyce’s signature. “The funny thing was that because Bob trusted us to use our judgment and not take more than we needed, it somehow put pressure on us to take less than we would have asked for,” Dutton explains. “We knew he had not offered that money in a cavalier way, and we wanted to be damn sure to live up to his trust.” Finally Teresi filled in six figures—Dutton guesses it was probably between $250,000 and $350,000—and deposited the check into Caere’s account. That was enough to keep the company going a while longer. Meanwhile, Noyce told no one, not even his investment partner Hwoschinsky, what he had done.27
1976年，28位独立证券分析师将英特尔评为“年度电子公司”。一张颁奖典礼的现场照片显示，诺伊斯接过纪念牌匾，并与颁奖嘉宾热情握手。格罗夫站在诺伊斯旁边，对着镜头露出灿烂的笑容。诺伊斯另一侧是戈登·摩尔，但他几乎看不见，因为他的半个身子都超出了画面。28
IN 1976, 28 INDEPENDENT SECURITIES ANALYSTS named Intel “Electronics Company of the Year.” A candid photograph from the awards presentation shows Noyce receiving the commemorative plaque and sharing a hearty handshake with the presenter. Grove stands next to Noyce, beaming a full-wattage grin straight into the lens of the photographer’s camera. On Noyce’s other side is Gordon Moore, but he is hardly visible, his body half-way out of the frame.28
这张照片完美地体现了人们普遍认为这三位人物对英特尔成功的重要性。诺伊斯理应获得赞誉，格鲁夫是核心人物，而摩尔则在幕后做着一些难以捉摸的事情。当然，这种看法完全不准确。现存的几份20世纪70年代中期的信件清楚地表明，在诺伊斯成为董事会主席之后，摩尔实际上掌管着英特尔。摩尔对产品、收购、增长、定价和预算都拥有最终决定权。摩尔负责筹划董事会会议，给潜在合作伙伴写信（“我建议，如果双方的交流内容如下……”），指导高管（“请你们两位研究一下其中涉及哪些方面”），明确关键问题（“你们应该重点关注最重要的优缺点，并就经济效益方面给我们讲解”），阐述英特尔的增长策略（“英特尔并非松散的集团公司，我们并非因为收购可以稀释股权而进行收购；相反，我们是一家运营公司，我们关注的是能够利用我们技术基础的大型新兴市场”），并向员工通报重大变动（“自公司成立以来一直担任英特尔人事经理的安·鲍尔斯已宣布她打算辞职”）。与此同时，格鲁夫则“强化”了摩尔的指示。“我倾向于用微妙的灰色地带看待事物，”摩尔解释道，但格鲁夫则专注于决策的黑白两面，并确保英特尔采取行动。按理说，诺伊斯担任英特尔总裁期间所受到的关注，在 1975 年之后应该转移到摩尔身上，甚至可能转移到格鲁夫身上。29
The photograph perfectly encapsulates the popular perception of the relative importance of the three men to Intel’s success. Noyce deserves the accolades, Grove is at the center of the action, and Moore does something inscrutable in the margins. This image, of course, was entirely inaccurate. The few sheets of correspondence that survive from the mid-1970s make it clear that Moore ran Intel after Noyce became board chair. Moore had the final say on products, acquisitions, growth, pricing, and budgets. Moore was the one planning board meetings, writing to potential partners (“I propose that it would be sufficient if the exchange consisted of the following …”), directing senior staff (“would you two please look at what would be involved”), defining essential problems (“you should concentrate on the most important advantages and disadvantages and educate us with respect to the economics”), articulating Intel’s approach to growth (“Intel is not a loose conglomerate that is interested in acquisitions because they are antidilutive; rather we are an operating company and are interested in large developing markets that utilize our technological base”), and informing employees about major changes (“Ann Bowers, Intel’s Personnel Manager since the company’s formation, has announced her intention to resign”). And Grove, meanwhile, was “amplifying” Moore’s direction. “I tend to see things in delicate shades of gray,” Moore explained, but Grove honed in on the black or white aspects of a decision and made sure Intel took action. By all rights, the attention paid to Noyce when he was president of Intel should have shifted to Moore, and possibly to Grove, after 1975.29
但事实并非如此。实际上，在诺伊斯担任董事会主席后的几年里，尽管他对公司的直接参与度逐渐降低，但他作为英特尔创始人之一的知名度和声望却持续增长。这种看似矛盾的现象可以用时间和个人意愿来简单解释。由于摩尔全身心投入到公司的日常运营中，而且他比诺伊斯要内敛得多，因此他并不介意扮演英特尔的“隐形CEO”的角色。在过去四十年里，摩尔接受过数十次采访，只有一次他表达了对诺伊斯高调行事的哪怕一丝不满。他曾私下告诉一位采访者，诺伊斯的“个性太出众了，以至于人们把所有成就都归功于他。”但几乎紧接着，摩尔又补充道：“鲍勃真是个不寻常的人——才智过人，个性非凡——这样的人并不常见。”30
But it did not. Indeed, in the years after Noyce became board chair, his visibility and prestige as one of Intel’s founders continued to grow even as his direct involvement with the company was shrinking. This apparent contradiction can be explained in simple terms of time and inclination. Because Moore was consumed with the day-to-day running of the company, and because he was far more reserved than Noyce, he did not mind functioning as Intel’s stealth CEO. In dozens of interviews that Moore has granted over the past four decades, only once did he make any comment indicating even the slightest resentment of Noyce’s visibility. He told an interviewer in an aside that Noyce’s “personality was so outstanding that people kind of gave him credit for everything that happened.” But almost immediately, Moore added, “Bob was truly an unusual guy—an exceptional intellect, an amazing personality—people like that don’t come along very often.”30
与摩尔不同，诺伊斯有时间接受采访，并与各种想要了解英特尔成功秘诀的机构交流。他很享受这种曝光机会，他和摩尔都认为保持英特尔的公众关注度至关重要。每一篇正面报道都像是对潜在投资者、员工和客户的邀请，同时也提醒着现有投资者、员工和客户，他们当初选择与英特尔合作是多么明智。
In contrast to Moore, Noyce had time to grant interviews and speak to various organizations that wanted to understand the secret to Intel’s success. He generally enjoyed the exposure, and he and Moore agreed that it was important to keep Intel in the public eye. Every favorable article served as an invitation to potential investors, employees, and customers and a reminder to existing investors, employees, and customers that their decision to affiliate with Intel had been wise.
雷吉斯·麦肯纳 (Regis McKenna) 所在的公关公司曾负责英特尔的公共关系，他认为让一家公司登上新闻头条的最佳方法是赋予它人性化的形象。“真正让一家企业在公众眼中脱颖而出的，”他说，“是人……将个性融入企业理念的想法由来已久。”诺伊斯——一位关键发明的发明者，一位谦逊的百万富翁，一位出身中西部牧师家庭并最终功成名就的人——具备了将个人特质“注入”公众对英特尔认知的理想条件。31
Regis McKenna, whose agency handled public relations for Intel, believed that the best way to get a company in the news was to put a human face on it. “What really differentiates a business [in the eyes of the public],” he said, “is people. … The idea of infusing personalities into this started back very, very, very early.” Noyce—father of a critical invention, humble millionaire, Midwestern preacher’s boy made good—possessed ideal characteristics to “infuse” into the public’s sense of Intel.31
此外，诺伊斯温和而深思熟虑的沟通方式极具说服力——他自己也深知这一点。当他的经纪人鲍勃·哈灵顿（他本人也是一位小有名气的电台主持人）称赞诺伊斯“表达能力极佳”时，诺伊斯略显尴尬地承认道：“是啊，我知道。我天生如此。我的说话方式，我的思考方式——到目前为止，这对我的人生非常有效。”32
Moreover, Noyce’s soft-spoken, thoughtful communications style was very persuasive—as he well knew himself. When his broker Bob Harrington, himself a minor radio personality, complimented Noyce on his “tremendous delivery,” Noyce, looking a bit embarrassed, admitted, “Yeah, I know. I was just born this way. The way I talk, the way I think—it has just worked really well for me in my life so far.”32
1976年，麦肯纳安排诺伊斯登上《商业周刊》的封面，照片中他俯身在棋盘前，标题是“半导体行业新领袖——英特尔的罗伯特·N·诺伊斯，引领技术变革”。文章将英特尔与美国国家半导体公司进行了比较——在内封页上，诺伊斯的好友查理·斯波克执黑棋，诺伊斯执白棋。《商业周刊》的文章向广大商业读者介绍了这位笑容可掬、“看起来年轻有活力的半导体先驱”诺伊斯，称他为业界的“创新企业家”和英特尔“最能言善辩的发言人”。同年晚些时候，《纽约时报》刊登了一篇关于诺伊斯的人物特写。33
In 1976, McKenna arranged for Noyce to appear on the cover of Business Week, leaning over a chess board, under the headline “New Leaders in Semiconductors—Intel’s Robert N. Noyce, Masterminding a Radical Change in Technology.” The article compared Intel and National Semi-conductor—on the inside cover flap, Noyce’s good friend Charlie Sporck was playing black to Noyce’s white. The Business Week article introduced smiling “youthful-looking semiconductor pioneer” Noyce to the general business reader as “the innovator-entrepreneur” of the industry and Intel’s “most articulate spokesman.” Later that year, Noyce was the subject of a New York Times profile.33
当时，价值60亿美元的半导体产业几乎完全依赖于与诺伊斯在仙童半导体公司构思的平面器件非常相似的集成电路。随着这项发明的重要性日益凸显，科学界开始授予诺伊斯诸多荣誉。1978年，他因“对硅集成电路——现代电子学的基石”的贡献，荣获电气电子工程师协会（IEEE）颁发的荣誉勋章。一位IEEE杰出会员致信诺伊斯：“一项真正具有革命性的重大发明，其发展方向以及在市场上的成功应用，都出自一人之手，这种情况实属罕见。您理应获得IEEE的最高荣誉，远远超过大多数获奖者。”34
At this point, nearly all of the $6 billion semiconductor business depended on integrated circuits very similar to the planar-based device Noyce had conceptualized at Fairchild. As the importance of this invention grew increasingly obvious, the scientific community began to bestow important honors on Noyce. In 1978, he received the Medal of Honor from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) “for his contributions to the silicon integrated circuit, a cornerstone of modern electronics.” A distinguished member of the IEEE wrote to Noyce, “It is rare that a truly revolutionary major invention, the direction of the development of the invention, and its successful exploitation in the marketplace are the work of a single individual. You deserve, far beyond most winners, this highest honor of the IEEE.”34
1979 年，卡特总统在白宫向诺伊斯颁发了国家科学奖章，这是美国授予科学成就的最高奖项。诺伊斯是当年 20 位获奖者之一；与他同台领奖的还有量子物理学家理查德·费曼、DNA 先驱阿瑟·科恩伯格以及核物理学家（也是诺伊斯在麻省理工学院的教授）维克多·魏斯科普夫等科学界泰斗。
At the White House in 1979, President Carter presented Noyce the National Medal of Science, the highest award granted for scientific achievement in the United States. Noyce was one of 20 recipients that year; sharing the stage with him were such luminaries as quantum physicist Richard Feynman, DNA pioneer Arthur Kornberg, and nuclear physicist (and Noyce’s one-time MIT professor) Victor Weisskopf.
安·鲍尔斯在1978年的圣诞贺卡中写道：“所有这些（认可）使（诺伊斯）成为一位炙手可热的演讲者。他似乎是一位……”他是创业精神的典范。”全美制造商协会表彰了他“通过科学研究和开发为人类福祉做出的杰出贡献”。他还获得了麻省理工学院颁发的企业领导力奖，并在该学院的校友大会上发表了题为“创新管理”的主题演讲。演讲伊始，他回顾了自己的职业选择，并声称这些选择从未特别冒险。“企业家就像身穿条纹西装的约翰·韦恩，开拓经济疆界，这只是好莱坞的神话，”他说。“创业固然有风险，但通常是经过深思熟虑的风险，而且你离开后留下的东西通常不值得你为此担忧。”他回忆起自己离开肖克利公司加入仙童半导体公司，或者从仙童半导体公司加入英特尔公司时说：“唯一的风险就是我可能无法实现自己设定的目标。我始终相信自己可以随时找到工作。”这算是对他当时想法的一种略微修正——他从未担心过找不到下一份工作；他只是理所当然地认为自己不会失败——但或许从他50岁的视角来看，年轻的诺伊斯显得过于自信了。在演讲的最后，诺伊斯强调“创新源于成功”，并指出鼓励创新的最佳方式是“对成功充满信心，并给予丰厚的回报”。他以英特尔的股票期权计划为例，阐述了这一理念的实际应用。35
Ann Bowers wrote in her 1978 Christmas letter that “all of this [recognition] has made [Noyce] much in demand as a speaker. He seems to be a model of entrepreneurial endeavor.” The National Association of Manufacturers recognized his “distinguished contribution to the well-being of mankind through scientific research and development.” He also received a Corporate Leadership Award from MIT and keynoted the Institute’s alumni conference on “the management of innovation.” He began the talk with a description of his own career choices, which he claimed had never been particularly daring. “The entrepreneur as a pin-striped John Wayne blazing economic frontiers is a Hollywood myth,” he said. “There is risk [in entrepreneurship], but it is usually a calculated risk, and what you leave behind is not usually worth looking over your shoulder for.” When he left Shockley for Fairchild or Fairchild for Intel, he said, “The only risk was that I wouldn’t meet the goals I had set myself. I always knew I could go out and get a job.” This is a slightly revisionist version of his thoughts—he had never worried about getting another job; he had simply assumed he would not fail—but perhaps the young Noyce seemed a bit too brazenly self-confident from the perspective of his 50-year-old self. At the end of his talk, Noyce emphasized that “innovation feeds on success” and suggested that the best way to encourage innovation is “to be confident of success and to reward it generously.” He cited Intel’s stock-option plan as an example of this philosophy in action.35
到了20世纪80年代初，诺伊斯的事迹已经出现在《商业周刊》、《经济学人》、《福布斯》、《财富》、《国家地理》、《纽约时报》、《时代周刊》和《华尔街日报》等众多电子行业刊物上。在许多人眼中，诺伊斯的故事堪称高科技产业乃至硅谷的典范。汤姆·沃尔夫1983年在《时尚先生》杂志上发表的关于诺伊斯的专题报道——《罗伯特·诺伊斯的发明：硅谷的崛起》——或许比其他一些文章更偏向于歌功颂德，但却概括了这些文章的整体基调。1983年11月，格林内尔镇宣布设立“罗伯特·诺顿·诺伊斯日”。公告称诺伊斯是“一位来自格林内尔的杰出人物，他在事业和事业上取得了卓越的成就，但他从未忘记自己在这里接受的教育和熏陶。”当被问及对被称为“硅谷之父”有何感想时，诺伊斯低下头，咧嘴一笑，回答说：“有点谦虚，有点自豪。我还能说什么呢？我喜欢这个称号。”36
By the early 1980s, Noyce had been featured in Business Week, the Economist, Forbes, Fortune, National Geographic, the New York Times, Time, and the Wall Street Journal, as well as many electronics-related publications. Noyce’s story was the paradigmatic tale of high-tech industry and of Silicon Valley in the eyes of many. The title of Tom Wolfe’s 1983 Esquire profile of Noyce, “The Tinkerings of Robert Noyce: How the Sun Rose on Silicon Valley,” might have been a bit more openly hagiographic than some of the other articles, but it captures their general tone. In November 1983, the town of Grinnell declared “Robert Norton Noyce Day.” The proclamation described Noyce as “a man from Grinnell who has gone on to high professional accomplishment and enterprise but who has never forgotten the upbringing and education he received here.” When Noyce was asked how he felt about being known as “the father of Silicon Valley,” he ducked his head, grinned, and answered, “a little humble, a little proud. What can I say? I love the term.”36
1979年， 《旧金山纪事报》记者赫伯·凯恩承认自己“又一年过去了，仍然不知道半导体是什么”，他的读者们纷纷写信给他，不是为了描述半导体这种器件或其背后的物理原理，而是为了介绍罗伯特·诺伊斯。“好几个人急忙跟我提起洛斯阿尔托斯的罗伯特·诺伊斯，他不仅是集成电路的先驱，还创立了仙童半导体公司和英特尔公司（十年内盈利6亿美元），而且，他还是个飞行员和滑雪冠军。”仅此而已！他刚刚成为美国历史上仅有的130位获得国家科学奖章的人之一。……当然了。”换句话说，凯恩的读者认为诺伊斯就是普通人了解半导体所需的一切。而凯恩则觉得他听起来好得令人难以置信。37
When San Francisco Chronicle reporter Herb Caen admitted in 1979 that he “had let another year go by without learning what a semiconductor is,” his readers wrote to him, not to describe the device or the physics behind it, but to describe Noyce. “Several people hasten to tell me about Robert Noyce of Los Altos, who not only pioneered the blamed thing [the integrated circuit], he founded Fairchild Semiconductor and Intel Corp. ($600 million in ten years) and, to boot, is a pilot and champion skier. Not only that! He has just become one of only 130 people in U.S. history to receive the National Science Medal. … Sure.” Caen’s readers, in other words, thought Noyce was all the layman needed to know about semiconductors. And Caen thought he sounded too good to be true.37
事实上，诺伊斯的公众成就和赞誉再次被个人困境所笼罩。他的两个孩子，如今已是青年，却都深陷毒瘾的泥潭。1976年，其中一个孩子被诊断出患有躁郁症，并被送往医院治疗。几个月后，诺伊斯的一个女儿在他家附近过马路时被车撞倒，头部受伤，昏迷了六周。康复过程漫长而艰难。
And in fact, Noyce’s public success and accolades were once again shadowed by personal difficulties. Two of his children, now young adults, were struggling with drug problems. In 1976, one of the young Noyces was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and hospitalized. A few months later, one of Noyce’s daughters was hit by a car while walking across a street near Noyce’s home. She lay in a coma for six weeks with an open head injury. Rehabilitation was slow and difficult.
除了最初一阵暴怒——他毫不留情地质问孩子的一位医生的资质——诺伊斯处理危机的方式，依然是那种奇怪的被动否认策略，正是这种策略让他得以度过与贝蒂早期的矛盾。“他完全不想谈任何情感上棘手的事情，”安·鲍尔斯回忆道。她说，正是在那段时间，她生平第一次对贝蒂·诺伊斯产生了同情。每当鲍尔斯想和诺伊斯谈谈家里的问题时，他的表现都让她想起一个捂着耳朵唱着“我听不见”的小孩。他会一连几个小时消失在地下室或房子后面的网球场上。鲍尔斯甚至开始想方设法把他困住——比如在车里或餐厅里——这样他或许就能被迫运用他的创造力、影响力以及智慧来解决问题。
Aside from an initial flare of anger, during which he mercilessly grilled one of his children’s doctors on his credentials, Noyce dealt with the crises using the same strangely passive denial tactics that had enabled him to weather his early difficulties with Betty. “He absolutely did not want to connect on anything that was emotionally difficult,” recalls Ann Bowers, who says that during this period she found herself sympathizing with Betty Noyce for the only time in her life. Noyce’s behavior when Bowers wanted to talk with him about the family’s problems reminded her of a toddler sticking his fingers in his ears and singing, “I can’t hear you.” He would disappear for hours into the basement or onto the tennis court behind their house. It got to the point that Bowers found herself trying to trap him—in the car, or at a restaurant—so he might be forced to bring his creativity, influence, and brainpower to bear on the situation.
但如果家里气氛太紧张，诺伊斯就会离开小镇。总有演讲要发表，客户需要讨好，销售会议需要鼓舞士气，或者面试机会摆在眼前。“我父亲样样都行，”他的一位女儿曾说，“除了人际交往。”38
But if life got too tense at home, Noyce would leave town. There was always a speech that could be given, a customer who needed wooing, a sales meeting that required inspiration, or an interview that might be granted. “My father was good at everything,” one of his daughters once said, “except, maybe, human interaction.”38
贝蒂·诺伊斯和鲍勃一样，都不愿意介入此事。在一次危机时刻，她解释说，她不会取消原定的巴哈马度假计划，因为“（病人）已经在医院了，我再做什么又有什么用呢？”最终，寻找最佳治疗方案和治疗师，并与学校官员、医生和其他医学专家协商的重任，落在了诺伊斯健康的成年子女和安·鲍尔斯身上。
Betty Noyce was no more willing than Bob to become involved. At one crisis point she explained that she would not cancel a scheduled vacation to the Bahamas because “[the ill person] is in the hospital, so what good would I do anyway?” It fell to Noyce’s healthy adult children and Ann Bowers to find the best treatment programs and therapists and to confer with school officials, doctors, and other medical experts.
诺伊斯发现自己在情感上无法承受孩子们所遭受的痛苦。毫无疑问，他至少觉得自己对此负有部分责任。孩子们的困境似乎印证了他一直以来的恐惧：他的罪孽终将降临到孩子们身上。1979年，诺伊斯应邀到一位企业家家中赴宴，这位企业家的公司曾得到卡拉尼什基金会的资助。餐后，孩子们都已入睡，诺伊斯静静地听着公司创始人讲述，如果有一天……生意兴隆，他想带着家人搬进更大更漂亮的房子。诺伊斯抬头看着他，轻声说道：“你的家庭很幸福。我的家庭却一团糟。你就待在原地吧。”二十五年过去了，公司也取得了成功，这位企业家却依然没有搬家。39
Noyce found it emotionally impossible to cope with the pain that his children were suffering. He no doubt felt at least partially responsible for it. Their troubles seemed to confirm his fear that the wages of his sins would be visited upon his children. In 1979, Noyce was invited to dinner at the home of an entrepreneur whose company the Callanish Fund had supported. After the dishes had been cleared and the children sent to bed, Noyce listened as the company founder explained that some day, if the business did well, he would like to move his family into a bigger, nicer house. Noyce looked up at him and said very quietly, “You’ve got a nice family. I screwed up mine. Just stay where you are.” Twenty-five years and a successful company later, the entrepreneur has not moved.39
公关顾问雷吉斯·麦肯纳坚称，诺伊斯并没有主动寻求自我宣传的机会，他认为接受采访和争取曝光是他在英特尔工作的一部分。诺伊斯似乎对名利兴趣寥寥。尽管有人替他抱怨他不得不与德州仪器的杰克·基尔比分享集成电路的荣誉，但诺伊斯对此并不介意。1973年，当江崎理雄因隧道二极管的研究获得诺贝尔奖时，诺伊斯显然没有告诉任何人，他也是隧道二极管的发明者，而且与江崎理雄几乎同时提出这一想法。十年后，当诺伊斯提及他关于隧道二极管的研究时，他轻描淡写地说：“我没发表我的研究成果并没有错过什么；这项工作在其他地方已经有人做过了。”
PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSULTANT Regis McKenna insists that Noyce did not actively seek opportunities to promote himself, that Noyce considered granting interviews and garnering publicity to be part of his job at Intel. It does appear that Noyce had little interest in fame. While others resented, on his behalf, that he had to share credit for the integrated circuit with TI’s Jack Kilby, Noyce never had a problem with it. When Leo Esaki won the Nobel Prize in 1973 for his work on the tunnel diode, Noyce apparently told no one that he, too, had conceived of the device, and at the same time as Esaki. When, a decade later, Noyce did mention his tunnel diode work, he dismissed it with “I didn’t miss much [by not publishing my research]; the work had already been done elsewhere.”
无论诺伊斯是否想成为英特尔的焦点，有一个人对他似乎永远占据这个位置感到非常不满。在《纽约时报》刊登了他的专访后不久，诺伊斯给雷吉斯·麦肯纳打了个电话。“安迪（格鲁夫）觉得我和戈登（格鲁夫）包揽了英特尔的所有功劳，”诺伊斯听起来有些担忧，“我们必须让安迪更加引人注目，也必须给他更多的认可。”麦肯纳联系了撰写诺伊斯专访的记者。麦肯纳指出，格鲁夫也有着一段非常精彩的故事。他的故事广为流传，讲述了一个移民来到美国，通过教育和勤奋努力，最终走向商业成功的故事。在诺伊斯专访刊登六个月后，同一位记者为《纽约时报》周日版撰写了一篇关于格鲁夫的半版专题文章，格鲁夫是英特尔的“高科技奇才” 。“那篇文章让安迪一炮而红，”麦肯纳满意地回忆道。40
Whether or not Noyce wanted to occupy the center of the Intel spotlight, one man sorely resented his apparently permanent claim to it. Shortly after his New York Times profile appeared, Noyce called Regis McKenna. “Andy [Grove] feels like Gordon and I get all the credit [for Intel],” Noyce said, sounding a little worried. “We have got to make Andy more visible, and we’ve got to give him more credit.” McKenna called the reporter who wrote the Times profile of Noyce. Grove, McKenna pointed out, had an outstanding story of his own. His was the much-cherished tale of an immigrant who comes to America and through education and diligent self-application, rises to business success. Six months after the Noyce profile appeared, the same reporter wrote a half-page feature article on Grove, Intel’s “high technology jelly bean ace,” for the Sunday New York Times. “That article launched Andy,” McKenna recalls with satisfaction.40
诺伊斯或许并不刻意追求公众的赞誉和关注，但他却乐在其中。“他喜欢被人注视，喜欢成为众人瞩目的焦点，”安·鲍尔斯解释道，“鲍勃有点爱炫耀。”几乎所有熟悉诺伊斯的人都有一段他刻意吸引眼球的故事。查理·斯波克回忆说，诺伊斯曾在一家酒店的泳池里上演了一场“精彩绝伦的跳水表演”。理查德·霍奇森记得，诺伊斯曾在他家的一次午餐会上，坚持穿着一件亮黄色的夹克——这件夹克是为了纪念他曾在厚厚的粉雪中滑降了约10万英尺（约30000米）而特意设计的。后来诺伊斯承认，尽管他当时几乎热得受不了，但他注意到另一位客人穿着一件纪念他成功登顶乔戈里峰（世界第二高峰）的夹克。诺伊斯说，他“绝不会让一件乔戈里峰的夹克比一件10万英尺（约3000米）的夹克更引人注目。”诺伊斯的飞行教练吉姆·拉弗蒂简单地说：“他喜欢在所做的每一件事上都与众不同。”41
Noyce may not have actively pursued public accolades and attention, but he thoroughly enjoyed them. “He liked being looked at and being the center of attention,” explains Ann Bowers. “There was a showoff side to Bob.” Almost anyone who knew Noyce well has a story of him deliberately drawing attention to himself. Charlie Sporck recalls Noyce putting on “a hell of a diving show” at a hotel pool. Richard Hodgson remembers that Noyce once insisted on wearing a bright yellow jacket—which commemorated his having downhill skied some 100,000 feet in deep powder—throughout a luncheon at Hodgson’s home. Later Noyce admitted that although he had almost overheated, he had noticed another guest wearing a jacket from a successful climb of K2 (the second highest peak in the world). Noyce said that he “was not going to have a K2 jacket take precedence over a hundred-thousand-foot [jacket].” Jim Lafferty, Noyce’s sometime flight instructor said simply, “He liked being special at everything he did.”41
哈里·塞洛是费尔柴尔德公司的一名员工，他主持一档名为《本周科学》的公共电视节目。他回忆起20世纪60年代末，他邀请诺伊斯作为嘉宾参加节目的那一天。塞洛原本计划让诺伊斯用显微镜观察晶体管，而他自己则用另一台显微镜观察，并向观众描述他们所看到的景象，观众可以在屏幕上看到放大的图像。然而，事情的发展却出乎意料：
Harry Sello, a Fairchild employee who hosted a public television show called This Week in Science, recalls the day in the late 1960s when he invited Noyce to appear as his guest on the show. Sello had planned to have Noyce look at a transistor through a microscope while he, Sello, looked through another microscope and described what they were seeing for viewers, who could see the magnified image on their screens. Events transpired differently, however:
诺伊斯走过来，挡在我前面。我可是这节目的主角啊！他打断了我的台词，处处抢我的风头。他说：“让我给你演示一下。”话音刚落，诺伊斯的声音就响了起来，我们俩看着同样的显微镜图像，他开始讲解。他抬起头后，我开玩笑说：“你明白为什么他是这个组织的总裁而我不是了吧？”他哈哈大笑起来。
[Noyce] walked over and he stepped in front of me. And I’m the damn lead on the show! He cut my lines. He upstaged me all over the place. He said, “Let me show it to you,” and all of a sudden Noyce’s voice comes on and we’re looking at the same [microscopic] pictures [while] he explains it. After he looked up, I made a crack about, “Do you see why he’s president of the organization and I’m not?” He burst out laughing.
塞洛强调，诺伊斯并非故意抢风头。“他就是这样的人。”42
Sello stressed that Noyce did not deliberately steal the limelight. “That’s just how he was.”42
当汤姆·沃尔夫在《时尚先生》杂志上发表了那篇热情洋溢的文章后，诺伊斯对沃尔夫“几乎完全正确”的描述印象深刻，尽管他们只交谈了几分钟。诺伊斯把文章寄给了他的母亲，母亲立刻写信给她的妯娌们：“ 《太空先锋》的作者汤姆·沃尔夫竟然选择写鲍勃和那颗神奇的芯片。他（鲍勃）占了二十页篇幅，而杰奎琳·肯尼迪·奥纳西斯（在同一期杂志上也有报道）却只占了两页，而且作者平庸至极。”英特尔公司的几位同事为了庆祝沃尔夫文章的发表，特意制作了一份“年度人物图文致敬”。他们把诺伊斯的脸合成到《花花公子》杂志的几张性感照片上，并为每张照片配上了沃尔夫最夸张的几句名言——“他似乎很享受寻找各种新奇的冒险方式”或者“嘿，那是你的屁股”。然后他们把杂志送给了诺伊斯。他非常喜欢这份礼物。43
When Tom Wolfe’s glowing Esquire article appeared, Noyce was impressed that Wolfe “got it pretty much right,” despite having spoken to him only for a few minutes. Noyce sent a copy of the article to his mother, who promptly wrote to her sisters-in-law, “Tom Wolfe of The Right Stuff book chose to write up Bob and the miracle chip. He [Bob] was given twenty pages, and Jackie Onassis [profiled in the same issue] got two pages by another, dull, author.” Several people at Intel honored the publication of the Wolfe article with a “pictorial salute to our man of the year.” They superimposed Noyce’s face on several risqué pictures in Playgirl magazine and captioned every image with one or another of Wolfe’s most histrionic lines—“He seemed to enjoy finding new ways to hang his hide over the edge” or “Hey, it’s your ass.” Then they gave the magazine to Noyce. He loved it.43
对于一个刚刚走出20世纪70年代困境的国家来说，诺伊斯的公众形象尤其引人注目。70年代中期，欧佩克石油禁运及其引发的能源危机之后，紧接着是两位数的通货膨胀，高物价和创纪录的抵押贷款利率使得许多人无力购房。1979年11月，70名美国大使馆雇员在伊朗被劫持为人质，并被扣押了444天。
NOYCE’S PUBLIC IMAGE was particularly compelling for a nation just beginning to emerge from the difficult years of the 1970s. The OPEC oil embargo and ensuing energy crisis in the middle of the decade were followed by double-digit inflation and a combination of high prices and record mortgage rates that put homeownership beyond the means of many. In November 1979, 70 American embassy employees were taken hostage in Iran and held for 444 days.
在这样黯淡的背景下，诺伊斯和硅谷以半导体为基础的高科技经济犹如灯塔般闪耀。当其他行业举步维艰时，1968年至1978年间，全球电子产品销售额以每年15%的速度增长，达到惊人的1400亿美元。一些专家预测，到1988年，销售额将达到5000亿美元。半导体行业的表现更为出色，年增长率估计为18%。1974年至1980年间，150万美国制造业工人失业，旧金山湾区的高科技就业人数增长了77%，其中圣克拉拉县（其边界与硅谷最为接近）在该领域新增了令人瞩目的8.3万个就业岗位。1979年，《圣何塞水星报》的“招聘”栏目刊登了超过60页的技术人员招聘广告。圣克拉拉县的人均个人收入增长率比加州其他地区高出10%以上。44
Against this bleak backdrop, Noyce and the semiconductor-based, high-technology economy of Silicon Valley shone like beacons. While other sectors suffered, worldwide electronics sales increased at an annual rate of 15 percent between 1968 and 1978, to a whopping $140 billion. Some experts predicted sales of $500 billion by 1988. Semiconductors did even better, growing at an estimated 18 percent annual rate. While more than 1.5 million American manufacturing workers lost their jobs, high technology employment in the San Francisco Bay Area grew 77 percent from 1974 to 1980, with Santa Clara County (the county whose boundaries most closely match those of Silicon Valley), gaining an impressive 83,000 jobs in the sector. In 1979, the “help wanted” section of the San Jose Mercury News listed more than 60 pages of advertisements for technical personnel. Per capita personal income growth in Santa Clara County outpaced the rest of California by more than 10 percent.44
据一些统计，硅谷在20世纪70年代创造的百万富翁数量超过了美国历史上任何时期其他任何地方。1975年至1983年间，超过1000家公司在硅谷成立，其中一些公司取得了巨大的成功。1983年，美国证券交易所主席对这些新兴高科技公司充满热情，他告诉《时代》杂志：“如果我们的经济还有希望，那就寄托在这些人身上。他们是周围最具挑战性、最不拘一格的一群人。”45
According to some calculations, Silicon Valley produced more millionaires in the decade of the 1970s than anywhere else in the country at any time in history. Between 1975 and 1983, more than 1,000 companies—some of them fantastically successful—were launched in Silicon Valley. In 1983, the chairman of the American Stock Exchange was excited enough about young high-technology firms that he told Time magazine, “If there is any hope for our economy, it rests with these people. They are the most challenging, irreverent bunch around.”45
董事长的评论发表在《时代》杂志的一期封面上，封面照片是苹果电脑联合创始人史蒂夫·乔布斯的柔焦照片，标题是“致富之道：美国的冒险家”。乔布斯当时26岁，身价近1.5亿美元。他是新一代电子企业家中最引人注目的人物——这些年轻人（虽然是新一代，但男性主导的局面依然不变）创建的公司，其产品都依赖于半导体技术。诺伊斯曾说过，“小型创业者完全依赖于已经建立起来的基础设施……这样他们才能利用这些工具和技术，去做一些专业的事情。” 这句话对苹果电脑来说确实如此，这家公司由与仙童半导体和英特尔有关联的人士投资，员工也大多来自惠普和英特尔。46
The chairman’s comments appeared in an issue of Time whose cover featured a soft-focus picture of Apple Computer co-founder Steve Jobs under the headline, “Striking it Rich: America’s Risk Takers.” Jobs was 26 years old and worth nearly $150 million. He was the most visible member of a new generation of electronics entrepreneurs—young men (a new generation, but the dominance of men remained a constant) building companies whose products relied on semiconductor technology. Noyce once said that “small entrepreneurs depend totally upon the infrastructure that is—has been—established … so that they can use those tools, those techniques, and go off and do something specialized.” This certainly was true of Apple Computer, which was financed by men associated with Fairchild and Intel and staffed with many people from Hewlett-Packard and Intel.46
苹果公司成立于1976年，当时年仅19岁的乔布斯说服了他的朋友史蒂夫·沃兹尼亚克与他共同创业。沃兹尼亚克此前在自家车库里开发了一台个人电脑。两人将电脑展示给风险投资家唐·瓦伦丁（一位前仙童电脑公司的销售员），瓦伦丁建议他们联系迈克·马库拉。马库拉当时年仅34岁，刚刚从英特尔的营销部门退休。马库拉一直梦想着拥有一台类似个人电脑的产品——十几岁时，他就曾制作过一台“可编程电子计算尺”。他向苹果公司投资了9.1万美元，作为交换，他获得了苹果公司三分之一的股份。47
Apple had gotten its start in 1976, when 19-year-old Jobs convinced his friend Steve Wozniak, who had developed a personal computer in his garage, to start a business with him. The two showed their computer to venture capitalist Don Valentine (a former Fairchild salesman), who suggested they contact Mike Markkula, recently retired (at age 34) from his job in Intel’s marketing group. Markkula, who had long dreamed of something like a personal computer—as a teenager, he had built a “programmable electronic sliderule”—invested $91,000 in the company. In exchange, he received a one-third ownership stake in Apple.47
马克库拉代表苹果公司打出的第一个电话就是打给诺伊斯的。“我想让你知道这件事，”马克库拉说，“我想向（英特尔）董事会做个报告。”诺伊斯同意了，到了约定的日子，马克库拉和史蒂夫·沃兹尼亚克就个人电脑做了演示，现场还准备了一台Apple II用于演示。“如果你想以某种方式参与，请告诉我，”马克库拉对董事会说，“如果你不想，也没关系。但是……”这是你应该时刻牢记在心的事情。”自从摩尔扼杀了诺伊斯和格尔巴赫与Altair正面竞争的计划后，英特尔就没怎么考虑过个人电脑市场。董事会礼貌地听着，也问了一些问题，但没有人提出英特尔和苹果之间除了英特尔可能为苹果电脑提供微处理器之外的任何合作关系。“除此之外，其他任何合作都不符合英特尔的最佳利益，”马克库拉承认道。48
One of Markkula’s first calls on behalf of Apple was to Noyce. “I want you to be aware of this,” Markkula said. “I’d like to present to the [Intel] board.” Noyce gave his approval and on the appointed day, Markkula and Steve Wozniak gave a presentation about the personal computer, an Apple II on hand for demonstration purposes. “If you want to participate in this in some way, say so,” Markkula told the board. “If you don’t, fine. But this is something you should have in front of your consciousness.” Intel had not given much thought to the personal computer since Moore squelched Noyce and Gelbach’s plans to go head to head with Altair. The board listened politely and asked a few questions, but no one proposed a relationship between Intel and Apple that went beyond Intel’s possibly providing the microprocessor for Apple Computers. “Nothing else was really in Intel’s best interest,” Markkula acknowledges.48
但亚瑟·洛克认真听取了马克库拉和沃兹尼亚克的演讲。几天后，他打电话到马克库拉的办公室。“我想和他们谈谈，”洛克说。在参加了一个小型电脑爱好者大会后，洛克注意到苹果展位前的人比其他任何展位都多得多，于是决定向该公司投资6万美元。他还拉来了泰莱公司的亨利·辛格尔顿，后者投资了10.8万美元。
But Arthur Rock had paid careful attention to Markkula and Wozniak’s presentation. A few days later, he called Markkula’s office. “I want to talk to these guys,” Rock said. After attending a small computer hobbyists’ convention and noticing many more people crowded around the Apple booth than any other, Rock decided to invest $60,000 in the company. He also brought in Henry Singleton of Teledyne, who invested $108,000.
1977年，负责英特尔公关的雷吉斯·麦肯纳开始与苹果公司合作。他举办了一场派对，其主要目的之一是将当时正在发展咨询业务的安·鲍尔斯介绍给史蒂夫·乔布斯。麦肯纳认为乔布斯需要聘请一位人力资源专家。乔布斯给鲍尔斯留下的印象并不好。他当时22岁，自称是“大学辍学生”，留着稀疏的胡须和长发。他穿着破旧的牛仔裤、T恤、勃肯鞋和晨礼服参加了麦肯纳的晚宴。但他很有趣，鲍尔斯很快就被他所谓的“史蒂夫的所有计划”深深吸引，而她认为其中只有一半勉强可行。显然，这家公司需要她的帮助。她同意为苹果公司提供咨询服务。49
In 1977, Regis McKenna, who handled Intel’s public relations, began working with Apple. He hosted a party, one of whose key objectives was to introduce Ann Bowers, who was building her consulting business, to Steve Jobs, who McKenna thought needed to hire a human-resources expert. Jobs did not make a good impression on Bowers. He was a 22-year-old, self-described “college drop in,” with a stringy beard and long hair. He attended McKenna’s dinner party in scruffy jeans, a t-shirt, Birkenstock sandals, and a morning coat. But he was interesting enough to talk to, and soon Bowers found herself engrossed in what she called “all Steve’s schemes,” only half of which she thought were even remotely feasible. Clearly this was a company that needed her help. She agreed to consult for Apple.49
在担任咨询顾问几个月后，鲍尔斯得知史蒂夫·沃兹尼亚克想以每股13美元的价格出售一些创始人的股份。她从他手中买下了这些股份。“鲍勃觉得我疯了，”她回忆道。诺伊斯并没有阻止她投资——他们很久以前就达成共识，她可以随意支配自己的钱，他也可以——但他无法认真对待乔布斯和沃兹尼亚克。就连亚瑟·洛克也承认，“在那个年代，史蒂夫·乔布斯和史蒂夫·沃兹尼亚克都不是那么讨人喜欢的人。”沃兹尼亚克是电话时代的黑客——他使用一个能发出电子音的小盒子免费拨打全球电话——而史蒂夫·乔布斯不修边幅的外表也让诺伊斯感到反感。诺伊斯本人也曾游离于主流企业之外，他频繁跳槽，并试图让仙童公司的企业文化更加民主化。但即使是敢于在办公室穿衬衫袖子的诺伊斯，开会时也总是西装革履。他恪守礼仪。他一直留着短发，除了泳池边，他从不穿凉鞋。50
A few months into her consulting work, Bowers learned that Steve Wozniak wanted to sell some of his founders’ stock for $13 a share. She bought it from him. “Bob thought I was nuts,” she recalls. Noyce did not try to stop her from investing—they had long ago agreed that she could do what she liked with her money, and he could do the same with his—but he could not take Jobs and Wozniak seriously. Even Arthur Rock admits, “Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak weren’t very appealing people in those days.” Wozniak was the telephone-era’s version of a hacker—he used a small box that emitted electronic tones to call around the world for free—and Steve Jobs’s ungroomed appearance was offputting to Noyce. In his day, Noyce, too, had worked outside the corporate mainstream, with his company hopping and his attempts to democratize Fairchild’s corporate culture. But even Noyce, who had dared to wear shirt sleeves in the office, wore a coat and tie to meetings. He respected protocol. He always had cut his hair short, and he did not wear sandals beyond the pool deck.50
此外，诺伊斯带着一丝嫉妒问鲍尔斯，这家嬉皮士公司凭什么值每股13美元？没错，诺伊斯坚信个人电脑终有一天会成为一个巨大的市场。但他同样也……他确信乔布斯和沃兹尼亚克并非引领苹果市场的合适人选。1978年，鲍尔斯把她的第一台苹果电脑带回家后，这种想法尤为强烈。她和诺伊斯花了周末的大部分时间打电话给迈克·马库拉，试图正确设置电脑。诺伊斯认为，苹果电脑并非那种能够将计算能力带给普通人的突破性技术。
Besides, Noyce asked Bowers with perhaps a touch of jealousy, what made this hippie company worth $13 a share? Yes, Noyce was convinced that personal computers would one day be a huge market. But he was equally convinced that Jobs and Wozniak were not the men to lead that market. This was especially true after Bowers brought home her first Apple in 1978, and she and Noyce spent much of the weekend on the phone to Mike Markkula trying to set it up properly. The Apple machine did not strike Noyce as the groundbreaking technical breakthrough necessary to bring computing power to the common man.
但随着时间的推移，诺伊斯对苹果的看法开始转变。这在很大程度上要归功于史蒂夫·乔布斯，他特意向诺伊斯寻求指导。（乔布斯还询问杰里·桑德斯和安迪·格鲁夫，是否可以每季度请他们吃午饭，“向他们请教”。）鲍尔斯回忆说：“史蒂夫经常骑着摩托车来我们家。很快，他和鲍勃就经常躲进地下室，讨论各种项目。”诺伊斯觉得乔布斯虽然不成熟，但非常聪明，而且很有趣。1979年，诺伊斯邀请乔布斯和他一起乘坐他的“海蜂”飞机——一架二战时期的飞机，可以在水面或陆地上起降。在湖面上降落后，诺伊斯不小心拉错了操纵杆，导致起落架锁死。直到他试图在跑道上降落时，才意识到出了问题。飞机一落地，“海蜂”就向前猛冲，差点翻了个底朝天。乔布斯眼睁睁地看着诺伊斯拼命控制飞机，火花从窗外飞溅，心中越来越恐慌。“当时，”乔布斯回忆说，“我脑海里浮现出这样的新闻标题：‘鲍勃·诺伊斯和史蒂夫·乔布斯在飞机失事中丧生’。多亏他精湛的驾驶技术，我们才得以幸存。真是千钧一发。”51
But over time, Noyce’s feelings about Apple began to change. This was due, in no small measure, to Steve Jobs, who deliberately sought out Noyce as a mentor. (Jobs also asked Jerry Sanders and Andy Grove if he could take them to lunch every quarter and “pick your brain.”) “Steve would regularly appear at our house on his motorcycle,” Bowers recalls. “Soon he and Bob were disappearing into the basement, talking about projects.” Noyce decided Jobs was immature but extremely bright and a lot of fun. In 1979, Noyce invited Jobs to fly with him in his Seabee, a World War II era plane that could land on either water or land. After landing on a lake, Noyce pulled a wrong lever, inadvertently locking the wheels. It was not until he tried to land the plane on a runway that he realized there was a problem. Immediately upon hitting the ground, the Seabee leapt forward and nearly flipped. Jobs watched with mounting panic as Noyce furiously tried to bring the plane under control while sparks shot past the windows. “As this was happening,” Jobs recalls, “I was picturing the headline: ‘Bob Noyce and Steve Jobs Killed in Fiery Plane Crash.’ It was only due to his excellent piloting that we survived. It was really close.”51
鲍尔斯说，诺伊斯对待乔布斯“就像对待孩子一样，但并非居高临下。他允许乔布斯自由出入，在角落里睡觉。我们会给他做饭，带他参加各种活动，甚至带他去阿斯彭滑雪。” 乔布斯的电话总是以“我一直在想你说的话”或“我有个想法”开头，即使是在午夜，诺伊斯也会接听。有一次，他向鲍尔斯吐露心声：“如果他再这么晚打电话来，我就杀了他”，但他仍然接了电话。
Bowers says that Noyce treated Jobs “like a kid, but not in a patronizing way. He would let him come and go, crash in the corner. We would feed him and bring him along to events and to ski in Aspen.” Noyce answered Jobs’s phone calls—which invariably began with “I’ve been thinking about what you said” or “I have an idea”—even when they came at midnight. At some point he confided to Bowers, “If he calls late again, I’m going to kill him,” but still he answered the phone.
乔布斯也认同他与诺伊斯的关系与其说是工作关系，不如说是父子关系。“我对鲍勃的记忆都是些私人的事情，”他说，“我记得他教我滑雪。他对个人电脑非常感兴趣，甚至可以说是着迷，我们经常谈论这个话题。”乔布斯认为“鲍勃是英特尔的灵魂”，他还说，他想“嗅到硅谷第二个辉煌时代的气息，感受半导体公司向计算机领域转型的浪潮”。52
Jobs agrees that his relationship with Noyce was almost more filial than professional. “The things I remember about Bob are the personal things,” he says. “I remember him teaching me how to ski better. And he was very interested in—fascinated by—the personal computer, and we talked a lot about that.” Jobs thought that “Bob was the soul of Intel,” and Jobs wanted, he said, “to smell that second wonderful era of the valley, the semiconductor companies leading into the computer.”52
诺伊斯从这段关系中得到了什么？乔布斯推测道：“苹果可能是硅谷第一家被广泛认为是生活方式公司的企业，第一家生产大众消费品的公司——而我当时才25岁。对鲍勃来说，这有点像‘什么？！这家伙是谁？这是怎么回事？’对他来说有点奇怪。鲍勃可能有点好奇。”
What did Noyce get out of the relationship? Jobs surmises, “Apple was probably the first Silicon Valley company that was widely known as a lifestyle company, the first that made a broad consumer product—and here I was, twenty-five [years old]. And for Bob, it was a bit of ‘What?! Who is this guy? What’s going on here?’ It was just a little strange for him. Bob might have been a little curious.”
苹果公司于1980年12月上市，发行价为每股22美元。此次发行为苹果公司带来了超过1亿美元的资金，大约是英特尔首次公开募股所得资金的14倍。53
Apple went public in December of 1980 at $22 a share. The offering netted Apple more than $100 million, roughly 14 times the proceeds Intel received from its IPO.53
诺伊斯亲眼见证了苹果公司发生的一切。他不仅是乔布斯的导师之一，也是马克库拉的朋友。1980年8月，安·鲍尔斯加入苹果公司，担任人力资源副总裁。苹果公司充满了年轻公司特有的活力和干劲，而这正是诺伊斯所欣赏的。正如马克库拉所说，诺伊斯时不时会“来苹果公司待一会儿，去实验室和同事们聊聊他们的工作进展”。多年后，当诺伊斯在国会作证反对联邦政府推行的“国家产业政策”时，他引用了自己在苹果公司的经历来佐证自己的观点。“如果我都无法预测哪些科技公司会胜出，”他说，“我们又怎能指望美国政府做到呢？”
Noyce had a front-row seat for all that transpired at Apple. Not only was he one of Jobs’s mentors and Markkula’s friends, but in August of 1980, Ann Bowers joined the company as the human resources vice president. Apple burst with the young-company spirit and hunger that Noyce adored, and every once in a while, Noyce would, as Markkula put it, “come over to Apple and just hang around. Go in the lab and talk to the guys about what they were doing.” Years later, when Noyce was testifying before Congress against a “national industrial policy” administered by the federal government, he would refer to his experience with Apple to bolster his point. “If I can’t pick the technological winners,” he said, “how can we expect the U.S. government to do so?”
与苹果公司类似， 20世纪70年代硅谷许多成功的公司都是围绕微电子技术，进而围绕诺伊斯的集成电路技术而建立的。1974年，詹姆斯·特雷比格创办了Tandem Computer公司，该公司通过将16个处理器连接起来并编写程序使其在发生故障时相互备份，制造出近乎万无一失的小型计算机。Tandem的主要投资方是凯鹏华盈（Kleiner Perkins），特雷比格在创办Tandem之前曾在该公司工作。该公司于1980年上市——诺伊斯的经纪人鲍勃·哈灵顿安排员工参与了他当天的股票出售计划——并在三年内实现了10亿美元的账面价值。（该公司于1997年以30亿美元的价格出售给了康柏电脑公司。）54
LIKE APPLE, many of the successful Silicon Valley companies formed in the 1970s were built around microelectronics, and by extension, around Noyce’s integrated circuit. In 1974, James Treybig started Tandem Computer, a company that made nearly fail-safe minicomputers by linking 16 processors and programming them to back each other up in case of failure. Tandem’s primary backer was Kleiner Perkins, where Treybig had worked before starting the company. The company went public in 1980—Noyce’s broker Bob Harrington arranged for employees to participate in his same-day stock-sale program—and within three years had a book value of $1 billion. (It was sold to Compaq computer in 1997 for $3 billion.)54
电子游戏制造商雅达利（Atari）于1972年以500美元起家，短短三年内便跻身美国商界最知名的公司之列。其多款较为复杂的游戏均采用英特尔微处理器运行。雅达利的家用版电子网球游戏《Pong》成为1975年最畅销的圣诞礼物。1976年推出的雅达利2600开启了家用游戏机时代，玩家可以通过购买卡带，将游戏插入连接电视的硬件设备进行游戏。1977年，华纳通讯以2800万美元收购了雅达利。55
Video game maker Atari was started on $500 in 1972 and within three years was among the most recognized names in American business. Several of its more complex games ran on Intel microprocessors. The home version of Atari’s video-tennis game Pong was the bestselling Christmas gift of 1975, and the Atari 2600, introduced in 1976, ushered in the era of video console games, in which a person could purchase any number of games on cartridges that plugged into hardware connected to a television set. In 1977, Warner Communications purchased Atari for $28 million.55
基因泰克（Genentech）是世界上最早的生物技术公司之一，由一位旧金山生物化学家在凯鹏华盈（Kleiner Perkins）一位合伙人的鼓励下于1976年创立。该公司率先在微生物中生产人类蛋白质，也是最早克隆人类胰岛素和人类生长激素的公司之一。1980年基因泰克上市时，市场对其前景极为看好，上市首日短短一小时内，股价就从35美元飙升至88美元。2004年，基因泰克的市值达到570亿美元。56
Genentech, one of the world’s first biotech companies, was started in 1976 by a San Francisco–based biochemist at the urging of a Kleiner Perkins partner. The company was the first to produce a human protein in a microorganism and among the earliest groups to clone human insulin and human growth hormone. The anticipation surrounding Genentech’s public offering in 1980 was so great that in a single hour during the first day of trading, the company’s share price shot from $35 to $88. In 2004, Genentech had a $57 billion market capitalization.56
这些公司在前一代技术进步的基础上发展壮大，同时也充分利用了供应商网络。风险投资家、设备供应商、专业律师事务所和公关公司、代工芯片制造厂（负责制造其他地方设计的芯片）以及过去十年间涌现的众多客户，共同支持着硅谷的高科技创业者。到1983年，圣克拉拉县已有超过3000家小型咨询公司为新公司提供创业方面的专业知识，并在其运营初期提供持续的帮助。许多服务于硅谷高科技创业者的芯片设计师、玻璃吹制工、芯片制造厂和模切工本身也是小型私营企业。这条“供应链”因其对小型企业的支持而备受关注，但它本身也是一种创业现象。57
In the same way that these companies built on the previous generation’s technical advances, they also took advantage of the network of suppliers, venture capitalists, equipment vendors, specialized law and public relations firms, contract fabs (that would build chips designed elsewhere), and customers that had sprung up in the past decade to support high-tech entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley. By 1983, more than 3,000 small consulting firms in Santa Clara County provided new companies with startup expertise and continuing help over the early years of operation. Many of the chip designers, glass blowers, fab houses, and die cutters that catered to Silicon Valley high-tech entrepreneurs were themselves small privately held firms. This “supply chain,” most often mentioned for its support of small companies, is itself an entrepreneurial phenomenon.57
许多在小型高科技公司发家致富的富裕投资者，通过正式的风险投资基金和“天使投资”（例如诺伊斯对小型创业公司的资助或他的卡拉尼什基金投资）——或者诺伊斯在 20 世纪 70 年代加入的 3000 万美元饮酒俱乐部——延续了成功带来成功的循环。58
Wealthy investors, many of whom had made their fortunes at small high-technology companies, perpetuated the success-breeds-success cycle through formal venture capital funds and “angel investments” such as Noyce’s funding of the shoebox startups or his Callanish fund investments—or the $30 million drinking club, which Noyce joined sometime in the 1970s.58
致力于满足周边产业需求的当地教育机构，为硅谷企业补充了人才储备。斯坦福大学、加州大学伯克利分校和圣何塞州立大学等高校培养工程师，并在其商学院开设相关课程。位于洛斯阿尔托斯的福特希尔学院提供半导体加工专业的副学士学位和电子技术员课程。斯坦福大学开发了一项远程学习项目，允许部分当地高科技公司的工程师通过电视修读斯坦福大学的课程并获得学分。59
Local educational institutions committed to meeting the needs of nearby industry helped to replenish the pool of talent from which Silicon Valley firms drew their employees. Universities such as Stanford, Berkeley, and San Jose State trained engineers and offered relevant coursework in their business schools. Foothill College in Los Altos offered an A.S. degree in semiconductor processing and a program for electronics technicians. Stanford developed a distance-learning program that allowed engineers at select local high-tech firms to take Stanford courses, for credit, via television.59
房地产开发商和城市规划者也是创业支持体系的重要组成部分。开发商们正以最快的速度清理硅谷南部的果园，匆忙建造低矮的建筑来容纳新公司。1982 年一项针对硅谷的独立研究指出：“非高科技产业的增长很可能受到经济因素和政策决策的双重抑制。高科技公司将成为争夺最佳地段的强劲对手。电子行业的声望和‘干净’的形象在很多情况下会对规划和分区决策产生积极影响。”到了 20 世纪 80 年代中期，安迪·格鲁夫将硅谷称为一台“商业机器”，暗示该地区生产公司的速度就像英特尔生产芯片一样。60
Real estate developers and city planners also formed an important part of the entrepreneurial support system. Developers were clearing orchards south down the Valley as fast as they could, hurriedly constructing low-slung buildings to house new companies. “It is likely that [non-high-tech] growth will be inhibited by both economic factors and policy decisions. High technology firms will be strong competitors for the best available sites,” noted an independent study of the Valley in 1982. “The prestige and ‘clean’ image of the electronics industry will favorably influence planning and zoning decisions in many cases.” By the mid-1980s, Andy Grove was calling Silicon Valley a “business machine,” implying that the region churned out companies the way that Intel churned out chips.60
分区规划、风险投资公司和课程设置——尽管它们看似毫不相干——却都基于硅谷一个共同的假设：高科技创业是确保个人和区域活力的最佳途径。桑德希尔路上的风险投资家、在车库里创业或在矮隔间里策划转型的创业者、市政厅的规划者以及在课程选择中挑选方向的学生，都基于这样一种信念做出决策：成功的循环将会持续下去。为了使自身得以延续，创新才能持续涌现，市场才能不断发展壮大。
Zoning laws, venture capital companies, and course offerings—unrelated as they may seem—were predicated on a common assumption in Silicon Valley: that high-tech entrepreneurship was the best way to assure personal and regional vitality. Venture capitalists on Sand Hill Road, entrepreneurs in their garages or plotting defections in their low-walled cubicles, planners in City Hall, and students picking their way through course offerings made decisions based on a faith that the cycle of success would continue to perpetuate itself, that the innovations would continue to flow and the markets to develop and grow.
这一假设的核心在于企业家。正如诺伊斯曾经说过的那样：“环顾硅谷，看看谁才是真正的英雄。他们不是律师，甚至也不是金融家。他们是那些创办公司的人。” 如果没有对企业家会持续成功的坚定信念，硅谷将无法运转。61
At the heart of this assumption stands the entrepreneur. As Noyce once put it, “Look around Silicon Valley and see who the heroes are. They aren’t lawyers, nor are they even so much the financiers. They’re the guys who start companies.” Silicon Valley could not function without the abiding faith that entrepreneurs will continue to succeed.61
对许多人来说，诺伊斯是故事的核心人物，堪称创业典范。他的经济成功直接惠及了他所投资的公司，而诺伊斯的成功故事也间接地激励了更多人。一位企业家这样说道：“我们为什么如此热爱这种充满活力的环境？我来告诉你为什么。因为我们亲眼见证了史蒂夫·乔布斯、鲍勃·诺伊斯、诺兰·布什内尔（雅达利创始人）以及其他许多人的成就，我们知道这样的故事能够也必将再次上演。”换句话说，如果他们能做到，他为什么不能？这种逻辑在硅谷形成了一种自我实现的预言，推动着该地区在创业和财富的良性循环中不断前行。62
And for many, Noyce was the paradigmatic entrepreneur at the center of the story. His financial success directly benefited the entrepreneurs whose companies he funded, but the stories about Noyce’s success indirectly inspired many more. One entrepreneur put it this way: “Why do we love this dynamic environment? I’ll tell you why. Because we have seen what Steve Jobs, Bob Noyce, Nolan Bushnell [founder of Atari], and many others have done, and we know it can and will happen many times again.” In other words, if they could do it, why couldn’t he? Such rationale functioned as a self-fulfilling prophecy in Silicon Valley, propelling the region forward on a self-perpetuating cycle of entrepreneurship and wealth.62
诺伊斯曾欣喜地解释说，半导体行业“所有性能都同时提升，没有任何取舍。随着器件尺寸的缩小，它们的速度也更快，功耗更低，可靠性更高，而且单位功能的生产成本也更低。” 他说，这个行业“简直违背了墨菲定律”。的确，在20世纪70年代末硅谷的繁荣时期，老牌半导体公司蓬勃发展。查理·斯波克的国家半导体公司1979年的利润为3400万美元，是1975年的两倍多。在杰里·桑德斯的AMD公司（诺伊斯曾投入少量启动资金），同期利润增长了十倍，达到1100万美元。到70年代末，美国排名前12位的半导体公司占据了全球80%的市场份额。63
Noyce once happily explained that with semiconductors, “Everything gets better simultaneously, without any tradeoffs. As they get smaller, devices also get faster, use less power, are more reliable, and cost less per function to produce.” The industry, he said, was “a violation of Murphy’s Law.” To be sure, established semiconductor companies flourished in the late 1970s boom in Silicon Valley. Profits at Charlie Sporck’s National Semiconductor were $34 million in 1979—more than double its 1975 performance. At AMD, Jerry Sanders’ operation in which Noyce had invested a small bit of seed money, profits grew tenfold over the same period, to $11 million. At the end of the decade, the top 12 American semiconductor firms claimed 80 percent of the world market.63
英特尔的增长最为惊人。1979年，公司利润高达7800万美元，是1975年的四倍，几乎是1972年的40倍。自1976年以来，该公司一直是全球最大的半导体存储元件供应商。1973年至1979年间，英特尔的股票进行了五次拆股。1978年，公司在旧金山牛宫举办了一场盛大的十周年庆典，庆典上设有赌场（提供虚拟货币）和两个迪斯科舞厅。庆典的高潮是宣布英特尔将向每位员工发放股票，每服务一年即可获得一股。这意味着公司共向员工发放了超过1万股股票，总价值超过56万美元。64
Intel’s growth was most dramatic of all. In 1979, the company’s profits were $78 million, quadruple the 1975 performance and nearly 40 times 1972 profits. The company had been the largest supplier of semiconductor memory components in the world since 1976. The stock had split five times between 1973 and 1979. The company celebrated its tenth anniversary in 1978 with an extravagant party at San Francisco’s Cow Palace that included a casino with play money and two discotheques. The highlight of the festivities was the announcement that Intel would give every one of its employees one share of stock for every year of service. This amounted to a distribution of more than 10,000 shares with a combined value that surpassed $560,000.64
1979年5月，英特尔首次跻身《财富》 500强，排名第486位。到那时，诺伊斯在1968年公司创立之初投资的每一美元都价值600美元。他当年以24.5万美元购入的股票，11年后，价值已达1.47亿美元。
In May 1979, Intel debuted on the Fortune 500 at number 486. By this time, every dollar that Noyce invested when the company began in 1968 was worth $600. The stock he had bought at the founding for $245,000 was now, 11 years later, worth $147 million.
20世纪70年代末，英特尔、苹果和Tandem Computers等公司取得的辉煌成就频频见诸报端，硅谷由此成为创新、富裕、大胆、成功且引领世界的美国的象征也就不足为奇了。此前，在70年代中期那段艰难时期，一些人曾担心这种美国精神会永远消失。事实上，许多报道将硅谷描绘成美国梦中最理想的“美国”之地——充满传奇色彩的西部——的重生，那里是自由和坚韧不拔的个人主义的发源地。许多报道称硅谷的创业者为“牛仔”和“先驱”。这些人开辟了一片新天地，在那里建立起人人平等、反官僚主义的公司，正如一个世纪前的美国人为了逃离僵化的东部文化而奔赴边疆一样。诺伊斯本人也用同样的语言来描述大规模整合，他将之比作“一片广袤肥沃的平原……几乎还是一片处女地……如今虽已不如往昔葱郁，但仍能养活一大群牲畜。”一位圣克拉拉县果园主的女儿（在她那本颇具深意的书《逝去的农场，永恒的价值》中）写道，尽管旧西部时代已然远去，但它的精神却在像鲍勃·诺伊斯这样的人身上得以延续。“部分要归功于诺伊斯，如今的圣克拉拉县才以其平等主义的管理方式而闻名，”她写道。“他被认为是新企业文化的标志——敞开的衬衫、休闲的着装、直呼其名的交流——的奠基人。他还帮助员工找到了成为所有者的途径，就像过去的农场工人最终成为拥有土地的农民一样。”65
With stories about spectacular successes at Intel, Apple, and Tandem Computers crossing the media wires at the end of the 1970s, it is no wonder that Silicon Valley came to represent an innovative, wealthy, daring, successful, world-leading America that some had begun to fear might have disappeared forever in the difficult middle years of the decade. Indeed, stories cast the region as a reincarnation of the most “American” place imaginable, the mythic West, legendary birthplace of freedom and rugged individualism. Many accounts called Silicon Valley entrepreneurs “cow-boys” and “pioneers.” These men had staked out new territory where they could build egalitarian, antibureaucratic companies in the same way that Americans a century earlier had headed to the frontier to escape the confines of a stultified Eastern culture. Noyce himself used the same vernacular when he described large-scale integration as “a broad and fertile plain,… more or less virgin territory … less verdant today, but it will support a large herd still.” The daughter of a displaced Santa Clara County orchardist wrote (in a rather poignantly titled book Passing Farms, Enduring Values) that although the Old West was gone, its spirit endured in men like Bob Noyce. “Thanks, in part, to Noyce, today’s Santa Clara County has a reputation for egalitarian management,” she wrote. “He has been credited with establishing the style that is the hallmark of the new corporate culture: open shirts, casual clothes, interaction on a first-name basis. He has also helped to show the way for employees to become owners very much as farm laborers used to become landed farmers.”65
1983年，里根总统在国情咨文中经常用美国西部的意象来象征自由、独立和小政府，他赞扬了硅谷的“未来先驱”：“正如美国的开拓精神使我们成为20世纪的工业巨头一样，如今，同样的开拓精神正在另一个广阔的机遇领域——高科技领域——开辟新的天地。”一周后，诺伊斯在华盛顿特区举行的高科技公共政策会议上发表讲话时引用了里根的话，并补充道：“我真希望这话是我说的。”66
In his 1983 State of the Union address, President Reagan, who regularly used images of the American West as shorthand for freedom, independence, and small government, praised Silicon Valley’s “pioneers of tomorrow”: “Surely as America’s pioneer spirit made us the industrial giant of the 20th century, the same pioneer spirit today is opening up on another vast front of opportunity, the frontier of high technology.” A week later, in a speech before a Washington, D.C. conference on high-technology public policy, Noyce quoted Reagan and added, “I wish I’d said that.”66
11
政治创业
11
Political Entrepreneurship
到1979年底，英特尔的员工人数是诺伊斯成长地——爱荷华州格林内尔镇——人口的两倍。公司在七个国家拥有十几个主要工厂，销售办事处的数量也大约是工厂数量的两倍。如此迅猛的发展促使诺伊斯、摩尔和格鲁夫决定再次调整他们在英特尔的职位。摩尔担任的总裁兼首席执行官一职将被拆分。格鲁夫将出任总裁，摩尔将继续担任首席执行官，同时兼任董事会主席，而诺伊斯将卸任董事长一职，转任公司副董事长。实际上，这意味着格鲁夫将与摩尔密切合作，共同管理公司。1
By the end of 1979, Intel employed twice as many people as lived in Grinnell, Iowa, when Noyce was growing up. The company had a dozen major facilities in seven countries and roughly twice that number of sales offices. The dramatic growth led Noyce, Moore, and Grove to decide they would again shuffle jobs and assume new positions at Intel. The president/CEO job occupied by Moore would be split. Grove would become president, Moore would retain the title of CEO but also serve as board chair, and Noyce would leave the chairmanship to become vice-chairman of the corporation. In effect, this meant that Grove would run the company with Moore in close consultation.1
这第二轮管理层人事变动对诺伊斯意义重大，因为这是他第一次失去在英特尔的正式领导职位。作为创始人之一，他始终在公司内部拥有一定的影响力。每当英特尔需要接触重要客户的高层管理人员或促成一笔特别重要的交易时，他仍然会被请来帮忙。例如，1985年，他曾向IBM做推介，力图说服该公司在其个人电脑中使用英特尔最新的微处理器。但作为副董事长，诺伊斯不再觉得自己有义务——或者说有权——像他自己所说的那样“看管公司”。2
This second round of management musical chairs was significant for Noyce because it left him, for the first time, without an official leadership role at Intel. His status as a founder would always give him some measure of special influence within the company. He would still be brought in when Intel needed to access a high-level executive at a key account or to close a particularly important deal. In 1985, for example, he presented to IBM as part of an effort to convince the company to use Intel’s newest microprocessor in its personal computer. But as vice-chairman, Noyce no longer felt obligated—or entitled—to “watch the store,” as he put it.2
随着诺伊斯升任副董事长，他以英特尔为中心的职业生涯阶段实际上宣告结束。整个20世纪80年代，他待在英特尔的时间少得可怜——据他以前的秘书估计，他每周最多去两次——以至于1983年愚人节，公司通讯刊登了一篇题为“罕见的鲍勃·诺伊斯现身”的文章。此时，诺伊斯的离婚以及他出售部分英特尔股份用于收购或支持初创公司的决定，使得他持有的股份不到联合创始人戈登·摩尔的一半，而摩尔出售的股份寥寥无几。在1988年公司盛大的二十周年庆典上（英特尔为此聘请了一个由50人组成的专业舞台剧团，表演了一场90分钟的音乐致敬演出），在英特尔公司，安迪·格鲁夫被誉为公司的“三位创始人”之一，而诺伊斯在令人叹为观止的“格鲁夫、诺伊斯和摩尔”表演中却被略显逊色地称为“物理学家”，摩尔被称为“董事长”，格鲁夫被称为“总裁”。在1979年之后的某些英特尔年度报告中，诺伊斯的名字只出现在最后一页的董事名单中。大约在同一时期，诺伊斯私下承认：“要从舞台上下来真是太难了。”3
With the move to vice-chair, the Intel-centered phase of Noyce’s career effectively ended. Throughout the 1980s, he spent so little time at Intel—his one-time secretary estimates he was there no more than twice a week—that an April Fool’s edition of the company newsletter ran an article in 1983 under the headline, “Rare Bob Noyce Sighting Reported.” By this time, Noyce’s divorce and his decisions to sell some of his Intel holdings either to make purchases or to support startup companies had left him with less than half the amount of stock than was owned by his co-founder Gordon Moore, who had sold very little. At the company’s blowout twentieth anniversary celebration in 1988 (for which Intel hired a professional stage troupe of 50 people to perform a 90-minute musical tribute to the company), Andy Grove was celebrated as one of the company’s “three founders,” while Noyce was referred to rather lamely as “the physicist” in the showstopping “Grove, Noyce, and Moore” number that called Moore “the chairman” and Grove “the president.” In some Intel annual reports after 1979, Noyce’s name appears only in the list of directors on the last page. Around this time Noyce privately admitted, “It’s so hard to get off the stage.”3
1980年，诺伊斯为庆祝一位朋友四十岁生日而作的一首诗清楚地表明，他一直在纠结自己随着年龄增长可能会变得无关紧要。“现在是唯一存在的时候，”他略显生硬地写信给他的朋友，这位朋友的昵称是布金。
A poem he composed in honor of a friend’s fortieth birthday in 1980 makes it clear that Noyce wrestled with the possibility that he might grow irrelevant as he aged. “Now’s the only time to be,” he wrote rather stiltedly to his friend, whose nickname was Bougin:
亲爱的布真，时候总会来的。
Time should come, my dear Bougin
至少对那些凡人来说是这样。
At least for those mortal men
活出自己的年龄，那一天就过去了。
To act one’s age, and gone’s the day
停下来买“Chip chip hooray”。
One stops to get “Chip chip hooray.”
为未来储蓄
Saving for advancing years,
大声压制住内心的恐惧
Shouting down the gnawing fears
错过了地球上的某些东西
Of missing something here on earth
因为时间越来越紧迫。
Because of time’s increasing dearth.
[…]
[…]
挑战陡峭的雪坡
Challange [sic] snowy slopes so steep
潜入深海的波涛之中
Plunge through the waves of ocean deep
有氧舞蹈，并击球
Aerobic dance, and hit the ball
乘飞机环游世界，饱览美景。
Jet the world and see it all.
世界本该如此衰老。
This is the way the world should age
世界本该如此衰老。
This is the way the world should age
世界本该如此衰老
THIS IS THE WAY THE WORLD SHOULD AGE
一声巨响，而非一声呜咽。4
Just with a BANG, not a whimper.4
诺伊斯决心“轰轰烈烈地”谢幕，卸任英特尔董事长一职后，他为自己搭建了一个全新的舞台。20世纪70年代末，他的职业生涯进入了一个新阶段——不再为任何一家公司效力，而是投身于整个行业。在这些年以及整个80年代，美国半导体行业的全球霸主地位首次受到挑战，几乎被推翻。挑战者是日本公司，而领导美国应对挑战则成为诺伊斯毕生工作的重心。
Determined to age “with a BANG,” Noyce built himself a new stage when he stepped down from the Intel chairmanship. The late 1970s marked the opening of a new phase of his career—one spent not in the service of any specific company, but in the service of the industry itself. During these years, and throughout the 1980s, the American semiconductor industry found its worldwide supremacy challenged—and nearly toppled—for the first time. The challengers were Japanese firms, and leading the American response became the defining animus of Noyce’s work.
几十年来，美国半导体公司之间一直维持着合作与竞争之间脆弱的平衡。业内许多首席执行官都曾共同担任行业协会WEMA半导体小组的执行委员会成员，而诺伊斯正是该小组的主席。其他人曾在仙童公司共事，也曾为诺伊斯效力。当他们离开仙童公司去经营竞争对手公司时，他们互相挖走对方的员工，抄袭对方的产品，偶尔还会互相起诉，但这种竞争很大程度上类似于兄弟之间那种短暂的竞争，他们并肩成长为职业精英，共同积累了财富和影响力。
For decades, American semiconductor companies had sustained among themselves a tenuous balance between cooperation and competition. Many of the CEOs in the industry served together on the executive board of trade association WEMA’s semiconductor group, which Noyce chaired. Others had worked together—and for Noyce—at Fairchild. When they left Fairchild to run competitor firms, they stole each others’ employees, copied each others’ products, and occasionally sued each other, but much of this aggression was akin to flashes of sibling rivalry among brothers who had come of professional age side by side and had grown wealthy and influential together.
美国半导体行业的亲密关系在1971年被一个自嘲式的短剧恶搞了一番。这个名为“哦，说，集成电路怎么样？”的节目以一首“友谊终曲”结尾，斯波克、桑德斯、诺伊斯以及来自德州仪器、摩托罗拉、Signetics和Intersil的高管（或许是扮演这些高管的演员）唱着歌，歌颂他们彼此的支持——“如果你赔光了钱，我会很伤心”——以及他们之间的“友谊，友谊，真是天作之合”。当然，这些唱歌的高管们都希望自己的公司能胜过其他公司——而且每个人都竭尽所能确保胜利。但他们都可以感到欣慰的是，即使自己的公司在某个时期不是世界第一，至少他们兄弟的公司中也有一家是。5
The chumminess of the American semiconductor industry was the subject of a self-parodying skit in 1971. The show, called “Oh Say, Can I.C.?,” concluded with a “Friendship Finale” that featured Sporck, Sanders, Noyce, and executives from Texas Instruments, Motorola, Signetics, and Intersil (or perhaps actors playing these executives) singing about their support for each other—“If you ever lose your shirt, I’ll be hurt”—and their “friendship, friendship, just a perfect blendship.” Every one of these singing executives, of course, wanted his company to beat the others—and each did what he could to ensure his triumph. But they all could take comfort in knowing that if their company was not number one in the world at any given time, at least one of their brothers’ firms was.5
这一切在20世纪70年代末发生了改变，当时日本半导体公司开始销售价格更低、质量至少与美国产品相当的芯片。在日本芯片进入美国市场的同时，庞大且不断增长的日本市场几乎完全禁止进口，这意味着美国公司无法通过在竞争对手的地盘上销售来弥补损失。日本芯片的出现提高了美国公司面临的风险。突然之间，失败的后果比以往任何时候都更加严重。例如，1974年，美国公司几乎满足了全球对4K DRAM（内存芯片）的所有需求。但到了1979年，下一代（16K）芯片35%的市场份额来自日本公司，三年后，日本在DRAM市场的份额超过了美国。兄弟公司引领世界已不再是理所当然的事情。6
This all changed in the late 1970s, when Japanese semiconductor firms began selling chips that were less expensive and at least as high-quality as American devices. At the same time that the Japanese chips were being sold in the United States, the large and ever-growing Japanese market was almost completely closed to imports, which meant that American firms could not attempt to make up their losses by selling in their rivals’ territory. The appearance of competitive Japanese chips raised the stakes for American firms. Suddenly the consequences of not winning were much higher than they had ever been. In 1974, for example, American firms had supplied nearly all of the world’s demand for 4K DRAMs (memory chips). But by 1979, 35 percent of the next generation (16K) chip was supplied by Japanese firms, and three years later, the Japanese share of the DRAM market surpassed that of the United States. It was no longer a given that one’s brother firm would lead the world.6
诺伊斯和他的半导体行业同行们担心，DRAM市场损失的连锁反应可能会威胁到整个美国半导体产业。DRAM是业内所谓的“技术驱动力”——一种相对简单的芯片，产量巨大，使制造商能够磨练技术，并将这些技术应用于更复杂设备的生产。换句话说，1979年美国人生产的16K DRAM芯片数量减少，意味着1981年其他利润更高的芯片的生产效率也会降低。“占领16K市场就像占领山顶，”AMD创始人杰里·桑德斯解释说，“一旦占领了山顶，你只需要向下射击即可。”7
Noyce and his fellow semiconductor executives worried that ripple effects from losses in the DRAM market could threaten the entire American industry. The DRAM was what the industry called a “technology driver”—a relatively simple chip produced in such large quantities that it enabled the manufacturers to hone skills that they could then apply to the production of more complex devices. In other words, fewer 16K DRAM chips produced by Americans in 1979 would mean less efficient production of other, more profitable chips in 1981. “Capturing the 16K market is like taking the top of a hill,” explained AMD founder Jerry Sanders. “Once you have it, all you have to do is shoot down.”7
美国其他行业的从业者已经付出了惨痛的代价，才明白千万不要低估日本人。尽管“日本制造”……二战后，日本曾一度以做工粗糙著称，但如今却已发展成为世界一流的制造商和商业领袖。到1985年，日本钢铁公司的产量超过了美国钢铁公司，而日本第一银行也成为了全球最大的银行。日本电视机将美国产品挤出了市场。美国对日本的贸易逆差飙升至407亿美元——几乎是十年前的40倍。20世纪80年代末，68%的美国人认为日本是美国未来面临的最大威胁。8
Americans in other industries had learned in the most painful way possible not to underestimate the Japanese. Although “made in Japan” was once synonymous with shoddy workmanship, after World War II, the Japanese had developed into world-class manufacturers and business leaders. By 1985, Nippon Steel outproduced U.S. Steel, and a Japanese bank (Dai-Ichi Kangyo) was the world’s largest. Japanese televisions had driven American products out of the market. America’s trade deficit with the island nation ballooned to $40.7 billion—almost 40 times the deficit just one decade earlier. As the 1980s drew to a close, 68 percent of Americans named Japan as the number one threat to the nation’s future.8
早在1978年，诺伊斯就警告说，历史学家或许有一天会注意到，“美国不仅开创并培育了一个充满活力的半导体产业，而且还像失去钢铁产业和电视市场一样，将其拱手让给了外国竞争对手。” 仅在之前的八年里，就有19家美国半导体公司被外国投资者部分或全部收购。9
As early as 1978, Noyce was warning that historians might someday note that “in addition to originating and nurturing a vibrant semiconductor industry, the United States also lost it—the same way we have lost the steel industry and the TV market—to foreign competition.” In just the previous eight years, 19 United States semiconductor firms had been partially or entirely purchased by foreign investors.9
诺伊斯一想到自己一手创立的产业可能很快会在美国消亡，就怒不可遏。他当然不是种族主义者——他曾力主放宽移民法，赞扬“来自印度和东方等地的杰出人才对高科技做出的重大贡献”，而且他对欧洲半导体公司的批评，在欧洲拥有保护市场时期，与他对日本公司的批评一样严厉——但他对日本人的评论却充满了反常的种族歧视和夸张言辞。他曾对《财富》杂志说，日本人“想割断我们的喉咙”，他后来承认，这番言论让他“差点被赶出日本”。他还警告说，“在空手道劈砍落地之前就应该出手格挡”。当一位日本半导体公司高管将美国公司称为“精品半导体公司”（暗示日本公司效率更高）时，诺伊斯开始对他大吼大叫——这对于一个素来羞于与人发生冲突、绰号“和蔼博士”的人来说，实属罕见。后来，诺伊斯的一个朋友开玩笑地做了一个蛋糕，上面贴满了日本国旗，诺伊斯却掏出打火机，把所有国旗都烧掉了。10
The prospect that the industry he had helped to launch might soon die on American shores absolutely infuriated Noyce. He certainly was not a racist—he pushed for eased immigration laws, praised the “brilliant minds from places like India and the Orient which have made such major contributions to high technology,” and had been as harsh in his criticism of European semiconductor firms when Europe had a protected market as he was of the Japanese—but his comments about the Japanese could be spiked with uncharacteristic racial nastiness and hyperbole. He told Fortune magazine that the Japanese were “out to slit our throats,” a comment that he later admitted got him “almost thrown out of Japan,” and he warned that “the time to throw up a block to a karate chop is before it lands.” When a Japanese semiconductor executive referred to United States firms as “boutique semiconductor companies” (thus implying that Japanese firms were more efficient manufacturers), Noyce started yelling at him—highly unusual behavior for a man so shy of confrontation that his nickname was “Dr. Nice.” When as a joke, one of Noyce’s friends made him a cake covered with paper Japanese flags, Noyce pulled out his cigarette lighter and burned every one of them.10
他的感受并非孤例。1977年，诺伊斯、仙童半导体总裁威尔弗雷德·科里根、AMD总裁杰里·桑德斯、美国国家半导体公司总裁查理·斯波克以及摩托罗拉副总裁约翰·韦尔蒂决定联手应对行业面临的威胁。这五人中，有三人曾在仙童半导体共事，彼此相识近十年。他们共同创立了半导体产业协会（SIA），旨在利用业界的合作精神和创新思维，服务于一位创始人所说的SIA的“核心任务”：“减缓日本政府扶持本国产业的步伐，加快我国政府扶持本国产业的步伐。”11
He was not alone in his feelings. In 1977, Noyce, Fairchild president Wilfred Corrigan, AMD president Jerry Sanders, National Semiconductor president Charlie Sporck, and Motorola vice president John Welty decided to join forces to counter the threat to their industry. Three of these men had worked together at Fairchild, and all five had known each other for nearly a decade. This group founded the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) with plans to harness the industry’s cooperative spirit and innovative thinking in the service of what one founder described as the SIA’s “essential task”: “slow down what the Japanese government is doing in support of its industry, and speed up what our government [is doing].”11
两国政府的做法确实截然不同。美国对促进商业发展采取了相当自由放任的态度，而自20世纪50年代中期以来一直执政的日本自民党则积极扶持本国工业部门。这意味着进口原材料（日本几乎没有原材料），并出口用这些原材料制造的高附加值成品。
The two governments’ approaches were indeed quite different. Where the Americans had taken a fairly laissez-faire approach to fostering business development, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, which had governed the island nation since the mid-1950s, actively fostered the country’s industrial sector. This meant importing raw materials—Japan had almost none—and exporting high-value-added finished products manufactured from those materials.
直到1980年，日本通商产业省（MITI）一直拥有颁发进出口许可证的专属权力。在20世纪50年代和60年代，通商产业省重点扶持汽车和钢铁两大出口产业。政府向这些行业的企业提供低息贷款，并制定国家政策，将原有的外国竞争对手（通常是欧美企业）排除在日本国内的汽车和钢铁市场之外。这种政府主导的保护和扶持政策使目标产业得以蓬勃发展，并最终挑战了曾经被排除在日本市场之外的欧美竞争对手。随着钢铁和汽车产业在20世纪70年代的崛起，日本政府运用许多相同的政策扶持消费电子产品及其背后的半导体技术。
Until 1980, Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) held exclusive power to grant import and export licenses. In the 1950s and 1960s, MITI focused on two export industries: automobiles and steel. The government offered companies in these industries low-interest loans and developed national policies to shut established foreign (usually European and American) competitors out of the domestic Japanese auto and steel markets. This government-sponsored protection and support enabled the target industries to prosper, and eventually, to challenge the very European and American competitors once excluded from the Japanese market. As the steel and automobile industries strengthened in the 1970s, the Japanese government used many of the same policies to support consumer electronics and the semiconductors that made them work.
部分原因是由于两国政府政策的不同，日本和美国的半导体产业结构截然不同。20世纪80年代典型的硅谷半导体公司是独立的“商业”生产商，它们为终端用户而非自身生产芯片（尽管德州仪器、IBM和摩托罗拉都是垂直整合的公司）。商业公司通常起步于创业项目；依赖于持续的技术创新和大规模生产；在20世纪80年代之前，它们一直认为政府的恰当角色是财力雄厚的积极客户。
Partially as a result of their governments’ approaches, the Japanese and American semiconductor industries were structurally quite different from each other. The prototypical Silicon Valley semiconductor firm in the 1980s was the independent, “merchant” producer, which manufactured chips for end users other than itself (although Texas Instruments, IBM, and Motorola were vertically integrated companies). Merchant companies often got their start as entrepreneurial ventures; depended on continuous technological innovation and mass production; and before the 1980s, had traditionally regarded the government’s proper role to be that of an eager customer with very deep pockets.
与此模式截然不同的是，日本半导体产业由六家庞大的垂直整合电子公司（日本电气、富士通、日立、东芝、三菱电机和冲绳电气工业）组成，这些公司是在政府的直接扶持下发展起来的，其明确目的是为了发展日本的高科技产业。这些公司不仅生产芯片，还生产使用这些芯片的电子设备，例如计算机或录像机。事实上，1979年，这些公司的总收入中只有7%来自半导体销售。12
In sharp contrast to this model, the Japanese semiconductor industry consisted of six huge, vertically integrated electronics firms (Nippon Electric, Fujitsu, Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric, and Oki Electric Industry), which had been developed with direct assistance from the government for the express purpose of growing Japan’s high-technology sector. These firms manufactured not only chips, but also the electronic equipment—such as computers or VCRs—that used the chips. In fact, in 1979, only 7 percent of the companies’ combined revenues were derived from semiconductor sales.12
日本政府给予这些半导体公司大量优惠，对来自竞争对手的外国进口产品实施严格限制，补贴和组织国家研究项目，制定旨在引导优秀学生进入相关领域的计划。例如，政府允许灵活运用反垄断法，并给予电子行业相应的优惠政策。同样重要的是，此类政府举措向日本银行业发出了明确的信号。许多日本银行的董事同时也是电子公司的董事，这些银行愿意向这些明显受到“优待”的行业公司提供贷款，尽管这些公司的负债率按美国标准来看简直高得惊人。因此，日本半导体公司比美国公司更容易获得资金。13
The Japanese government conferred substantial benefits on these semiconductor firms, imposing tight restrictions on foreign imports from competing manufacturers, subsidizing and organizing national research projects, developing programs designed to funnel talented students into fields such as engineering, and permitting a flexible application of antitrust laws. Equally important was the signal that such government actions sent to the Japanese banking community. Japanese banks, many of whose directors also served on the boards of the electronics companies, were willing to make loans to companies in such clearly “favored industries,” despite the firms’ debt ratios, which would have been considered astronomical by American standards. As a result, Japanese semiconductor firms found it much easier to obtain capital than did American companies.13
资金获取渠道的差异促使半导体行业协会（SIA）发起了第一次大规模的游说活动。1978年2月，SIA贸易政策委员会主席、后来担任该协会董事会主席的诺伊斯代表SIA前往华盛顿特区，在美国参议院小企业委员会作证，呼吁降低资本利得税。当时的资本利得税税率高达49%。由于近一半的资本利得都归联邦政府所有，这导致风险投资普遍萎缩，而可用资金的减少使得美国高科技企业相对于日本企业处于竞争劣势。包括邀请诺伊斯作证的美国电子协会（前身为WEMA）在内的许多其他商业团体，也出于各自的原因希望降低资本利得税，并积极游说政府减税。
The difference in access to capital launched the Semiconductor Industry Association’s first serious lobbying push. In February of 1978, Noyce, who headed the SIA’s Trade Policy committee and would serve as chair of the organization’s board, traveled to Washington, D.C. on behalf of the SIA to testify before a United States Senate Committee on Small Business about the need to lower the capital gains tax, which stood at 49 percent in 1978. The fact that nearly half of any capital gains would go to the federal government had contributed to a general drying up of venture capital, and less available capital put American high-tech businesses at a competitive disadvantage relative to the Japanese. Many other business groups—including the American Electronics Association (formerly WEMA), which had invited Noyce to testify—had their own reasons for wanting the capital gains tax lowered and vigorously lobbied for a reduction.
他们的努力最终获得了回报。1978年底，卡特政府将资本利得税降至28%。较低的资本利得税，加上几乎同时出台的放宽“谨慎人”规则（该规则曾限制养老基金投资风险投资的能力），产生了显著的效果。据估计，在政策调整后的18个月内，流入专业管理的风险投资公司的资金每年从5000万美元飙升至近10亿美元。14
Their efforts paid off. At the end of 1978, the Carter administration reduced the tax to 28 percent. The lower capital gains tax—coupled with nearly contemporaneous changes easing the “prudent man” rules that had restricted pension funds’ abilities to invest with venture capitalists—had dramatic effects. By one estimate, within 18 months of the changes, the amount of money flowing into professionally managed venture capital companies each year shot from $50 million to nearly $1 billion.14
但美国半导体产业相对于日本的衰落并未放缓。事实上，正如美国半导体行业协会（SIA）所担心的那样，美国在全球半导体市场的份额，除了DRAM之外，也开始在其他领域下滑。日本厂商开始大幅降价，以至于习惯于每年降价约30%的英特尔，被迫在短短18个月内将其曾经的摇钱树——16K EPROM的价格下调了90%。美国业界确信，日本厂商正在向美国市场“倾销”芯片——以远低于生产成本的价格出售——然后计划在站稳脚跟后提高价格。形势严峻，英特尔不得不裁员2000人，并在1982年允许IBM以2.5亿美元的价格收购其12%的股份。其他公司也遭受了损失。从1981年到1982年，AMD的净利润下降了三分之二，而National半导体业务的年利润从 5200 万美元转为亏损 1100 万美元。大约在同一时期，诺伊斯在一次 SIA 会议上提出“带领大家祈祷”。15
But the decline of the American semiconductor industry relative to the Japanese did not slow. Indeed, just as the SIA had feared, the American share of the worldwide semiconductor market began to slip in areas other than DRAMs. The Japanese began cutting prices so dramatically that Intel, accustomed to dropping prices approximately 30 percent every year, found itself forced to cut the price of its 16K EPROM, once the company’s cash cow, by 90 percent in just 18 months. The American industry was convinced that the Japanese were “dumping” their chips on the American market—selling them well below the cost of production—and then planning to raise prices once their foothold in the American market was established. The situation was desperate enough that Intel furloughed 2,000 employees and in 1982 allowed IBM to acquire a 12 percent interest in the company in exchange for $250 million. Other companies suffered as well. From 1981 to 1982, AMD’s net income fell by two-thirds, and National Semiconductor went from a $52 million annual profit to losses of $11 million. Around this time, Noyce started an SIA meeting with an offer to “lead the group in prayer.”15
除了1983年和1984年利润短暂回升之外，情况每况愈下。日本市场继续对外国卖家关闭：美国公司生产的芯片在日本的销量占比不到10%，而在其他出口市场，美国制造的芯片销量约占三分之一。与此同时，日本制造商供应的半导体器件市场份额持续增长，直到1985年，一件曾经难以想象的事情发生了：日本在全球半导体器件市场的份额超过了美国。16
EXCEPT FOR A BRIEF UPSWING IN PROFITS in 1983 and 1984, things just got worse. The Japanese market continued to be closed to foreign sellers: United States firms manufactured less than 10 percent of the chips sold in Japan, whereas in other export markets, American-made devices accounted for about one-third of the chips sold. Meanwhile the share of the total market for semiconductor devices supplied by Japanese manufacturers continued to rise until, in 1985, the once-unthinkable happened: Japan’s share of the total world market for semiconductor devices surpassed that of the United States.16
诺伊斯估计，1984年至1986年间，美国半导体行业损失了20亿美元的收入和2.7万个工作岗位。同期，硅谷13%的电子行业工作岗位消失。雪上加霜的是，日本电子巨头富士通开始运作，试图收购硅谷半导体巨头仙童半导体80%的股份。仙童半导体此前已被一家外国公司收购——法国企业集团斯伦贝谢于1979年将其收购——但日本所有权的前景令《圣何塞水星报》感叹道：“这笔交易似乎用一句话就告诉我们，我们已经堕落到何种地步，以及我们面临着怎样的困境。”包括诺伊斯在内的行业领袖曾短暂讨论过联合反对这笔交易，但考虑到反垄断方面的担忧，最终放弃了这一想法。一位知名的半导体分析师在被问及这笔潜在的出售时，只能无奈地摇摇头，厌恶地嘟囔道：“真是世事颠倒啊。”17
Noyce estimated that between 1984 and 1986, the American semiconductor industry lost $2 billion in earnings and 27,000 jobs. In that same period, 13 percent of the electronics jobs in Silicon Valley disappeared. Adding insult to injury, the Japanese electronics giant Fujitsu began maneuvering to take over 80 percent of Fairchild, the granddaddy of Silicon Valley semiconductor firms. Fairchild was already owned by a foreign company—French conglomerate Schlumberger had bought it in 1979—but the prospect of Japanese ownership led the San Jose Mercury News to lament, “The transaction seems to tell us, in one quick message, how far we’ve fallen and what we’re up against.” Industry leaders, including Noyce, briefly discussed some sort of united opposition to the deal, but abandoned the idea in light of antitrust concerns. One well-known semiconductor analyst, when asked about the potential sale, could do little more than shake his head and mutter disgustedly, “Talk about the world being turned upside down.”17
这句话精准地概括了当时的时代氛围。美国过去一直主导着高科技产业，但在许多市场，它如今已落后于其他国家。半导体产业似乎并未受到20世纪70年代经济衰退的影响，但现在也被卷入了这场漩涡之中。
The phrase captured the overriding sense of the times. America was accustomed to dominating high-tech industry, but in many markets the country now lagged in second place. The semiconductor industry had seemed impervious to the recessionary forces of the 1970s, but now it was sucked into the vortex.
在一次令人震惊的政策逆转中，戈登·摩尔和安迪·格鲁夫于1985年向英特尔董事会建议公司彻底退出DRAM内存业务。DRAM内存——1103——曾是英特尔首款畅销产品。DRAM使这家公司从一家两人创业公司一跃成为财富500强企业。但如今，由于英特尔不得不将内存定价极低，该产品线反而拖累了英特尔其他业务领域（尤其是微处理器业务）的利润。安迪·格鲁夫回忆道：“我去见戈登（摩尔），问他如果我们被替换，新的管理层会怎么做。答案很明确：退出DRAM业务。于是，我建议戈登，我们不妨走回头路，重新做回自己。”18
In one of the more shocking reversals, Gordon Moore and Andy Grove recommended to the Intel board of directors that the company leave the DRAM memory business altogether in 1985. A DRAM memory—the 1103—had been Intel’s first best-selling product. DRAMs had brought the firm from a two-man startup to the Fortune 500. But now the product line was acting as a net drain on profits from other areas of Intel’s business, particularly microprocessors, because Intel had to price the memories so cheaply. Andy Grove recalls “going to see Gordon [Moore] and asking him what a new management would do if we were replaced. The answer was clear: get out of DRAMs. So, I suggested to Gordon that we go through the revolving door, come back in, and just do it ourselves.”18
亚瑟·洛克称，为了将英特尔的注意力集中在曾经被视为副业的微处理器上，而投票决定放弃存储器业务，是他作为董事会成员做出的最令人痛彻心扉的决定。但诺伊斯毫不犹豫地批准了摩尔和格鲁夫的决定。“他认为日本人已经在存储器领域遥遥领先，”安·鲍尔斯回忆道，“他希望微处理器能提供一条出路。”到20世纪90年代末，美国九家DRAM制造商中有七家退出了这一领域。19
Arthur Rock calls the vote to abandon memories in order to focus Intel’s attention on the microprocessors once considered only a sideline business “the most gut-wrenching decision I’ve ever made as a board member.” But Noyce had no second thoughts about approving Moore and Grove’s decision. “He thought the Japanese were already beating the heck out of memories,” recalls Ann Bowers. “He hoped microprocessors would offer a way out.” By the end of the decade, seven of the nine American DRAM manufacturers had left the business.19
然而，问题依然存在。1986年，英特尔自1971年上市以来首次出现亏损，亏损额高达1.73亿美元。AMD宣布这一年是公司历史上最糟糕的一年，亏损额达3700万美元。National公司亏损1.43亿美元。即便裁员7200人（占员工总数的28%），英特尔的困境依然严重，以至于其高管多次在诺伊斯（Noyce）的客厅里开会，讨论一个无人愿意面对的话题：“如果到了那一步，该如何关闭英特尔？”公司内部通讯在愚人节特刊中以“日本收购英特尔：格鲁夫被任命为将军”为题，提出了自己的建议。一位SIA高管解释说：“没有亲身经历过的人很难想象当时的情况有多糟糕。我们真的开始认为，美国半导体行业可能会不复存在，被日本的竞争对手彻底摧毁。”20
And still the problems persisted. In 1986, for the first time since it went public in 1971, Intel lost money—$173 million. AMD, declaring the year the worst in the company’s history, lost $37 million. National lost $143 million. Even after cutting 7,200 jobs (28 percent of the employee base), Intel was still in such trouble that several times its senior managers met in Noyce’s living room to discuss a topic no one wanted to contemplate: “how to shut down Intel, if it comes to that.” An April Fool’s edition of the company newsletter offered its own suggestion in a cover story headlined “Japanese Buy Intel: Grove Named Shogun.” Explained one SIA executive, “It’s hard for someone who did not live through it to imagine how bad things were. We had really begun to think that the American semiconductor industry might cease to exist, [having been] erased by Japanese competition.”20
难道只有美国的半导体产业陷入困境吗？诺伊斯确信，他在美国各地都能看到“帝国衰落”的迹象。联邦政府的财政赤字创下历史新高，美国人的储蓄比历史上任何时期都少，支出却比历史上任何时候都多，美国的进口额超过了出口额，美国学生的数学和科学素养逐年下降。“你能说出一个美国现在没有落后的领域吗？你能说出一个美国市场份额正在增长的领域吗？我们正处于死亡螺旋之中。”诺伊斯对一位记者说道。他预言，硅谷有朝一日可能会变成“一片荒地”，就像美国各地其他许多荒地一样。“你会怎么称呼底特律？”他问道，“我们很容易就会变成那样。”更糟糕的是，诺伊斯认为笼罩着整个行业的阴霾本身就十分危险。他说，他坚信“乐观是创新的必要因素。否则，人们又怎能接受变革而非安逸，接受冒险而非待在舒适区呢？”21
NOR WAS IT ONLY THE AMERICAN SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY that was in trouble. Noyce was convinced that everywhere he looked in the United States he saw signs of “the decline of the empire.” The federal government was running record deficits, Americans were saving less and spending more than at any time in history, the country was importing more than it exported, and math and science literacy among American students was declining with every passing year. “Can you name a field in which the U.S. is not falling behind now, one in which the U.S. is increasing its market share? We’re in a death spiral.” Noyce told a reporter. He predicted that Silicon Valley might one day become “a wasteland,” one of many around the country. “What would you call Detroit?” he asked. “We could easily become that.” To make matters worse, Noyce believed that the gloom overhanging the industry was dangerous in and of itself. He was convinced, he said, that “optimism is an essential ingredient for innovation. How else can the individual welcome change over security, adventure over staying in a safe place?”21
如果放开资本流动、淘汰无利可图的产品和裁员都无济于事，那么或许解决美国经济困境的办法在于效仿日本政府针对少数特定行业的产业政策，并制定一套本土化的方案。诺伊斯并不认同这种观点。他认为，政府应该“扶持”各个领域的“企业家”，而不是单独扶持某个特定行业。他的声音只是众多参与美国产业政策辩论的声音之一。其中一派——通常是罗纳德·里根总统的支持者——认为应对日本威胁的正确方法是加倍努力，从供给侧入手振兴美国经济：减轻监管负担和资本利得税；鼓励长期投资；增加政府支出，通常是通过增加军费开支。按照这种观点，美国政府最有效的措施就是让产业发展畅通无阻。政府应该通过减少税收和监管，给予更多。22
IF FREEING UP THE FLOW OF CAPITAL had not helped, and dropping unprofitable products and cutting jobs had not worked either, perhaps the answer to America’s economic woes lay in adopting a homegrown version of the Japanese government’s industrial policy targeting a few select industries. Noyce did not think so. He said that the government should “target entrepreneurs” in every field and not single out any particular industry for support. His voice was one of many engaged in the American debate over industrial policy. In one camp were those—generally supporters of President Ronald Reagan—who argued that the correct response to the Japanese threat was a redoubling of current supply-side efforts to revitalize the American economy: reduce regulatory burdens and capital gains taxes; create incentives for long-term investment; and increase government expenditures, generally through military spending. According to this argument, the most useful step that the American government could take was a flying leap out of industry’s way. Government should give more by taking away—via taxes and regulation—less.22
反对阵营的领头羊是民主党人，他们认为里根政府传统的刺激经济手段在应对日本经济时已经失效。里根经济学的反对者认为，共和党的供给侧政策正是美国陷入困境的根源：前所未有的巨额赤字推高了利率，从而推高了美元汇率，使得外国制造商能够在世界任何地方，包括美国本土，轻易地以低于美国竞争对手的价格出售产品。23
Leading the opposing camp were Democrats who argued that the Reaganites’ traditional means of stimulating the economy had already proven futile against the Japanese. The Republicans’ supply-side approach had led America into this problem in the first place, according to Reaganomics’ opponents: previously unimagined deficits had pushed up interest rates, thereby increasing the value of the dollar to the point that foreign manufacturers could easily undersell their American competitors anywhere in the world, including in the United States.23
秉持着“如果无法战胜敌人，那就加入敌人”的理念，许多民主党人建议美国政府效仿日本，在扶持本国工业部门方面发挥更积极的作用。参议员阿德莱·史蒂文森三世指出：“现在是时候改变美国以往一刀切的立法和政策大刀阔斧的做法，更加关注各个部门、行业和企业的‘微观’需求了。美国是唯一一个不尝试这样做，并且系统性地拒绝‘产业政策’的工业化国家。”1983年，作为拉法尔斯计划的一部分，众议院民主党人呼吁成立一家新的工业竞争力银行，以85亿美元的联邦资金注资，该银行将“向需要现代化改造的老牌产业和难以起步的创新型企业提供贷款和担保”。24
Hewing to the philosophy that if you can’t beat an enemy, you should join him, many Democrats suggested that the United States government follow Japan’s lead and play a more active role in fostering its industrial sector. “It is time to moderate the national habit of blanket legislation and broad policy strokes with more attention to the ‘micro’ requirements of individual sectors, industries and firms,” argued Senator Adlai Stevenson III. “The United States is the only industrial country which does not attempt to do this and rejects ‘industrial policy’ in any systematic sense.” In 1983 as part of the LaFalce Plan, House Democrats called for a new Bank for Industrial Competitiveness, capitalized with $8.5 billion in federal funds, which would “make and guarantee loans to older industries in need of modernization and to innovative businesses having trouble getting started.”24
这场关于产业政策的辩论远不止金钱那么简单。它关乎美国民众对自身作为自由市场、自由放任资本主义堡垒的认知。共和党人精心炮制他们的论点，意图恐吓这个历来对联邦权力抱有怀疑态度的国家：美国人真的希望政府更多地干预产业事务吗？选民真的相信华盛顿的官僚应该有权决定美国经济的“正确”发展方向吗？（加州共和党众议员丹·伦德格伦发表了一番令人啼笑皆非的言论，抨击产业政策的支持者，他声称：“产业政策的支持者从未证明‘最优秀、最聪明的人’都在华盛顿，而且……他们能够比现在做得更好，做出影响我们生活的经济决策。”）25
Much more than money was at stake in this debate over industrial policy. At issue was the country’s understanding of itself as a stronghold of free-market, laissez-faire capitalism. Republicans couched their arguments in language calculated to strike fear into a nation historically suspicious of federal power: did Americans really want more government meddling in industry affairs? Did voters really believe that Washington bureaucrats should have the power to determine the “proper” focus for the American economy? (In a strangely self-defeating slap at industrial policy advocates, Republican congressman Dan Lundgren of California alleged that “Supporters of industrial policy have never been able to demonstrate that the ‘best and the brightest’ are in Washington and … can do a better job [than is currently the case] of making the economic decisions affecting our lives.”)25
另一方面，产业政策倡导者则声称，自由放任的理念是空洞的，美国实际上已经拥有了一套产业政策，主要由国防部负责实施。几十年来，联邦政府以国防合同的名义，支持着电子、航空航天等特定目标行业的研发。此外，就在1983年，联邦政府仍然采购了超过一半的飞机、无线电和电视通信设备；四分之一的工程和科学仪器；以及三分之一的美国制造的电子管，这些采购主要用于军事用途。正如一位产业政策倡导者所言：“如果日本的产业政策是由通产省（MITI）实施的，并且是为了经济防御，那么美国的产业政策（如果它确实存在的话）则是由国防部实施的，并且是为了自身和自由世界的军事防御。”26
Industrial policy advocates, on the other hand, claimed that laissez-faire ideals were hollow and that the United States had a de facto industrial policy, administered largely by the Department of Defense. For decades, the federal government, in the guise of defense contracts, had supported research and development in specific target industries such as electronics and aerospace. Moreover, as recently as 1983, the federal government had purchased, largely for military use, more than half of all aircraft, radio, and TV communications equipment; a quarter of all engineering and scientific instruments; and a third of all electron tubes manufactured in the United States. In the words of one industrial policy advocate: “If Japan’s industrial policy has been implemented by … MITI and for purposes of economic defense, then America’s industrial policy (to the extent that it already has one) has been implemented by the Department of Defense and for purposes of its own military defense and that of the free world.”26
当全国各地的政界人士纷纷成立政府与产业界联合委员会，研究政府在经济中应扮演的角色时，硅谷商人和硅谷工业协会（SIA）成员，包括诺伊斯，都发挥了重要作用。里根总统成立了产业竞争力委员会，由惠普公司总裁约翰·杨（也是佩奇米尔饮酒投资俱乐部的成员）担任主席，诺伊斯也曾是该委员会的成员。一个由知名民主党人组成的特别委员会——成员包括商人、劳工领袖和参议员——成立了“产业政策研究小组”。此外，一群由加里·哈特、蒂姆·沃斯和迈克尔·杜卡基斯领导的年轻民主党人，极力推动高科技产业成为民主党产业政策的重点，以至于这些年轻人后来被称为“雅达利民主党人”。在萨克拉门托，州长杰里·布朗成立并主持了加州产业创新委员会。查理·斯波克和苹果电脑公司的史蒂夫·乔布斯都曾是布朗的委员会成员，但尽管州长本人多次邀请，诺伊斯仍然拒绝加入。27
AS POLITICIANS ACROSS THE COUNTRY formed joint government-industry committees to study the proper role of government in the economy, Silicon Valley businessmen and SIA members, including Noyce, played prominent roles. President Reagan established a Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, chaired by Hewlett-Packard president John Young (another member of the Page Mill drinking and investment club), on which Noyce served. A select committee of prominent Democrats—including businessmen, labor leaders, and Senators—formed a special “Industrial Policy Study Group,” and one group of young Democrats, led by Gary Hart, Tim Wirth, and Michael Dukakis, pushed so hard for high-tech industries to be the focus of the party’s industrial policies that the young men came to be known as “Atari Democrats.” In Sacramento, Governor Jerry Brown established and chaired a California Commission on Industrial Innovation. Charlie Sporck, along with Apple Computer’s Steve Jobs, served on Brown’s commission, but Noyce declined to join, despite multiple requests from the governor himself.27
高科技企业高管之所以备受这些委员会的青睐，是因为政客们认为信息技术代表着国家的经济未来。没有哪个政客愿意被指责为围绕日渐衰落的重工业的需求来制定政策。布朗委员会的观点代表了许多人的心声：“我们过去以重工业和廉价能源为基础的强劲经济政策目标，在当今国家经济增长乏力、国际竞争激烈、新兴第三世界国家正在重新夺回资源的时代，已经不再适用……我们必须着眼于以相对资源高效的信息技术和创新为基础的新型‘后工业’经济。”28
High-tech executives were highly sought for these committees because the politicians believed information-based technologies represented the nation’s economic future. No politician wanted to be caught designing policies around the needs of the declining heavy industries. The Brown commission spoke for many when it said, “Our former policy goals of a strong economy built on heavy industry and cheap energy are no longer appropriate for an age marked by national economic sluggishness, fierce international competition and emerging third world nations reclaiming their resources. … We must look to a new ‘post-industrial’ economy built around relatively resource-efficient information technologies and innovation.”28
关于产业政策的辩论以及政界人士对高科技的殷切期望，影响了新加坡航空公司就此问题开展的第二轮游说活动。日本的竞争。尽管诺伊斯在半导体行业协会（SIA）的一次闭门会议上坦言“我们正试图影响国家战略”，但该组织当时处境微妙。SIA必须鼓励里根总统考虑一些乍看之下似乎背离了他大肆宣扬的自由市场、小政府理念，反而更符合一些“雅达利民主党人”提出的产业政策主张的措施。与此同时，SIA还必须说服民主党人支持半导体产业——或许要放弃那些雇佣了民主党最忠实选民的重工业。29
The debate over industrial policy and the politicians’ high hopes for high tech informed the SIA’s second round of lobbying on the issue of Japanese competition. Although Noyce freely admitted behind closed doors at an SIA conference that “we are attempting to influence our national strategy,” the organization was in a delicate situation. The SIA had to encourage President Reagan to consider actions that on first blush appeared departures from his much-ballyhooed free market, small government ideals and more in line with some of the Atari Democrats’ calls for industrial policy. At the same time, the SIA had to convince Democrats to support the semiconductor industry—perhaps over the heavy industries that employed many members of the Democrats’ most reliable constituencies.29
美国半导体行业协会（SIA）还需要考虑半导体行业作为美国“白手起家、自力更生”个人主义最后堡垒的声誉——它是美国珍视价值观的典范，与日本截然相反。这种将半导体行业与“美国价值观”联系起来的做法如此根深蒂固，以至于一篇报纸文章将该行业与日本之间的问题归咎于两国文化差异：“一个是移民国家，另一个是奉行孤立主义的同质社会。一个重视冒险、创新和辩论；另一个重视安全、循规蹈矩和和谐。”一方面，SIA如何才能采取看似典型的日本式举措，即要求政府更多地参与其行业发展——同时又能坚守冒险、创新和个人主义的立场？简而言之，半导体行业如何在不显得不符合美国价值观的情况下寻求政府帮助？30
The SIA also needed to take into account the semiconductor industry’s reputation as the last bastion of do-it-yourself, up-by-the-bootstraps American individualism—exemplars of treasured American values, and the polar opposite of the Japanese. This linking of the semiconductor industry with “American values” was so pervasive that one newspaper article attributed the industry’s problems with Japan to differences in national culture: “One is a nation of immigrants, the other a homogenous society of isolationists. One values adventure, innovation, and debate; the other security, conformity, and harmony.” How, on the one hand, could the SIA take the seemingly quintessential Japanese step of asking for increased government involvement in their industry—and at the same time stay on the right side of adventure, innovation, and individualism? How, in short, could the semiconductor industry ask for government help without seeming un-American?30
1985年6月，美国芯片协会（SIA）发起了一项双管齐下的行动，旨在实现两个目标：一是开放日本市场（SIA认为日本市场对外国芯片进口关闭）；二是制止SIA所指控的日本企业以低于生产成本的价格销售芯片的行为。为了实现第一个目标，SIA向美国贸易代表提交了一份请愿书，请求依据1974年《贸易法》第301条获得救济。该条款授权总统对拒绝美国产品公平进入其市场的国家进行处罚。三个月后，英特尔、美国国家半导体公司和超微半导体公司与SIA密切合作，开始着手实现第二个目标，提起了一项针对64K EPROM芯片的反倾销诉讼。SIA其实很早就考虑过提交第301条请愿书和诉讼，但直到SIA首席律师的前同事克莱德·普雷斯托维茨加入里根政府，担任商务部长负责日本事务的顾问后，才采取行动。这种私人关系促成了SIA议程的良好反响。31
IN JUNE 1985, THE SIA LAUNCHED a two-pronged campaign to accomplish two goals: open the Japanese market, which the SIA argued was closed to foreign chip imports; and end what the SIA alleged were Japanese firms selling chips below the cost of production. To achieve the first goal, the SIA filed a petition with the United States Trade Representative for relief under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the section that authorizes the president to penalize countries that deny United States products fair access to their markets. Three months later, Intel, National Semiconductor, and Advanced Micro Devices—working in close cooperation with the SIA—began work on the second goal by filing an antidumping case pertaining to 64K EPROMs. The SIA had considered filing its Section 301 petition and lawsuits much earlier but waited until Clyde Prestowitz, a former colleague of SIA’s lead attorney, joined the Reagan administration as counselor for Japan affairs for the secretary of commerce. This personal connection encouraged a favorable reception for the SIA’s agenda.31
SIA精心制定了战略，并与华盛顿的杜威、巴兰坦、布什比、帕尔默和伍德律师事务所密切合作。选择这家律师事务所主要是因为其国际贸易专家艾伦·W·沃尔夫，他曾在卡特政府担任美国副贸易代表。SIA没有政治行动委员会来捐款。虽然SIA并未直接向候选人捐款，但其成员公司（包括英特尔）成立了政治行动委员会（PAC），在20世纪80年代中期共向全国性政治候选人捐赠了约35万美元。SIA还战略性地扩大了其成员基础，将小型特种芯片制造商、惠普等大型芯片买家以及IBM等主要为自身产品生产芯片的大型芯片生产商纳入其中。这些新成员的主要关注点在于维持合理的价格和灵活的供应，他们可能会反对SIA提出的那些会导致芯片整体价格上涨的举措。通过将这些公司纳入SIA的阵营，SIA可以在相关举措公开之前征求他们的意见并争取他们的支持。最后，为了尽可能地提升其信息的吸引力，SIA定期咨询公关专家雷吉斯·麦肯纳（Regis McKenna）。SIA还至少召开了一次董事会会议（诺伊斯也出席了该会议），专门讨论该组织的“形象——我们想要实现什么目标”。32
The SIA planned its strategy with great care, working in close consultation with the Washington law firm of Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, chosen largely for its international trade expert, Alan W. Wolff, who had been deputy United States trade representative in the Carter administration. The SIA did not have a Political Action Committee to donate money to candidates, but member firms—including Intel—formed PACs that together donated some $350,000 to national political candidates during the mid-1980s. The SIA also strategically expanded its membership base to include small companies that built specialty chips; major chip buyers such as Hewlett-Packard; and large captive producers of chips, such as IBM, which build chips primarily for use in their own products. Some of these new members, whose primary concern was maintaining reasonable prices and flexible supplies, might potentially oppose SIA initiatives that would result in higher overall chip prices. By bringing these companies into the tent, SIA could solicit their opinions and cultivate their support before initiatives were made public. Finally, to make its message as appealing as possible, the SIA consulted regularly with public relations expert Regis McKenna. The SIA also devoted at least one board meeting, which Noyce attended, to a discussion of the organization’s “image—what are we trying to accomplish.”32
美国半导体行业协会（SIA）召集了一批盟友，他们非正式地被称为“国会半导体支持小组”。这个由20人组成的小组——包括来自加利福尼亚州、密苏里州、佛罗里达州和宾夕法尼亚州等州的民主党人和共和党人、参议员和众议员——致电白宫并与内阁官员会面，表达对SIA诉求的支持。另有180名联邦众议员和参议员向行政部门官员发送了由SIA总法律顾问艾伦·W·沃尔夫起草的信函。加利福尼亚州的两名参议员也积极支持SIA的立场。33
The SIA rounded up a cluster of allies known informally as the Congressional Semiconductor Support Group. This group of 20—Democrats and Republicans, senators and representatives from states including California, Missouri, Florida, and Pennsylvania—made calls to the White House and met with cabinet officials to express support for the SIA’s requests. Another 180 federal representatives and senators sent letters, drafted by SIA general counsel Alan W. Wolff, to people in the executive branch. Both senators from California worked hard to support the SIA’s position.33
美国半导体行业协会（SIA）利用其成员公司的高管组成一支“精英队伍”，随时可以派往华盛顿特区代表半导体行业进行游说。这是一种不同寻常且非常成功的创新。其他行业协会有时也会委派知名高管就一些关键议题进行游说，但大多数日常行业游说工作都由驻扎在首都的专业人士负责。SIA 的小型团队与其总法律顾问紧密合作，起草文章和立场文件，并向高管们介绍具体议题中的政治细微差别和利害关系。
The SIA used the executives who ran its member companies as a “platoon” of CEOs that could be sent to Washington, D.C. to lobby on behalf of the semiconductor industry. This was an unusual and highly successful innovation. Other trade associations had at times pressed well-known executives into lobbying duty on particularly critical issues, but most day-today industry lobbying was the purview of paid professionals based in the nation’s capital. The small SIA staff worked closely with its general counsel to draft articles and position papers and to brief the executives on the political nuances and stakes at play in specific issues.
1985年和1986年，美国保险商协会（SIA）派出大量高管前往首都华盛顿，以至于美国贸易代表克莱顿·尤特在一次SIA会议上开玩笑说：“我们在华盛顿开玩笑说，你们很多人都快要变成常驻人员了。”一项学术研究得出结论：“公司高管的直接游说是SIA采取的最有效策略。”SIA联合创始人查理·斯波克称之为“ SIA成功的秘诀” 。34
In 1985 and 1986, the SIA sent so many executives to the nation’s capital that United States trade representative Clayton Yeutter told an SIA meeting, “We joked in Washington that many of you were becoming permanent fixtures.” An academic study concluded, “Direct lobbying by top company executives is the most effective tactic adopted by the SIA.” SIA co-founder Charlie Sporck called it “the secret to the SIA’s success.”34
华盛顿的政客和政治任命官员确实对半导体行业的领导者们印象深刻，这些领导者长期以来一直鄙视政府对其业务的“干预”，如今却愿意亲力亲为地进行游说。日本事务顾问普雷斯托维茨写道：“对于这些人以及业内其他像他们一样，体现美国梦理想的人来说，争取华盛顿的支持并非易事。”他们出身卑微，甚至贫困，却凭借着进取心、灵感和汗水，成功创立了一个被广泛认为是21世纪关键的行业。他们完全是靠自己，孤军奋战，没有政府的帮助——事实上，有时甚至是在政府的骚扰下才做到这一点的。35
Politicians and political appointees in Washington were indeed impressed that the semiconductor industry’s leaders, who had for so long disdained government “interference” in their business, were willing to dirty their hands with lobbying. Counselor for Japan affairs Prestowitz wrote that “appealing to Washington was not easy for these men and the others like them in the industry who embodied the ideals of the American dream. Coming from modest, even poor, backgrounds, they had succeeded through initiative, inspiration, and perspiration, in founding an industry widely seen as the key to the twenty-first century. They had done it on their own as lone riders without government help—indeed, sometimes in the face of government harassment.”35
在众多为半导体行业协会 (SIA) 挺身而出的“孤胆英雄”中，最引人注目的是鲍勃·诺伊斯。《哈佛商业评论》写道，他“在电子界堪称传奇人物” 。“华盛顿政界人士渴望结识他，正如他渴望拓展政治人脉一样。” 顾问普雷斯托维茨这样评价道：“诺伊斯是我们自己人，如果有人能搞定这件事，那非他莫属。” 诺伊斯仅仅是出席国会听证会，就传递出一个强有力的信息：半导体行业正面临如此困境，以至于连诺伊斯——这位企业家精神的化身——都愿意放下身段，寻求帮助。36
Most prominent among the “lone riders” for the SIA was Bob Noyce. He “is something of a legend in the electronics world,” wrote the Harvard Business Review. “The Washington establishment wanted to get to know him as much as he wanted to develop political contacts.” Counselor Prestowitz put it this way: “Noyce is one of our guys, and if anyone can hack it, he can.” Noyce’s mere appearance at a congressional hearing sent a compelling message: the semiconductor industry is in such trouble that even Noyce—the embodiment of entrepreneurial spirit—is willing to swallow his pride and ask for help.36
诺伊斯拥有成功游说活动所必需的时间、自信、政治手腕和信誉。他还指出自己如此高效的另一个原因——他很富有。“我发现金钱赋予你权力，如果你富有，你的意见在华盛顿就更有价值。[金钱]是一种衡量标准。它用来衡量谁对[社会]做出了贡献，谁没有，因此[如果你是一名政治家]，它就能告诉你应该听谁的，不应该听谁的。”37
Noyce possessed the time, confidence, political savvy, and credibility necessary for any successful lobbying campaign. And he pointed to another reason he was so effective—he was wealthy. “I found that money gave you power, that your opinion was more highly valued in Washington if you were rich. [Money] was a way of keeping score. It was a way of keeping track of who had contributed [to society] and who had not, and consequently [if you were a politician], who you should listen to and who you should not.”37
从某种意义上说，推广SIA的理念是诺伊斯擅长的又一项高阶销售工作。而这一次，他对“产品”充满热情。想到上世纪六七十年代，那些贪婪成性、对自身技术优势无比自信的美国半导体公司，在无意中将关键美国专利的早期授权卖给了日本竞争对手，想必令他感到十分沮丧。仙童半导体公司更是首当其冲，向日本芯片制造商收取每赚1美元芯片收入的4.5美分作为诺伊斯集成电路专利的授权费——实际上是将仙童半导体公司多年先进研究的成果拱手让给了他们。38
Promoting the SIA agenda was, in some sense, another one of the high-level sales jobs at which Noyce excelled. And in this case, he passionately believed in the “product.” It must have frustrated him to consider that American semiconductor companies, so money-hungry and so supremely confident of their technological edge in the 1960s and 1970s, had inadvertently helped to create their own Japanese competitors when they sold them early licenses to key American patents. And Fairchild had led the way, charging for the rights to the Noyce integrated circuit patent a royalty of 4.5 cents on every dollar the Japanese makers earned on chips—and effectively handing them blueprints that represented years of advanced research at Fairchild.38
在诺伊斯的整个职业生涯中，他与日本半导体行业的管理人员和研究人员一直保持着异常密切的关系。他曾在仙童半导体公司和后来的英特尔公司接待过日本代表团，并且对他访问日本时所受到的尊重感到受宠若惊。“鲍勃是个非常信任他人的人，”安·鲍尔斯解释说，“你得狠狠地揍他一拳，他才会觉得有什么不对劲。你可以想象，当他意识到这么多年来他接待的日本人一直在试图窃取（美国的）机密时，他有多么难过。”39
Throughout his career, Noyce had enjoyed an unusually close relationship with Japanese semiconductor executives and researchers. He hosted delegations of Japanese visitors at Fairchild and later at Intel, and he had been flattered by the respect accorded to him when he visited the island nation. “Bob was a very trusting person,” Ann Bowers explains. “You had to practically punch him in the nose to have him think there was something untoward happening. You can imagine how he felt when he realized that all those years that he had been hosting the Japanese guys, they had been trying to get [American] secrets.”39
为了拯救美国半导体产业，诺伊斯为几位政治候选人筹款，并鼓励英特尔成立政府事务委员会。据他估计，在20世纪80年代中期，他几乎一半的时间都待在华盛顿特区。在那里，他与参议员、众议员以及民主党全国委员会的成员进行非正式会面（共进各种餐点和咖啡）。汤姆·坎贝尔回忆道，他最初与诺伊斯合作，致力于遏制无理的股东诉讼，后来担任了包括硅谷大部分地区在内的选区的美国众议员，“他真正帮助我认识到让创新发生的重要性——让人们承担风险。重要的是要创建一个人们可以自由创新、创造、大胆行动的体系。[诺伊斯相信]赋权，而不是政府直接干预。”40
AS PART OF HIS CAMPAIGN to save the American semiconductor industry, Noyce raised money for several political candidates and encouraged the formation of a Government Affairs Committee at Intel. He estimated that he spent nearly half his time in Washington, D.C. in the mid-1980s. There he met informally (for various meals and coffees) with senators, congressional representatives, and people from the Democratic National Committee. Recalls Tom Campbell, who first worked with Noyce on an effort to discourage frivolous shareholder lawsuits and then served as a United States representative from the district that included much of Silicon Valley, “He really helped me to see the importance of letting invention happen—letting people take a risk. It is important to create a system in which people are free to innovate, create, be bold. [Noyce believed in] empowerment, rather than in the government directly helping out.”40
诺伊斯曾多次在美国国会作证，其中一次他声称自己“代表所有高科技行业”。20世纪80年代初，他开始与一位演讲稿撰写人合作。吉姆·贾勒特（现任英特尔法律与政府事务副总裁）在1980年刚入职英特尔担任公关经理时，就开始帮助诺伊斯准备演讲稿和撰写文章。两人关系融洽：诺伊斯会与贾勒特讨论他的想法和想表达的内容，然后贾勒特进行一些研究后会起草演讲稿，诺伊斯则会进行编辑——通常只是稍作修改。诺伊斯和贾勒特共同开发了一套即插即用的演讲稿制作系统，他们会制作各种“模块”，每个模块包含一到六个段落，并围绕不同的主题或幻灯片展开。这些模块可以以多种方式组合，并可使用针对特定受众定制的过渡效果进行连接。41
Noyce also testified multiple times before Congress, at one point identifying himself as speaking “as a representative of all high-tech industry.” He began working with a speechwriter in the early 1980s. Jim Jarrett, now Intel’s vice president of legal and government affairs, was a newly hired public relations manager in 1980 when he began helping Noyce on his presentations and occasional articles. The two men had an easygoing relationship: Noyce would talk to Jarrett about his ideas and what he wanted to say, and then Jarrett, after conducting a bit of research, would draft a talk, which Noyce would edit—usually quite lightly. Together Noyce and Jarrett developed a plug-and-play system of speech building in which they would craft various “modules,” each ranging from one to a half-dozen paragraphs, and each centered around a different theme or slide. These modules could be assembled in any number of ways and linked with customized transitions tailored to a specific audience.41
贾勒特回忆说，诺伊斯在演讲时似乎总感觉不太自在，尽管他经常即兴发挥，而且从听众的角度来看，他显得相当放松。“从演讲技巧的角度来看，他算不上一个优秀的演说家，但他魅力十足，足以弥补他演讲能力上的不足，”贾勒特解释道。这番话让人想起盖洛德·诺伊斯曾解释过，他的哥哥虽然嗓音比一般人好，却总能拿到主唱的位置。贾勒特继续说道：“真正重要的是他的存在感。他没有那种浸信会牧师的做派。他的风格深思熟虑，谦逊低调。他只是做他自己。”诺伊斯演讲时，他的肢体语言、语调、语速和语调都向听众传递着同一个信息：这次演讲的重点不在于我，而在于我提出的观点。42
Jarrett recalls that Noyce never seemed entirely comfortable when he delivered his talks, even though he would regularly ad-lib and appeared from the audience to be quite at ease. “He wasn’t a great speaker from an oratorical style standpoint, but he had so much charisma that it really overrode his moderate ability as an orator,” explains Jarrett, in a remark that recalls Gaylord Noyce’s explanation of how his brother always managed to land lead singing parts with only a better-than-average voice. Jarrett continues, “His presence was the really the thing that mattered. He did not have a Baptist-preacher approach. [His] was a thoughtful, kind of modestly presented style. He was just being himself.” When Noyce spoke, his body, tone, pace, and intonation all sent the same message to the listener: this talk is not about me; it’s about the points I’m making.42
到那时，诺伊斯已经学会了在公开场合控制自己的情绪。1978年以后，他再也没有说过“空手道劈砍”或“割断我们的喉咙”之类的话。但在私下里，他仍然非常沮丧。他内心深处的这种情绪，赋予了他的游说活动一种令人信服的热情和激情。他的信息他的证词以经济活力、公平竞争和国家安全这三点为基础，而SIA认为这三点是争取支持以实现其开放日本市场和阻止芯片倾销目标的关键。
By this time, Noyce had learned to keep his emotions under control in public presentations. There were no more “karate chop” or “slit our throats” comments after 1978. But in private, he was still very upset. The depth of his feelings gave his lobbying efforts a compelling fervor and passion. His message in his testimony built on three points—economic vitality, fair play, and national security—that the SIA had identified as key to building support for their goals of opening the Japanese market and stopping chip dumping.
20世纪80年代初，半导体产业对美国经济的重要性是诺伊斯最热衷的话题。他撰写了十几篇相关演讲稿，其中许多演讲稿还多次发表。他曾告诉全国州长协会，仅英特尔一家公司在成立的头13年就缴纳了超过2.45亿美元的税款，并估计这相当于整个行业纳税额的十分之一。他引用美国半导体行业协会（SIA）的一句常用语，告诉众议院筹款委员会：“美国半导体产业为电子产业提供了‘原油’，或者说是基础技术。” 他还告诉《洛杉矶时报》：“从汽车到飞机，半导体无处不在。我们的销售额是经济状况的晴雨表。”43
The importance of the semiconductor industry to the United States economy was Noyce’s favorite topic in the early 1980s. He wrote more than a dozen speeches on the subject and delivered many of them more than once. He told the National Governors’ Association that Intel alone had paid over $245 million in taxes in its first 13 years of business and estimated this was a tenth of the amount contributed by the industry as a whole. Repeating an often-used SIA line, he told the House Ways and Means Committee that “the American semiconductor industry provides the ‘crude oil,’ or fundamental technology, for the electronics industry.” He told the Los Angeles Times, “Semiconductors are in everything from automobiles to aircraft. Our sales are an index to the state of the economy.”43
他一向喜欢用量化数据说话，曾计算出半导体行业“回馈给社会的‘社会剩余’”超过1200亿美元。诺伊斯的计算过程晦涩难懂，但他的基本论点是：由于半导体芯片的单位功能成本随着每一代新芯片的推出而大幅下降，客户可以以相对较低的成本长期大幅提高生产效率。这1200亿美元的“社会剩余”是（一方面）如果芯片价格没有像历史上那样急剧下降，这种生产效率提升的理论成本与（另一方面）消费者实际支付的成本之间的差额。诺伊斯认为，这笔“意外之财”可以用来促进社会的其他目标。44
Always most comfortable with quantifiable claims, at one point he calculated the “‘social surplus’ which has been returned to the society by the semiconductor industry” to be more than $120 billion. Noyce’s calculations were hard to follow, but his basic argument was this: because semiconductors’ cost-per-function fell so dramatically with each new generation of chips, customers could greatly improve productivity over time at relatively little cost. The “$120 billion social surplus” was the difference between (on the one hand) the theoretical costs of such productivity improvements if chip prices had not historically fallen so precipitously and (on the other hand) the actual costs to consumers. This “windfall,” Noyce contended, “can be used to further the other goals of society.”44
诺伊斯反复强调半导体产业与新兴的“信息经济”之间的联系。他告诉商务部，“现在全国一半的劳动力都在处理信息而不是商品”，半导体产业“对新的信息时代至关重要”。他承诺，新的信息技术将提高工作效率，“其效果甚至超过上个世纪机械时代对体力劳动产出的提升”。45
Noyce repeatedly stressed the link between the semiconductor industry and the emerging “information economy.” He told the Department of Commerce that “half of the country’s work force is now dealing with information rather than goods” and that the semiconductor industry was “fundamental to the new information age.” He promised that the new information technologies would improve workplace efficiency “even more than the mechanical age enhanced the output of manual labor in the last century.”45
诺伊斯进一步强调，半导体行业并非寻求保护主义立法：301条款申请的重点在于获得进入日本市场的机会，而不是将美国市场对日本进口产品关闭。正如诺伊斯常说的，“美国重视公平竞争，重视所有参与者都遵守相同的游戏规则。”46
Noyce further sought to stress that the semiconductor industry was not seeking protectionist legislation: the Section 301 petition focused on gaining access to Japan’s market, rather than closing off America’s market to Japanese imports. As Noyce liked to say, “America has a concern for fair play, for having the rules of the game the same for all participants.”46
在诺伊斯阐述这些观点的同时，美国半导体工业协会（SIA）提出了第三点：美国半导体产业的薄弱构成重大的安全风险。先进的武器技术依赖于先进的电子设备，而先进的电子设备又依赖于最先进的半导体。如果美国半导体产业无法保持技术领先地位，美国军方将被迫使用，甚至可能依赖其他国家的半导体。关键电子元件的来源可能依赖国外渠道。这些国外渠道在战时可能会枯竭，而且它们可能同时向苏联和美国供应元件，从而可能将美国的技术信息传递给其最危险的军事对手，进而危及美国的安全。47
While Noyce was making these points, the SIA was making a third: a weak American semiconductor industry posed a significant security risk. Superior weapons technology depends on superior electronics, which in turn depend on state-of-the-art semiconductors. If the United States semiconductor industry could not stay on the technological cutting edge, the American military would be forced to use, perhaps even to depend upon, foreign sources for key electronics components. These foreign sources might dry up in wartime, and they might be supplying the Soviet Union as well as the United States, potentially compromising American security by passing along information about her technology to her most dangerous military rival.47
1986年春，美国半导体工业协会（SIA）的努力开始取得成效。经过一年的调查，国际贸易管理局初步认定，多家日本公司在美国销售EPROM芯片的价格低于生产成本。同年8月，里根总统签署了《美日半导体协定》，要求日本“开放”其半导体市场，其未明言的目标是外国公司在五年内获得20%的市场份额。该协定还通过规定半导体产品（不仅在美国，而且在全球范围内）的“公平市场价值”，来遏制日本所谓的芯片倾销行为。这些举措史无前例，针对的是美国的军事盟友，旨在将美国政府的管辖权扩展到全球范围内的私营企业。几个月后，里根政府认定日本违反了该协定，并对价值3亿美元的日本进口商品征收100%的关税——这是二战以来美国首次对盟友实施如此严厉的制裁。48
IN THE SPRING OF 1986, the SIA’s efforts began to bear fruit. After a year of inquiry, the International Trade Administration issued a preliminary determination that several Japanese companies were selling EPROM chips in the United States at less than the cost of production. In August, President Reagan signed the United States–Japan Semiconductor Agreement, which required Japan to “open” its semiconductor market, with the unstated goal of foreign firms gaining 20 percent market share within five years. The agreement also curbed alleged Japanese dumping of chips by mandating a “fair market value” at which semiconductors should be sold not just in the United States, but throughout the world. These were unprecedented steps, taken against a military ally, to extend United States government jurisdiction into a private-sector business on a global scale. A few months later, the Reagan administration determined that Japan was violating the accord and imposed 100 percent tariffs on $300 million of Japanese imports—the first such penalties against an ally since World War Two.48
令人惊讶的是，这一成果竟然出自一个成立不到十年、员工不足十二人、代表不到四十家会员公司（且这些公司的员工仅集中在加利福尼亚州、德克萨斯州和亚利桑那州三个州）的组织之手。从某种意义上说，SIA 应该被视为诺伊斯及其同伴共同创立的又一个极其成功的初创企业。到 1989 年年中，几家正在考虑成立类似 SIA 的大型计算机公司出资对政府官员进行的一项调查发现，在八个电子行业贸易组织中，SIA 因其“目标明确”和“建设性议程”而“最为有效”。49
That this outcome was engineered by an organization that was less than a decade old, staffed by fewer than a dozen people, and represented fewer than 40 member companies whose workforces were concentrated in only three states (California, Texas, and Arizona) is astonishing. In some sense, the SIA should be considered yet another remarkably successful startup, co-founded by Noyce and his peers. By mid-1989, a survey of government officials, paid for by several large computer companies contemplating the formation of their own SIA-like association, found the SIA to be the “most effective” of eight electronics industry trade groups because of its “clarity of purpose” and “constructive agenda.”49
半导体行业对美国首都华盛顿的影响力，从富士通拟收购仙童半导体的最终结果可见一斑。1987年，收购消息传出后，国防部长卡斯帕·温伯格、商务部长马尔科姆·鲍德里奇以及几位国会议员以安全担忧为由表示反对。仙童半导体母公司斯伦贝谢的总裁指责其美国竞争对手——尤其是诺伊斯——幕后操纵政府的反对行动。尽管诺伊斯公开称这笔收购是“糟糕的交易”，但他坚称自己从未直接向五角大楼或商务部表达过意见。富士通以“政治争议”为由撤回了收购要约，查理·斯波克随后收购了仙童半导体，以此作为其位于硅谷的国民经济公司扩张计划的一部分。半导体行业。世界似乎又一次恢复了正常。50
A further measure of the semiconductor industry’s influence in the nation’s capital was the outcome of the proposed Fujitsu purchase of Fairchild. When news of the pending sale broke in 1987, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge, and several congressmen voiced their opposition, citing security concerns. The president of Fairchild’s parent company Schlumberger charged his American competitors—Noyce in particular—with orchestrating the government’s objections, but while Noyce publicly called the purchase a “lousy deal,” he insisted that he never directly passed on his opinion to the Pentagon or the Department of Commerce. When Fujitsu rescinded its offer, citing “political controversy,” Charlie Sporck acquired the company as part of a move to expand operations at his Silicon Valley-headquartered National Semiconductor. The world, it seemed, was once again turned right-side-up.50
到1987年8月，许多美国半导体公司已恢复盈利，芯片销量比以往任何时候都更高，价格也更加合理。一年后，戈登·摩尔宣称这是“英特尔的黄金时代”。但这种改善究竟有多少功劳应归于诺伊斯和美国半导体行业协会（SIA）努力促成的贸易协定和制裁（剩余的反倾销制裁于1987年11月解除），目前尚不清楚。将存储器市场拱手让给日本的决定，虽然在当时令人痛苦，但到了20世纪90年代初，似乎颇具远见。美国公司将重心转向微处理器等设计密集型产品，恰逢个人电脑和其他逻辑驱动型产业的强劲增长。与此同时，韩国等国家进入通用存储器市场，加剧了该市场的价格战和成本削减。日本存储器制造商的崛起迫使美国公司放弃了依赖微薄利润和强大制造能力的业务，转而投身于利润更为丰厚的研发密集型产品领域，而这些产品的需求正呈指数级增长。
By August 1987, many American semiconductor firms had returned to profitability, selling more chips at comparatively healthier prices than ever before. One year later, Gordon Moore declared it “a great time at Intel.” But it is unclear how much credit for this improvement should go to the trade agreement and sanctions (the remaining antidumping sanctions were lifted in November 1987) for which Noyce and the SIA worked so hard. The decision to cede the memory market to Japan, while agonizing when it was made, seemed prescient by the early 1990s. American companies’ focus on more design-intensive products such as microprocessors coincided with strong growth in the personal computer and other logic-driven industries. At the same time, countries such as South Korea entered the commodity memory business and intensified price wars and cost cutting in that market. The rise of Japanese memory manufacturers thus forced American firms out of a business dependent on slim margins and manufacturing muscle and into much more profitable work building research-intensive products for which demand was growing exponentially.
时间是美国工业复苏的另一个重要因素。毕竟，在20世纪80年代中期经济衰退之前的几十年里，该行业曾多次经历两三年的低迷期，而当时并没有贸易协定的帮助。或许，美元走弱——导致日本产品对美国消费者而言更加昂贵——才是该行业资产负债表亮眼的最重要原因。无论如何，1987年，就连诺伊斯也表示，他无法将“业务的普遍好转”归因于“贸易协定或其他任何因素”，他只承认“停止倾销确实提高了我们的盈利能力”。51
Time was another important factor behind the American industry’s recovery. After all, in the decades before the mid-1980s recession, the industry had emerged from several two- or three-year downturns without trade agreements to help it on its way. Or perhaps the weaker dollar—which made Japanese products more expensive for United States consumers—was the most important source of the industry’s rosy balance sheets. In any case, in 1987, even Noyce said that he could not attribute the “general pickup in business” to “the trade agreement or anything else,” conceding only that “the cessation of dumping has helped our profitability.”51
在为美国航天工业协会（SIA）游说期间，诺伊斯始终无法摆脱对自身行业之外问题的思考。自从他离开实验室，不再局限于显微镜下观察那些技术难题后，他的视野就一直在不断拓展。他先是思考如何组织一个实验室，然后是公司的一个部门，接着是整个公司，再后来是涵盖众多不同公司的整个行业。如今，他的思考范围已扩展到美国经济的整个高科技基础。“经济和社会就像实验室，它们定义了思想家们要解决的问题，也是企业家们从中获利的场所，”他解释道。“个人作为思想家或先知、科学家或工程师、企业家或倡导者的角色不容忽视。然而，这些角色只有在有利的社会和产业环境中才能蓬勃发展。”52
WHILE HE WAS LOBBYING on behalf of the SIA, Noyce could not stop himself from thinking beyond his particular industry. His field of vision had been expanding ever since he left the lab bench with its technical problems visible only under a microscope. He had moved on to think about organizing a laboratory, then a division of a company, then a company in its entirety, and next an industry that encompassed many different companies. Now he pushed his thoughts to include the entire high-technology base of the American economy. “Economics and societies are the laboratories that define the problems thinkers solve and on which entrepreneurs capitalize,” he explained. “The role of the individual as thinker or prophet, as scientist or engineer, as entrepreneur or advocate, is not be minimized. Yet these roles can thrive only in conducive social and insutrial environments.”52
1985年，诺伊斯写信给格兰特·盖尔说：“我花了很多时间试图弄清楚美国目前经济困境的原因。肯定是我遗漏了什么，因为我开始……”我认为我确实理解了其中的原因。”美国任由其中小学教育衰落，大学理工科课程萎缩，移民法迫使外国学生毕业后离开美国，从而使国家失去了宝贵的劳动力。他认为美国“重消费轻储蓄”的政策导致了灾难：“我们的国民储蓄率在工业化国家中垫底，我们的企业资金匮乏，我们的贸易逆差巨大，而我们的贸易伙伴却在购买我们的国民资产，”诺伊斯声称。53
In 1985, Noyce wrote to Grant Gale, “I am spending more time trying to figure out the causes for the economic malaise we are experiencing in the U.S. There must be something I’m missing, for I am beginning to think that I do understand the cause.” America had allowed its K–12 schools to decline, its college-level science and engineering classes to dwindle, and its immigration laws to force foreign students to leave the country after graduation, thereby depriving the nation of a valuable workforce. He thought that America’s “emphasis on consuming, not saving” had led to disaster: “our national savings rate is the worst in the industrial world, our corporations are starved for capital, our trade deficit is enormous, and our trading partners are buying our national assets,” Noyce claimed.53
诺伊斯告诉盖尔：“我们已经走了政治上最容易的路”来试图改善现状，“而明智的路在政治上似乎行不通。比如削减消费，为未来储蓄。”无论政治上是否可行，诺伊斯都想努力推动他认为能够“治愈”美国经济的措施。他认为应该彻底取消资本利得税以鼓励投资。他认为应该扩大研发税收抵免。他一度似乎还考虑过用消费税来取代所得税。他说：“微电子技术让我们有机会扪心自问，我们想要的是什么——是每个车库里都停着五辆车，还是一个充满活力的学术环境，更好的医疗保健？”他认为，大多数美国人储蓄率极低，对联邦赤字也持放任自流的态度，因此他们一直在不负责任地回答这个问题。他说，他愿意冒着听起来“老派”的风险，鼓励美国回归到让他自己取得成功的“基本原则”：“努力工作，存钱，接受教育，努力出人头地。”54
“We have [already] taken the politically easy road” to try to improve things, Noyce told Gale, “and the wise road seems impossible politically. Things like cutting consumption and saving for tomorrow.” Politically impossible or not, Noyce wanted to try to build momentum for the measures he believed would “cure” the American economy. He thought the capital gains tax should be dropped entirely to encourage investment. He believed R&D tax credits should be expanded. At one point he seemed to flirt with the notion of a consumption-based tax to replace income taxes. He said, “Microelectronics is giving us the opportunity to ask ourselves what we want for our society—five cars in every garage, [or] a stimulating intellectual environment, better medical care?” He thought that most Americans, with their abysmal savings rates and their laissez-faire attitudes towards the federal deficit, were consistently answering this question irresponsibly. He was willing to risk sounding “old fashioned,” he said, to encourage the United States to return to the “first principles” responsible for his own success: “Work hard, save your money, get an education, try to get ahead.”54
诺伊斯曾担任里根总统竞争力委员会成员，并在全国州长协会和国会发表讲话，积极倡导这些理念。他还努力践行自己的信念，尤其是在改善教育体系方面。1982年，他成为加州大学的理事。他设立了唐纳德·斯特林·诺伊斯本科教学卓越奖（以纪念他的兄弟），旨在表彰伯克利分校杰出的科学教学。他还领导了格林内尔学院格兰特·盖尔天文台的筹款活动。
Noyce promoted these ideas as a member of President Reagan’s competitiveness commission and in speeches before the National Governor’s Association and Congress. He also sought to act on his beliefs, particularly when it came to improving the educational system. In 1982, he became a regent of the University of California. He endowed the Donald Sterling Noyce Prize for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching (in honor of his brother) to recognize outstanding science instruction at the flagship Berkeley campus. He led the fundraising drive for the Grant O. Gale Observatory at Grinnell College.
诺伊斯断言：“美国人的集体个人主义将继续为投资、盈利和个人成就提供机会。” 他在20世纪80年代与年轻企业家的合作日益增多，这可以被理解为他努力巩固这种在他年轻时就支撑着他的“集体个人主义”纽带。1982年，他加入了一家公司的董事会，该公司计划开发一种磁记录技术，该技术有望在速度更快、成本更低的情况下，将密度提高一个数量级。这家名为Censtor的公司最终以失败告终。诺伊斯也1979 年，诺伊斯与保罗·霍斯金斯基的私人投资合伙企业卡拉尼什基金友好解散后，诺伊斯开始与亚瑟·洛克一起投资。诺伊斯和洛克没有正式的投资合伙关系，但正如洛克所说，“我们会互相拉拢对方加入”。55
Noyce averred, “The collective individualism of Americans will continue to provide opportunity for investment, profit, and individual accomplishment.” His work with young entrepreneurs, which only increased in the 1980s, can be understood as an effort to reinforce these bonds of “collective individualism” that had supported him as a young man. In 1982, he joined the board of a company that planned to build a magnetic recording technology that could offer a potential order of magnitude improvement in density while working faster and costing less than any competitive product. The company, called Censtor, did not prove successful. Noyce also began investing with Arthur Rock after the Callanish Fund (Noyce’s private investment partnership with Paul Hwoschinsky) was amicably dissolved in 1979. Noyce and Rock did not have a formal investment partnership, but as Rock puts it, “We’d rope each other in.”55
两人共同投资了几家小公司：通用信号公司（General Signal）、莫霍克数据科学公司（Mohawk Data Sciences），以及在迈克·马库拉（Mike Markkula）的力荐下成立的沃兰特公司（Volant）。沃兰特公司生产一种新型钢制滑雪板，诺伊斯（Noyce）试用过原型后，确信它能立即提升他的滑雪水平。沃兰特公司的创始人巴基·柏和（Bucky Kashiwa）和他的兄弟汉克（Hank）始终不确定诺伊斯是否真的在意从公司赚钱。他最关心的是把这款出色的新型滑雪板推向市场——或者至少，让他自己穿上它。56
The two men together funded several small companies: General Signal, Mohawk Data Sciences, and, at the urging of Mike Markkula, Volant, a manufacturer of a novel steel ski that Noyce, who tried a prototype, was convinced instantly improved his skiing. It was never clear to Volant’s founders, Bucky Kashiwa and his brother Hank, that Noyce particularly cared about making money from the company. His primary concern was to get this fantastic new ski on the market—or at the very least, onto his own boot.56
诺伊斯和洛克还投资了迪亚索尼克斯公司，该公司开发和制造医疗成像系统，例如数字X光机和计算机控制的超声设备。诺伊斯一直对科技与医学的交叉领域很感兴趣，过去也曾在该领域进行过一些小额投资。但诺伊斯对迪亚索尼克斯的近80万美元投资，是他迄今为止对单一企业投入的最大一笔资金。作为回报，诺伊斯获得了330万股股票。（洛克是董事会主席，他的投资额略高于诺伊斯，持有390万股。）1983年迪亚索尼克斯上市时，筹集了1.23亿美元，超过了自1975年阿道夫·库尔斯公司上市以来任何一家公司的融资额。几周之内，诺伊斯的股份价值就接近1亿美元。但迪亚索尼克斯误判了市场，上市不到一年，公司就勉强收支平衡。该股在首次公开募股后不久股价曾接近每股30美元，但到1985年已跌至每股7.5美元。不久后，美国证券交易委员会（SEC）开始调查Diasonics公司的一名高管，指控其涉嫌内幕交易，同时一群股东提起诉讼，指控该公司误导投资者，夸大了其发展前景。到1988年，Rock和Noyce持有的股份价值仅为每股2.80美元，低于他们的买入价。57
Noyce and Rock also invested in Diasonics, a company that developed and built medical imaging systems, such as digital X-rays and computer-driven ultrasound equipment. The intersection of technology and medicine had long interested Noyce, and he had made a few small investments in the area in the past. But the nearly $800,000 that Noyce invested in Diasonics was by far the largest he had directed into any single business. In exchange, Noyce received 3.3 million shares of stock. (Rock, who chaired the board and invested slightly more than Noyce, held 3.9 million shares.) When Diasonics went public in 1983, it raised $123 million, more money than any company since the Adolph Coors Co. offering in 1975. Within weeks, Noyce’s stake was worth almost $100 million. But Diasonics misjudged the market and less than a year after the IPO, the company was barely breaking even. The stock, which traded at almost $30 a share shortly after the IPO, was down to 7½ by 1985. Soon the SEC was investigating a Diasonics executive for alleged insider trading, and a group of shareholders filed suit, alleging the company misled investors about its prospects. By 1988, Rock’s and Noyce’s holdings were worth only $2.80 a share, less than what they had paid for them.57
诺伊斯继续将大部分精力投入到条形码扫描器公司Caere，这家公司是他几年前开出的空白支票投资的。1985年，Caere的长期首席财务官鲍勃·特雷西（Bob Teresi）——他最近被任命为公司总裁——提议公司收取微薄的利润，偿还投资者，然后关门大吉。显然，Caere在条形码阅读器行业永远不可能取得巨大成功。
NOYCE CONTINUED TO TRAIN most of his entrepreneurial attention on Caere, the barcode-scanner company for which he had written the blank check several years before. In 1985, Bob Teresi, Caere’s longtime CFO who had recently been named the company’s president, proposed that the firm take its small profits, repay its investors, and close up shop. Caere was clearly never going to make it big in the barcode-reader business.
诺伊斯认为解决办法是改变商业模式。“鲍勃的想法是，人们可以把杂志页面放进扫描仪里，扫描仪能够识别页面并将其转换成可编辑的格式，”特雷西回忆道。“我觉得鲍勃的想法根本不合理——要处理他提出的如此复杂的内容，需要一台超级计算机。”
Noyce thought the solution was to change the business model. “Bob had the idea [that a person should be able to] stick a magazine page in a scanner that would be able to recognize it and convert it into a format that could be edited,” recalls Teresi. “I thought Bob’s idea was just not reasonable—it would take a supercomputer to be able to process something as complex as what he was proposing.
“但鲍勃在很多方面都预感到了即将发生的事情，”特雷西继续说道。诺伊斯向凯尔提出了他那略显异想天开的下一款产品建议几天后，特雷西遇到了两位年轻人——一位钢琴家和一位电脑程序员——他们给他看了一份商业计划书，其中提出的方案与诺伊斯的设想非常相似。诺伊斯认为他们的方案似乎可行。凯尔与这两位年轻人以及另外两位工程师签订了产品开发合同，用特雷西的话说，“给他们安排了一间位于伯克利车库楼上的工作室，并提供津贴和一台意式咖啡机。”
“But Bob knew what was coming down the pipe in so many ways,” Teresi continues. A few days after Noyce offered his rather outrageous suggestion for Caere’s next product, Teresi met a pair of young men—a pianist and a computer programmer—who gave him a business plan proposing something very similar to Noyce’s vision. Noyce thought their approach seemed plausible. Caere gave the pair and two other engineers a contract to develop the product and, in Teresi’s words, “set them up in a space over a garage in Berkeley with a stipend and espresso machine.”
从这四位员工——Vijayakumar Rangarajan、William W. Allen、James Chen 和 Tong Chen——的名字中，我们可以窥见1975年至1990年间，来自印度和中国的受过高等教育的移民浪潮的痕迹。正是这股浪潮，使得圣克拉拉县的外国出生人口数量在1975年至1990年间翻了一番。到1990年，加州高科技公司雇佣的工程师和科学家中，有四分之一出生于美国以外。这些年轻工程师的名字如今来自世界各地，但这种探索精神对诺伊斯来说却并不陌生。58
In the names of these four employees—Vijayakumar Rangarajan, William W. Allen, James Chen, and Tong Chen—one can discern evidence of the wave of highly educated immigrants from India and China who helped to double the size of the foreign-born population of Santa Clara County between 1975 and 1990. By 1990, one-quarter of the engineers and scientists employed in California high-technology companies were born outside the United States. The young engineers’ names now came from around the world, but the spirit of the quest was familiar to Noyce.58
大约每月一次，诺伊斯和特雷西会驱车穿过海湾大桥前往伯克利，以便诺伊斯能够查看“秘密研发部门”的技术进展。不到一年，这个车库团队就开发出了一款名为 OmniPage 的实用产品，它可以扫描文本并将其转换为可编辑的格式。在 OmniPage 开发完成后不久的一次董事会上，特雷西告诉诺伊斯，他计划将该产品集成到一台售价在 2 万至 3 万美元之间的扫描仪中。特雷西预计 Caere 公司每月能售出两台这样的扫描仪。
Roughly once a month, Noyce and Teresi would drive across the Bay Bridge to Berkeley so Noyce could review the technical progress at the “skunk works.” Within a year, the garage team had created a usable product, named OmniPage, that could scan text and convert it to a format that could be edited. At a board meeting shortly after OmniPage was developed, Teresi told Noyce that he planned to hardwire the product into a scanner that would sell for between $20,000 and $30,000. Teresi expected Caere would sell two of these scanners every month.
诺伊斯并不认为这是最佳方案，但他从未明确地向特雷西表达过这种想法。相反，他告诉特雷西，他会把他介绍给现任苹果电脑公司董事长迈克·马库拉，后者或许对OmniPage有其他想法。这种巧妙的引导正是诺伊斯的典型风格。“即使他严厉批评你，”ROLM公司首席执行官兼创始人肯尼斯·奥什曼回忆道，这家商业通信和军用计算机系统公司诺伊斯曾在其董事会任职两年，“你也会觉得很受用。” 那些被诺伊斯“批评”的人很少会认为诺伊斯觉得他们的工作不够好，或者他们的想法考虑不周。相反，他似乎是在告诉他们，他们已经非常出色的工作还可以更上一层楼。他最喜欢的一句话是：“你的想法让我不禁思考……” 例如，鲍勃·特雷西并没有把诺伊斯建议他与马库拉交谈解读为认为他开发硬件的计划考虑不周。他把这话理解为一种赞扬：诺伊斯似乎在说，这款 OmniPage 产品如此令人兴奋，值得更多人关注。所以，别急着停止思考。59
Noyce did not think this was the best way to go, but he never explicitly said as much to Teresi. Instead, he told Teresi that he would introduce him to Mike Markkula, now chairman of Apple Computer, who might have some other ideas for OmniPage. This redirection is vintage Noyce. “Even if he was blasting you,” recalls Kenneth Oshman, CEO and founder of ROLM, the business communications and military computer systems firm on whose board Noyce served for two years, “you just felt good about it.” The people on the receiving end of this “blasting” rarely believed that Noyce thought their work was inadequate or their ideas poorly considered. Instead, he seemed to be telling them that their already-excellent work could be taken even farther. One of his favorite lines was “Your ideas have made me wonder if …” Bob Teresi, for example, did not translate Noyce’s suggestion to talk to Markkula to mean that his plan to build hardware was ill conceived. He read it as a compliment: this OmniPage product is so exciting that it deserves the attention of many people, Noyce seemed to be saying. So don’t stop thinking yet.59
当迈克·马库拉与特雷西会面时，他建议OmniPage应该作为软件而非硬件销售。他还认为苹果公司可能会有意购买该软件的授权，用于其扫描仪产品中。原计划很快推出。最终，苹果公司大力推广 OmniPage——总裁约翰·斯卡利亲自在 1988 年的 MacWorld 大会上发布了该产品——以至于 Caere 公司几乎无需进行任何宣传。“苹果的背书让这款产品迅速获得了信誉，也让 Caere 公司的发展突飞猛进，”一位电脑销售主管解释道。在 1988 年 MacWorld 大会之后的一年里，OmniPage 的销售额达到了 1000 万美元。60
When Mike Markkula met with Teresi, he suggested that OmniPage should be sold as software, not hardware. He also thought that Apple might want to license the software for use in a scanner the company planned to introduce soon. In the end, Apple promoted OmniPage so heavily—President John Sculley personally introduced it at MacWorld 1988—that Caere had to do very little publicity itself. “The Apple endorsement gave the product immediate credibility and put a rocket under [Caere],” explained one computer sales executive. Sales of OmniPage were $10 million in the year following MacWorld 1988.60
OmniPage的成功推出使Caere得以在1989年6月上市，其发行成为当年最成功的IPO之一。到12月，诺伊斯持有的近40万股股票价值近900万美元。这笔收益让那些多年来一直嘲笑诺伊斯一心扑在“少年创业”上的朋友们哑口无言。61
The successful launch of OmniPage enabled Caere to go public in June 1989, with an offering that was one of the most successful of the year. By December, Noyce’s nearly 400,000 shares were worth almost $9 million. The returns went a long way towards silencing the friends who for years had teased Noyce about his devotion to his “teenage startup.”61
诺伊斯通过与教育机构和初创公司合作，通过向国会和行业团体发表关于储蓄和学习重要性的演讲，尽自己的一份力，正如他所说，以确保美国仍然是“所有未来成功者的机遇之地”。62
In his work with educational institutions and startup companies, in his speeches before Congress and industry groups about the importance of saving and learning, Noyce was doing his part, as he put it, to ensure American remained “the land of opportunity for all of those who will be the achievers of the future.”62
总而言之，诺伊斯很满足。他很享受在SIA的工作。孩子们都已长大成人，而且大多过得很好。他和安·鲍尔斯也过得很幸福。他们翻修了位于洛约拉大道上的房子。从街上看，房子依然毫不起眼，但正如一位朋友所说，房子内部“变成了度假胜地”，“就像你在参观豪宅时会看到的那种房子，绝对是热闹非凡的场所”。在后院，诺伊斯和鲍尔斯建了一个大池塘、一个桑拿房和一个不规则形状的泳池，泳池里有瀑布和人造岩石，用来隐藏控制装置。诺伊斯的兄弟们私下里把这处改造后的房产称为“北方迪士尼乐园”。
ALL IN ALL, NOYCE WAS CONTENT. He enjoyed the SIA work. His children were grown and for the most part doing well. He and Ann Bowers were happy together. They remodeled the house on Loyola Drive. From the street it appeared as unassuming as ever, but inside, it “became a resort,” as one friend put it, “something you would see on a house tour, and definitely a happening.” In the backyard, Noyce and Bowers installed a large pond, a sauna, and a free-form pool with waterfalls and artificial rocks to hide the controls. Noyces’ brothers privately called the remodeled property “Disneyland North.”
短短几年间，诺伊斯和鲍尔斯就和朋友们一起去了澳大利亚、波拉波拉岛、加勒比海地区、塔希提岛、大堡礁、巴厘岛、维尔京群岛、墨西哥、新几内亚、韩国和日本。他们每年还会去阿斯彭住上几个星期，他们在那里买了一栋房子。63
Over the course of just a few years, Noyce and Bowers traveled with friends to Australia, Bora Bora, the Carribbean, Tahiti, the Great Barrier Reef, Bali, the Virgin Islands, Mexico, New Guinea, Korea, and Japan. They also spent several weeks each year in Aspen, where they had bought a home.63
1984年，诺伊斯和鲍尔斯随英特尔代表团访问中国。期间，诺伊斯会见了中国总理赵紫阳，赵紫阳询问了他对中国微型计算机和半导体发展的看法。诺伊斯还被北京航空航天学院授予“荣誉教授”称号。英特尔代表团与一个“微型计算机用户组”的成员会面，探讨了制造业的发展趋势和技术方向。访问结束时，英特尔代表团成员对繁复的正式晚宴感到厌倦，于是决定在某晚的晚餐中，把各自行李箱里的零食都拿出来凑合着吃。那天晚上，他们在诺伊斯和鲍尔斯的酒店房间地板上，一边吃着放久的薯片，一边品尝着飞机上提供的迷你苏格兰威士忌，那滋味却比他们想象的还要美味。64
In 1984, Noyce and Bowers joined an Intel delegation visiting China, where Noyce met with Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang—who asked his opinions on developing microcomputers and semiconductors in China—and was named “Honourable Professor” by the Beijing Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. The Intel representatives met with members of a “microcomputers users group” and spoke on trends in manufacturing and technology direction. By the trip’s end, the Intel contingent was so tired of elaborate formal meals that for one night’s dinner they decided to pool their private stashes from their suitcases. The stale potato chips and airplane-issued mini bottles of scotch they shared that night on the floor of Noyce and Bowers’s hotel room tasted better than anything they could have imagined.64
诺伊斯发现了水肺潜水的乐趣，在迪士尼乐园的泳池里练习了一段时间后，他就获得了潜水证。他喜欢拍摄水下照片，经常花几个小时待在地下室里，加热并塑形大块塑料，为他的相机制作防水外壳。当然，他本来可以买一台防水相机，但他总是想要最新的配件，而这些配件很少具备防水功能。在他和鲍尔斯一起进行的多次潜水度假中，他的相机时好时坏，时而漏水，时而漂浮在水面上。
Noyce discovered scuba diving and after a bit of practice in his Disneyland pool, he was certified to dive. He enjoyed taking photos deep beneath the surface and spent hours in his basement warming and shaping large pieces of plastic to work as waterproof casings for his cameras. He could have bought a waterproof camera, of course, but he always wanted the latest accessories, and they were rarely water resistant. During the many diving vacations he and Bowers took together, his cameras intermittently worked, leaked, and floated.
诺伊斯偶尔会灵光一闪，想到一些点子——通常是关于改进相机——然后他会随手把想法记在手边任何能找到的纸上：随便一张法律用纸、酒店信笺、小便签纸、电脑打印稿的背面，甚至是光伏组件价目表的背面。他把这些涂鸦称为“涂鸦”，里面充满了图表、方程式、绘图和电路图，内容包罗万象，从焦距计算到频闪灯连接器故障排除，再到一些占据整页篇幅的莫名其妙的计算。诺伊斯显然非常热爱这种思考方式。他的涂鸦上到处都是感叹号和下划线，字里行间流露出他的兴奋之情。65
Every once in a while, Noyce would be struck with an idea—usually for an improvement to a camera—and he would jot down his thoughts on the nearest available sheet of paper: a random legal pad, hotel stationery, tiny memo sheets, the backs of computer printouts, the reverse side of a price list for photovoltaic modules. His “doodles,” as he called them, are filled with graphs, equations, drawings, and electrical diagrams covering everything from focal length calculations, to strobe connector troubleshooting, to unidentified calculations that continue for the length of the page. Noyce clearly adored this sort of thinking. His doodles are punctuated with exclamation points and underlines that bring his excitement off the page.65
到了20世纪80年代中期，诺伊斯已经为自己设计出了一个近乎完美的、充实而精彩的退休生活。他有时间旅行、钻研各种技术，指导年轻的创业者；与此同时，SIA的努力也为他提供了有意义的工作，让他重返那个他曾经无比渴望离开的舞台。
By the middle of the 1980s, Noyce had managed to design a nearly ideal jam-packed version of retirement for himself. He had time to travel and tinker and mentor young entrepreneurs, but at the same time, the SIA’s efforts provided him meaningful work that returned him to the stage he had found so hard to leave.
当诺伊斯想要彻底摆脱游说和投资工作时，有两个地方能让他感到平静：一是1982年他和鲍尔斯在卡梅尔谷买下的那座占地6500英亩的牧场；二是翱翔蓝天。这座牧场距离硅谷两小时车程，地处偏僻，只有那些知道路的人才能找到。远离硅谷和华盛顿的喧嚣，诺伊斯和鲍尔斯可以骑马，偶尔还会以一种非常特别的方式一起读一本廉价的平装书。鲍尔斯读完一小段后，会把它从书脊上撕下来递给诺伊斯读。66
When he wanted to escape his lobbying and investment work completely, Noyce could find peace in two places—at the 6,500-acre ranch in Carmel Valley that he and Bowers purchased in 1982, and in the air. The ranch was two hours from Silicon Valley, in an isolated spot that only people who had been told how to get there could have found. Away from the demands of the valley and Washington, Noyce and Bowers could ride horses and occasionally even read a cheap paperback together in a most unusual fashion. When Bowers finished a section, she would rip it out of the binding and hand it to Noyce to read.66
他的飞机给他带来了更大的自由。当然，诺伊斯喜欢飞行也有实际原因。这节省了他的时间。他估计自己每年飞行大约100小时，其中40小时是商务飞行。他经常亲自飞往华盛顿参加商务会议，直到鲍尔斯担心他会筋疲力尽地飞回家，才让他雇佣了一名飞行员。他也喜欢操控飞机带来的身体挑战——他曾经为了测试自己能否做到，直接冲过一团小小的雷暴云——当他告诉一位电视记者，他喜欢飞行的原因在于“人战胜自然”，以及“科技使人类能够做到以前做不到的事情”时，他用了一些老生常谈的话。（顺便提一下，诺伊斯提到个人电脑和飞机在这方面很相似：个人电脑是一种……）技术进步使人们能够“探索原本可能超出他们能力范围的智力活动”。）67
His planes offered even more release. Noyce liked to fly for practical reasons, of course. It saved him time. He estimated that he flew roughly 100 hours per year, 40 of those on business. He regularly flew himself to Washington and to business meetings until Bowers, worried he might fly himself home exhausted, asked him to hire a pilot. He also liked the physical challenge of controlling a plane—he once barreled right through a baby thunderhead cloud just to see if he could do it—and he resorted to cliché when he told a television reporter that what he enjoyed about flying was that “it’s man over nature,” with “technology allow[ing] man to do something that he could not earlier do.” (As an aside, Noyce mentioned that the personal computer was similar to the airplane in this way: the PC was a technical advance that enabled people “to explore intellectual activities” that might otherwise have been beyond their grasp.)67
但与诺伊斯一起飞行过的人都觉得，他飞上天空也是为了逃避地面上的生活。诺伊斯的朋友兼飞行教练吉姆·拉弗蒂说：“他喜欢独处。他喜欢与世隔绝，独自一人待在高空。在那里，你可以做任何你想做的事，去任何你想去的地方。”拉弗蒂回忆说，他曾与诺伊斯一起飞行一个小时甚至更久，全程一片寂静。但诺伊斯也并非总是想“谈论太空、谈论无限或谈论永恒”。其中一个晚上尤其令我印象深刻：“我记得他当时在谈论波义耳定律。[十七世纪科学家罗伯特·波义耳提出的方程描述了密闭气体的压力和体积之间的关系，这是飞机发动机物理学的重要组成部分。] 那简直就是一篇论文。鲍勃滔滔不绝地讲着他脑子里那些我完全无法理解的方程式和计算……当时飞机在三万九千到四万一千英尺的高空，开启了自动驾驶，所有灯光都调暗了，他正独自驾驶着飞机起飞。我当时真应该关掉电脑，走到飞机后部，让他自言自语。”68
But people who flew with Noyce felt that he also took to the skies to escape his life on the ground. Jim Lafferty, Noyce’s friend and sometime flight instructor, said, “He liked the aloneness. He loved to be disconnected, up there, by himself. You can do whatever you want to do, go wherever you want to go.” Lafferty recalls flying with Noyce for an hour or more in complete silence. But it was not unusual for Noyce to want to “talk about space, about infinity, or eternity.” One night in particular stands out: “I remember him talking about Boyle’s Law. [Seventeenth-century scientist Robert Boyle’s equation describing the relationship between the pressure and volume of a confined gas is an important part of the physics behind aircraft engines.] It was a dissertation, really. Bob took off into equations and calculations out of his head that were so far beyond what I could comprehend. … There he was at 39,000, 41,000 feet, with the airplane on auto pilot, the lights all turned down, and he’s taking off on his own. I might as well have switched off and gone to the back of the airplane and let him talk to himself.”68
1984年，诺伊斯决定购买一架塞斯纳奖状轻型喷气式飞机，这架飞机对驾驶技能的要求比他之前驾驶过的任何其他飞机都要高。他的飞机将被运送到位于堪萨斯州威奇托的塞斯纳飞行学校。在完成为期两周的培训课程并获得奖状所需的机型等级后，他就可以驾驶这架飞机回家了。69
In 1984, Noyce decided to buy a Cessna Citation, a light jet that required more sophisticated piloting skills than he had needed for any of his other aircraft. His plane would be delivered to the site of Cessna’s flight school in Wichita, Kansas. After he graduated from a two-week training course with the type rating he needed for the Citation, he would be able to fly his plane home.69
诺伊斯出资让吉姆·拉弗蒂和他一起去飞行学校，两人都觉得课程非常艰苦。每天的课程包括八小时的教室和模拟器实战训练，外加晚上几个小时的录像复习。诺伊斯从未驾驶过如此高速且复杂的飞机。他发现摸索着操作新的仪表盘让他非常沮丧。在模拟器中，他难以控制飞机的速度，并且认为自己在仪表着陆时操作失误。他的教官们经常遇到类似的问题，他们向诺伊斯保证，多加练习就会熟练，但他始终觉得自己不够优秀。上课几天后，他告诉拉弗蒂：“我做不到，我现在还没准备好。”他希望拉弗蒂——拉弗蒂的学习进度比诺伊斯快得多——能够完成课程，然后驾驶他的喷气式飞机返回加利福尼亚。诺伊斯会和拉弗蒂一起驾驶飞机来磨练自己的技能，只有当他确信自己能够在那里表现出色时，才会回到飞行学校。
Noyce paid for Jim Lafferty to attend the flight school with him, and both men found the program grueling. A typical day consisted of eight hours of direct instruction in classrooms and simulators, plus a few evening hours spent reviewing videos. Noyce had never flown such a fast or complex aircraft. He found it frustrating to grope his way around the new instrument panel. In the simulator, he had problems controlling the plane’s speed and thought he flubbed his attempts at landing using instruments. His instructors, who saw students with these troubles all the time, assured Noyce that it would get easier with practice, but he did not enjoy thinking of himself as anything less than a highly competent pilot. A few days into classes, he told Lafferty, “I can’t do this; I’m not ready right now.” He wanted Lafferty, who was having a less difficult time, to finish the program and fly Noyce’s jet back to California. Noyce would hone his skills by flying the plane with Lafferty and would return to flight school only when he was confident he could perform exceptionally well there.
在与拉弗蒂（拉弗蒂说诺伊斯“就是不肯放弃”）一起训练了几周后，诺伊斯认为自己的技能已经达到了标准，于是回到塞斯纳飞机学校完成正式课程。这一次，他轻松获得了所需的机型等级。
After a few weeks training with Lafferty (who said Noyce “just wouldn’t give up”), Noyce decided his skills met his own standards and returned to the Cessna school to complete his formal instruction. This time he easily obtained the type rating he needed.
1985年，诺伊斯再次展现了他“精益求精”的精神，与吉姆·拉弗蒂和迈克·马库拉一起，认为硅谷需要一个顶级的私人飞机设施。当时，市属机库的预订名单已经排到了十年之后。三人联合了14位投资者，在圣何塞机场西侧购置了一块15英亩的土地，并开始进行建设。圣何塞喷气机中心于1986年开业，拥有20万平方英尺的机库和办公空间。诺伊斯在喷气机中心董事会任职数年，该中心的创始人可以讲述一个与凯尔公司非常相似的故事，讲述他如何坚持不懈地推动项目进展。拉弗蒂回忆说，诺伊斯总是说：“放手去做吧。一切都会好起来的。如果出了问题，我会想办法解决。”70
In 1985, in yet another of his why-not-make-it-better moves, Noyce, along with Jim Lafferty and Mike Markkula, decided that Silicon Valley needed a top-of-the-line facility for private aircraft. The city-owned hangars had ten-year waiting lists. The trio joined forces with a group of 14 investors who bought a 15-acre property west of the San Jose airport and began building on it. The San Jose Jet Center opened in 1986 with 200,000 square feet of hangar and office space. Noyce served on the board of the Jet Center for several years, and the center’s founders can tell a story, very similar to the one at Caere, about his refusing to let the project fail. His message, recalls Lafferty, was always the same: “Go ahead and do it. It’ll be okay. And if it’s not okay, I’ll make it okay.”70
12
公共创业公司
12
Public Startup
1988年夏天，诺伊斯决定放弃他充实而忙碌的退休生活和挚爱的加州，转而执掌SEMATECH——一家由美国半导体工业协会（SIA）支持、总部位于德克萨斯州奥斯汀的半导体制造联盟。诺伊斯的决定，至少可以说，令人费解。SEMATECH由14家半导体公司联合组建并出资，每年从美国国防部获得1亿美元的拨款，而SEMATECH的方方面面几乎都与诺伊斯的优势和兴趣背道而驰。他毕生都在拒绝让公司承担国防部资助的研究项目，但SEMATECH本身就是一个政府研究项目。他向来对各种形式的官僚机构抱有怀疑，但很难想象还有什么比一个由十几家公司和一个庞大的政府机构共同运营的联盟更具官僚作风的了。他热衷于打造持久的团队和文化，但SEMATECH的设计初衷却是采用轮换式“派遣人员”模式，这些人员由各个公司支付薪酬，在SEMATECH工作仅两年。1980年，诺伊斯曾在国会作证时表示，他怀疑半导体公司是否能够在研发方面进行合作——而合作研发正是SEMATECH背后的驱动愿景。“创新并非由委员会决策所推动，”他曾说道，“多元化并非美国传统……个人主义才是，而且大多数（美国半导体）公司都有着……创业的历史，他们相信自己能比任何人都做得更好。” 一个拥有如此信念的人，在他人生中本可以做任何事的阶段，最终为何会执掌像SEMATECH这样由国防部资助的庞然大物呢？1
In the summer of 1988, Noyce decided to leave his satisfyingly busy retirement and his beloved California to run SEMATECH, a semiconductor manufacturing consortium supported by the SIA and based in Austin, Texas. Noyce’s decision was curious, to say the least. Almost nothing about SEMATECH, which was jointly staffed and funded by 14 semiconductor companies, and that received $100 million annually from the Department of Defense, jibed with Noyce’s strengths or interests. He had spent his career refusing to take on Defense Department-sponsored research projects at his companies, but SEMATECH was its own sort of government research project. He was suspicious of all forms of bureaucracy, but it is hard to imagine a more bureaucratic arrangement than a consortium operated by more than a dozen companies and a hulking government agency. He took great joy in building enduring teams and cultures, but SEMATECH was designed to function with a revolving team of “assignees” who would be paid by individual corporations and work at SEMATECH for a period of only two years. In 1980, Noyce had testified before Congress that he had doubted whether semiconductor companies could ever cooperate on research—and cooperative research was the driving vision behind SEMATECH. “Innovation is not fostered by committee decisions,” he had said. “Pluralism is not an American tradition. … individualism is, and most [American semiconductor] companies have … an entrepreneurial history, and they believe they can do anything better than anybody else.” How did a man with such beliefs, at a stage in his life where he could have done anything, end up running a defense-sponsored behemoth like SEMATECH?1
SEMATECH项目由半导体研究公司（Semiconductor Research Corporation）发起，该公司是一个支持大学研究的行业联盟。查理·斯波克（Charlie Sporck）大力倡导该项目，并亲自拜访了数十家美国半导体行业协会（SIA）成员公司的管理人员，力证无论国会通过多少立法，除非美国制造工艺得到改进，否则美国公司永远无法在长期内与日本公司竞争。情况有所改善。斯波克最初设想 SEMATECH 是一个由多家公司组成的运营机构，主要由国防部资助，以如此大的规模和如此高的效率生产存储设备，从而“摧毁价格”，斯波克说，“真正让日本人难堪”。2
SEMATECH was conceived by the Semiconductor Research Corporation, an industry consortium that supports university research. Charlie Sporck championed the project and personally visited dozens of executives at SIA-member companies to argue that no matter how much legislation they pushed through Congress, United States firms would never be able to compete with the Japanese over the long-term unless American manufacturing processes were improved. Sporck originally envisioned SEMATECH as a multi-firm operation, funded to a significant degree by the Department of Defense, that would manufacture memory devices in such volume and with such efficiency as to “destroy the prices,” said Sporck, “really give the Japanese a hard time.”2
这项计划很大程度上效仿了日本在20世纪70年代末期非常成功的财团模式，但很快就夭折了。这样的安排几乎肯定会违反反垄断法；即便不违反，SIA成员公司德州仪器和IBM在整个80年代仍然持续销售大量存储设备，它们绝不会乐见自己的产品价格“暴跌”。
This plan, largely modeled on Japan’s highly successful consortium efforts of the late 1970s, was short-lived. Such an arrangement would almost certainly violate antitrust laws; and even if it did not, SIA-member companies Texas Instruments and IBM continued to sell large volumes of memory devices throughout the 1980s, and they would not appreciate “destroyed prices” for their products.
事实证明，要找到替代SEMATECH这一使命的组织并非易事。1987年夏天，SIA在圣克拉拉举办了一系列会议，会议清楚地表明，尽管SIA的每个人都希望成立一个类似SEMATECH的组织来改善美国的半导体制造业，但没有人确切地知道这个组织应该做些什么。3
Replacing this mission for SEMATECH proved difficult. A series of SIA-sponsored meetings in Santa Clara in the summer 1987 made it clear that while everyone involved with the SIA wanted a SEMATECH-type organization to do something to improve American semiconductor manufacturing, no one knew precisely what that something should be.3
简而言之，三个不同的利益相关方希望该联盟承担三种不同的任务。十大军工承包商中有八家很可能是SEMATECH的成员，他们认为SEMATECH应该专注于开发“灵活”的生产线，这种生产线能够先生产少量符合某种军用规格的专用芯片，然后通过计算机快速改造，生产完全不同的芯片以满足另一种军用需求。4
In the simplest terms, three different constituencies wanted three different missions for the consortium. Eight of the ten major military contractors were likely SEMATECH members, and they believed SEMATECH should focus on developing “flexible” manufacturing lines that could produce a small batch of specialized chips for one military specification and then be quickly re-tooled via computers to produce a completely different chip to meet another military requirement.4
另一方面，大型半导体企业则放弃了灵活、专业化的批量生产模式，转而致力于提升行业大规模生产下一代芯片的能力。为了实现这一目标，英特尔、德州仪器和摩托罗拉等公司希望改进其晶圆厂的设备和材料。这些公司过去常常花费一年多的时间和数亿美元来评估和验证用于芯片制造的工具。他们希望SEMATECH能够承担这项调试工作。
At the other end of the spectrum were the large merchant semiconductor firms who eschewed a focus on flexible, specialized batch production in favor of honing the industry’s ability to mass produce large volumes of next-generation chips. To achieve this goal, companies such as Intel, Texas Instruments, and Motorola wanted to improve the equipment and materials that went into their fabs. These companies were each accustomed to spending more than a year and several hundred million dollars evaluating and qualifying the tools they used to build chips. They wanted SEMATECH to do this de-bugging.
然而，还有第三类公司，它们规模较小，主要由半导体业务部门组成（例如惠普、LSI Logic 和美光），它们希望 SEMATECH 的重点不是制造过程中使用的设备，而是制造过程本身。这些公司通常比大公司落后一年之久，因此当它们购买设备时，大公司实际上已经为它们进行了精细的调整。这些小公司需要的是一个分享“秘诀”制造技术的平台，一个学习其他公司如何优化制造流程的地方，理想情况下，它们还希望获得一本“秘籍”，可以带回自己的公司，指导它们如何操作。
Yet a third group, made up of firms with smaller semiconductor operations (Hewlett-Packard, LSI Logic, and Micron, for example) wanted SEMATECH to focus not on the equipment used in the manufacturing process, but on the process itself. These companies usually lagged behind the big ones by a good year, so by the time they bought the equipment, the larger firms had effectively fine-tuned it for them. What these smaller companies wanted was a forum for sharing “black magic” manufacturing knowhow, a place to learn how other companies had made the process work best for them, and ideally, a “recipe” book they could take back to their own firms telling them exactly how to do it themselves.
每个团体都担心其他两个团体试图从SEMATECH展会上获得比他们投入更多的利益。大型机构表示，小型机构……各家公司都在试图逃避自己的工作。小公司抱怨说，大公司只想专注于先进设备的改进，而这些改进只会让大公司受益。那些并非以军工合同为核心业务的公司则公开质疑，这种柔性制造模式的设计初衷是否更多是为了国防部的利益，而非半导体行业。所有人都担心，自己公司缴纳的巨额会费——会员费为一次性100万美元的入会费，外加每年相当于公司销售额1%或100万美元（以较低者为准）的会费——会被用来推进竞争对手的计划。
Each group worried that the other two were trying to get more out of SEMATECH than they put into it. Big operations said small ones were trying to avoid doing their own work. Small ones said big ones wanted to focus on advanced equipment improvements that would benefit only the big companies. Firms not centered around military contracts wondered aloud if the flexible manufacturing option was designed to benefit the Department of Defense more than the semiconductor industry. Everyone was concerned that their company’s sizable contribution—membership dues were set at a one-time $1 million entry fee, plus annual dues equal to either 1 percent of a company’s sales or $1 million, whichever was less—not be used to further a competitor’s agenda.
关于SEMATECH的三种相互竞争的愿景始终未能达成一致。集思广益的小组没有制定一个统一的联盟计划，而是炮制了一本厚达四英寸的“黑皮书”，有人将其描述为“一个宏伟的计划，旨在以每年仅1亿美元的总投资完成成员公司无法完成的一切”。英特尔、摩托罗拉或德州仪器的年度研发预算约为4亿美元——然而，这些公司甚至连黑皮书中列出的雄心勃勃的计划的一部分都没能实现。5
The three competing visions for SEMATECH were never reconciled. Instead of a single unifying plan for the consortium, the brainstorming group produced a four-inch-thick “black book” that one person described as “a grandiose scheme to do everything that the member companies couldn’t do—but with a total investment of only $100 million per year.” The annual R&D budget at Intel, Motorola, or Texas Instruments was roughly $400 million—and yet none of these companies had accomplished even a portion of the ambitious agenda outlined in the black book.5
该黑皮书还为SEMATECH制定了三阶段技术计划。每个阶段都以半导体电路上的电路径宽度来定义。半导体芯片表面可追踪的电路数量部分取决于电路路径的宽度，而路径宽度以微米（百万分之一米）为单位。（一根头发的直径约为75微米。）路径越窄，可追踪的电路数量就越多。美国芯片行业的第一阶段目标是在三年内制造出路径宽度为0.80微米的芯片，这是一个很容易实现的目标。第二阶段的目标是在1992年第二季度将线宽缩小至0.50微米。第三阶段计划于1993年底完成，目标是将线宽缩小至0.35微米——这是一个雄心勃勃的目标，因为大多数预测认为，在1996年之前，独立研发的公司无法生产0.35微米的芯片（例如64Mb DRAM）。SEMATECH声称，这三个阶段大致对应于美国半导体产业恢复全球竞争力、保持市场均势以及重夺全球领导地位——但SEMATECH将如何帮助实现这一精心设计的阶段性目标却未作具体说明。6
The black book also established a three-phased technical plan for SEMATECH. Each phase was defined by the width of the electrical paths on the semiconductor circuits. The number of circuits that can be traced on the surface of a semiconductor chip depends, in part, on the width of the circuit paths, which are measured in microns, one-millionths of a meter. (A human hair is about 75 microns in diameter.) The narrower the path, the greater the number of traceable circuits. The Phase I objective for the American chip industry was to build chips with 0.80-micron paths within three years, an easily attainable goal. The Phase II objective was to reduce this size to .50-micron lines by the second quarter of 1992. In Phase III, to be complete by the end of 1993, the geometries would be .35-micron—an ambitious target, since most projections held that companies working on their own would not be able to produce .35 micron chips (such as 64Mb DRAMs) before 1996. SEMATECH claimed that the three stages roughly corresponded to recovering global competitiveness, maintaining parity, and regaining global leadership for the United States semiconductor industry—but how SEMATECH would aid in the achievement of this neatly phased agenda was left unspecified.6
那本黑皮书的封面上写着一份措辞含糊不清的使命宣言，以至于无人能够提出异议：“为美国半导体产业提供世界领先的制造能力。”7
The black book was crowned with a mission statement so vaguely worded that no one could object to it. “To provide the U.S. semiconductor industry the capability for world leadership in manufacturing.”7
与此同时，美国汽车工业协会（SIA）的游说团队开始积极争取联邦政府为SEMATECH项目提供资金，他们强调，已承诺加入该联盟的十家公司合计占美国汽车工业制造业总量的约80%。SEMATECH项目将是帮助整个行业的一次性举措，同时，各公司自身也将受益，因为它们将承担一半的资金。这个联盟。事实上，SEMATECH 的支持者们乐于将这项工作描述为“高科技谷仓建造”。正如其中一位解释的那样：“你知道，农民在田里干活，谷仓被闪电击中，方圆几英里的邻居都会出来帮他重建一个。然而，之后他们又会立刻展开激烈的竞争，看谁能种出最好的棉花或其他作物。”他们承诺，SEMATECH 也将如此。8
Meanwhile, the SIA’s platoon of lobbying executives began to push for federal government funding for SEMATECH, emphasizing that the ten companies already committed as members of the would-be consortium together accounted for some 80 percent of the American industry’s manufacturing base. SEMATECH would be a one-shot way to help an entire industry that would also be helping itself by providing half the money for the consortium. SEMATECH’s proponents, in fact, enjoyed describing the effort as “a high-tech barn raising.” As one of them explained, “You know, the farmer’s out there, and lightning hits the barn, and the neighbors from miles around come out and help him build a new one. And yet, then they turn right around and compete very heavily with each other as to who’s going to raise the best cotton crop or whatnot.” So it would be with SEMATECH, they promised.8
诺伊斯积极推动该联盟的成立，他先后在众议院和参议院发言，强调需要一个平台，让“业界能够在真实的生产条件下开发和测试先进制造技术”。他指出，尽管半导体行业已经通过发表论文和技术会议等方式共享科学和工程知识，但目前尚无机制共享制造方面的知识。SEMATECH 可以填补这一空白。9
Noyce did his part to promote the consortium, speaking to both the House and the Senate on the need for a vehicle through which “the industry will develop and test advanced manufacturing technology under realistic production conditions.” He pointed out that while the semiconductor industry already shared scientific and engineering knowledge—through published papers and technical conferences—no mechanism existed to share manufacturing knowledge. SEMATECH could fill that void.9
1987年2月，国防科学委员会半导体依赖性工作组发布的一份报告，极大地推动了半导体产业协会（SIA）对半导体制造技术协会（SEMATECH）的游说工作。报告指出：“半导体技术和制造专长的流失，对我们国家整体乃至国家安全的影响，无疑是巨大的。” 工作组成员建议立即采取“政府、产业界和大学之间的合作行动”，以确保此类损失不再发生。10
A report issued by a Defense Science Board Task Force on Semiconductor Dependency in February 1987 boosted the SIA’s lobbying for SEMATECH. “The implications of the loss of semiconductor technology and manufacturing expertise, for our country in general and our national security in particular, are awesome indeed,” proclaimed the report. Task force members recommended that “cooperative government, industry, and university action” be taken immediately to ensure such a loss never occurred.10
SIA和国防部工作组的同步且互补的努力并非偶然。诺伊斯与德州仪器和摩托罗拉的多位高管一同担任国防部工作组顾问委员会成员。工作组的八名非政府成员中，包括SIA半导体研究公司的两位最高领导人以及杰克·基尔比。可以肯定的是，这些人具备人们期望在高级别政府工作组中看到的专业知识。他们中的许多人也了解SIA对解决行业弊病的最佳方案的看法，而这些看法无疑影响了工作组的建议。5月12日，国防部和业界代表签署了一份谅解备忘录，为SEMATECH的资金筹措流程的启动扫清了障碍。11
The contemporaneous and complementary efforts of the SIA and the Defense task force were no coincidence. Noyce served on the Defense task force advisory board, along with several senior executives from Texas Instruments and Motorola. Among the eight nongovernment members of the task force were the top two men from the SIA’s Semiconductor Research Corporation, as well as Jack Kilby. To be sure, these men possessed the expertise one would hope to see involved with a high-level government task force. Many of them also knew the SIA’s thoughts on the best solution for the industry’s ills, and these thoughts undoubtedly influenced the task force’s recommendations. On May 12, the Defense Department and representatives of the industry signed a memorandum of understanding that cleared the way for the funding process for SEMATECH to begin.11
国防部的认可在里根时代的华盛顿举足轻重，但SEMATECH的提案仍然遭遇了强烈的反对。国家科学基金会牵头开展的一项关于芯片行业的跨部门调查的一位首席研究员表示，半导体行业“严重夸大”了自身的问题。由总统科学顾问威廉·格雷厄姆担任主席的白宫科学委员会对SEMATECH的提案持怀疑态度，最终仅以一票之差勉强批准了拨款。商务部在对《SEMATECH资助的利弊》进行总体上持肯定态度的审查中，对该联盟的运作方式提出了质疑。研究结果将会公布，以及该行动是否存在串谋的风险，或者是否会对该国此前分散的半导体研究造成不利的集中化。12
The Defense Department imprimatur meant a good deal in Reaganera Washington, but the SEMATECH proposal nonetheless faced strong opposition. A principal researcher for an interagency survey on the chip industry led by the National Science Foundation said that the semiconductor industry had “wildly overstated” its problems. The White House Science Council, chaired by the president’s science adviser, William Graham, received the SEMATECH proposal skeptically and ultimately recommended funding by only a one-vote margin. The Department of Commerce, in a generally favorable review of the “Benefits and Risks of Funding for SEMATECH,” raised questions about how the consortium’s results would be distributed and whether the operation ran the risk of collusion or of detrimentally centralizing the nation’s previously diverse research in semiconductors.12
一位众议院科学技术委员会的愤怒成员，最近目睹了加州最后一家大型钢铁厂在其选区关闭，几乎是在指责半导体行业在反对SEMATECH项目时虚伪。“他们大多数都是右翼共和党人……基本上反对任何政府干预，”他说。“但当他们因为愚蠢至极而陷入困境时，他们就来找我们寻求救助。” 诺伊斯在国会作证，敦促支持该联盟，这无疑引起了一些人的质疑。《华盛顿邮报》对诺伊斯持怀疑态度，评论道：“他最近的举动与该行业一贯的独立精神完全背道而驰。他现在在华盛顿乞求施舍。”13
One angry member of the House Science and Technology Committee, who had recently seen California’s last major steel mill close in his district, all but accused the semiconductor industry of hypocrisy in his objections to SEMATECH. “Most of them are right-wing Republicans … basically against any government intrusion,” he said. “But when they get into trouble because they’ve been damn fools, then they come to us for bailout.” Certainly Noyce’s testimony before Congress to urge support for the consortium raised a few eyebrows. “His latest mission hardly evokes the industry’s history of rugged independence,” said a skeptical Washington Post of Noyce. “He’s in Washington pleading for a handout.”13
然而，势头对美国半导体行业协会（SIA）和半导体技术联盟（SEMATECH）有利。在1986年游说与日本达成贸易协定的过程中，SIA使半导体行业在华盛顿成为热门话题。“过去几年，半导体行业获得了国会的大力支持，”亚利桑那州共和党参议员约翰·麦凯恩在1987年解释说，“人们普遍认为，半导体代表了美国工业竞争力的尖端技术。”此外，SIA在国会投票表决拨款之前拒绝为该联盟确定具体地点，这也对SIA的努力起到了推动作用。14
Momentum was on the side of the SIA and SEMATECH, however. In its lobbying for the 1986 trade agreement with Japan, the SIA had made semiconductors a cause celebre in Washington. “The semiconductor industry has garnered enormous congressional support in the past few years,” explained Republican senator John McCain from Arizona in 1987. “There is a perception that they [sic] represent the high technology edge of America’s industrial competitiveness.” The SIA’s efforts were also aided by the organization’s refusal to commit to a specific location for the consortium before the funding vote in Congress.14
1987年6月，众议院在一项综合贸易法案中批准了5亿美元的SEMATECH拨款。四个月后，参议院一致通过了1988财年国防授权法案的修正案，为SEMATECH在1988和1989财年各提供1亿美元的资金。有了这项授权，SEMATECH的资金来源基本符合SIA的设想：年度预算2.5亿美元，其中1亿美元来自联邦政府，1亿美元由成员公司提供，剩余的5000万美元来自工厂所在地的州和地方政府。令人难以置信的是，这些资金竟然被批准用于一个当时还缺乏统一愿景的组织。尽管如此，诺伊斯仍然宣称SEMATECH对美国人民来说是一笔“划算的买卖”——他指出，该联盟每年获得的联邦拨款总额加起来也只够买半架B-1轰炸机。15
In June of 1987, the House approved $500 million for SEMATECH in an omnibus trade bill. Four months later, the Senate unanimously approved an amendment to the 1988 Defense authorization bill in order to provide $100 million to SEMATECH in fiscal 1988 and 1989. With this authorization, funding for SEMATECH emerged very much along the lines that the SIA had imagined: a $250 million annual budget, with $100 million from the federal government, an equal amount provided by member companies, and the remaining $50 million from the local and state governments of the community in which the facility would be located. Incredible as it may seem, these sums were approved for an organization that still lacked a cohesive vision. Noyce nonetheless proclaimed SEMATECH a “bargain” for the American people—taken together, he pointed out, the consortium’s total annual federal funding would buy only half a B-1 bomber.15
SEMATECH在圣克拉拉设立了临时总部，不久后，选址委员会发布了永久厂址的招标公告。他们原本预计会收到十几份回复，结果却收到了来自34个州约135个地点的提案。所有这些提案都被SEMATECH的计划所吸引：该计划旨在雇用近800名高科技人才，他们将在SEMATECH计划建造的全新、耗资数百万美元的尖端工厂中开展合作研究并工作，以模拟诺伊斯在参议院作证时提到的“真实生产环境”。16
SEMATECH established temporary headquarters in Santa Clara and soon a site-selection committee issued a request for proposals for a permanent site. They expected perhaps a dozen responses but received proposals from some 135 locations in 34 states, all of them lured by SEMATECH’s plan to employ nearly 800 high-tech workers who would collaborate on research and work in the brand new, multimillion-dollar, state-of-the-art fab that SEMATECH planned to build in order to simulate the “realistic production conditions” to which Noyce referred in his Senate testimony.16
对于竞相争取SEMATECH园区的地区而言，这样一个备受瞩目的高科技企业带来的前景具有独特的吸引力。几乎从晶体管诞生之初，城市和郊区就一直试图吸引光鲜亮丽的电子产业。20世纪60年代，斯坦福大学教务长弗雷德里克·特曼曾主动提出帮助威廉·肖克利为其公司寻找合适的园区，他还与德克萨斯州和新泽西州一些有意向的区域开发商进行过磋商，这些开发商都渴望在各自地区打造自己的电子产业园区。夏尔·戴高乐将军和日本国会议员也曾参观过斯坦福工业园。在美国，20世纪70年代的经济衰退重新激发了人们对通过高科技振兴区域经济的兴趣。到1981年，全国州长协会成立了“技术创新工作组”，旨在“改进国家税法，以鼓励产业创新”，并帮助各州“履行其作为本州经济发展支持者的联邦职责”。一年后，国会联合经济委员会发布了一项研究，该研究得出结论：“高科技公司为美国带来了更光明的未来，但它们也为那些遭受经济衰退重创的美国地区带来了希望。”17
The prospect of such a high-profile, high-tech anchor offered a singular appeal to the regions vying for the SEMATECH site. Almost from the birth of the transistor, cities and suburbs had tried to attract the glamorous electronics industry. In the 1960s, Frederick Terman, the Stanford provost who had offered to help William Shockley find suitable home for his company, consulted with interested regional developers in Texas and New Jersey eager to build electronics zones of their own. Charles Degaulle and members of the Japanese Diet had visited the Stanford Industrial Park. In the United States, the recession of the 1970s brought renewed interest in regional revitalization through high technology, and by 1981, the National Governors Association had formed a “Task Force on Technological Innovation” to seek “improvements in the national tax code which would encourage industrial innovation” and to help states “fulfill their federalist role as supporters of economic development in their states.” One year later, the Congressional Joint Economic Committee issued a study that concluded, “High technology companies offer a brighter future for America but they [also] offer salvation for those regions of America that have borne the brunt of our economic decline.”17
20世纪80年代中期，美国乃至世界各地开始向饱受硅谷交通拥堵和房贷之苦的科技从业者们大力宣传其高品质的生活和低廉的生活成本。“还记得20年前的硅谷吗？如今的阿尔伯克基就是那样！”《圣何塞商业杂志》上的一则广告如此宣传。到1989年，美国已经涌现出许多自称为“硅森林”（俄勒冈州波特兰）、“硅谷峡谷”（亚利桑那州凤凰城）、“仿生谷”（盐湖城）、“硅谷东部”（纽约州特洛伊-奥尔巴尼）、“硅草原”（达拉斯-奥斯汀）和“硅山”（科罗拉多斯普林斯）的地区。一些欧洲和亚洲国家也拥有以硅谷命名的科技中心。18
In the mid-1980s, regions across the country and around the world began trumpeting their high quality of life and low cost of living to traffic-and mortgage-weary technologists in Silicon Valley. “Remember the Silicon Valley as it was 20 Years Ago? That’s Albuquerque Today!” promised one representative advertisement in the San Jose Business Journal. By 1989, the United States boasted regions calling themselves Silicon Forest (Portland, Oregon), Silicon Gulch (Phoenix, Arizona), Bionic Valley (Salt Lake City), Silicon Valley East (Troy-Albany, New York), Silicon Prairie (Dallas, Austin), and Silicon Mountain (Colorado Springs). Several European and Asian countries also possessed technology regions named in homage to Silicon Valley.18
在旧金山半岛，人们曾戏称这些“硅谷异乡”为美国最成功的城市，而德克萨斯州奥斯汀无疑是其中之一。这座孤星之州的首府，其高科技经济正是从国内石油工业衰落后的废墟中崛起。1982年至1985年间，奥斯汀新增了1万个制造业岗位，其中三分之二来自高科技企业。 1985年， 《圣何塞水星报》略带担忧地报道说，在这座阳光普照的城市里，高科技的话题“就像炎炎夏日里畅饮一杯冰镇孤星啤酒一样司空见惯”。短短几年内，几家硅谷知名企业——英特尔、ROLM、Tandem Computers、AMD、美国国家半导体公司——都在奥斯汀及其周边地区设立了分支机构。摩托罗拉和数据通用公司在该地区也设有工厂，IBM（在奥斯汀拥有一座380万平方英尺的工厂）和微电子与计算机技术公司（MCC，最早的电子研究联盟之一）也都在这里设有工厂。因此，奥斯汀可以提供SEMATECH 拥有成熟的高科技基础设施，以及德克萨斯大学和德克萨斯农工大学的吸引力、低廉的住房和劳动力成本、充满活力的文化生活，而且不征收公司所得税或个人所得税。19
Arguably the most successful of the American “Silicon Elsewheres,” as they were derisively called on the San Francisco Peninsula, was Austin, Texas. The high-technology economy in the Lone Star State’s capital emerged from the ashes of the domestic oil industry. Between 1982 and 1985, Austin added 10,000 manufacturing jobs to its economy—two-thirds of them in high-tech businesses. In this sun-drenched city, reported a somewhat concerned San Jose Mercury News in 1985, high-tech talk was becoming “as common as a tall Lone Star beer on a hot day.” Within a few years, several prominent Silicon Valley companies—Intel, ROLM, Tandem Computers, Advanced Micro Devices, National Semiconductor—had sites in or near Austin. Motorola and Data General had facilities in the area, too, as did both IBM (which owned a 3.8-million-square-foot plant in Austin) and Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp. (MCC), one of the earliest electronics research consortiums. Austin could thus offer SEMATECH an established high-tech infrastructure as well as the attractions of the University of Texas and Texas A&M, low housing and labor costs, a vibrant cultural life, and no corporate or personal income taxes.19
奥斯汀市提出的SEMATECH选址方案汇集了大学、企业、州政府和地方政府的共同努力，他们事先决定，奥斯汀将是德克萨斯州唯一愿意考虑的城市。德克萨斯大学提出以5000万美元的价格购买一座原Data General公司的厂房，并免费供SEMATECH使用。奥斯汀市议会追加了25万美元的资金，并承诺“简化一切阻碍项目的繁文缛节”。在众议院议长吉姆·赖特和众议员JJ·皮克尔（众议院筹款委员会成员）的领导下，德克萨斯州国会代表团积极协助SIA开展联邦游说活动，以确保SEMATECH获得资金。与此同时，加利福尼亚州的方案却四分五裂，以至于州长杜克梅吉安绕过正在制定方案的州议会，直接提交了圣何塞市的SEMATECH竞标方案。20
Austin’s proposal for the SEMATECH site included a coordinated effort among universities, companies, and state and local governments who had decided in advance that Austin would be the only city the state would offer for consideration. The University of Texas offered to buy a former Data General plant for $50 million and then allow SEMATECH to use it at no charge. The Austin city council supplemented this with $250,000 and a promise to “cut through any red tape hindering the project.” The Texas congressional delegation, under the leadership of House Speaker Jim Wright and Representative J. J. Pickle (a member of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee), actively assisted the SIA in its federal lobbying efforts to secure funding for SEMATECH. The state of California’s proposal efforts, meanwhile, were so fractured that Governor Deukmejian bypassed the state legislature, which was drawing up its own plan, to submit San Jose’s bid for SEMATECH.20
1988年1月，选址委员会宣布，SEMATECH工厂将落户奥斯汀，而非硅谷。几个月内，工厂建设便已启动。与许多其他人一样，圣何塞市长汤姆·麦克纳里担心，SEMATECH的选址意味着加利福尼亚州“有可能失去在高科技产业中的领导地位”。21
In January 1988, the site-selection committee announced that Austin, not Silicon Valley, would house SEMATECH. Within months, construction on the fab was underway. Along with many others, San Jose mayor Tom McEnery worried that the SEMATECH decision meant the state of California was “in danger of losing our leadership position with the high-technology industries.”21
到此时，SEMATECH 已成功完成了“黑皮书”的编纂、与国防部的磋商、游说国会、选址、破土动工兴建晶圆厂、确定会费结构，并组建了由 14 家公司和 DARPA（国防高级研究计划局）组成的会员队伍——所有这一切都是在没有人清楚该联盟究竟要做什么的情况下完成的。大家普遍认为，SEMATECH 的首要任务是尝试大规模生产芯片，并非为了销售，而是作为一项研究项目。SEMATECH 的工程师——其中一半是联盟的雇员，一半是成员公司派来的——将负责实施和优化这些芯片的生产流程，并在过程中互相学习、分享经验。当每个步骤都确定了最有效的方法后，SEMATECH 会将这些信息分发给其成员公司。
BY THIS POINT, SEMATECH had successfully assembled its “black book,” consulted with the Department of Defense, lobbied Congress, chosen a location, broken ground for a fab, determined a dues structure, and assembled a membership base of 14 companies and DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)—all without anyone having a clear sense of what the consortium would actually do. There was a general agreement that a worthwhile first task would be for SEMATECH to try to manufacture a huge run of chips, not to sell, but as a research project. Engineers at SEMATECH—half of them employed by the consortium, half of them assignees from member companies – would implement and optimize the production processes for these chips, learning from each other and sharing their insights along the way. When the most efficient approach had been determined for every step, SEMATECH would disseminate this information to its member companies.
但他们究竟会制造什么样的芯片呢？今年一月，SEMATECH发布了一份令人振奋的新闻稿，宣布IBM和AT&T都向SEMATECH提供了“制造演示车辆”（Manufacturing Demonstration Vehicles）——一套涵盖制造先进芯片所需数百个步骤的完整指南。AT&T提供的芯片是全新的，此前从未被应用过。由于该芯片已实现量产，其作为展示大规模生产技术的工具的价值值得怀疑。IBM提供的是一款已投入生产的成熟芯片，但该公司出于对知识产权的担忧，拒绝向SEMATECH透露具体工艺步骤的细节，并进一步规定只有IBM的指定人员或SEMATECH的直接雇员才能使用该技术。AT&T在得知IBM的专有限制后，立即采取了类似的措施。这些限制彻底破坏了SEMATECH旨在促进的行业共享和跨公司交流。22
But what chips would they build? In January, SEMATECH issued a proud press release announcing that IBM and AT&T had both contributed “Manufacturing Demonstration Vehicles”—soup-to-nuts guidelines to the several-hundred-step process needed to build advanced chips—to SEMATECH. The chip that AT&T offered was brand new and had not been produced in volume, so its value as a vehicle for demonstrating mass-production techniques was questionable. IBM’s contribution was an established chip already in production, but the company, concerned about intellectual property, refused to release to SEMATECH details on a specific process step and further stipulated that only IBM assignees or SEMATECH direct hires could work with the technology. Upon hearing of IBM’s proprietary restrictions, AT&T summarily imposed similar ones. Such limitations thoroughly undermined the very industry-wide sharing and cross-company interactions that SEMATECH was supposed to foster.22
此外，AT&T 和 IBM 的设备差异巨大，SEMATECH 同时接受这两款设备反而凸显了该联盟整体方向的不明确。IBM 的芯片是 DRAM，这种典型的通用芯片自 20 世纪 60 年代末以来一直是技术发展的驱动力，也是日本人首次在芯片制造方面超越美国人取得的成功。相比之下，AT&T 的芯片是 SRAM，这种设备采用与制造更专业电路（包括小批量特殊应用芯片）相同的工艺技术制造。同时接受 IBM 和 AT&T 的演示样机使得 SEMATECH 可以推迟决定是专注于通用芯片还是更专业的设备。
Moreover, the AT&T and IBM devices were so different that SEMATECH’s decision to accept both signalled the consortium’s overall lack of direction. IBM’s chip was a DRAM, the quintessential commodity chip that had served as a technology driver since the late 1960s, and the first chips that the Japanese built more successfully than the Americans. By contrast, AT&T’s chip was an SRAM, a device built with the same process technology used to manufacture more specialized circuits, including small lots of special-application chips. Accepting both the IBM and AT&T demonstration vehicles enabled SEMATECH to postpone a decision on whether it would focus on commodity chips or more specialized devices.
该联盟的努力之所以如此分散，部分原因是它没有领导者。三位男士各自在自己的公司担任全职高级管理职位，且均无权决定SEMATECH的发展方向，他们组成临时管理团队负责联盟的日常运作，同时一个遴选委员会正在筛选正式的首席执行官候选人。与此同时，近300名员工（包括成员公司派来的员工）在SEMATECH工作，但却没有人力资源部门。一位受邀与该联盟合作的顾问这样描述当时的状况：“他们似乎在短短两周内就把五百人一下子塞了进去，而且没有任何组织架构。真的，根本没有管理结构可言。我以前从未见过这种情况。”此外，也没有任何正式的方法来决定资金的支出方式，以及研发合同的授予方式。23
The consortium’s efforts were so diffuse, in part, because it had no leader. Three men, each of whom held a full-time, high-level management job at his own company, and none of whom was empowered to decide the direction SEMATECH should take, ran the consortium as an interim management team while a search committee vetted permanent CEO candidates. Meanwhile, almost 300 people (including the assignees from member companies) worked at SEMATECH, but there was no Human Resources department. One consultant called in to work with the consortium described the situation thus: “They stacked five hundred people out there all at once in what seemed to be a two week period, and there was no structure. Literally, there was no management structure to speak of. I’d never seen anything like it before.” Nor was there any formal method to determine how money was spent, or how contracts for research and development were to be awarded.23
由斯波克、诺伊斯和AMD公司的杰里·桑德斯组成的遴选委员会花了数周时间筛选了约200名潜在的CEO候选人。他们发现几乎不可能找到一个所有14家成员公司和国防部都能接受的人选，而且最终出现的名字——包括诺伊斯的名字——往往属于对这份工作不感兴趣的人。SEMATECH成立之初就制定了一项规定，进一步限制了选择范围：联盟的任何高级管理人员在SEMATECH任期结束后都不得为任何成员公司工作。这项限制旨在确保客观性并降低人才外流的风险，但这确实是一个不小的挑战。这个问题问得有点难，因为大多数合适的候选人很可能都在他们想回去的成员公司担任高级管理职位。极少数情况下，如果某个有前途的候选人对SEMATECH的工作感兴趣，他的雇主就会给他加薪并升职。“我提拔的人比别人多得多，”十年后，查理·斯波克感慨道。24
A search committee comprised of Sporck, Noyce, and Jerry Sanders of Advanced Micro Devices spent weeks sifting through some 200 names of potential CEO candidates. They found it nearly impossible to come up with a name acceptable to all 14 member companies and the Department of Defense, and often the names that came up—including Noyce’s—belonged to men who were not interested in the job. The choices were further limited by the requirement, adopted at SEMATECH’s founding, that none of the top officers at the consortium could work for a member company after their tenure at SEMATECH ended. This restriction was adopted in an effort to assure objectivity and reduce the risk of raiding, but it was quite a bit to ask, given that most viable candidates would likely be found in very senior management positions at member companies to which they would like to return. On the rare occasions that a promising candidate seemed interested in the SEMATECH job, his employer had offered him a raise and a promotion. “I got more damn guys promoted,” Charlie Sporck mused a decade later.24
1988年4月，在国会批准SEMATECH项目拨款十个月后，美国国防高级研究计划局（DARPA）以缺乏“关于（该联盟的）运营计划的具体细节”以及未能找到首席执行官为由，宣布推迟发放该联盟联邦拨款。一个月后，拨款到位，但随后，感到不满的美国参议院威胁要将SEMATECH 1989年预计的1亿美元拨款削减至4500万美元，理由是SEMATECH在没有首席执行官的情况下进度落后。这些举措给首席执行官遴选委员会带来了更多难题。《电子新闻》评论道：“任何头脑清醒的高管都不会为了参与一个可能在未来的立法预算辩论中崩溃的项目而中断自己前途光明、收入丰厚的职业生涯。 ”25
In April, 1988—ten months after Congress approved funding for SEMATECH—DARPA, citing the lack of “specific details on [the consortium’s] operating plan,” as well as the failure to find a CEO, announced that it was delaying the release of the federal portion of the consortium’s funding. Funding was released one month later, but then a frustrated United States Senate threatened to trim SEMATECH’s expected $100 million allotment for 1989 to $45 million on the grounds that without a chief executive, SEMATECH was falling behind schedule. These moves created even more problems for the CEO search committee. “No right-minded executive would interrupt a promising and lucrative career to commit to a project that might disintegrate beneath future legislative budget debates,” opined Electronic News.25
诺伊斯觉得整件事尴尬至极。七月的一天，他给理查德·霍奇森打了电话，霍奇森是他自费尔柴尔德公司成立之初就一直指导他的导师。“我想听听你的建议，”诺伊斯说。他当时正在考虑是否自愿担任SEMATECH的首席执行官。过去曾有好几个人劝他接受这个职位，但他不想离开加州，而且坦白说，他觉得自己年纪太大，无法再运营一家初创公司了。诺伊斯曾像年轻时不愿接受费尔柴尔德公司总经理一职那样，敦促SEMATECH的遴选委员会“找个比我更合适的人”。但随着SEMATECH的联邦拨款面临威胁，诺伊斯开始重新考虑。他说，他仍然不想接受这份工作，但“我不想看到我毕生的心血付诸东流”。他告诉霍奇森：“我不会去那里，但我对那里发生的事情感到羞愧，这简直——太荒谬了。[SEMATECH] 是一项不错的尝试。” 他也曾对安·鲍尔斯说过同样的话。26
NOYCE FOUND THE ENTIRE SITUATION appallingly embarrassing. One day in July, he called Richard Hodgson, his mentor since the earliest days at Fairchild. “I’d like your advice,” Noyce said. He was considering volunteering for the job as SEMATECH CEO. Several people had urged him to take the position in the past, but he did not want to leave California and frankly thought he was too old to run another startup effort. In a comment reminiscent of his youthful reluctance to accept the general manager’s job at Fairchild, Noyce had urged the SEMATECH search committee to “find someone better than me.” But with SEMATECH’s federal funding under threat, Noyce had begun to reconsider. He still did not want the job, he said, but “I prefer not to see all of [my] life’s work go down in flames.” He told Hodgson, “I wouldn’t go down there, but I’m embarrassed by what’s going on and it’s just—it’s ridiculous. [SEMATECH] is a good effort.” He had told Ann Bowers the same thing.26
霍奇森劝诺伊斯不要接受这份工作，理由有二：“你已经结婚了，而且你热爱飞行。”如果诺伊斯成为SEMATECH的首席执行官，他就没多少时间陪妻子旅行，也没多少时间思考宇宙的奥秘了。诺伊斯似乎觉得他的导师说得有道理。霍奇森挂断电话，以为自己已经成功劝阻了诺伊斯自愿担任首席执行官。27
Hodgson advised Noyce not to take the job for two reasons: “You got married and you love to fly airplanes.” There would not be much time to travel with his wife or muse on infinity if Noyce became SEMATECH’s CEO. Noyce seemed to think his mentor had a point. Hodgson hung up the phone believing he had talked Noyce out of volunteering.27
第二天，诺伊斯飞往奥斯汀，新加坡航空公司董事会正在那里开会讨论SEMATECH项目。回程航班上，诺伊斯坐在他的朋友查理·斯波克旁边。两人一边喝着加冰的必富达啤酒，一边抱怨着搜索方面的问题，这时诺伊斯突然说道：“你知道吗，查理，我觉得我应该去那里当CEO。”
The next day, Noyce flew to Austin, where the SIA board was meeting to discuss SEMATECH. On the flight back, Noyce sat next to his friend Charlie Sporck. The two were griping about the search problems over a few Beefeaters on the rocks when Noyce suddenly said, “You know, Charlie, I think I ought to probably be the CEO there.”
斯波克有些惊讶，但很快恢复了过来。“鲍勃，”他说，“这份工作就交给你了。”28
Sporck was surprised but recovered immediately. “Bob,” he said, “the job is yours.”28
斯波克认为，“将所有这些公司聚集在一起，让他们奏响美妙的乐章，这个想法对鲍勃很有吸引力……他认为自己很擅长这个。” 但在诺伊斯被任命为SEMATECH首席执行官后不久，英特尔对他进行了一次内部采访。诺伊斯表示，他并不指望这个职位能带来多少刺激或乐趣。他当然从未假装想要离开他在加州的生活，而且他拥有超过1亿美元的净资产，所以他也没有理由离开。29
Sporck thinks that “the idea of bringing all of these companies together and making them play beautiful music was appealing to Bob. … He saw himself as good at that.” But in a private Intel interview conducted shortly after Noyce was named SEMATECH CEO, Noyce said that he did not expect the position to offer much in the way of excitement or fun. He certainly never pretended he wanted to leave his life in California, and with a net worth in excess of $100 million, there was no reason he needed to.29
在宣布他新职位的记者招待会上，诺伊斯说道：“SEMATECH 对整个行业乃至整个国家都至关重要，我们不能忽视领导的召唤。” 几代以来，诺伊斯家族的男性都响应着以基督教精神为指导的领导召唤，投身于服务事业。在鲍勃·诺伊斯自己的职业生涯中，他也聆听着同样的召唤，只不过是以创业者的身份。诚然，追求个人经济和职业成功的愿望驱动着诺伊斯职业生涯的早期阶段，但一旦实现了这一目标，他便转向了年轻的创业公司，因为他相信这是他能够提供最佳服务的方式。与诺伊斯共事的创业者中，没有一个人认为他是为了金钱而来——尽管诺伊斯也乐于接受金钱。相反，他想要帮助、指导、培养和回馈社会。正如诺伊斯的一位朋友所说：“鲍勃的一生都在基督教信仰的边缘徘徊。”30
At the press conference announcing his new position, Noyce said, “SEMATECH is just too important for the industry and the country to ignore the call to leadership.” For generations, Noyce men had heeded the call to service through leadership in its explicitly Christian guise. In his own career, Bob Noyce had tuned his ear to an entrepreneurial version of the same summons. To be sure, the desire to secure his own financial and professional success had driven the earliest stage of Noyce’s career, but once he had accomplished this, he had turned to young startup companies precisely because this was how he believed he could be of best service. Not one of the entrepreneurs with whom Noyce worked ever thought he had been drawn in for the money—though Noyce welcomed that, too. Instead, he had wanted to help, to mentor, to nurture, and to give back. As one of Noyce’s friends put it, “Bob spent his life walking along the edges of his Christianity.”30
或许诺伊斯是在自我安慰，或者是在将自己的决定带入他过去曾从中获得极大乐趣的领域，他创造了一个新词来描述这个联盟。他说，SEMATECH 是一个“公共创业公司”，是“国家创业精神的实验，产业界和政府以风险合作伙伴的身份携手合作”。但如果诺伊斯真的认为 SEMATECH 是一种新型的创业公司，那么他在危机时刻挺身而出领导这项工作的决定，就符合他很久以前就确立的另一个模式。在他从事高科技行业的三十年里，鲍勃·诺伊斯从未心甘情愿地让任何一家创业公司倒闭。31
Perhaps Noyce was consoling himself or moving his decision into a realm from which he had drawn such pleasure in the past when he coined a new phrase to describe the consortium. SEMATECH, he said, was a “public start-up,” an experiment in “national entrepreneurialism, with industry and government teaming up as venture partners.” But if Noyce really did consider SEMATECH to be a novel sort of startup, then his decision to lead the effort in its time of crisis fits another pattern he had established long before. In the three decades he had worked in high-technology industry, Bob Noyce had never willingly allowed one of his startups to die.31
1988年7月27日，诺伊斯将领导SEMATECH的消息公布后，业内人士纷纷表示赞扬和欣慰。斯波克公开表示高兴，称诺伊斯是“业内最具声望的理想人选”。消息一经公布，国会领导人几乎立即向诺伊斯保证，SEMATECH将获得预期的全部1亿美元拨款。就连SEMATECH最激烈的批评者也印象深刻。“我之前担心SEMATECH会变成一个养火鸡的窝点，”赛普拉斯半导体公司的TJ·罗杰斯说道，他曾多次预测该联盟只会让业内最大的公司受益。“但有了诺伊斯这样有声望的人领导，这种情况就不会发生了。”一篇社论简洁地写道：“对于一家初创企业来说，要想提升信誉度，没有什么比聘请一位传奇人物更好的办法了。”32
THE NEWS THAT NOYCE would head SEMATECH was greeted with praise and relief when it was announced on July 27, 1988. Sporck publicly rejoiced, calling Noyce, “the ideal guy with the greatest stature in the industry.” Almost immediately upon receiving the news, congressional leaders assured Noyce that SEMATECH would receive the full $100 million it had expected. Even SEMATECH’s most vocal critic was impressed. “I was afraid [SEMATECH] was going to turn into a turkey farm,” said T. J. Rogers of Cypress Semiconductor, who had repeatedly predicted that the consortium would benefit only the largest firms in the industry. “But with a guy of Noyce’s stature, that won’t happen.” One editorial said simply, “When an infant business needs credibility, there’s nothing like hiring a legend.”32
只有诺伊斯最亲密的知己对他的决定表达了略显冷淡的态度——并非因为他们认为他无法胜任这份工作，而是因为他们认为这对他不利。在得知诺伊斯将执掌该财团之前，他的几位朋友都认为SEMATECH是由一群形形色色的怪人组成的，注定会失败。一位诺伊斯从仙童半导体时期就认识的同事在一封信中写道：“祝贺你找到新工作。” 亚瑟·洛克给诺伊斯的评论——“我认为他接受SEMATECH主席一职堪称典范”——并非完全赞同。安迪·格鲁夫的信中称赞他接受这一职位是“正直之举”，也并非完全赞同。ROLM创始人肯·奥什曼写道：“美国政府、美国半导体行业和SEMATECH真是走运，你简直是自讨苦吃。” “有了你掌舵——这我之前从未想过——我对SEMATECH的所有反对意见都烟消云散了。”戈登·摩尔总结了诺伊斯许多朋友的感受，他说SEMATECH的工作对诺伊斯来说是“巨大的牺牲”。摩尔说：“我当时觉得鲍勃不想接手这份极其棘手的工作，一份政治色彩浓厚且管理任务繁重的工作。但鲍勃还是去了，他去了那里。”33
Only Noyce’s closest confidants expressed anything less than enthusiasm for his decision—not because they thought he would not be good at the job, but because they thought it would not be good for him. Before hearing that Noyce would run the consortium, several of his friends had believed SEMATECH was such a hodgepodge of strange bedfellows that it was doomed to fail. One letter from a colleague Noyce had known since Fairchild begins, “Condolences and congratulations on your new job.” The entirety of Arthur Rock’s comment to Noyce—“I think taking the Sematech chairmanship was a class act”—was not an unqualified endorsement of it. Nor was Andy Grove’s note calling him a “mensch” for accepting the position. “The U.S. government, the U.S. semiconductor industry, and Sematech are damned lucky that you are a glutton for punishment,” wrote Ken Oshman, founder of ROLM. “With you at the helm, a possibility I never contemplated, all my objections [to SEMATECH] evaporate.” Gordon Moore summarized the feelings of many of Noyce’s friends when he said the SEMATECH job was “a huge sacrifice” for Noyce. “I didn’t think Bob wanted to take on a terribly difficult job, a job with a strong political content as well as a major managerial task at the time,” Moore says. “But Bob did it, he went down there.”33
诺伊斯被任命为首席执行官两周后，日本半导体制造商NEC申请加入SEMATECH。该联盟拒绝了NEC的申请，除声明“重申其将联盟成员限定为美国公司的意图”外，未作任何公开评论。34
Two weeks after Noyce was named CEO, Japanese semiconductor manufacturer NEC asked to join SEMATECH. The consortium refused the application with no public comment beyond the statement that it had “reaffirmed [its] intent to keep the consortium limited to U.S. companies.”34
如果接纳一家日本公司，就会削弱那种爱国热情，而这种热情似乎有时是维系14家成员公司和国防部的唯一纽带。在SEMATECH成立之初，它“与美国国旗紧密相连”（正如一位人士所说），以至于管理层甚至考虑将最好的停车位留给美国制造的汽车。公司旗帜“美国企业旗帜”仿照了著名的殖民时期响尾蛇旗帜（但有14个响尾），蛇身盘绕在“勿踩我”（Don't Tread on Me）的字样上方。曾有人提议将这面旗帜作为SEMATECH首份年度报告的焦点——封面照片原本会是一群穿着兔子服的人像硫磺岛战役那样升起这面旗帜——但诺伊斯虽然赞同这种情怀，却仍然以“太过火”为由否决了这个想法。35
To have admitted a Japanese firm would have undermined the patriotic fervor that at times seemed the only thing uniting the 14 member companies and the Department of Defense. In its earliest incarnation, SEMATECH was so “tightly wrapped in the United States flag” (as one person put it) that management considered reserving its best parking spaces for American-made cars. The house banner, “The American Enterprise Flag,” reproduced the famous colonial banner of a rattlesnake (but with 14 rattles) coiled above the phrase, “Don’t Tread on Me.” There had been talk of making this flag the focal point of SEMATECH’s first annual report—the cover shot would have shown men in bunny suits raising the flag Iwo Jima-style—but Noyce, who approved of the sentiment, nonetheless squelched the idea as “too over the top.”35
诺伊斯原本计划住在加州，然后通勤到德州上班——他很期待坐飞机——但他觉得自己需要“以身作则”，全身心投入工作，再加上德州不征收个人所得税，最终促使他宣布正式定居奥斯汀。他和鲍尔斯搬进了一套不错但并不奢华的房子。诺伊斯于八月入住了一栋错层式住宅。在按计划前往西藏旅行后，他于九月正式接管了SEMATECH。两个月后，SEMATECH的正式开幕仪式盛大隆重。奥斯汀交响乐团进行了简短的演奏，附近空军基地的两架喷气式飞机进行了飞行表演。随后，诺伊斯在一面巨大的美国国旗下登台亮相。在他两侧列队的是国会议员、里根政府和德克萨斯州州长政府的官员、奥斯汀市长、SEMATECH 14家成员公司的代表以及德克萨斯大学系统的多位领导——共计69人。“纵观美国历史，美国人总是挺身而出，迎接挑战，”诺伊斯说道，“SEMATECH正是美国应对当今最严峻挑战的答案。”36
Noyce had originally planned to live in California and commute to Texas—he looked forward to the flying—but the sense that he needed to “lead by example” and commit himself fully to the job, coupled with the lack of a personal income tax in Texas, swung him to declare official residency in Austin. He and Bowers moved into a nice, but not extravagant, split-level home in August. After taking a previously scheduled trip to Tibet, Noyce assumed the helm of SEMATECH in September. The official opening of the SEMATECH facility two months later was a lavish affair. After a brief performance by the Austin Symphony and a fly-over by a pair of jets from a nearby Air Force base, Noyce took the stage beneath an enormous American flag. Arrayed on either side of him were members of Congress, officials of the Reagan and Texas gubernatorial administrations, the mayor of Austin, representatives of each of SEMATECH’s 14 member companies, and various leaders of the University of Texas system—69 people in all. “Throughout the history of our nation, Americans have stepped up and met challenges,” Noyce said. “SEMATECH is the American answer to a most modern challenge.”36
诺伊斯预计他在SEMATECH的工作将与他在英特尔的工作类似。他说，他将扮演“外联者”的角色，在华盛顿作证，并在全国各地演讲，阐述SEMATECH的重要性及其使命。至于内部事务，他表示，他将“担任观察员和顾问……我在这里的时候会列席员工会议之类的活动，尽我所能做出贡献。”他补充道，“我希望能够成为一个倾听者……或许还能因为身处奥斯汀，与总部保持一定距离，而对组织内部的一些情况有所了解。”37
NOYCE EXPECTED HIS JOB at SEMATECH to resemble the work he had done at Intel. He said that he would be “Mr. Outside,” offering testimony in Washington and speaking around the country about the importance of SEMATECH and its mission. As far as internal affairs were concerned, he said, he would be “an observer and a counselor. … When I’m here I will sit in on the staff meetings and that sort of thing. Try to contribute what I can.” He added, “I hope to be able to be a sounding board … and perhaps to be able to see some things about the organization just because I’m standing a little bit farther away from the force there [in Austin].”37
扮演“内务先生”的角色，与诺伊斯“外务先生”相对的是保罗·卡斯特鲁奇，一位在IBM工作了32年的老将，他将担任首席运营官。诺伊斯和卡斯特鲁奇此前素未谋面，但业内人士认为这种安排类似于诺伊斯与格罗夫的合作关系：诺伊斯负责SEMATECH的公众形象、团队精神和长远规划；而卡斯特鲁奇则负责具体运营。诺伊斯任命了自己的首席行政官彼得·米尔斯，随后出人意料地宣布，这三人将共同组成一个类似英特尔的“首席执行官办公室”，而不是由诺伊斯一人独揽首席执行官之职。38
Playing “Mr. Inside” to Noyce’s “Mr. Outside” would be Paul Castrucci, a 32-year veteran of IBM, who would serve as chief operating officer. Noyce and Castrucci had never met, but industry insiders pictured the arrangement as something akin to a Noyce-Grove partnership, with Noyce providing SEMATECH’s public image, esprit de corps, and long-range vision; and Carstrucci serving as the get-things-done operations man. Noyce named his own chief administrative officer, Peter Mills, and then made the unexpected announcement that the three men would serve together in an Intel-style “Office of the Chief Executive,” rather than Noyce serving as the sole chief.38
但诺伊斯很快发现，组织内部问题太多，他无法只专注于对外关系。SEMATECH 的外派人员由派遣他们到该联盟的成员公司支付薪酬。诺伊斯上任仅几周就意识到，SEMATECH 的大多数人“忠诚度不高。他们究竟是忠于支付薪酬、结束 SEMATECH 工作后要回去的公司，还是忠于 SEMATECH 本身？这确实是个棘手的问题。我们该如何把所有这些因素协调起来呢？”他疑惑道。39
But Noyce soon found there were too many problems within the organization for him to focus exclusively on outside relations. The assignees at SEMATECH were paid by the member companies who sent them to the consortium. It took Noyce only a few weeks on the job to realize that most people at SEMATECH “have split loyalty. Is their cause [the company that pays them and to which they will return after their stint at SEMATECH], or is their cause SEMATECH? That’s an interesting one to work around. How do we get that all pulled together?” he wondered.39
SEMATECH的通讯主管米勒·邦纳回忆说，成员公司并没有为联盟的事业提供帮助。其中一些公司把SEMATECH视为解雇低绩效员工的地方。在前往奥斯汀之前，他们中的大多数人都派了法律顾问与受让人沟通。“无论如何，千万别开口。但要做好笔记，”律师们会这样建议。“记住，我们在这里要起诉B公司和C公司，所以说话要小心。” 对知识产权的担忧如此之大，以至于SEMATECH早期的一次筹备会议就吸引了来自潜在成员公司和国防部的32位知识产权律师。正如诺伊斯无奈地说道：“每个人都来这里是为了从SEMATECH中获取利益，却没有人为SEMATECH做出贡献。” 这是一种典型的公地悲剧。诺伊斯解释说，如果每个人都只做对自己公司最有利的事情，“那就什么也得不到了。”40
Miller Bonner, head of communications for SEMATECH, recalled that the member companies did not help the consortium’s cause. Some of them saw SEMATECH as a place to dump low-performing employees. Most of them sent their legal counsel to chat with assignees before they left for Austin. “Whatever you do, don’t open your mouth. But take a lot of notes,” the attorneys would advise. “And remember, we’re suing companies B and C over here, so watch what you say.” Concerns about intellectual property were so great that an early SEMATECH planning meeting had attracted 32 intellectual property lawyers from potential member companies and the Department of Defense. As Noyce put it, rather resignedly, “Everyone comes here to extract something from SEMATECH and nobody comes here to contribute something to SEMATECH.” It was a classic tragedy-of-the-commons situation. If everyone did only what was best for his or her individual company, Noyce explained, “there isn’t going to be anything to extract [from].”40
这些麻烦让诺伊斯无法继续从事他在英特尔时所热爱的“外联先生”工作，反而迫使他扮演类似于他在仙童公司逐渐厌恶的总经理角色。SEMATECH 不像仙童公司那样存在严重的部门间紧张关系，但成员公司之间的争执却产生了同样的效果。律师们提出的“保密”建议非常有效，诺伊斯发现自己不得不参加那些他原本以为在 SEMATECH 会尽量避免的会议。他必须绕着会议桌走一圈，逐一询问在场的工程师，对于当前的问题，他们认为最佳的解决方案是什么。沟通专家邦纳声称诺伊斯的做法是有效的。“当一个如此重要的人物直视着你的眼睛，征求你的意见时，你不会说‘我不会告诉你’。很快，大家都会发现，每个人都在隐瞒着同样的信息。”41
These troubles kept Noyce from performing the “Mr. Outside” job he had loved at Intel, and instead forced him to play a role similar to the general manager’s function he had grown to detest at Fairchild. SEMATECH lacked much of the interdivisional tension that had hobbled Fairchild, but the wrangling among member companies produced the same effect. The lawyers’ don’t-tell counseling proved extremely effective, and Noyce found himself pulled into the very sorts of meetings he thought he would avoid at SEMATECH. He would have to go around a conference table, individually asking each engineer present how she or he thought whatever given problem at hand could best be solved. Bonner, the communications expert, claimed that Noyce’s approach was effective. “When you’ve got somebody of that kind of stature looking you in the eye and asking for your opinion, you’re not going to say, ‘I’m not going to tell you.’ In a very short time, it became very apparent that everybody was holding back the same kind of information.”41
但这种做法效果有限。为了消除公司间的猜疑，并在三家公司相互竞争的目标之间找到妥协方案，诺伊斯聘请了一位曾与英特尔密切合作的顾问。诺伊斯还推行了一项强制性的沟通培训课程，该课程基于安迪·格鲁夫在英特尔开发的名为“建设性对抗”的模式。
But it was effective only to a degree. To cut through the interfirm suspicion and find a compromise among the three competing agendas, Noyce brought in a consultant who had worked closely with Intel. Noyce also implemented a mandatory communications training session based on a model called “Constructive Confrontation” that Andy Grove had developed at Intel.
诺伊斯非常依赖他个人的魅力。他第一次与一大群SEMATECH员工会面时，开场就摘掉了领带。当SEMATECH的支出即将超出预算，而诺伊斯批准成立一个几乎所有人都厌恶的预算委员会时，他和他的公关团队制定了一个缓和紧张局势的计划。他们计划，在下一次季度全体员工大会上，诺伊斯走上讲台时，灯光会熄灭。然后，诺伊斯会从讲台下拿出一根蜡烛，点燃，问坐在漆黑环境中的听众：“有人事先和预算委员会沟通过这次会议吗？”42
Noyce leaned heavily on his own personal magnetism. The first time he met with a large group of SEMATECH employees, he started the meeting by removing his tie. When SEMATECH’s spending threatened to outpace its budget and Noyce approved the installation of a Budget Committee that nearly everyone at SEMATECH detested, he and his communications staff mapped out a plan to ease the tension. When Noyce mounted the stage at the next quarterly all-hands meeting, they plotted, the lights would go out. Noyce would then reach under the lectern, pull out a candle, light it, and ask his audience, all sitting in pitch darkness, “Did anyone clear this meeting with the Budget Committee?”42
他们以为这会引发轩然大波，结果也确实如此。但诺伊斯仍然把大部分会议时间都花在了应对工程师们愤怒的质问上，这些工程师希望他们的申请能立即获得批准。在这种情况下，他的回应总是千篇一律。“好吧，我理解这令人沮丧，”他会说，“但我们不会改变政策。而这正是你们应该庆幸我们正在控制开支的原因。”诺伊斯这种体谅的态度通常能让抱怨者们发泄完不满后心情好转，但这种阻碍工作进度的做法，想必也让诺伊斯和工程师们一样感到恼火。然而，诺伊斯别无选择。如果SEMATECH在某个季度超支，在华盛顿的舆论压力将会非常大，甚至危及未来的拨款。43
They thought it would bring down the house. It did. But Noyce nonetheless devoted most of the meeting to fielding irate questions from engineers who wanted their requests approved now. His response in this situation was always a variation on the same theme. “Well, I understand why this would be frustrating,” he would say, “but we’re not going to change the policy. And here is why you should be glad we’re watching expenses.” Noyce’s sympathetic approach usually left the complainers happier than before they had vented their frustrations, but serving as a roadblock slowing the pace of work must have frustrated Noyce as much as it irritated the engineers. Noyce, however, had no choice. If SEMATECH overran its budget in a given quarter, it would look bad enough in Washington to jeopardize future appropriations.43
会议结束时，一位员工抱怨他的职位名称未能准确反映他在SEMATECH承担的重任，对此，诺伊斯回应说，他本人并不太看重职位名称，但如果提问者——或者其他任何人——想给自己起个新头衔，他完全没意见。几天之内，就有几位员工索要了名片，并很快收到了。诺伊斯在SEMATECH任职期间，始终坚持认为该联盟不需要组织结构图，这与他一贯的作风如出一辙。他认为这类文件除了让人过分关注层级之外，并无其他作用。而他的首席运营官却持相反观点，偷偷地为自己绘制了一份组织结构图。44
At the end of this meeting, in response to a question from an employee complaining that his job title did not accurately describe the high level of his responsibilities at SEMATECH, Noyce said that he had never put much stock in titles himself, but if the questioner—or anyone else—wanted to give himself a new job title, that was fine with Noyce. Within days, several employees had filed requests for business cards—which they promptly received. In much the same vein was Noyce’s insistence, throughout his tenure at SEMATECH, that the consortium did not need an organization chart. He thought such documents did little more than encourage undue attention to hierarchy. His COO, who believed otherwise, secretly drew up an organization chart for his own reference.44
但诺伊斯的个人魅力和他尝试的组织创新都未能促使成员公司“携手共创美好未来”。这些公司虽然承认各自的生产流程存在相似的问题，但却不愿在此基础上更进一步。这意味着，SEMATECH 的使命既不会像规模最小的公司所希望的那样，涉及分享“黑魔法”，也不会像国防利益集团所期望的那样，开发灵活的生产方法。
But neither Noyce’s charisma nor his attempts at organizational innovation could lead the member companies to “make beautiful music together.” The firms were willing to concede that they had similar problems in their manufacturing processes, but they did not want to go beyond that. This meant that SEMATECH’s mission would not involve sharing black magic (as the smallest companies had hoped) or developing flexible production methods (as the defense interests had desired).
相反，SEMATECH缩小了议程范围，专注于联盟最大成员公司最为关注的问题：改进其晶圆厂中使用的设备和材料。SEMATECH将确定对下一代技术发展至关重要的领域，并资助供应商开发新工具和材料。该联盟还将与供应商合作，改进现有工具和设备。正如诺伊斯所说：“基于我们共享的知识基础，我们将明确先进工具集的需求和规格，然后……与美国设备和材料供应商合作，投资开展联合研发项目，以开发先进工具集。”诺伊斯表示，一旦新设备开发完成，SEMATECH将对其进行测试、特性分析，并向成员公司进行演示，以便他们能够将其集成到自己的晶圆厂中。45
Instead, SEMATECH narrowed its agenda to focus on issues of greatest concern to the consortium’s largest member companies: improving the equipment and materials that they used in their fabs. SEMATECH would identify the areas most critical for next-generation progress and fund contracts for suppliers to develop new tools and materials. The consortium would also work with suppliers to improve existing tools and equipment. Or as Noyce put it, “From our base of shared knowledge, we will define the needs and specifications for the advanced tool set and then … invest in joint R&D projects with U.S. equipment and materials suppliers to develop the advanced tool set.” Once the new equipment was developed, Noyce said, SEMATECH would test, characterize, and demonstrate it to member companies so they could incorporate it into their own fabs.45
诺伊斯对SEMATECH内部事务最重要的贡献，就是迫使联盟明确使命——即便这个使命的诞生更多是出于排除法而非一致认可。在他到来之前，SEMATECH内部无人能就联盟的最终目标达成一致。诺伊斯上任几个月后，联盟的使命便得以明确。
Forcing the consortium to pinpoint a mission—even a mission born more of a process of elimination than universal acclamation—was Noyce’s single most important contribution to internal affairs at SEMATECH. Before he arrived, no one at SEMATECH could agree on what the consortium would do. A few months into Noyce’s tenure, the mission was defined.
为了专注于改进晶圆制造材料和设备，SEMATECH 需要从同行间的“横向”研究合作模式转型为 Noyce 所说的成员与其设备和材料供应商之间的“虚拟”垂直整合模式。在许多方面，这使得 SEMATECH 比最初设想的更像日本的研究联盟——其中约 80% 的成员实现了垂直整合。46
A focus on improving fab materials and equipment meant that SEMATECH would need to transform itself from a “horizontal” research collaboration among peers to what Noyce called a “‘virtual’ vertical integration” between its members and the suppliers from whom they bought equipment and materials. In many ways this made SEMATECH even more like a Japanese research consortium—roughly 80 percent of which were vertically integrated—than had originally been imagined.46
任务明确后，诺伊斯开始将SEMATECH描述为一项旨在“加强”半导体制造行业基础设施的举措。从这个意义上讲，与供应商建立联系的举措也可以被理解为一项耗资2.5亿美元的尝试，旨在重现硅谷早期硅公司赖以生存的紧密关系。SEMATECH的新使命让人回想起那个时代：寻求建议就像借一杯糖一样简单，而为你制造炉子的公司的负责人曾经是你的员工。
Once the mission was defined, Noyce began speaking of SEMATECH as an effort to “strengthen the infrastructure” that supported the semiconductor manufacturing business. In this sense, the move to reach out to suppliers can also be understood as a $250 million attempt to reproduce the close relationships that had nurtured the earliest silicon companies in Silicon Valley. SEMATECH’s new mission hearkened back to the days when asking for advice felt like borrowing a cup of sugar and the guy who ran the company that built your furnace used to work for you.
但那种和谐的关系早已不复存在。供应商和制造商的发展方向截然不同。供应商行业的规模只有制造商的四分之一。例如，1989年两者的收入分别为50亿美元和200亿美元。与由英特尔和德州仪器等少数几家大型公司主导的制造商行业形成鲜明对比的是，800多家美国供应商中，88%都是年销售额不足2500万美元的小型企业。47
But those harmonious relationships had long since disappeared. The supplier and manufacturing businesses had grown in very different directions. The supplier industry was only one-quarter the size of its manufacturing counterpart. Revenues for 1989, for example, were $5 billion and $20 billion, respectively. And in contrast to the manufacturing side, which was dominated by a few large companies such as Intel and Texas Instruments, 88 percent of the more than 800 American supplier companies were small businesses with annual sales of less than $25 million.47
当SEMATECH联盟的成员制造企业决定将联盟的注意力集中于加强与供应商的关系时，似乎这两个行业之间的大部分沟通都由律师进行。供应商认为，制造商口口声声说追求质量，实际上却基于短期成本做出决策。供应商还感到制造商对知识产权的过度重视束缚了他们的手脚，使得制定行业通用的设备标准成为不可能。此外，由于大多数供应商规模太小，无法建造先进的晶圆厂来在真实的量产环境中测试设备，他们只能在客户的生产线上进行调试——然后却因为“产品质量差”而遭到制造商的指责，这些制造商认为设备本应更早完善，同时又拒绝分享设备性能数据。48
By the time the manufacturing firms that belonged to SEMATECH decided to focus the consortium’s attention on shoring up relations with suppliers, it seemed that most communications between the two industries were being conducted by lawyers. Suppliers believed that manufacturers said they wanted quality but really made decisions based on short-term costs. The suppliers also felt handicapped by the manufacturers’ acute concern for intellectual property, which made it impossible to develop industry-wide equipment standards. Moreover, because most supplier companies were too small to build state-of-the-art fabs to test their equipment in a realistic mass-production environment, they had to de-bug on a customer’s line—and then suffer castigation for “poor quality products” from manufacturers who thought the equipment should have been perfected earlier and who at the same time refused to share data on how the equipment performed.48
当然，制造商们的看法截然不同。正如一位IBM老员工解释的那样：“芯片制造商购买的许多昂贵设备运到工厂后都无法按预期运行。对于为新工厂购置的最新型号设备来说，这种情况尤为突出。芯片制造商可能在一家无法正常运转的工厂上投入高达十亿美元的资金。工厂通常需要十八到二十个月才能恢复正常运转，在此期间，芯片制造商不仅损失惨重，而且市场份额也在不断下滑。自然而然地，所有制造部门的中层管理人员都将责任推卸给了设备制造商，而高层管理人员也接受了这种说法。”49
Manufacturers, of course, felt differently. As one long-time IBM employee explained, “Much of the very expensive equipment purchased by the chipmakers didn’t work according to specifications when it got to their factories. This was particularly true with the latest models that were purchased for a new factory. The chip maker could have upwards of a billion dollars tied up in a factory that didn’t work. It frequently took eighteen to twenty months to get up and running, [during which] time the chipmaker was losing his proverbial rear end and was also losing market share. Naturally all of the manufacturing middle management was shifting all the blame to the equipment makers [and] top management accepted this input.”49
一位曾参加SEMATECH与供应商贸易组织SEMI早期谈判的人士表示，他曾旁听过一些更为友好的诉讼。另一位与会者回忆说，其中一方的代表称另一方的成员为“窃贼”，随后却因其坦率而赢得掌声。50
One person who attended the early talks between SEMATECH and the suppliers’ trade organization SEMI said that he had attended friendlier lawsuits. Another participant recalls a representative from one organization referring to the other group’s members as “thieves”—and then receiving an ovation for his candor.50
转向供应商的举措激怒了国防部。改进基础制造——SEMATECH最初的既定目标——对国防工作有着直接的益处，因为它提高了美国武器使用美国电子元件的可能性。但在华盛顿的许多人看来，加强供应商建设显然对工业界更有利，而非对国防。1990年末，DARPA（美国国防高级研究计划局）局长来到SEMATECH，在与首席执行官会面时，他缓慢而刻意地在白板上写下了DARPA。然后他宣布：“这代表‘国防高级研究计划局’。SEMATECH与这些都无关。它与国防无关，它不是前沿研究，它也不是作为一个项目来运作的。你们不符合我们的计划。”51
THE MOVE TO FOCUS on suppliers irritated the Department of Defense. Improved basic manufacturing—SEMATECH’s original stated mission—offered a direct benefit to Defense efforts, because it increased the likelihood that American weapons could be built with American electronics. But bolstering suppliers seemed to many in Washington to be more clearly beneficial to industry than to the national defense. In late 1990, the head of DARPA came to SEMATECH, and during a meeting with the CEO, slowly and deliberately wrote D-A-R-P-A on the white board. Then he announced, “This stands for ‘Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.’ SEMATECH is none of these things. It’s not defense-related, it isn’t advanced research, and it’s not being run as a project. You don’t fit in our program.”51
到1989年初，诺伊斯已经感受到国防部对这项新任务的不满。同时，他也发现与首席运营官保罗·卡斯特鲁奇的合作越来越困难。卡斯特鲁奇出色地完成了SEMATECH工厂的建设工作，该工厂耗资7500万美元，仅用32周就建成，这在当时的行业中堪称奇迹。要知道，建造一座最先进的工厂，平均需要2亿美元和18到24个月的时间。工厂建成后不久，SEMATECH就向成员公司和政府提供了详细的工程、商业和制造设计方案——这是该联盟的首次“技术转让”，在几家成员公司看来，这是一个良好的开端。52
By early 1989, Noyce was already feeling the Defense Department’s disapproval of the new mission. He was also finding it increasingly difficult to work with Paul Castrucci, his COO. Castrucci had done an unassailable job overseeing the construction of SEMATECH’s fab, which at $75 million and 32 weeks’ building time, had set records in an industry that spent, on average, $200 million and 18 to 24 months to build a state-of-the-art fab. Shortly after the fab’s completion, SEMATECH provided detailed engineering, business, and manufacturing design plans to member companies and the government—the first “technology transfer” at the consortium and an auspicious beginning in the eyes of several member companies.52
但随着时间的推移，卡斯特鲁奇自上而下的管理风格与诺伊斯的理念以及SEMATECH的新使命格格不入。1989年3月，经过数周的痛苦犹豫，诺伊斯要求卡斯特鲁奇辞职。他任命特纳·哈斯蒂为首席运营官，哈斯蒂此前曾在诺伊斯到任前担任临时运营主管。诺伊斯和卡斯特鲁奇同意对此事保密，在最初的声明之后不再透露任何信息。但几个月后，诺伊斯为了赢得一个毛绒老鹰玩偶（象征着他自己），便补充了一些细节。问题并非出在政策上，而是出在诺伊斯认为组织内部的“偏离”。他几乎毫不犹豫地将SEMATECH的内部运作称为该组织的“薄弱环节”。诺伊斯每周要花费近40个小时处理这些内部事务，并对此感到非常沮丧，以至于他告诉几个人，他怀疑如果减少成员公司和相关政府机构的数量，联盟的运作可能会更加顺畅。53
But as time progressed, Castrucci’s top-down managerial style proved incompatible with Noyce’s approach and SEMATECH’s new mission. In March 1989, after several weeks of agonizing indecision, Noyce asked for Castrucci’s resignation. He named Turner Hasty, who had served as interim operations chief prior to Noyce’s arrival, as COO. Noyce and Castrucci agreed to keep their counsel and say nothing more about the resignation after the initial announcement, but a few months thereafter Noyce, in a move that won him a plush muzzled eagle doll (representing himself) to keep on his desk, added a few details. The problems arose not over policy, but over what Noyce saw as “drifting” within the organization. He came within a breath of calling internal operations at SEMATECH the organization’s “weak link.” Noyce was spending nearly 40 hours per week on these internal operations and finding them so frustrating that he told several people that he suspected the consortium might run more smoothly with fewer member companies and interested government parties.53
与此同时，诺伊斯继续担任英特尔董事会成员——他尽量不缺席任何一次会议——并偶尔以公司代表的身份发表演讲。他还必须履行他受聘担任的全职“对外联络人”的各项职责。他几乎每周至少要向一个团体发表演讲；在SEMATECH的头十个月里，他发表了58次演讲或作证。54
Meanwhile, Noyce continued to serve on the Intel board—he tried not to miss a meeting—and to deliver occasional speeches as a representative of the company. He also had to fulfill the ongoing requirements of the full-time “Mr. Outside” work for which he had been hired. He spoke to at least one group nearly every week; in his first ten months at SEMATECH, he gave a speech or testified 58 times.54
诺伊斯的演讲日程安排得满满当当，他自己也难辞其咎。米勒·邦纳回忆说，公关团队会拒绝一些采访请求，但“无论我们拒绝谁，他们都会想方设法联系上诺伊斯。他会说，‘好吧，我们可以安排’——因为他不想让任何人失望。” 邦纳把诺伊斯叫到一边，对他说：“鲍勃，我们真的得好好想想这个问题了。我的意思是，你不可能对每个人都说‘好’。” 之后，这个问题才有所缓解。55
Noyce was himself somewhat to blame for his packed speaking schedule. The communications team would decline an interview request, recalled Miller Bonner, but “whoever we declined would go in the back door and get Noyce on the phone. And he’d say, ‘Well, okay. We can make that happen’—because he didn’t want to disappoint people.” The problem abated somewhat after Bonner took Noyce aside and said, “Bob, we’ve really got to focus this. I mean, you just can’t say yes to everybody.”55
诺伊斯同意发言并非出于好意。他和邦纳一样认为，“我们（SEMATECH）需要宣传；我们需要各方支持。这包括地方、州和联邦政府。供应商行业。下游（半导体用户）。SEMATECH 的会员。以及非会员。”56
Noyce was not simply being nice when he agreed to speak. He believed, as did Bonner, that “we [SEMATECH] need publicity; we need support of many, many masters. You’ve got the local, state, and federal governments. You’ve got the supplier industry. You’ve got the downstream [users of semiconductors]. You’ve got the members [of SEMATECH]. And you’ve got the non-members.”56
诺伊斯补充道：“我们所说的每一句话，背后都必须有非常明确、非常可靠的人支持。我认为我们需要努力阐明我们做这件事的目标和理念。我们需要清晰地阐述这些，以便人们能够认同。” 当然，诺伊斯本人就是那个需要确保获得SEMATECH“众多上级”支持的人，尤其是在首都华盛顿的支持。从1989年9月到1990年3月，他几乎每个月都会飞往华盛顿特区，进行为期两到三天的访问。这些访问通常包括国会听证会、拜访政策制定者和工作人员、与曾与SIA合作过的杜威律师事务所和巴兰坦律师事务所的律师进行战略会议、接受媒体采访以及参加工作早餐、午餐和晚餐。在他待在华盛顿的每一天，日程安排上都有十几个不同的会议，这并不罕见。定期返回东海岸以及需要获得大多不熟悉半导体行业的外部人士的支持，诺伊斯正在重温他在费尔柴尔德担任总经理时最不喜欢的几个方面。
Noyce added, “We’ve got to have someone very obviously, very soundly behind anything we say. I think that we need to try to express the objectives and the philosophy of why we are doing this. We need to try to articulate that pretty clearly so people can subscribe to it.” Noyce, of course, was the “someone” who needed to ensure the support of SEMATECH’s “many masters,” particularly in the nation’s capital. Between September 1989 and March of 1990, he flew to Washington, D.C. almost every month for two- or three-day visits that usually included congressional testimony, visits to policymakers and staffers, strategy sessions with the Dewey, Ballantine attorneys who had also worked with the SIA, interviews with the press, and working breakfasts, lunches, and dinners. It was not unusual for him to have a dozen different meetings on his agenda each day he was in Washington. In the regular returns to the East Coast and the need to garner support from outsiders mostly unfamiliar with semiconductors, Noyce was re-living some of his least favorite aspects of the general manager’s job at Fairchild.
尽管米勒·邦纳和其他所有熟悉诺伊斯并看过他演讲的人一样，都觉得诺伊斯在讲台上显得有些紧张，但此时的诺伊斯已经展现出极其娴熟的公众形象。一份罕见的完整版电视采访文字稿显示，诺伊斯在讲话过程中突然打断自己——“刚才说得不太好，”他说——然后用更简洁的方式重新表述了一遍。诺伊斯在SEMATECH任职初期也曾有过类似的自我修饰。当时，他告诉采访他的英特尔员工，CEO的工作比他想象的要有趣得多。几乎立刻，他又补充道：“我想我不应该那样被引用。”
Although Miller Bonner, like everyone else who knew Noyce well and watched him speak, thought Noyce seemed a little nervous at the podium, by this point Noyce possessed an extremely savvy public presence. A rare full-text transcription of a lengthy television interview that Noyce knew would be edited shows him interrupting himself midsentence—“that wasn’t very good,” he says—and then rephrasing the comment in a more pithy way. Noyce similarly edited himself early in his tenure at SEMATECH when he told the Intel employee interviewing him that the CEO’s job was more enjoyable than he had imagined it would be. Almost immediately, he added, “I suppose I shouldn’t be quoted that way.”
在诺伊斯担任SEMATECH大会演讲稿撰写人期间，米勒·邦纳几乎一直负责他的演讲稿撰写工作。他们沿用了诺伊斯在英特尔时行之有效的模块化演讲稿撰写结构。通常情况下，两人会在从奥斯汀飞往演讲地点的途中，在飞机上共同完成诺伊斯的演讲稿。诺伊斯坐在驾驶舱里，与飞行员一起，大声向邦纳提出意见和想法，邦纳则将这些信息输入到他的便携式电脑中。
Miller Bonner served as Noyce’s speechwriter for much of his SEMATECH tenure. They used the same modular speech-building structure that had worked well for Noyce at Intel. Often the pair would assemble Noyce’s presentations in the air en route from Austin to the location where he would speak, Noyce sitting in the cockpit with his pilot, shouting comments and ideas back to Bonner, who would key them into his portable computer.
诺伊斯每次上讲台都会带着事先写好的讲稿，但这份讲稿与其说是脚本，不如说是一个起点。事实上，诺伊斯即兴发挥的成分非常多，以至于经常有记者索要诺伊斯演讲稿的博纳，不得不在演讲稿的封面上印上这样一段话：“诺伊斯博士可能会偏离所附的讲稿，但他坚持讲稿的内容。”
Noyce always arrived at the podium with every word of his speech written out, but the text served more as a starting point than a script. Indeed, Noyce extemporized so much that Bonner, who regularly received requests from journalists for copies of Noyce’s talks, had the following statement printed across the cover page of his speeches: “Dr. Noyce may deviate from the attached text, but he stands by the text as written.”
诺伊斯还是设法找了点乐子。他参加了SEMATECH的万圣节派对，打扮成布鲁斯·斯普林斯汀，戴着一顶乌黑的假发，系着一条红色头巾，穿着一件印着“老板”（THE BOSS）字样的T恤。他还在他搬到德克萨斯州时买的那辆野马敞篷车里安装了一个“远程启动器”。每当他从办公室窗口看到有人在停车场靠近他的车时，他都喜欢按下钥匙链发射器上的按钮，然后看着空车仿佛自动启动时的反应。他还从SEMATECH抽出时间回到格林内尔学院参加他的大学四十周年同学聚会。57
NOYCE DID MANAGE to work in a bit of fun. He came to a SEMATECH Halloween party dressed as Bruce Springsteen, complete with a jet-black wig, a red bandana, and a t-shirt that read THE BOSS. He installed a “remote car starter” in the Mustang convertible he had bought when he moved to Texas. Whenever he spied from his office window someone near his car in the parking lot, he loved to push a button on his key-chain transmitter and watch the reaction when his empty car seemed to start itself. He also took a break from SEMATECH to return to Grinnell for his fortieth college reunion.57
1989年9月，诺伊斯又经历了一次令人愉快的插曲。他惊喜地发现，日程表上原本安排的下午会议，实际上是一次前往附近伯格斯特罗姆空军基地的行程。在那里，第67战术侦察联队的成员们帮他穿戴好飞行装备，然后带他试驾了一架RF-4C喷气式飞机。一张诺伊斯在飞机后座的照片显示，起飞前他兴奋地竖起了大拇指。“他当时就像个进了糖果店的孩子，”一位陪同他前往基地的人回忆道。58
Another enjoyable diversion came in September 1989, when Noyce was surprised to learn that the afternoon-long meeting on his calendar was really a trip to nearby Bergstrom Air Force Base, where members of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing helped him to suit up and then took him to fly an RF-4C jet. A photo of Noyce in the rear cockpit of the plane shows him giving an enthusiastic thumbs-up before take off. “He was like a kid in a candy store,” recalled one person who accompanied him to the base.58
当时经营圣何塞喷气机中心的吉姆·拉弗蒂（Jim Lafferty）为诺伊斯（Noyce）提供了他最喜欢的消遣方式：他介绍诺伊斯认识了一位名叫韦恩·东（Wayne Higashi）的企业家。东与发明家保罗·皮雷斯（Paul Pires）共同研发了一种机械变速器，他们相信这种变速器能将许多汽车的油耗降低多达20%。诺伊斯邀请东到奥斯汀演示这种变速器的原型，它的大小和鞋盒差不多，由一台半马力的电机驱动。
Jim Lafferty, now running the San Jose Jet Center, provided Noyce his favorite distraction when he put him in touch with an entrepreneur named Wayne Higashi who, along with inventor Paul Pires, had developed a mechanical transmission that they believed could reduce fuel consumption in many cars by as much as 20 percent. Noyce invited Higashi to Austin to demonstrate a prototype of the transmission, which was about the size of a shoe box and powered by a half-horsepower motor.
与东先生交流约两小时后，诺伊斯说道：“我认为它的输出并不均匀。”如果没有均匀的输出，变速器所驱动的任何装置（例如汽车车轮）的转速就无法保持恒定。车轮有时会转得快，有时转得慢。
After about two hours with Higashi, Noyce said, “I don’t think it has a uniform output.” Without a uniform output, the speed of whatever device the transmission turned—automobile wheels, for example—could not be constant. They would rotate faster at some times and slower at others.
东解释说，他和皮雷斯已经建立了一个传动装置的数学模型，证明其输出是均匀的。诺伊斯认为他看到的任何变化都一定是电机输入不均匀造成的。
Higashi explained that he and Pires had developed a mathematical model of the transmission that proved its output was uniform. Any variation Noyce thought he saw must be the result of non-uniform input from the motor.
诺伊斯仍然不为所动。“我觉得行不通，”他说。然后，他做了一件让他深受同事喜爱的事。“这行不通，但看起来是个好主意，”他说。“把你的图纸和商业计划书留给我，我会考虑一下。”接下来的几周，他把所有空闲时间都花在了工作室里，琢磨着这个传动装置——经常到深夜。“两个相对的轴通过齿轮连接在一起，这个系统就相当于一个简单的曲柄臂系统，”他一边画着草图一边写道。“这仍然能产生一个基本正弦输出，只是会受到臂长等因素的轻微影响。基本情况是d/a>>1，l>>a……但无论你怎么尝试，它都无法产生线性输出（即恒定的角速度）！”然后，他开始在几页纸上画方程式、图表和线条图，同时不停地记笔记——“必须提高效率！”——显然，正如他告诉安·鲍尔斯的那样，这是他“自大学学习物理以来最快乐的时光”。59
Noyce remained unconvinced. “I don’t think it works,” he said. He then made the move that had endeared him to so many people who worked with him. “It doesn’t work, but it looks like a great idea,” he said. “Leave your drawings and business plan with me, and I’ll think about it.” He then proceeded to spend every available minute of the next several weeks in his workshop, musing on the transmission—often until well past midnight. “With the two opposing shafts geared together, the system is equivalent to a simple crank arm system,” he wrote, sketching as we went along. “This still gives basically a sinusoidal output, slightly modified by arm length, etc. The basic case is d/a>>1, l>>a. … But try as you may, this won’t give a linear output (i.e. constant angular velocity)!” He then proceeded to fill several pages with equations, graphs, and line drawings, jotting notes all the while—“must have clutches [sic] efficiency!”—and clearly having what he told Ann Bowers was “the most fun he’d had since he had been in college working on physics.”59
诺伊斯很快就用数学证明了变速器的输出不可能是均匀的。当他下次去硅谷（东当时在那里工作）时，他把这个证明展示给东看，这位企业家对此表示怀疑。诺伊斯非常友好地建议东启动变速器。然后，诺伊斯从口袋里掏出一张信用卡，贴在变速器的输出驱动齿轮上。信用卡撞击齿轮发出的咔哒声的频率明显不均匀。他们听到的不是规律的“咔哒咔哒咔哒咔哒”声，而是类似“咔-咔-咔-咔-咔”的声音。这并非随机的，而是变化的。“这让我很惊讶，”东回忆道，“诺伊斯仅仅通过观察我们的图纸和模型，就建立了他自己复杂的数学模型，并证明了我们错了。”60
In short order Noyce proved mathematically that the transmission’s output could not be uniform. When he showed this proof to Higashi on his next trip to Silicon Valley (where Highashi worked), the entrepreneur was skeptical. Noyce suggested, very pleasantly, that Higashi start the transmission. Noyce then reached into his pocket, extracted a credit card from his wallet, and held the card against the output drive gear on the transmission. The frequency oscillation of the clickety-clack of the card hitting the gear tooth was clearly not uniform. Instead of hearing a regular k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k sound, the men heard something like k-k-kkk-k-k-kkk. It was not random, but it was variable. “It amazed me,” Higashi recalls. “Noyce developed his own complex mathematical model—and proved us wrong—just by looking at our drawings and observing our model.”60
诺伊斯向东展示了他在地下室研究的第二组计算结果。他用数学模型模拟了变速器的不均匀性，并提出了一些企业家可以利用这一特性获利的想法。这或许适用于柴油车，因为柴油发动机的输出比变速器的波动更大。或者，将变速器安装在自行车上，使骑行更轻松、更高效，又如何呢？
Noyce showed Higashi a second set of calculations from his basement research. He had mathematically modeled the non-uniformity of the transmission and had some ideas about how the entrepreneurs could use it to their advantage. It might work in a diesel vehicle, which has an engine with an output even more variable than that of the transmission. Or how about installing the transmission on a bicycle to make it easier to pedal more efficiently?
诺伊斯的计算结果促使东和皮雷斯重新设计了变速箱的一个部件，这一改动使输出更加均匀，提升了两倍。最终，他们将变速箱的设计授权给一家制造商，该制造商希望将其用于柴油卡车变速箱。
Noyce’s calculations led Higashi and Pires to redesign one part of the transmission, a change that made the output more uniform by a factor of two. The pair eventually licensed the transmission to a manufacturer who wanted to use it for diesel truck transmissions.
东向诺伊斯提出以初创公司的股份作为交换，感谢他的帮助。但诺伊斯拒绝了，他说自己不需要更多钱，而且他之前并没有因为打算投资或持有公司股份而对计算结果做任何改动。（东认为诺伊斯的动机是想要一辆很酷的自行车。）诺伊斯还担心，如果其他人知道他要投资，就会认为他认为这家公司很有可能盈利。但诺伊斯并没有调查过这款产品的市场，也没有对其前景进行任何正式的尽职调查。不过，诺伊斯确实告诉东：“如果你遇到麻烦，我会支持你。如果你需要帮助（紧急注资），一定要给我打电话。”
Higashi offered Noyce stock in the startup in exchange for his help. But Noyce declined, saying he didn’t need any more money and he had not messed around with the math because he had planned to make an investment or take stock in the company. (Higashi thinks Noyce’s motivation was the desire for a very cool bicycle.) Noyce was also concerned that if other people knew he was making an investment, they would assume he believed the company was likely to make money. But Noyce had not looked into the market for the device or conducted any formal due diligence on its prospects. Noyce did, however, tell Higashi, “I’m here to support you if you ever get in trouble. If you need a helping hand [an emergency infusion of money], be sure to call me.”
“知道背后有位天使可以依靠，给了我很大的信心，”东说。“知道他不会让我们失败，我就更容易继续前进。如果需要，他一定会帮助我。”61
“It gave me a great deal of confidence to know that I had an angel back there that I could count on,” Higashi says. “It was easier to move forward knowing that he wasn’t going to let us fail. He would help me out if we needed it.”61
但诺伊斯在地下室或大学同学聚会上享受的那些惬意时光，都被他在SEMATECH公司极其繁重的工作挤走了。他的生活发生了翻天覆地的变化。在搬到奥斯汀之前，诺伊斯的生活充实而忙碌，他热爱自己的工作，晚上则与老朋友们相聚。而现在，他每周工作六七十个小时，周末也常常无暇休息。他在SEMATECH任职期间的日程表密密麻麻，几乎难以辨认。安·鲍尔斯在给格兰特·盖尔的一封私人信件中写道，诺伊斯觉得SEMATECH的工作“充满挑战”，而且并非他所乐见的挑战。“对鲍勃来说，重操旧业做管理工作简直是当头一棒，”她写道。他在SEMATECH任职期间拍摄的照片显示，他看起来比人生中的任何时候都更加疲惫不堪。62
BUT THE PLEASANT HOURS Noyce spent in his basement or at his college reunion were stolen from his extremely demanding job at SEMATECH. His life had changed dramatically. Before he moved to Austin, Noyce’s days had been filled with a busy-ness of his own choosing, anchored by work he enjoyed and punctuated with evenings with friends of long standing. Now he was working 60- or 70-hour weeks and often did not pause for a weekend. His calendars from his tenure at SEMATECH are so crammed with activity that they are nearly illegible. In a private letter to Grant Gale, Ann Bowers said that Noyce was finding the SEMATECH job a “challenge”—and not a welcome one. “It’s a real kick in the side of the head [for Bob] to go back to managing,” she wrote. Pictures taken during his SEMATECH tenure show him looking more exhausted than at any other point in his life.62
婚姻支撑着他，但SEMATECH以外的其他压力让诺伊斯精疲力竭。他投资了一家经营不善的石油天然气公司。越来越绝望的老板给他打了好几个电话。他一天多次来找他，寻求建议和更多钱财。他的小女儿搬到了奥斯汀，拒绝了鲍尔斯帮她找公寓的请求后，带着年幼的儿子加入了一个宗教团体。这个团体的领袖是一位魅力十足、浑身纹身的前摩托车帮派头目，自称“约瑟夫兄弟”。诺伊斯和鲍尔斯来访时，约瑟夫兄弟坚持全程在场，监视他们的谈话。
His marriage sustained him, but other pressures outside SEMATECH drained Noyce. He had made an investment in an oil and gas outfit that was not doing well. The increasingly desperate owner was calling him multiple times a day to ask for advice and more money. His youngest daughter had moved to Austin, and after rejecting Bowers’s attempts to help her find an apartment, she had joined a religious community with her young son. The community’s leader was a charismatic, heavily tattooed former motorcycle gang leader who called himself “Brother Joseph.” When Noyce and Bowers visited, Brother Joseph insisted on being present at all times to monitor their conversations.
然而，正如诺伊斯人生中经常出现的情况一样，他人生中那些不艰难的部分都无比精彩。他持续获得各种荣誉。1987年，里根总统授予他国家技术奖章。两年后，老布什总统将他引入商业名人堂。
AND YET, as was so often the case with Noyce, the parts of his life that were not difficult were fantastic. He continued to be showered with recognition. President Reagan awarded him the National Medal of Technology in 1987. Two years later, George H.W. Bush inducted him into the Business Hall of Fame.
1990年2月，诺伊斯和杰克·基尔比共同荣获首届查尔斯·斯塔克·德雷珀奖——被誉为“工程界的诺贝尔奖”——以表彰他们在集成电路领域的贡献，这是他们获得的至高荣誉。该奖项由美国国家工程院赞助，由乔治·H·W·布什总统在国务院举行的盛大颁奖典礼上颁发。布什总统引用丘吉尔的话说，集成电路“从未有过如此微小的东西为如此多的人带来如此巨大的贡献”。通用电气董事长兼首席执行官、同时也是美国国家工程院院长的杰克·韦尔奇问道：“要找到比这更具变革意义的突破，还需要探索多远？电力？蒸汽动力？车轮？……他们所创造的这项发明，其极限实际上就是人类想象力的极限。”诺伊斯认为该奖项的目的是“激励他人为社会做出贡献”，他邀请格兰特·盖尔作为嘉宾出席颁奖典礼，并在致辞中感谢盖尔的“激励”。盖尔后来写信给诺伊斯，希望“英语中能有一种比简单的‘谢谢’更好的方式来表达感激和喜爱之情”。63
The singular honor came in February 1990, when Noyce and Jack Kilby shared the first Charles Stark Draper Award—the so-called Nobel Prize of Engineering—for their work on the integrated circuit. President George H. W. Bush presented the award, sponsored by the National Academy of Engineering, in a black-tie ceremony held at the State Department. Paraphrasing Churchill, the president said of the integrated circuit, “Never has something so small done so much for so many.” General Electric chairman and CEO Jack Welch, who chaired the National Academy of Engineering, asked, “How far do you have to reach to find a more profoundly transformational breakthrough? Electricity? Steam power? The wheel? … The limits of the invention to which they gave birth are literally the limits of the human imagination.” Noyce, who believed the purpose of the award was “to inspire others to make their contributions to society,” invited Grant Gale to attend the ceremony as his guest and thanked him for his “inspiration” in his speech. Gale later wrote to Noyce wishing for “a better way in the English language to convey appreciation and affection than a mere ‘thank you.’”63
当诺伊斯从德雷珀奖颁奖典礼返回时，SEMATECH对供应商关系的重视已初见成效。该联盟将其外部研究经费从8400万美元增加到近1.4亿美元，主要用于改进现有设备和开发下一代设备的项目。SEMATECH还制定了技术“路线图”，详细列出了成员公司开发下一代技术的目标和时间表。到6月份，已有63家设备供应商的高管与制造企业高管进行了一对一的管理会议。SEMATECH已授予22份联合开发合同，用于开发下一代工具和材料，以及13份设备改进项目合同，用于改进现有设备。而一年前，总共只授予了三份合同。64
By the time Noyce returned from the Draper Award ceremonies, SEMATECH’s focus on supplier relations had begun to show some results. The consortium increased its funding for outside research from $84 million to almost $140 million, mainly for projects to improve existing equipment and develop next-generation equipment. SEMATECH also developed technology “road maps” that detailed member companies’ goals and timetables for developing next-generation technology. By June, executives from 63 equipment suppliers had attended one-on-one management meetings with manufacturing executives. SEMATECH had awarded 22 joint-development contracts to develop next-generation tools and materials and 13 equipment-improvement program contracts to improve existing equipment. One year earlier, only three contracts, total, had been awarded.64
新的战略重点也引发了一些反对意见。两家公司对这一决定非常不满，甚至开始计划退出SEMATECH。一些供应商还指责SEMATECH在研发合同方面存在偏袒行为。该联盟决定优先向其成员公司提供SEMATECH合同支持的任何设备或材料，这激怒了非成员制造商。毕竟，这些制造商缴纳税款，并通过联邦政府的拨款支持了SEMATECH。他们为何要受到歧视？
The new focus had generated some opposition, as well. Two companies were unhappy enough with the decision to begin planning to withdraw from SEMATECH. And several suppliers alleged that SEMATECH was playing favorites with its research contracts. The consortium’s decision to grant its member companies first dibs on any equipment or materials supported by a SEMATECH contract enraged manufacturers who were not members. After all, these manufacturers paid taxes and thus supported SEMATECH via the federal government’s contribution. Why should they be discriminated against?
即便存在这些问题，SEMATECH 也比诺伊斯到来之前的情况好得多，因为它拥有了清晰的使命。诺伊斯本人似乎对自己的工作很满意，他曾自豪地在一次供应商高管会议上说：“我们既是客户，也是供应商。”他带领这个“公开创业”机构走出了初创阶段，克服了那些威胁其生存的直接危险。SEMATECH 应该专注于实施，而诺伊斯也清楚自己并非带领它完成这项工作的最佳人选。1990 年 4 月，诺伊斯开始计划在年底离开 SEMATECH。他私下要求联盟董事会开始寻找他的继任者。65
But even with these problems, SEMATECH was far better off with a clear mission than it had been before Noyce arrived. Noyce himself seemed pleased with his work, at one point proudly telling a meeting of supplier company executives, “We’re all customers and we’re all suppliers.” He had taken the “public startup” beyond the startup phase and past the immediate dangers that had threatened its very existence. It was time for SEMATECH to focus on implementation, and Noyce knew he was not the man to lead it through this effort. In April 1990 Noyce began planning to leave SEMATECH at the end of the year. He confidentially asked the consortium’s board to begin a search for his replacement.65
他并没有立即的计划。他期待着在加州海岸，靠近戈登·摩尔家乡佩斯卡德罗的地方，和鲍尔斯一起买下一个牧场，好好休养几个月，从SEMATECH展会的喧嚣中恢复过来。（在搬到德克萨斯州之前，他们已经卖掉了卡梅尔谷的牧场。）正如鲍尔斯所说：“鲍勃想好好放松一段时间。他太忙了，压力太大了，根本没时间考虑下一步该做什么。”66
He had no immediate plans for the future. He was looking forward to spending a few months recuperating from the SEMATECH frenzy at a ranch he and Bowers had decided to buy on the California coast near Gordon Moore’s hometown of Pescadero. (They had sold the Carmel Valley ranch before moving to Texas.) As Bowers put it, “Bob was up for hanging out for a while. He was so busy, so pushed, that he hadn’t had a lot of time to think about what was coming next.”66
5月10日，诺伊斯与杰克·基尔比、晶体管发明家约翰·巴丁、作曲家伦纳德·伯恩斯坦、医学研究人员劳埃德·康诺弗（发现了四环素）和格特鲁德·埃利翁（合成了几种重要的白血病和疱疹药物）、宝丽来创始人埃德温·兰德、作家詹姆斯·A·米切纳、导演史蒂文·斯皮尔伯格以及词曲作家史蒂文·桑德海姆和史蒂夫·旺德一起，在《专利法》颁布 200 周年庆典上获得了“终身成就奖章”。
ON MAY 10, Noyce—along with Jack Kilby, transistor inventor John Bardeen, composer Leonard Bernstein, medical researchers Lloyd Conover (who discovered tetracycline) and Gertrude Elion (who synthesized several key leukemia and herpes drugs), Polaroid founder Edwin Land, author James A. Michener, director Steven Spielberg, and songwriters Steven Sondheim and Stevie Wonder—received a “Lifetime Achievement Medal” during the bicentennial celebration of the Patent Act.
大约两周后，诺伊斯开车前往他小女儿居住的宗教社区。这是他第一次独自前往社区。当他见到女儿——当然还有约瑟夫修士——时，女儿提到她打算让儿子在社区内接受教育，而不是在传统的学校。诺伊斯表示他不认为这是个好主意，约瑟夫修士打断了他。“你以为你是谁，竟敢对别人的育儿方式指手画脚？”他问道。他告诉诺伊斯，一个从不在家陪伴孩子、对妻子不忠的男人，根本没有资格为人父母。他有权告诉女儿任何关于养育孩子的事情。然后他宣布会议结束。67
Perhaps two weeks later, Noyce drove to the religious community where his youngest daughter lived. It was his first trip to the community alone, and when he met with his daughter—and Brother Joseph, of course—she mentioned that she planned to educate her son not at a traditional school, but within the community. When Noyce said that he did not think this was a good idea, Brother Joseph cut him off. “Who do you think you are, giving advice on parenting?” he asked. He told Noyce that a man who was never home for his children and had been unfaithful to his wife had no right to tell his daughter anything about raising children. Then he announced that the meeting was over.67
这些指控令诺伊斯深受打击。他不愿去想自己与贝蒂·诺伊斯的婚姻以及这些指控对孩子们的影响。诺伊斯一回到家，安·鲍尔斯就看出他不对劲。他情绪低落，几乎说不出发生了什么事。鲍尔斯怒不可遏，不仅因为那些指控，也因为自己没有陪同诺伊斯回家而自责不已。
The accusations left Noyce profoundly shaken. He did not like to think about his marriage to Betty Noyce and its effects on their children. As soon as Noyce arrived home, Ann Bowers could see something was wrong. He was so upset that he could barely tell her what had happened. Bowers was furious, not only at what had been said, but at herself for not accompanying Noyce.
几天后，诺伊斯拿起电话，拨通了卡拉尼什基金合伙人保罗·霍斯钦斯基的号码。霍斯钦斯基曾帮助他处理离婚事宜，并管理着他子女的信托基金。霍斯钦斯基认识诺伊斯超过25年。他曾在费尔柴尔德公司担任诺伊斯的助理，并多次与诺伊斯一家在滑雪场和洛约拉大道上的家中共度时光。除了安·鲍尔斯之外，他或许是唯一一个能够将诺伊斯的私人生活和公众生活联系起来的人。
A few days later, Noyce picked up the phone and called Paul Hwoschinsky, his Callanish Fund partner who had helped him through the divorce and administered his children’s trusts. Hwoschinsky had known Noyce for more than 25 years. He had worked as Noyce’s assistant at Fairchild and spent many days with the family on the ski slopes and at the house on Loyola Drive. He was perhaps the only person apart from Ann Bowers who bridged the private and public sides of Noyce’s life.
“嗨，”诺伊斯说道。
“Well, hi,” Noyce said.
“我的天哪，你在哪里？”霍斯钦斯基问道。此时西海岸已是午夜。
“My God, where are you?” asked Hwoschinsky. It was midnight on the West Coast.
“哦，我在奥斯汀。”当时是德克萨斯州凌晨两点。
“Oh, I’m in Austin.” It was two in the morning in Texas.
“你在干什么？”
“What are you doing?”
“嗯，我只是想给你打个电话。”
“Well, I just thought I’d call you up.”
“鲍勃，你打电话给我肯定是有原因的，是什么原因呢？如果我能到场，我一定会到。”
“Bob, you didn’t just call me up. There’s a reason you called me, and what is the reason, because if I can be present to you, I will.”
诺伊斯没有回答，而是发出了一声沙哑的轻笑。霍斯钦斯基认出了那声紧张的笑声，知道“背后肯定有故事”。
Noyce did not answer. Instead, he laughed a hoarse little laugh. Hwoschinsky knew that nervous chuckle, knew “there was something behind it.”
两人沉默了一会儿。然后霍什钦斯基说：“好吧，我来选个话题。”
Both men sat quiet for a moment. Then Hwoschinsky said, “Okay, I will choose a subject for our conversation.”
“美好的。”
“Fine.”
“问题在于吸烟，你必须戒烟，否则你会死的，”霍斯钦斯基说。“我不会说教……但你的朋友们能为你做些什么呢？我们每个人，包括我自己。”
“The issue is smoking and you’ve got to give it up or you’re going to die,” Hwoschinsky said. “I’m not going to lecture you … but what is it that any of your friends can do to be present to you? Any of us, myself included.”
诺伊斯没说太多。“那真是一次奇怪的谈话，”霍斯钦斯基十多年后回忆道，“直到今天我也不知道他为什么打电话。老实说，我真的不知道。我不知道他知道的那么多。我真的不知道。这真是个谜。我能感觉到……我知道肯定发生了什么非常重要的事情，但我却怎么也问不出来。”68
Noyce did not have much to say. “It was such a strange conversation,” Hwoschinsky recalls more than a dozen years later. “I don’t know to this day [why he called]. Honest to God, I don’t know. I don’t know as he knows. I don’t really know. It was a real mystery. I could get to a feeling level. … I knew there was something really important happening, and I couldn’t get it out of him.”68
诺伊斯为何给多年未联系的霍辛斯基打电话？他是否对与约瑟夫修士的谈话感到不满？是否像霍辛斯基后来怀疑的那样，他预感到自己将在不到两周后死去？诺伊斯的行为显然不像一个认为自己即将死去的人。他的日程安排一直排到了盛夏。他还计划把他的Citation轿车卖掉。几天后，他就要购买一架性能更强劲的新型喷气式飞机。为了购买这架飞机，他接受了一系列全面的体检，所有检查都合格。但诺伊斯在SEMATECH公司承受的压力如此之大，以至于许多与他共事的人都认为这导致了他的死亡。所以，或许他确实预感到了什么。
Why did Noyce call Hwoschinsky, with whom he had not had contact for several years? Was he upset about the conversation with Brother Joseph? Did he sense, as Hwoschinsky later suspected, some premonition of his death, which would come in less than two weeks? Certainly Noyce’s actions were not those of a man who thought he would die soon. His calendar was full well into the summer. He had plans to trade in his Citation for a new, even higher performance jet in just a few days. And in connection with that purchase, he had undergone a battery of medical tests, administered as part of a full physical, all of which he passed. But the stress Noyce faced at SEMATECH was so great that many people who worked with him there think it contributed to his death. So perhaps he did sense something.
五月底，诺伊斯在硅谷的SEMATECH展会上发表了演讲。这将是他最后一次到访硅谷。得知诺伊斯要来，史蒂夫·乔布斯想让未婚妻见见他，便邀请诺伊斯到家中共进晚餐。三人彻夜长谈，直到第二天清晨。之后，诺伊斯飞回了奥斯汀。69
At the end of May, Noyce delivered a speech on SEMATECH in Silicon Valley. It would be his last visit. When he learned Noyce was coming to town, Steve Jobs, who wanted his fiancée to meet Noyce, invited him to his home for dinner. The three stayed up talking until early the next morning. Then Noyce flew back to Austin.69
诺伊斯返回后，惊讶地发现SEMATECH公司宣布1990年6月1日为“鲍勃·诺伊斯日”。这并非一场告别派对——公司里几乎没人知道他打算离开。这场庆祝活动的灵感源于一位设备供应商在接受《圣何塞水星报》采访时发表的一番言论。他说，美国人需要“更换偶像”，并提名鲍勃·诺伊斯“登上神坛”。SEMATECH公司制作了印有这句话、诺伊斯照片以及“鲍勃·诺伊斯，青少年偶像”字样的T恤。活动现场的一张照片显示，诺伊斯站在SEMATECH公司的草坪上，笑容满面，周围都是穿着T恤的女士。70
Upon his return, Noyce was surprised to learn that SEMATECH had declared June 1, 1990, “Bob Noyce Day.” It was not a good-bye party—almost no one at the consortium knew that he was planning to leave. Instead, the celebration was inspired by a comment that an equipment supplier had made to the San Jose Mercury News. Americans need to “change their idols,” he said. He nominated Bob Noyce “for the pedestal.” SEMATECH made up t-shirts printed with the quote, Noyce’s picture, and the phrase “Bob Noyce, teen idol.” A photo from the event shows Noyce on the SEMATECH lawn, grinning ear-to-ear, surrounded by women wearing the t-shirts.70
这是诺伊斯的最后一张照片。照片拍摄两天后，他像往常一样晨泳后躺下休息。睡梦中，他突发严重心脏病，不幸离世。就在医护人员在他卧室里徒劳地抢救他时，那个几个月来一直纠缠诺伊斯的油田老板打来了电话。日期是1990年6月3日。诺伊斯享年62岁。
This is the last image of Noyce. Two days after photo was taken, he lay down for a rest after his regular morning swim. As he slept, he suffered a massive heart attack that took his life. The oil field owner who had been hounding Noyce for months called while the paramedics were in his bedroom vainly trying to revive him. The date was June 3, 1990. Noyce was 62 years old.
结论
Conclusion
在奥斯汀，超过一千人参加了诺伊斯的追悼会。在日本，数百人前来参加纪念他的仪式。另有两千人参加了在圣何塞举行的纪念仪式，由诺伊斯的兄弟盖洛德主持。在硅谷，也就是这座城市正式宣布的“鲍勃·诺伊斯日”的那个六月午后，数百个红白相间的气球被放飞到晴朗的天空。随后，飞机的轰鸣声响起。片刻之后，诺伊斯最新款的塞斯纳奖状喷气式飞机——他生前从未有机会驾驶过的那架——从十层楼高的空中掠过。
More than 1,000 people attended memorial services for Noyce in Austin. In Japan, hundreds came to a service honoring his memory. Another 2,000 attended ceremonies in San Jose, officiated by Noyce’s brother Gaylord. At the end of that June afternoon in Silicon Valley, which the city officially declared “Bob Noyce Day,” hundreds of red and white balloons were released into the clear sky. Then the roar of an airplane grew audible. Moments later, Noyce’s newest Cessna Citation jet—the one that he had never had a chance to fly—soared past, a mere ten stories off the ground.
老布什总统致电安·鲍尔斯，表达了个人慰问。大约二十几位国会议员，来自两党，在国会记录中写下了他们对诺伊斯的悼念之词。国防部长迪克·切尼称他为“国宝”。白宫科学顾问D·艾伦·布罗姆利表示，他是“他那一代人中，乃至全世界极少数真正配得上‘天才’称号的人之一”。世界各地报纸的讣告都缅怀诺伊斯，称他为“电子行业最具影响力的人物”，他帮助“缔造了一场工业革命”，并“改变了二十世纪”。《圣何塞水星报》刊登了长达四页的特别纪念文章，其中收录了数十位读者的回忆，他们中有曾经手诺伊斯支票购买飞机的银行柜员，也有与他关系最亲近的人——安·鲍尔斯、戈登·摩尔和格兰特·盖尔。苹果电脑公司在悼念诺伊斯时写道：“他是硅谷的巨擘之一，为我们树立了榜样，激励了我们所有人。他是终极发明家，终极叛逆者，终极企业家。”1
President George H. W. Bush phoned Ann Bowers to offer his personal condolences. Roughly two dozen members of Congress, from both sides of the aisle, entered their thoughts on Noyce into the Congressional Record. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney called him “a national treasure.” White House science advisor D. Allan Bromley said he “was one of the very few in his generation, worldwide, who truly deserved the appellation of ‘genius.’” Obituaries from newspapers around the world remembered Noyce as “the most powerful personal force in the electronics industry,” who helped to “create an industrial revolution” and “transform the twentieth century.” The San Jose Mercury News ran a special four-page tribute, filled with dozens of reminiscences from readers who ranged from a bank teller who had handled his check to buy a plane to those closest to him—Ann Bowers, Gordon Moore, and Grant Gale. Apple Computer’s tribute to Noyce read, in part, “He was one of the giants in this valley who provided the model and inspiration for everything we wanted to become. He was the ultimate inventor. The ultimate rebel. The ultimate entrepreneur.”1
许多认识诺伊斯的人都称他为“文艺复兴式人物”。除了“文艺复兴式人物”之外，还能如何定义一位集发明家、科学家、实业家、歌手和探险家于一身的奇才呢？然而，诺伊斯的人生根基并非十五世纪的意大利，而是独特的美国。热情洋溢。“走吧！无论你是谁，都来和我一起旅行吧，”沃尔特·惠特曼在《草叶集》中写道。
Many people who knew Noyce described him as a “Renaissance man.” How else to define someone who was an inventor, a scientist, an industrialist, a singer, and an explorer—all at the same time? Yet Noyce’s life was rooted not in fifteenth-century Italy; but in a distinctively American exuberance. “Allons! Whoever you are come travel with me,” wrote Walt Whitman in Leaves of Grass.
从此刻起，我决定摆脱一切限制和人为的界限。
From this hour I ordain myself loos’d of limits and imaginary lines.
去我列出的所有地方，我自己的总和绝对，
Going where I list, my own master total and absolute,
认真倾听他人的意见，并仔细考虑他们所说的话。
Listening to others, considering well what they say,
暂停、寻找、接收、沉思
Pausing, searching, receiving, contemplating,
温柔地，但又坚定不移地，挣脱了束缚我的枷锁。
Gently, but with undeniable will, divesting myself of the holds that would hold me.
在诺伊斯生前最后一次接受采访时，他被问及如果自己成为美国的“皇帝”会做什么。他表示，他会做的其中一件事是“确保我们的下一代能够在科技时代蓬勃发展。这意味着要为最底层和最贫困的学生提供教育，同时也要为研究生提供教育。”秉持着这些理念，诺伊斯将大部分遗产捐赠给了由安·鲍尔斯担任主席的诺伊斯基金会，用于资助“旨在显著提高公立学校学生在幼儿园至12年级数学、科学和早期读写能力方面的学业成绩的各项举措”。迄今为止，诺伊斯基金会的捐赠总额已超过6500万美元。2
In the last interview he granted, Noyce was asked what he would do if he were “emperor” of the United States. He said that he would, among other things, “make sure we are preparing our next generation to flourish in a high-tech age. And that means education of the lowest and the poorest, as well as at the graduate school level.” In keeping with these beliefs, most of Noyce’s estate was channeled into a foundation, chaired by Ann Bowers, to provide grants to support “initiatives designed to produce significant improvement in the academic achievement of public school students in math, science, and early literacy in grades K–12.” To date, Noyce Foundation grants have totaled more than $65 million.2
诺伊斯参与的许多公司、组织和事业如今都蓬勃发展。2004年，微处理器——诺伊斯曾满怀热情地向难以置信的听众推销的那种小芯片——在全球的销售额约为300亿美元。该市场最大的公司是英特尔，其微处理器驱动着当今市场上超过80%的个人电脑。诺伊斯少年时期创办的Caere公司在2000年初以约1.4亿美元的价格出售给了Scansoft公司。
Many of the companies, organizations, and causes with which Noyce involved himself flourish today. In 2004, roughly $30 billion worth of microprocessors—the little chips Noyce once promoted with missionary zeal before incredulous audiences—were sold around the world. The largest company in this market is Intel, whose microprocessors drive more than 80 percent of the personal computers on the market today. Caere, Noyce’s teenage startup, was sold to Scansoft in early 2000 for roughly $140 million.
如今，电子产业已成为美国最大的产业，其发展的基础是集成电路，而集成电路的复杂程度是诺伊斯在1959年构思该设备时绝对无法想象的。当时，他设想或许有一天，100个元件可以印刷成一个电路。而现在，新一代的微处理器包含1亿个元件。2003年，半导体行业平均为地球上每个人生产了约9000万个晶体管；到2010年，这个数字应该会达到10亿个晶体管。3
The electronics industry, today the largest industry in the United States, is built upon integrated circuits of a complexity that Noyce never could have imagined in 1959, when he sketched out his ideas for the device. At that point he thought that maybe, someday, 100 components might be printed together as a circuit. The current generation of microprocessors contains 100 million components. In 2003, the semiconductor industry manufactured roughly 90 million transistors for every human on the planet; by 2010, this number should be 1 billion transistors.3
诺伊斯参与创立的半导体行业协会如今拥有约90家会员企业，并在立法方面取得了诸多成就。该协会将其最负盛名的奖项——“业内最高领导力荣誉”——以诺伊斯的名字命名。他曾担忧日本可能会永久取代美国，成为全球半导体产业的主导者，但这种担忧并未成为现实。如今，美国企业占据了价值1660亿美元的全球半导体市场的48%；日本企业占27%。（中国和东亚一些小国的新兴产业占据了剩余的市场份额。）事实上，人们所感受到的威胁已经大幅降低，以至于在民族主义拯救我们行业的狂热氛围中成立的 SEMATECH，现在拥有来自五个国家的成员公司，其中包括日本。
The Semiconductor Industry Association, the trade association that Noyce helped to found, today has some 90 member companies and a long record of legislative successes. The organization named its most prestigious award—“the industry’s highest honor for leadership”—after Noyce. His great concern that Japan might permanently supplant the United States as home to the world’s dominant semiconductor industry has not materialized. Today American firms account for 48 percent of the $166 billion world market for semiconductors; the Japanese account for 27 percent. (A rising industry in China and small East Asian countries accounts for the balance of the market.) Indeed, the perceived threat has diminished so dramatically that SEMATECH, founded in a flush of nationalistic save-our-industry fervor, now has member companies from five countries, including Japan.
格林内尔学院以诺伊斯的名字命名了其科学中心和计算机科学奖项。英特尔总部如今被称为罗伯特·诺伊斯大楼，该公司还设立了三项以他名字命名的大学奖学金。电气电子工程师协会（IEEE）设立了罗伯特·诺伊斯奖章，以表彰对微电子行业做出杰出贡献的人士。位于圣何塞的科技创新博物馆也有一座以诺伊斯命名的建筑。美国国家科学基金会在其成立四十周年纪念研讨会上向他致敬，并于2002年设立了罗伯特·诺伊斯奖学金项目，旨在“鼓励有才华的科学、技术、工程和数学（STEM）专业的学生和专业人士成为中小学数学和科学教师”。迄今为止，美国国家科学基金会已通过该项目拨款超过1900万美元，资助了约1700名新教师。4
Grinnell College named both its science center and its prize in computer science for Noyce. Intel’s headquarters is today called the Robert Noyce Building, and the company sponsors three university fellowships in his honor. The IEEE has a Robert N. Noyce medal for exceptional contributions to the microelectronics industry. The Tech Museum of Innovation in San Jose has a Noyce building. The National Science Foundation dedicated its fortieth anniversary symposium to him and in 2002 established a Robert Noyce Scholarship Program to “encourage talented science, technology, engineering, and mathematics majors and professionals to become K–12 mathematics and science teachers.” To date NSF has awarded more than $19 million to support approximately 1,700 new teachers under this program.4
但诺伊斯最持久的遗产无法用建筑、赞誉、奖项或荣誉来衡量，也无法用赚到的或捐出的金钱来衡量，更不能用股价或市场份额来衡量。它无法镌刻在硅片上，也无法印刻在微芯片上。在硅谷，存在着一种非正式的代际传承，诺伊斯在其中占据着举足轻重的地位。例如，几年前，谷歌的创始人就曾向史蒂夫·乔布斯寻求建议和指导，就像当年乔布斯在苹果公司初创时期向诺伊斯请教一样。即便没有这种与诺伊斯直接的联系——即便最新一代的创业者可能并不了解他的名字——他的影响仍然体现在他所秉持的一系列理念中，这些理念已成为美国高科技文化不可磨灭的一部分：知识胜于等级制度，每个想法都可以进一步发展，新颖有趣的事物胜过老套保守的事物，要么孤注一掷，要么干脆放弃。当然还有无数其他影响因素，但诺伊斯的愿景深深植根于硅谷翻腾的能量之中，他的精神默默地敦促着每一个可能听到的人“去做一些了不起的事情”。
But Noyce’s most enduring legacy cannot be measured in buildings, accolades, awards, or honors, not in dollars earned or given away, nor in stock price or market share. It cannot be etched in silicon or printed on microchips. There is an informal sort of generational succession in Silicon Valley that places Noyce near the top of the family tree. A few years ago, for example, the founders of Google asked Steve Jobs for advice and mentorship in the same way Jobs had come to Noyce when Apple was young. And even when there is no such explicit tie back to Noyce—even if the latest generation of entrepreneurs do not know his name—his influence endures in a set of ideals that have become an indelible part of American high-tech culture: knowledge trumps hierarchy, every idea can be taken farther, new and interesting is better than established and safe, go for broke or don’t go at all. There are countless other influences of course, but Noyce’s vision is embedded deep in the eye of the swirling energy that is Silicon Valley, his spirit quietly urging anyone who might listen to “go off and do something wonderful.”
笔记
Notes
材料来源缩写
Abbreviations for Sources of Material
缩写 全名
Abbreviation Full Name
AIP AIP |
美国物理学会物理史中心，马里兰州大学城 Center for History of Physics, American Institute for Physics, College Park, Md. |
匿名 Anon. |
消息人士要求匿名 Source requested anonymity |
ASB ASB |
安·鲍尔斯 Ann Bowers |
氯 CHC |
加州历史中心，德安扎学院，库比蒂诺，加利福尼亚州 California History Center, De Anza College, Cupertino, Calif. |
DA DA |
Dietz and Associates，缅因州肯纳邦克 Dietz and Associates, Kennebunk, Maine |
DSN DSN |
唐纳德·S·诺伊斯 Donald S. Noyce |
ELEC ELEC |
美国电化学学会，彭宁顿，新泽西州 Electrochemical Society, Pennington, N.J. |
FMCA FMCA |
福特汽车公司档案，福特汽车公司 Ford Motor Company archives, Ford Motor Company |
GCA GCA |
格林内尔学院档案馆，格林内尔学院，爱荷华州格林内尔市 Grinnell College archives, Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa |
GRSPL GRSPL |
格林内尔厅，斯图尔特公共图书馆，爱荷华州格林内尔市 Grinnell Room, Stewart Public Library, Grinnell, Iowa |
HPA HPA |
惠普公司档案，惠普公司 Hewlett-Packard archives, Hewlett-Packard Corporation |
IA IA |
英特尔档案，英特尔公司 Intel archives, Intel Corporation |
IEEE IEEE |
IEEE历史中心口述历史收藏，罗格斯大学，新泽西州新布伦瑞克 IEEE History Center Oral History Collection, Rutgers, New Brunswick, N.J. |
低频 LF |
天秤座基金会，缅因州波特兰市 Libra Foundation, Portland, Maine |
麻省理工学院 MIT |
麻省理工学院图书馆档案馆和特藏部，马萨诸塞州剑桥市。 Institute Archives and Special Collections, MIT Libraries, Cambridge, Mass. |
中间人 MITP |
麻省理工学院物理系 MIT University Physics Department |
原发性硬化症 PSC |
太平洋研究中心，加利福尼亚州山景城 Pacific Studies Center, Mountain View, Calif. |
新加坡航空 SIA |
半导体行业协会阅览室 Semiconductor Industry Association reading room |
太空探索 SSC |
斯坦福大学特藏部，加利福尼亚州斯坦福市 Stanford Special Collections, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. |
英石 ST |
SEMATECH 档案 SEMATECH archives |
介绍
Introduction
1. Bob Noyce 提携了我：史蒂夫·乔布斯，作者采访。
1. Bob Noyce took me under his wing: Steve Jobs, interview by author.
2. 大即是坏，小而合作更多：诺伊斯，《成功的果实》，《化学技术》，1979 年 12 月。补充资源：诺伊斯引自苏珊·J·格罗德斯基，《从篷车到硅芯片：罗伯特·诺伊斯，先驱》，《格林内尔杂志》，1983 年 4 月至 5 月。
2. Big is bad, small cooperates more: Noyce, “The Fruit of Success,” Chemtech, Dec. 1979. Restock the stream: Noyce quoted in Susan J. Grodsky, “From the Covered Wagon to the Silicon Chip: Robert Noyce, Pioneer,” The Grinnell Magazine, April–May 1983.
3. 让我们看看你能不能超越：Noyce 在“活着的传奇，来自国家商业名人堂的简介”[视频]，ST。他努力做到卓越：Penny Noyce 在 1990 年 6 月 9 日为 Bob Noyce 举行的 SEMATECH 追悼会上发表讲话[视频]，ASB。
3. Let’s see if you can top: Noyce in “Living Legends, Profiles from the National Business Hall of Fame,” [video], ST. He tried to excel: Penny Noyce speaking at the SEMATECH memorial service for Bob Noyce, 9 June 1990 [video], ASB.
4. 从未跳过：比尔·戴维多夫，作者访谈。出去做点什么：诺伊斯，比尔·戴维多夫、吉恩·弗拉斯和罗伯特·诺伊斯口述历史[1983]，爱荷华州。像个吹笛人：罗杰·博罗沃伊，作者访谈。
4. Had never jumped: Bill Davidow, interview by author. Go out and do something: Noyce in Bill Davidow, Gene Flath, and Robert Noyce oral history [1983], IA. Like the pied piper: Roger Borovoy, interview by author.
5. 冷漠而迷人：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。
5. Aloof and charming: Andy Grove, interview by author.
6. 人人都喜欢鲍勃：沃伦·巴菲特，作者采访。
6. Everybody liked Bob: Warren Buffett, interview by author.
7. 便携式电话：诺伊斯，赫伯特·S·克莱曼采访，1965 年，录音带，SSC。蝴蝶跳跃：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。
7. Portable telephones: Noyce, interview by Herbert S. Kleiman, 1965, audiotape, SSC. Butterfly hopping: Andy Grove, interview by author.
8. 如果你没有被诺伊斯吓倒：吉姆·拉弗蒂，作者采访。
8. If you weren’t intimidated by Noyce: Jim Lafferty, interview by author.
9. 托马斯·爱迪生和亨利·福特：“缅怀鲍勃·诺伊斯：特别致敬” ，1990年6月17日《圣何塞水星报》四页插页。改变世界的人：“奥斯古德档案”[视频]，ASB。汤姆·沃尔夫撰写了关于诺伊斯的文章：汤姆·沃尔夫，《罗伯特·诺伊斯的修补：硅谷的崛起》，《时尚先生》 ，1983年12月，第346-374页。最重要的美国人：乔治·吉尔德在英特尔内部刊物《Inteleads》中被引用，1990年7月，IA。最重要的时刻：艾萨克·阿斯米奥夫在米勒·邦纳、W·莱恩·博伊德和珍妮特·A·艾伦合著的《罗伯特·N·诺伊斯，1927-1990》中被引用，该纪念册由SEMATECH内部出版，ST。
9. Thomas Edison and Henry Ford: “Remembering Bob Noyce: A Special Tribute,” four-page insert to San Jose Mercury News, 17 June 1990. Man who changed the world: “Osgood Files” [video], ASB. Tom Wolfe wrote about Noyce: Tom Wolfe, “The Tinkerings of Robert Noyce: How the Sun Rose on Silicon Valley,” Esquire, Dec. 1983, 346–74. Most important American: George Gilder quoted in the internal Intel publication Inteleads, July 1990, IA. Most important moment: Isaac Asmiov quoted in Miller Bonner, W. Lane Boyd, and Janet A. Allen, “Robert N. Noyce, 1927–1990,” commemorative brochure internally published by SEMATECH, ST.
10. 根很重要：诺伊斯为格林内尔高中1945届四十周年同学聚会纪念册所做的贡献，由罗伯特·卡卢佩克提供。我的爱好是手工艺：1939年剪贴簿，标题为“我的爱好”，ASB。
10. Roots are important: Noyce’s contribution to the Grinnell High School Class of 1945’s fortieth reunion booklet, courtesy Robert Kaloupek. My hobby is handicraft: 1939 scrapbook labeled “My Hobby,” ASB.
第一章：肾上腺素与汽油
Chapter 1: Adrenaline and Gasoline
1. 最高点：诺伊斯，格林内尔学院申请表，格林内尔学院提供。剪贴簿：“我的爱好”，1939 年，ASB。
1. All time high: Noyce, Grinnell College application, courtesy Grinnell College. Scrapbook: “My Hobby,” 1939, ASB.
2. 纸气球，点燃模型：盖洛德·诺伊斯在圣何塞为鲍勃·诺伊斯举行的追悼会上的悼词；威尔弗雷德·乔治，“关于罗伯特·诺伊斯博士的‘其余故事’”，2001 年 11 月 4 日[未发表的回忆录]，由威尔弗雷德·乔治提供。
2. Paper balloons, lighting models afire: Gaylord Noyce, eulogy at the San Jose service for Bob Noyce; Wilfred George, “‘The Rest of the Story’ about Dr. Robert Noyce,” 4 Nov. 2001 [unpublished reminiscence], courtesy Wilfred George.
3. 飞行表演者飞机之旅：唐·格雷格森，作者采访。
3. Barnstormer plane ride: Don Gregson, interview by author.
4. 马修斯和史密斯的贡献：鲍勃·史密斯，作者采访；夏洛特·马修斯，作者采访；盖洛德·诺伊斯致作者，2002 年 9 月 8 日。滑翔机的描述：盖洛德·诺伊斯致作者，2002 年 9 月 8 日。
4. Matthews and Smith contributions: Bob Smith, interview by author; Charlotte Matthews, interview by author; Gaylord Noyce to author, 8 Sept. 2002. Description of glider: Gaylord Noyce to author, 8 Sept. 2002.
5. 我们成功运行了：盖洛德·诺伊斯致作者，2002 年 9 月 8 日。
5. We succeeded in running: Gaylord Noyce to author, 8 Sept. 2002.
6. 从屋顶跳下去，活下去：诺伊斯，格林内尔学院申请，格林内尔学院提供。
6. Jump off the roof and live: Noyce, Grinnell College application, courtesy Grinnell College.
7. 我制作了糊状物：Harriet Noyce，“我记得”[未出版的回忆录]，1988 年，DSN。
7. I made the paste: Harriet Noyce, “I Remember” [unpublished memoir], 1988, DSN.
8. 多做事，并且把每件事都做好：盖洛德·诺伊斯，作者采访。
8. Do a lot and do it well: Gaylord Noyce, interview by author.
9. 成为基督教领袖：哈里特·诺伊斯，《我记得》。
9. To be Christian leaders: Harriet Noyce, “I Remember.”
10. 丹麦教堂：唐纳德·S·诺伊斯，《从蜡烛到电脑》[未发表的家族史]，133-150。
10. Denmark church: Donald S. Noyce, “Candles to Computers” [unpublished family history], 133–150.
11. 拉尔夫·诺伊斯的薪水和支出：DS 诺伊斯，“从蜡烛到电脑”，133-148。
11. Ralph Noyce’s salary and expenses: D. S. Noyce, “Candles to Computers,” 133–148.
12. 可惜他是个男的：未注明日期的信，ASB。
12. Too bad he was a he: undated letter, ASB.
13. 乒乓球的故事：尼罗·林格伦，《构建一个理性的双头怪兽》，《创新》，1970 年。
13. Ping Pong story: Nilo Lindgren, “Building a Rational Two-Headed Monster,” Innovation, 1970.
14. 大西洋城和韦伯斯特城的萧条：DS Noyce，“从蜡烛到电脑”，157-187。出于无人完全理解的原因，诺伊斯牧师在倒闭银行的账户中的钱在几周后被恢复了。
14. Depression in Atlantic and Webster City: D. S. Noyce, “Candles to Computers,” 157–187. For reasons no one quite understood, the money from Reverend Noyce’s account in the closed bank was restored a few weeks later.
15. 可以倾诉的对象：拉尔夫·布鲁斯特·诺伊斯致哈丽特·诺顿，1921 年 3 月 27 日。
15. Someone to tell things to: Ralph Brewster Noyce to Harriet Norton, 27 March 1921.
16. 拉尔夫·诺伊斯的旅行：DS 诺伊斯，“从蜡烛到电脑”。
16. Ralph Noyce’s travel: D. S. Noyce, “Candles to Computers.”
17. 爸爸在外奔波，我却成了母亲，我感受到了归属感：哈里特·诺伊斯，《我记得》，34。
17. Mothering with a daddy on the road, I felt the sense of belonging: Harriet Noyce, “I Remember,” 34.
18. 格林内尔人口：“格林内尔综合规划 2001 年人口报告”，http://web.grinnell.edu/individuals/martzahn/Population.pdf，2002年 9 月访问。教堂数量：“二战期间的格林内尔”文件，第 37 号藏品，斯图尔特图书馆，格林内尔室。
18. Population of Grinnell: “Report on Population, Grinnell Comprehensive Plan 2001,” http://web.grinnell.edu/individuals/martzahn/Population.pdf Accessed Sept. 2002. Church count: “Grinnell During World War II” file, Collection #37, Stewart Library, Grinnell Room.
19. 不足 2%：美国历史统计，二百周年纪念版（华盛顿：美国商务部人口普查局，1975 年）：系列 H 700–15。男孩的曾曾祖父：“罗伯特·诺顿·诺伊斯：敬仰与感激。格林内尔学院董事会决议，1990 年 10 月 26 日”，文件标题为“诺伊斯之死”，GCA。
19. Less than 2 percent: Historical Statistics of the United States, Bicentennial ed. (Washington: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1975): Series H 700–15. Boys’ great-great-grandfather: “Robert Norton Noyce: in Admiration and Gratitude. A Resolution of the Grinnell College Board of Trustees, October 26, 1990,” file labeled “Noyce Death,” GCA.
20. 罗德奖学金：拉尔夫·B·诺伊斯致其母亲，1949 年 8 月 9 日，DSN。诺伊斯童年成绩：成绩单，ASB 和 DSN。
20. Rhodes scholarship: Ralph B. Noyce to his mother, 9 Aug. 1949, DSN. Noyce childhood grades: report cards, ASB and DSN.
21. 格林内尔的 D 日：诺伊斯在他的告别演说（1945 年 5 月 17 日发表）中提到了这一点，感谢埃文·拉姆斯塔德。
21. D-Day in Grinnell: Noyce refers to this in his valedictory speech (delivered 17 May 1945), courtesy Evan Ramstad.
22. 近 2,000 名男性：Alan Jones，《开拓：格林内尔学院的摄影和文献史》（格林内尔学院，1996 年）：117。格林内尔对战争努力的贡献详情：《二战期间的格林内尔》中的无标题剪贴簿，GRSPL 收藏集 #37。
22. Nearly 2,000 men: Alan Jones, Pioneering: A Photographic and Documentary History of Grinnell College (Grinnell College, 1996): 117. Details on Grinnell’s contributions to the war effort: untitled scrapbook in “Grinnell During World War II,” Collection #37, GRSPL.
23. 哈丽特忙得不可开交：罗伯特·史密斯、大卫·汉密尔顿和查尔斯·曼利，作者访谈。尝试制造电弧：夏洛特·马修斯·基廷，作者访谈；诺伊斯剪下的《大众科学》文章收录在他的“我的爱好”剪贴簿中，ASB。诺伊斯的高中趣事：作者对格林内尔居民的访谈。
23. Harriet had her hands full: Robert Smith, David Hamilton, and Charles Manly, interview by author. Trying to build electrical arc: Charlotte Matthews Keating, interview by author; Noyce’s clipping of the Popular Science article is in his “My Hobby” scrapbook, ASB. Noyce’s high school antics: author’s interviews with Grinnell residents.
24. 总是急着赶路：罗伯特·卡卢佩克，作者采访。
24. Always in a hurry to get somewhere: Robert Kaloupek, interview by author.
25. 所有女孩都为鲍勃疯狂：夏洛特·马修斯·基廷，作者采访。最优雅的体态：玛丽安·斯坦丁·伍尔夫，埃文·拉姆斯塔德1995年4月采访，埃文·拉姆斯塔德提供。惹麻烦的天赋：哈丽特·诺伊斯，《我记得》，第42页。
25. All the girls were crazy about Bob: Charlotte Matthews Keating, interview by author. Most physically graceful: Marianne Standing Woolfe, interview by Evan Ramstad, April 1995, courtesy Evan Ramstad. Gift for trouble: Harriet Noyce, “I Remember,” 42.
26. 非常优秀的孩子：TT Cranny 推荐 Bob 入读格林内尔学院的信，1945 年 4 月 26 日，由格林内尔学院提供。我们班的答题高手：格林内尔高中年鉴，1945 年，GRSPL。拆卸和组装手表：Robert Smith、David Hamilton 和 Charles Manly，作者访谈。
26. Very fine boy: T. T. Cranny, letter recommending Bob’s admission to Grinnell College, 26 April 1945, courtesy Grinnell College. Quiz Kid of our class: Grinnell High School year book, 1945, GRSPL. Dismantling and rebuilding a watch: Robert Smith, David Hamilton, and Charles Manly, interview by author.
27. 诺伊斯对盖洛德的离开感到悲痛：哈里特·诺伊斯，《我记得》，37。
27. Noyce bereft at Gaylord’s departure: Harriet Noyce, “I Remember,” 37.
28. Noyce 和 Gale 之间的关系：Grant Gale，“回忆 Bob Noyce 的学生时代”，1990 年 9 月 4 日，DSN。
28. Relations between Noyces and Gales: Grant Gale, “Remembering Bob Noyce as a Student,” 4 Sept. 1990, DSN.
29. 盖尔的教学方法和训诫：基思·奥尔森，作者采访，2002 年 7 月 30 日。
29. Gale’s teaching methods and homilies: Keith Olsen, interview by author, 30 July 2002.
30. 兴趣极具感染力：引自肯·富森（Ken Fuson）的文章《塑造天才的人》（“The Man Who Shaped a Genius”），刊登于1990年6月10日《得梅因纪事报》（Des Moines Register），GCA。诺伊斯在盖尔（Gale）课堂上的表现：贝蒂·诺伊斯（Bettie Noyce）接受作者采访。贝蒂在嫁给唐·诺伊斯（Don Noyce）之前曾是这门课的学生。
30. Interest was infectious: Noyce quoted in Ken Fuson, “The Man Who Shaped a Genius,” Des Moines Register, 10 June 1990, GCA. Noyce’s behavior in Gale’s class: Bettie Noyce, interview by author. Bettie was a student in this course before she married Don Noyce.
31. 几乎成了家族传统：诺伊斯的大学申请文书，由格林内尔学院提供。才华横溢却平庸：罗伯特·史密斯、大卫·汉密尔顿和查尔斯·曼利，作者访谈。
31. Almost a family tradition: Noyce’s college admissions essay, courtesy Grinnell College. Bright but common: Robert Smith, David Hamilton, and Charles Manly, interview by author.
32. 获得不错的评论：鲍勃·诺伊斯在 1945 年 7 月 1 日之前写给人们的信，转载于 DS 诺伊斯，《从蜡烛到电脑》，第 228 页。
32. Getting a nice bit of review: Bob Noyce to folks, “before July 1 [1945],” reprinted in D. S. Noyce, “Candles to Computers,” 228.
33. 所以盖伊见过自由女神像：鲍勃·诺伊斯告诉人们，“在 1945 年 7 月 1 日之前”，同上。
33. So Gay has seen the Statue of Liberty: Bob Noyce to folks, “before July 1 [1945],” ibid.
34. 太棒了！：一封来自俄亥俄州迈阿密的信的未注明日期的片段，转载于 DS Noyce 的《从蜡烛到电脑》第 229 页。
34. Whoopee!: Undated fragment of a letter from the summer at Miami of Ohio, reprinted in D. S. Noyce, “Candles to Computers,” 229.
35. 我的门牙差点掉了：鲍勃·诺伊斯致《家》，1945 年 8 月 13 日，转载于 DS 诺伊斯，《从蜡烛到电脑》，第 231 页。
35. My front teeth almost fell out: Bob Noyce to Home, 13 Aug. 1945, reprinted in D. S. Noyce, “Candles to Computers,” 231.
36. 另一个微不足道的学生：信件片段，1945 年 7 月 16 日，转载于 DS Noyce，“Candles to Computeres”，230。我们对你寄予厚望：Samuel Stevens 致 Robert Noyce，1945 年 5 月 7 日，由格林内尔学院提供。
36. Another insignificant student: letter fragment, 16 July [1945], reprinted in D. S. Noyce, “Candles to Computeres,” 230. We expect great things from you: Samuel Stevens to Robert Noyce, 7 May 1945, courtesy Grinnell College.
37. 对 Smythe 报告的兴趣：Bob Noyce 致家人，1946 年 1 月 22 日，ASB。
37. Interest in Smythe report: Bob Noyce to Family, 22 Jan. [1946], ASB.
38. 他从未努力向前：斯科特·克罗姆，埃文·拉姆斯塔德采访，1995 年 4 月，由埃文·拉姆斯塔德提供。
38. He never pushed himself forward: Scott Crom, interview by Evan Ramstad, April 1995, courtesy Evan Ramstad.
39. 肾上腺素和汽油：拉尔夫·诺伊斯致鲍勃·诺伊斯，1945 年 10 月 29 日，DSN。
39. Adrenaline and gasoline: Ralph Noyce to Bob Noyce, 29 Oct. 1945, DSN.
40. 诺伊斯的学术著作：各种信件，特别是鲍勃·诺伊斯写给霍姆的信，未注明日期，但可能是 1946 年春季，DSN。你不会知道：拉尔夫·诺伊斯写给鲍勃·诺伊斯的信，1945 年 10 月 29 日，DSN。
40. Noyce’s academic work: various letters, especially Bob Noyce to Home, undated but probably spring 1946, DSN. You won’t know: Ralph Noyce to Bob Noyce, 29 Oct. 1945, DSN.
41. 我很遗憾我有这样的兄弟：鲍勃·诺伊斯致《家》，星期三晚上[没有日期，但可能是 1947 年]，ASB。
41. I’m just sorry I’ve got such brothers: Bob Noyce to Home, Wednesday night [no date, but probably 1947], ASB.
42. 银行里有 5 美元，口袋里有 4 美元：鲍勃·诺伊斯致《朋友们》，1945 年 9 月 23 日，DSN。19美元买鞋，而不是战争债券：哈丽雅特·诺伊斯，《我记得》，36。给银行职员的支票：信件片段，1945 年 7 月 16 日，转载于 D. 诺伊斯，《从蜡烛到电脑》，230。
42. $5 in the bank, $4 in my pocket: Bob Noyce to Folks, 23 Sept. [1945], DSN. $19 to buy shoes, not war bond: Harriet Noyce, “I Remember,” 36. Check to the bank clerk: letter fragment, 16 July [1945], reprinted in D. Noyce, “Candles to Computers,” 230.
43. 诺伊斯加入跳水队的动机：鲍勃·诺伊斯致《福克斯报》，1945 年 9 月 23 日。格林内尔游泳池描述：乔治·德雷克，作者采访，2002 年 8 月 15 日。
43. Noyce’s motivation for joining the diving team: Bob Noyce to Folks, 23 Sept. [1945]. Grinnell pool description: George Drake, interview by author, 15 Aug. 2002.
44. 展望下一个阶段：安·鲍尔斯，作者采访，2002 年 6 月 22 日。
44. Envisioning myself at the next level: Ann Bowers, interview by author, 22 June 2002.
45. 诺伊斯的跳水锦标赛：“中西部联盟游泳和跳水锦标赛”（宣传册）及相关报纸文章，全部由学生会提供。诺伊斯担心他的父母可能会失望：诺伊斯致家人，3 月 7 日 [1949 年]，由佩妮·诺伊斯提供。
45. Noyce’s diving championship: “Midwest Conference Swimming and Diving Championships” (brochure) and accompanying newspaper articles, all ASB. Noyce’s concern that his parents might be disappointed: Noyce to Folks, 7 March [1949], courtesy Penny Noyce.
46. 对猪事件及其后果的描述：拉尔夫·诺伊斯与格林内尔学院行政部门之间的信件往来；格兰特·盖尔，《在罗伯特·N·诺伊斯科学中心落成晚宴上发表的讲话》，1997 年 9 月 26 日，盖尔文集，GCA；以及露丝·格林沃尔德，作者于 2002 年 7 月 23 日对她的采访。
46. Description of the pig event and aftermath: letters exchanged between Ralph Noyce and Grinnell College administration; Grant Gale, “Remarks Made at the Dedication Dinner of the Robert N. Noyce Science Center,” 26 Sept. 1997, Gale Papers, GCA; and Ruth Greenwald, interview by author, 23 July 2002.
47. 堕胎：在罗兰·克罗斯接受埃文·拉姆斯塔德1996年2月的采访时提及，并经佩妮·诺伊斯在作者采访中证实。与猪事件的巧合：基于哈丽特·诺伊斯在《我记得》一书中的评论。鲍勃说他偷猪是因为“我当时心情很差。我和（女朋友）吵架了”，而作者也了解鲍勃和女朋友约会期间的种种不愉快。
47. Abortion: mentioned in Rowland Cross, interview by Evan Ramstad, Feb. 1996, and confirmed by Penny Noyce, interview by author. Coincidence with the pig incident: based on Harriet Noyce’s comment, in “I Remember” that Bob said he stole the pig because “I was in a lousy mood. I had a fight with [the girlfriend]” and on the author’s knowledge of the rough dates during which the girlfriend and Bob dated.
48. 市长以恐吓的方式激励学生：“如果你不明白必须参与战斗，必须搜遍你房产的每个角落——那你肯定看不懂英语。”摘自《二战期间的格林内尔》，第37号藏品，GRSPL。院长会开除学生：格兰特·盖尔致乔治·德雷克，1984年6月6日，由埃文·拉姆斯塔德提供。
48. Mayor’s motivation through intimidation: “If you do not understand the necessity of getting in the scrap, of searching every corner of your property—well, you certainly can’t read English.” Clippings from “Grinnell During WWII,” collection 37, GRSPL. Dean would expel: Grant Gale to George Drake, 6 June 1984, courtesy Evan Ramstad.
49. 在农业州爱荷华州：卡尔·迪尔伯恩（格林内尔学院人事管理主任）于 1948 年 5 月 29 日致拉尔夫·诺伊斯。据 1948 年 4 月 26 日《格林内尔先驱报》报道，在鲍勃偷猪事件发生前一个月，一头获奖猪的售价为 925 美元。
49. In the agricultural state of Iowa: Karl Dearborn (dean of Grinnell College Personnel Administration) to Ralph Noyce, 29 May 1948. A prize pig sold for $925 a month before Bob’s pig heist according to the Grinnell Herald-Register, 26 April 1948).
50. 更关心猪的人，必须准备好接受年轻人的悔改提议：拉尔夫·诺伊斯致卡尔·迪尔伯恩，1948 年 6 月 2 日，ASB。
50. More concerned with hogs, have to be ready to accept youth’s offer of repentance: Ralph Noyce to Karl Dearborn, 2 June 1948, ASB.
51. 年金领取者表格已过时：鲍勃·诺伊斯致父亲，1948 年 7 月，DSN。孤独：鲍勃·诺伊斯致父亲，1948 年 7 月，DSN。
51. Annuitant table quite outdated: Bob Noyce to Dad, July 1948, DSN. Loneliness: Bob Noyce to Dad, July 1948, DSN.
52. 祝贺高台跳水创意诞生：西联电报，玛丽·爱丽丝，1949 年 2 月 24 日，ASB。公平的工作机会：诺伊斯致全家，1949 年 5 月 4 日，由佩妮·诺伊斯提供。
52. Congratulations high dive brain child: Western Union telegram from Mary Alice, 24 Feb. 1949, ASB. Equitable job offer: Noyce to Family Everywhere, 4 May 1949, courtesy Penny Noyce.
53. 像原子弹一样震撼：“活着的传奇”[视频]，ASB。我无法理解：鲍勃·诺伊斯，TR Reid 采访，1982 年 3 月 31 日，由 TR Reid 提供（以下简称诺伊斯，1982 年 Reid 采访）。
53. Struck like an atom bomb: “Living Legends” [video], ASB. I couldn’t grasp: Bob Noyce, interview by T. R. Reid, 31 March 1982, courtesy T. R. Reid (henceforth Noyce, 1982 Reid interview).
54. 关于晶体管和真空管：晶体管化！（网页，http://www.pbs.org/transistor/）；Riordan 和 Hoddeson，《水晶之火》。
54. On the transistor and vacuum tubes: Transistorized! (web page, http://www.pbs.org/transistor/); Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire.
55. 这相当令人惊讶：诺伊斯，1982 年里德访谈。非常新颖：“活着的传奇”[视频]，ASB。
55. It was rather astonishing: Noyce, 1982 Reid interview. Phenomenally new: “Living Legends” [video], ASB.
56. 他们接上了麦克风，效仿亚历山大·格雷厄姆·贝尔的做法：里德，《芯片》，50。
56. They hooked up a microphone, in the tradition of Alexander Graham Bell: Reid, The Chip, 50.
57. 自动变速器、冷冻食品上市：詹姆斯·T·帕特森，《宏伟的期望：美国，1945-1974》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1996 年）：70。《纽约时报》晶体管报道：欧内斯特·布劳恩和斯图尔特·麦克唐纳，《微型革命》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1982 年）：封面图片；里奥丹和霍德森，《水晶之火》，165。
57. Automatic transmissions, frozen foods coming on the market: James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 70. New York Times transistor story: Ernest Braun and Stuart Macdonald, Revolution in Miniature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): cover image; Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 165.
58. 据历史学家估计，这减轻了士兵的负担：陆军新闻稿引自里奥丹和霍德森，《水晶之火》，第169页。
58. A load off a soldier’s back, historians estimate: army press release quoted in Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 169.
59. Gale 发布剪报以及他与晶体管的联系：Grant Gale 致 Dave Jordan，1984 年 3 月 22 日，由 Evan Ramstad 提供。
59. Gale posting the clipping and his connections to the transistor: Grant Gale to Dave Jordan, 22 March 1984, courtesy Evan Ramstad.
60. 贝尔实验室专著及盖尔在诺伊斯毕业后才收到晶体管：在盖尔1984年3月22日致乔丹的信中，盖尔提到“附有一份1950年3月6日的晶体管原始发货单（由巴丁寄给盖尔）”（现已遗失）。专著标题来自格兰特·盖尔文稿（GCA）中的一份清单。
60. Bell Labs monographs and Gale not receiving a transistor until after Noyce graduated: In Gale to Jordan, 22 March 1984, Gale mentions an “attached original shipping invoice [for the transistors, sent from Bardeen to Gale] dated March 6, 1950” (now lost). Monograph titles are from a list in the Grant Gale papers, GCA.
61. 用电气术语来说：感谢 Ross Bassett 对本段和下一段的编辑。
61. In electrical terms: thanks to Ross Bassett for his edits on this and the following paragraph.
62. 巧妙地扭动它们：里德，《芯片》，50。
62. Wriggled them just right: Reid, The Chip, 50.
63. 严重夸大其词：格兰特·盖尔，《鲍勃·诺伊斯的无题回忆录》，无日期，盖尔文集，GCA。
63. A gross overstatement: Grant Gale, untitled recollections of Bob Noyce, n.d., Gale Papers, GCA.
64. 麻省理工学院学费奖学金：菲利普·M·莫尔斯于 1949 年 3 月 25 日授予鲍勃·诺伊斯，MITP。
64. MIT tuition scholarship: Philip M. Morse to Bob Noyce, 25 March 1949, MITP.
65. 学习时间的最佳回报：鲍勃·诺伊斯致《无处不在的家庭》，1949 年 5 月 4 日。
65. Best returns on the time spent studying: Bob Noyce to Family Everywhere, 4 May 1949.
第二章：快速罗伯特
Chapter 2: Rapid Robert
1. 诺伊斯的奖学金：诺伊斯的研究生学习记录，MITP。在麻省理工学院一年的费用：《麻省理工学院公报》，1949年6月，1949-1950学年目录。建筑工地受伤：拉尔夫·诺伊斯致母亲，1949年8月9日，ASB。诺伊斯对乡村俱乐部的奢靡生活感到震惊：鲍勃·诺伊斯致家人，[1947年]3月7日，ASB。
1. Noyce’s scholarship: Noyce’s graduate school record, MITP. Cost of a year at MIT: MIT Bulletin, June 1949, Catalogue Issue, 1949–1950. Construction site injury: Ralph Noyce to Mother, 9 Aug. 1949, ASB. Noyce shocked by country club extravagance: Bob Noyce to Folks, 7 March [1947], ASB.
2. 决心获得研究奖学金：鲍勃·诺伊斯致亲爱的家人，1950 年 4 月 20 日。
2. Determination to secure a research fellowship: Bob Noyce to Dear Family, 20 April [1950].
3. 麻省理工学院就像一个巨大的地下室：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者采访。
3. MIT as a giant basement: Penny Noyce, interview by author.
4. 偏远而简朴：巴德·惠伦，作者采访，2002 年 10 月 8 日。
4. Remote and austere: Bud Wheelon, interview by author, 8 Oct. 2002.
5. 极其困难：约翰·贝利，作者于 2002 年 10 月 10 日采访了他。盖尔要求了解诺伊斯进展情况的请求在纳撒尼尔·弗兰克 1950 年 5 月 24 日写给格兰特·盖尔的信中有所提及，该信收录于格兰特·盖尔文集（GCA）。
5. Incredibly difficult: John Bailey, interview by author, 10 Oct. 2002. Gale’s request for an update on Noyce’s progress is referenced in Nathaniel Frank to Grant Gale, 24 May 1950, Grant Gale Papers, GCA.
6. 要求女友远离他：鲍勃·诺伊斯于 1949 年 10 月 25 日对家人说。
6. Asked girlfriend to stay away: Bob Noyce to family, 25 Oct. 1949.
7. 诺伊斯的不足之处：诺伊斯的毕业记录，MITP。每个人都表现不佳：诺伊斯致家人，1949 年 10 月 25 日。
7. Noyce’s deficiencies: Noyce graduate record, MITP. Everyone did badly: Noyce to family, 25 Oct. 1949.
8. 巴德·惠伦背景：巴德·惠伦，作者采访。
8. Bud Wheelon background: Bud Wheelon, interview by author.
9. 生活看起来不太愉快：鲍勃·诺伊斯对家人说，1949 年 10 月 25 日。
9. Life looks unpleasant: Bob Noyce to family, 25 Oct. 1949.
10. 我多么误入歧途：鲍勃·诺伊斯致《星期五晚上》[显然是他在麻省理工学院早期]，由佩妮·诺伊斯提供。
10. How misdirected I am: Bob Noyce to Folks, “Friday Evening,” [clearly early in his time at MIT], courtesy Penny Noyce.
11. 29/100，《屠杀与失败》：约翰·贝利，作者访谈。诺伊斯的课程安排：MITP。
11. 29 out of 100, Slaughter and Flunk: John Bailey, interview by author. Noyce’s course schedule: MITP.
12. 约翰·斯莱特的讲座：大卫·杰弗里斯，作者采访；休·沃森，作者采访。
12. John Slater’s lectures: David Jeffries, interview by author; Hugh Watson, interview by author.
13. 物理电子学研讨会：“第十届麻省理工学院物理电子学年会”，[紫色油印节目单，1949 年]，韦恩·诺丁汉文集，MC 241，第 1 盒，第 30 文件夹，麻省理工学院；“麻省理工学院的诺丁汉博士受到同事们的祝贺”，《波士顿先驱报》，1964 年 3 月 27 日，韦恩·诺丁汉收藏，MC 241，第 1 盒，第 3 文件夹，麻省理工学院。
13. Physical Electronics seminar: “Tenth Annual MIT Conference on Physical Electronics,” [purple mimeographed program, 1949], Wayne Nottingham papers, MC 241, Box 1, Folder 30, MIT; “Dr. Nottingham of MIT Feted by Colleagues,” Boston Herald, 27 March 1964, Wayne Nottingham Collection, MC 241, Box 1, Folder 3, MIT.
14. 诺丁汉的课程内容：“物理电子学8.21课程笔记”（未注明日期，可能为1949年），“8.21笔记，1950年”，均藏于麻省理工学院韦恩·诺丁汉藏品，MC 241，第1盒，第21文件夹。到1951年，诺丁汉的考试中已经开始出现一些关于半导体的问题。
14. Nottingham’s course contents: “Notes for Course 8.21 on Physical Electronics,” [undated, probably 1949], “8.21 Notes, 1950,” both in Wayne Nottingham Collection, MC 241, Box 1, Folder 21, MIT. By 1951, Nottingham was asking a few questions about semiconductors in his exams.
15. 最容易的路径：Noyce，1982 年 Reid 采访。你必须学习：Noyce 引自《硅谷“教父”重返格林内尔》，《时代共和党人报》 （爱荷华州马歇尔镇），1989 年 6 月 3 日，ASB。
15. Path of least resistance: Noyce, 1982 Reid interview. You had to study: Noyce quoted in “Silicon Valley ‘Father’ Returns to Grinnell,” Times Republican [Marshalltown, IA], 3 June 1989, ASB.
16. 所有课程均获得荣誉：MIT 官方成绩单，ASB。
16. Passed every course with honors: MIT official transcript, ASB.
17. 语言捷径，dee x：莫里斯·纽斯坦，作者采访。
17. Verbal shortcuts, dee x: Maurice Newstein, interview by author.
18. 惠伦-斯莱特对话：巴德·惠伦，作者采访。
18. Wheelon-Slater conversation: Bud Wheelon, interview by author.
19. 教学奖学金和教职工奖：Noyce 的研究生院记录，MITP。
19. Teaching fellowship and staff award: Noyce’s graduate school record, MITP.
20. 他觉得自己应该站起来：莫里斯·纽斯坦，作者访谈。生气从来没带来过任何好处：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者访谈。冒充专家：盖洛德·诺伊斯，作者访谈。
20. He thought he should have stood up: Maurice Newstein, interview by author. Nothing good ever came from being angry: Penny Noyce, interview by author. Pass himself off as an expert: Gaylord Noyce, interview by author.
21. 啤酒雨派对：吉姆·安吉尔，作者于 2002 年 6 月 6 日采访；大卫·杰弗里斯，作者采访。
21. Raining beer party: Jim Angell, interview by author, 6 June 2002; David Jeffries, interview by author.
22. 合唱团 Pro Musica：约翰·安德烈斯，作者访谈；亨利·斯托克，作者访谈。如丝般顺滑：约翰·安德烈斯，作者访谈。
22. Chorus Pro Musica: John Andres, interview by author; Henry Stroke, interview by author. Smooth as silk: John Andres, interview by author.
23. 实物标本：莫里斯·纽斯坦，作者采访。
23. Physical specimen: Maurice Newstein, interview by author.
24. 朋友的挑战：约翰·安德烈斯对作者的采访；约翰·贝利对作者的采访；亨利·斯托克对作者的采访。
24. Friends a challenge: John Andres, interview with author; John Bailey, interview with author; Henry Stroke, interview with author.
25. 诺伊斯制造望远镜：乔治·克拉克致作者，2003 年 2 月 11 日。诺伊斯的自动镜磨机：莫里斯·纽斯坦，作者采访。
25. Noyce’s building a telescope: George Clark to author, 11 Feb. 2003. Noyce’s automatic mirror grinder: Maurice Newstein, interview by author.
26. 诺伊斯的绘画尝试：莫里斯·纽斯坦，作者采访。
26. Noyce’s painting effort: Maurice Newstein, interview by author.
27. 诺伊斯申请富布赖特奖学金：诺伊斯致家人，1950年10月22日。诺伊斯拒绝富布赖特奖学金：哈丽特·诺伊斯致格兰特·盖尔，1951年9月20日，格兰特·盖尔文稿，GCA。教员推荐信赞誉有加：“诺伊斯是我们最优秀的研究生之一，无论在学业上还是在综合能力和品格方面，都取得了非常优异的成绩。”“诺伊斯展现了卓越的智力素质，除了是一位杰出的学生之外，他还是一个非常稳重、令人愉快的人。”
27. Noyce applying for Fulbright: Noyce to Family, 22 Oct. 1950. Noyce’s rejecting Fulbright: Harriet Noyce to Grant Gale, 20 Sept. 1951, Grant Gale Papers, GCA. Faculty recommendations glowed: “Noyce is one of our best graduate students, making a very fine record both as a student and on account of his general ability and character.” “Noyce has displayed superior intellectual qualifications, and in addition to being an outstanding student is a very stable and pleasing person.”
28. 诺伊斯先生是一位杰出的学生：纳撒尼尔·弗兰克致格兰特·盖尔，1950 年 5 月 24 日，格兰特·盖尔文件，GCA。
28. Mr. Noyce has been an outstanding student: Nathaniel Frank to Grant Gale, 24 May 1950, Grant Gale Papers, GCA.
29. 我希望看到这样的内容：鲍勃·诺伊斯致亲爱的家人，1950 年 4 月 20 日。
29. I was hoping something like this: Bob Noyce to Dear Family, 20 April [1950].
30. Noyce 在哈佛大学审计：研究生记录，MITP；Philip Morse 致 HL Hazen，1952 年 9 月 23 日，MITP。
30. Noyce auditing at Harvard: Graduate Record, MITP; Philip Morse to H. L. Hazen, 23 Sept. 1952, MITP.
31. 没有论文，就没有滑雪：鲍勃·诺伊斯致家人，没有日期，但拉尔夫于 1952 年 11 月 24 日回复，DSN。
31. No thesis, no ski: Bob Noyce to Family, no date, but Ralph responded 24 Nov. 1952, DSN.
32. 教授的思想被扭曲了：鲍勃·诺伊斯致家人，1945 年 9 月 23 日，DSN。诺丁汉不懂理论：诺伊斯致家人，1950 年 10 月 22 日，DSN。
32. Professor’s mind perverted: Bob Noyce to Folks, 23 Sept. [1945], DSN. Nottingham knew no theory: Noyce to Family, 22 Oct. 1950, DSN.
33. 原子如同房屋：非常感谢 Jose Arreola 对表面态的精辟解释。
33. Atoms as houses: many thanks to Jose Arreola for his cogent explanation of surface states.
34. 诺伊斯选择研究绝缘体：诺丁汉可能建议他研究绝缘体。他的学生大卫·杰弗里斯最近完成了一篇硕士论文，指出石英非常适合用于光电效应研究。
34. Noyce chose to study insulators: Nottingham may have suggested insulators. One of his students, David Jeffries, had recently completed a master’s thesis indicating that quartz would lend itself well to photoelectric investigations.
35. 诺伊斯过得很艰难：何塞·阿雷奥拉与作者的电话谈话。诺伊斯的博士论文：罗伯特·诺顿·诺伊斯，《绝缘体表面态的光电研究》（麻省理工学院未发表的博士论文，1953 年 9 月）。
35. Noyce had a hell of a time: Jose Arreola, telephone conversation with author. Noyce’s dissertation work: Robert Norton Noyce, “A Photoelectric Investigation of Surface States on Insulators,” (unpublished MIT doctoral dissertation, September, 1953).
36. 诺伊斯的事故和访客：鲍勃·诺伊斯致《家人》，1953 年 1 月 13 日。
36. Noyce’s accident and visitors: Bob Noyce to Folks, 13 Jan. 1953.
37. Philco需要我：诺伊斯在Tekla Perry的《名人第一份工作》（IEEE Spectrum，1967年7月）一文中被引用。48.诺伊斯觉得他能因此名声大噪：诺伊斯在接受Perry的《名人第一份工作》一文采访时明确提到了这一动机，但在编辑Perry的草稿时，他删除了有关这一抱负的描述。《名人第一份工作》一文的打字稿，IA。
37. Philco needed me: Noyce quoted in Tekla Perry, “Famous First Jobs,” IEEE Spectrum, July 1967: 48. Noyce felt he would make a better name for himself: Noyce had clearly mentioned this motivation in his interview for the Perry, “Famous First Jobs” article, but he deleted the reference to this ambition when he edited Perry’s draft. Typescript of the “Famous First Jobs” article, IA.
38. 简短对话：哈丽雅特·诺伊斯，《我记得》，第46页。诺伊斯牧师当时的笔记写道：“罗伯特在8月20日星期四下午3点左右打电话来。‘你愿意为我们主持婚礼吗？’我不得不问女孩的名字。”转载于唐·诺伊斯，《从蜡烛到电脑》，第252页。原文粗体。
38. Brief conversation: Harriet Noyce, “I Remember,” 46. Reverend Noyce’s notes from the time read, “Robert phoned about 3 o’clock Thursday afternoon August 20. ‘Would you marry us?’ I had to ask the girl’s name.” Reprinted in Don Noyce, “Candles to Computers,” 252. Bold in the original.
39. 舌头像剃刀一样锋利：鲍勃·诺伊斯致家人，5月21日[1946？]。磨砺我们的智慧：海伦·博特姆利引自哈丽特·诺伊斯致亲爱的母亲，1953年8月27日。
39. Tongue as sharp as a razor: Bob Noyce to Family, 21 May [1946?]. Sharpen our wits: Helen Bottomley quoted in Harriet Noyce to Dearest Mother, 27 Aug. 1953.
40. 小小人类发电机：海伦·博特姆利在哈丽雅特·诺伊斯致亲爱的母亲的信中被引用，1953 年 8 月 27 日。
40. Little human dynamo: Helen Bottomley quoted in Harriet Noyce to Dearest Mother, 27 Aug. 1953.
41. 娱乐生产线：海伦·博特姆利在《哈丽特·诺伊斯致亲爱的母亲》中被引用，1953 年 8 月 27 日。
41. Production lines for entertainment: Helen Bottomley quoted in Harriet Noyce to Dearest Mother, 27 Aug. 1953.
42. 她拥有了一切，她自己做出了决定：哈丽雅特·诺伊斯致亲爱的母亲，1953 年 8 月 27 日。
42. All one could ask for, made her own decisions: Harriet Noyce to Dearest Mother, 27 Aug. 1953.
43. 诺伊斯想要自由：哈丽雅特·诺伊斯，《我记得》，36。
43. Noyce wanted to be free: Harriet Noyce, “I Remember,” 36.
44. 老朋友和家人可能会让你慢下来：盖洛德·诺伊斯，作者采访。
44. Old friends and family can slow you down: Gaylord Noyce, interview by author.
45. 担心贝蒂怀孕了：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者采访。
45. Feared Betty was pregnant: Penny Noyce, interview by author.
46. 我感觉这根本不可能：哈丽雅特·诺伊斯，《我记得》。婚礼描述和准备工作：唐·诺伊斯，《从蜡烛到电脑》，252-253；哈丽雅特·诺伊斯，《我记得》，46-47；哈丽雅特·诺伊斯致“亲爱的母亲”，1953 年 8 月 27 日；盖洛德和多蒂·诺伊斯，私人通信，2002 年 11 月 25 日和 2002 年 11 月 28 日；以及乔治·克拉克，作者访谈，2002 年 10 月 23 日。
46. I felt it simply could not be: Harriet Noyce, “I Remember.” Wedding description and preparations: Don Noyce, “Candles to Computers,” 252–253; Harriet Noyce, “I Remember,” 46–47; Harriet Noyce to “Dearest Mother,” 27 August 1953; Gaylord and Dotey Noyce, personal communications, 25 Nov. 2002 and 28 Nov. 2002; and George Clark, interview by author, 23 Oct. 2002.
47. 真糟糕：多蒂·诺伊斯，作者采访，2002 年 10 月 24 日。
47. Darn: Dotey Noyce, interview by author, 24 Oct. 2002.
48. 哈丽特的评论：哈丽特·诺伊斯致“亲爱的母亲”，1953 年 8 月 27 日；拉尔夫·诺伊斯引述于唐·诺伊斯，《从蜡烛到电脑》，第 252-253 页。
48. Harriet’s comments: Harriet Noyce to “Dearest Mother,” 27 Aug. 1953; Ralph Noyce quoted in Don Noyce, “Candles to Computers,” 252–253.
49. 这件事不会这么快发生：哈丽雅特·诺伊斯致亲爱的母亲，1953 年 8 月 27 日。
49. It wouldn’t have happened so soon: Harriet Noyce to Dearest Mother, 27 Aug. 1953.
50. 他们真的这么说：哈丽雅特·诺伊斯致亲爱的母亲，1953 年 8 月 27 日。
50. They really say: Harriet Noyce to Dearest Mother, 27 Aug. 1953.
51. 关于菲尔科公司的军事工作：约翰·保罗·沃尔科诺维奇，《菲尔科公司：历史回顾与战略分析，1892-1961》，未发表的硕士论文（麻省理工学院，管理学），1981年：56；AR-82-34052，FMCA。海军信贷额度：“菲尔科公司为国防生产安排4000万美元三年期V型贷款信贷”，新闻稿，1952年1月9日，AR-84-56520，第1盒，FMCA。
51. On Philco’s military work: John Paul Wolkonowicz, “The Philco Corporation: Historical Review and Strategic Analysis, 1892–1961,” unpublished master’s thesis (MIT, Management), 1981: 56; AR-82-34052, FMCA. Navy line of credit: “Philco Arranges $40,000,000 Three-Year V-Loan Credit for Defense Production,” press release, 9 Jan. 1952, AR-84-56520, Box 1, FMCA.
52. 对社会有用的成员：菲尔科公司研究副总裁大卫·B·史密斯在菲尔科公司新闻稿“菲尔科研究开发出首个用于军事和民用用途的‘表面势垒’晶体管”中被引用，AR-84-56520，第 1 盒，FMCA。
52. Useful member of society: David B. Smith, Philco vice president of research, quoted in “Philco Research Develops First ‘Surface-Barrier’ Transistor for Military and Civilan Uses,” Philco press release, AR-84-56520, Box 1, FMCA.
53. IRE 对表面势垒晶体管的兴趣：WE Bradley 等人，“表面势垒晶体管，第一部分至第五部分”，IRE 会议记录（1953 年 12 月）：1702-1753。
53. IRE interest in surface-barrier transistor: W. E. Bradley et al., “The Surface-Barrier Transistor, Part I–V,” Proceedings of the IRE (Dec. 1953): 1702–1753.
54. 诺伊斯可以立即做出贡献：吉姆·安吉尔，作者采访；乔治·梅森格，作者采访；弗兰克·凯珀，作者采访。
54. Noyce could contribute immediately: Jim Angell, interview by author; George Messenger, interview by author; Frank Keiper, interview by author.
55. Philco 生产创新：JW Tiley，“第二部分——表面势垒晶体管制造的电化学技术”，载于“表面势垒晶体管，第一至五部分”，IRE 会议论文集（1953 年 12 月）：1706–1708。开发该工艺的 John Tiley 没有接受过正规的半导体教育。像他的许多同事一样，他是一位在工作中学习的熟练工程师。Noyce的第一项专利：专利号 2,875,141，授权日期为 1959 年 2 月 24 日，申请日期为 1954 年 8 月 12 日。Noyce的基础表面势垒论文：RN Noyce 和 GC Messenger，“表面势垒晶体管理论”，1955 年 6 月 14 日，由 George Messenger 提供。
55. Philco production innovation: J. W. Tiley, “Part II—Electrochemical Techniques for Fabrication of Surface-Barrier Transistors,” in “The Surface-Barrier Transistor, Part I–V,” Proceedings of the IRE (Dec. 1953): 1706–1708. John Tiley, who developed the process, had no formal semiconductor education. Like many of his co-workers, he was a skill engineer who learned on the job. Noyce’s first patent: #2,875,141, issued 24 Feb. 1959, filed 12 Aug. 1954. Noyce’s basic surface barrier paper: R. N. Noyce and G. C. Messenger, “Surface Barrier Transistor Theory,” 14 June 1955, courtesy George Messenger.
56. Bocciarelli 描述：Jim Angell，作者于 2002 年 6 月 6 日采访。当我梦游时：Noyce 引自 Tekla Perry，“名人第一份工作”。
56. Bocciarelli description: Jim Angell, interview by author 6 June 2002. When I talked in my sleep: Noyce quoted in Tekla Perry, “Famous First Jobs.”
57. 比尔·布拉德利描述：阿尔伯特·布拉德利致作者，2003 年 4 月 4 日。白噪声来源：诺伊斯引自特克拉·佩里，《著名的第一份工作》。
57. Bill Bradley description: Albert Bradley to author, 4 April 2003. White noise source: Noyce quoted in Tekla Perry, “Famous First Jobs.”
58. 非常容易交谈：乔治·梅辛格，作者访谈。难以与反应慢的人相处：吉姆·安吉尔，作者访谈；乔治·梅辛格，作者访谈；弗兰克·凯珀，作者访谈。卡通对话框图片：约翰·乔斯，作者访谈。
58. Very easy to talk to: George Messenger, interview by author. Difficulty dealing with slow people: Jim Angell, interview by author; George Messenger, interview by author; Frank Keiper, interview by author. Image of cartoon bubble: John Joss, interview by author.
59. 最高机械精度：“菲尔科研究公司开发出首款用于军事和民用领域的‘表面势垒’晶体管”，菲尔科新闻稿，AR-84-56520，方框 1，FMCA。晶体管问题以及诺伊斯的工作 更正如下：George Messenger，作者访谈，2002 年 5 月 20 日；Tekla Perry，“名人第一份工作”；Frank Keiper，作者访谈。
59. Highest mechanical precision: “Philco Research Develops First ‘Surface-Barrier’ Transistor for Military and Civilian Uses,” Philco press release, AR-84-56520, Box 1, FMCA. Problems with transistor and Noyce’s work to correct them: George Messenger, interview with author, 20 May 2002; Tekla Perry, “Famous First Jobs”; Frank Keiper, interview by author.
60. Philco 的问题：Philco 年度报告，1953-1956 年。到 1956 年，收益仅为 250,000 美元。Philco不相信研究会带来回报：鲍勃·诺伊斯致家人，1955 年 3 月 9 日。
60. Philco’s problems: Philco Annual Report, 1953–1956. By 1956, earnings were only $250,000. Philco not convinced research pays: Bob Noyce to Family, 9 March 1955.
61. 胡说八道、浪费和好的科学：罗伯特·诺伊斯，赫伯特·克莱曼采访，1965 年，M827，SSC。诺伊斯对军事服从的拖延：乔·查普林与作者的交流，2002 年 3 月 23 日。
61. Bullshit, waste and good science: Robert Noyce, interview by Herbert Kleiman, 1965, M827, SSC. Noyce’s procrastination on military compliance: Joe Chapline, communication with author, 23 March 2002.
62. 糟糕的工作，耽误了时间：摘自佩里《名人第一份工作》。
62. Lousy job, took time away: from Perry, “Famous First Jobs.”
63. 诺伊斯开车：贝蒂·诺伊斯致家人，星期一[可能为1955年春季]。鲍勃必须走了，比利看到行李箱就哭了：贝蒂·诺伊斯致祖母和H妈妈，星期一，22日[1955年]，亚当·诺伊斯文稿，GCA。他们接下来会想到什么：吉姆·安吉尔，2002年6月6日对作者的采访。
63. Noyce taking car: Betty Noyce to Family, Mon. [probably Spring 1955]. Bob has got to go, Billy crying at sight of suitcase: Betty Noyce to Grandmother and Mama H., Monday 22nd [1955], Adam Noyce papers, GCA. What will they think of next: Jim Angell, interview with author, 6 June 2002.
64. 诺伊斯从未谈起过他的妻子：乔治·梅森格，作者访谈。他把她藏在幕后：弗兰克·凯珀，作者访谈。
64. Noyce never talked about his wife: George Messenger, interview by author. Kept her in the back: Frank Keiper, interview by author.
65. 贝蒂想要一栋房子：贝蒂·诺伊斯致家人，星期二[可能是1955年8月]，DSN。太势利眼了：鲍勃和贝蒂·诺伊斯致家人，1955年3月9日，亚当·诺伊斯文件，GCA。
65. Betty wanted a house: Betty Noyce to Family, Tuesday [probably August 1955], DSN. Too snobbish: Bob and Betty Noyce to Family, 9 March 1955, Adam Noyce papers, GCA.
66. 西屋公司提议：贝蒂·诺伊斯致《福克斯报》，1955 年 11 月和星期一上午，亚当·诺伊斯文件，GCA。开始考虑永久站点：贝蒂·诺伊斯致《福克斯报》，1955 年 7 月 6 日和星期一晚上[可能是 1955 年 8 月]，DSN。
66. Westinghouse offer: Betty Noyce to Folks, Nov. 1955 and Mon. AM, Adam Noyce Papers, GCA. Start thinking of a permanent site: Betty Noyce to Folks, 6 July 1955 and Monday eve [probably Aug. 1955], DSN.
67. 诺伊斯资产声明：诺伊斯致伊利诺伊州兵役登记系统主任保罗·G·阿姆斯特朗上校，1955 年 8 月 26 日，ASB。
67. Noyce’s statement of assets: Noyce to Col. Paul G. Armstrong, Director of Illinois Selective Service System, 26 Aug. 1955, ASB.
68. 无限期推迟征兵：美国兵役登记局推迟征兵，1955年12月12日，ASB。圣诞节装饰一新的房子：诺伊斯写给父母的信，1955年12月20日。这封信是在他访问赖特机场拜访空军“晶体管人员”后，在回家的火车上写的。离开：诺伊斯在佩里《名人第一份工作》一书中的引述。
68. Indefinite postponement of induction: Selective Service System Postponement of Induction, 12 Dec. 1955, ASB. House decorated for Christmas: Noyce to his parents, 20 Dec. 1955. This letter was written on the train home after a visit to Wright Field to visit with the Air Force’s “transistor personnel.” Walk away: Noyce quoted in Perry, “Famous First Jobs.”
69. 肖克利的通话记录：日期来自“Noyce”条目，记录簿中标记为“1956年1-2月”（另有一本未标记的精装本，第53页），肖克利文稿，95-153页，B2盒，SSC。肖克利于1月30日星期一再次致电Noyce。肖克利在此：戈登·摩尔，作者访谈。如同与上帝对话：Noyce引自里德，《芯片》，第73页。
69. Shockley’s call: date is from entry labeled “Noyce,” in Record Book labeled “Jn-Fe 1956,” (also in unmarked hardbound book, page 53), Shockley Papers, 95–153, Box B2, SSC. Shockley called Noyce again on Monday 30 January. Shockley here: Gordon Moore, interview by author. Like talking to God: Noyce quoted in Reid, The Chip, 73.
第三章：学徒制
Chapter 3: Apprenticeship
1. 一半有价值的想法：Raymond M. Warner, Jr.，“微电子学：其不寻常的起源和特性”，IEEE电子器件学报48（2001年11月）：2457–2467。Warner在20世纪50年代的大部分时间里都在贝尔实验室从事晶体管开发工作。Shockley为他妻子所做的努力：标有“JBS”的文件夹，Shockley文件，95-153，B2盒，SSC。
1. Half the worthwhile ideas: Raymond M. Warner, Jr., “Microelectronics: Its Unusual Origin and Personality,” IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices 48 (Nov. 2001): 2457–2467. Warner worked in transistor development at Bell Labs through most of the 1950s. Shockley’s efforts on behalf of his wife: folder marked “JBS,” Shockley Papers, 95-153, Box B2, SSC.
2. 整个事情，哦，天哪，肖克利，专利律师的调查结果：迈克尔·里奥丹和莉莲·霍德森，《水晶之火：信息时代的诞生》（纽约：WW Norton and Company，1997 年）：145。除非另有说明，否则对肖克利及其在创办公司之前的工作的描述来源为里奥丹和霍德森， 《水晶之火》；“晶体管化！” www.pbs.org/transistor/background1/events/nobelprize.html；以及詹姆斯·M·厄尔利，“前往默里山玩耍：晶体管的早期历史”，IEEE 电子器件学报48（2001 年 11 月）：2468–72。
2. Whole damn thing, Oh hell, Shockley, patent attorney’s findings: Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson, Crystal Fire: The Birth of the Information Age (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997): 145. Unless otherwise noted, sources for the description of Shockley and his work before starting his company are Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire; “Transistorized!” www.pbs.org/transistor/background1/events/nobelprize.html; and James M. Early, “Out to Murray Hill to Play: An Early History of Transistors,” IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices 48 (Nov. 2001): 2468–72.
3. 与 Jean Shockley 离婚：Jean Shockley 致 Bill Shockley，1946 年 3 月 4 日，在标有“JBS”的文件夹中，Shockley 文件，95-153，B2 盒，SSC。
3. Divorce from Jean Shockley: Jean Shockley to Bill Shockley, 4 March 1946, in a folder marked “JBS,” Shockley Papers, 95–153, Box B2, SSC.
4. 肖克利的筹款尝试：Riordan 和 Hoddeson，《水晶之火》，232-233。
4. Shockley’s fundraising attempts: Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 232–233.
5. Beckman 1955 年业绩：Beckman Instruments 年度报告，1954 年、1955 年。
5. Beckman 1955 performance: Beckman Instruments Annual Report, 1954, 1955.
6. 防止过时的保险：贝克曼仪器公司年度报告，1955 年、1956 年。
6. Insurance against obsolescence: Beckman Instruments Annual Report, 1955, 1956.
7. 迅速而有力地参与：阿诺德·贝克曼致威廉·肖克利，1955 年 9 月 3 日，肖克利文稿，入藏号 95–153，第 4B 盒，SSC。预计销售额：特曼文稿，第三辑，第 48 盒，SSC。支付给贝尔实验室：里奥丹和霍德森，《水晶之火》，第 240 页。
7. Engage promptly and vigorously: Arnold Beckman to William Shockley, 3 Sept. 1955, Shockley Papers, Accession #95–153, Box 4B, SSC. Projected sales: Terman Papers, Series III, Box 48, SSC. Payment to Bell Labs: Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 240.
8. 关于帕洛阿尔托的信息：沃德·温斯洛和帕洛阿尔托历史协会，《帕洛阿尔托：百年历史》（帕洛阿尔托：帕洛阿尔托历史协会，1993 年）。
8. Information on Palo Alto: Ward Winslow and the Palo Alto Historical Association, Palo Alto: A Centennial History (Palo Alto: Palo Alto Historical Association, 1993).
9. 结满果实的树木：“退伍军人——这是你们的‘树林中的家’”（广告），转载于温斯洛，《帕洛阿尔托》，第116页。
9. Bearing fruit trees: “Veterans—here’s your ‘Home among the Trees’” (advertisement), reprinted in Winslow, Palo Alto, 116.
10. 技术学者社群：特曼的观点引自亨利·洛伍德的《从卓越尖塔到硅谷》（瓦里安联合出版社，1987年）。关于斯坦福大学和特曼为吸引产业界所做的努力，请参阅：丽贝卡·洛文的《创建冷战大学：斯坦福的转型》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，1997年）；玛格丽特·普格·奥马拉的《知识之城：冷战科学与寻找下一个硅谷》（普林斯顿，新泽西州：普林斯顿大学出版社，2004年），第三章。
10. Community of technical scholars: Terman quoted in Henry Lowood, “From Steeples of Excellence to Silicon Valley,” (Varian Associates, 1987). For more on Stanford’s and Terman’s efforts to attract industry: Rebecca Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Margaret Pugh O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the Next Silicon Valley (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), chap. 3
11. 斯坦福大学将热烈欢迎一项令人兴奋的业务：弗雷德里克·特曼致威廉·肖克利，1955 年 9 月 20 日；特曼文集，第三辑，第 48 盒，斯坦福大学图书馆。
11. Stanford would heartily welcome, an exciting business: Frederick Terman to William Shockley, 20 Sept. 1955; Terman Papers, Series III, Box 48, SSC.
12. 大赌上当：写在黄色纸片上的笔记，特曼文件，系列 III，盒子 48，SSC。
12. Playing for big stakes: Note scrawled on yellow piece of paper, Terman Papers, Series III, Box 48, SSC.
13. 心理温度：“心灵的秘密”，《新闻周刊》，1954 年 12 月 6 日，第 72-73 页。
13. Mental temperature: “Secrets of the Mind,” Newsweek, 6 Dec. 1954, 72–73.
14. 卓越无可替代：贝克曼仪器公司1955 年年度报告。
14. No substitute for superiority: Beckman Instruments Annual Report, 1955.
15. 半导体研讨会：JW Faust（半导体研讨会主席）致Shockley，日期不详，文件夹标记为“1956 年会议”，Shockley 文稿，编号 95–153，B2 盒。会议描述：电化学学会第 108 届会议的议程，由电化学学会提供。
15. Semiconductor symposium: J. W. Faust [program chair of Semiconductor Symposium] to Shockley, no date, in folder marked “Meetings 1956,” Shockley papers, Accession 95–153, Box B2. Description of the conference: program of the Electrochemical Society’s 108th meeting, courtesy Electrochemical Society.
16. 诺伊斯是唯一的科学家：1955年10月10日，绿色备忘录笔记本中的记录，肖克利文稿，入藏号95-153，2B盒。该记录包含“菲尔科公司没有其他好人”的评论。非常感谢罗斯·巴塞特在“穿透”问题上提供的技术支持。
16. Noyce only scientist: entry dated October 10, 1955 in green memoranda notebook, Shockley Papers, Accession number 95–153, box 2B. This entry includes the comment “no other good man at Philco.” Many thanks to Ross Bassett for his technical assistance on the “punch-through” problem.
17. 你的未来更光明吗？未标记的精装书第 67 页条目，肖克利文稿，95-153，B2。
17. Is your future brighter? Entry at page 67 in unmarked hardbound book, Shockley papers, 95–153, B2.
18. 所有爱荷华人都这么想： 《经济学人》 1983年12月27日文章“快速思考的芯片”。在佩里所著的《名人第一份工作》中，诺伊斯回忆起，他家乡有人曾竖起一块牌子，上面写着“加州不存在！”，以此来阻止年轻人离开。想重拾研究：肖克利的笔记写道：“想住在西海岸……离开菲尔科？——管理方面没有研究方面的头脑。”记录簿中标记为“诺伊斯”的条目，编号为“1956年1-2月”，肖克利文稿，SSC。获得那份工作：诺伊斯在里德的《芯片》一书中被引用，第73页。想看看自己能不能站起来：诺伊斯，1982年里德采访。
18. All Iowans think: “Quick Thinking for Chips,” The Economist, 27 Dec. 1983. In Perry, “Famous First Jobs,” Noyce recalled that someone in his hometown once put up a sign that read “California does not exist!” in a novel effort to keep young people from moving away. Wanted to return to research: Shockley’s notes read, “Would like to live in WC [West Coast] … Leaving Philco?—management not R. [research] minded.” Entry labeled “Noyce,” in Record Book labeled “Jn–Fe 1956,” Shockley Papers, SSC. Getting that job: Noyce quoted in Reid, The Chip, 73. Wanted to see if I could stand up: Noyce, 1982 Reid interview.
19. 两年协议：Penny Noyce，作者采访；Phyllis Kefauver，作者采访。
19. Two-year agreement: Penny Noyce, interview by author; Phyllis Kefauver, interview by author.
20. 网球难题：詹姆斯·F·吉本斯对作者的采访。肖克利一生都在向人们提出这个问题。
20. Tennis problem: James F. Gibbons, interview with author. Throughout his life, Shockley posed this question to people.
21. 花了太多时间纠结我是否喜欢我的母亲：费尔柴尔德创始人B，作者访谈。线条画问题：哈里·塞洛，作者访谈。
21. Too much time on whether I liked my mother: Fairchild Founder B, interviewed by author. Line-drawing question: Harry Sello, interview with author.
22. 首先：Noyce 引自《经济学人》 1980 年 12 月 27 日的《快速思考芯片》一文。Noyce到达日期：记录簿中标记为“Noyce”的条目，1956 年 1 月至 2 月，Shockley 文件。
22. First things first: Noyce quoted in “Quick Thinking for Chips,” The Economist, 27 Dec. 1980. Date of Noyce’s arrival: entry labeled “Noyce,” Record Book labeled Jn–Fe 1956, Shockley papers.
23. 真是稳健的手：杰伊·拉斯特，查理·斯波克采访。
23. Damn steady hands: Jay Last, interview by Charlie Sporck.
24. 对肖克利科学家的描述：作者对这些科学家的采访以及查理·斯波克对这些科学家的采访，其中一些内容摘录在他的著作《查理·斯波克，衍生品：改变世界的行业的个人历史》（萨纳克湖出版社，2001 年）中。
24. Descriptions of Shockley scientists: author’s interviews of the subjects and Charlie Sporck’s interviews of the subjects, some of which have been excerpted in his book, Charlie Sporck, Spinoff: A Personal History of the Industry that Changed the World (Sarnac Lake Publishing, 2001).
25. 30 岁以上的员工寥寥无几：“现任员工”，1956 年 5 月 21 日，未标记的精装书，Shockley Papers 95–153，第 81 页，SSC。实际生产产品：Gordon Moore，Allen Chen 采访，1992 年 7 月 9 日，IA。
25. Only a handful over 30: “Present Employees,” May 21, 1956, unmarked hardback book, Shockley Papers 95–153, page 81, SSC. Actually making a product: Gordon Moore, interview by Allen Chen, 9 July 1992, IA.
26. 你会按照他的方式去做：詹姆斯·F·吉本斯，作者访谈。吉本斯回忆起收到肖克利的一封信，信中肖克利非常明确地阐述了他的想法。
26. You’d do it his way: James F. Gibbons, interview by author. Gibbons recalls receiving a letter in which Shockley spelled out his ideas quite explicitly.
27. 工资：“截至 1956 年 7 月 1 日的工资预测”，未标记的精装书，第 82 页，肖克利文稿，入藏号 #95–153，B2，SSC。冰柱：费尔柴尔德创始人 A，作者访谈。
27. Salaries: “Payroll Projected to July 1, 1956,” unmarked hardback book, page 82, Shockley Papers, Accession #95–153, B2, SSC. Icicles: Fairchild Founder A, interview by author.
28. 他没刮胡子：朱利叶斯·布兰克，查理·斯波克采访。布兰克在鲍勃·里斯泰尔胡伯的文章《诺伊斯回忆录：不寻常的想法，不寻常的方法》（ 1990 年 6 月 11 日， 《电子新闻》）中讲述了这个故事的删减版本。
28. He hadn’t shaved: Julius Blank, interview by Charlie Sporck. Blank tells a censored version of this story in Bob Ristelhueber, “Noyce Remembered: Unusual Ideas, Unusual Approaches,” Electronic News, 11 June 1990.
29. 牙齿上的玫瑰：Riordan 和 Hoddeson，《水晶之火》。
29. Rose in his teeth: Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire.
30. 肖克利早期对硅的倡导：摘自里奥丹和霍德森的《水晶之火》第230页的信件。
30. Shockley’s early advocacy of silicon: Letter excerpted in Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 230.
31. 烧烤类比：Reid，《芯片》，73-74页。在扩散法发明之前，硅器件的制造要么采用生长结技术，要么采用合金技术。肖克利派诺伊斯和摩尔去贝尔实验室参加研讨会：诺伊斯，1982年Reid访谈。
31. Barbecue analogy: Reid, The Chip, 73–74. Before the invention of the diffusion method, silicon devices had been built using either grown junction techniques or alloy techniques. Shockley sent Noyce and Moore to Bell Labs seminar: Noyce, 1982 Reid interview.
32. 对实验室设备配备的担忧：费尔柴尔德创始人 A，作者采访。汽车零部件仓库：里奥丹和霍德森，《水晶之火》，237。
32. Concern about outfitting lab: Fairchild Founder A, interview by author. Auto-parts warehouse: Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 237.
33. 实验室空间描述：作者对 Harry Sello 的采访。
33. Description of lab space: Harry Sello, interview by author.
34. 清洁真空泵的故事：费尔柴尔德创始人B的访谈（作者采访）。他的心声：费尔柴尔德创始人A的访谈（克里斯托夫·勒库耶于1996年7月6日采访）。勒库耶于1999年11月11日与作者的私人通信。
34. Clean vacuum-pump story: Fairchild Founder B, interview by author. In his mind: Fairchild Founder A, interview by Christophe Lecuyer on 6 July 1996. Personal communication from Lecuyer to author, 11 Nov.1999.
35. 诺伊斯在肖克利的贡献：未标记的精装书，第 68、71 和 81 页；1957 年 6 月 5 日的条目，帝国笔记本，均在肖克利文稿中，入藏号 #95–153，B2，SSC。
35. Noyce’s contributions at Shockley: Unmarked hardback book, pages 68, 71, and 81; entry dated 5 Jun 57, Empire Notebook, both in Shockley Papers, Accession #95–153, B2, SSC.
36. 安静的领导风格：R. Victor Jones，作者采访。感觉他们从诺伊斯那里学到了更多：Fairchild 创始人 A，作者采访；Harry Sello，作者采访；“摩尔博士，录音带 2，1994 年 6 月 8 日”，IA。
36. Quiet leadership style: R. Victor Jones, interview by author. Felt they learned more from Noyce: Fairchild Founder A, interview by author; Harry Sello, interview by author; “Dr. Moore, Tape 2, 6/8/94,” IA.
37. 诺伊斯唯一重要的意见：费尔柴尔德创始人 A，作者采访；哈里·塞洛，作者采访。
37. Noyce’s only opinion that mattered: Fairchild Founder A, interview by author; Harry Sello, interview by author.
38. 诺伊斯的隧道二极管：1956年8月14日的实验记录，插入在他费尔柴尔德实验室的实验记录本首页。他是如何复印这些页面的尚不清楚——20世纪50年代末，复印技术还处于起步阶段，而诺伊斯他并未提及日后是否会翻阅肖克利实验室的笔记本——但这些页面的真实性毋庸置疑。肖克利实验室唯一幸存的笔记本属于威廉·肖克利，现藏于斯坦福大学特藏部。诺伊斯记录其想法的页面显然出自威廉·肖克利发给员工的同类型实验记录本，这一事实，加上诺伊斯的工作日期（与他1979年对此的评论相吻合），以及摩尔对该事件的回忆，都进一步证实了这些页面的真实性。
38. Noyce’s tunnel diode: Lab book entry dated 14 Aug. 1956, inserted at the front of his Fairchild lab book. How he managed to copy these pages is unclear—photocopy technology was in its infancy in the late-1950s, and Noyce makes no note of going back to his Shockley notebooks later in his life—but that the pages are legitimate are indisputable. The only surviving notebook from Shockley Labs belonged to William Shockley and resides in the Special Collections of Stanford University. The pages on which Noyce’s ideas are written are clearly from the same type of lab book that William Shockley issued to his staff, and this fact, along with the date of Noyce’s work (which correlates with his 1979 comments about it), and Moore’s recollections of the event further validate their authenticity.
39. 球穿过墙壁：皇家科学院的斯蒂格·伦德奎斯特教授在向利奥·埃萨基、伊瓦尔·贾埃弗和布莱恩·大卫·约瑟夫森颁发 1973 年诺贝尔奖的演讲中使用了这个比喻。
39. Balls tunneling through the wall: Professor Stig Lundqvist of the Royal Academy of Sciences used this analogy in his speech presenting the 1973 Nobel Prize to Leo Esaki, Ivar Giaever, and Brian David Josephson.
40. 老板毫无兴趣，这极大地打击了员工的积极性：Noyce，“创新：成功的果实”，《技术评论》，1978 年 2 月：24-27。
40. Boss showed no interest, powerful demotivator: Noyce, “Innovation: The Fruit of Success,” Technology Review, Feb. 1978: 24–27.
41. 江崎的开创性论文：Leo Esaki，“窄锗PN结中的新现象”，《物理评论》，1958年，109：603。江崎于1957年进行了这项研究，大致与诺伊斯提出其想法的时间相同。关于对这篇论文的回应：Leo Esaki，“日本科学的全球影响力”，http://www.jspsusa.org/FORUM1996/esaki.html，访问日期：2004年11月1日。
41. Esaki’s seminal paper: Leo Esaki, “New Phenomenon in Narrow Germanium P-N Junctions, Physical Review, 1958, 109: 603. Esaki conducted his research in 1957, at roughly the same time Noyce noted his ideas. On the response to this paper: Leo Esaki, “The Global Reach of Japanese Science,” http://www.jspsusa.org/FORUM1996/esaki.html, accessed 1 Nov. 2004.
42. 诺伊斯和江崎的工作相似之处：两人都使用了能带图，该图以y轴表示电子和空穴的允许能量，以x轴表示它们在PN结中的位置。它显示了电子和空穴的位置。在低电压下，空穴与电子的能量相同，因此可以产生隧穿电流；但在稍高的电压下，电子和空穴的能量不再相同，隧穿电流消失。江崎和诺伊斯还绘制了非常相似的电流-电压图，说明了在负电阻区域电流的意外下降。如果我再进一步：戈登·摩尔，作者采访，2004年7月1日。
42. Similarities in Noyce and Esaki’s work: Both men used an energy-band diagram that represents the allowed energies on the y axis for electrons and holes versus their position in the P-N junction on the x axis. It shows where the electrons and holes are located. At small voltages, there are holes at the same energy as electrons, so tunneling current can flow, but at somewhat higher voltages, the electrons and holes are no longer at the same energy and the tunneling current ceases. Esaki and Noyce both also drew very similar current-versus-voltage graphs illustrating the unexpected drop in current in the region of negative resistance. If I had gone one step further: Gordon Moore, interview by author, 1 July 2004.
43. 等量的知识：戈登·摩尔，作者采访，2004 年 7 月 1 日。当肖克利提出这个问题时：迈克尔·F·沃尔夫，《集成电路的起源：两位美国创新者如何将许多人心中的概念变为现实》，IEEE Spectrum，1976 年 8 月，第 49 页。这个故事有各种版本，包括一次官方的非正式调查，但沃尔夫写道，诺伊斯证实了这个故事的这个版本，尽管“有些尴尬”。
43. Equivalent amount of knowledge: Gordon Moore, interview by author, 1 July 2004. When Shockley asked: Michael F. Wolff, “The Genesis of the Integrated Circuit: How a Pair of U.S. Innovators Brought Into Reality a Concept that was on the Minds of Many,” IEEE Spectrum, Aug. 1976, 49. Various versions of this story exist, including an official straw poll, but Wolff writes that Noyce confirmed this version of the story, albeit “with some embarrassment.”
44. 重新设计螺栓：尤金·克莱纳，查理·斯波克采访；杰伊·拉斯特引自雷蒙德·M·华纳，《微电子学：其不寻常的起源和特性》，IEEE电子器件学报（2001年11月）：2457-2467，第2461页。霍尔尼的“放逐”：让·霍尔尼，查理·斯波克采访；杰伊·拉斯特，查理·斯波克采访；仙童半导体创始人A和B，作者采访。
44. Redesign bolts: Eugene Kleiner, interview by Charlie Sporck; Jay Last quoted in Raymond M. Warner, “Microelectronics: Its Unusual Origin and Personality,” IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices (Nov. 2001): 2457–2467, at 2461. Hoerni’s “banishment”: Jean Hoerni, interview by Charlie Sporck; Jay Last, interview by Charlie Sporck; Fairchild Founders A and B, interview by author.
45. 盲人领路：朱利叶斯·布兰克，查理·斯波克采访，1994 年 7 月 15 日。
45. Blind leading blind: Julius Blank, interview by Charlie Sporck, 15 July 1994.
46. 需要六个月的时间：朱利叶斯·布兰克，查理·斯波克采访。
46. Would have taken six months: Julius Blank, interview by Charlie Sporck.
47. 肖克利拥有非凡的能力：诺伊斯，1982 年里德访谈。电子就像停车场里的汽车：威廉·肖克利，《半导体中的电子和空穴》（纽约：D. Van Nostrand：1950 年）。
47. Shockley had a marvelous ability: Noyce, 1982 Reid interview. Electrons like cars in parking lot: William Shockley, Electrons and Holes in Semiconductors (New York: D. Van Nostrand: 1950).
48. 肖克利的汽车和最喜欢的餐厅：戈登·摩尔，作者采访。
48. Shockley’s car and favorite restaurant: Gordon Moore, interview by author.
49. 香槟庆祝：“哦，我当然记得比尔获得诺贝尔奖的那天！我以前从来没在早上九点就开始喝香槟！”戈登·摩尔，引自《晶体管化！》www.pbs.org/transistor/background1/events/nobelprize.html
49. Champagne celebration: “Oh, I certainly remember the day Bill got the Nobel Prize! I never [before had] adjourned to start drinking champagne at 9:00 in the morning!” Gordon Moore, quoted in “Transistorized!” www.pbs.org/transistor/background1/events/nobelprize.html
50. 巴丁脱口而出：“晶体管化！” www.pbs.org/transistor/background1/events/nobelprize.html
50. Bardeen dropped: “Transistorized!” www.pbs.org/transistor/background1/events/nobelprize.html
51. 巴丁、布拉坦和肖克利的论文：诺贝尔奖网站：www.nobel.se/physics/laureates/1956
51. Papers given by Bardeen, Brattain, and Shockley: Nobel Prize Web site: www.nobel.se/physics/laureates/1956
52. 邀请他加入：Riordan 和 Hoddeson，Crystal Fire。
52. Invited him to join: Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire.
53. 关于时间：Vic Grinich，Charlie Sporck 采访。
53. About time: Vic Grinich, interview by Charlie Sporck.
54. 这会给你一个教训：杰伊·拉斯特，查理·斯波克采访。薪资数据：“截至1956年7月1日的预计工资”，出自肖克利文稿中未标记的精装本，编号95-153，B2。我真的需要吗？诺伊斯，“创新：成功的果实”，《技术评论》。
54. That will teach you: Jay Last, interview by Charlie Sporck. Salary figure: “Payroll Projected to July 1, 1956,” from unmarked hardback book in Shockley papers, accession 95–153, B2. Am I really needed: Noyce, “Innovation: The Fruit of Success,” Technology Review.
55. 只有一个灯泡：哈里·塞洛，作者采访。
55. Only one light bulb: Harry Sello, interview by author.
56. 几乎让人落泪：哈里·塞洛，作者访谈。仪式性的羞辱：鲍勃·怀特，作者访谈。怀特曾与肖克利在斯坦福大学共事。
56. Reduce almost to tears: Harry Sello, interview by author. Ritual humiliation: Bob White, interview by author. White taught with Shockley at Stanford.
57. 大型精神病研究所，引用艾略特的话：杰伊·拉斯特，查理·斯波克采访。门上的图钉：每位接受采访的肖克利员工对这起事件的描述都一致。
57. Big psychiatric institute and quoting Eliot: Jay Last, interview by Charlie Sporck. Thumbtack in the door: every Shockley employee interviewed gave a consistent account of this affair.
58. 最后向诺伊斯倾诉：杰伊·拉斯特，作者采访；杰伊·拉斯特，查理·斯波克采访。
58. Last confiding in Noyce: Jay Last, interview by author; Jay Last, interview by Charlie Sporck.
59. 数据处理组：贝克曼仪器公司 1956 年年度报告。
59. Data-processing group: Beckman Instruments Annual Report 1956.
60. 为了他的个人魅力而竞选：肖克利员工 A，作者采访。
60. Ran for benefit of his personality: Shockley Employee A, interview by author.
61. 四层二极管：“发明者称其在计算机中的应用”，《电子新闻》，1958 年 2 月 24 日。
61. Four-layer diode: “Inventor Cites Use in Computer,” Electronic News, 24 Feb. 1958.
62. 四层二极管的吸引力：作者采访仙童半导体创始人A。关于四层二极管制造的难点，详见Riordan和Hoddeson合著的《水晶之火》（Crystal Fire），第267页。
62. Appeal of four-layer diode: Fairchild Founder A, interview by author. For more on the difficulties of manufacturing the four-layer diode, see Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 267.
63. 聚焦晶体管：戈登·摩尔，作者访谈；诺伊斯，《创新：成功的果实》；仙童半导体创始人A回忆说，诺伊斯是团队中第一个看到晶体管巨大潜力的人。仙童半导体创始人A，作者访谈。另见里奥丹和霍德森，《水晶之火》，第250页。市场广阔：“摩尔博士，录音带2，1994年6月8日”。诺伊斯在数据系统操作方面的工作：诺伊斯致比尔·冈宁（数据与控制系统组），1957年4月17日，文件夹标签为“贝克曼-科学仪器部”；泰勒·C·弗莱彻（数据与控制系统组组长）致肖克利，1956年11月2日，文件标签为“贝克曼-富勒顿55-56”，肖克利文稿，第90-117页，第14盒，SSC。
63. Focus on transistor: Gordon Moore, interview by author; Noyce, “Innovation: the Fruit of Success”; Fairchild Founder A recalls Noyce as the first member of the group to see the great potential in the transistor. Fairchild Founder A, interview by author. See also Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 250. Plenty of market: “Dr. Moore, Tape 2, 6/8/94.” Noyce’s work with data systems operation: Noyce to Bill Gunning [Data and Control Systems group], 17 April 1957, folder labeled “BECKMAN -Scien Instr Div”; Taylor C. Fletcher [head of the Data and Control Systems Group] to Shockley, 2 Nov. 1956, File labeled “BECKMAN-Fullerton 55–56,” Shockley Papers, 90–117, Box 14, SSC.
64. 向 IBM 的提议：肖克利致毕晓普，1957 年 5 月 2 日，肖克利文件，90-117，第 14 盒。
64. Offer to IBM: Shockley to Bishop, 2 May 1957, Shockley papers, 90–117, Box 14.
65. Mesa 晶体管：KJ Dean 和 G. White，“半导体的故事：寻找最好的晶体管”（四部分系列文章的第二部分），《无线世界》，1973 年 2 月，第 67 页。该系列论文以技术性但通俗易懂的方式介绍了半导体研究和制造。
65. Mesa transistors: K. J. Dean and G. White, “The Semiconductor Story: Search for the Best Transistor” (Part 2 of a four-part series), Wireless World, Feb. 1973, 67. This series of papers is a technical-but-readable introduction to semiconductor research and manufacturing.
66. 你可以和鲍勃谈谈：R. Victor Jones，作者采访了他。
66. Bob you could talk to: R. Victor Jones, interview by author.
67. 他们当然知道：所涉专利是 Shockley 和 Noyce 的专利，专利号为 2,967,985，申请日为 1957 年 4 月 11 日，授权日为 1961 年 1 月 10 日。虽然尚不清楚 Shockley 是如何做到的，但他后来将该专利的所有权完全转让给了自己——这种情况非常不寻常，因为大多数所有权转让都是转让给公司的。
67. Certainly they knew: patent in question is Shockley and Noyce, #2,967,985, filed 11 April 1957, granted 10 Jan. 1961. Though it is unclear how he did it, Shockley later had ownership of this patent assigned entirely to himself as an individual—a highly unusual situation, since most ownership assignments are to corporations.
68. 某些不足之处：贝克曼仪器公司1957 年年度报告。
68. Certain inadequacies: Beckman Instruments Annual Report, 1957.
69. 1957 年 5 月会议：“跨部门研究和工程会议记录”，文件夹标记为“Beckman—1957”，1957 年 5 月 16 日，Shockley 文件 90–117，第 14 盒，SSC。
69. May 1957 meeting: “Minutes of Interdivisional Research and Engineering Conference,” folder marked “Beckman—1957,” 16 May 1957, Shockley Papers 90–117, Box 14, SSC.
70. 对肖克利、贝克曼和科学家们会面的描述：戈登·摩尔，作者采访，以及里奥丹和霍德森，《水晶之火》，247-251。
70. Description of the meetings among Shockley, Beckman, and the scientists: Gordon Moore, interview by author, and Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 247–251.
71. 做些糟糕的事，维克·琼斯的离职：R·维克多·琼斯，作者访谈。肖克利对琼斯的决定感到失望，但仍然给了他一份热情洋溢的推荐信——肖克利后来在一次员工会议上公开朗读了这份推荐信，以此为自己谋利。一些激烈的行动：鲍勃对“所有人”说，1957年5月28日，波莉·诺伊斯提供。听着，该死的：杰伊·拉斯特，作者访谈。
71. Doing awful things, Vic Jones’s departure: R. Victor Jones, interview by author. Shockley was disappointed by Jones’s decision but nonetheless gave him a glowing recommendation—a recommendation Shockley later turned to his own advantage by reading it aloud at an employee meeting. Some drastic action: Bob to “Everybody,” 28 May 1957, courtesy Polly Noyce. Look, goddammit: Jay Last, interview by author.
72. 声音因焦虑而颤抖：杰伊·拉斯特，查理·斯波克采访。
72. Voice quaking with anxiety: Jay Last, interview by Charlie Sporck.
73. 与贝克曼的初次会面：肖克利不知何故获得了足够的信息，得以绘制出一张示意图，标明贝克曼和众人的座位安排。示意图显示贝克曼坐在桌子的一端，诺伊斯紧随其后，依次是克莱纳、霍尼、格里尼奇、罗伯茨、摩尔、拉斯特和克纳皮克。《帝国笔记》，肖克利文稿，编号95-153。本段中所有诺伊斯的引文均出自：诺伊斯致所有人，1957年5月28日，由波莉·诺伊斯提供。
73. First meeting with Beckman: Somehow Shockley got enough information about this meeting to sketch out a diagram showing the seating arrangements of Beckman and the group. The sketch shows Beckman at one end of the table, with Noyce immediately to his right, followed by Kleiner, Hoerni, Grinich, Roberts, Moore, Last, and Knapic. Empire Notebook, Shockley Papers, Accession #95–153. All Noyce quotes in this paragraph: Noyce to Everyone, 28 May 1957, courtesy Polly Noyce.
74. 肖克利的反应：哈里·塞洛，作者采访；詹姆斯·F·吉本斯，作者采访；里奥丹和霍德森，《水晶之火》，249。教官类比：詹姆斯·F·吉本斯，作者采访。
74. Shockley’s reaction: Harry Sello, interview by author; James F. Gibbons, interview by author; Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 249. Drill sergeant analogy: James F. Gibbons, interview by author.
75. 诺伊斯和肖克利讨论中的所有引语：1957 年 6 月 3 日的条目，帝国笔记本，肖克利文稿，入藏号 #95–153。
75. All quotes in discussion between Noyce and Shockley: Entry dated 3 June 1957, Empire Notebook, Shockley Papers, Accession #95–153.
76. 远程分析员工：诺伊斯致所有人，1957年5月28日。诺伊斯的忠诚摇摆不定：在关系最为紧张的时期，几位科学家认为诺伊斯与肖克利的关系“冷淡”。然而，在此期间，肖克利的笔记本上却充满了类似的记录：“给诺伊斯打电话”、“诺伊斯只有一个建议”、“和诺伊斯谈谈”。除了斯穆特·霍斯利之外，他几乎没有记录与其他实验室员工的谈话。
76. Analyze staff from afar: Noyce to Everyone, 28 May 1957. Noyce’s divided loyalties: Several of the scientists thought that Noyce’s relationship with Shockley was “cool” during the period of greatest tension. During this period, however, Shockley’s notebook is full of entries like these: “Call to Noyce,” “Noyce has only one suggestion,” “Talk with Noyce.” He recorded few conversations with any other lab employee, with the exception of Smoot Horsley.
77. 新的组织结构：标记为 6 月 6 日的条目，帝国笔记本。霍斯利、克纳皮克和“S”（可能是萨赫）将向诺伊斯汇报。诺伊斯缺乏推动力：“来自 AOB 的印象，6 月 6 日星期四下午电话”，肖克利文件，入藏号 #95–153，SSC。
77. New organizational structure: Entry labeled 6 Jun, Empire Notebook. Horsley, Knapic, and “S” [probably Sah] would report to Noyce. Noyce lacked push: “Impressions from AOB, call Thurs PM 6 Jun,” Shockley Papers, Accession #95–153, SSC.
78. 管理委员会：其他两名成员分别是迪恩·克纳皮克（制作主管）和埃尔·彼得森（行政）。
78. Managing committee: the other two members were Dean Knapic (production head), and E. L. Peterson (administration).
79. 贝克曼决定支持肖克利：有关此的更多信息，请参阅里奥丹和霍德森的《水晶之火》第 250 页；戈登·摩尔的作者访谈。
79. Beckman’s decision to support Shockley: For more on this, see Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 250; Gordon Moore, interview by author.
80. 一个非常好的人：鲍勃和贝蒂·诺伊斯致家人，1957 年 7 月 11 日，由波莉·诺伊斯提供。
80. A very good man: Bob and Betty Noyce to Family, 11 July 1957, courtesy Polly Noyce.
81. 对最终成功更有信心：鲍勃和贝蒂·诺伊斯致所有人，1957 年 5 月 28 日。
81. More confident of eventual success: Bob and Betty Noyce to Everybody, 28 May 1957.
82. 气氛变得糟糕：“至少可以说，”行政主管彼得森写信给肖克利说，“反应并不好”EL 彼得森致肖克利，1957 年 8 月 7 日，肖克利文件，入藏号 #95-153，SSC。
82. Atmosphere turned ugly: “To say the least,” administrative head Peterson wrote to Shockley, “the reaction was not favorable” E. L. Peterson to Shockley, dated August 7, 1957, Shockley Papers, Accession #95-153, SSC.
83. 回到原点：EI Peterson 致 MC Hanafin 的信。主题为 1957 年 7 月 31 日高级职员薪资明细，肖克利文稿，编号 95–153。严重高估了我们的力量：戈登·摩尔，《威廉·肖克利》，http://www.time.com/time/time100/scientist/profile/Shockley.html
83. Back where they were: Letter to M. C. Hanafin from E. I. Peterson. Subject is Payroll Detail, Senior Staff, as of July 31, 1957, Shockley Papers, Accession #95–153. Grossly overestimated our power: Gordon Moore, “William Shockley,” http://www.time.com/time/time100/scientist/profile/Shockley.html
84. 拉斯特还有另一个提议：杰伊·拉斯特，作者采访；杰伊·拉斯特，查理·斯波克采访。
84. Last had another offer: Jay Last, interview by author; Jay Last, interview by Charlie Sporck.
85. 他加入了肖克利公司：诺伊斯手写的修改稿，该稿件后来以佩里（Perry）的《名人第一份工作》（Famous First Jobs）为题发表。牧师之子：费尔柴尔德公司创始人B，作者采访。亚瑟·洛克也对诺伊斯的忠诚感发表了类似的评论。亚瑟·洛克，作者采访，1999年2月25日。
85. He had joined Shockley: Noyce’s handwritten corrections to a draft of the article later published as Perry, “Famous First Jobs.” Son of a minister: Fairchild Founder B, interview by author. Arthur Rock made similar comments about Noyce’s sense of loyalty. Arthur Rock, interview by author, 25 Feb. 1999.
86. 初始产品：由 Jay Last 友情提供给 Hayden, Stone 的招股说明书。
86. The initial product: Prospectus sent to Hayden, Stone, courtesy Jay Last.
87. 横向联系紧密：招股说明书由杰伊·拉斯特提供，已寄送至海登·斯通公司。相关问题：朱利叶斯·布兰克致作者，2003年6月17日。
87. Horizontal ties are strong: Prospectus sent to Hayden, Stone, courtesy Jay Last. Concerns: Julius Blank to author, 17 June 2003.
88. 最强卖点：作者对亚瑟·洛克的采访。
88. Strongest selling point: Arthur Rock, interview by author.
89. 访问七人：亚瑟·洛克，作者采访；亚瑟·洛克的《已完成的交易》节选，转载于《Upside》杂志，2000 年 11 月。
89. Visit the seven: Arthur Rock, interview by author; “Done Deals” excerpt by Arthur Rock, reprinted in Upside Magazine, Nov. 2000.
90. 相当不错的家伙，需要 100 万美元：亚瑟·洛克，作者采访。
90. Pretty good guys, need $1 million: Arthur Rock, interview by author.
91. 对湾区的依恋：克莱纳最初写给海登、斯通公司（Hayden, Stone, and Co.）的信中明确提到了该集团“对旧金山半岛南部地区的依恋”。戈登·摩尔曾戏称这种不愿搬迁的愿望是“推动仙童半导体公司成立的创业精神”。（戈登·摩尔接受艾伦·陈采访）
91. Attachment to Bay Area: Kleiner’s original letter to Hayden, Stone, and Co. explicitly refers to the group’s “attachment to this lower San Francisco peninsula area.” Gordon Moore has jokingly called the desire not to move “the entrepreneurial spirit that drove the formation of Fairchild Semiconductor.” Gordon Moore interview by Alan Chen.
92. 不会轻易放弃：Fairchild 创始人 A，Christophe Lécuyer 采访。
92. Not going to give away the store: Fairchild Founder A, interview by Christophe Lécuyer.
93. 临阵退缩：戈登·摩尔，艾伦·陈采访，IA。诺伊斯的担忧：约翰·W·威尔逊，《新冒险家：风险投资高风险世界内幕》（门洛帕克，加利福尼亚州：艾迪生-韦斯利出版社，1985 年）：32。
93. Chickening out: Gordon Moore, interview by Alan Chen, IA. Noyce’s concerns: John W. Wilson, The New Venturers: Inside the High-Stakes World of Venture Capital, (Menlo Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley, 1985): 32.
94. 两个主要原因：贝蒂和鲍勃·诺伊斯致家人，1957 年 7 月 11 日。
94. Two primary reasons: Betty and Bob Noyce to Family, 11 July 1957.
95. 很高兴您能来：朱利叶斯·布兰克，作者采访。
95. Nice to have you here: Julius Blank, interview by author.
96. 某种意义上的领导者：亚瑟·洛克，作者访谈。夸夸其谈者：费尔柴尔德创始人A，作者访谈。
96. Some kind of leader: Arthur Rock, interview by author. Big talker: Fairchild Founder A, interview by author.
97. 美元钞票仪式：费尔柴尔德创始人 A，作者采访。
97. Dollar bill ceremony: Fairchild Founder A, interview by author.
第四章：脱离
Chapter 4: Breakaway
1. 该组织接触的公司：名单转载于“创始文件”。
1. Companies approached by group: List reprinted in “Founding Documents.”
2. 诺伊斯浸透了他的树：贝蒂和戈登·摩尔，埃文·拉姆斯塔德采访，1997 年 5 月 18 日。埃文·拉姆斯塔德提供。
2. Noyce soaked his trees: Betty and Gordon Moore, interview by Evan Ramstad, 18 May 1997. Courtesy Evan Ramstad.
3. 晶体管销量：统计数据为 1957 年 10 月。“1958 年：人人都在做”和“晶体管的出现”，《电子新闻》25 周年纪念刊，1982 年 1 月 25 日，第 2 部分，第 6 页和第 23 页。Alfred Cook 和 Bob Shephard，“Wescon 的大型商业推杆式产品”，《电子新闻》，1957 年 8 月 26 日，第 1 页。十几家新的晶体管公司：Richard Levin，“半导体行业”，载于Richard R. Nelson 编辑的《政府与技术进步：跨行业分析》（纽约，1982 年）：第 29 页。
3. Transistor sales: Statistics are for Oct. 1957. “1958: Everybody’s Doin’ It,” and “The Transistor Emerges,” EN 25th Anniversary Issue, 25 Jan. 1982, Section 2, pages 6, 23. Alfred Cook and Bob Shephard, “Heavy Commercial Push Top Feature at Wescon,” Electronic News, 26 Aug. 1957, 1. Dozen new transistor firms: Richard Levin, “The Semiconductor Industry,” in Government and Technical Progress: A Cross-Industry Analysis, ed. Richard R. Nelson (New York, 1982): 29.
4. 每家公司都拒绝了他们：戈登·摩尔，艾伦·陈采访，IA。从众精神：亚瑟·洛克，作者采访。
4. Every company turned them down: Gordon Moore, interview by Alan Chen, IA. Ethos of conformity: Arthur Rock, interview by author.
5. 身着清新靓丽的服饰：《财富》杂志1960年5月刊第170页刊登的《多才多艺的谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德》；《电子新闻》1965年9月13日第8页刊登的《鲜少犯错的谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德》。费尔柴尔德曾在蓝带厨艺学院学习，并凭借在音乐出版业的短暂经历，与乔治·格什温和杰罗姆·科恩等人保持着友好的关系。他或许曾在自己于长岛建造的法式城堡中招待过他们。然而，费尔柴尔德有时却出人意料地节俭。在与作者理查德·霍奇森的访谈中，他谈到了这一点。费尔柴尔德说，在他位于长岛的庄园举办了星光熠熠的周末派对之后，他会让他的厨师把剩菜剩饭送到他在曼哈顿的联排别墅。
5. Wore a fresh pretty girl: Multifarious Sherman Fairchild, Fortune, May 1960, 170; “Sherman Fairchild, Man of Few Miscalculations,” Electronic News, 13 Sept. 1965, 8. Fairchild had studied at Cordon Bleu and thanks to a stint in the music-publishing business, he was on genial terms with the likes of George Gershwin and Jerome Kearn, whom he may have entertained at the French chateau he built for himself on Long Island. Yet at other times, Fairchild could be surprisingly thrifty. In his interview with the author, Richard Hodgson said that after the starlet- and celebrity-filled weekend parties at his Long Island estate, Fairchild would have his cook drive the leftovers to the Manhattan townhouse.
6. 收购是最容易的切入点：费尔柴尔德相机仪器公司董事会会议纪要（以下简称 FCI 董事会纪要）1957 年 11 月 21 日。所有者要求匿名。
6. Acquisitions were easiest entrée: Fairchild Camera and Instrument Board of Directors meeting minutes (henceforth FCI board minutes) for 21 Nov. 1957. Owner has requested anonymity.
7. 1957 年半导体的应用：Ken Stein，“现场经验正在开拓市场”，《电子新闻》，1958 年 2 月 17 日，第 1 页。六个月前就已考虑：仙童相机和仪器公司1957 年年度报告。仙童准备充分，跃跃欲试：Noyce 在“仙童半导体公司：公司简介”，《固态杂志》，1960 年 9/10 月，第 1 页中引用。
7. 1957 uses of semiconductors: Ken Stein, “Experience in Field is Opening Markets,” Electronic News, 17 Feb. 1958, 1. Had considered six months before: Fairchild Camera and Instrument Annual Report 1957. Fairchild primed and eager: Noyce quoted in “Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation: Company Profile,” Solid State Journal, Sept./Oct. 1960, 1.
8. 将公司引入电子行业：理查德·霍奇森，作者访谈。恰到好处的个性：仙童半导体创始人B，作者访谈。
8. Get the company into electronics: Richard Hodgson, interview by author. Just right personality: Fairchild Founder B, interview by author.
9. 永远不会成为问题：理查德·霍奇森，作者访谈。阿诺德·贝克曼后来显然后悔自己当初的慷慨。1962年，在肖克利晶体管公司因业绩不佳被出售，而仙童半导体公司业绩持续飙升之后，他谈到“劳工剥削”时说：“雇主和雇员都应该重新审视相关的道德准则，以确定何为良好的道德行为……如果自愿行动不足以维持公平的商业行为，那么就可能需要加强法律监管。”罗伯特·R·多克森，《电子行业综合研究》，《西部电子新闻》 ，1962年11月，第17页。
9. Never going to be a problem: Richard Hodgson, interview by author. Arnold Beckman later apparently rued his largesse. In 1962, after Shockley Transistor had been sold for underperformance, and the fortunes of Fairchild Semiconductor continued to soar, he said of “labor pirating”: “Employer and employee alike should re-examine the moral precepts involved to determine what constitutes good ethical behavior. … If voluntary action should prove inadequate to maintain fair business practices, then it may be necessary to amplify legal controls.” Robert R. Dockson, “A Comprehensive Study of the Electronics Industry,” Western Electronic News, Nov. 1962, 17.
10. 出售乐队：鲍勃·诺伊斯向父母出售乐队，1957 年 9 月 4 日，由波莉·诺伊斯提供。
10. Selling the group: Bob Noyce to Mother and Dad, 4 Sept. 1957, courtesy Polly Noyce.
11. 正式谈判：严格来说，谈判是在八人小组和费尔柴尔德控制公司（Fairchild Controls，相机与仪器公司（Camera and Instrument）的子公司）之间进行的。洛克和科伊尔确保了：“科学家们与科伊尔、霍奇金斯（原文如此）和索默温会面”，此信息由杰伊·拉斯特提供。这份文件概述了费尔柴尔德公司提出的方案，该方案立即被科伊尔拒绝。
11. Formal negotiations: The negotiations were technically between the group of eight and Fairchild Controls, a subsidiary of Camera and Instrument. Rock and Coyle ensured: “Scientists meet with Coyle, Hodgkins [sic], and Somerwine,” courtesy Jay Last. This document outlines an offer made by Fairchild and immediately rejected by Coyle.
12. 屡试不爽：这个故事来自 Julius Blank，作者采访了他。
12. Works every time: This story is from Julius Blank, interview by author.
13. 本段中的所有引文：鲍勃·诺伊斯致父母，1957 年 9 月 4 日，由波莉·诺伊斯提供。
13. All quotes in this paragraph: Bob Noyce to Mother and Dad, 4 Sept. 1957, courtesy Polly Noyce.
14. 摩尔感到悲伤：戈登·摩尔，作者采访。
14. Moore saddened: Gordon Moore, interview by author.
15. 博士生产线：仙童创始人 A，作者采访。
15. PhD production line: Fairchild Founder A, interview by author.
16. 没有实际影响：“8 离开肖克利组建海岸半导体公司”，《电子新闻》，1957 年 10 月 20 日。德国科学家习惯于等级制度：詹姆斯·F·吉本斯，作者采访。
16. No real effect: “8 Leave Shockley to Form Coast Semiconductor Firm,” Electronic News, 20 Oct. 1957. German scientists used to hierarchy: James F. Gibbons, interview by author.
17. 肖克利雇佣了一名线人：LN Duryea 向 Erickson、Wright、Hanafin 和 Steinmeyer 提供线索，肖克利文件，入藏号 95–153，SSC。诺伊斯离开后，肖克利申请的专利：诺伊斯专利 2,869,055，申请日为 1957 年 9 月 20 日，授权日为 1959 年 1 月 13 日；诺伊斯专利 3,010,033，申请日为 1958 年 1 月 2 日，授权日为 1961 年 11 月 21 日；诺伊斯专利 3,111,590，申请日为 1958 年 6 月 5 日，授权日为 1963 年 11 月 19 日；诺伊斯专利 3,098,160，申请日为 1958 年 2 月 24 日，授权日为 1961 年 12 月 26 日。
17. Shockley hired an informant: L. N. Duryea to Erickson, Wright, Hanafin, and Steinmeyer, Shockley papers, Accession # 95–153, SSC. Patents filed by Shockley after Noyce left: Noyce patent 2,869,055, filed 20 Sept. 1957, issued 13 Jan. 1959; Noyce patent 3,010,033, filed 2 Jan. 1958, issued 21 Nov. 1961; Noyce patent 3,111,590, filed 5 June 1958, issued 19 Nov. 1963; Noyce patent 3,098,160, filed 24 Feb. 1958, issued 26 Dec. 1961.
18. 硅谷的摩西：F. Seitz 引自 Riordan 和 Hoddeson，《水晶之火》，第 275 页。
18. Moses of Silicon Valley: F. Seitz quoted in Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 275.
19. Beckman 感受：A.O. Beckman 讲话摘要，1957 年 9 月 22 日，由 Jay Last 提供。
19. Beckman feels: Summary of Remarks, A. O. Beckman, 22 Sept. 1957, courtesy Jay Last.
20. 贝蒂泪流满面，肖克利太太最后一次来访：波莉·诺伊斯，作者采访。
20. Betty in tears and Mrs. Shockley’s last visit: Polly Noyce, interview by author.
21. 你好，鲍勃，你怎么能这样做：马龙，《大得分》，80。
21. Hello, Bob, How could you do this: Malone, Big Score, 80.
22. 储备股300股：仙童半导体公司（以下简称FSC）董事会第一次会议纪要，1957年10月16日，匿名。投票信托：共有七名投票受托人——诺伊斯和克莱纳；卡特、霍奇森以及另外两位相机和仪器公司的高级经理；还有来自海登·斯通公司的巴德·科伊尔。合同详情：“加州集团”与“仙童控制公司”之间的合同，1957年9月19日，肖克利文稿，编号95-153，SSC。另见鲍勃·诺伊斯致员工的信，《仙童半导体，1957-1977》（一本收录了仙童半导体公司成立前20年相关资料的小册子），SSC。对双方来说都是一笔非常划算的交易：仙童创始人A，作者访谈。
22. 300 shares held in reserve: Minutes of the First Meeting of Board of Directors of Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation (henceforth FSC board minutes), 16 Oct. 1957, Anon. Voting trust: There were seven voting trustees—Noyce and Kleiner; Carter, Hodgson, and two other Camera and Instrument senior managers; and Bud Coyle from Hayden, Stone. Details of contract: Contract between “the California Group” and “Fairchild Controls,” 19 Sept. 1957, Shockley Papers, Accession # 95–153, SSC. See also letter from Bob Noyce to employees, “Fairchild Semiconductor, 1957–1977” (booklet of reproduced items pertaining to the first 20 years of Fairchild Semiconductor’s existence), SSC. A very good deal for both: Fairchild Founder A, interview by author.
23. 我希望下地狱：杰伊·拉斯特，作者采访。
23. I hope to hell: Jay Last, interview by author.
24. 冰箱推销员的故事：Penny Noyce，作者访谈，2002 年 4 月 9 日。
24. Refrigerator salesman story: Penny Noyce, interview with author, 9 April 2002.
25. 用于支付必要开支：理查德·霍奇森致鲍勃·诺伊斯，1957年10月2日，杂项文件581，SSC。诺伊斯收入更高：布兰克、格里尼奇、霍尼、拉斯特和摩尔的年薪为13,800美元。克莱纳和罗伯茨的年薪为14,700美元。诺伊斯的年薪为15,600美元。FSC董事会会议记录，匿名。
25. To cover necessary expenditures: Richard Hodgson to Bob Noyce, 2 Oct. 1957, Misc 581, SSC. Noyce earned more: Salaries for Blank, Grinich, Hoerni, Last, and Moore were $13,800. Kleiner and Roberts were paid $14,700 per year. Noyce received $15,600. FSC board minutes, Anon.
26. 其他与诺伊斯博士“有关联的”创始人：“8 人离开肖克利，组建海岸半导体公司”，《电子新闻》 ，1957 年 10 月 20 日。更像个政治家：让·霍尔尼，查理·斯波克采访。永远当船长：仙童半导体创始人 A，作者采访。
26. Other founders “associated with Dr. Noyce”: “8 Leave Shockley to Form Coast Semiconductor Firm,” Electronic News, 20 Oct. 1957. More of a politician: Jean Hoerni, interview by Charlie Sporck. Always be captain: Fairchild Founder A, interview by author.
27. 人造卫星发射：Vic Grinich，Charlie Sporck 采访。
27. Sputnik launch: Vic Grinich, interview by Charlie Sporck.
28. 小心翼翼地移动：纳尔逊·斯通，作者采访。
28. Carefully moving: Nelson Stone, interview by author.
29. 一无所知：汤姆·贝，作者采访。
29. Didn’t know bupkis: Tom Bay, interview by author.
30. 照片侦察系统：FCI 董事会会议记录，1958 年 3 月 20 日，匿名。
30. Photo reconnaissance systems: FCI board minutes, 20 March 1958, Anon.
31. 空军要求：Lecuyer，“仙童半导体”，167-168。
31. Air Force required: Lecuyer, “Fairchild Semiconductor,” 167–168.
32. 鲍勃口齿伶俐，心中从无疑虑：汤姆·贝，作者采访。
32. Bob is so articulate, never a doubt in his mind: Tom Bay, interview by author.
33. 私人会面：理查德·霍奇森，作者采访，1999 年 5 月 19 日；“仙童半导体公司：公司简介”，《固态杂志》，1960 年 9 月/10 月，第 1 页。
33. Private meeting: Richard Hodgson, interview by author, 19 May 1999; “Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation: Company Profile,” Solid State Journal, Sept./Oct. 1960, 1.
34. IBM 不留任何侥幸余地：Lecuyer，“打造硅谷”，166。
34. IBM left little to chance: Lecuyer, “Making Silicon Valley,” 166.
35. 自行研发设备，从瑞典订购元件：戈登·摩尔，艾伦·陈采访。一角硬币大小的晶圆：诺伊斯在1963年发表的《集成电路：起源与影响》（Core 1.3 [计算机博物馆历史中心杂志]，2000年9月）一文中提到了“5/8英寸晶圆”，该文最初发表于《计算机博物馆报告》第11卷，1984-1985年冬季刊。感谢罗斯·巴塞特向我推荐这篇文章。
35. Develop own equipment, order elements from Sweden: Gordon Moore, interview by Alan Chen. Wafers the size of a dime: Noyce speaks of “5/8-inch wafers” in 1963 in Noyce, “The Integrated Circuit: Origins and Impacts,” Core 1.3 [Magazine of the Computer Museum History Center], Sept. 2000, originally printed in The Computer Museum Reports, Vol. 11, Winter 1984–1985. Thanks to Ross Bassett for pointing me to this article.
36. 诺伊斯去了一家摄影器材店：戈登·摩尔，艾伦·陈采访。
36. Noyce went to a photography store: Gordon Moore, interview by Alan Chen.
37. 与伊士曼柯达公司合作：Lecuyer，“硅谷的诞生”，170。
37. Work with Eastman Kodak: Lecuyer, “Making Silicon Valley,” 170.
38. 晶体管良率低：例如，1960 年，戈登·摩尔在仙童半导体公司报告称，晶圆测试的良率为 85%，而其中只有 54% 的晶体管在加工结束时完全可工作。他称这样的结果“是一个相当大的进步”。“进展报告——物理部，1960 年 4 月 1 日”，仙童研发部，技术报告和进展报告，M1055，SSC。
38. Low transistor yields: At Fairchild Semiconductor in 1960, for example, Gordon Moore reported that yields were 85 percent at wafer test—and of this percentage, on 54 percent were fully operational at the end of processing. He called such results “a rather substantial improvement.” “Progress Report—Physics Section, 1 April 1960,” Fairchild R&D Division, Technical Reports and Progress Reports, M1055, SSC.
39. 工作职责细分：LN Duryea 到 Erickson、Wright、Hanafin 和 Steinmeyer。
39. Breakdown of job responsibilities: L. N. Duryea to Erickson, Wright, Hanafin, and Steinmeyer.
40. Noyce 是技术主管：Julius Blank，Charlie Sporck 采访。
40. Noyce was the technical head: Julius Blank, interview by Charlie Sporck.
41. 除了我们的名字之外的一切：大卫·迪芬德弗，作者采访，2003 年 5 月 1 日。
41. Everything but our names: David Diffenderfer, interview by author, 1 May 2003.
42. 鲍德温从未投入那象征性的 500 美元：戈登·摩尔，罗布·沃克采访，1995 年 9 月 18 日。视频，硅谷创世纪收藏，SSC。鲍德温争取更多股票：理查德·霍奇森，作者采访。
42. Baldwin never put in the cursory $500: Gordon Moore, interview by Rob Walker, 18 Sept. 1995. Video, Silicon Genesis Collection, SSC. Baldwin pressing for more stock: Richard Hodgson, interview by author.
43. 津贴：理查德·霍奇森，作者采访。
43. An allowance: Richard Hodgson, interview by author.
44. 瞄准十倍的目标：贝在唐·霍夫勒的文章《我没有把我的儿子培养成经理》中引用，发表于1966年10月17日的《电子新闻》。做好一件事：诺伊斯，1982年里德采访。
44. Shoot ten times that high: Bay quoted in Don Hoefler, “I Didn’t Raise My Boy to be a Manager,” Electronic News, 17 Oct. 1966. Do one thing well: Noyce, 1982 Reid interview.
45. 圆圈中的小组：朱利叶斯·布兰克，作者采访。
45. Group in circle: Julius Blank, interview by author.
46. 我们抢先报道了行业动态：最后一份“会议记录”笔记本，由 Jay Last 提供。关于 Wescon 和 Fairchild 晶体管的介绍详情：Lecuyer，“Fairchild Semiconductor”，171。
46. We scooped the industry: Last “meeting notes” notebook, courtesy Jay Last. Details on Wescon and introduction of the Fairchild transistor: Lecuyer, “Fairchild Semiconductor,” 171.
第五章：发明
Chapter 5: Invention
1. 所有 Fairchild 笔记本：匿名。
1. All Fairchild notebooks: Anon.
2. 关于肖克利的研究方法：谢尔顿·罗伯茨，克里斯托夫·勒库耶于 1996 年 7 月 6 日采访了他。
2. On Shockley’s research method: Sheldon Roberts, interview by Christophe Lecuyer, 6 July 1996.
3. 了解科学，发现而非寻找：诺伊斯的评论，凯西·科恩回忆，作者采访。
3. Know the science, find not seek: Noyce’s comments recalled by Kathy Cohen, interview by author.
4. 思考基本原理：谢尔顿·罗伯茨接受勒库耶采访。问问自己为什么这样做行不通：“芯片的快速思考”，《经济学人》，1980 年 12 月 27 日。
4. Think about the fundamentals: Sheldon Roberts interview by Lecuyer. Ask himself why won’t this work: “Quick Thinking for Chips,” Economist, 27 Dec. 1980.
5. 很多想法，其中一些很好：戈登·摩尔，作者采访。
5. Many ideas, some of them good: Gordon Moore, interview by author.
6. 诺伊斯和摩尔关于铝触点的交流：戈登·摩尔，作者采访。
6. Exchange between Noyce and Moore on aluminum contacts: Gordon Moore, interview by author.
7. 所有传统智慧：戈登·摩尔，作者采访。
7. All the conventional wisdom: Gordon Moore, interview by author.
8. 在许多相同的应用中发挥作用：诺伊斯笔记本第 8 号，记录日期为 1959 年 1 月 12 日。该装置的专利是罗伯特·N·诺伊斯的“半导体扫描装置”，美国专利号 2,959,681，申请日为 1959 年 6 月 18 日，授权日为 1960 年 11 月 8 日。他还为该开关装置申请了专利，专利号为罗伯特·N·诺伊斯的“半导体开关装置”，美国专利号 2,971,139，申请日为 1959 年 6 月 16 日，授权日为 1961 年 2 月 7 日。
8. Serve in many of the same applications: Noyce notebook #8, entry dated 12 Jan. 1959. Patent for this device is Robert N. Noyce, “Semiconductor Scanning Device,” U.S. Patent 2,959,681, filed 18 June 1959, patented 8 Nov. 1960. He also patented the switching device as Robert N. Noyce, “Semiconductor Switching Device,” U.S. Patent #2,971,139, filed 16 June 1959, patented 7 Feb. 1961.
9. 铝触点的问题：戈登·摩尔笔记本第 6 号，1958 年 4 月 5 日的记录。诺伊斯的建议：拉离式思维——诺伊斯笔记本第 8 号，1958 年3 月 10 日的记录。镀镍：诺伊斯笔记本第 8 号，1958 年 2 月 25 日的记录。
9. Problems with aluminum contacts: Gordon Moore notebook #6, entry dated 5 April 1958. Noyce’s suggestions: Pulling-away ideas—Noyce notebook #8, entry dated 10 March 1958. Nickel plating: Noyce notebook #8, entry dated 25 Feb. 1958.
10. 纯铝制品：戈登·摩尔笔记本第 6 号，记录日期为 1958 年 5 月 2 日。铝触点专利：戈登·E·摩尔和罗伯特·N·诺伊斯，“晶体管制造方法”，美国专利 3,108,359，申请日期为 1959 年 6 月 30 日，授权日期为 1963 年 10 月 29 日。
10. Pure aluminum works: Gordon Moore notebook #6, entry dated 2 May 1958. Aluminum contact patent: Gordon E. Moore and Robert N. Noyce, “Method for Fabricating Transistors,” U.S. Patent 3,108,359, filed 30 June 1959, granted 29 Oct. 1963.
11. 请参阅 IBM 规范：Noyce 实验室笔记本 #8，7；Moore 实验室笔记本 #6，27。唯一令人兴奋的技术是：Noyce 引自 Woolf，“集成电路的起源”，53。
11. Refer to IBM specifications: Noyce lab notebook #8, 7; Moore lab notebook #6, 27. The only thing that’s technologically exciting: Noyce quoted in Woolf, “Genesis of the Integrated Circuit,” 53.
12. 重要如车轮：约翰·巴丁，引自《时代周刊》 1990 年 6 月 18 日第 103 页的“篇章”。
12. Important as the wheel: John Bardeen, quoted in “Passages,” Time, 18 June 1990, 103.
13. 前两分钟内失败：Siekman，“在电子领域，重大风险取决于微小的芯片”，122。
13. Failure within first two minutes: Siekman, “In Electronics, the Big Stakes Ride on Tiny Chips,” 122.
14. 军事努力：关于“Tinkertoy”、“Micromodule”和“Molecular Electronics”项目的更多信息，请参阅Braun和MacDonald的《微型革命》（Revolution in Miniature），第88-98页；Reid的《芯片》（The Chip），第19-20页；Wolff的《集成电路的起源》（“The Genesis of the Integrated Circuit”），第49页。本书中关于数字暴政的讨论很大程度上依赖于这些资料，尤其是Reid的著作。至少有20家公司：Herbert S. Kleiman，《集成电路：电子行业产品创新案例研究》（纽约大学博士论文，1966年），第114页。
14. Military efforts: For more on the “Tinkertoy,” “Micromodule,” and “Molecular Electronics” projects, see Braun and MacDonald, Revolution in Miniature, 88–98; Reid, The Chip, 19–20; Wolff, “The Genesis of the Integrated Circuit,” 49. The discussion of the tyranny of numbers in this book relies heavily on these sources, particularly Reid. At least 20 companies: Herbert S. Kleiman “The Integrated Circuit: A Case Study of Product Innovation in the Electronics Industry,” (PhD diss., New York University, 1966): 114.
15. 氧化层的形成：Jean Hoerni，实验记录本#3，3.
15. Building up of an oxide layer: Jean Hoerni, lab notebook #3, 3.
16. 关于抽头测试的引述和描述：Moore 笔记本 #6，1959 年 7 月 3 日的条目。参加会议：Lecuyer，“Fairchild Semiconductor”，175。
16. Quotes and descriptions of tap testing: Moore notebook #6, entry dated 3 July 1959. Attended a conference: Lecuyer, “Fairchild Semiconductor,” 175.
17. Hoerni 的专利披露：Hoerni，“通过氧化物掩蔽技术保护硅晶体管表面裸露 pn 结的方法”，1959 年 1 月 14 日；“半导体器件中电子和空穴寿命的选择性控制”，1959 年 1 月 20 日，由 Jay Last 提供。
17. Hoerni’s patent disclosures: Hoerni, “Method of Protecting Exposed p-n Junctions at the Surface of Silicon Transistors by Oxide Masking Techniques,” 14 Jan. 1959; “Selective Control of Electron and Hole Lifetimes in Semiconductor Devices,” 20 Jan. 1959, courtesy Jay Last.
18. 诺伊斯集成电路笔记本条目：诺伊斯笔记本#8：70-74。
18. Noyce’s integrated circuit notebook entry: Noyce notebook #8: 70–74.
19. 诺伊斯想象：诺伊斯，“改变世界的机器”访谈，视频，IA。
19. Noyce was imagining: Noyce, “Machine that Changed the World” interview, video, IA.
20. 不记得灯泡亮过：诺伊斯，1982 年里德访谈。
20. No recollection of light bulb going off: Noyce, 1982 Reid interview.
21. 我们当时还是一家全新的公司：诺伊斯在里德的《芯片》第 88 页中引用。
21. We were still a brand new company: Noyce quoted in Reid, The Chip, 88.
22. 这个想法太显而易见了，无需赘述：沃尔夫，《集成电路的起源》，第 51 页。（拉斯特称互连方案是“一个早已存在的想法”；格里尼奇说这是“自然而然发生的事情之一——一件显而易见的事情。”）
22. The idea was too obvious to bother mentioning: Wolff, “Genesis of the Integrated Circuit,” 51. (Last called the interconnection plan “an idea that was around”; Grinich said it was “one of those tings that just happened—one of those obvious things.”)
23. 祝你好运：朱利叶斯·布兰克（Julius Blank），作者访谈。理查德·霍奇森（Richard Hodgson），作者访谈。瑞姆半导体公司总裁曾是霍奇森在斯坦福大学的同学。关于鲍德温离开仙童半导体公司：R·戴尔·佩恩特（R. Dale Painter），《寻求解决瑞姆半导体公司的诉讼》，《电子新闻》，1960年3月14日；埃德·伍兹（Ed Woods），《瑞姆半导体公司卷入100万美元诉讼》，《电子新闻》，1959年7月27日；唐·霍夫勒（Don Hoefler），《美国硅谷》（第一部分），《电子新闻》，1970年1月11日。鲍德温会见了一位代表：L·N·杜里亚（L.N. Duryea）致艾克森、赖特、哈纳芬和斯坦迈耶的信，肖克利文稿，SSC。
23. I wish you luck: Julius Blank, interview by author. Richard Hodgson, interview by author. Rheem’s president had been Hodgson’s classmate at Stanford. On departure of Baldwin from Fairchild: R. Dale Painter, “Seek to Settle Suit on Rheem Semiconductor,” Electronic News, 14 March 1960; Ed Woods, “Rheem Semiconductor Named in $1 Million Suit,” Electronic News, 27 July 1959; Don Hoefler, “Silicon Valley, USA” (Part 1), Electronic News, 11 Jan. 1970. Baldwin met with a representative: L. N. Duryea to Eirckson, Wright, Hanafin, and Steinmeyer, Shockley papers, SSC.
24. 一场灾难：费尔柴尔德创始人 B，作者采访，1999 年 3 月 19 日。
24. A disaster: Fairchild Founder B, interview by author, 19 March 1999.
25. 鹤立鸡群：汤姆·贝，作者访谈。人人都还在报道：汤姆·贝，查理·斯波克访谈。
25. Head and shoulders above: Tom Bay, interview by author. Everybody had still reported: Tom Bay, interview by Charlie Sporck.
26. 自信满满：唐·霍夫勒，“我没有把我的儿子培养成经理”，《电子新闻》，1966 年 10 月 17 日。
26. Sure of [him]self: Don Hoefler, “I Didn’t Raise my Boy to be a Manager,” Electronic News, 17 Oct. 1966.
27. 最擅长评估研究成果的人是研究人员：罗伯特·诺伊斯博士访谈记录（尼洛·林德格伦访谈），日期不详，但可能在1965年，由帕特里夏·林德格伦提供（以下简称：诺伊斯，1965年，林德格伦访谈）。拥有最多保险的人寿命最短：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者访谈。
27. People doing research best to evaluate it: transcript of interview with Dr. Robert Noyce, [by Nilo Lindgren], no date but probably 1965, courtesy Patricia Lindgren (henceforth: Noyce 1965, Lindgren interview). Those with most insurance die soonest: Penny Noyce, interview by author.
28. 非常好的主管，随意，不干涉：Hoerni 引自 Bob Ristelhueber，“Noyce 回忆录：不寻常的想法，不寻常的方法”，《电子新闻》，1990 年 6 月 11 日，第 4 页。
28. Very good supervisor, casual, not interfere: Hoerni quoted in Bob Ristelhueber, “Noyce Remembered: Unusual Ideas, Unusual Approaches,” Electronic News, 11 June 1990, 4.
29. 我可以执导这部作品：诺伊斯，1965 年林德格伦访谈。
29. I could direct the work: Noyce, 1965 Lindgren interview.
30. Fairchild Semiconductor 的发展：Fairchild Camera and Instrument 1959 年年度报告。Fairchild -Rheem 诉讼：1959 年 7 月 15 日在加利福尼亚州最高法院和旧金山市县提起的诉讼，标题为“Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, A Corporation (原告) 诉 EM Baldwin 等人”，#491279。
30. Fairchild Semiconductor growth: Fairchild Camera and Instrument Annual Report 1959. Fairchild-Rheem lawsuits: suit filed on 15 July 1959 in the Supreme court of California and for the city and county of San Francisco entitled “Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, A Corporation (plaintiff) vs. E. M. Baldwin et al.,” #491279.
31. 与代表会面：“日本顶尖科学家访问仙童公司”，《Leadwire》杂志，1960 年 2 月。这对[他]的自尊心有好处：霍夫勒，“我没有把我的儿子培养成经理。”
31. Met with representatives: “Top Scientist from Japan Visits Fairchild,” Leadwire, Feb. 1960. Good for [his] ego: Hoefler, “I Didn’t Raise my Boy to be a Manager.”
32. 电子活性区域：Seidenberg，“从锗到硅”。
32. Electronically active regions: Seidenberg, “From Germanium to Silicon.”
33. 二氧化硅茧：诺伊斯引自里德，《芯片》，76。诺伊斯和摩尔对平面演示的反应：让·霍尔尼，查理·斯波克采访。
33. Cocoon of silicon dioxide: Noyce quoted in Reid, The Chip, 76. Noyce and Moore’s reactions to the planar demonstration: Jean Hoerni, interview by Charlie Sporck.
34. 霍尔尼平面器件专利：霍尔尼，“半导体器件制造方法”，美国专利号 3,025,589，申请日 1959 年 5 月 1 日，授权日 1962 年 3 月 20 日；霍尔尼，“半导体器件”，美国专利号 3,064,167，申请日 1959 年 5 月 1 日，授权日 1962 年 11 月 23 日。 “平面”一词的版权名称：理查德·霍奇森，作者采访。杜蒙公司生产了一种名为“平面三极管”的真空管，但我没有发现这种真空管与平面晶体管之间有任何联系。“杜蒙公司生产平面三极管”，《电子新闻》，1959 年 2 月 23 日，第 15 页。
34. Hoerni planar patents: Hoerni, “Method of Manufacturing Semiconductor Devices,” U.S. Patent #3,025,589, filed 1 May 1959, patented 20 March 1962; Hoerni, “Semiconductor Devices,” U.S. Patent #3,064,167, filed 1 May 1959, patented 23 Nov. 1962. Copyright name ‘planar’: Richard Hodgson, interview by author. Dumont manufactured a vacuum tube that it called a “Planar Triode,” but I have found no connection between this tube and the planar transistor. “Planar Triode in Production at Du Mont,” Electronic News, 23 Feb. 1959, 15.
35. 不讲美学：诺伊斯，克莱曼采访。戈登·摩尔回忆：沃尔夫，《集成电路的起源》，51。
35. Not aesthetic: Noyce, interview by Kleiman. Gordon Moore remembers: Wolff, “Genesis of the Integrated Circuit,” 51.
36. 我试图解决的问题：诺伊斯，《改变世界的机器》，视频。他们不颁发诺贝尔奖：比尔·诺伊斯，作者访谈。
36. I was trying to solve: Noyce, “Machine that Changed the World,” video. They don’t give Nobel Prizes: Bill Noyce, interview by author.
37. 为了改进：诺伊斯，“半导体器件和引线结构”，美国专利号 2,981,877，申请日 1959 年 7 月 30 日，专利授权日 1961 年 4 月 25 日。不想经历所有这些工作：诺伊斯，《改变世界的机器》。他在胡里奥·莫林编剧、制作和导演的影片《硅谷》（Silicon Valley，SSC 出品）中也表达了类似的观点。
37. To provide improved: Noyce, “Semiconductor Device-and-Lead Structure,” U.S. patent #2,981,877, filed 30 July 1959, patented 25 April 1961. Did not want to go through all that work: Noyce, “Machine that Changed the World.” He makes a similar point in “Silicon Valley,” written, produced, and directed by Julio Moline, video, SSC.
38. 时机成熟的想法：沃尔夫，《集成电路的起源》，51。
38. Idea whose time had come: Wolff, “Genesis of the Integrated Circuit,” 51.
39. 两者都是必要的：Noyce，1965 年林德格伦访谈。
39. Both are necessary: Noyce, 1965 Lindgren interview.
40. 非常清楚地记得：诺伊斯，1965 年林德格伦访谈。
40. Recall very vividly: Noyce, 1965 Lindgren interview.
41. 触发器的描述：Jay Last，“集成电路的发展，1959 年 8 月至 1961 年 1 月”，由 Jay Last 提供。
41. Description of the flip-flop: Jay Last, “Development of the Integrated Circuit, August 1959–January 1961,” courtesy Jay Last.
42. 诺伊斯发挥了关键作用：唐纳德·E·法里纳的来信，“直觉引发革命”，《圣何塞水星报》，1990年6月17日；伊西·哈斯，作者采访，2001年7月26日。极低的良率：大致计算如下。如果给定晶圆上只有一半的晶体管是合格的，这意味着任意两个晶体管组合在一起，只有四分之一的概率能正常工作；组合四个晶体管，只有十六分之一的概率是合格的。当时有说法称，在一个给定的电路中使用20或30个晶体管，良率会低到令人发指，以至于每个真正能正常工作的电路都必须花费巨资。（即使在90%的晶体管都能正常工作的最佳情况下，20个晶体管电路的总体良率也只有12%。）关于这一点，请参阅诺伊斯的《改变世界的机器》； Kilby，“集成电路的发明”，652。
42. Noyce was instrumental: Letter from Donald E. Farina, “Gut Feeling Launched Revolution,” San Jose Mercury News, 17 June 1990; Isy Haas, interview by author, 26 July 2001. Abysmal yields: The math is roughly as follows. If only half of the transistors on a given wafer are good, that means that putting together any two transistors yields chances of only one in four that the combination works; put together four transistors, and only one-sixteenth of them are good. There was talk that with 20 or 30 transistors in a given circuit, yields would be so abysmally low that each circuit that actually worked would have to cost a fortune. (Even a best-case scenario of 90 percent of transistors being functional resulted in 12 percent overall yields of 20-transistor circuits.) For more on this point, see Noyce, “Machine that Changed the World”; Kilby, “Invention of the Integrated Circuit,” 652.
据诺伊斯称，直到 1964 年 7 月，对于包含 30 个晶体管的集成电路而言，30% 的良率仍然被认为是非常好的，甚至可以说是“过于乐观了”。“消费电子和工业电子中的集成电路”，《电子采购》（1964 年 7 月）。
As late as July 1964, a 30 percent yield for an integrated circuit containing 30 transistors was considered very good, or perhaps even “on the optimistic side,” according to Noyce. “Integrated Circuits in Consumer and Industrial Electronics,” Electronic Procurement (July 1964).
43. 一个简单的门：马歇尔·考克斯在胡里奥·莫林编剧、制作和导演的纪录片《硅谷》中接受采访，SSC出品。每磅有效载荷都需要一吨燃料：罗伯特·诺伊斯，《军用设备中的集成电路》，IEEE Spectrum，1964年6月，第71页。
43. A simple gate: Marshall Cox interviewed in “Silicon Valley,” written, produced, and directed by Julio Moline, video, SSC. Every pound of payload required a ton of fuel: Robert Noyce, “Integrated Circuits in Military Equipment,” IEEE Spectrum, June 1964, 71.
44. 有趣且令人兴奋：摩尔在沃尔夫的《集成电路的起源》中被引用。继续追求[想法]：诺伊斯，1965 年林德格伦访谈。
44. Interesting and exciting: Moore quoted in Wolff, “Genesis of the Integrated Circuit.” Go ahead and pursue [ideas]: Noyce, 1965 Lindgren interview.
45. 87% 的利润率：Arthur Rock 致 Hayden、Stone 和 Co. 的合伙人，《创始文件》。预计收入将增长三倍：FCI 董事会会议记录，1959 年 1 月 22 日，匿名。
45. 87 percent profit margin: Arthur Rock to partners at Hayden, Stone, and Co., “Founding Documents.” Estimated revenues would triple: FCI board minutes, 22 Jan. 1959, Anon.
46. 西联电报：ASB
46. Western Union telegram: ASB
47. 破坏了建筑物的外观：诺伊斯，1965 年林德格伦访谈。为诺伊斯的父母买单：DS 诺伊斯，《从蜡烛到电脑》，269。
47. Ruins the look of the building: Noyce, 1965 Lindgren interview. Paid for Noyce’s parents: D. S. Noyce, “Candles to Computers,” 269.
48. 我们的动机：杰伊·拉斯特对大家说，日期不详，但显然是在与费尔柴尔德相机和仪器公司签署协议后立即说的，由杰伊·拉斯特提供。一丝不安，回报似乎太大了：诺伊斯，1965年林德格伦访谈。
48. Our motivation: Jay Last to folks, undated but clearly immediately after the deal with Fairchild Camera and Instrument was signed, courtesy Jay Last. Tiny area of disquiet, the reward seemed too much: Noyce, 1965 Lindgren interview.
49. 轻松回答问题：《Leadwire》（仙童半导体公司内部通讯），1959 年 11 月。人们过去常常这样做：理查德·霍奇森，作者采访。这是一件非常令人满意的事情：诺伊斯引自里德，《芯片》，第 186 页。
49. Answered questions with ease: Leadwire (Fairchild Semiconductor internal newsletter), Nov. 1959. People used to do things: Richard Hodgson, interview by author. It’s a very satisfying thing: Noyce quoted in Reid, The Chip, 186.
50. 我们绝不会坑害客户：鲍勃·格雷厄姆，查理·斯波克采访。诺伊斯的良率制体系最终胜出：鲍勃·格雷厄姆，查理·斯波克采访。斯波克证实了低性能器件的库存过剩。
50. We’re not ever going to screw a customer: Bob Graham, interview by Charlie Sporck. Noyce’s yield-based system prevailed: Bob Graham, interview by Charlie Sporck. Sporck confirms the excess inventory of the low-performance device.
51. 诺伊斯与耶尔弗顿的对话：杰克·耶尔弗顿，作者采访。
51. Noyce’s conversation with Yelverton: Jack Yelverton, interview by author.
52. 5,000 根电线：“离开 Leadwire”，《Leadwire》，1960 年 5 月。经验丰富的员工：杰克·耶尔弗顿，作者采访。
52. 5,000 wires: “Off the Leadwire,” Leadwire, May 1960. An experienced workforce: Jack Yelverton, interview by author.
53. 我们不能穿裤子：芭芭拉·艾勒，作者采访。
53. We could not wear pants: Barbara Eiler, interview by author.
54. 早餐会，工头接受管理培训：《Leadwire》，1963 年 3 月。咖啡谈话会议：《Leadwire》，1963 年 10 月。
54. Breakfast meetings, foremen offered management training: Leadwire, March 1963. Coffee-conversation meetings: Leadwire, Oct. 1963.
55. 被介绍为盖洛德的兄弟：盖洛德·诺伊斯，作者采访。
55. Introduced as Gaylord’s brother: Gaylord Noyce, interview by author.
56. 诺伊斯谈日本之行：“罗伯特·诺伊斯博士谈日本之行”，《Leadwire》，1960年6月
56. Noyce comments on trip to Japan: “Dr. Robert Noyce Gives Comments on Visit to Japan,” Leadwire, June 1960
57. 诺伊斯感到有些内疚，经济上不如父母：诺伊斯，1965 年林德格伦访谈。
57. Noyce felt a little guilty, financially outperformed parents: Noyce, 1965 Lindgren interview.
58. 诺伊斯在飞机上的份额：汤姆·贝，作者采访。贝蒂不想被抛弃：佩妮·诺伊斯对作者说，2004年4月5日。
58. Noyce share in plane: Tom Bay, interview by author. Betty did not want to be left: Penny Noyce to author, 5 April 2004.
59. 这并非事实，宗教阻碍了人们取得成就：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者访谈。一件事，或一个人：《铅线》，1960年1月。
59. Not the truth, thought religion kept people from achieving: Penny Noyce, interview by author. One event, or one man: Leadwire, Jan. 1960.
60. 移民统计：美国人口普查数据。新移民的青年和教育：例如，在帕洛阿尔托，1950 年至 1960 年间，中位年龄下降了 3 岁，家庭收入中位数增长了 50%（芬德利，《魔法之地》，147）。
60. Immigration statistics: U.S. census data. Youth and education of new arrivals: in Palo Alto, for example, median age decreased by three years and median family income increased by 50 percent between 1950 and 1960, Findlay, Magic Lands, 147.
61. IBM 25 号楼：Alan Hess，“一座值得拯救的 45 年历史的建筑”，《圣何塞水星报》，2003 年 11 月 16 日。
61. IBM Building 25: Alan Hess, “A 45-Year-Old Building Worth Saving,” San Jose Mercury News, 16 Nov. 2003.
62. 电子产品销售额超过 5 亿美元，接近三分之二：西部电子制造商协会 1961 年报告，转载于1961 年 10 月的Leadwire 杂志。新创企业：“印刷电路公司在门洛帕克成立” ， 《电子新闻》，1960 年 10 月；“Diotran Pacific 由四人在加州帕洛阿尔托成立”，《电子新闻》，1961 年 3 月 6 日；“公司在帕洛阿尔托成立，为生产商提供服务”，1961 年 9 月 18 日。斯坦福工业园租户：Findlay，Magic Lands，140。
62. Electronics sales surpassed $500 million, nearly two-thirds: Western Electronics Manufacturers Association 1961 report, reprinted in Leadwire, Oct. 1961. New startups: “Printed Circuits Firm Formed in Menlo Park,” Electronic News, Oct. 1960; “Diotran Pacific Formed by Four In Palo Alto, Cal,” Electronic News, 6 March 1961; “Firm Established in Palo Alto to Service Producers,” 18 Sept. 1961. Stanford Industrial Park tenants: Findlay, Magic Lands, 140.
63. Fairchild Semiconductor 可获得的资源：“化学部门进展报告，1960 年 2 月 1 日”，第 5 盒，第 1 号文件，Fairchild 研发报告，M1055，SSC；“微逻辑部门进展报告，1960 年 7 月 1 日”，第 5 盒，第 2 号文件，同上；第 6 盒，第 1 号文件，同上。
63. Resources available to Fairchild Semiconductor: “Progress Report, Chemistry Section, 1 Feb. 1960,” Box 5, File 1, Fairchild R&D Reports, M1055, SSC; “Progress Report, Micrologic Section, 1 July 1960,” Box 5, File 2, ibid.; Box 6, File 1, ibid.
64. 农业机械化：萨克森尼安，《硅芯片与空间结构》，第60页。关于拉丁裔工人在硅谷的经历，详见斯蒂芬·J·皮蒂，《硅谷的魔鬼：北加州、种族与墨西哥裔美国人》（普林斯顿，新泽西州：普林斯顿大学出版社，2002年）。基础设施建设：芬德利，《魔法之地》，第21-22页。整合的教育体系：普里尔，《科技之都的兴起》，第140页。
64. Mechanization of agriculture: Saxenian, “Silicon Chips and Spatial Structure,” 60. For a wide-ranging discussion of the experience of Latino workers in Silicon Valley, see Stephen J. Pitti, The Devil in Silicon Valley: Northern California, Race, and Mexican Americans (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002). Infrastructure development: Findlay, Magic Lands, 21–22. Consolidated educational system: Preer, Emergence of Technopolis, 140.
65. 世界是他的牡蛎，他可以做任何事：罗伯特·诺伊斯，《改变世界的机器》，IA。
65. World was [his] oyster, could do anything: Robert Noyce, “The Machine that Changed the World,” IA.
66. 又一个员工：杰伊·拉斯特接受查理·斯波克采访时；拉斯特在接受作者采访时也发表了类似的评论；让·霍尔尼在接受查理·斯波克采访时也表达了同样的观点。
66. Just another employee: Jay Last interview by Charlie Sporck; Last made a similar comment in his interview with author; Jean Hoerni, in his interview with Charlie Sporck, echoed the sentiment.
67. 诺伊斯想要股票期权和“渐进式社会主义”：理查德·霍奇森，作者采访。
67. Noyce wanted stock options and “creeping socialism”: Richard Hodgson, interview by author.
68. 《相机与仪器》杂志扩充版：“仙童相机公司的微型复兴”。卡特声称所有收购都合情合理，以某种方式融入了公司的核心业务战略。“我收购一家胸罩公司并非仅仅因为它赚钱，”他在为自己的收购狂潮辩护时说道。
68. Camera and Instrument expanded: “The Micro-Renaissance at Fairchild Camera.” Carter claimed that all the acquisitions made sense, fitting in one way or another into the company’s core business strategy. “I didn’t go out and buy a brassiere company just because it was making money,” he said in defense of his buying spree.
69. 卡特和费尔柴尔德的股票持有情况：卡特持有77,000股相机仪器公司股票，而两位创始人每人仅持有约5,000股。收购费尔柴尔德半导体公司使谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德的个人净资产增加了2000万至3000万美元，因为股票交换立即使相机仪器公司的净利润翻了四倍（费尔柴尔德相机仪器公司1959年年报）。谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德个人财富的增长：“多才多艺的谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德”，第171页。
69. Stock holdings of Carter and Fairchild: Carter owned 77,000 shares of Camera and Instrument stock to the founders’ roughly 5,000 shares apiece. The acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor increased Sherman Fairchild’s personal net worth by $20 to $30 million, since the exchange of stock had immediately quadrupled Camera and Instrument’s net profits Fairchild Camera and Instrument Annual Report, 1959. Boost to Sherman Fairchild’s personal fortune: “Multifarious Sherman Fairchild,” 171.
70. IBM 计划会议的引述：“IBM 战略，1961 年 3 月 15 日”，Noyce 1961 年日记，ASB。
70. Quotes for planned IBM meeting: “IBM Strategy, Mar 15 [1961],” Noyce 1961 datebook, ASB.
71. 半导体公司加入SGS：理查德·霍奇森（Richard Hodgson）的访谈（作者采访）。关于仙童半导体与SGS合作安排的其他信息，请参阅《仙童半导体1961》（Fairchild 1961）、《导线》（Leadwire）杂志1961年1月刊以及汤姆·贝（Tom Bay）的访谈（作者采访）。
71. Semiconductor joined SGS: Richard Hodgson, interview by author. Other information on Fairchild’s arrangement with SGS is from “Fairchild 1961,” Leadwire, Jan. 1961, and Tom Bay, interview by author.
72. Minuteman 合同：“Minuteman！” Leadwire，1961 年 2 月；“FSC 签署两份 Autonetics 合同”，Leadwire，1960 年 6 月；“Autonetics 合同：总额达 800 万美元” ， Leadwire，1960 年 12 月。
72. Minuteman contract: “Minuteman!” Leadwire, Feb. 1961; “FSC Signs Two Autonetics Contracts,” Leadwire, June 1960; “Autonetics Contracts: Now Total 8 Million,” Leadwire, Dec. 1960.
73. 微电路领域的人员缩减：戈登·摩尔，《根据 1960 年 10 月 4 日的人员预测所定义的工作量分配近似值》，1961 年 1 月 18 日，由杰伊·拉斯特提供。好了，集成电路已经完成了：戈登·摩尔，作者访谈。
73. Personnel reductions in microcircuitry: Gordon Moore, “Approximate Distribution of Effort as Defined in 10/4/60 Personnel Forecast,” 18 Jan. 1961, courtesy Jay Last. OK, we’ve done integrated circuits: Gordon Moore, interview by author.
74. 拉斯特已经说过：杰伊·拉斯特接受作者采访时说道。汤姆·贝在接受作者采访时表示：“我肯定说过一些类似杰伊记得的话——我们投入了大量资金，但在销售额或基本面方面却一无所获——但我从未觉得我们应该放弃集成电路。我认为集成电路是公司的未来，但与此同时，我们也不能把所有精力都投入到五年后的项目上。我们还要经营公司。”
74. Last has already: Jay Last, interview by author. Tom Bay, in his interview by author, says, “I’m sure I made some comment along the lines that Jay remembers—we were spending a lot of money and not getting anything in terms of sales or fundamental interest—but I don’t ever remember feeling like we should scrub integrated circuits. I felt that [the integrated circuit] was the future for the business, but at the same time, we could not afford to spend all our energy on five-year-away projects. We had a business to run.”
75. 诺伊斯和摩尔未能进行投资：戈登·摩尔，作者访谈。戴维斯和罗克的历史：哈佛商学院，《工作知识》 （简报），2000年12月4日。http://hbswk.hbs.edu/pubitem.jhtml? id=1821&t=special_reports_donedeals
75. Noyce and Moore prevented from investing: Gordon Moore, interview by author. Davis and Rock history: Harvard Business School, Working Knowledge (newsletter), 4 Dec. 2000. http://hbswk.hbs.edu/pubitem.jhtml?id=1821&t=special_reports_donedeals
76. 泰莱达因交易：杰伊·拉斯特，作者采访。
76. Teledyne deal: Jay Last, interview by author.
77. Signetics 资金信息：作者采访 Jack Yelverton。人员扩张率：Moore 和 Grinich 致 Noyce，1961 年 2 月 8 日；Moore 和 Grinich 致 Noyce 的研发进展报告，1961 年 3 月 8 日，第 6 盒，第 2 文件。Fairchild 研发报告，M1055，SSC。
77. Signetics funding information: Jack Yelverton, interview by author. If personnel expansion rate: Moore and Grinich to Noyce, 8 Feb., 1961; R&D Progress Report from Moore and Grinich to Noyce, 8 March 1961, Box 6, File 2. Fairchild R&D Reports, M1055, SSC.
78. 关于与美国国税局的问题：杰伊·拉斯特，作者采访；费尔柴尔德创始人 A，作者采访；870 表格，“放弃对税款不足的评估和征收的限制以及接受超额评估”，1963 年 12 月 23 日，致杰伊·拉斯特，由杰伊·拉斯特提供。
78. On the issue with the IRS: Jay Last, interview by author; Fairchild Founder A, interview by author; Form 870, “Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in Tax and Acceptance of Overassessment,” 23 Dec. 1963, addressed to Jay Last and courtesy Jay Last.
79. 只是一份工作，尝到鲜血的滋味：费尔柴尔德创始人 B，作者采访。
79. Just a job, a taste of blood: Fairchild Founder B, interview by author.
80. 电子股增长：1959 年增长 60%，而 1958 年为 30%；1959 年增长 50%，而 1958 年为 38%。斯图尔特·盖尔曼，《电子新闻》 ，1959 年 12 月 28 日， “行业在市场中依然高歌猛进”。关于分拆：“前雇员提起 70 万美元反诉”，《电子新闻》，1961 年 1 月 30 日；“硅晶体管公司起诉前雇员，寻求 100 万美元赔偿”，《电子新闻》， 1961 年 1 月 23 日；“Diotran Pacific 公司由四人在加州帕洛阿尔托成立”，《电子新闻》，1961 年 3 月 6 日。 “Melapar起诉Scope等公司索赔50万美元”，《电子新闻》，1961年7月27日，第1页。另见关于马里兰州计算机动力公司的报道：“5人公司第一年发展到100人”，《电子新闻》，1963年1月7日。1961年底，该公司数量达到150-200家：“半导体行业：混乱与百万富翁”，《电子新闻》，1982年1月25日，第二部分，第16页。
80. Growth of electronics stocks: 60 percent vs. 30 percent growth in 1958; 50 percent vs. 38 percent growth in 1959, Stuart Gellman, “Industry Still Flying High in the Market,” Electronic News, 28 Dec 1959, 1. On spinouts: “Ex-Employe[e]s File $700,000 Counter Claim,” Electronic News, 30 Jan. 1961; “Silicon Transistor Sues Ex-Employe[e]s, Seeks $1 Million,” Electronic News, 23 Jan. 1961; “Diotran Pacific Formed by Four In Palo Alto, Cal,” Electronic News, 6 March 1961; “Melapar Sues Scope, Others for $500,000,” Electronic News, 27 July 1961, 1. See also, reports on Maryland-based Computer Dynamics Corporation: “5 Man Firm Grows to 100 in First Year,” Electronic News, 7 Jan. 1963. At the end of 1961, 150–200 companies: “The Semiconductor Industry: Mayhem and Millionaires,” Electronic News, 25 Jan. 1982, Section 2, 16.
81. 不正当行为和经纪人发行股票的意愿：阿尔弗雷德·D·库克，《编辑来信》，《电子新闻》，1960 年 2 月 15 日。筹集资金的便利性：克劳斯，《半导体行业的经济研究》，第 110 页。另见《Transitron 发行引发经纪人蜂拥而至》，《电子新闻》25 周年纪念版，1982 年 1 月 25 日，第 2 部分，第 28 页。
81. Improper practices and brokers’ willingness to float issues: Alfred D. Cook, “Letter from the Editor,” Electronic News, 15 Feb. 1960. Ease of raising capital: Kraus, “An Economic Study of the Semiconductor Industry,” 110. See also, “Transitron Offer Sparks Broker Deluge,” Electronic News 25th Anniversary Edition, 25 Jan. 1982, Section 2, 28.
82. 关于从研发到制造过程中遇到的问题：摩尔和格里尼奇于 1961 年 4 月 11 日向诺伊斯提交的研发进展报告，第 6 盒，第 3 文件，费尔柴尔德研发报告，M1055，SSC。研发报告中充斥着关于从研发到制造过程中遇到的问题的论述。
82. On problems from development to manufacturing: R&D Progress Report from Moore and Grinich to Noyce, 11 April 1961, Box 6, File 3, Fairchild R&D Reports, M1055, SSC. References to the problems moving from development to manufacturing are rife in the R&D reports.
83. 转移程序受阻：摩尔和格里尼奇致诺伊斯的研发进展报告，1961年4月11日，第6盒，第3号文件，费尔柴尔德研发报告，M1055，SSC。制造方面存在问题：摩尔和格里尼奇致诺伊斯的研发进展报告，1961年6月14日，第6盒，第5号文件，费尔柴尔德研发报告，M1055，SSC。另见“摩尔和格里尼奇致诺伊斯的研发进展报告，1961年8月11日”，第6盒，第7号文件，同上。
83. Transfer procedure is plagued: R&D Progress Report from Moore and Grinich to Noyce, 11 April 1961, Box 6, File 3, Fairchild R&D Reports, M1055, SSC. Manufacturing complained: R&D Progress Report from Moore and Grinich to Noyce, 14 June 1961, Box 6, File 5, Fairchild R&D Reports, M1055, SSC. See also, “R&D Progress Report from Moore and Grinich to Noyce, 11 August 1961,” Box 6, File 7, ibid.
84. 通讯线路和议程的其他部分：Noyce，1962 年日记，未注明日期，但显然是 1963 年的第一个周末，ASB。
84. Communication lines and rest of agenda: Noyce, 1962 datebook, undated but clearly the first weekend of 1963, ASB.
85. 诺伊斯偶尔会与霍尼一起工作：杰伊·拉斯特，作者采访。诺伊斯对离职的反应：杰克·耶尔弗顿于2003年12月18日对作者说；杰里·莱文，作者采访；“霍尼博士和拉斯特博士辞去费尔柴尔德公司职务，加入泰莱达因公司”，《电子新闻》，1961年2月13日。
85. Noyce had occasionally joined Hoerni: Jay Last, interview by author. Noyce’s reactions to departures: Jack Yelverton to author, 18 Dec. 2003; Jerry Levine, interview by author; “Drs. Hoerni, Last Resign Posts at Fairchild to Join Teledyne,” Electronic News, 13 Feb. 1961.
86. 半导体市场份额翻了一番：“仙童半导体副总裁称公司地位稳固”，《电子新闻》，1961 年 3 月 20 日，第 16 页。利润和销售额创历史新高：仙童相机和仪器公司 1961年年度报告。1962年数据：仙童相机和仪器公司1962 年年度报告。
86. Semiconductor doubled its share: “Strong Position of Firm Cited by Fairchild Semiconductor VP,” Electronic News, 20 March 1961, 16. Record profits and sales: Fairchild Camera and Instrument Annual Report 1961. 1962 figures: Fairchild Camera and Instrument Annual Report 1962.
第六章：一个古怪的小后起之秀
Chapter 6: A Strange Little Upstart
1. 经理的职责：诺伊斯引自沃尔特·古扎尔迪，《商业巨擘的智慧》，《财富》杂志（1989年7月3日）：78-91页。百分之百的加薪：保罗·霍斯金斯基，作者采访。安迪·格鲁夫在接受作者采访时也分享了类似的经历。
1. Job of the manager: Noyce quoted in Walter Guzzardi, “Wisdom from the Giants of Business,” Fortune (3 July 1989): 78–91. Hundred percent raise: Paul Hwoschinsky, interview by author. Andy Grove shared a similar memory in his interview with the author.
2. 工作人员鸡尾酒会：查理·斯波克，作者采访。相机和仪器会议：纳尔逊·斯通，作者采访。
2. Staff met over cocktails: Charlie Sporck, interview by author. Camera and Instrument meetings: Nelson Stone, interview by author.
3. 高管言论：“工厂里到处都是”，《Leadwire》杂志，1962年9月。诺伊斯设想便携式电话：诺伊斯，1965年克莱曼访谈录音带，SSC。每个行业都会有电子商店：诺伊斯，1965年林德格伦访谈。删除了自己的访谈：各种视频，ASB。
3. Executive expressions: “All around the Plant,” Leadwire, Sept. 1962. Noyce imagining portable telephones: Noyce, 1965 Kleiman interview, audiotape, SSC. Every industry will have electronics shop: Noyce, 1965 Lindgren interview. Erased own interviews: miscellaneous videos, ASB.
4. 奇怪的小创业者：格罗夫引自佩里，《名人第一份工作》，第50页。博士们发挥了作用：弗兰克·万拉斯引自乔治·罗斯基，《三十年》。16 % 的重大创新：莱文，《半导体行业》，第54页。
4. Strange little upstart: Grove quoted in Perry, “Famous First Jobs,” 50. PhDs play: Frank Wanlass quoted in George Rostky, “Thirty Years.” 16 percent of major innovations: Levin, “The Semiconductor Industry,” 54.
5. 市场营销部门：Walter Matthews，“仙童半导体销售部门调整”，《电子新闻》，1964年4月6日。库存代表：“FCS设立‘库存代表’计划”，《电子新闻》，1961年6月12日。关于电子产品分销商以及仙童与其分销商关系的更多信息，请参阅Robert Noyce，“集成电路生产商将补充OEM电路的角色”，《电子新闻》，1965年5月10日。首个电视购物广告：“集成电路简报”，由Harry Sello提供。“仙童‘特别节目’面向特定群体”，《广播》 （1967年10月2日）：35。该文章称该特别节目是“电视史上的里程碑事件……电视史上的首例”。费尔柴尔德公司 1967 年的年度报告指出，该节目在 32 个电视台播出，“估计有 200 万人观看。这是已知最早利用商业电视教授技术科目的案例。”
5. Marketing divisions: Walter Matthews, “Shift Semicon Sales Setup at Fairchild,” Electronic News, 6 April 1964. Stocking representatives: “FCS Sets up ‘Stocking Rep’ Plan,” Electronic News, 12 June 1961. For more on electronics distributors and Fairchild’s relations with its distributors, see Robert Noyce, “integrated circuit Producers to Complement OEM Circuit Role,” Electronic News, 10 May 1965. First infomercial: “A Briefing on Integrated Circuits,” courtesy Harry Sello. “Fairchild ‘Special’ Aimed at Select Group,” Broadcasting (2 Oct. 1967): 35. The article calls the special “a landmark event in television … the first of its kind in TV history.” The Fairchild annual report for 1967 notes that the show was carried by 32 stations and “viewed by an estimated 2 million persons. This is [the] first known use of commercial TV to teach a technical subject.”
6. 政府直接采购占销售额的 35%：“仙童半导体：小型半导体，大生意”，《帕洛阿尔托时报》，1960 年 8 月 10 日。仙童半导体与政府密切合作：查理·斯波克，作者采访；杰伊·拉斯特，作者采访；勒库耶，《硅谷的崛起》，第 3 章和第 4 章。
6. Direct government purchases 35 percent of sales: “Fairchild: Tiny Semiconductors, Big Business,” Palo Alto Times, 10 Aug. 1960. Fairchild worked closely with the government: Charlie Sporck, interview by author; Jay Last, interview by author; Lecuyer, “Making Silicon Valley,” chaps. 3 and 4.
7. 政府合同不道德，要对自己有信心：诺伊斯，1965 年克莱曼访谈。
7. Government contracts unethical, have confidence in yourself: Noyce, 1965 Kleiman interview.
8. 仿佛竞标者都是骗子：比尔·诺伊斯，作者访谈。有趣的垃圾；一群努力、年轻、渴望成功的团队：诺伊斯，1965年克莱曼访谈。戈登·摩尔分享：摩尔和格里尼奇于1962年2月15日提交给诺伊斯的研发进展报告，第7盒，第2号文件，仙童研发报告，SSC。我们喜欢这样：“新闻背后的男人”，《电子新闻》，1962年12月3日。
8. Written as if bidders were crooks: Bill Noyce, interview by author. Interesting slop; hard, young, hungry group: Noyce, 1965 Kleiman interview. Gordon Moore shared: R&D Progress Report from Moore and Grinich to Noyce, 15 Feb. 1962, Box 7, File 2, Fairchild R&D Reports, SSC. We like it that way: “Man Behind the News,” Electronic News, 3 Dec. 1962.
9. 香港太空：Noyce 1961 年日记（但条目始于 1962 年 5 月 21 日）。
9. Space in Hong Kong: Noyce 1961 datebook (but entry from 21 May 1962).
10. 半导体行业的自动化： 《电子新闻》 ，1960年3月21日， “半导体领域快速机械化” ，第110页。当时，半导体行业的自动化仅限于测试领域，该领域最终发展成为仙童仪器公司。迁往香港：杰瑞·莱文（作者采访）；查理·斯波克（作者采访）。
10. Automation in semiconductor industry: “Semiconductor Field Mechanizing Fast,” Electronic News, 21 March, 1960, 110. At this point, Semiconductor’s automation was limited to testing, the area that was eventually spun into Fairchild Instrumentation. Move to Hong Kong: Jerry Levine, interview by author; Charlie Sporck, interview by author.
11. 几乎被赶出董事会会议室：理查德·霍奇森，作者采访；日期来自费尔柴尔德相机和仪器公司董事会执行委员会会议记录，1964 年 1 月 22 日。
11. Practically thrown out of the board room: Richard Hodgson, interview by author; date is from minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of Fairchild Camera and Instrument, 22 Jan. 1964.
12. 香港工资：杰瑞·莱文（Jerry Levine）的采访（作者本人）。仙童公司工资：尤金·克莱纳（Eugene Kleiner）致戈登·摩尔（Gordon Moore）的信，1960年12月1日，仙童公司研发报告，SSC。韩国工厂及工资：“FCS计划在韩国建厂”，《电子新闻》。
12. Hong Kong wages: Jerry Levine, interview by author. Fairchild wages: Eugene Kleiner to Gordon Moore, 1 Dec. 1960, Fairchild R&D Reports, SSC. Korean plant and wages: “FCS Plans Korea Plant,” Electronic News.
13. 1968 年海外数据：费尔柴尔德相机和仪器公司1968 年年度报告。
13. 1968 overseas data: Fairchild Camera and Instrument Annual Report 1968.
14. 其他公司也效仿了这一举措：其中包括大陆设备公司、通用电气和ITT半导体公司。唐·霍夫勒，《击中他们的弱点》，《电子新闻》 ，1968年1月15日，第1页。1974年，69家组装厂：布劳恩和麦克唐纳，《微型革命》。
14. Other firms imitated the move: these include Continental Device Corp., General Electric, and ITT Semiconductor. Don Hoefler, “Hit ‘Em Where They Ain’t,” Electronic News, 15 Jan. 1968, 1. In 1974, 69 assembly plants: Braun and McDonald, Revolution in Miniature.
15. 我们输掉了过程：保罗·霍沃辛斯基，作者访谈。我们将埋葬：詹姆斯·F·吉本斯，作者访谈。
15. We lost the process: Paul Hwoschinsky, interview by author. We are going to bury: James F. Gibbons, interview by author.
16. 诺伊斯 1965 年日程表：9 月和 10 月条目，1965 年日记，ASB。
16. Noyce’s 1965 schedule: Sept. and Oct. entries, 1965 datebook, ASB.
17. 要求10%：诺伊斯，1961年日记，未注明日期条目。本可获得更多，《诺伊斯在日本是上帝》：罗杰·博罗沃伊，作者访谈。超过1亿美元：博罗沃伊，《德州仪器在日本的集成电路专利：真相究竟如何？》，未发表备忘录，1989年11月27日，由罗杰·博罗沃伊提供。
17. Ask for 10 percent: Noyce, 1961 datebook, undated entry. Could get much more, Noyce is God in Japan: Roger Borovoy, interview by author. Excess of $100 million: Borovoy, “The T.I. Integrated circuit Patents in Japan: What Really Happened?” unpublished memo, 27 Nov. 1989, courtesy Roger Borovoy.
18. 我很担心：诺伊斯，1965 年克莱曼访谈。
18. I’m concerned: Noyce, 1965 Kleiman interview.
19. 空军实验：Siekman，“在电子领域，重大风险取决于微小的芯片。”
19. An air force experiment: Siekman, “In Electronics, the Big Stakes Ride on Tiny Chips.”
20. 第一个商用集成电路：“应用工程部进展报告，1961 年 6 月 1 日”，第 6 盒，第 5 文件，仙童研发部，技术报告和进展报告，SSC。圣莫里茨研讨会：唐·霍夫勒，“集成电路十亿美元宝贝”，电子新闻，1971 年 10 月 18 日。
20. First commercial integrated circuit: “Progress Report, Applications Engineering Section, 1 June 1961,” Box 6, File 5, Fairchild R&D Division, Technical Reports and Progress Reports, SSC. St. Moritz seminars: Don Hoefler, “Integrated Circuit Billion $ Baby,” Electronic News, 18 Oct. 1971.
21. 1952 年选举中的计算机：Martin Campbell-Kelly 和 William Aspray，《计算机：信息时代史》（纽约：Basic Books 出版社，1996 年），第 121-123 页。只有 100 家公司需要计算机：James W. Cortada，《美国的计算机：从实验室到市场》（纽约州阿蒙克：ME Sharpe 出版社，1993 年）。联邦政府统计数据：Martha Smith Parks，《20 世纪 70 年代的微电子技术》（罗克韦尔国际公司，1974 年），第 59 页。
21. Computer in 1952 election: Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray, Computer: A History of the Information Age (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 121–123. Only 100 corporations would need computers: James W. Cortada, The Computer in the United States: From Laboratory to Market (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993). Federal government statistics: Martha Smith Parks, Microelectronics in the 1970s, (Rockwell International Corporation, 1974), 59.
22. 对 Micrologic 器件的兴趣：Leadwire，1961 年 4 月。Noyce告诉 Philco 很艰难：Noyce 1961 年日记，6 月 29 日条目。
22. Interest in Micrologic devices: Leadwire, April 1961. Noyce tells Philco tough: Noyce 1961 datebook, 29 June entry.
23. 截至1961年底：Micrologic销售经理Bob Graham于1961年12月1日致所有现场销售人员的信函，由Jay Last提供。Graham的信函也是德州仪器定价信息的来源。
23. By the end of 1961: Bob Graham [Micrologic sales manager] to All Field Sales, 1 Dec. 1961, courtesy Jay Last. Graham letter is also the source of the Texas Instruments pricing information.
24. 现在诺伊斯想要：诺伊斯在1961年的日记中写道“μckts集团→系统”。设计工程师对集成电路的抵制：关于这一点，详见巴塞特，《新技术》，第229页。
24. Now Noyce wanted: Noyce wrote “μckts group → systems” in his 1961 datebook. Resistance to integrated circuits by design engineers: For more on this point, see Bassett, “New Technology,” 229.
25. 仍处于研发阶段：理查德·格塞尔，“集成电路远未获得回报”，《电子新闻》，1963 年 3 月 27 日。
25. Would remain on R&D level: Richard Gessell, “Integrated Circuitry Held Far From Payoff,” Electronic News, 27 March 1963.
26. 最重要的 Fairchild First：Leadwire，1961 年 10 月。诺伊斯关于微电路的笔记：诺伊斯 1961 年和 1962 年的笔记本。大约在当年的二月或三月，他在待办事项清单上写道：“停止对 Signetics 和 Amelco 的侵权行为。”寻找 Signetics 侵权的证据：诺伊斯 1961 年笔记本 ASB 中 1962 年 6 月 20 日的条目。
26. Most important Fairchild First: Leadwire, Oct. 1961. Noyce’s notes on microcircuits: Noyce’s 1961 and 1962 notebooks. In roughly February or March of that year, he has noted on his to-do list: “Cease and desist to Signetics, Amelco.” Find evidence of Signetics infringement: 20 June 1962 entry in Noyce’s 1961 notebook, ASB.
27. 影响小于 10%：“微电子技术的影响”。
27. Less than 10 percent effect: “The Impact of Microelectronics.”
28. 集成电路的宣传优势：“来自仙童：多种器件的两种方法”（广告），《电子新闻》 ，1961 年 5 月 8 日。该公司在其技术演示中宣传了类似的特性。
28. Advertised integrated circuit benefits: “From Fairchild: Two Approaches to Multiple Devices” (advertisement), Electronic News, 8 May 1961. The company promoted similar qualities in its technical presentations.
29. 军方购买的集成电路百分比：Michael G. Borrus，《争夺控制权：美国在微电子领域的利益》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：Ballinger，1988 年）：159。有关 20 世纪 60 年代早期军方采购变化的更多信息，请参阅 Lecuyer，“硅谷的形成”，220-225。
29. Percent of integrated circuits bought by military: Michael G. Borrus, Competing for Control: America’s Stake in Microelectronics (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988): 159. For more on the changes in military purchasing in the early 1960s, see Lecuyer, “Making Silicon Valley,” 220–225.
30. 推销理念是一个工程问题：Noyce，“变化的世界：在 Bendix 微处理器会议上发表的主题演讲”，1977 年 10 月 26 日：1，IA。客户的技术成熟度：Freund，“竞争与创新”，30；E. Floyd Kvamme，“硅谷生活：该地区发展的第一手观察”，载于《硅谷优势：创新和创业的栖息地》，Chong-Moon Lee、William F. Miller、Marguerite Gong Hancock 和 Henry S. Rowen 编辑（斯坦福，加利福尼亚州：斯坦福大学出版社，2000 年）。
30. Selling ideas is engineering problem: Noyce, “A Changing World: Keynote Speech Delivered Before Bendix Microprocessor Conference,” 26 Oct. 1977: 1, IA. Technical sophistication of customers: Freund, “Competition and Innovation,” 30; E. Floyd Kvamme, “Life in Silicon Valley: A First-Hand View of the Region’s Growth,” in The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation and Entrepreneurship, ed. Chong-Moon Lee, William F. Miller, Marguerite Gong Hancock, and Henry S. Rowen (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 2000).
31. 以低于设备成本的价格出售：尚不清楚此次成本削减的具体月份是三月还是五月。参见Philip Siekman，“在电子领域，微型芯片至关重要”，第122页；“微型芯片带来巨大回报；集成电路找到更多商业应用”，《商业周刊》1965年4月17日：第85-88页。另见“集成电路价格接近1美元以下”，转载于《电子新闻》 25周年纪念特刊，第二部分，1982年1月25日。76. Bob鲜为人知的贡献：Moore在“微电子学的宏观视角：英特尔的Gordon E. Moore”，《IEEE设计与测试》 （1984年11月），第17页中被引用。此次价格暴跌虽然令人惊讶，但并非史无前例。Fairchild在前一年也对其硅晶体管采取了类似的措施。诺伊斯笑了：罗斯特基，《改变世界的三十年》，64。
31. Sell for less than cost of device: it is unclear whether the precise month in which the cost cutting occurred was March or May. Philip Siekman, “In Electronics, the Big Stakes Rides on Tiny Chips,” 122; “Tiny Chip Brings a Big Payoff; Integrated Circuits Find More Commercial Applications,” Business Week 17 April 1965: 85–88. See also, “Below $1 integrated circuit Price Nears,” reprinted in Electronic News 25th Anniversary Issue, Section 2, 25 Jan. 1982. 76. Bob’s unheralded contribution: Moore quoted in “A Macro View of Microelectronics: Gordon E. Moore of Intel,” IEEE Design and Test (Nov., 1984), 17. The price slashing, while surprising, was not unprecedented. Fairchild had done something similar with its silicon transistors the year before. Noyce smiled: Rostky, “Thirty Years That Made A Difference,” 64.
32. 低价致富：仙童半导体公司近期的发展历程或许让诺伊斯对成功充满信心。例如，1959年至1962年间，仙童半导体公司低通高频晶体管的产量增长了660倍，而成本仅增长了5倍。晶体管成本下降了90%，与此同时，收入增长了10倍，利润增长了3倍。弗罗因德，《竞争与创新》，表11，70。遇到问题时，降低价格：戈登·摩尔在1990年6月18日英特尔公司为诺伊斯举行的追悼会上发表讲话。
32. Profit on low prices: Events in Fairchild’s recent history may well have given Noyce reason to be optimistic about his chances of success. Between 1959 and 1962, for example, Fairchild’s production of its LPHF transistor line increased 660-fold, with costs only quintupling. The cost of the transistor fell by 90 percent, while at the same time, revenue grew ten-fold and profits tripled. Freund, “Competition and Innovation,” Table XI, 70. When there’s a problem, lower the price: Gordon Moore speaking at the Intel memorial service for Noyce, 18 June 1990.
33. 书籍印刷类比：诺伊斯，《改变世界的机器》；比尔·福特的信，载于《罗伯特·诺伊斯，特别致敬》，《圣何塞水星报》 ，1990 年 6 月 17 日。
33. Book-printing analogy: Noyce, “Machine that Changed the World”; letter from Bill Ford in “Robert Noyce, Special Tribute,” San Jose Mercury News, 17 June 1990.
34. 我怀疑诺伊斯：“摩尔博士，录音带 2，1994 年 6 月 8 日。”价格已经开始下降：1963 年至 1964 年间，集成电路的平均价格下降了 41%。布劳恩和麦克唐纳，《微型革命》，第 98 页。价格下降但利润翻了三倍：弗罗因德，《竞争与创新》，第 70 页。
34. I doubt if Noyce: “Dr. Moore, Tape 2, 6/8/94.” Prices already falling: The average price of an integrated circuit fell 41 percent between 1963 and 1964. Braun and Macdonald, Revolution in Miniature, 98. Prices fell but profits tripled: Freund, “Competition and Innovation,” 70.
35. Fairchild 占据榜首：Philip Siekman，“电子行业，关键在于微型芯片”，第 122 页。1966年销售数据：Bob Tamarkin，“微型电路的大世界”，《芝加哥每日新闻》，1966 年 11 月 3 日。Lecuyer 指出商业市场爆炸式增长的原因有几个，包括早期计算机行业的增长，以及美国联邦通信委员会 (FCC) 要求所有电视监视器都能接收超高频 (UHF) 信号的决定。Lecuyer，“硅谷的崛起”，第 226-229 页。
35. Fairchild in top position: Philip Siekman, “In Electronics, the Big Stakes Ride on Tiny Chips,” 122. 1966 sales figures: Bob Tamarkin, “Tiny Circuitry’s Big World,” Chicago Daily News, 3 Nov. 1966. Lecuyer points to several reasons for this explosive growth in the commercial market, including growth in the early computer industry, as well as the FCC’s decision to require all television monitors to be able to receive UHF signals. Lecuyer, “Making Silicon Valley,” 226–229.
36. 单一订单：该订单很可能是给罗兰系统公司的。“仙童半导体公司获得斯佩里订单”，《电子新闻》，1965年4月5日。1966年巴勒斯订单： 《导线》 ，1966年12月。集成电路的应用：“集成电路简报”；“工程师关注集成消费产品”，《电视文摘》，1964年3月30日，第7-8页；迈克尔·F·沃尔夫，“集成电路何时走向民用？猜测：1965年”，《电子学》，1963年5月10日，第20-24页。
36. A single order: The order was probably for Loran Systems. “Fairchild Semicon Gets Sperry Order,” Electronic News, 5 April 1965. 1966 Burroughs order: Leadwire, Dec. 1966. Uses for integrated circuits: “A Briefing on Integrated Circuits”; “Engineers Eye Integrated Consumer Products,” Television Digest, 30 March 1964, 7–8; Michael F. Wolff, “When Will Integrated Circuits Go Civilian? Good Guess: 1965,” Electronics, 10 May 1963, 20–24.
37. IBM System/360 的成本：Campbell-Kelly 和 Aspray，《计算机》，140。唯一需要的计算机：Don Palfreman 和 Doron Swade，《梦想机器：探索计算机时代》（伦敦：BBC 图书，1993 年），78-80。有关 IBM System/360 系列的当代描述，请参阅国际商业机器公司，《IBM 数据处理系统简介》（纽约州白原市：1969 年）。电子女工星期五：玛莎·史密斯·帕克斯，《20 世纪 70 年代的微电子学》（罗克韦尔国际公司：1974 年），第 59 页。95 % 的银行：帕尔弗雷曼和斯韦德，《梦想机器》，第 78 页。
37. Cost of IBM System/360: Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, Computer, 140. Only computers anyone would need: Don Palfreman and Doron Swade, The Dream Machine: Exploring the Computer Age (London: BBC Books, 1993), 78–80. For a contemporary description of the IBM System/360 series, see International Business Machines, Introduction to IBM Data Processing Systems (White Plains, N.Y.: 1969). Electronic Girl Fridays: Martha Smith Parks, Microelectronics in the 1970s (Rockwell International Corporation: 1974), 59. 95 percent of banks: Palfreman and Swade, Dream Machine, 78.
38. 1966 年，小型计算机数量为 3,600 台：Campbell-Kelly 和 Aspray，《计算机》，第 229 页。
38. In 1966, 3,600 minicomputers: Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, Computer, 229.
39. 重要和必要的贡献：“奖章日”，《富兰克林研究所新闻》，1966 年 10 月。革命的全部范围：富兰克林研究所第 3467 号报告，调查德克萨斯州达拉斯的杰克·S·基尔比和加利福尼亚州洛斯阿尔托斯的罗伯特·N·诺伊斯的工作[1966 年 6 月 15 日发布]，IA。
39. Significant and essential contributions: “Medal Days,” The [Franklin] Institute News, Oct. 1966. Full extent of revolution: Report No. 3467 of the Franklin Institute, Investigating the Work of Jack S. Kilby, of Dallas, Texas, and Robert N. Noyce, of Los Altos, California [issued 15 June 1966], IA.
40. 没有巨大的灯泡：沃尔夫，《集成电路的起源》，51。
40. No huge lightbulb: Wolff, “Genesis of the Integrated Circuit,” 51.
41. 相机与仪器公司股价：《是什么让一家高飞公司以最高速度起飞》，《商业周刊》，1965年10月30日，第118-122页；《交易所称FC&I Pacer》，《电子新闻》 ，1966年2月7日。IBM交叉许可协议：《Leadwire》，1965年12月；《仙童相机公司与IBM达成交叉协议》，《电子新闻》 ，1965年9月29日；诺伊斯的笔记在其1965年日记本中，3月16日条目，ASB。销售人员受到鼓舞：罗伯特·格雷厄姆，查理·斯波克采访。
41. Camera and Instrument share price: “What Made a High Flier Take Off at Top Speed,” Business Week, 30 Oct. 1965, 118–22; “Exchange Calls FC&I Pacer,” Electronic News, 7 Feb. 1966. IBM cross licensing deal: Leadwire, Dec. 1965; “Fairchild Camera, IBM in Cross Deal,” Electronic News, 29 Sept. 1965; Noyce’s notes are in his 1965 datebook, 16 March entry, ASB. Salesmen were encouraged: Robert Graham, interview by Charlie Sporck.
42. 骑快马：保罗·霍斯金斯基，作者采访。
42. Riding a fast horse: Paul Hwoschinsky, interview by author.
43. 五十万件：费尔柴尔德相机和仪器公司1965 年年度报告。
43. Quantities of half million: Fairchild Camera and Instrument Annual Report 1965.
44. Fairchild 报告结构：Charlie Sporck，作者采访，2000 年 12 月 28 日。
44. Fairchild reporting structure: Charlie Sporck, interview by author, 28 Dec. 2000.
45. 诺伊斯将时间分配在：1965 年日记。
45. Noyce split his time: 1965 datebook.
46. 花两个小时：摩尔在林德格伦的《双头怪兽》中引用。鲍勃在派对上：贝蒂·诺伊斯对比尔·诺伊斯说，1963 年 7 月 22 日。
46. Spend two hours: Moore quoted in Lindgren, “Two-Headed Monster.” Bob at party: Betty Noyce to Bill Noyce, 22 July 1963.
47. 汤姆·斯威夫特的粉丝：贝蒂·诺伊斯致比尔·诺伊斯，1963年7月22日。袜子木偶：菲利斯·凯弗维尔，作者采访。1972年，贝蒂·诺伊斯以笔名EN Barry，创作了略带虚构色彩的袜子奇遇记《袜子玩偶》（Sock-Dol-O-Gy）。
47. Tom Swifties: Betty Noyce to Bill Noyce, 22 July 1963. Sock puppets: Phyllis Kefauver, interview by author. In 1972, Betty Noyce wrote a slightly fictionalized account of the sock escapade, “Sock-Dol-O-Gy” under the pen name E. N. Barry.
48. 帮助查理·斯波克：查理·斯波克，作者访谈。带比利去调音：吉姆·安吉尔，作者访谈。安排周末会议：诺伊斯，1962年日程表。太浩湖畔的小屋：鲍勃和菲利斯·怀特，作者访谈；鲍勃和菲利斯·凯弗，作者访谈。无数次：佩妮·诺伊斯在SEMATECH鲍勃·诺伊斯追悼会上的讲话。
48. Helped Charlie Sporck: Charlie Sporck, interview by author. Took Billy to tune: Jim Angell, interview by author. Scheduled weekend meetings: Noyce, 1962 datebook. Cottage at Lake Tahoe: Bob and Phyllis White, interview by author; Bob and Phyllis Kefauver, interview by author. A thousand times: Penny Noyce, speaking at the SEMATECH memorial service for Bob Noyce.
49. 放松地做某事：比尔·诺伊斯，作者采访。
49. Relaxing to work on something: Bill Noyce, interview by author.
50. 担心她会造成伤害：一位要求匿名的家庭朋友的采访。诺伊斯的几个孩子证实了他们母亲的育儿方式。跳伞运动员的故事：佩妮·诺伊斯在英特尔为她父亲举行的追悼会上发表讲话。
50. Worried she was damaging: interview with family friend requesting anonymity. Several of Noyce’s children confirmed their mother’s childrearing tactics. Story of the skydiver: Penny Noyce speaking at the Intel memorial service for her father.
51. 他想要孩子：波莉·诺伊斯，作者采访。
51. He wanted children: Polly Noyce, interview by author.
52. 不想要男人：肖克利笔记本，标记为“1955 年 11 月 25 日至 12 月 5 日的旅行”，肖克利文稿，95-153，SSC。理想妻子的描述：“高管妻子”，《电子新闻》，1966 年 6 月 6 日。
52. Did not want a man: Shockley notebook marked “Trip 25 Nov to 5 Dec 1955,” Shockley papers, 95–153, SSC. Description of ideal wife: “Executive Wives,” Electronic News, 6 June 1966.
53. 我恐怕疏忽了：贝蒂·诺伊斯引自《墨尔本太阳报》（澳大利亚），1966 年 5 月 12 日。由波莉·诺伊斯提供。
53. I fear I neglect: Betty Noyce quoted in Melbourne [Australia]Sun, 12 May 1966. Courtesy Polly Noyce.
54. 用餐时间不应过长：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者访谈。为什么？理查德·霍奇森，作者访谈。
54. Meals should not take longer: Penny Noyce, interview by author. Why is it: Richard Hodgson, interview by author.
55. 想念美丽的年轻女孩们：Leadwire，1959 年 11 月。
55. Miss the beautiful young girls: Leadwire, Nov. 1959.
56. 对自己的家人来说，你是个陌生人，你什么都不是：尼洛·林格伦，《双头怪兽》。
56. Stranger to his own family, you’re nothing: Nilo Lindgren, “Two-Headed Monster.”
57. 重组：查理·斯波克，作者采访，2000 年 12 月 28 日。
57. Reorganization: Charlie Sporck, interview by author, 28 Dec. 2000.
58. 履行三分之一的承诺：Hoefler，“FC&I 集成电路利润下滑”，《电子新闻》，1966 年 11 月 21 日。从未生产的器件：Don Hoefler，“FC&I 集成电路利润下滑”；Walter Matthews，“仙童公司开启地域扩张”，《电子新闻》，1965 年 7 月 19 日。研发的首批零件：Roger Borovoy，作者采访，1999 年 1 月 27 日。
58. Meeting one-third of commitments: Hoefler, “FC&I Profit Dip on integrated circuits,” Electronic News, 21 Nov. 1966. Devices never manufactured: Don Hoefler, “FC&I Profit Dip on integrated circuits”; Walter Matthews, “Geographic Expansion Set by Fairchild,” Electronic News, 19 July 1965. First parts from R&D: Roger Borovoy, interview by author, 27 Jan. 1999.
59. 如果我能买到这本书就好了：“是什么让一架高飞飞机以最高速度起飞。”
59. If I could just buy: “What Made a High Flier Take Off at Top Speed.”
60. 费尔柴尔德 71：费尔柴尔德相机与仪器公司1966年年度报告。部门盈利能力更强：罗伯特·诺伊斯致谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德，1968年6月25日。相机与仪器公司没有按部门细分收益，但《时代》杂志估计半导体部门贡献了母公司98%的利润。“强大的微型设备”，《时代》杂志，1965年3月4日，第93-94页。诺伊斯并非董事：费尔柴尔德相机与仪器公司1966年年度报告。
60. FAIRCHILD 71: Fairchild Camera and Instrument Annual Report 1966. Division more profitable: Robert Noyce to Sherman Fairchild, 25 June 1968. Camera and Instrument did not break down earnings by division, but Time estimated that Semiconductor was responsible for 98 percent of the parent company’s profits. “Mighty Miniatures,” Time, 4 March 1965, 93–94. Noyce not director: Fairchild Camera and Instrument Annual Report 1966.
61. 斯波克等人致信美国国家半导体公司：“美国国家半导体公司高层人事变动及重组”，《电子新闻》，1967年3月6日。与斯波克一同离职或随后不久加入他团队的人员包括：集成电路市场经理弗洛伊德·克瓦姆、集成电路生产经理皮埃尔·拉蒙德、集成电路制造经理罗杰·斯穆勒、微电路海外运营经理弗雷德·比亚莱克以及市场总监唐·瓦伦丁。 （作者采访查理·斯波克，内容为“抛弃，我为什么不这么做？ ”）
61. Sporck and others to National: “Nat’l Semiconductor Moving, Realigning Top Management,” Electronic News, 6 March 1967. Among those who left with Sporck, or shortly thereafter to join him, were Floyd Kvamme, marketing manager for integrated circuits, Pierre Lamond, integrated circuit production manager; Roger Smuller, manufacturing manager for integrated circuits; Fred Bialek, overseas operations manager for microcircuits; and Don Valentine, director of marketing. Throwing away, why don’t I do that: Charlie Sporck, interview by author.
62. 我几乎哭了：诺伊斯在马龙的《大得分》第108页中引用。技术报告：所有者要求匿名。
62. I essentially cried: Noyce quoted in Malone, Big Score, 108. Technical reports: owner requested anonymity.
63. 公司一团糟：戈登·摩尔，作者于 2004 年 7 月 2 日采访。
63. Company was a mess: Gordon Moore, interview by author, 2 July 2004.
64. 我们的计划奏效了：布伦达·博罗沃伊于 1998 年 5 月 11 日致作者的信。
64. Our scheme had worked: Communication from Brenda Borovoy to the author, 11 May 1998.
65. 感觉事情正在分崩离析：罗伯特·诺伊斯，《改变世界的机器》。
65. Felt things were falling apart: Robert Noyce, “Machine that Changed the World.”
66. 行政细节：Noyce 1961、1962、1965 年的笔记本，全部为 ASB。尝试将东海岸的情况弄出来：Noyce 1962 年的笔记本，大约在 1963 年 1 月 2 日的条目。
66. Administrative details: Noyce notebooks for 1961, 1962, 1965, all ASB. Try to get East Coast out: Noyce 1962 notebook, entry around 2 Jan. 1963.
67. 去实验室：“父母与孩子”，电子学（1968 年 7 月 8 日）：54。长大后：“将科学变成产业”，IEEE Spectrum，1966 年 1 月，101。
67. Going to the lab: “Parent and Child,” Electronics (8 July 1968): 54. After growing up: “Turning a Science into an Industry,” IEEE Spectrum, Jan. 1966, 101.
68. 股票期权的普及化：该数据已考虑了1967年进行的三比二股票分割。新增股份源于授予的215,525份新期权——即使考虑到股票分割，这一数字也比上一年的73,400份和1965年的5,300份大幅增长。费尔柴尔德相机和仪器公司1965、1966、1967年度报告。股票期权详情：FCI股票期权委员会会议记录，1967年3月1日、1967年3月16日、1967年5月18日、1967年9月21日，匿名。
68. Democratization of stock options: This figure takes into account a three-for-two stock split during 1967. The additional shares followed on the granting of 215,525 new options—an enormous increase (even taking into account the stock split) over the previous year’s 73,400, and the 1965 grant of 5,300. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Annual Report 1965, 1966, 1967. Stock option details: Minutes of the FCI Stock Option Committee, 1 March 1967, 16 March 1967, 18 May 1967, 21 Sept. 1967, Anon.
69. 35 人加入了 Sporck，每家半导体公司：“仙童赢得的战斗”，100。
69. 35 people joined Sporck, every semiconductor company: “The Fight That Fairchild Won,” 100.
70. 困难克服：《沿海公司解除产量瓶颈》，《电子新闻》，1967年3月20日。需求下降：《付出代价》，《福布斯》 ，1967年11月15日；《FC&I 负责人辞职；盈利暴跌》，《电子新闻》，1967年10月27日。费尔柴尔德公司报告亏损：唐·霍夫勒，《FC&I，山景城，喘口气》，《电子新闻》 ，1967年10月30日。
70. Difficulties overcome: “Coast Firm Unplugs Jam in Output,” Electronic News, 20 March 1967. Drop in demand: “Paying the Piper,” Forbes, 15 Nov. 1967; “FC&I Head Resigns; Earnings Plummet,” Electronic News, 27 Oct. 1967. Fairchild reported losses: Don Hoefler, “FC&I, Mountain View, Breathes Easier,” Electronic News, 30 Oct. 1967.
71. 第三季度业绩：“付出代价”；“卡特辞职；收益暴跌”，《电子新闻》，1967 年 10 月 23 日。股价下跌：阿尔弗雷德·D·库克，“谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德的 7 月 4 日惨败”，《电子新闻》，1968 年 7 月 8 日。
71. Third-quarter performance: “Paying the Piper”; “Carter Resigns; Earnings Plummet,” Electronic News, 23 Oct. 1967. Stock price slid: Alfred D. Cook, “Sherman Fairchild’s July 4th Fizzles,” Electronic News, 8 July 1968.
72. 卡特离职，霍奇森上任：当其他董事希望剥离亏损业务时，卡特试图拉拢一小群董事捍卫他的收购策略。卡特的努力失败后，他在被解雇前辞职。FCI董事会会议记录。弑君：诺伊斯引自唐·C·霍夫勒，《傲慢的船长》，《加州今日报》 ，1981年6月28日，第42页。
72. Carter out, Hodgson in: Carter attempted to rally a small group of directors to defend his acquisitions strategy when the rest of the board wanted to divest themselves of the losing operations. When Carter’s rally failed, he quit before he could be fired. FCI board minutes. When you kill the king: Noyce quoted in Don C. Hoefler, “Captains Outrageous,” California Today, 28 June 1981, 42.
73. 亏损 770 万美元：费尔柴尔德相机和仪器公司1967 年年度报告。该报告指出，“半导体部门的销售额占公司总销售额的一半以上。” 将所有亏损汇总：库克，《谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德的七月四日计划失败》，第 1 页。
73. $7.7 million loss: Fairchild Camera and Instrument Annual Report 1967. The report notes that “the Semiconductor Division accounts for well over half of the Corporation’s sales.” Group all losses: Cook, “Sherman Fairchild’s July 4th Fizzles,” 1.
74. 我正在考虑离开费尔柴尔德：戈登·摩尔，作者采访，2004 年 7 月 2 日。
74. I’m thinking of leaving Fairchild: Gordon Moore, interview by author, 2 July 2004.
75. 小型计算机的数量：坎贝尔-凯利和阿斯普雷，《计算机》 ，第229页。仙童公司占据了80%的市场份额：勒库耶，《硅谷的崛起》，第22页。仙童公司本身：戈登·摩尔，作者访谈。IBM一直在进行相关研究：巴塞特，《新技术》，第332页。
75. Number of minicomputers: Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, Computer, 229. Fairchild held 80 percent: Lecuyer, “Making Silicon Valley,” 22. Fairchild itself: Gordon Moore, interview by author. IBM had been researching: Basset, “New Technology,” 332.
76. 人人期待：《电子新闻》，1968年5月27日；查理·斯波克（Charlie Sporck）访谈（作者）；戈登·摩尔（Gordon Moore）访谈（作者）；罗杰·博罗沃伊（Roger Borovoy）访谈（作者）。未来总统候选人：罗伯特·诺伊斯致谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德，1968年6月25日，匿名。有点恼火：戈登·摩尔（Gordon Moore）访谈（SSC），罗伯·沃克（Rob Walker）。尾巴摇狗：“半导体才是公司，”诺伊斯说，“但他们（相机和仪器部门）坚持把它当作另一个部门来对待。”唐·霍夫勒，《诺伊斯博士乐于做他该做的事》，《电子新闻》，1968年10月28日。
76. Everyone expected: Electronic News, 27 May 1968; Charlie Sporck, interview by author; Gordon Moore, interview by author; Roger Borovoy, interview by author. Presidential material someday: Robert Noyce to Sherman Fairchild, 25 June 1968, Anon. Kind of ticked off: Gordon Moore, interview by Rob Walker, SSC. Tail wagging the corporate dog: “Semiconductor was the company,” Noyce said, “but they [Camera and Instrument] insisted on treating it as just another division.” Don Hoefler, “Dr. Noyce Happy Doing His Thing,” Electronic News, 28 Oct. 1968.
77. 诺伊斯口头辞职：“费尔柴尔德赢得的战斗”，112。这一说法得到了“音乐椅”一文中细节的支持，该文发表于1968年7月19日的《电子》杂志。诺伊斯与霍根的谈判：C.莱斯特·霍根，罗布·沃克采访，SSC。
77. Noyce verbally resigned: “The Fight That Fairchild Won,” 112. This version of events is supported by details in “Musical Chairs,” Electronics, 19 July 1968. Noyce’s negotiations with Hogan: C. Lester Hogan, interview by Rob Walker, SSC.
78. 霍根：“电子行业的最新动态”，《商业周刊》，1969年10月4日；马龙， 《大获全胜》 ，第124页。几乎带走了所有经理：唯一的例外是市场营销副总裁汤姆·康纳斯。两年内，大约60名前摩托罗拉员工搭上了被一位戏称的“摩托罗拉到仙童快车”前往加利福尼亚。总部迁址：“仙童相机正式将总部设在加利福尼亚”，《电子新闻》，1968年9月30日。我不会去：莱斯特·霍根，罗伯·沃克采访，1995年8月22日，SSC。
78. The Hogan: “Where the Action is in Electronics,” Business Week, 4 Oct. 1969; Malone, Big Score, 124. Brought every manager: The one exception was marketing VP Tom Connors. In two years, some 60 former Motorola employees caught what one wag called “the Motorola-to-Fairchild Express” to California. Move headquarters: “Fairchild Camera Formalizes Base Location to California,” Electronic News, 30 Sept. 1968. I wouldn’t have gone: Lester Hogan, interview by Rob Walker, 22 Aug. 1995, SSC.
79. 随着公司的发展，人口翻了一番：罗伯特·诺伊斯致谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德，1968 年 6 月 25 日。
79. As the company has grown, twice the population: Robert Noyce to Sherman Fairchild, 25 June 1968.
80. 本段中的所有引文：罗伯特·诺伊斯致谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德，1968 年 6 月 25 日。
80. All quotes in this paragraph: Robert Noyce to Sherman Fairchild, 25 June 1968.
81. 本段中的所有引文：罗伯特·诺伊斯致谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德，1968 年 6 月 25 日。
81. All quotes in this paragraph: Robert Noyce to Sherman Fairchild, 25 June 1968.
82. 鲍勃确实认真思考过：摩尔引自鲍勃·里斯泰尔休伯（Bob Ristleheuber）[原文如此]，《诺伊斯回忆录：不同寻常的想法，不同寻常的方法》，《电子新闻》，1990年6月11日，第4页。对太多人太好：哈里·塞洛，作者采访。你可以让他答应：查理·斯波克，作者采访。
82. Bob really thought: Moore quoted in Bob Ristleheuber [sic], “Noyce Remembered: Unusual Ideas, Unusual Approaches,” Electronic News, 11 June 1990, 4. Too nice to too many people: Harry Sello, interview by author. You could get him to say yes: Charlie Sporck, interview by author.
83. 培养的是企业家，而不是产品：小阿尔弗雷德·D·钱德勒，《信息时代的历史视角》，阿尔弗雷德·D·钱德勒导言，小詹姆斯·W·科尔塔达和詹姆斯·W·科尔塔达编，《信息改变国家：信息如何塑造美国从殖民时代到今天》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，2000年）：31。在诺伊斯卸任仙童公司总裁一职时，一位记者写道，该公司“似乎致力于为技术而技术……在仙童公司，似乎没有哪个工程师愿意从事生产工作。”（埃里克森，《霍根如何拯救仙童公司》，22。）
83. Produced entrepreneurs, not products: Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., “The Information Age in Historical Perspective,” introduction to Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and James W. Cortada, eds., A Nation Transformed by Information: How Information Has Shaped the United States from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000): 31. By the end of Noyce’s tenure at Fairchild, one reporter could write that the company “seemed dedicated to technology for its own sake. … At Fairchild, it almost seemed that no engineer wanted to be in production.” (Erickson, “How Hogan Rescued Fairchild,” 22.)
84. 放弃又重新尝试：Noyce 引自 McIlheny，“不满是事业的动力”，1976 年 12 月 15 日。我学到的一件事：Robert Noyce，Mary Burt Baldwin 采访，文字记录，IA。
84. Gave up and tried again: Noyce quoted in McIlheny, “Dissatisfaction as a Spur to Career,” 15 Dec. 1976. One thing I learned: Robert Noyce, interview by Mary Burt Baldwin, transcript, IA.
第七章：创业
Chapter 7: Startup
1. 关于谣言：1968 年 7 月的《电子新闻》。该行业已经吞噬：1968 年 10 月 3 日《电子新闻》上的广告。
1. On rumors: Electronic News throughout July 1968. The industry has devoured: Advertisement in Electronic News, 3 Oct. 1968.
2. 鲍勃的日子不好过：贝蒂·诺伊斯在哈丽特·诺伊斯写给鲍勃·诺伊斯的信中说道，日期不详（但显然是1968年夏天），IA。把诺伊斯从床上吓醒：诺伊斯在比尔·戴维多、尤金·弗拉斯和罗伯特·诺伊斯的口述历史中说道，1983年8月13日，IA（以下简称戴维多、弗拉斯和诺伊斯口述历史）。经济上支持你：多特（诺伊斯的助手）写给诺伊斯，1968年7月1日，ASB。
2. Bob is having a harrowing time: Betty Noyce quoted in Harriet Noyce to Bob Noyce, undated (but clearly summer, 1968), IA. Startled Noyce out of bed: Noyce in Bill Davidow, Eugene Flath, and Robert Noyce, Oral History, 13 Aug. 1983, IA (henceforth Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history). Back you financially: Dot [Noyce’s assistant] to Noyce, 1 July 1968, ASB.
3. 诺伊斯几乎什么也没做：例如，参见霍夫勒，《诺伊斯博士乐于做他该做的事》，《电子新闻》，1968 年 10 月 28 日。不断推出越来越多的纸张：《辞职潮席卷费尔柴尔德》，《圣何塞水星报》，1968 年 7 月 4 日。当被问及原因时：库克，《谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德的七月四日计划失败》，《电子新闻》 。
3. Noyce did little: See, for example, Hoefler, “Dr. Noyce Happy Doing His Thing,” Electronic News, 28 Oct. 1968. Pushing more and more paper: “Resignations Shake Up Fairchild,” San Jose Mercury, 4 July 1968. When asked why: Cook, “Sherman Fairchild’s July 4th Fizzles,” Electronic News.
4. 几乎无人察觉：1994 年 6 月 29 日对 Gordon Moore 博士的采访，爱荷华州。不会有任何麻烦：Noyce 在 Davidow、Flath 和 Noyce 的口述历史中，爱荷华州。是时候了：Arthur Rock 在计算机历史博物馆风险投资小组上的讲话，2002 年 9 月 30 日。
4. Practically unobserved: Interview with Dr. Gordon Moore, 6/29/94, IA. Wouldn’t have any trouble: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history, IA. It’s about time: Arthur Rock speaking at Computer History Museum’s venture capital panel, 30 Sept. 2002.
5. 周末花时间粉刷窗户：鲍勃·怀特，作者采访。
5. Weekends spent painting the windows: Bob White, interview by author.
6. 为鱼而做：保罗·霍斯金斯基，作者采访。
6. Does it for the fish: Paul Hwoschinsky, interview by author.
7. 无论你计划做什么：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。人力资源经理：莱斯·瓦达兹，埃文·拉姆斯塔德采访。
7. Whatever you’re planning to do: Andy Grove, interview by author. Human resources manager: Les Vadasz, interview by Evan Ramstad.
8. 不但不拉近人与人之间的距离：诺伊斯在《电子新闻》 1968 年 6 月 10 日刊登的《行业领袖齐聚肯尼迪致敬》一文中被引用。关于肯尼迪遇刺：鲍勃·格雷厄姆接受查理·斯波克采访。
8. Instead of drawing the people closer together: Noyce quoted in “Industry Leaders Join in Kennedy Tributes,” Electronic News, 10 June 1968. On Kennedy assassination: Bob Graham, interview by Charlie Sporck.
9. 让人们互相切磋，不要争吵：安迪·格鲁夫，作者访谈。关于格鲁夫的生平：安迪·格鲁夫，《横渡：回忆录》（纽约：华纳图书公司，2002年）。班级第一名毕业：尼洛·林德格伦，《打造理性双头怪兽：罗伯特·诺伊斯和戈登·摩尔的管理风格》，《创新》 （未注明日期，但显然是1970年）。
9. Let people bite into each other, did not argue: Andy Grove, interview by author. On Grove’s life: Andy Grove, Swimming Across: A Memoir, (New York: Warner Books, 2002). Graduated first in his class: Nilo Lindgren, “Building a Rational Two-Headed Monster: The Management Style of Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore,” Innovation (no date, but clearly 1970).
10. 我们不在乎：比尔·诺伊斯，作者访谈。非常舒适：“与戈登·摩尔博士的访谈”，1994年6月29日，《爱荷华州》。降薪：罗伯特·诺伊斯，“创新：除了恐惧别无所惧”[他在麻省理工学院创新管理研讨会上的演讲摘要]，《技术评论》，1977年2月。
10. We don’t care: Bill Noyce, interview by author. It’s very comfortable: “Interview with Dr. Gordon Moore,” 29 June 1994, IA. Pay cut: Robert Noyce, “Innovation: Nothing to Fear but Fear” [summary of his presentation at the MIT symposium on the management of innovation], Technology Review, Feb. 1977.
11. 占相当大的比例：亚瑟·洛克，作者采访。集中持有费尔柴尔德股票：诺伊斯对谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德说。
11. Represented a sizable portion: Arthur Rock, interview by author. Concentrated in Fairchild stock: Noyce to Sherman Fairchild.
12. 启动费用明细：“拟议收益用途”，IA。诺伊斯无法抗拒：盖洛德·诺伊斯，作者采访。
12. Breakdown of startup expenses: “Proposed Use of Proceeds,” IA. Noyce could not resist: Gaylord Noyce, interview by author.
13. 硅供应商报告：“硅的使用给供应商带来压力；交货期延长至 4 个月”，《电子新闻》，1969 年 8 月 4 日。
13. Silicon suppliers reported: “Silicon Usage Pushes Suppliers; Deliveries Stretch to 4 Months,” Electronic News, 4 Aug. 1969.
14. 漫画：“电子行业的精彩之处”，《商业周刊》，1969年10月4日，第86-87页。仔细观察这幅漫画，你会发现，画面中的人正透过显微镜观察集成电路的内部运作。显微镜并没有放大晶体管和其他电路元件，而是展现了这个纷繁复杂的世界。
14. Cartoon: “Where the Action is in Electronics,” Business Week, 4 Oct. 1969, 86–87. A closer look at the cartoon reveals that this activity is actually being witnessed by a man peering through a microscope at the inner workings of an integrated circuit. Rather than magnifying a cluster of transistors and other circuit components, the microscope reveals this frenzied world.
15. 出席会议：唐·霍夫勒，“工程师们在商业小组会议上发表讲话”，《电子新闻》，1969 年 8 月 25 日；“韦斯康会议将重点关注初创企业的财务需求”，《电子新闻》，1969 年 8 月 18 日。
15. Attendance at a session: Don Hoefler, “Engineers Jam Business Panel,” Electronic News, 25 Aug. 1969; “Wescon Session to Spotlight Financial Needs of Start-Ups,” Electronic News, 18 Aug. 1969.
16. 摩尔定律：戈登·摩尔，“将更多元件塞进集成电路”，《电子学》，1965 年 4 月 19 日：114-117。摩尔自己的研发小组：里德，《芯片》，128。
16. Moore’s Law: Gordon Moore, “Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,” Electronics, 19 April 1965: 114–117. Already Moore’s own R&D group: Reid, The Chip, 128.
17. 诺伊斯预测：诺伊斯在《将科学变成产业》一文中被引用，IEEE Spectrum，1966 年 1 月，第 102 页。
17. Noyce predicted: Noyce quoted in “Turning a Science into an Industry,” IEEE Spectrum, Jan. 1966, 102.
18. 技术寻求应用：摩尔在摩尔、瓦达兹、帕克口述历史中。
18. Technology looking for applications: Moore in Moore, Vadasz, Parker oral history.
19. 我们一无所知：哈里特·诺伊斯致鲍勃·诺伊斯，未注明日期（但显然是 1968 年夏天），爱荷华州。
19. We have no idea: Harriet Noyce to Bob Noyce, undated (but clearly summer, 1968), IA.
20. 关于诺伊斯在英特尔成立之初的活动：诺伊斯 1968 年日记，ASB；诺伊斯致弗兰克·罗伯茨（律师），1968 年 7 月 20 日。
20. On Noyce’s activities at the start of Intel: Noyce 1968 datebook, ASB; Noyce to Frank Roberts [attorney], 20 July 1968.
21. Jay Last 的 Teledyne 租借了：“天线——好人永不言败”，《电子新闻》，1969 年 11 月 17 日。卡特的公司名为“香港卡特半导体公司”。1969 年，该公司从雷神公司获得了大约 1 亿个晶体管芯片。学校没有招到学生：诺伊斯，“改变世界的机器”，文字稿，IA。
21. Jay Last’s Teledyne rented: “Antenna—Can’t Keep a Good Man Down,” Electronic News, 17 Nov. 1969. Carter’s firm was called “Carter Semiconductor of Hong Kong.” It received somewhere around 100 million transistor dice in 1969 from Raytheon. Schools weren’t turning out: Noyce, “Machine that Changed the World,” transcript, IA.
22. 我们只会聘用完美的人：比尔·诺伊斯，作者采访。费尔柴尔德马戏团：诺伊斯 1968 年日记。
22. We are only going to hire perfect people: Bill Noyce, interview by author. Fairchild circus: Noyce 1968 datebook.
23. 东海岸的诺伊斯：丑闻，“两位创始人离开费尔柴尔德”。如同吹笛人：罗杰·博罗沃伊，作者采访。请附上说明：“每个针孔都很重要！”未注明日期的广告（但显然来自1968年），爱荷华州。
23. Noyce on East Coast: Scandling, “2 of Founders Leave Fairchild.” Like Pied Piper: Roger Borovoy, interview by author. Please drop a note with qualifications: “Every Pinhole Counts!” Undated advertisement (but obviously from 1968), IA.
24. 戈登和我离开了：吉姆·安吉尔，作者访谈。能否判断一个计算机程序是否有效：吉姆·安吉尔，作者访谈。
24. Gordon and I have left: Jim Angell, interview by author. Could tell whether a computer program: Jim Angell, interview by author.
25. 如果你身处学术界：Ted Hoff，作者采访。
25. If you’re in academia: Ted Hoff, interview by author.
26. Noyce-Hoff 访谈：作者对 Ted Hoff 的采访。
26. Noyce-Hoff interview: Ted Hoff, interview by author.
27. 接近先进技术：罗伯特·诺伊斯于 1968 年 6 月 25 日致谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德。没有人比他更了解这个行业，能够把英特尔卖给一家计算机公司：诺伊斯在 Davidow、Flath 和 Noyce 的口述历史中说道，IA。
27. Get close to advanced technology: Robert Noyce to Sherman Fairchild, 25 June 1968. No one knew the business better, could sell Intel to a computer company: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history, IA.
28. 做得相当不错，我觉得自己还很年轻：泰德·霍夫，作者采访。
28. Do quite well, I felt I was young: Ted Hoff, interview by author.
29. 会在附近闲逛：鲍勃·怀特，作者采访。
29. Would wander through the neighborhood: Bob White, interview by author.
30. 有点性感，四个名字已被占用：Noyce in Davidow、Flath 和 Noyce 口述历史。考虑中的名字：标题为“标题”的文件，IA。
30. Sort of sexy, four had been taken: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history. Names under consideration: paper headed “Titles,” IA.
31. 暗示其他事情：罗伯特·诺伊斯在戴维多夫、弗拉斯和诺伊斯口述历史中，IA。
31. Implied other things: Robert Noyce in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history, IA.
32. 人必须有杀手本能：引自 Rock 在《商业周刊》 1970 年 5 月 30 日发表的《拥有坚定直觉的风险投资家》一文中的话。最重要的是：引自 Noyce 在 Pete Carey 于 1978 年 2 月 19 日在《圣何塞水星报》发表的《风险投资家的英雄》一文中的话。
32. Man has to have killer instinct: Rock quoted in “Venture Capitalist with a Solid Intuition,” Business Week, 30 May 1970. The main thing is: Noyce quoted in Pete Carey, “The Hero of Venture Capitalists,” San Jose Mercury News, 19 Feb. 1978.
33. 关于英特尔债券的更多细节：债券期限为十年，年利率为6%（前三年免息），可按每股5美元的价格转换。“完全次于所有债务；一年内不可赎回；自第五年起设立偿债基金，用于偿还一半未偿债券；具有防止股票分割的反稀释保护……；对普通股股息支付有限制。”“英特尔公司2,500,000美元可转换债券”，第1-2页，IA。
33. More detail on the Intel debentures: they had a ten-year term, paid 6 percent interest (waived for three years), and were convertible at $5 per share. “Fully subordinated to all indebtedness; non-callable for one year; sinking fund beginning in the fifth year to retire one-half of the outstanding debentures; anti-dilution protection against stock splits …; negative restriction against payment of dividends on common stock.” “Intel Corp $2,500,000 Convertible Debentures,” 1–2, IA.
34. 计划用于为“英特尔公司 2,500,000 美元可转换债券”提供资金。该公司董事没有参与该计划。
34. Intended to fund: “Intel Corp $2,500,000 Convertible Debentures,” IA. Directors of the company did not participate in the plan.
35. 诺伊斯开始概述：杰罗姆·多尔蒂（律师）致诺伊斯，1968 年 7 月 18 日，爱荷华州。科学数据系统提供了选项：亚瑟·洛克，作者采访。
35. Noyce had begun outlining: Jerome Dougherty [attorney] to Noyce, 18 July 1968, IA. Scientific Data Systems had given options: Arthur Rock, interview by author.
36. 百万富翁太多了：Art Rock 致 Frank Roberts，1968 年 8 月 27 日，IA。
36. There are too many millionaires: Art Rock to Frank Roberts, 27 Aug. 1968, IA.
37. 每位符合条件的员工：Noyce 致股东，1969 年 4 月 25 日，IA。64,700股期权：英特尔公司资产负债表，1968 年 12 月 31 日，IA。
37. Every eligible employee: Noyce to shareholders, 25 April 1969, IA. Options on 64,700 shares: Intel Corporation Balance Sheet, 31 December 1968, IA.
38. 谨慎人规则：“谨慎人”规则极大地限制了养老基金投资高风险企业的能力。自1979年《雇员退休收入保障法》修订以来，养老基金被允许将高达10%的资产配置于高风险风险投资基金。参见Paul A. Gompers，《风险投资的兴衰》，《商业与经济史》，第23卷，第2期，1992年：1。另见Bygrave和Timons， 《十字路口的风险投资》（波士顿：哈佛商学院出版社，1992年）。提供财务援助：Charles J. Coronella致Noyce，1968年7月10日；Robert R. Barker致Noyce，1968年7月24日；John K. Koeneman致Noyce，1968年7月18日；Sterling Grumman致Noyce，1968年8月7日。埃尔莫·霍华德致诺伊斯，1968年7月25日；迪克·汉德致诺伊斯，1968年12月4日。以上均来自ASB。库克近期曾向诺伊斯和摩尔提供过投资机会：保罗·库克，作者访谈，1999年2月2日；戈登·摩尔，作者访谈。诺伊斯曾提议投资谢尔曼·费尔柴尔德：ASB投资者档案中的无标题页（显然是潜在投资者名单）。
38. Prudent man rule: The “prudent man” rule sharply limited pensions funds’ ability to invest in high-risk ventures. Beginning in 1979, with changes to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, pension funds were allowed to allocate up to 10 percent of assets in high-risk venture funds. Paul A. Gompers, “The Rise and Fall of Venture Capital,” Business and Economic History, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1992: 1. See also Bygrave and Timons, Venture Capital at the Crossroads (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992). Offers of financial assistance: Charles J. Coronella to Noyce, 10 July 1968; Robert R. Barker to Noyce, 24 July 1968; John K. Koeneman to Noyce, 18 July 1968; Sterling Grumman to Noyce, 7 Aug. 1968; Elmor Howard to Noyce, 25 July 1968; Dick Hand to Noyce, 4 Dec. 1968. All ASB. Cook had recently offered Noyce and Moore the opportunity: Paul Cook, interview by author, 2 Feb. 1999; Gordon Moore, interview by author. Noyce proposed Sherman Fairchild: untitled page (clearly a list of potential investors) in Investors file, ASB.
39. 希望这项投资能带来 1000 万美元的收益：乔·罗森菲尔德致萨姆·罗森塔尔、唐·威尔逊和沃伦·巴菲特，1973 年 4 月 17 日，沃伦·巴菲特提供。押注骑师：沃伦·巴菲特，作者访谈，2002 年 8 月 28 日。
39. Hoped the investment would generate $10 million: Joe Rosenfield to Sam Rosenthal, Don Wilson, and Warren Buffett, 17 April 1973, courtesy Warren Buffett. Betting on the jockey: Warren Buffett, interview by author, 28 Aug. 2002.
40. 商业计划书：“英特尔公司 2,500,000 美元可转换债券”，IA。不想让人们知道：诺伊斯在戴维多夫、弗拉斯和诺伊斯口述历史中，IA。
40. Business plan: “Intel Corp $2,500,000 Convertible Debentures,” IA. Didn’t want people to know: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history, IA.
41. 有点排好队：罗克在吉恩·拜林斯基的文章“英特尔如何赢得内存芯片的赌注”中被引用，《财富》杂志，1973 年 11 月，第 144 页。人们不得不回电话：亚瑟·罗克，作者采访。
41. Kind of lined up: Rock quoted in Gene Bylinsky, “How Intel Won Its Bet on Memory Chips,” Fortune, Nov. 1973, 144. People had to return calls: Arthur Rock, interview by author.
42. 贝蒂·摩尔接到了几个电话：“与戈登·摩尔博士的访谈，1994 年 6 月 29 日”，IA。非常失望：罗伯特·B·巴克致鲍勃·诺伊斯，1968 年 7 月 24 日。他告诉他们罗克负责：罗伯特·诺伊斯在戴维多夫、弗拉斯和诺伊斯口述历史中，IA。
42. Betty Moore received several calls: “Interview with Dr. Gordon Moore, 6/29/94,” IA. Keenly disappointed: Robert B. Barker to Bob Noyce, 24 July 1968. He told them Rock was in charge: Robert Noyce in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history, IA.
43. 英特尔可能是唯一一家这样的公司：Arthur Rock 引自 Udayan Gupta 编辑的《已完成的交易：风险投资家讲述他们的故事》（波士顿：哈佛商学院出版社，2000 年）。
43. Intel is probably the only company: Arthur Rock quoted in Udayan Gupta, ed., Done Deals: Venture Capitalists Tell Their Stories (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2000).
44. 公司倒闭：“电子行业倒闭数量降至历史最低水平”，《电子新闻》，1968 年 6 月 10 日。电子水瓶座时代：“固态电子行业的分裂”。
44. Failures of companies: “Electronics Industry Failures Fall to Lowest Level Ever,” Electronic News, 10 June 1968. Age of Electro-Aquarius: “The Splintering of the Solid-State Electronics Industry.”
45. 去年：“电子行业的风向标”，《商业周刊》，1969 年 10 月，第 86 页。市场完全饱和：杰克逊，《英特尔内幕》，第 47 页。
45. The last year: “Where the Action is in Electronics,” Business Week, Oct. 1969, 86. Market fully saturated: Jackson, Inside Intel, 47.
46. 参与扶贫战争：尼尔·凯利，“沿海公司积极参与扶贫斗争”，《电子新闻》，1968 年 7 月 22 日。陆军的计算机化设施：希瑟·M·戴维，“陆军开设防暴控制中心”，《电子新闻》 ，1969 年 7 月 14 日。
46. Participation in War on Poverty: Neil Kelly, “Coast Firms Eager in Poverty Fight,” Electronic News, 22 July 1968. Army’s computerized facility: Heather M. David, “Army Opens Riot Control Center,” Electronic News, 14 July 1969.
47. 知道英特尔会赔钱：“英特尔公司 2,500,000 美元可转换债券”，IA。更激进：戈登·摩尔，作者采访。
47. Knew Intel would lose money: “Intel Corp $2,500,000 Convertible Debentures,” IA. More aggressive: Gordon Moore, interview by author.
48. 8月初，诺伊斯离开：诺伊斯 1968 年日记，ASB缅因州房屋描述：作者访问。
48. In early August, Noyce left: Noyce 1968 datebook, ASB Description of Maine house: author’s visit.
49. 128号公路：萨克森尼亚，《区域优势》。英特尔的整体概念：迪克·霍奇森，作者访谈。
49. On Route 128: Saxenian, Regional Advantage. The whole concept of Intel: Dick Hodgson, interview by author.
50. 所以贝蒂回家了：哈丽特·诺伊斯致鲍勃·诺伊斯，日期不详（但显然是 1968 年夏天），爱荷华州。哈丽特认为贝蒂让鲍勃对金钱过于感兴趣：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者采访。
50. So Betty’s home: Harriet Noyce to Bob Noyce, undated (but clearly summer, 1968), IA. Harriet thought Betty had made Bob overly interested in money: Penny Noyce, interview by author.
51. 高层官员：诺伊斯在戴维多夫、弗拉斯和诺伊斯口述历史中（爱荷华州）。专业装饰：简·琼斯，作者访谈。关于办公室布置：安迪·格罗夫，作者访谈。
51. High muckety-mucks: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history, IA. Professionally decorated: Jean Jones, interview by author. On arrangement of offices: Andy Grove, interview by author.
52. 自助餐厅和通讯中心：Jean Jones 致 Dinah Lee，主题：行政 SLRP，1992 年 4 月 9 日，爱荷华州。
52. Cafeteria and communications center: Jean Jones to Dinah Lee, Subject: Admin SLRP, 9 April 1992, IA.
53. 通往街道的污水管道：戈登·摩尔口述历史，1983 年 10 月 17 日，爱荷华州。
53. Sewer pipe running out to the street: Gordon Moore oral history, 17 Oct. 1983, IA.
54. 相当于支票簿，我要一本：吉恩·弗拉斯在戴维多夫、弗拉斯和诺伊斯口述历史中说道，爱荷华州
54. Equivalent of a checkbook, I’ll have one of those: Gene Flath in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history, IA
55. Betty Noyce 已经宣布：Ted Hoff，作者采访。
55. Betty Noyce had already announced: Ted Hoff, interview by author.
56. 行业之神：汤姆·伊内斯 (Tom Innes) 和汤姆·罗 (Tom Rowe) 的口述历史，IA。
56. Gods of the industry: Tom Innes in Tom Innes and Tom Rowe oral history, IA.
57. 每月1000美元：安迪·格鲁夫在埃德·格尔巴赫、安迪·格鲁夫和泰德·詹金斯的口述历史中说道，1983年10月24日，爱荷华州（以下简称格尔巴赫、格鲁夫、詹金斯口述历史）。极具性魅力，引领未来：约翰·里德，作者访谈。
57. $1,000 per month: Andy Grove in Ed Gelbach, Andy Grove, and Ted Jenkins oral history, 24 Oct. 1983, IA (henceforth Gelbach, Grove, Jenkins oral history). A lot of sex appeal, steering the future: John Reed, interview by author.
58. 双头怪兽：林德格伦，《构建一个理性的双头怪兽》。计算机公司的高级管理人员：曾任 Scientific Data Systems 主管的马克斯·帕列夫斯基和曾任 Data Technology 主管的杰拉德·柯里。
58. Two-headed monster: Lindgren, “Building a Rational Two-Headed Monster.” Senior executives from computer companies: Max Palevsky, who ran Scientific Data Systems, and Gerard Currie, who ran Data Technology.
59. 关于英特尔的战略：Marian Jelinek 和 Claudia Bird Schoonhover在《创新马拉松：高科技公司的经验教训》（英国牛津；美国马萨诸塞州剑桥：B. Blackwell，1990 年）中详细讨论了这一战略。
59. On Intel’s strategy: Marian Jelinek and Claudia Bird Schoonhover, The Innovation Marathon: Lessons from High Technology Firms (Oxford:, OX, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell, 1990) discuss this strategy at length.
60. 群体思维，一个“是”：诺伊斯，《成功的果实》，Chemtech，1979 年 12 月。
60. Group think, a single yes: Noyce, “The Fruit of Success,” Chemtech, Dec. 1979.
61. 用金钱换取时间：吉恩·弗拉斯（Gene Flath）访谈（作者访谈）。一位开枪的步枪手：戈登·摩尔（Gordon Moore），《英特尔——存储器与微处理器》，《代达罗斯》（Daedalus） 125期，1966年春季：55-80页。在本文中，摩尔举了以下先发优势的例子：英特尔的首款MOS存储器1101最初设计的工作电压为+5V和+12V。然而，英特尔很快发现“12V的电压超过了该器件结构的承受能力”。由于当时还没有系统采用半导体存储器，英特尔可以自由调整电压，实际上规定半导体存储器的工作电压为+5V和+9V——这些规格最终成为了行业标准。
61. Use money to buy time: Gene Flath, interview by author. A rifleman who shoots: Gordon Moore, “Intel—Memories and the Microprocessor,” Daedalus 125, Spring 1966: 55–80. In this article, Moore offers the following example of first-mover advantage: the 1101, Intel’s first MOS memory device, was initially designed to operate at standard power supply voltages of +5 and +12v. Intel soon discovered, however, that “12 volts was more than the device structure could handle.” Since no system had yet been built to use semiconductor memories, Intel was free to adjust the voltage, effectively decreeing that semiconductor memories would run at +5 and +9v—specifications that eventually became industry standards.
62. 我们只需要做：Noyce 在 Noyce、Davidow、Flath 口述历史，IA。售价约为 4%：“采访 Robert Noyce—1973”，IA。
62. All we have to do: Noyce in Noyce, Davidow, Flath oral history, IA. Sold for about 4 percent: “Interview Robert Noyce—1973,” IA.
63. 磁芯存储器已取得突破：Campbell-Kelly 和 Aspray，《计算机》，167。正如 Fairchild 公司的 Noyce 和 Texas Instruments 公司的 Kilby 分别独立构思和开发集成电路一样，磁芯（或铁氧体）存储器几乎同时由 MIT、哈佛大学和 RCA 的研究人员于 1951 年开发出来。MIT 最终获得了专利。
63. Core memories had netted: Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, Computer, 167. In much the same way that Noyce at Fairchild and Kilby at Texas Instruments independently conceived and developed the integrated circuit, magnetic core (or ferrite) memories had been almost simultaneously developed by researchers at MIT, Harvard, and RCA in 1951. MIT was eventually awarded the patent.
64. 沿着十平方英尺的距离旅行：里德，《芯片》，128页。1999年，亚瑟·洛克开玩笑地估计，要达到21世纪初计算机的数量，需要“全世界的人口来串联核心”。亚瑟·洛克，作者访谈。
64. Travel along ten square feet: Reid, The Chip, 128. In 1999, Arthur Rock jokingly estimated that it would take “the entire world’s population to string cores” for the number of computers in use at the turn of the twenty-first century. Arthur Rock, interview by author.
65. 正式产品计划：Noyce 1968 年日记。
65. Formal product plans: Noyce 1968 datebook.
66. MOS：正如历史学家罗斯·巴塞特所说，“如果双极晶体管的经典定义是‘三明治’，主要效应发生在面包和馅料的交界处，那么 MOS 晶体管更像是披萨，主要效应发生在表面。”
66. MOS: As historian Ross Bassett puts it, “If the classic definition of the bipolar transistor is a ‘sandwich,’ with the main effects happening at the intersection of the bread and the filling, the MOS transistor is more like a pizza, with the main effects happening at the surface.”
67. 关于倒装芯片：作者采访了戈登·摩尔和芭芭拉·艾勒。艾勒解释说，倒装芯片团队试图摒弃传统的键合工艺，即用极细的导线将封装引脚连接到芯片上的专用键合焊盘。芭芭拉·艾勒于2004年7月26日致作者的信。
67. On the flip chip: Gordon Moore, interview by author; Barbara Eiler, interview by author. Eiler explains that the flip chip group was trying to eliminate the traditional bonding process, in which very small wires are attached from the package leads to special bonding pads on the chip. Barbara Eiler to author, 26 July 2004.
68. 为什么采用三管齐下的方法：戈登·摩尔，作者采访。
68. Why three-pronged approach: Gordon Moore, interview by author.
69. 使用烧毁的二极管：Ted Hoff，作者采访。
69. Using blown diodes: Ted Hoff, interview by author.
70. 他的问题非常有洞察力：泰德·霍夫，作者采访。他总是挑战你：莱斯·瓦达兹，埃文·拉姆斯塔德采访。
70. His questions were so perceptive: Ted Hoff, interview by author. He challenged you all the time: Les Vadasz, interview by Evan Ramstad.
71. Donald S. Noyce 致 Adam Noyce，2002 年 5 月 1 日，GCA。
71. Donald S. Noyce to Adam Noyce, 1 May 2002, GCA.
72. 诺伊斯最小信息原则：戈登·摩尔，“关于半导体行业研究的一些个人观点”，载于罗森布鲁姆和威廉·J·斯宾塞，《创新引擎：一个时代的终结中的美国工业研究》（波士顿，马萨诸塞州：哈佛商学院出版社，1996 年），第 165-174 页。设计一个电路需要五到六个人年：戴维多夫、弗拉斯、诺伊斯口述历史。
72. Noyce principle of minimum information: Gordon Moore, “Some Personal Perspectives on Research in the Semiconductor Industry,” in Rosenbloom and William J. Spencer, Engines of Innovation: U.S. Industrial Research at the End of an Era (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 165–174. Five or six man years to design a circuit: Davidow, Flath, Noyce oral history.
73. 诺伊斯称格罗夫为鞭子：诺伊斯在戴维多夫、弗拉斯和诺伊斯口述历史中说道。对我来说，做难事很艰难：凯西·科恩，作者访谈。你必须做点什么：罗在罗和伊内斯口述历史中说道。
73. Noyce calling Grove the whip: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history, IA. It is tough for me to do the hard things: Kathy Cohen, interview by author. You had to do something: Rowe in Rowe and Innes oral history.
74. 自避孕药问世以来最好的东西：汤姆·伊内斯在汤姆·伊内斯和汤姆·罗的口述历史中讲述。
74. Best thing since the Pill: Tom Innes in Tom Innes and Tom Rowe oral history.
75. 我想我好几个月没跟鲍勃说过话了：安·鲍尔斯，作者访谈，2004年8月5日。我想我正式向鲍勃汇报过：罗杰·博罗沃伊，作者访谈。实际上没有人向鲍勃汇报过：安·鲍尔斯，作者访谈，2004年8月16日。
75. I don’t think I talked to Bob for months: Ann Bowers, interview by author, 5 Aug. 2004. I guess I officially reported to Bob: Roger Borovoy, interview by author. Nobody actually reported to Bob: Ann Bowers, interview by author, 16 Aug. 2004.
76. 关于诺伊斯-摩尔-格罗夫的关系：雷吉斯·麦肯纳，作者采访。
76. On Noyce-Moore-Grove relationship: Regis McKenna, interview by author.
77. 纯粹的运气：诺伊斯在《改变世界的机器》中，IA。自我怀疑，伪装：安迪·格鲁夫在格尔巴赫、格鲁夫、詹金斯口述历史中，IA。
77. Plain dumb luck: Noyce in “Machine That Changed the World,” IA. Self doubts, Faking It: Andy Grove in Gelbach, Grove, Jenkins oral history, IA.
78. 格鲁夫与格雷厄姆之间的问题：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。
78. Grove’s problems with Graham: Andy Grove, interview by author.
79. 格雷厄姆与格罗夫的问题：鲍勃·格雷厄姆，查理·斯波克采访。
79. Graham’s problems with Grove: Bob Graham, interview by Charlie Sporck.
80. 敌意开始毒害：迈克·马库拉（Mike Markkula），作者采访。
80. Enmity began to poison: Mike Markkula, interview by author.
第八章：起飞
Chapter 8: Takeoff
1. 诺伊斯的活动：1968 年和 1969 年的日记簿，ASB。1968 年 10 月 3 日的一条记录写道：“向客户披露计划”。
1. Noyce’s activities: 1968 and 1969 datebooks, ASB. An entry from 3 Oct. 1968 reads “Disclosure of plans to customers.”
2. 业内无人：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。
2. Nobody in the industry: Andy Grove, interview by author.
3. 家族切割红宝石：比尔·诺伊斯，作者访谈。他们做了一个，他们做了一个：罗杰·博罗沃伊，作者访谈。
3. Family cutting rubylith: Bill Noyce, interview by author. They made one, they made one: Roger Borovoy, interview by author.
4. 开始讨论英特尔上市：戈登·摩尔，作者采访。关于诺伊斯对股票期权的担忧：林德格伦，《打造一个理性的双头怪兽》。
4. Began to talk of taking Intel public: Gordon Moore, interview by author. On Noyce’s concerns about stock options: Lindgren, “Building a Rational Two-Headed Monster.”
5. 价格堪比：诺伊斯对员工说，1969 年 10 月 20 日，由泰德·霍夫提供。
5. At prices that rivaled: Noyce to employees, 20 Oct. 1969, courtesy Ted Hoff.
6. 有趣的转变：戈登·摩尔，亚当·诺伊斯（GCA）采访。
6. Interesting transformation: Gordon Moore, interview by Adam Noyce, GCA.
7. 管理不是剧烈的影响吗？我可没从中获得乐趣：林德格伦，《构建一个理性的双头怪兽》。
7. Isn’t management, drastic effect, and I don’t get my kicks: Lindgren, “Building a Rational Two-Headed Monster.”
8. 收入涓滴：Gene Flath，作者采访。
8. Revenue trickle: Gene Flath, interview by author.
9. 多芯片问题：Tom Innes 在 Innes, Rowe 口述历史中提及。摩尔的抗冲击性测试：Gordon Moore 在 Moore, Vadasz 口述历史中提及，IA。
9. Problems with the multichip: Tom Innes in Innes, Rowe oral history. Moore’s shock resistance test: Gordon Moore in Moore, Vadasz oral history, IA.
10. 关于证词：Noyce 日记本中的注释，1969 年 3 月 14 日：“FCI 证词”；Roger Borovoy，与作者的私人通信，2004 年 4 月 2 日。进化改进：Noyce 在 Davidow、Flath 和 Noyce 口述历史中，IA。
10. On the deposition: notation in Noyce datebook, 14 March 1969: “FCI Depositions”; Roger Borovoy, personal communication to author, 2 Apr. 2004. Evolutionary improvements: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history, IA.
11. 没有办法：罗杰·博罗沃伊，作者采访。
11. There was no way: Roger Borovoy, interview by author.
12. 蹒跚而行：进度报告引自 Davidow、Flath 和 Noyce 的口述历史。就像剥洋葱一样：引自 Tom Rowe 的《进行中的革命》（1983 年，英特尔内部出版物）：10.一天之内：1968 年 11 月 4 日的报告引自 Innes 和 Rowe 的口述历史，IA。
12. Off and limping: the progress report is quoted in Davidow, Flath, Noyce oral history. Like peeling an onion: Tom Rowe quoted in Revolution in Progress (1983, internal Intel publication): 10. One day ho: 4 Nov. 1968 report quoted in Innes, Rowe oral history, IA.
13. 我得到过的最好的消息，却又充满了愧疚：诺伊斯在戴维多夫、弗拉斯、诺伊斯口述历史中。
13. Best news I’ve ever gotten, swamped with guilt: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, Noyce oral history.
14. 不需要钻头：诺伊斯，1965 年克莱曼访谈。
14. Need is not for drill bits: Noyce, 1965 Kleiman interview.
15. 微处理器的发明和发展：例如，参见 Robert Noyce 和 Marcian E. Hoff, Jr. [Ted Hoff]，“英特尔微处理器发展史”，IEEE Micro（1981 年 2 月）：9；Frederico Faggin，“微处理器的诞生”，转载于 Jay Ranade、Alan Nash 编辑的《Byte 精选》（纽约：McGraw-Hill，1994 年），355；Aspray，“微处理器的社会建构”。
15. Invention and development of the microprocessor: see, for example, Robert Noyce and Marcian E. Hoff, Jr. [Ted Hoff], “A History of Microprocessor Development at Intel,” IEEE Micro (Feb. 1981): 9; Frederico Faggin, “The Birth of the Microprocessor,” reprinted in Jay Ranade, Alan Nash, eds., Best of Byte (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 355; Aspray, “Social Construction of the Microprocessor.”
16. 500位发明家：比尔·戴维多夫，作者采访。英特尔专利授予霍夫等人，专利号3,821,715，申请日1973年1月22日，授权日1974年6月28日；微型计算机专利授予吉尔伯特·海厄特，专利号4,942,156，申请日1970年12月28日，授权日1990年7月17日；德州仪器专利授予加里·W·布恩，专利号3,757,306，申请日1971年8月31日，授权日1973年9月4日。
16. 500 inventors: Bill Davidow, interview by author. Intel patent issued to Hoff et al., patent #3,821,715, filed 22 Jan. 1973, granted 28 June 1974; Micro Computer patent issued to Gilbert Hyatt, patent #4,942,156, filed 28 Dec. 1970, granted 17 July 1990; Texas Instruments patent issued to Gary W. Boone, patent #3,757,306, filed 31 Aug. 1971, granted 4 Sept. 1973.
17. 与微处理器的有趣交易：戈登·摩尔，作者采访，2004 年 7 月 1 日。
17. Funny deal with the microprocessor: Gordon Moore, interview by author, 1 July 2004.
18. 微处理器就不会出现：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。
18. Microprocessor would not have happened: Andy Grove, interview by author.
19. 英特尔几乎是唯一没有合作伙伴的制造商：诺伊斯在戴维多夫、弗拉特、诺伊斯口述历史中。
19. Intel nearly only manufacturer without partner: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, Noyce oral history.
20. 关于佐佐木和夏普：佐佐木正博士致作者，2004年10月9日。威廉·阿斯普雷，《微处理器的社会建构：日本和美国故事”，载于 Andrew Goldstein 和 William Aspray 编辑的《半导体历史新视角》（新泽西州新不伦瑞克：IEEE 电气工程史中心，1977 年）：216-267。
20. On Sasaki and Sharp: Dr. Tadashi Sasaki to author, 9 Oct. 2004. Willliam Aspray, “The Social Construction of the Microprocessor: A Japanese and American Story,” in Andrew Goldstein and William Aspray, eds. Facets: New Perspectives on the Hsitory of Semicondcutors (New Brunswick, N.J.: IEEE Center for the History of Electrical Engineering, 1977): 216–267.
21. 神：罗杰·博罗沃伊，作者访谈。我们设计这一切皆因你：埃德·格尔巴赫，作者访谈。Busicom出现：戈登·摩尔，作者访谈，2004 年 7 月 1 日。
21. A god: Roger Borovoy, interview by author. We designed this because of you: Ed Gelbach, interview by author. Busicom appeared: Gordon Moore, interview by author, 1 July 2004.
22. Busicom/Intel 协议的具体内容：Intel 与日本计算机器公司（Busicom 的母公司）于 1969 年 4 月 28 日签署的临时协议，由 Ted Hoff 提供。
22. Specifics of the Busicom/Intel agreement: Provisional Agreement between Intel and Nippon Calculating Machine [parent company of Busicom], 28 April 1969, courtesy Ted Hoff.
23. 我没有设计职责：Ted Hoff，作者采访。
23. I had no design responsibilities: Ted Hoff, interview by author.
24. 有点震惊：泰德·霍夫，作者采访。
24. Kind of shocked: Ted Hoff, interview by author.
25. 一个芯片的性能：James F. Donohoe，“微处理器的第一个十年：它曾经的样子”，EDN 微处理器特刊，1988 年 10 月 27 日。
25. One chip performed: James F. Donohoe, “The Microprocessor’s First Decades: The Way It Was,” EDN Microprocessor Issue, 27 Oct. 1988.
26. 细节不太好：Shima 引自 William Aspray，“微处理器的社会建构：一个日本和美国的故事”，载于 Andrew Goldstein 和 William Aspray 编，《Facets：半导体历史的新视角》（新泽西州新不伦瑞克：IEEE 电气工程史中心，1977 年）：216–267。
26. Detail was not so good: Shima quoted in Willliam Aspray, “The Social Construction of the Microprocessor: A Japanese and American Story,” in Andrew Goldstein and William Aspray, eds. Facets: New Perspectives on the History of Semicondcutors (New Brunswick, N.J.: IEEE Center for the History of Electrical Engineering, 1977): 216–267.
27. 诺伊斯与霍夫的交流：泰德·霍夫，作者访谈。自我辩驳，成就一番伟业：莱斯·瓦达兹，作者访谈。
27. Exchange between Noyce and Hoff: Ted Hoff, interview by author. Argued yourself into some smart things: Les Vadasz, interview by author.
28. 你为什么不继续呢？：泰德·霍夫，作者采访。
28. Why don’t you go ahead: Ted Hoff, interview by author.
29. 宣布：戈登·摩尔在摩尔、瓦达兹、帕克口述历史中，1983 年 10 月 17 日，爱荷华州。逆向工程竞争芯片：汤姆·罗在因尼斯、罗口述历史中，爱荷华州。
29. Made an announcement: Gordon Moore in Moore, Vadasz, Parker oral history, 17 Oct. 1983, IA. Reverse engineered a competing chip: Tom Rowe in Innes, Rowe oral history, IA.
30. 莱斯非常兴奋：汤姆·罗在《革命进行时》（1983 年，英特尔内部出版物）中引用：10.
30. Les was so excited: Tom Rowe quoted in Revolution in Progress (1983, internal Intel publication): 10.
31. 每比特 20 至 60 美分：巴塞特，《迈向数字时代》，191。销售情况不佳：“英特尔将电路价格降低了 2 倍”，《电子新闻》，1970 年 1 月 26 日。
31. Twenty to sixty cents per bit: Bassett, To the Digital Age, 191. Sales were sluggish: “Intel Slices 2 Circuit Prices,” Electronic News, 26 Jan. 1970.
32. 总是非常乐于助人：泰德·霍夫，作者访谈。热情并不那么明显：戈登·摩尔，作者访谈，2004 年 7 月 1 日。
32. Always very helpful: Ted Hoff, interview by author. Enthusiasm not so obvious: Gordon Moore, interview by author, 1 July 2004.
33. 所有引文均出自信件：Noyce 致 Y. Kojima 先生，1969 年 8 月 21 日，由 Ted Hoff 提供。Bob Graham 随后致信：Robert Graham 致 Y. Kojima 先生，1969 年 9 月 16 日，由 Ted Hoff 提供。
33. All quotes from the letter: Noyce to Mr. Y. Kojima, 21 Aug. 1969, courtesy Ted Hoff. Bob Graham followed up with a letter: Robert Graham to Mr. Y. Kojima, 16 Sept. 1969, courtesy Ted Hoff.
34. 有点儿政变：霍夫在阿斯普雷的《微处理器的社会建构》中被引用。
34. Bit of a coup: Hoff quoted in Aspray, “Social Construction of the Microprocessor.”
35. 两家公司之间的协议：英特尔与日本计算机器公司于 1970 年 2 月 6 日签署的协议，由 Ted Hoff 提供。Busicom高管发了一封措辞温和的信：山田三郎致 Noyce，1970 年 3 月 20 日，由 Ted Hoff 提供。
35. Agreement between the two companies: agreement between Intel and Nippon Calculating Machine, 6 Feb. 1970, courtesy Ted Hoff. Busicom executive sent a gently worded letter: Saburo Yamada to Noyce, 20 March 1970, courtesy Ted Hoff.
36. 我们要开始另一个项目了；走开，走开：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。
36. We’re starting another project; go away, go away: Andy Grove, interview by author.
37. 管理层近乎恐慌：此图表在 Innes, Rowe 口述历史中被引用，IA。对 Noyce 来说比 Moore 更痛苦：Lindgren，“双头怪兽”。
37. Management near panic: this chart is referenced in Innes, Rowe oral history, IA. More painful for Noyce than Moore: Lindgren, “Two-Headed Monster.”
38. 头条新闻：电子新闻，1990 年 7 月 27 日。
38. Headlines: Electronic News, 27 July 1990.
39. 罗克相当舒适：杰拉德·柯里，作者采访，2004 年 4 月 12 日。
39. Rock was quite comfortable: Gerard Currie, interview by author, 12 April 2004.
40. 它就是记不住：Grove 在 Gelbach、Grove、Jenkins 口述历史中提到。Hoff的 28 页备忘录：“Intel 1103：突破核心限制的 MOS 存储器”，《电子学》，1973 年 4 月 23 日。
40. The thing just couldn’t remember: Grove in Gelbach, Grove, Jenkins oral history, IA. Hoff’s 28-page memo: “The Intel 1103: The MOS memory that defied cores,” Electronics, 23 April 1973.
41. 1103 更具挑战性：戈登·摩尔，作者于 2004 年 7 月 1 日采访。
41. 1103 more challenging: Gordon Moore, interview by author, 1 July 2004.
42. 当电灯泡被发明出来的时候：史蒂夫·乔布斯在雷吉斯·麦肯纳的《实时：为永不满足的客户时代做好准备》（波士顿：哈佛商学院出版社，1997 年）第 165 页中引用。
42. When the light bulb was invented: Steve Jobs quoted in Regis McKenna, Real Time: Preparing for the Age of the Never Satisfied Customer (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997): 165.
43. 你只需要做：诺伊斯在戴维多夫、弗拉斯的《诺伊斯口述历史》中说道。关于MIL协议的详情：美国证券交易委员会，《英特尔公司资本股票初步招股说明书》，1971年7月20日。诺伊斯告诉英特尔的投资者：诺伊斯致股东信，1970年7月16日，由泰德·霍夫提供。并非每天都会发生：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。
43. All you had to do: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, Noyce oral history, IA. Details on MIL agreement: Securities and Exchange Commission, Intel Corporation Capital Stock Preliminary Prospectus, 20 July 1971. Noyce told Intel’s investors: Noyce to Shareholders, 16 July 1970, courtesy Ted Hoff. It’s not every day: Andy Grove, interview by author.
44. 安迪·格鲁夫在接受作者采访时表示：“以我所能采取的最激进的方式，这将是英特尔的末日。”
44. As aggressively as I was capable, this will be the death of Intel: Andy Grove, interview by author.
45. 我们决定这样做：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。MIL付款降低了损失：英特尔公司合并财务报表，1971 年和 1970 年 12 月 31 日，IA。
45. We have decided to do this: Andy Grove, interview by author. MIL payment lowered losses: Intel Corporation Consolidated Financial Statements, 31 Dec. 1971 and 1970, IA.
46. Noyce 在 MIL 派对上：Stan Mazor 在 Mazor、Thompson、Whittier 口述历史中。
46. Noyce at MIL party: Stan Mazor in Mazor, Thompson, Whittier oral history.
47. 你的角色取决于：《诺伊斯的中世纪兼职》，《半岛电子新闻》，1972年3月27日。等级权力和知识权力：莱斯·瓦达兹，作者访谈。运营经理向董事会汇报：理查德·霍奇森，作者访谈；迈克·马库拉，作者访谈。
47. Your part depends: “Noyce’s Medieval Moonlighting,” Peninsula Electronics News, 27 March 1972. Hierarchy power and knowledge power: Les Vadasz, interview by author. Operations managers presenting to board: Richard Hodgson, interview by author; Mike Markkula, interview by author.
48. 轮式组织结构图：这个轶事出自 Jackson 的《英特尔内幕》，第 36 页。
48. Wheel-type organization chart: This anecdote is from Jackson, Inside Intel, 36.
49. 这是我们做的，不是我做的：朱迪·瓦达兹，作者采访。
49. We, not I, did this: Judy Vadasz, interview by author.
50. 其中一个原因：Lindgren，“构建一个理性的双头怪兽”。在 Cybercom 上：Julius Blank 致作者，2004 年 5 月 17 日。
50. One of the reasons: Lindgren, “Building a Rational Two-Headed Monster.” On Cybercom: Julius Blank to author, 17 May 2004.
51. 关于相干辐射：吉姆·霍巴特，作者采访；相干辐射年度报告，1970-1983 年；相干辐射首次公开募股招股说明书，1970 年 5 月 19 日。
51. On Coherent Radiation: Jim Hobart, interview by author; Coherent Radiation Annual Reports, 1970–1983; Coherent Radiation Initial Public Offering Prospectus, 19 May 1970.
52. 关于 Four-Phase：Lee Boysel 与作者的访谈。关于 Boysel 为何没有大肆宣传 Four-Phase 的微处理器，请参阅 Bassett 的《迈向数字时代》，第 256-261 页。
52. On Four-Phase: Lee Boysel, interview with author. For a discussion of why Boysel did not trumpet the news of Four-Phase’s microprocessor, see Bassett, To the Digital Age, 256–261.
53. 他们通常都能以某种方式到达：格伦·莱格特，作者采访。
53. Somehow they usually reached: Glenn Leggett, interview by author.
54. 这所学院：FBI 报告引自 Alan Jones，《开拓》，第 176 页。花花公子是金钱兑换商：Alan Jones，《开拓》，第 173 页。外部煽动者：Penny Noyce 致作者，2004 年 4 月 27 日。
54. This College: FBI report quoted in Alan Jones, Pioneering, 176. Playboy is a money changer: Alan Jones, Pioneering, 173. Outside agitators: Penny Noyce to author, 27 April 2004.
55. 大城市的孩子：格伦·莱格特，作者访谈。暴力行为：格伦·莱格特致格林内尔家长，转载于1970年5月15日《格林内尔猩红与黑》报。官方镇压行为：艾伦·琼斯《开拓者》第177页引述的决议。关于1970年4月和5月格林内尔的抗议和紧张局势，最佳资料来源是学生报纸《格林内尔猩红与黑》。校园气氛日益紧张：格伦·莱格特，作者访谈。
55. Big city kids: Glenn Leggett, interview by author. Violent action: Glenn Leggett to Grinnell parents, reprinted in Grinnell Scarlet & Black, 15 May 1970. Act of official repression: resolution quoted in Alan Jones, Pioneering, 177. For protests and tensions at Grinnell in April and May 1970, the best source is the student newspaper, Grinnell Scarlet & Black. Temperature at that campus was rising: Glenn Leggett, interview by author.
56. 我们（受托人）什么都不知道：格伦·莱格特，作者采访。
56. We [trustees] don’t know anything: Glenn Leggett, interview by author.
57. 肯特州立大学的事件在意料之中：佩妮·诺伊斯于2004年4月28日对作者说。一次开拓性的冒险：艾伦·琼斯，《开拓》，第177页。学生运动员拒绝参赛，诺伊斯担心学校是在迎合学生：乔治·德雷克，作者采访。我们是革命者：摩尔引自吉恩·拜林斯基，《英特尔如何在内存芯片领域赢得赌注》，《财富》杂志，1973年11月，第143页。
57. Events at Kent State predictable: Penny Noyce to author, 28 April 2004. A pioneering adventure: Alan Jones, Pioneering, 177. Student athletes refusing to compete, Noyce worried that the college was pandering: George Drake, interview by author. We are the revolutionaries: Moore quoted in Gene Bylinsky, “How Intel Won Its Bet on Memory Chips,” Fortune, Nov. 1973, 143.
58. 这很有帮助，安迪不可能做到这一点：埃德·格尔巴赫，作者采访。
58. It helped, Andy couldn’t have done that: Ed Gelbach, interview by author.
59. 日本在英特尔销售额中所占比例：英特尔提交给美国证券交易委员会的文件，1972年3月。小岛秀夫想要英特尔：我选择在2月份进行这次谈话是基于以下原因：根据诺伊斯1971年的日记记录，两人于2月8日在日本会面。小岛先生此后直到9月21日才再次出现在诺伊斯的笔记中。
59. Japan’s percentage of Intel’s sales: Intel SEC filing, March 1972. Kojima wanted Intel: My choice of the February date for this conversation is based on notations in Noyce’s 1971 datebook, which indicate the two men met on February 8 in Japan. Mr. Kojima does not appear again in Noyce’s notes until September 21.
60. 标准 2x4 或 6 便士钉：Noyce 在《微处理器的过去、现在和未来》一文中引用，《圣何塞水星报》 ，1981 年 10 月 19 日。
60. Standard 2-by-4 or 6-penny nail: Noyce quoted in “The past, present and future of microprocessors,” San Jose Mercury News, 19 Oct. 1981.
61. 关于诺伊斯的私人市场调研：诺伊斯在戴维多夫、弗拉斯的《诺伊斯口述史》中提到；比尔·戴维多夫回忆说，1970年初（当时戴维多夫在英特尔的竞争对手Signetics公司工作）诺伊斯曾拦住他，询问他对“通用编程逻辑方法”的看法。诺伊斯的日记显示，他与戴维多夫在1969年11月和12月有过谈话。
61. On Noyce’s private market research: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, Noyce oral history; Bill Davidow recalls being buttonholed by Noyce in early 1970 (when Davidow was at Intel competitor Signetics), who asked him about his thoughts on “a general purpose way of programming logic.” Noyce’s datebooks show conversations with Davidow in November and December 1969.
62. 在高层管理人员中，诺伊斯几乎是唯一持这种观点的人：泰德·霍夫（作者采访）；莱斯·瓦达兹（作者采访）。霍夫认为：戈登·摩尔（作者采访）。每年2000台：诺伊斯和霍夫，《英特尔微处理器发展史》，IEEE Micro，1981年2月。
62. Noyce was almost alone among senior management: Ted Hoff, interview by author; Les Vadasz, interview by author. Hoff thinks: Gordon Moore, interview by author. 2,000 units per year: Noyce and Hoff, “A History of Microprocessor Development at Intel,” IEEE Micro, Feb. 1981.
63. 关于办公楼：“英特尔公司新总部破土动工”，《帕洛阿尔托时报》，1970 年 4 月 21 日。
63. On office building: “Intel Corp. Breaks Ground for New Headquarters,” Palo Alto Times, 21 April 1970.
64. 当我下来吃早餐时：泰德·霍夫，作者采访。
64. When I came down for breakfast: Ted Hoff, interview by author.
65. 各大计算机制造商：“Markkula 夺取英特尔市场地位”，《电子新闻》，1971 年 2 月 8 日。诺伊斯和洛克的感受：作者对亚瑟·洛克的采访。一只知更鸟不足以构成春天：诺伊斯致全体员工，日期不详，但显然是 1971 年 9 月，由泰德·霍夫提供。
65. Every major computer manufacturer: “Markkula Takes Intel Market Post,” Electronic News, 8 Feb. 1971. Noyce and Rock felt: Arthur Rock, interview by author. One robin doesn’t make a spring: Noyce to All Employees, undated but clearly Sept. 1971, courtesy Ted Hoff.
66. 诺伊斯与IPO相关的活动：诺伊斯1971年日记。
66. Noyce’s IPO-related activities: Noyce 1971 datebook.
67. 向每位员工（包括清洁工）提供期权：作者采访了迈克·马库拉。股票购买计划详情：诺伊斯致全体员工的信，1972 年 1 月 25 日，由泰德·霍夫提供。
67. Options to every employee, including janitors: Mike Markkula, interview by author. Details of stock purchase plan: Noyce to All Employees, 25 Jan. 1972, courtesy Ted Hoff.
68. 这太痛苦了，格罗夫与摩尔的对话：安迪·格罗夫，作者采访。
68. It was far too painful, Grove conversation with Moore: Andy Grove, interview by author.
69. 诺伊斯开始采访：诺伊斯 1971 年日记。格罗夫采访了格尔巴赫：埃德·格尔巴赫，作者采访。胡子给格罗夫留下了深刻印象：格罗夫、格尔巴赫、詹金斯口述历史，IA。
69. Noyce began interviewing: Noyce 1971 datebook. Grove interviewed Gelbach: Ed Gelbach, interview by author. Mustache impressed Grove: Grove, Gelbach, Jenkins oral history, IA.
70. 这让我轻松多了：戈登·摩尔，作者访谈。诺伊斯与格雷厄姆的互动，格雷厄姆与妻子的对话：鲍勃·格雷厄姆，查理·斯波克访谈。
70. Made it a lot easier for me: Gordon Moore, interview by author. Noyce interaction with Graham, Graham conversation with his wife: Bob Graham, interview by Charlie Sporck.
71. 就像切除他的肝脏一样：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。
71. Like cutting out his liver: Andy Grove, interview by author.
72. 所有关于微处理器的引述：Noyce 1971–1973 年记录簿。
72. All quotes on microprocessor: Noyce 1971–1973 record book.
73. 独家经营权：1971-73 年记录簿中 1971 年 8 月 31 日的条目显示，谈判于 9 月 21 日最终敲定：诺伊斯与 Busicom 的会面记录在他的日程本中。在 1983 年的一次采访中，诺伊斯表示谈判是在日本进行的，他本人也参加了。此外，英特尔于 1971 年 7 月 20 日向美国证券交易委员会提交的材料中，并未提及微处理器或逻辑电路业务，这让我相信，这些权利是在此日期之后重新谈判归还给英特尔的。日本人不用律师：诺伊斯在 Davidow、Flath 合著的《诺伊斯口述历史》（IA）中如是说。
73. Exclusivity: 31 Aug. 1971 entry in 1971-73 record book Negotiations finalized September 21: Noyce’s meeting with Busicom is from his datebook. In a 1983 interview, Noyce said that the negotiations were conducted in Japan, and that he attended them. Moreover, materials Intel filed with the SEC, dated 20 July 1971, make no mention of a microprocessor or logic-circuit business, which leads me to believe the rights were negotiated back to Intel after this date. Japanese don’t use lawyers: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, Noyce oral history, IA.
74. 抓住老虎的尾巴：泰德·霍夫，作者访谈。我们应该等待更好的东西吗：诺伊斯在戴维多夫、弗拉斯的《诺伊斯口述历史》中说道。对微处理器的担忧：格尔巴赫、格罗夫和詹金斯的口述历史；诺伊斯和霍夫，《英特尔微处理器发展史》，第13页。
74. Tiger by the tail: Ted Hoff, interview by author. Should we wait to get something better: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, Noyce oral history, IA. On board fears of microprocessor: Gelbach, Grove, and Jenkins oral history; Noyce and Hoff, “History of Microprocessor Development at Intel,” 13.
75. 每次你拖延的时候：泰德·霍夫，作者采访。
75. Every time you delay: Ted Hoff, interview by author.
76. 微处理器毫无意义：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。
76. Microprocessors meant nothing: Andy Grove, interview by author.
77. 关于英特尔首次公开募股：美国证券交易委员会，《英特尔公司资本股票初步招股说明书》，1971 年 7 月 20 日。
77. On Intel IPO: Securities and Exchange Commission, Intel Corporation Capital Stock Preliminary Prospectus, 20 July 1971.
78. 关于芭芭拉·马内斯的所有传记细节以及她与诺伊斯的关系细节：芭芭拉·艾勒（原名芭芭拉·马内斯），作者采访。
78. All biographical details about Barbara Maness and details about her relationship with Noyce: Barbara Eiler (the former Barbara Maness), interview by author.
79. 向鲍勃发出公开邀请，让他去找另一个女人：一位要求匿名的英特尔高管。
79. An open invitation for Bob to find another woman: Intel executive requesting anonymity.
80. 我非常保护她：芭芭拉·艾勒，作者采访。
80. I was very protective: Barbara Eiler, interview by author.
81. 十倍百万富翁：美国证券交易委员会，英特尔公司资本股票初步招股说明书，1971 年 7 月 20 日。
81. A millionaire ten times over: Securities and Exchange Commission, Intel Corporation Capital Stock Preliminary Prospectus, 20 July 1971.
82. 教导价值观很难，但由贫穷的父亲抚养长大更容易：凯西·科恩，作者采访。
82. Tough to teach values, easier to be raised by a poor father: Kathy Cohen, interview by author.
83. 新时代：“宣布集成电子学的新时代”（广告），《电子新闻》 ，1971 年 11 月 15 日。超过 5,000 人，参考套件：Aspray，“微处理器的社会史”，243。
83. A new era: “Announcing a New Era of Integrated Electronics,” (advertisement), Electronic News, 15 Nov. 1971. More than 5,000 people, reference to the suite: Aspray, “Social History of the Microprocessor,” 243.
84. 变化不是通过移动物体实现的：Noyce 和 Hoff，“英特尔微处理器发展史”，13。
84. Changes not by moving objects: Noyce and Hoff, “A History of Microprocessor Development at Intel,” 13.
85. 无法推广：Regis McKenna，Rob Walker 采访，Silicon Genesis 收藏，SSC。独立微处理器营销：“我们当时确实成立了一家小型公司，完全是为了实际用途。” Ed Gelbach，《Gelbach、Grove、Jenkins 口述历史》。用户手册超过 100 页：Frederico Faggin，《微处理器的诞生》，第 356 页。很多人都想读：Bill Davidow，《Davidow、Flath、Noyce 口述历史》。
85. Couldn’t promote: Regis McKenna, interview by Rob Walker, Silicon Genesis collection, SSC. Independent microprocessor marketing: “We absolutely had a small company going for practical purposes.” Ed Gelbach in Gelbach, Grove, Jenkins oral history. Owners’ manual ran over 100 pages: Frederico Faggin, “The Birth of the Microprocessor,” 356. Lots of people who wanted to read: Bill Davidow in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history.
86. 对抗程度降低：比尔·戴维多夫在戴维多夫、弗拉斯、诺伊斯口述历史中提到。英特尔研讨会：“英特尔第二款芯片计算机！”广告，《电子新闻》，1972年4月24日。
86. Lower confrontation level: Bill Davidow in Davidow, Flath, Noyce oral history. Intel seminars: “Intel’s Second Computer On a Chip!” advertisement, Electronic News, 24 April 1972.
87. 微处理器的应用：雷吉斯·麦肯纳（Regis McKenna）访谈（作者访谈）。值得骄傲的客户：格尔巴赫、格罗夫、詹金斯口述历史。
87. Uses of microprocessors: Regis McKenna, interview by author. Customers to be proud of: Gelbach, Grove, Jenkins oral history.
88. 诺伊斯如何化解问题：迈克·马库拉，作者采访；罗杰·博罗沃伊，作者采访。
88. How Noyce defused problems: Mike Markkula, interview by author; Roger Borovoy, interview by author.
89. 传教工作：Noyce 和 Hoff，“英特尔微处理器发展史”，IEEE Micro，1981 年 2 月。Noyce在家庭巴士旅行中的演讲：Linda Vognar 和 Bob Noyce（Don Noyce 的儿子），作者采访。
89. Missionary work: Noyce and Hoff, “A History of Microprocessor Development at Intel,” IEEE Micro, Feb. 1981. Noyce’s speech during family bus ride: Linda Vognar and Bob Noyce [Don Noyce’s son], interview by author.
90. 微处理器只是个玩具：比尔·戴维多夫，作者采访。
90. Microprocessor was just a toy: Bill Davidow, interview by author.
91. 微处理器掉到地板下面：雷吉斯·麦肯纳（Regis McKenna）的访谈（作者）；泰德·霍夫（Ted Hoff）的访谈（作者）；林德格伦（Lindgren），《构建一个理性的双头怪兽》。关于微处理器维修：泰德·霍夫（Ted Hoff）的访谈（作者）。
91. Microprocessor falling through the floor: Regis McKenna, interview by author; Ted Hoff, interview by author; Lindgren, “Building a Rational Two-Headed Monster.” On microprocessor repairs: Ted Hoff, interview by author.
92. 意见之争：诺伊斯在多诺霍的《微处理器的最初二十年：它的样子》中被引用。
92. Battle of opinion: Noyce quoted in Donohue, “Microprocessor’s First Two Decades: The Way it Was.”
93. 诺伊斯访问通用汽车：戴维多夫、弗拉斯和诺伊斯口述历史，IA。
93. Noyce visit to General Motors: Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history, IA.
94. 4004 缓慢而原始：“芯片——二十世纪革命者”，[大约 1983 年]，IA。
94. 4004 slow and rudimentary: “The Chip—Twentieth-Century Revolutionary,” [roughly 1983], IA.
95. Noyce 驾驶概念车兜风：Noyce 在 Davidow、Flath 的《Noyce 口述历史》中。
95. Noyce taking concept car for a spin: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, Noyce oral history.
第九章：几乎不可能的边缘
Chapter 9: The Edge of What’s Barely Possible
1. 我们的情况非常糟糕：格罗夫执行人员会议记录，1972 年 1 月 10 日，爱荷华州。简短，夹杂着长时间的沉默和叹息：格罗夫执行人员会议记录，1972 年 12 月 4 日，爱荷华州。
1. We are not doing well at all: Grove’s ESM [Executive Staff Meeting] notes 10 Jan. 1972, IA. Brief, between long periods of silence and sighs: Grove’s ESM notes, 4 Dec. 1972, IA.
2. 每年十万台1103 ：诺伊斯在《新电子》杂志1972年4月25日“观点”栏目中引用。没有竞争对手： 《电子新闻》1971年8月23日“格尔巴赫绘制英特尔目标图”。英特尔几乎所有的收入都依赖于1103：埃德·格尔巴赫在格尔巴赫、格鲁夫和詹金斯口述历史（IA）中引用。一位与安迪·格鲁夫在斯坦福大学共同授课的学者估计，1103贡献了英特尔1972年收入的90%。罗伯特·A·伯格曼，《消逝的记忆：动态环境下战略性企业退出过程研究》，《行政科学季刊》39（1994）：24-56。
2. One hundred thousand 1103s each year: Noyce quoted in “Viewpoint,” New Electronics, 25 April 1972. No competitors: “Gelbach Maps Intel Goals,” Electronic News, 23 Aug. 1971. Effectively all of Intel’s revenue was dependent on the 1103: Ed Gelbach quoted in Gelbach, Grove, and Jenkins oral history, IA. An academic who team-teaches a course at Stanford with Andy Grove estimates that the 1103 accounted for fully 90 percent of Intel’s 1972 revenue. Robert A. Burgelman, “Fading Memories: A Process Study of Strategic Business Exit in Dynamic Environments.” Administrative Science Quarterly 39 (1994): 24–56.
3. 诺伊斯对日托中心的兴趣：“日托中心——参与其中”，1972 年 1 月 31 日的笔记，记录簿；与琼·琼斯的谈话。
3. Noyce’s interest in daycare center: “Day care center—get involved,” note from 31 Jan. 1972, record book; conversation with Jean Jones.
4. Microma 获得 200 万美元：董事会会议记录，1972 年 4 月 13 日，爱荷华州。Microma预计销售额为 2000 万美元：Sam Rosenthal 致 Joe Rosenfield，1972 年 11 月 27 日，由 Warren Buffett 提供。
4. $2 million for Microma: Minutes of Board of Directors meeting, 13 April 1972, IA. $20 million expected Microma sales: Sam Rosenthal to Joe Rosenfield, 27 Nov. 1972, courtesy Warren Buffett.
5. Boy Noyce 向我们展示了：Sam Rosenthal 致 Joe Rosenfield，1972 年 11 月 27 日，由 Warren Buffett 提供。
5. Boy Noyce showed us: Sam Rosenthal to Joe Rosenfield, 27 Nov. 1972, courtesy Warren Buffett.
6. 40% 税前利润率：乔·罗森菲尔德致萨姆·罗森塔尔、唐·威尔逊和沃伦·巴菲特，1973 年 4 月 17 日，沃伦·巴菲特提供。
6. Forty percent pretax margin: Joe Rosenfield to Sam Rosenthal, Don Wilson, and Warren Buffett, 17 April 1973, courtesy Warren Buffett.
7. 将 1974 年的研究成果移至 1973 年，鲍勃非常焦虑：乔·罗森菲尔德致萨姆·罗森塔尔、唐·威尔逊和沃伦·巴菲特，1973 年 4 月 17 日，由沃伦·巴菲特提供。
7. Moved 1974 research to 1973, Bob is very anxious: Joe Rosenfield to Sam Rosenthal, Don Wilson, and Warren Buffett, 17 April 1973, courtesy Warren Buffett.
8. 英特尔是我们拥有的最佳工具：沃伦·巴菲特对乔·罗森菲尔德说，1973 年 4 月 20 日。沃伦·巴菲特供稿。
8. Intel is the best vehicle we have: Warren Buffett to Joe Rosenfield, 20 April, 1973. Courtesy Warren Buffett.
9. 为了让你们安心：诺伊斯致期权持有者，1973 年 3 月 3 日，IA。唯一限制其增长的因素：诺伊斯引述于劳埃德·沃森，《增长的经典案例》，《旧金山纪事报》，没有日期，但显然是 1973 年。
9. Just to put your minds at rest: Noyce to Optionees, 3 March 1973, IA. Only thing limiting its growth: Noyce quoted in Lloyd Watson, “A Classic Case of Growth,” San Francisco Chronicle, no date, but clearly 1973.
10. 假设石化产品和电力免费且可用：“Coast Semicon 公司为能源危机最坏情况做好准备”，《电子新闻》，1973 年 12 月 3 日。晶圆厂的电力消耗：“电子行业的电力请求”，《旧金山纪事报》 ，1973 年 12 月 4 日。
10. Assumed petrochemicals and power were free and available: “Coast Semicon firms Gird for Worst in Energy Crisis,” Electronic News, 3 Dec. 1973. Power consumption of fabs: “Electronics Industry’s Power Plea,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4 Dec. 1973.
11. 第三次停电之后：诺伊斯在《旧金山纪事报》 1973年12月4日发表的《电子行业的求助》一文中被引用。推动法案出台：《电子新闻》1973年12月10日报道《半导体公司遭遇停电计划》 ； 《电子新闻》1973年11月24日报道《湾区能源危机蔓延至加州》； 《电子新闻》1973年12月17日报道《能源之争进入第二阶段》 ； 《电子新闻》1973年12月3日报道《公用事业委员会掌握湾区命运》 ；《旧金山纪事报》1973年12月4日报道《电子行业的求助》；《电子新闻》1974年2月4日报道《禁止加州停电法案“被削弱”》。
11. After a third blackout: Noyce quoted in “Electronics Industry’s Power Plea,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4 Dec. 1973. Pushed for bill: “Semicon Firms Hit Power Cut Plans,” Electronic News, 10 Dec. 1973; “Bay Area Energy Crisis Spreads Throughout California, Electronic News, 24 Nov. 1973; “Energy Fight in 2d Phase,” Electronic News, 17 December 1973; “Utilities Commission Holds Bay Area Fate,” Electronic News, 3 Dec. 1973; “Electronics Industry’s Power Plea,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4 Dec. 1973; “Bill to Prohibit Blackouts in Calif. ‘Watered Down,’” Electronic News, 4 Feb. 1974.
12. 这确实是一个受控制的社会：诺伊斯在林德格伦的《构建一个理性的双头怪物》中引用。
12. This really is a controlled society: Noyce quoted in Lindgren, “Building a Rational Two-Headed Monster.”
13. 政府对我们的生活影响越来越大：诺伊斯引自罗恩·伊斯科夫，《半导体需求没有放缓：诺伊斯》，《电子新闻》 ，1973 年 12 月 31 日。
13. Government affecting our lives more and more: Noyce quoted in Ron Iscoff, “No Slowdown in Demand for Semicons: Noyce,” Electronic News, 31 Dec. 1973.
14. 电子应用似乎在几乎不可能的边缘摇摆不定，而且似乎没有限制：Noyce 在《半岛电子新闻》 1973 年 12 月 31 日。
14. Teetering on the edge of what’s barely possible, electronic applications appear to be unlimited: Noyce in Peninsula, Electronics News, 31 Dec. 1973.
15. 诺伊斯股票的价值：通过将他的股票数量乘以英特尔股票的适当市场价格计算得出，该市场价格记录在 1976 年 6 月 21 日提交给美国证券交易委员会的 S-8 表格的历史图表中。
15. Value of Noyce’s stock: calculated by multiplying the number of his shares by the appropriate market price of Intel’s stock as recorded in a historical chart included in Form S-8 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 June 1976.
16. 你认为我能做到吗？：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者采访。扫清障碍：诺伊斯引自沃尔特·古扎尔迪，《商业巨擘的智慧》，《财富》杂志1989年7月3日，第78-91页。
16. Do you think I could do: Penny Noyce, interview by author. Get the barriers out of the way: Noyce quoted in Walter Guzzardi, “Wisdom from the Giants of Business,” Fortune 3 July 1989, 78–91.
17. 诺伊斯与海鹦的合作：史蒂夫·克雷斯（海鹦项目主任），作者采访。
17. Noyce’s work with the puffins: Steve Kress (director of the Puffin Project), interview by author.
18. 你做一点工作，挣一点钱：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者采访。
18. You do a little work for a little money: Penny Noyce, interview by author.
19. 金钱可以做很多事：波莉·诺伊斯，作者采访。
19. Money can do lots of things: Polly Noyce, interview by author.
20. 关于“硅谷”一词的首次使用：唐·霍夫勒，《硅谷——美国》，《电子新闻》 （1971年1月11日、18日和25日）；以及霍夫勒，《船长们的无耻行径》和《为这个名字承担责任》，《今日加州》（ 《圣何塞水星报》增刊），1981年6月28日，第42-45页。该地区其他名称的来源是查尔斯·佩蒂特，《硅谷奇才》，《半岛时报论坛报》 ，1977年9月21日；比尔·丹斯莫尔，《圣克拉拉谷电子产业在“自我一代”的十年间走向成熟》，《半岛时报论坛报》 ，1979年12月28日；《固态电子产业的分裂》，《创新》杂志第8期，1969年。关于诺伊斯和摩尔的文章：《为什么核心可能最终沦为存储器》 ， 《商业周刊》，1970年12月26日——表面上是关于存储器业务，但只有一张诺伊斯的照片。 《财富》杂志文章：吉恩·拜林斯基，《英特尔如何在存储芯片领域赢得赌注》，《财富》杂志，1973年11月。
20. On the first use of the term “Silicon Valley”: Don Hoefler, “Silicon Valley—USA,” Electronic News (11, 18, and 25 Jan. 1971); and Hoefler, “Captains Outrageous” and “Taking Blame for the Name,” California Today (supplement to the San Jose Mercury News), 28 June 1981, 42–45. Sources for other names for the region are Charles Petit, “Wizard of Silicon Gulch,” Peninsula Times Tribune, 21 Sept. 1977; Bill Densmore, “The Santa Clara Valley electronics industry comes of age during the ‘me’ generation decade,” Peninsula Times Tribune, 28 Dec. 1979, “The Splintering of the Solid-State Electronics Industry,” Innovation 8, 1969. Articles on Noyce and Moore: “Why cores could become just a memory,” Business Week, 26 Dec. 1970—ostensibly about the memory business, but contains exactly one photo—of Noyce. Fortune article: Gene Bylinsky, “How Intel won its bet on memory chips,” Fortune, Nov. 1973.
21. 微型计算机扩展到几乎所有领域：“罗伯特·诺伊斯访谈——1973 年”，IA。控制装置将允许：林赛·阿瑟，“家用和汽车的计算机奇迹”，没有日期，但显然是 1973 年，IA。诺伊斯的演讲：比尔·诺伊斯对家人的讲话，1973 年 4 月 14 日。
21. Extension of the microcomputer into just about everything: “Interview Robert Noyce—1973,” IA. Control gadgetry will permit: Lindsay Arthur, “The Computer Miracle for the Home and Car,” no date, but clearly 1973, IA. Noyce’s speech: Bill Noyce to family, 14 April [1973].
22. 诺伊斯博士抽出时间滑雪：“英特尔的鲍勃·诺伊斯就集成电路行业发表讲话”，EDN/EEE，1971 年 9 月 15 日。这正是每个父母所希望的：“诺伊斯的新赢家：英特尔”，电子工程时报，1972 年 9 月 11 日。
22. Dr. Noyce finds time for skiing: “Bob Noyce of Intel Speaks Out on the Integrated Circuit Industry,” EDN/EEE, 15 Sept. 1971. Just what every parent hopes: “Noyce’s New Winner: Intel,” Electronic Engineering Times, 11 Sept. 1972.
23. 鲍勃叔叔的新手表：唐·诺伊斯致南希和唐·诺伊斯，1972 年 9 月 29 日，DSN。
23. Uncle Bob’s new watch: Don Noyce to Nancy and Don Noyce, 29 Sept. 1972, DSN.
24. 如果我提出最简单的请求：佩妮致妈妈、波莉和比尔，1972年8月11日，佩妮·诺伊斯提供。包机坠毁：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者采访；比尔·科恩，作者采访；1974年3月12日笔记，佩妮·诺伊斯提供，内容为：“您的414号飞机坠毁了。_先生和另外三人在机上。他们报告说在卡森城地区发现了一个无线电信标。请致电了解更多详情。”
24. If I made the simplest request: Penny to Mummy, Polly, and Bill, 11 Aug. [1972], courtesy Penny Noyce. Crash of the charter plane: Penny Noyce, interview by author; Bill Cohen, interview by author; note dated 3/12[/74], courtesy Penny Noyce, reading, “Your 414 is down. Mr. _ and three other people are aboard. They have a report of a radio beacon in the Carson City area. Please call for more details.”
25. 社会对技术的负面态度：Noyce，1982 年 Reid 访谈。
25. Society’s negative attitude towards technology: Noyce, 1982 Reid interview.
26. 不喜欢自己，试图改变：Noyce 在 Davidow、Flath、Noyce 口述历史、IA。
26. Didn’t like myself, tried to switch: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, Noyce oral history, IA.
27. 只有坏母亲才会不在家照顾孩子：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者采访。
27. Only bad mothers weren’t home for their children: Penny Noyce, interview by author.
28. 英特尔喜欢战争努力：朱迪·瓦达兹，作者采访。
28. Intel like the war effort: Judy Vadasz, interview by author.
29. 过强的管理能力：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者访谈。又一个拎着公文包的丈夫：菲利斯和鲍勃·凯弗，作者访谈。贝蒂·诺伊斯大喊大叫或哭泣：多次访谈，所有受访者均要求匿名。
29. Too much executive ability: Penny Noyce, interview by author. Just another husband carrying a briefcase: Phyllis and Bob Kefauver, interview by author. Betty Noyce yelling or crying: multiple interviews, all requesting anonymity on this detail.
30. 每人抽一包烟：吉姆·安吉尔，作者采访。
30. Smoking a pack of cigarettes each: Jim Angell, interview by author.
31. 乘飞机去纽约更简单：格伦·莱格特，作者采访。
31. Simpler to get on a plane to New York: Glenn Leggett, interview by author.
32. 我不怕承担责任：比尔致达，1973年10月18日，由佩妮·诺伊斯提供。诺伊斯写给比尔的信已遗失，但这份回信直接提到了诺伊斯的反对意见。
32. I’m not afraid of the responsibility: Bill to Da, 18 Oct. 1973, courtesy Penny Noyce. Noyce’s letter to Bill is lost, but this reply directly references Noyce’s objections.
33. 我感到无比震撼，敬畏不已：Penny Noyce 致 Bob Noyce，1974 年 11 月 6 日。
33. I am overwhelmed, awed: Penny Noyce to Bob Noyce, 6 Nov. 1974.
34. 贝蒂写给母亲的未寄出的信：贝蒂·诺伊斯致咪咪（她的母亲），1974年4月25日，由佩妮·诺伊斯提供。所有贝蒂关于离婚的引述均出自这封信。
34. Betty’s unsent letter to her mother: Betty Noyce to Mimi [her mother], 25 April 1974, courtesy Penny Noyce. All quotes from Betty regarding the divorce come from this letter.
35. 离婚是错误的：盖洛德·诺伊斯，作者采访。
35. Divorce was wrong: Gaylord Noyce, interview by author.
36. 利润率和净收入报表：1974 年英特尔年度报告。60 % 的厂房面积，70% 的员工：安迪·格鲁夫引自威廉·道尔，《英特尔力图证明德鲁克错了》，《奥克兰论坛报》，1974 年 2 月 27 日。不到十分之一美分就能买到：《半导体行业再次迎来繁荣时期》，《商业周刊》，1974 年 4 月 20 日，第 66 页。
36. Profit margin and net income statements: 1974 Intel annual report. 60 percent of plant space, 70 percent of employees: Andy Grove quoted in William Doyle, “Intel Out to Prove Drucker Wrong,” Oakland Tribune, 27 Feb. 1974. Could be bought for less than one-tenth of a penny: “Boom Times Again for Semiconductors,” Business Week, 20 April 1974, 66.
37. 每月十亿比特：“英特尔认为新产品会削减利润率”，《电子新闻》，1974 年 3 月 4 日。十八个相互竞争的微处理器：Noyce，“微处理器”，《电子工程时报》周年纪念特刊（1987 年 11 月）：A15–A20，IA。
37. A billion bits per month: “Intel Sees New Products Cutting Into Profit Margins,” Electronic News, 4 March 1974. Eighteen competing microprocessors: Noyce, “Microprocessors,” Electronic Engineering Times Anniversary Issue (Nov. 1987): A15–A20, IA.
38. 跳过了冒险：史蒂夫·克雷斯，作者采访。
38. Skipped the adventures: Steve Kress, interview by author.
39. 这是一场彻头彻尾的战争：作者匿名采访。
39. It was outright warfare: Anonymous interview by author.
40. 金钱只是其中的一部分：保罗·霍斯金斯基，《真正的财富》（加州伯克利：Ten Speed出版社，1990年）：2。
40. Money is just one part: Paul Hwoschinsky, True Wealth (Berkeley, Ca.: Ten Speed Press, 1990): 2.
41. 如果你从悬崖上走下去：保罗·霍斯金斯基，作者采访，2003 年 6 月 3 日。
41. If you walk off a cliff: Paul Hwoschinsky, interview by author, 3 June 2003.
42. 大部分是英特尔股票：保罗·霍斯金斯基，作者于 2003 年 6 月 3 日采访了他。
42. The bulk was Intel stock: Paul Hwoschinsky, interview by author, 3 June 2003.
43. 这是什么？：关于鞋盒创业公司的所有引语均来自作者于 2003 年 6 月 3 日对 Paul Hwoschinsky 的采访。
43. What’s this?: All quotes in the discussion of the shoebox startups are from Paul Hwoschinsky, interview by author, 3 June 2003.
44. 那又怎样？：莱斯·瓦达兹接受埃文·拉姆斯塔德采访。
44. Well, so what?: Les Vadasz, interview by Evan Ramstad.
45. Page Mill Partners 饮酒小组：Jack Melchor，作者采访。
45. Page Mill Partners drinking group: Jack Melchor, interview by author.
46. 爸爸有点难过：佩妮·诺伊斯致贝蒂·诺伊斯，1974年9月4日，佩妮·诺伊斯提供。选择一位家长参加家长周末活动：玛格丽特·诺伊斯致贝蒂·诺伊斯，1974年10月5日，佩妮·诺伊斯提供。我所做的其他一切都不重要：一位要求匿名的晚宴参与者的采访。
46. Da is a little sad: Penny Noyce to Betty Noyce, 4 Sept. 1974, courtesy Penny Noyce. Choose parent for parents’ weekend: Margaret Noyce to Betty Noyce, 5 Oct. 1974, courtesy Penny Noyce. Nothing else I’ve done matters: interview with a person at the dinner who requested anonymity.
47. 英特尔股价暴跌：这源于一系列离奇的巧合。7月3日星期三股市收盘后，英特尔宣布其第二季度营收低于预期。然而，熟悉英特尔股票的交易员们当时并不在办公桌前听到这一消息。他们的年度大会将于下周举行，他们中的大多数人决定在佛罗里达州大会举办地附近度过一个漫长的独立日假期。7月5日星期五股市重新开盘后，这些储备交易员在阅读了英特尔低于预期的销售报告后，开始疯狂抛售英特尔股票。英特尔股价从每股63.5美元暴跌至每股44.5美元。关于当日抛售股票的详情：鲍勃·哈灵顿，作者采访。
47. Precipitous drop in Intel’s share: this stemmed from a bizarre coincidence of events. After the market closed on Wednesday, July 3, Intel announced that its second-quarter revenues were lower than expected. The traders familiar with Intel stock were not at their desks to hear the news, however. Their annual convention was being held the following week, and most of them had decided to spend a long Independence Day holiday near the convention site in Florida. When the stock market reopened on Friday, July 5, the reserve traders, having read the reports of Intel’s lower-than-expected sales, began furiously selling Intel stock. The price of an Intel share plummeted from 63½ to 44½. Details of the same-day stock-sale program: Bob Harrington, interview by author.
48. 几乎所有：Larry Hootnick [财务副总裁] 致 Andy Grove，1975 年 4 月 2 日，爱荷华州。
48. Virtually all: Larry Hootnick [vice president, finance] to Andy Grove, 2 April 1975, IA.
49. 种子来自：鲍勃·哈灵顿，作者采访了他。
49. Seed came from: Bob Harrington, interview by author.
50. 1974 年半导体行业裁员：“英特尔停工一周；AMI 裁员 230 人；理由是业绩平淡”，《电子新闻》，1974 年 9 月 6 日；“英特尔、Intersil 削减工资”，《电子新闻》，1974 年 8 月 12 日，第 16 页。
50. 1974 layoffs in the semiconductor industry: “Intel Shuts Down for Week; AMI Cuts 230; Cite Flatness,” Electronic News, 6 Sept. 1974; “Intel, Intersil Trim Payroll,” Electronic News, 12 Aug. 1974, 16.
51. Microma 1974 年 12 月税前亏损：Larry Hootnick 致董事会，“主题：Microma——1974 年 12 月实际情况与 75.0 计划对比”，1975 年 1 月 15 日，IA。Intel将 Mostek 作为第二供应商：《电子新闻》，1974 年 12 月 30 日。AMD 、Signetics 和 Mostek 的业绩：AMD 1975 年年度报告、Signetics 1974 年年度报告、Mostek 1975 年年度报告。
51. Microma pretax loss in Dec. 1974: Larry Hootnick to Board of Directors, “Subject: Microma—December, 1974 Actual vs. Plan 75.0,” 15 Jan. 1975, IA. Intel second-sourcing Mostek: Electronic News, 30 Dec. 1974. AMD, Signetics, and Mostek performance: AMD 1975 annual report, Signetics 1974 annual report, Mostek 1975 annual report.
52. 必须减少我们的员工人数：诺伊斯致全体员工，1974 年 10 月 7 日，爱荷华州。
52. Necessary to have a reduction in our work force: Noyce to all employees, 7 Oct. 1974, IA.
53. 裁员数据：真实，《革命进行时》，47.为了几个该死的分数：雷吉斯·麦肯纳，作者采访。
53. Layoff data: Real, Revolution in Progress, 47. For a few goddamned points: Regis McKenna, interview by author.
54. 未预料到变化，价格大幅下跌：Martin Gold，“英特尔的诺伊斯：未来 6 个月半导体不会回暖”，《电子新闻》， 1974 年 10 月 14 日。Paul Plansky，“抗议活动影响 Wema 会议”，《电子新闻》 ，1974 年 12 月 2 日。
54. Did not anticipate changes, tremendous price attrition: Martin Gold, “Intel’s Noyce: No Semicon Upturn in Next 6 Months,” Electronic News, 14 Oct. 1974. Paul Plansky,” Protests Mark Wema Meeting,” Electronic News, 2 Dec. 1974.
55. 近20%的人被裁员：拉蒙·C·塞维利亚，《就业实践与产业结构调整：硅谷半导体产业案例研究，1955-1991》（加州大学洛杉矶分校博士论文，1992年），表3.10，第179页。诺伊斯是主导力量：“WEMA向英特尔的罗伯特·诺伊斯博士颁发成就奖章”[WEMA新闻稿]，1974年9月27日，ASB。标语牌上的口号：保罗·普兰斯基，“抗议活动影响了WEMA会议”。
55. Nearly 20 percent laid off: Ramon C. Sevilla, “Employment practices and industrial restructuring: A case study of the semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley, 1955–1991,” (PhD dissertation, UCLA, 1992), Table 3.10, 179. Noyce a dominant force: “WEMA Medal of Achievement to Intel’s Dr. Robert Noyce” [WEMA Press Release], 27 Sept. 1974, ASB. Slogans on signs: Paul Plansky,” Protests Mark Wema Meeting.”
56. 洛克的猜想：亚瑟·洛克在圣何塞追悼会上发表讲话，1990 年 6 月 18 日。这并不罕见：戈登·摩尔，作者采访，2004 年 7 月 1 日。
56. Rock conjectures: Arthur Rock speaking at the San Jose memorial service, 18 June 1990. It was not unusual: Gordon Moore, interview by author, 1 July 2004.
57. 格罗夫想要更多：理查德·霍奇森，作者访谈。安迪已经厌倦了他的博士学位：戈登·摩尔，作者访谈，2004年7月1日。
57. Grove wanted more and more: Richard Hodgson, interview by author. Andy had gotten over his PhD: Gordon Moore, interview by author, 1 July 2004.
58. 员工会议五周周期：诺伊斯记录簿，1972 年 1 月 3 日。
58. Five-week cycle for staff meetings: Noyce record book, 3 Jan. 1972.
59. 来自外部的鲍勃：一位英特尔员工要求不要透露其在这一点上的身份。
59. From outside Bob running: Intel employee who requested not to be attributed on this point.
60. 我们怎样才能让你做好准备/给我这份工作：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。
60. How can we get you ready/give me the job: Andy Grove, interview by author.
61. 诺伊斯和格罗夫计划：诺伊斯 1975 年的日记本。
61. Noyce and Grove planned: Noyce’s 1975 datebook.
62. 疯狂的扩张主义者：摩尔在林德格伦的《双头怪兽》中被引用。走在悬崖边的细线上：诺伊斯在劳埃德·沃森的《增长的经典案例》中被引用，旧金山纪事报，没有日期，但显然是 1973 年。
62. Wild expansionist: Moore quoted in Lindgren, “Two-Headed Monster.” Walking the thin line next to the cliff: Noyce quoted in Lloyd Watson, “A Classic Case of Growth,” San Francisco Chronicle, no date, but clearly 1973.
63. 我们的五年目标：Noyce 在 Davidow、Flath、Noyce 口述历史、IA。
63. Our five year goal: Noyce in Davidow, Flath, Noyce oral history, IA.
64. 让我们拿下山头：罗杰·博罗沃伊，作者采访。
64. Let’s take the hill: Roger Borovoy, interview by author.
65. 功能齐全的 300 美元电脑：Gelbach、Grove、Jenkins 口述历史。
65. Fully functional $300 computer: Gelbach, Grove, Jenkins oral history.
66. 比尔·诺伊斯对祖母的评论：一张家庭相册中的电脑屏幕照片，由波莉·诺伊斯提供。电脑/运动类比：比尔·诺伊斯，作者访谈。
66. Bill Noyce’s comments to his grandmother: a photo of the computer screen in a family photo album, courtesy Polly Noyce. Computer/motor analogy: Bill Noyce, interview by author.
67. 我当时觉得他要么会晕倒，要么会打我：格尔巴赫（Gelbach），引自格尔巴赫、格罗夫和詹金斯的口述历史。我们的产品并非通用微型计算机：安迪·格罗夫，作者访谈。值得注意的是，在20世纪80年代中期的一次访谈中（《改变世界的机器》访谈，IA），诺伊斯表示他“错过了个人电脑”——他没有意识到市场的潜在规模，也没有意识到该设备可能产生的影响。这番话可能意味着诺伊斯设想的英特尔计算机是用于商业用途的，或者他只是低估了市场规模——又或者他一贯谦逊。无论如何，格尔巴赫、格罗夫和摩尔都分别讲述了非常相似的故事，讲述了诺伊斯力推英特尔计算机的历程。目前尚未有文献证据出现。
67. Thought he would either faint or hit me: Gelbach in Gelbach, Grove, Jenkins oral history. Ours is not a general purpose microcomputer: Andy Grove, interview by author. It is interesting to note that in an interview from the mid-1980s (“Machine that Changed the World” interview, IA), Noyce says that he “missed the personal computer”—that he did not appreciate the potential size of the market nor the probable impact of the device. This comment may mean that Noyce envisioned the Intel machine for business use, or that he simply underestimated the size of the market—or that he was being characteristically self-effacing. In any case, Gelbach, Grove, and Moore all independently told very similar stories about Noyce’s push for an Intel computer. Documentary evidence has yet to emerge.
68. 世界最大的计算机制造商：诺伊斯引自吉恩·拜林斯基，《第二次计算机革命即将到来》，《财富》杂志，1975 年 11 月。
68. World’s largest computer manufacturer: Noyce quoted in Gene Bylinsky, “Here Comes the Second Computer Revolution,” Fortune, Nov. 1975.
69. 重点转向控制：“英特尔的罗伯特·诺伊斯自责不已”，《商业周刊》，1974 年 12 月 14 日。
69. Emphasis shifting to control: “Intel’s Robert Noyce Kicks Himself Upstairs,” Business Week, 14 Dec. 1974.
70. 以人际交往为主导的领导力：“英特尔的罗伯特·诺伊斯自食其果”，《商业周刊》，1974 年 12 月 14 日。麦英特尔和高科技软糖：维克多·K·麦克尔亨尼，“高科技软糖王牌”，《纽约时报》，1977 年 6 月 5 日。格鲁夫最初于 1974 年在一次安全分析师会议上发表了这些评论。
70. Leadership by personal contact: “Intel’s Robert Noyce Kicks Himself Upstairs,” Business Week, 14 Dec. 1974. McIntel and high-technology jelly beans: Victor K. McElheny, “High Technology Jelly Bean Ace,” New York Times, 5 June 1977. Grove originally made these comments to a meeting of security analysts in 1974.
71. 鲍勃几乎消失了：安迪·格鲁夫，作者采访。
71. Bob practically disappeared: Andy Grove, interview by author.
72. 克里特岛人口：根据人口普查数据估算。50,000美元捐款：菲利普·赫克曼于 1975 年 6 月 21 日向鲍勃·诺伊斯捐赠，ASB。
72. Population of Crete: approximation based on census data. $50,000 donation: Philip Heckman to Bob Noyce, 21 June 1975, ASB.
73. 多恩学院诺伊斯教堂的落成典礼：除非另有说明，描述和引语均出自哈里特·诺伊斯汇编的回忆录《诺伊斯教堂，致敬和奉献仪式》，ASB。
73. Dedication of the Noyce Chapel at Doane College: Unless otherwise noted, the description and quotes are from a booklet of recollections Harriet Noyce assembled, “The Noyce Chapel, A Service of Tribute and Dedication,” ASB.
74. 这深深地感动了我：拉尔夫·诺伊斯致鲍勃·诺伊斯，1975 年 5 月 21 日。
74. How deeply it moves me: Ralph Noyce to Bob Noyce, 21 May 1975.
第十章：更新
Chapter 10: Renewal
1. 安·鲍尔斯传记：安·鲍尔斯，作者采访，2004 年 8 月 5 日和 2004 年 8 月 16 日。
1. Ann Bowers biography: Ann Bowers, interview by author, 5 Aug. 2004 and 16 Aug. 2004.
2. 他能记住口号：在 1982 年接受 TR Reid 采访时，诺伊斯在没有 Reid 提示的情况下背诵了这句口号。
2. He could recall slogan: In his 1982 interview with T. R. Reid, Noyce recited this slogan without any prompting from Reid.
3. 最大单一股东：贝蒂·诺伊斯 (Betty Noyce) 引述于《缅因州时报》 1991 年 10 月 4 日的“贝蒂·诺伊斯创办了自己的银行”一文。关于贝蒂·诺伊斯的传闻：“据报道，英特尔创始人的前妻出售了股票”，《旧金山观察家报》 1976 年 6 月 25 日。
3. Largest single stockholder: Betty Noyce quoted in “Betty Noyce Starts a Bank of Her Own,” Maine Times, 4 Oct. 1991. Rumors that Betty Noyce: “Intel Founder’s Ex-Wife Reported Selling Shares,” San Francisco Examiner, 25 June 1976.
4. 关于贝蒂·诺伊斯的慈善事业：艾伦·古德曼，《做出改变》，《旧金山纪事报》，1996年9月26日；《贝蒂·诺伊斯创办自己的银行》，《缅因州时报》 ，1991年10月4日；《波特兰新闻先驱报》（1996年9月23日）和《班戈每日新闻》 （1996年9月19日）的讣告；1996年6月和7月， 《波特兰新闻先驱报》和《缅因州周日电讯报》刊登的关于公共市场和LL Bean商店开业的文章。金·斯特罗斯奈德撰写的关于贝蒂·诺伊斯的精彩人物特写《诺伊斯低调行事，却引领潮流》，《缅因州周日电讯报》，1995年12月3日。所有文章均由天秤座基金会和欧文·威尔斯提供。
4. On Betty Noyce’s philanthropy: Ellen Goodman, “Making a Difference,” San Francisco Chronicle, 26 Sept. 1996); “Betty Noyce Starts a Bank of Her Own,” Maine Times, 4 Oct. 1991; obituaries in Portland Press Herald (23 Sept. 1996) and Bangor Daily News (19 Sept. 1996); articles on the opening of the public market and an L.L. Bean store from June and July, 1996 in Portland Press Herald and Maine Sunday Telegram. An excellent profile of Betty Noyce is Kim Strosnider, “Noyce shuns limelight while showing the way,” Maine Sunday Telegram, 3 Dec. 1995. All articles courtesy Libra Foundation and Owen Wells.
5. Bowers 与 Grove 的对话：Ann Bowers，作者采访，2004 年 8 月 5 日。
5. Bowers conversation with Grove: Ann Bowers, interview by author, 5 Aug. 2004.
6. 本段所有引文：戈登·摩尔致员工，1976 年 6 月 4 日，爱荷华州。
6. All quotes this paragraph: Gordon Moore to employees, 4 June 1976, IA.
7. 非工会成员，并希望保持非工会成员身份：“非工会研讨会定于1973年12月26日举行” ， 《帕洛阿尔托时报》。该研讨会于1974年1月在PSC举行。每张桌子上都有一份传单：迈克·艾森舍尔在塞维利亚的《雇佣实践和产业重组》第295页中引用。
7. Non-union and wish to remain so: “Non-Union Seminar Slated,” Palo Alto Times, 26 Dec. 1973. The seminar was conducted in January 1974, PSC. A copy of the leaflet on every desk: Mike Eisenscher quoted in Sevilla, “Employment Practices and Industrial Restructuring,” 295.
8. 增加 25%：查尔斯·戈德斯坦引自罗恩·伊斯科夫，《工资不是员工工会化的关键因素》，《西海岸电子新闻》，1977 年 4 月 18 日，PSC。5000名工人罢工：“湾区 3 家电子公司遭受罢工”，《电子新闻》，1968 年 4 月 8 日；塞维利亚，156。
8. 25 percent more: Charles Goldstein quoted in Ron Iscoff, “Wages Not Key Factor in Employee Unionization,” West Coast Electronic News, 18 April 1977, PSC. 5,000 workers struck: “3 Electronics Firms Hit By Strikes in Bay Area,” Electronic News, 8 April 1968; Sevilla, 156.
9. 英特尔奖金会议：塞维利亚 296。如果你相信：查尔斯·戈德斯坦引自罗恩·伊斯科夫，“工资不是员工工会化的关键因素”，西海岸电子新闻，1977 年 4 月 18 日，PSC。
9. Intel bonus meetings: Sevilla 296. If you believe: Charles Goldstein quoted in Ron Iscoff, “Wages Not Key Factor in Employee Unionization,” West Coast Electronic News, 18 April 1977, PSC.
10. 可怕的工作场所：Gene Flath 在 Davidow、Flath 和 Noyce 的口述历史中，IA。大型 1103 机器：Real，“进行中的革命”，41，IA。
10. Scary places to work: Gene Flath in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history, IA. Big 1103 machine: Real, “Revolution in Progress,” 41, IA.
11. 我们吓坏了：琳达·埃尔利希，瑞秋·斯图尔特采访，IA。
11. We were petrified: Linda Erlich, interview by Rachel Stewart, IA.
12. 他们当时非常紧张：Gene Flath 在 Davidow、Flath 和 Noyce 的口述历史中说道。
12. They were just so nervous: Gene Flath in Davidow, Flath, and Noyce oral history, IA.
13. 36% 至 27%：《美国统计摘要》，1990 年，图表 728；《美国统计摘要》，1984 年，图表 698。生产工人的人口统计：塞维利亚，《就业实践与产业结构调整》，第 172、292 页。1979年的流动率：塞维利亚，《就业实践与产业结构调整》，第 299 页。
13. 36 percent to 27 percent: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990, Chart 728; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1984, Chart 698. Demographics of production workers: Sevilla, “Employment Practices and Industrial Restructuring,” 172, 292. 1979 turnover rates: Sevilla, “Employment Practices and Industrial Restructuring,” 299.
14. 我们非工会地位：戈登·摩尔致全体员工，1976 年 7 月 6 日，爱荷华州。
14. Our non-union status: Gordon Moore to all employees, 6 July 1976, IA.
15. 过强：戈登·摩尔，作者访谈，2004 年 7 月 1 日。诺伊斯谈汽车电子：例如，参见诺伊斯，《动力总成控制：LSI 技术的融合》，《汽车电子》，1978 年，IA；诺伊斯和克雷格·R·巴雷特，《汽车与微型计算机革命——解决可靠性问题》，[1984？]，IA。诺伊斯分析师演讲：诺伊斯，《英特尔公司向纽约安全分析师协会的演讲》，1978 年 1 月 31 日，ASB。
15. Too strong: Gordon Moore, interview by author, 1 July 2004. Noyce speaking on automotive electronics: See, for example, Noyce, “Power Train Control: A Convergence of LSI Technologies,” Automotive Electronics, 1978, IA; Noyce and Craig R. Barrett, “The Automobile and the Microcomputer Revolution—Solving the Reliability Problem,” [1984?], IA. Noyce analyst presentation: Noyce, “Intel Corporation Presentation to the New York Society of Security Analysts,” 31 Jan. 1978, ASB.
16. 我遇到了诺伊斯：汤姆·罗在因尼斯，罗口述历史，IA。
16. I ran into Noyce: Tom Rowe in Innes, Rowe oral history, IA.
17. 我一直在做很多风险投资方面的事情：保罗·霍斯金斯基，作者采访。
17. I’ve been doing a lot of venture stuff: Paul Hwoschinsky, interview by author.
18. 诺伊斯很可能是其中之一：尤金·克莱纳在接受作者采访时强调，为第一支凯鹏华盈基金寻找有限合伙人非常困难。克莱纳和诺伊斯此前已经投资过对方的公司（克莱纳投资了英特尔，诺伊斯投资了克莱纳的外围设备公司Cybercom）。因此，几乎可以肯定的是，克莱纳会邀请诺伊斯投资他的风险投资基金。诺伊斯几乎肯定会接受这一邀请，但公司的有限合伙人名单当然属于商业机密。不过值得注意的是，安·鲍尔斯表示，在他们1975年结婚后，诺伊斯就再也没有成为任何凯鹏华盈基金的有限合伙人。
18. Noyce most likely among them: in his interview with the author, Eugene Kleiner stressed that it had been very difficult to find limited partners for the first Kleiner Perkins fund. Kleiner and Noyce had already invested in each other’s companies once (Kleiner in Intel and Noyce in Kleiner’s peripherals company Cybercom). It is thus almost certain that Kleiner would have offered Noyce an opportunity to invest in his venture fund. Noyce almost certainly would have taken him up on this offer, but a firm’s list of limited partners is, of course, proprietary. It should be noted, however, that Ann Bowers says that after their 1975 marriage, Noyce was not a limited partner in any Kleiner Perkins fund.
19. 投资与希望：尤金·克莱纳，作者采访。
19. Invest and hope: Eugene Kleiner, interview by author.
20. 第一支基金回报了 40 倍：尤金·克莱纳，查理·斯波克采访。
20. First fund returned 40 times: Eugene Kleiner, interview by Charlie Sporck.
21. 只能损失 100%：保罗·霍斯金斯基，作者采访，2003 年 6 月 3 日。
21. Can only lose 100 percent: Paul Hwoschinsky, interview by author, 3 June 2003.
22. 卡拉尼什基金：除非另有说明，信息均来自保罗·霍斯金斯基，作者于 2003 年 6 月 3 日对其进行的采访。诺伊斯的日记中出现了许多卡拉尼什公司的名称。
22. Callanish Fund: Unless otherwise noted, information is from Paul Hwoschinsky, interview by author, 3 June 2003. The names of many Callanish companies appear throughout Noyce’s datebooks.
23. 诺伊斯的另一家公司：杰伊·帕尔默，“获得认可——诺伊斯的另一家公司 Caere 正在走向成功”，《巴伦周刊》，1991 年 8 月 5 日。
23. Noyce’s other company: Jay Palmer, “Achieving Recognition—Caere, the Other Noyce Company, is Coming into Its Own,” Barron’s, 5 Aug. 1991.
24. 帮助说服他的朋友们：Caere 的投资者包括格林内尔学院、Venrock Associates（Noyce 曾与该公司共同投资英特尔和相干辐射公司）以及 Asset Management Partners（其负责人 Pitch Johnson 是相干辐射公司的主要投资者）。Caere 首次公开募股招股说明书，1989 年 10 月 19 日，由 Bob Teresi 提供。
24. Helped convince his friends: Among the investors in Caere were Grinnell College, Venrock Associates (with whom Noyce had invested at Intel and Coherent Radiation), and Asset Management Partners (whose principal Pitch Johnson was a major investor in Coherent Radiation). Caere IPO Prospectus, 19 Oct. 1989, courtesy Bob Teresi.
25. Caere：除非另有说明，否则信息来自 Bob Teresi，作者对其进行了采访。
25. Caere: Unless otherwise indicated, information is from Bob Teresi, interview by author.
26. 偿还体制：吉姆·达顿，作者采访。
26. Paying back the system: Jim Dutton, interview by author.
27. 大概25万美元：达顿和特雷西都记不清确切金额。由于当时公司是私人控股，因此没有向美国证券交易委员会提交交易记录。
27. Probably $250,000: Neither Dutton nor Teresi recalls the precise amount. Since the company was privately held at the time, no record of the transaction was filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
28. 年度电子公司：未识别剪报，爱荷华州。
28. Electronics company of the year: unidentified clipping, IA.
29. 我提议：戈登·摩尔致理查德·戈蒂埃（控制数据公司），1975年4月4日。请你们两位看一下：摩尔致RS·博罗沃伊和LR·胡特尼克，1975年7月18日。你们应该集中注意力：摩尔致WF·乔丹，1975年1月20日。安·鲍尔斯已宣布：摩尔致员工，1976年5月20日。格罗夫补充摩尔的观点：戈登·摩尔，瑞秋·斯图尔特采访，日期不详。所有项目，IA。
29. I propose: Gordon Moore to Ricard Gottier (Control Data Corporation), 4 Apr. 1975. Will you two please look: Moore to R. S. Borovoy and L. R. Hootnick, 18 July 1975. You should concentrate: Moore to W. F. Jordan, 20 Jan. 1975. Ann Bowers has announced: Moore to employees, 20 May 1976. Grove amplifying Moore: Gordon Moore, interview by Rachel Stewart, no date. All items, IA.
30. 诺伊斯的个性非常杰出：戈登·摩尔，亚当·诺伊斯采访，无日期[可能是 2000 年]，GCA。
30. Noyce’s personality was so outstanding: Gordon Moore, interview by Adam Noyce, no date [probably 2000], GCA.
31. 真正不同之处：雷吉斯·麦肯纳，作者采访。
31. What really differentiates: Regis McKenna, interview by author.
32. 我刚刚出生：鲍勃·哈灵顿，作者采访。
32. I was just born: Bob Harrington, interview by author.
33. 《商业周刊》封面：“半导体领域的新领袖”，《商业周刊》，1976 年 3 月 1 日。 《纽约时报》人物特写：维克托·K·麦克尔亨尼，“不满成为职业生涯的动力”，《纽约时报》，1976 年 12 月 15 日。
33. Business Week cover: “New Leaders in Semiconductors,” Business Week, 1 March 1976. New York Times profile: Viktor K. McElheny, “Dissatisfaction as a Spur to Career,” New York Times, 15 Dec. 1976.
34. 这种情况很少见：James M. Early 致 Noyce，1977 年 12 月 9 日，ASB。
34. It is rare: James M. Early to Noyce, 9 Dec. 1977, ASB.
35. 创业模式：安·鲍尔斯和鲍勃·诺伊斯于1978年12月7日发表的圣诞贺信，格兰特·盖尔文集，GCA。唯一的风险：维克托·K·麦克尔亨尼，《麻省理工学院研讨会谴责工业“创新危机”》，《纽约时报》 ，1976年12月10日。企业家不是约翰·韦恩：诺伊斯，《演讲提纲：创业精神，麻省理工学院》（未注明日期，但显然是在麻省理工学院研讨会上发表的），IA。对成功充满信心：罗伯特·诺伊斯，《创新：除了恐惧之外，别无所畏惧》（麻省理工学院创新管理研讨会总结），《技术评论》 ，1977年2月。
35. Model of entrepreneurial endeavor: general Christmas letter from Ann Bowers and Bob Noyce, 7 Dec. 1978, Grant Gale Papers, GCA. Only risk: Viktor K. McElheny, “An Industrial ‘Innovation Crisis’ is Decried at MIT Symposium,” New York Times, 10 Dec. 1976. Entrepreneur not John Wayne: Noyce, “Speech Outline: Entrepreneurship, MIT,” [no date, but clearly delivered at the MIT symposium], IA. Be confident of success: Robert Noyce, “Innovation: Nothing to Fear but Fear” [summary of MIT Symposium on the management of Innovation], Technology Review, Feb. 1977.
36. 有点谦逊，有点骄傲：摘自一段未具名的采访片段，收录于“美好人生的回忆”视频中，IA。
36. A little humble, a little proud: clip from an unidentified interview included in “Remembrance of a Life Well Lived,” video, IA.
37. 好几个人急忙告诉我：赫伯·凯恩，“最新消息”，《旧金山纪事报》，1980 年 2 月 5 日。
37. Several people hasten to tell me: Herb Caen, “Update,” San Francisco Chronicle, 5 Feb. 1980.
38. 我父亲样样都好：佩妮·诺伊斯，作者采访，2002 年 4 月 9 日。
38. My father was good at everything: Penny Noyce, interview by author, 9 Apr. 2002.
39. 你有一个幸福的家庭：受访者要求匿名。
39. You’ve got a nice family: interview subject requested anonymity.
40. 让安迪更加引人注目：雷吉斯·麦肯纳，作者采访。关于格罗夫的专题文章：维克托·K·麦克尔亨尼，“聚光灯：高科技果冻豆王牌”，《纽约时报》，1977 年 6 月 5 日。
40. Make Andy more visible: Regis McKenna, interview by author. Feature article on Grove: Viktor K. McElheny, “Spotlight: High-Technology Jelly Bean Ace,” New York Times, 5 June 1977.
41. 鲍勃爱炫耀的一面：安·鲍尔斯，作者访谈，2002年6月22日。精彩绝伦的跳水表演：查理·斯波克，作者访谈。K2夹克的故事：理查德·霍奇森在英特尔为诺伊斯举行的追悼会上发言，视频，ASB。喜欢与众不同：吉姆·拉弗蒂，作者访谈。
41. Showoff side to Bob: Ann Bowers, interview by author, 22 Jun. 2002. Hell of a diving show: Charlie Sporck, interview by author. K2 jacket story: Richard Hodgson speaking at the Intel memorial service for Noyce, video, ASB. Liked being special: Jim Lafferty, interview by author.
42. 诺伊斯走到我面前：哈里·塞洛，作者采访。
42. Noyce stepped in front of me: Harry Sello, interview by author.
43. 杰奎琳·奥纳西斯：哈丽特·诺伊斯致《女孩们》，1984 年 2 月 8 日，DSN。向诺伊斯致敬的图片：大幅修改的《花花公子》，1984 年 1 月，ASB。
43. Jackie Onassis: Harriet Noyce to Girls, 8 Feb. 1984, DSN. Pictorial salute to Noyce: much-altered Playgirl, Jan. 1984, ASB.
44. 销售额达 5000 亿美元：富国银行，《经济预测——圣克拉拉县：1990 年增长前景》，1982 年 4 月，第 9 页，IA。年增长率达 18%：富国银行，《经济预测》，第 9 页。150万制造业工人：苏珊·本纳，《硅谷上空的乌云》，《公司》，1982 年 9 月，第 84 页。高科技就业增长：湾区政府协会，《硅谷及周边地区：旧金山湾区的高科技增长》（区域经济工作文件，第 2 号），第 1 页； 《硅谷经济》，旧金山联邦储备银行周刊，第92-22期，1992年5月29日。（就业岗位从38万个增加到66.5万个。）六十页广告：塞维利亚，“就业实践和产业结构调整”，238。人均个人收入增长：富国银行，“经济预测”，17。
44. Sales of $500 billion: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., “Economic Forecast—Santa Clara County: Growth Prospects to 1990,” April 1982, 9, IA. 18 percent annual growth: Wells Fargo Bank, “Economic Forecast,” 9. 1.5 million manufacturing workers: Susan Benner, “Storm Clouds Over Silicon Valley,” Inc., Sept. 1982, 84. High-technology employment grew: Association of Bay Area Governments, “Silicon Valley and Beyond: High Technology Growth for the San Francisco Bay Area,” (Working Papers on the Region’s Economy, No. 2), 1; “The Silicon Valley Economy,” FRBSF [Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco] Weekly Newsletter, Number 92–22, 29 May 29 1992. (Jobs increased from 380,000 to 665,000.) Sixty pages of advertisements: Sevilla, “Employment Practices and Industrial Restructuring,” 238. Per capita personal income growth: Wells Fargo Bank, “Economic Forecast,” 17.
45. 更多百万富翁：Kindel 和 Teitelman，“年轻人，去东方吧”，第 132 页。超过 1000 家公司：“一场美国革命：硅谷的即时大亨”，《旧金山纪事报》，1980 年 9 月 23 日。如果还有希望：Arthur Levitt, Jr. 引自 Alexander L. Taylor III，“一夜暴富”，《时代周刊》，1982 年 2 月 15 日。
45. More millionaires: Kindel and Teitelman, “Go East, Young Man,” 132. More than 1,000 companies: “A U.S. Revolution: Instant Tycoons in Silicon Valley,” San Francisco Chronicle, 23 Sept. 1980. If there is any hope: Arthur Levitt, Jr., quoted in Alexander L. Taylor III, “Striking It Rich,” Time, 15 Feb. 1982.
46. 小企业家完全依赖于：罗伯特·诺伊斯，在国会作证，众议院能源和商业委员会电信和金融小组委员会，高清电视：在众议院能源和商业委员会电信和金融小组委员会的听证会，1989 年 9 月 13 日。
46. Small entrepreneurs depend totally: Robert Noyce, Testimony before Congress, Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, High Definition Television: Hearing Before the House Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 13 Sept., 1989.
47. 苹果公司的创立：Mike Markkula，作者采访；Steve Jobs，作者采访；Michael Moritz，《小王国：苹果电脑的私人故事》（纽约：William Morrow and Co.，1984 年）。
47. Apple founding: Mike Markkula, interview by author; Steve Jobs, interview by author; Michael Moritz, The Little Kingdom: The Private Story of Apple Computer (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1984).
48. 除此之外，英特尔别无所求：迈克·马库拉（Mike Markkula），作者采访。甚至英特尔和苹果之间建立供应商-客户关系也未能实现。沃兹尼亚克最初为苹果电脑选择了摩托罗拉处理器，尽管马库拉表示他和格鲁夫曾多次会面讨论是否应该改用英特尔芯片，但“时机始终不成熟”，因此苹果最终还是选择了摩托罗拉。
48. Nothing else was in Intel’s interest: Mike Markkula, interview by author. Even a supplier-customer relationship between Intel and Apple failed to materialize. Wozniak had originally chosen a Motorola processor for Apple machines, and even though Markkula says he and Grove met several times to discuss whether a switch to an Intel chip was warranted, “the timing was never right,” and so Apple stayed with Motorola.
49. 麦肯纳晚宴上的工作：安·鲍尔斯，作者采访。
49. Jobs at McKenna dinner: Ann Bowers, interview by author.
50. 不太吸引人：Arthur Rock 在“哈佛商学院工作知识”中引用，http://hbswk.hbs.edu/pubitem.jhtml?id =1821&t=special_reports_donedeals
50. Not very appealing: Arthur Rock quoted in “HBS [Harvard Business School] Working Knowledge,” http://hbswk.hbs.edu/pubitem.jhtml?id=1821&t=special_reports_donedeals
51. 诺伊斯和乔布斯海蜂事故：史蒂夫·乔布斯，作者采访。
51. Noyce and Jobs Seabee accident: Steve Jobs, interview by author.
52. 记住个人的事情：史蒂夫·乔布斯，作者采访。
52. Remember personal things: Steve Jobs, interview by author.
53. 苹果电脑公司首次公开募股：苹果电脑公司招股说明书，1980 年 12 月 12 日。
53. Apple Computer IPO: Apple Computer prospectus, 12 Dec. 1980.
54. 关于 Tandem：Smith，“硅谷精神”；“美国偶像的陨落”，《商业周刊》，1996 年 2 月 5 日。康柏收购 Tandem：David Lazarus，“康柏通过收购 Tandem 提升高端产品”，《公司》，1997 年 6 月 23 日。
54. On Tandem: Smith, “Silicon Valley Spirit”; “The fall of an American Icon,” Business Week, 5 Feb. 1996. Compaq acquisition of Tandem: David Lazarus, “Compaq Boosts High End with Tandem Deal,” Inc., 23 June 1997.
55. 关于雅达利：http://www.campusprogram.com/reference/en/wikipedia/n/no/nolan_bushnell.html
55. On Atari: http://www.campusprogram.com/reference/en/wikipedia/n/no/nolan_bushnell.html
56. 关于 Genentech：时间线和投资者情况说明书，网址为http://www.gene.com，访问日期为 2004 年 8 月 24 日。
56. On Genentech: Timeline and Investors Fact Sheet at http://www.gene.com, accessed 24 Aug. 2004.
57. 超过 3,000 家小公司：Lenny Siegel，为众议院科学技术委员会科学、研究和技术小组委员会以及众议院预算委员会教育和就业工作组准备的证词，1983 年 6 月 16 日，PSC。供应链：James F. Gibbons，“斯坦福与硅谷的关系”，未发表的演讲稿，第 11 页，由 James Gibbons 提供。
57. More than 3,000 small firms: Lenny Siegel, Testimony Prepared for the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Technology and the Task Force on Education and Employment of the House Budget Committee, 16 June 1983, PSC. Supply chain: James F. Gibbons, “The Relationship Between Stanford and Silicon Valley,” unpublished speech manuscript, 11, courtesy James Gibbons.
58. 诺伊斯加入了饮酒俱乐部：杰克·梅尔乔，作者采访。
58. Noyce joined drinking club: Jack Melchor, interview by author.
59. 教育课程：本段大量引用了 Saxenian 的《区域优势》第 42 页。
59. Educational offerings: This paragraph relies heavily on Saxenian, Regional Advantage, 42.
60. 声望和干净的形象：富国银行，“经济预测”，IA。商业机器：安迪·格鲁夫，题为“斯坦福谈话——硅谷”的手写笔记，IA。
60. Prestige and clean image: Wells Fargo, “Economic Forecast,” IA. Business machine: Andy Grove, handwritten notes titled “Stanford talk—Si Valley,” IA.
61. 环顾硅谷：诺伊斯在《Upside》杂志1990年7月刊的《鲍勃·诺伊斯与Upside对话》一文中被引用（采访日期为1990年5月23日）。斯坦福大学前工程学院院长詹姆斯·吉本斯，长期参与并观察硅谷。Valley 也表达了同样的观点——“硅谷的英雄是企业家”，见 James F. Gibbons，“斯坦福大学的角色：一位院长的反思”，载于Chong-Moon Lee、William F. Miller、Marguerite Gong Hancock 和 Henry S. Rowen 编辑的《硅谷优势：创新和创业的栖息地》（斯坦福：斯坦福大学出版社），第 200-217 页。
61. Look around Silicon Valley: Noyce quoted in “Bob Noyce talks to Upside,” Upside, July 1990 [interview date is 23 May 1990]. Former Stanford Dean of Engineering James Gibbons, a long-time participant in and observer of Silicon Valley, makes the identical point—“the heroes in Silicon Valley are the entrepreneurs” in James F. Gibbons, “The Role of Stanford University: A Dean’s Reflections,” in The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation and Entrepreneurship, ed. Chong-Moon Lee, William F. Miller, Marguerite Gong Hancock, and Henry S. Rowen (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 200–217.
62. 我们为什么喜欢：马丁·米克尔，《硅谷的曙光》（致编辑的信），《公司》杂志，1982 年 12 月，第 11 页。
62. Why do we love: Martin Meeker, “Silicon Valley’s Silver Lining,” (Letter to the Editor), Inc., Dec. 1982, 11.
63. 墨菲定律的违背：诺伊斯，“巴黎大爆炸——RNN谈话要点”，[演讲提纲]，1988年4月12日，爱荷华州。老牌公司蓬勃发展：1973年至1978年间，仅有一家半导体公司成立，当时建造晶圆厂的固定成本高得令人望而却步——大约是诺伊斯和摩尔在1968年支付成本的六倍——这让大多数新进入者望而却步。美国十二大半导体公司：《电子市场数据手册：1981年版》（电子工业协会：1981年），第92页。
63. Violation of Murphy’s Law: Noyce, “Big Bang Paris—RNN Talking Points,” [speech outline] 12 Apr. 1988, IA. Established companies flourished: Only one semiconductor company was launched in the 1973–1978 period, when the prohibitively high fixed costs of building a fab—roughly six times what Noyce and Moore paid in 1968—discouraged most new entrants to the industry. Top twelve American firms: Electronic Market Data Book: 1981 Edition (Electronic Industries Association: 1981), 92.
64. 英特尔十周年庆典：“英特尔庆祝”，《圣何塞水星报》，1978 年 8 月 23 日。
64. Intel tenth anniversary celebration: “Intel Celebrates,” San Jose Mercury News, 23 Aug. 1978.
65. 自由的摇篮：这种思想可以追溯到历史学家弗雷德里克·杰克逊·特纳的著作。特纳写道，西部的“自由之地”如同“逃生之门”，通过倡导“个人主义、经济平等、向上流动的自由和民主”，重振了国家。弗雷德里克·杰克逊·特纳，《西部对美国民主的贡献》，《大西洋月刊》，1903年1月，第91页。广袤肥沃的平原：诺伊斯，《竞争与合作——八十年代的处方》，《研究管理》 ，1982年3月，第14页，IA。部分得益于诺伊斯：雅各布森，《逝去的农场，永恒的价值：加利福尼亚州的圣克拉拉谷》（洛斯阿尔托斯，加州：威廉·考夫曼出版社，1984年），第237页。
65. Birthplace of freedom: Such ideas can be traced to the writings of historian Frederick Jackson Turner. The “free lands” of the West, Turner wrote, served as a “gate of escape” and reinvigorated the country by promoting “individualism, economic equality, freedom to rise, [and] democracy.” Frederick Jackson Turner, “Contributions of the West to American Democracy,” Atlantic Monthly, 91, Jan. 1903, 91. Broad and fertile plain: Noyce, “Competition and Cooperation—A Prescription for the Eighties,” Research Management, March 1982, 14, IA. Thanks, in part, to Noyce: Jacobson, Passing Farms, Enduring Values: California’s Santa Clara Valley, (Los Altos, Ca.: William Kaufmann, Inc., 1984), 237.
66. 当然，作为美国：罗纳德·里根，“在国会联席会议上就国情咨文发表的讲话：1983 年 1 月 25 日”，《总统文件：罗纳德·里根政府》，107。我希望我当时说：诺伊斯，“高科技产业：20 世纪 80 年代的公共政策”，1983 年 2 月 1-2 日，IA。
66. Surely as America: Ronald Reagan, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union: January 25, 1983,” Papers of the Presidents: Administration of Ronald Reagan, 107. I wish I’d said: Noyce “High Technology Industries: Pulbic Policies for the 1980s,” 1–2 Feb. 1983, IA.
第十一章：政治创业
Chapter 11: Political Entrepreneurship
1. 政治企业家精神：菲利普·A·蒙多用“政治企业家”一词来描述与半导体行业协会合作的高管。菲利普·A·蒙多，《半导体行业协会》，利益集团：案例与特征（芝加哥：纳尔逊-霍尔出版社，1992 年）：41-66。
1. Political entrepreneurship: Philip A. Mundo uses the term “political entrepreneurs” to describe executives working with the Semiconductor Industry Association. Philip A. Mundo, “The Semiconductor Industry Association,” Interest Groups: Cases and Characteristics (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1992): 41–66.
2. 促成交易：1985年6月，诺伊斯提交了一份费用报告，记录了他前往IBM公司就英特尔微处理器进行演讲的行程。诺伊斯同期费用报告还列出了1983年4月与巴勒斯的一次会面，以及1984年1月与伦敦金属交易所（LME）客户的一次会议（费用报告，ASB）。接触重要客户：英特尔市场营销主管威廉·H·戴维多夫在其著作《高科技营销：内幕视角》（纽约：自由出版社，1986年）第130页和第152页中，探讨了诺伊斯在促成交易和接触高管方面提供的帮助。关注市场动态：诺伊斯，《数字创造》，《哈佛商业评论》 ，1980年5-6月。
2. Close deals: In June 1985, Noyce submitted an expense report for his having traveled to present on the Intel microprocessor to IBM. Noyce’s expense reports from this period also list a meeting with Burroughs in April 1983 and an LME Customer Meeting in January 1984 (expense reports, ASB). Access important accounts: Intel marketing executive William H. Davidow discusses Noyce’s help in closing deals and accessing executives in Marketing High-Technology, An Insider’s View (New York: The Free Press, 1986): 130, 152. Watch the store: Noyce, “Creativity by the Numbers,” Harvard Business Review, May–June 1980.
3. 罕见的鲍勃·诺伊斯目击事件：Inteleads，1983 年 4 月 1 日，爱荷华州。二十周年庆典：视频，爱荷华州。难以离开舞台：作者对玛尔·戴尔·卡斯托的采访。
3. Rare Bob Noyce Sighting: Inteleads, 1 Apr. 1983, IA. Twentieth anniversary celebration: video, IA. Hard to get off the stage: Mar Dell Casto, interview by author.
4. 诺伊斯的诗：由玛丽莱斯·卡斯托提供。诗的署名是“1980，鲍勃·诺伊斯”。
4. Noyce’s poem: courtesy Maryles Casto. The poem is signed, “1980, Bob Noyce.”
5. 友谊，友谊：哦，说，IC 可以吗？（剧本节选），第一届年度行业宴会，半导体设备和材料协会，1971 年 5 月 26 日，爱荷华州。
5. Friendship, friendship: Oh Say, Can IC? (script excerpt), First Annual Industry Banquet, Semiconductor Equipment and Materials Institute, 26 May 1971, IA.
6. 日本与美国市场份额对比：伦纳德·希尔斯（英特尔员工）于1986年10月15日致《List》杂志，信中引用了Dataquest的数据，并将其描述为“令人沮丧的图表”。这些数据基于全球市场收入。
6. Japanese vs. American share of market: Leonard Hills [Intel employee] to List, 15 Oct. 1986, IA. Hills includes figures from Dataquest that he describes as “‘Doom & Gloom’ graphs” in his letter. Figures based on world market revenues.
7. 就像占领山顶一样：杰弗里·比勒，“半导体行业代表对日本发出警报”，《计算机世界》，1979 年 6 月 25 日，第 64 页。
7. Like taking a hilltop: Jeffrey Beeler, “Semi Industry Reps Raise Alarm on Japanese,” Computerworld, 25 June 1979, 64.
8. 1985 年贸易逆差：McCraw，《从合作伙伴到竞争对手》，4.日本制铁，日本是头号威胁：Richards，《美国如何失去优势》；Lou Harris and Associates 民意调查结果引自 Robert Noyce，“SIA 行业会议”，1989 年 9 月 3 日，SIA。
8. 1985 trade deficit: McCraw, From Partners to Competitors, 4. Nippon Steel, Japan number one threat: Richards, “How America Lost the Edge”; Lou Harris and Associates poll results cited in Robert Noyce, “SIA Industry Conference,” 3 Sept. 1989, SIA.
9. 起源与培育：罗伯特·诺伊斯，《世界贸易与美国半导体行业面临的挑战》：半导体行业协会年度预测晚宴，1978 年 9 月 28 日，SIA。收购 19 家公司：诺伊斯，《代表半导体行业协会在美国国际贸易委员会的证词》，1979 年 5 月 30 日，SIA。
9. Originating and nurturing: Robert Noyce, World Trade and the Challenges Facing the U.S. Semiconductor Industry: Semiconductor Industry Association Annual Forecast Dinner, 28 Sept. 1978, SIA. Nineteen firms purchased: Noyce, Testimony Before the United States International Trade Commission on Behalf of the Semiconductor Industry Association, 30 May 1979, SIA.
10. 杰出人才：诺伊斯，《保持加州在研发领域的竞争力》，1986 年 10 月 10 日，《爱荷华州》。割断我们的喉咙：诺伊斯在吉恩·拜林斯基的《硅谷的日本间谍》一文中被引用，《财富》杂志，1978 年 2 月 27 日；差点被赶出日本：里奇·卡尔加德，《鲍勃·诺伊斯与Upside对话》， 《Upside》杂志，1990 年 7 月（1990 年 5 月 23 日采访）。空手道劈砍：诺伊斯，《世界贸易与美国半导体行业面临的挑战》[在SIA年度预测晚宴上的演讲]，1978年9月28日。1981年与日本人的会面：查理·斯波克，《衍生品：改变世界的行业的个人历史》（纽约州萨纳克湖：萨纳克湖出版社，2001年）：247。诺伊斯在蛋糕上烧纸旗：消息来源要求匿名。
10. Brilliant minds: Noyce, “Keeping California Competitive in R&D,” 10 Oct. 1986, IA. Slit our throats: Noyce quoted in Gene Bylinsky, “The Japanese Spies in Silicon Valley,” Fortune, 27 Feb. 1978; Almost thrown out of Japan: Rich Karlgaard, “Bob Noyce Talks to Upside,” Upside, July 1990 (interview 23 May 1990). Karate chop: Noyce, World Trade and the Challenges Facing the U.S. Semiconductor Industry [speech before the SIA Annual Forecast Dinner], 28 Sept. 1978. 1981 meeting with Japanese: Charlie Sporck, Spinoff: A Personal History of the Industry that Changed the World (Sarnac Lake, N.Y.: Sarnac Lake Publishing, 2001): 247. Noyce burning paper flags on cake: sources requested anonymity.
11. 放慢日本政府的步伐：SIA 董事会会议记录 1977 年 6 月 16 日，SIA。
11. Slow down Japanese government: Minutes of SIA Board of Directors meeting 16 June 1977, SIA.
12. 收入的 7%：Joel Stern，“国际融资结构差异”（由 Chase Financial Policy 应 SIA 要求进行的研究），IA。
12. Seven percent of revenues: Joel Stern, “International Structural Differences in Financing,” (Study undertaken by Chase Financial Policy at the request of the SIA), IA.
13. 政府赋予的优惠：Okimoto、Sugano 和 Weinstein，《竞争优势》，第 6 页。日本银行业：Stern，“融资的国际结构差异”，第 134-135 页。Stern 估计，“许多日本半导体公司的负债资本比率高达 60% 至 70%。……在过去三年（1978-1980 年）中，所审查的九家美国公司的负债资本比率中位数在 16% 至 18% 之间。” 日本银行愿意向这些高杠杆公司放贷，部分原因也源于日本产业的“财团”（keiretsu）结构。每家主要的日本半导体公司都是一到两个“财团”的长期成员。这些跨行业的企业集团——通常由一家大型商业银行牵头——通过股权和交叉持股、管理层和交叉董事、融资以及买卖关系等方式结合在一起。
13. Government-conferred benefits: Okimoto, Sugano, and Weinstein, Competitive Edge, 6. Japanese banking: Stern, “International Structural Differences in Financing,” 134–135. Stern estimates, “Many Japanese semiconductor companies maintain debt-to-capital ratios as high as 60 to 70 percent. … During the past three years [1978–1980], the median debt-to-capital ratios of the nine US companies reviewed were between 16 and 18 percent.” In part, the willingness of Japanese banks to lend to such highly leveraged firms also stemmed from the “keiretsu” structure of Japanese industry. Each of the major Japanese semiconductor firms was a longstanding member of one or two “keiretsu,” cross-industry corporate groups—usually headed by a major commercial bank—joined together through equity and cross-shareholdings, management and interlocking directorates, financing, and buying/selling relationships.
14. 关于资本利得税：作者对 Ed Zschau 的采访；J. Andrew Hoerner 编辑，《资本利得争议：税务分析师读本》（弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿：税务分析师，1992 年）。
14. On the capital gains tax: Ed Zschau, interview by author; J. Andrew Hoerner, ed., The Capital Gains Controversy: A Tax Analysts Reader (Arlington, Va.: Tax Analysts, 1992).
15. 美国市场份额：Douglas A. Irwin，“贸易政治与半导体行业”，NBER 工作论文 4745。16K EPROM降价：Noyce，萨克拉门托演讲，1983 年 9 月 28 日，IA。带领大家祈祷：Noyce，SIA 演讲，1981 年 10 月 1 日，SIA。
15. American share of market: Douglas A. Irwin, “Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry,” NBER Working Paper 4745. 16K EPROM price cuts: Noyce, Sacto Speech, 28 Sept. 1983, IA. Lead the group in prayer: Noyce, SIA Speech, 1 Oct. 1981, SIA.
16. 日本市场份额超过美国：SIA，“半导体行业协会，关键事实和问题”，4。
16. Japanese share surpassed American: SIA, “The Semiconductor Industry Association, Key Facts and Issues,” 4.
17. 20亿美元，27000个就业岗位：诺伊斯，《向美国众议院科学、空间和技术委员会技术政策工作组提供的关于国家技术开发和利用的证词》，1987年9月25日。我们堕落到何种地步：《仙童出售影响我们所有人》，《圣何塞水星报》，1986年10月26日。业界被视为联合反对：伊芙琳·理查兹，《底线表明谁将收购仙童》，《圣何塞水星报》，1987年9月7日。世界天翻地覆：克里斯托弗·H·施密特，《日本人将收购仙童的大部分股份：富士通有限公司将收购这家芯片先驱80%的股份》，《圣何塞水星报》 ， 1986年10月24日。
17. $2 billion, 27,000 jobs: Noyce, “Testimony on National Technology Development and Utilization Provided to the Technology Policy Task Force Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives,” 25 Sept. 1987. How far we’ve fallen: “Fairchild Sale Touches Us All,” San Jose Mercury News, 26 Oct. 1986. Industry considered united opposition: Evelyn Richards, “Bottom Line Indicated Who Would Buy Fairchild,” San Jose Mercury News, 7 Sept. 1987. World turned upside down: Christopher H. Schmitt, “Japanese to Buy Most of Fairchild: Fujitsu Ltd would Take Over 80 Percent of Chip Pioneer,” San Jose Mercury News, 24 Oct. 1986.
18. 穿过旋转门：安迪·格鲁夫引自罗伯特·A·伯格曼，《褪色的记忆：动态环境下战略性企业退出的过程研究》，《行政科学季刊》，第 39 卷（1994 年），第 24-56 页。
18. Go through the revolving door: Andy Grove quoted in Robert A. Burgelman, “Fading Memories: A Process Study of Strategic Business Exit in Dynamic Environments,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 39 (1994), 24–56.
19. 最令人揪心的决定：亚瑟·洛克在2002年9月30日于加州山景城计算机历史博物馆举行的“风险投资传奇”小组讨论会上发表讲话。日本人完胜：安·鲍尔斯，作者采访，2004年8月16日。
19. Most gut-wrenching decision: Arthur Rock, speaking at a “Legends of Venture Capital” panel, Computer History Museum, Mountain View, Calif., 30 Sept. 2002. Japanese beating the heck: Ann Bowers, interview by author, 16 Aug. 2004.
20. 每年损失7200个工作岗位：诺伊斯，《向美国众议院科学、空间和技术委员会技术政策工作组提供的关于国家技术发展和利用的证词》，1987年9月25日。如何关闭英特尔：安·鲍尔斯，作者采访，2004年8月16日。日本收购英特尔：Inteleads，1987年4月1日，爱荷华州。这对某些人来说很困难：达里尔·哈塔诺对作者说，1998年2月2日。
20. 7,200 jobs, annual losses: Noyce, “Testimony on National Technology Development and Utilization Provided to the Technology Policy Task Force Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives,” 25 Sept. 1987. How to shut down Intel: Ann Bowers, interview by author, 16 Aug. 2004. Japanese Buy Intel: Inteleads, 1 April 1987, IA. It’s hard for someone: Daryl Hatano to author, 2 Feb. 1998.
21. 帝国的衰落：诺伊斯，《在开放经济中竞争》，加州大学伯克利分校主题演讲，1987 年 1 月 22 日，爱荷华州。死亡螺旋：诺伊斯引自伊芙琳·理查兹。 《美国如何在世界贸易战场上失去优势》，《圣何塞水星报》，1986年4月20日。你会如何称呼底特律：诺伊斯引自伊芙琳·理查兹，《两位硅谷远见卓识者对未来愿景的看法不同》，《圣何塞水星报》，1986年1月20日。失业人数：大卫·西尔维斯特，《2017年，硅谷的奥德赛》，《西部杂志》（ 《圣何塞水星报》周日增刊），1987年6月7日，第18页。乐观至关重要：罗伯特·诺伊斯，《创新促繁荣：未来十年》，1981年2月21日向全国州长协会发表，并于1981年3月10日至11日在华盛顿特区举行的SIA“国际微电子挑战：产业界、大学和政府的应对”会议上发表。
21. Decline of empire: Noyce, Competing in an Open Economy, Keynote Address UCB [University of California at Berkeley], 22 Jan. 1987, IA. Death spiral: Noyce quoted in Evelyn Richards. “How America Lost the Edge on the World Trade Battlefield,” San Jose Mercury News, 20 April 1986. What would you call Detroit: Noyce quoted in Evelyn Richards, “Two Valley Visionaries Don’t See Same Horizon,” San Jose Mercury News, 20 Jan. 1986. Job loss figure: David Sylvester, “2017, A Silicon Valley Odyssey,” West Magazine (Sunday supplement to the San Jose Mercury News), 7 June 1987, 18. Optimism is essential: Robert Noyce, “Innovation for Prosperity: The Coming Decade,” delivered to the National Governor’s Association 21 Feb. 81 and to SIA’s conference on the “International Microelectronics Challenge: A Response by the Industry, the Universities and the Government,” Washington D.C. 10–11 March 1981, IA.
22. 目标企业家：Noyce，“高科技产业：20 世纪 80 年代的公共政策”，[演讲]，1983 年 2 月 2 日，爱荷华州。
22. Target entrepreneurs: Noyce, “High Technology Industries: Public Policies for the 1980s,” [speech], 2 Feb. 1983, IA.
23. 民主党的论点：拉扎勒斯和利坦，《民主党即将爆发内战》，第 95 页。
23. Democratic argument: Lazarus and Litan, “Democrats’ Coming Civil War,” 95.
24. 是时候更加关注微观需求了：参议员阿德莱·史蒂文森二世引述于美国参议院民主党经济工作组，《产业政策和生产力小组委员会报告》，1980 年 8 月 4 日，第 3-4 页。发放和担保贷款：拉扎勒斯和利坦，《民主党人即将爆发内战》，第 93 页。
24. Time for more attention to micro requirements: Senator Adlai Stevenson II quoted in U.S. Senate Democratic Task Force on the Economy, “Report of the Subcommitteee on Industrial Policy and Productivity,” 4 Aug. 1980, 3–4. Make and guarantee loans: Lazarus and Litan, “Democrats’ Coming Civil War,” 93.
25. 支持者无法在华盛顿展现最优秀、最聪明的人才：国会议员丹·伦德格伦在国会美国联合经济委员会“新闻稿：JEC 研究发现产业政策存在缺陷”中引用，1984 年 6 月 28 日，SIA。
25. Supporters cannot demonstrate best and brightest in Washington: Congressman Dan Lundgren quoted in Congress of the United States Joint Economic Committee, “Press Release: JEC Study Finds Industrial Policy Deficient,” 28 June 1984, SIA.
26. 联邦政府采购统计数据：罗伯特·B·赖克，《美国为何需要产业政策》，《哈佛商业评论》，1982年1-2月：75。当然，正如诺伊斯本人的职业生涯轨迹所充分表明的那样，在硅谷，高科技创业精神与联邦政府的支持远非互斥。仙童半导体早期的几乎所有产品都销往政府部门——主要是军方。1958年至1974年间，美国国防部在半导体研发领域投资超过10亿美元，甚至在1965年，五角大楼仍采购了全国70%的集成电路产量。即使在20世纪70年代消费电子市场的快速增长降低了半导体公司对政府客户的依赖——到1978年，五角大楼的集成电路采购量仅占销售额的7%——军方在硅谷仍然保持着强大的影响力。据估计，1980 年，圣克拉拉县人口仅占美国总人口的 0.6%，却获得了国防部所有主要合同的 3%。（国防部投资：Saxenian，《区域优势》，第 42 页。）3% 的主要合同：Findlay，《魔法之地》，第 144-145 页，引用 SRI International，《国防部在圣克拉拉县经济中的作用》（华盛顿特区，1980 年），第 v-vii 页。）国防部实施的美国产业政策：Johnson，“导论：产业政策的理念”，第 4 页。
26. Federal government purchasing statistics: Robert B. Reich, “Why the U.S. Needs an Industrial Policy,” Harvard Business Review, January–February 1982:75. Of course, as the contours of Noyce’s own career make abundantly clear, in Silicon Valley high-tech entrepreneurship and federal government support were far from mutually exclusive. Nearly all of Fairchild’s early products went to government—primarily military—uses. The Defense Department invested over $1 billion in semiconductor R&D between 1958 and 1974, and as late as 1965, the Pentagon purchased 70 percent of the nation’s integrated circuit output. Even after the rapid growth of the consumer electronics market in the 1970s reduced semiconductor companies’ dependence on government customers—by 1978, the Pentagon’s integrated circuit purchases accounted for only 7 percent of sales—the military maintained a strong presence in Silicon Valley. By one estimate, in 1980, Santa Clara County, with 0.6 percent of the American population, captured 3 percent of all Department of Defense prime contracts. (Defense department invested: Saxenian, Regional Advantage, 42.) Three percent of prime contracts: Findlay, Magic Lands, 144–145, citing SRI International, The Role of Defense in Santa Clara County’s Economy [Washington, D.C., 1980], v–vii.) American industrial policy implemented by Defense Department: Johnson, “Introduction: The Idea of Industrial Policy,” 4.
27. 工业竞争力委员会：“全球竞争：新现实”，总统工业竞争力委员会报告，1985 年 1 月，SIA。
27. Commission on Industrial Competitiveness: “Global Competition: The New Reality,” Report of the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, Jan. 1985, SIA.
28. 布朗委员会评论：制胜技术：加利福尼亚州和全国的新产业战略，执行摘要。加利福尼亚州工业创新委员会报告，1982 年 9 月，第 10 页。
28. Brown commission comments: Winning Technologies: A New Industrial Strategy for California and the Nation, Executive Summary. Report of the California Commission on Industrial Innovation, Sept. 1982, 10.
29. 我们试图影响：Robert Noyce，“引言和会议主题”，载于 SIA，“美国高科技产业的公共政策和战略：SIA 长期规划会议论文集”，1982 年 11 月 22 日，SIA。
29. We are attempting to influence: Robert Noyce, “Introduction and Conference Theme,” in SIA, “Public Policies and Strategies for U.S. High Technology Industry: Proceedings of the SIA Long Range Planning Conference,” 22 Nov. 1982, SIA.
30. 一个是移民国家：理查兹，《美国如何失去优势》。
30. One is a nation of immigrants: Richards, “How America Lost the Edge.”
31. 芯片倾销：道格拉斯·A·欧文对美国半导体行业协会（SIA）关于日本倾销芯片的指控提出质疑。道格拉斯·A·欧文，《贸易政治与半导体行业》，NBER 工作论文 4745。EPROM反倾销案：克里斯托弗·R·施密特，《日本面临新的倾销指控》，《圣何塞水星报》，1986 年 7 月 25 日，15E 版。6 月，美光科技公司就 64K DRAM 芯片提起反倾销申诉。 SIA，“导致协议谈判的事件：附录 A”，《美日半导体协议实施一年半的经验：半导体行业协会向主席提交的半年报告》，第 43 页。SIA 曾考虑提起诉讼：Daryl G. Hatano，“SIA 为何提起 301 贸易诉讼”，《日本经济杂志》，1985 年 10 月 12 日。
31. Chip dumping: Douglas A. Irwin challenges the SIA’s allegations that the Japanese were dumping chips. Douglas A. Irwin, “Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry,” NBER Working Paper 4745. EPROM antidumping case: Christopher R. Schmitt, “New Dumping Charges Leveled at Japanese,” San Jose Mercury News, 25 July 1986, 15E. In June, Micron Technology had filed an antidumping complaint about 64K DRAMs. SIA, “Events Leading to the Negotiation of the Agreement: Appendix A,” One and One-Half Years of Experience under the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement: Semi-Annual Report to the President by the Semiconductor Industry Association, 43. SIA had considered filing the petition: Daryl G. Hatano, “Why SIA Filed the 301 Trade Action,” Japan Economic Journal, 12 October 1985.
32. 半导体政治行动委员会捐款：Irwin，“贸易政治”，14. SIA形象会议：1984年9月23日条目，Noyce 1984年日程簿。
32. Semiconductor PACs donated: Irwin, “Trade Politics,” 14. SIA image meeting: entry dated 23 Sept. 1984, Noyce 1984 datebook.
33. 国会半导体支持小组：此描述主要参考了 Yoffie 的文章“一个行业如何建立政治优势”，第 87 页；另见 TomRedburn 和 Robert Magnuson，“受税收法案打击，电子公司寻求更广泛的政治基础”，《洛杉矶时报》，1981 年 11 月 15 日。加州参议员支持：Irwin，“贸易政治与半导体行业”，第 8 页。
33. Congressional semiconductor support group: this description relies heavily on Yoffie, “How an Industry Builds Political Advantage,” 87; see also Tom Redburn and Robert Magnuson, “Stung by Tax Bill, Electronics Firms Seek Broader Political Base,” Los Angeles Times, 15 Nov. 1981. California Senators supported: Irwin, “Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry,” 8.
34. 华盛顿的常驻人物：克莱顿·尤特，“在 SIA 年度预测晚宴上的演讲：1986 年 9 月 23 日”，载于《日本半导体市场准入：背景和资料汇编》 ，第 46 页。直接游说最为有效：蒙多，“半导体行业协会”，第 56 页。SIA成功的秘诀：查理·斯波克，作者采访。
34. Permanent fixtures in Washington: Clayton Yeutter, “Speech to SIA Annual Forecast Dinner: September 23, 1986,” in Japan Semiconductor Market Access: Background and Source Book, 46. Direct lobbying is most effective: Mundo, “Semiconductor Industry Association,” 56. The secret to the SIA’s success: Charlie Sporck, interview by author.
35. 向华盛顿求助并不容易：克莱德·普雷斯托维茨，《交换位置：我们如何让日本占据主导地位》（纽约：基础书籍出版社，1988 年），第 149 页。
35. Appealing to Washington was not easy: Clyde Prestowitz, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 149.
36. 他堪称传奇人物：Yoffie，“一个行业如何建立政治优势”，88。
36. He is something of a legend: Yoffie, “How an Industry Builds Political Advantage,” 88.
37. 金钱赋予你权力：诺伊斯，《改变世界的机器》文字稿，磁带 F8，IA。
37. Money gave you power: Noyce, transcript of “Machine that Changed the World,” Tape F8, IA.
38. 美国公司贪婪且过度自信：一种更合理的解释是，由于当时日本的大部分市场对美国公司关闭，当这些公司收到（而且是相当优厚的）将其技术引进日本的提议时，它们毫不犹豫地接受了。正如一位学者所说，美国人知道日本人“会转而从其他渠道——即西门子、AEG 和飞利浦等欧洲高科技公司——获取日本所需的技术”。托马斯·K·麦克劳，《从合作伙伴到竞争对手：二战后时期的概述》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1986 年），第 17-18 页。
38. American firms money hungry and overconfident: a more sympathetic explanation would note that because most Japanese markets were closed to U.S. firms, when the firms received offers (quite generous ones at that) to import their technology into Japan, they jumped. As one scholar put it, the Americans knew that the Japanese “would simply have gone to other sources—namely European high-technology companies such as Siemens, AEG and Philips—to get what was needed in Japan.” Thomas K. McCraw, From Partners to Competitors: An Overview of the Period Since World War II (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), 17–18.
39. 鲍勃是一个非常信任别人的人：安·鲍尔斯，作者于2002年8月16日采访鲍勃。
39. Bob was a very trusting person: Ann Bowers, interview by author, 16 Aug. 2002.
40. 诺伊斯非正式会议：1985 年和 1986 年的日程簿以及英特尔的费用报告，日期分别为 1984 年 11 月 6 日、1984 年 11 月 30 日、1985 年 2 月 26 日、1985 年 3 月 10 日、1985 年 6 月 10 日、1985 年 7 月 29 日、1985 年 10 月 3 日和 1985 年 12 月 2 日，均由 ASB 出具。他真的帮助我看清了：汤姆·坎贝尔，作者采访。
40. Noyce informal meetings: 1985 and 1986 datebooks and Intel expense reports dated 6 Nov. 1984, 30 Nov. 1984, 26 Feb. 1985, 10 March 1985, 10 June 1985, 29 July 1985, 3 Oct. 1985, and 2 Dec. 1985, all ASB. He really helped me to see: Tom Campbell, interview by author.
41. 代表所有高科技企业的诺伊斯，1981年4月2日代表电子工业协会、科学仪器制造商协会、计算机和商业设备制造商协会、美国电子协会和半导体工业协会在美国众议院筹款委员会发表的声明，IA
41. Representative of all high tech: Noyce, Statement before the Committee on Ways and Means, United States House of Representatives, on behalf of Electronic Industries Association, Scientific Apparatus Makers Association, Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association, American Electronics Association, and Semiconductor Industry Association, 2 Apr. 1981, IA
42. 所有引语均来自吉姆·贾瑞特：吉姆·贾瑞特，作者采访。
42. All quotes from Jim Jarrett: Jim Jarrett, interview by author.
43. 英特尔支付了超过 2.45 亿美元：诺伊斯，《创新促繁荣》。电子行业的“原油” ：罗伯特·诺伊斯，《在美国众议院筹款委员会的声明》，1981 年 4 月 2 日，爱荷华州。半导体无处不在：保罗·里希特，《硅谷艰难求生》，《洛杉矶时报》 ，1981 年 11 月 15 日。
43. Intel paid over $245 million: Noyce, “Innovation for Prosperity.” Crude oil of electronics industry: Robert Noyce, “Statement Before the Committee on Ways and Means, United States House of Representatives,” 2 April 1981, IA. Semiconductors are in everything: Paul Richter, “Silicon Valley Wrestles with Hard Times,” Los Angeles Times, 15 Nov. 1981.
44. 社会剩余：罗伯特·诺伊斯，“创新促进繁荣：未来十年”，1981 年 2 月 1 日在全国州长协会的演讲，爱荷华州。
44. Social surplus: Robert Noyce, “Innovation for Prosperity: The Coming Decade,” speech before the National Governors’ Association, 1 Feb. 1981, IA.
45. 全国一半的劳动力从事信息相关工作：罗伯特·诺伊斯，“半导体行业概览”，1983 年 4 月在商务部国际贸易管理局的证词。载于《高科技产业：概况与展望——半导体行业》（美国政府印刷局，1983 年），第 16 页。
45. Half of the country’s work force dealing with information: Robert Noyce, “Overview of the Semiconductor Industry,” Testimony before the International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, April 1983. In High Technology Industries: Profiles and Outlooks—The Semiconductor Industry (Government Printing Office, 1983), 16.
46. 美国对此表示担忧：诺伊斯，《电子领域的国际竞争——美国的观点》[在《金融时报》世界电子会议上的演讲]，1981 年 5 月 11 日，IA。
46. America has a concern: Noyce, International Competition in Electronics—An American View [speech to the Financial Times Conference on World Electronics], 11 May 1981, IA.
47. 国家安全论点：SIA，“贸易与国家安全”，载于《国际微电子挑战：美国产业界、大学和政府的应对》。1981 年 3 月 10 日至 11 日在华盛顿特区举行的会议论文集，G2，SIA。
47. National security argument: SIA, “Trade and National Security,” in The International Microelectronics Challenge: An American Response by the Industry, the Universities, and the Government. Proceedings from a conference held 10–11 March 1981, in Washington D.C., G2, SIA.
48. 初步裁定：国际贸易管理局[A-588-504]，“日本产可擦除可编程只读存储器半导体；暂停调查”，《联邦公报》，第51卷，第151期，1986年8月6日，第28253页。戈登·摩尔回忆说，在初步裁定发布前的九个月里，领先的EPROM芯片价格下跌了90%，从30美元跌至3美元。公平市场价值的定义为公司生产成本加上8%的利润。
48. Preliminary determination: International Trade Administration [A-588-504], “Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory Semiconductors From Japan; Suspension of Investigation,” Federal Register, Vol. 51, No. 151. 6 Aug. 1986, 28253. Gordon Moore recalls that the price of the leading EPROM chip dropped 90 percent—from $30 to $3 in the nine months before the preliminary findings were issued. Fair market value was defined as a company’s cost of production, plus an 8 percent profit.
49. SIA 最有效：Pollack，“小游说团体的大声音”。
49. SIA most effective: Pollack, “Small Lobby’s Large Voice.”
50. 拟议的仙童半导体出售结果：理查兹，“底线表明了谁会收购仙童半导体。”查理·斯波克说：“我们以 1.22 亿美元的价格收购了仙童半导体及其所有资产。……我们逐步出售了仙童半导体的部分业务，获利超过 1.5 亿美元，然后以 5 亿美元的价格将剩余部分出售给了新的所有者！”斯波克，《分拆》，第 238 页。
50. Outcome of proposed Fairchild sale: Richards, “Bottom Line Indicated Who Would Buy Fairchild.” Charlie Sporck says, “We bought Fairchild Semiconductor, with all of that company’s properties, for $122 million. … [W]e gradually sold off parts of Fairchild for more than $150 million, and then we sold the remains of the company to new owners for $500 million!” Sporck, Spinoff, 238.
51. 停止倾销有所帮助：迈克尔·费布斯，“芯片协议有效吗？美国芯片制造商的利润上升了，但该协议可能不值得称赞”，《圣何塞水星报》，1987 年 8 月 24 日。
51. Cessation of dumping has helped: Michael Feibus, “Is the Chip Pact Working? U.S Chip Makers’ Profits are Up, but Agreement May Not Deserve Credit,” San Jose Mercury News, 24 August 1987.
52. 经济和社会是实验室：诺伊斯，《虚假的希望和高科技虚构》，《哈佛商业评论》 ，1990 年 1 月至 2 月。
52. Economies and societies are the laboratories: Noyce, “False Hopes and High-Tech Fiction,” Harvard Business Review, Jan.–Feb. 1990.
53. 我正在花更多的时间：诺伊斯致格兰特·盖尔，1985 年 12 月 17 日，格兰特·盖尔文件，GCA。国家储蓄率：诺伊斯，在爱荷华州中部青少年成就商业名人堂年度晚宴上的讲话，1990 年 3 月 29 日。
53. I am spending more time: Noyce to Grant Gale, 17 Dec. 1985, Grant Gale Papers, GCA. National saving rate: Noyce, Remarks to the Central Iowa Junior Achievement Business Hall of Achievement Annual Banquet, 29 March 1990.
54. 微电子技术正在给我们带来：诺伊斯，《微电子技术与信息社会》（1983 年 3 月 31 日在各大学的演讲）。基本原理：诺伊斯，在爱荷华州中部青年成就商业名人堂年度晚宴上的讲话，1990 年 3 月 29 日。
54. Microelectronics is giving us: Noyce, Microelectronics and the Information Society [speech to various universities], 31 March 1983. First principles: Noyce, Remarks to the Central Iowa Junior Achievement Business Hall of Achievement Annual Banquet, 29 March 1990.
55. 关于审查员：埃德·佐绍（Ed Zschau）的采访（作者）；基普·哈戈皮安（Kip Hagopian）的采访（作者）。集体个人主义：诺伊斯，《电子领域的国际竞争——美国视角》（1981年5月11日至12日在英国伦敦举行的《金融时报》世界电子会议上的演讲）。互相拉拢：亚瑟·洛克（Arthur Rock）的采访（埃文·拉姆斯塔德），1997年5月19日，由埃文·拉姆斯塔德提供。
55. On Censtor: Ed Zschau, interview by author; Kip Hagopian, interview by author. Collective individualism: Noyce, International Competition in Electronics—An American View [speech delivered at Financial Times Conference on World Electronics, London, England], 11–12 May 1981 Rope each other in: Arthur Rock, interview by Evan Ramstad, 19 May 1997, courtesy Evan Ramstad.
56. 关于 Volant：作者对 Hank Kashiwa 的采访；作者对 Bucky Kashiwa 的采访。
56. On Volant: Hank Kashiwa, interview by author; Bucky Kashiwa, interview by author.
57. 其他小额投资：Rock 给 Noyce 的汇票，盖有“1980 年 12 月 3 日收到”的印章，ASB。关于 Diasonics：Noyce 和 Rock 的持股：Diasonics IPO 招股说明书，1983 年 2 月 23 日；自 Coors 以来规模最大的 IPO：Gary Putka，“Diasonics 在华尔街首秀受到投资者欢迎”，《华尔街日报》，1983 年 2 月 24 日；问题：“Diasonics 的 Waxman 辞去公司两个重要职位”，《华尔街日报》，1987 年 11 月 20 日； Diasonics Inc. 同意支付 1200 万美元以和解诉讼”，《华尔街日报》，1987 年 6 月 4 日；Fred R. Bleakley，“动荡的医学影像世界”，《纽约时报》，1983 年 11 月 27 日；Nathaniel C. Nash，“2 人因内幕交易被起诉”，《纽约时报》 ，1986 年 12 月 31 日。
57. Other small investments: Rock to Noyce, stamped “rec’d 3 Dec. 1980,” ASB. On Diasonics: Noyce and Rock holdings: Diasonics IPO Prospectus, 23 Feb. 1983; Largest offering since Coors: Gary Putka, “Diasonics Debut On Wall Street Cheered by Investors,” Wall Street Journal, 24 Feb. 1983; Problems: “Diasonics’ Waxman Quits Two Leading Posts at Firm,” WSJ, 20 Nov. 1987; Diasonics Inc. Agrees to Settle Litigation by Paying $12 Million,” WSJ, 4 June 1987; Fred R. Bleakley, “The Volatile World of Medical Imaging,” New York Times, 27 Nov. 1983; Nathaniel C. Nash, “2 Charged In Insider Trading,” NYT, 31 Dec. 1986.
58. 开发团队成员：彼得·H·刘易斯，《信息革命的英雄》，《纽约时报》 ，1989年11月14日。外来人口翻了一番：Analee Saxenian，《硅谷的新移民企业家》（旧金山：加州公共政策研究所，1999 年）：11。75 % 为亚裔：Sevilla，278。四分之一的工程师：Analee Saxenian，“移民企业家网络”，载于 Chong Moon Lee 等，《硅谷优势：创新与创业的栖息地》（斯坦福，加州：斯坦福大学出版社，2000 年）：249。除非另有说明，Teresi 也是 Caere 信息的来源。
58. Development team members: Peter H. Lewis, “Heroes of Information Revolution,” New York Times, 14 Nov. 1989. Foreign-born population doubled: Analee Saxenian, Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California, 1999): 11. 75 percent Asian: Sevilla, 278. One-quarter of engineers: Analee Saxenian, “Networks of Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” in Chong Moon Lee et al., The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000): 249. Unless otherwise noted, Teresi is also the source for information on Caere.
59. 即使他抨击你：肯·奥什曼，作者采访。
59. Even if he was blasting you: Ken Oshman, interview by author.
60. 苹果公司的认可：ComputerWare 执行副总裁 Martin Mazner 在 Ken Siegmann 的文章“Caere 计划首次股票发行”中被引用，Macintosh News，1989 年 9 月 18 日。1000万美元的销售额：Bob Teresi 于 2004 年 10 月 18 日致作者，引用了 1989 年年度报告和 IPO 招股说明书。
60. The Apple endorsement: Martin Mazner, executive vice president for ComputerWare, quoted in Ken Siegmann, “Caere Plans Initial Stock Offering,” Macintosh News, 18 Sept. 1989. $10 million sales: Bob Teresi to author, 18 Oct. 2004, citing 1989 annual report and IPO prospectus.
61. 年度最成功的五件事：剪报，可能来自《旧金山观察家报》，日期不详，Caere剪贴簿，由Donna Teresi提供。Noyce持有近40万股：Caere IPO招股说明书，1989年10月19日，由Bob Teresi提供。
61. Year’s five most successful: Clipping, probably from the San Francisco Examiner, undated, Caere scrapbook, courtesy Donna Teresi. Noyce’s nearly 400,000 shares: Caere IPO Prospectus, 19 Oct. 1989, courtesy Bob Teresi.
62. 机遇之地：一段未识别的诺伊斯讲话片段[可能是他在 1990 年获得国家技术奖章时]，收录于“美好人生纪念”视频中，ASB。
62. Land of opportunity: unidentified clip of Noyce speaking [probably when he received the National Medal of Technology in 1990] included in “Remembrance of a Life Well Lived,” video, ASB.
63. 诺伊斯旅行记：玛尔·戴尔·卡斯托、玛丽莱斯·卡斯托、凯西·科恩、比尔·科恩、朱迪·瓦达兹，作者访谈。热气球之旅：诺伊斯订购录像带“欧洲热气球之旅”的表格和支票副本，1985 年 11 月 22 日，ASB。
63. Noyce travels: Mar Dell Casto, Maryles Casto, Kathy Cohen, Bill Cohen, Judy Vadasz, interviews by author. Balloon tours: Copy of form and check from Noyce ordering a video cassette “Ballooning in Europe,” 22 Nov. 1985, ASB.
64. 1984 年 5 月中国之行：“英特尔公司代表团 1984 年 5 月 21 日至 31 日访问中华人民共和国”[详细行程]，ASB；“赵紫阳会见美国科学家”，《中国日报》 ，1984 年 5 月 26 日，ASB。薯片和苏格兰威士忌：安·鲍尔斯，作者采访，2002 年 6 月 22 日。
64. May 1984 China trip: “Intel Corporation Delegation Visit May 21–May 31 [1984] to People’s Republic of China,” [detailed itinerary], ASB; “Zhao Ziyang Meets US Scientist,” China Daily, 26 May 1984, ASB. Potato chips and scotch: Ann Bowers, interview by author, 22 June 2002.
65. 涂鸦：文件标记为“RNN—涂鸦！”，内容没有标注日期，但显然是 20 世纪 80 年代中后期的作品，ASB。
65. Doodles: file marked “RNN—Doodles!” none of the contents dated but apparently from the mid- to late 1980s, ASB.
66. 6,500 英亩牧场：肖恩·弗拉文于 1982 年 11 月 29 日将牧场转让给诺伊斯，ASB。
66. 6,500-acre ranch: Sean Flavin to Noyce, 29 Nov. 1982, ASB.
67. 诺伊斯飞行时间的估计：诺伊斯致黛安·拉布拉多[英特尔]，1984 年 2 月 24 日，ASB。诺伊斯关于飞行和个人电脑的引言：诺伊斯，《改变世界的机器》演讲稿，IA。
67. Estimates of Noyce flying time: Noyce to Diane Labrador [Intel], 24 Feb. 1984, ASB. Noyce quotes on flying and the personal computer: Noyce, transcript of “The Machine that Changed the World,” IA.
68. 吉姆·拉弗蒂的所有语录：吉姆·拉弗蒂，作者采访。
68. All Jim Lafferty quotes: Jim Lafferty, interview by author.
69. 诺伊斯的飞行学校经历：吉姆·拉弗蒂，作者采访。
69. Noyce’s flight-school experience: Jim Lafferty, interview by author.
70. 十年等候名单：克里斯汀·唐尼，“投资者决心在圣何塞机场建造私人航空航站楼，一切就绪”，《圣何塞水星报》，1986 年 1 月 23 日。放手去做吧：吉姆·拉弗蒂，作者采访。
70. Ten-year waiting lists: Kristin Downey, “Getting Off the Ground, Investors are Determined to Build a Private Air Terminal at S.J. Airport,” San Jose Mercury News, 23 Jan. 1986. Go ahead and do it: Jim Lafferty, interview by author.
第十二章：公共创业
Chapter 12: Public Startup
1. 委员会未能促进创新：Noyce 在美国参议院的《银行、住房和城市事务委员会：国际金融小组委员会关于电子行业贸易和技术的监督听证会的未经校正的会议记录》（华盛顿特区：1980 年 1 月 15 日）第 113-115 页中引用。
1. Innovation not fostered by committee: Noyce quoted in United States Senate, “Uncorrected Transcript of Proceedings, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: Subcommittee on International Finance, Oversight Hearing on Trade and Technology in the Electronics Industry,” (Washington, D.C.: 15 Jan. 1980) 113–115, SIA.
2. 摧毁价格：查理·斯波克，作者采访。
2. Destroy the prices: Charlie Sporck, interview by author.
3. 工作组成员：AMD、AT&T、Digital Equipment Corporation、惠普、英特尔、IBM、LSI Logic、美光技术公司、摩托罗拉、美国国家半导体公司、NCR公司、罗克韦尔国际公司和德州仪器公司。这些公司，加上哈里斯公司，都是SEMATECH的创始成员。
3. Working group participants: Advanced Micro Devices, AT&T, Digital Equipment Corporation, Hewlett-Packard, Intel, IBM, LSI Logic, Micron Technology, Motorola, National Semiconductor, NCR, Rockwell International, and Texas Instruments. These companies, plus Harris Corporation, were the founding members of SEMATECH.
4. 三个相互竞争的议程：本讨论主要依据 Browning 和 Shetler 的SEMATECH，第 60-62 页。
4. Three competing agendas: this discussion relies heavily on Browning and Shetler, SEMATECH, 60–62.
5. 宏伟计划：克雷格·巴雷特引自布朗宁和谢特勒，《SEMATECH》，第55页。年度研发预算：罗伯特·诺伊斯，“在DARPA实验室主任晚宴会议上的讲话”，1990年3月14日，ST。
5. Grandiose scheme: Craig Barrett quoted in Browning and Shetler, SEMATECH, 55. Annual R&D budget: Robert Noyce, “Remarks to the DARPA Lab Directors Dinner Meeting,” 14 March 1990, ST.
6. 三阶段目标：联邦参与 SEMATECH 咨询委员会，《SEMATECH：1989 年进展与展望》，ES-2，ST；《SEMATECH 战略概述》，1991 年 12 月，D-2，ST；《1989 年 SEMATECH 运营计划》，3，ST。
6. Three-phase goal: Advisory Council on Federal Participation in Sematech, SEMATECH: Progress and Prospects 1989, ES-2, ST; SEMATECH Strategic Overview, December 1991, D-2, ST; 1989 SEMATECH Operating Plan, 3, ST.
7. 提供：SEMATECH 网站：http://www.sematech.org/public/corporate/history
7. To provide: SEMATECH Web site: http://www.sematech.org/public/corporate/history
8. 高科技谷仓建造：米勒·邦纳，作者采访。
8. High-tech barn raising: Miller Bonner, interview by author.
9. 诺伊斯向众议院和参议院作证：诺伊斯，“关于国家技术发展和利用的证词，提交给科学、空间和技术技术政策工作组委员会，1987 年 9 月 25 日，爱荷华州；诺伊斯，“关于参议院第 1233 号法案‘1987 年经济竞争力、国际贸易和技术发展法案’的证词，提交给参议院政府事务委员会”，1987 年 6 月 9 日，爱荷华州。
9. Noyce spoke to House and Senate: Noyce, “Testimony on National Technology Development and Utilization Provided to the Technology Policy Task Force Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 25 Sept. 1987, IA; Noyce, “Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs Regarding Senate Bill 1233, ‘The Economic Competitiveness, International Trade, & Technology Development Act of 1987,’” 9 June 1987, IA.
10. 其影响非常巨大：“致国防部长的备忘录”，美国国防科学委员会国防半导体依赖性工作组，国防科学委员会半导体依赖性工作组报告（1987 年 2 月）。
10. Implications are awesome: “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,” United States Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Semiconductor Dependency, Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Semiconductor Dependency (Feb. 1987).
11. 国防科学委员会中的偏见：例如，参见《国防科学委员会及其他军事咨询小组内部的偏袒和偏见》（美国众议院政府运作委员会下属小组委员会听证会，第98届国会，1983年9月22日）。国会内部就商务部（众议院以及曾与马尔科姆·鲍德里奇部长共事的几位行业领袖支持）还是国防部（参议院支持）才是资助和参与SEMATECH项目的合适政府机构存在分歧。众议院曾提出一项贸易决议支持SEMATECH项目，而参议院则通过了一项国防拨款法案。最终，总统经济政策委员会（该委员会曾表示反对产业政策，因此也反对商务部的参与）建议国防部出于国家安全考虑参与SEMATECH项目。这一建议，再加上国防部已有高科技拨款的资助机制这一实际情况，最终使国防部做出了有利于国防部的决定。Browning 和 Shetler，《SEMATECH》，第 29、51 页；Miller Bonner，作者访谈，1999 年 2 月 4 日。
11. Bias in defense science boards: See, for example, Favoritism and Bias Within the Defense Science Board and Other Military Advisory Panels (Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Congress, September 22, 1983). There was a disagreement in Congress as to whether the Department of Commerce (favored by the House of Representatives, as well as several industry leaders who had worked with Secretary Malcom Baldridge) or Department of Defense (favored by the Senate) would be the appropriate government agency to fund and work with SEMATECH. The House had put together a Trade Resolution in support of SEMATECH, and the Senate had passed a Defense Appropriations Bill. Ultimately, the president’s Economic Policy Council, which had expressed dislike of industrial policy (and thus of Commerce’s involvement) recommended that Defense participate in Sematech in the interest of national security. This recommendation, coupled with the practical reality that the Defense Department already had funding mechanisms in place for high-technology grants, swung the decision in the Defense Department’s favor. Browning and Shetler, SEMATECH, 29, 51; Miller Bonner, interview by author, 4 Feb. 1999.
12. 夸大其词：彼得·沃尔德曼，《芯片制造商的 SEMATECH 合资企业急于击败对手，但路径受到质疑》，《华尔街日报》，1988 年 1 月 8 日。商务部提出质疑：国会预算办公室，《联邦政府资助 SEMATECH 的益处和风险》，1987 年 9 月，第 46 页。
12. Wildly overstated: Peter Waldman, “Chip Makers’ SEMATECH Venture Rushes to Vanquish Foe, but Path is Questioned,” Wall Street Journal, 8 Jan. 1988. Department of Commerce raised questions: Congressional Budget Office, The Benefits and Risks of Federal Funding for SEMATECH, Sept. 1987, 46.
13. 大多数是右翼共和党人：威尔曼，“国会对芯片援助不感兴趣”。恳求施舍：罗伯特·J·萨缪尔森，“芯片行业的恳求”，《华盛顿邮报》 ，1987 年 6 月 24 日。
13. Most are right-wing Republicans: Willman, “Congress Cool to Chips Aid.” Pleading for a handout: Robert J. Samuelson, “Chip Industry’s Plea,” Washington Post, 24 June 1987.
14. 他们所代表的认知：参议员约翰·麦凯恩在路易丝·基欧的文章《芯片制造商向国会寻求帮助》（伦敦《金融时报》 ，1987年3月5日）中被引用。SIA拒绝确定选址：查理·斯波克，作者采访。为了规避反竞争问题，SIA将SEMATECH设计得符合1984年《国家合作研究法》（SIA曾大力倡导该法案）的各项规定。
14. Perception they represent: Senator John McCain quoted in Louise Kehoe, “Chip Makers Ask Congress for Help,” Financial Times of London, 5 March 1987. SIA refused to commit to location: Charlie Sporck, interview by author. To sidestep anticompetitive issues, the SIA designed SEMATECH to fit within the parameters of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (an act the SIA had championed).
15. SEMATECH 很便宜：Noyce，“RNN SIA 演讲 12/7/88”，ST。
15. SEMATECH is a bargain: Noyce, “RNN SIA Speech 12/7/88,” ST.
16. 选址过程：作者采访了 Miller Bonner；作者采访了 Charlie Sporck。委员会的期望来自 Browning 和 Shetler，《SEMATECH》，第 43 页。
16. Site-selection process: Miller Bonner, interview by author; Charlie Sporck, interview by author. Committee’s expectations are from Browning and Shetler, SEMATECH, 43.
17. 全国州长协会工作组：《鼓励技术创新的州级活动：最新进展》（1982年2月）。“为全国州长协会技术创新工作组编写”，iv，ST。高科技公司带来希望：高科技公司选址与区域经济发展（1982年6月1日）。“为美国国会联合经济委员会货币和财政政策小组委员会编写的一份工作人员研究报告”，v。感谢玛格丽特·奥马拉向我推荐斯坦福工业园的国际访客。关于早期技术区域的精彩论述包括玛格丽特·奥马拉的《知识之城：冷战科学与寻找下一个硅谷》（新泽西州普林斯顿，普林斯顿大学出版社，2004年）以及斯图尔特·W·莱斯利和罗伯特·H·卡贡的《战后美国电子技术与创新地理》，载《历史与技术》 ，第1卷，第1期，第1-10页。 1994 年第 11 期，第 217-231 页。有关国际讨论，请参阅 Rolf Sternberg 的文章“技术政策与区域增长：来自四个国家的证据”，载于《小企业经济学》第 8 卷（1996 年），第 75-86 页。
17. National Governor’s Association task force: State Activities to Encourage Technological Innovation: An Update (Feb. 1982). “Prepared for the National Governors Association Task Force on Technological Innovation,” iv, ST. High-tech companies offer salvation: Location of High Technology Firms and Regional Economic Development (1 June 1982). “A staff study prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Monetary and Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States,” v. Thanks to Margaret O’Mara for pointing me to international visitors to the Stanford Industrial Park. Excellent discussions of early technology regions include Margaret O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the Next Silicon Valley, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 2004) and Stuart W. Leslie and Robert H. Kargon, “Electronics and the Geography of Innovation in Post-War America,” History and Technology, Vol. 11, 1994, 217–231. For an international discussion, see Rolf Sternberg, “Technology Policies and the Growth of Regions: Evidence from Four Countries,” Small Business Economics 8 (1996), 75–86.
18. 阿尔伯克基的广告：《圣何塞商业杂志》，1989年9月25日。为了吸引企业家，该广告强调了阿尔伯克基相对较低的劳动力成本——平均周薪为347美元，而圣何塞为451美元。如需查看更多区域性广告的优秀范例，请参阅《电子工程时报》 1981年11月9日刊登的“专题报道：工业发展/选址”。
18. Advertisement for Albuquerque: San Jose Business Journal, 25 Sept. 1989. In a bid to attract entrepreneurs, the advertisement stressed the relatively low cost of labor in Albuquerque—average weekly earnings of $347 versus $451 in San Jose. For an excellent sample of a variety of regional advertisements, see “Special Report: Industrial Development/Site Selection,” Electronic Engineering Times, 9 Nov. 1981.
19. 奥斯汀新增 10,000 个工作岗位：托马斯·C·海耶斯，《奥斯汀会成为下一个硅谷吗？》，《纽约时报》，1988 年 1 月 13 日，第 6 页。像孤星啤酒一样常见：玛丽·AC·法伦，《套牢高科技——德克萨斯州城市试图拉拢硅谷企业》，《圣何塞水星报》，1985 年 7 月 1 日。
19. Austin added 10,000 jobs: Thomas C. Hayes, “Is Austin the Next Silicon Valley?” New York Times, 13 Jan. 1988, 6. Common as a Lone Star beer: Mary A. C. Fallon, “Roping High Technology—Texas Cities Trying to Tie Up Silicon Valley Business,” San Jose Mercury News, 1 July 1985.
20. 奥斯汀的报价：“德克萨斯城坚持不懈，最终赢得 SEMATECH 的竞标”，《波士顿环球报》，1988 年 1 月 27 日。加州的竞标分裂：道格拉斯·舒伊特，“德克梅吉安悄悄竞标高科技研究中心”，《洛杉矶时报》 ，1987 年 9 月 5 日。
20. Austin’s offer: “Texas City’s Persistence Pays in Battle to Snare SEMATECH,” Boston Globe, 27 Jan. 1988. California’s fractured bid: Douglas Shuit, “Deukmejian Quietly Bids for High-Tech Study Center,” Los Angeles Times, 5 Sept. 1987.
21. 加州面临危险：汤姆·麦克纳里在路易丝·基欧的文章《SEMATECH 给硅谷带来打击》中被引用，该文章发表于 1988 年 1 月 8 日的《伦敦金融时报》 。
21. California in danger: Tom McEnery quoted in Louise Kehoe, “SEMATECH Blow to Silicon Valley,” Financial Times of London, 8 Jan. 1988.
22. AT&T 和 IBM 制造演示车辆：Browning 和 Shetler，《SEMATECH》，58-59。有关 MDV 公开宣布的更多信息，请参阅 SEMATECH 网站：http://www.sematech.org/public/corporate/history和“IBM、AT&T 为 SEMATECH 贡献技术”，《洛杉矶时报》 ，1988 年 1 月 27 日。
22. AT&T and IBM Manufacturing Demonstration Vehicles: Browning and Shetler, SEMATECH, 58–59. For more on the public announcement of the MDVs, see SEMATECH Web site: http://www.sematech.org/public/corporate/history and “IBM, AT&T Contributing Technology to SEMATECH,” Los Angeles Times, 27 Jan. 1988.
23. 三位领导者：吉姆·彼得曼（德州仪器）、桑迪·凯恩（IBM）和乔治·施内尔（英特尔）。他们聚集了500人：比尔·丹尼尔斯引自布朗宁和谢特勒，《SEMATECH》，第93页。
23. Three leaders: Jim Peterman (Texas Instruments), Sandy Kane (IBM), and George Schneer (Intel). They stacked 500 people: Bill Daniels quoted in Browning and Shetler, SEMATECH, 93.
24. 更多该死的家伙被提拔了：查理·斯波克，作者采访。
24. More damn guys promoted: Charlie Sporck, interview by author.
25. DARPA 延迟拨款：Jack Robertson，“报告称 DARPA 向 Sematech 施压”，《电子新闻》，1988 年 4 月 25 日；Robert Ristelhueber，“Sematech 董事长：研发由我们决定”，同上；Jack Robertson，“DARPA 获得 Sematech 的发言权”，同上，1988 年 5 月 16 日。参议院威胁削减预算：“Bob Noyce 创建了硅谷，现在他被要求拯救它”，《今日物理》，1988 年 9 月，第 50 页；Andrew Pollack，“Sematech 苦苦寻找首席执行官”，《纽约时报》 ，1988 年 4 月 1 日，第 1 页。没有合适的首席执行官：Richard Bambrick 和 Robert Ristelhueber，“Sematech 首席执行官：为什么无人问津？” ， 《电子新闻》，1988 年 5 月 23 日。
25. DARPA delayed funding: Jack Robertson, “Report DARPA Presses Sematech,” Electronic News, 25 April 1988; Robert Ristelhueber, “Sematech Chairman: We’ll Decide R&D,” Ibid.; Jack Robertson, “DARPA Gets Sematech Voice,” Ibid., 16 May 1988. Senate threatening to trim: “Bob Noyce Created Silicon Valley and Now He’s Asked to Save It,” Physics Today, Sept. 1988, 50; Andrew Pollack, “SEMATECH’s Weary Hunt for a Chief,” New York Times, 1 April 1988, 1. No right-minded executive: Richard Bambrick and Robert Ristelhueber, “Sematech CEO: Why No Takers?” Electronic News, 23 May 1988.
26. 找个更合适的人：罗伯特·N·诺伊斯，“SEMATECH 演讲，华盛顿新闻发布会，1988 年 7 月 27 日”，IA；奥蒂斯·波特，“鲍勃·诺伊斯创建了硅谷。他能拯救它吗？” 《商业周刊》，1988 年 8 月 15 日，76。不愿看到毕生心血：诺伊斯引自《活着的传奇，国家商业名人堂人物简介 [1989]》，ST。
26. Find someone better: Robert N. Noyce, “SEMATECH Presentation, Washington Press Conference, July 27, 1988,” IA; Otis Port, “Bob Noyce Created Silicon Valley. Can He Save It?” Business Week, 15 Aug. 1988, 76. Prefer not to see life’s work: Noyce quoted in “Living Legends, Profiles from the National Business Hall of Fame [1989],” ST.
27. Noyce-Hodgson 对话：Richard Hodgson，作者采访。
27. Noyce-Hodgson conversation: Richard Hodgson, interview by author.
28. Noyce-Sporck 对话：Charlie Sporck，作者采访。
28. Noyce-Sporck conversation: Charlie Sporck, interview by author.
29. 美妙的音乐相伴：查理·斯波克访谈（作者访谈）。不期待乐趣：罗伯特·诺伊斯访谈，谈及他在爱荷华州SEMATECH的工作。净资产：根据诺伊斯持有的股票数量乘以1988年6月的股价计算得出。
29. Beautiful music together: Charlie Sporck, interview by author. Not expecting fun: Interview, Robert Noyce, Regarding his Work at SEMATECH, IA. Net worth: calculation based on number of Noyce’s shares times share price in June of 1988.
30. 不容忽视的呼吁：诺伊斯，SEMATECH 演讲，华盛顿新闻发布会，1988 年 7 月 27 日。诺伊斯游走于基督教的边缘：马尔·戴尔·卡斯托，作者采访。
30. Too important to ignore call: Noyce, SEMATECH Presentation, Washington Press Conference, 27 July 1988. Noyce walking the edges of his Christianity: Mar Dell Casto, interview by author.
31. 公开创业：Robert N. Noyce，“SEMATECH 演讲，华盛顿新闻发布会，1988 年 7 月 27 日”，ST.
31. Public startup: Robert N. Noyce, “SEMATECH Presentation, Washington Press Conference, July 27, 1988,” ST.
32. 理想人选：斯波克（Sporck）在卡丽·多兰（Carrie Dolan）和爱德华多·拉奇卡（Eduardo Lachica）的文章《SEMATECH任命英特尔的诺伊斯领导半导体行业研究小组》（“SEMATECH任命英特尔的诺伊斯领导半导体行业研究小组”，《华尔街日报》，1988年7月28日）中被引用。国会反应：“鲍勃·诺伊斯创建了硅谷，现在他被要求拯救它。”火鸡农场：多兰和拉奇卡，《SEMATECH任命英特尔的诺伊斯》。没有什么比聘请一位传奇人物更棒的了：“为SEMATECH贡献力量”，《圣何塞水星报》，1988年7月29日。
32. Ideal guy: Sporck quoted in Carrie Dolan and Eduardo Lachica, “SEMATECH Names Intel’s Noyce to Head Semiconductor Industry Research Group,” Wall Street Journal, 28 July 1988. Congressional reaction: “Bob Noyce Created Silicon Valley and Now He’s Asked to Save It.” Turkey farm: Dolan and Lachica, “SEMATECH Names Intel’s Noyce.” Nothing like hiring a legend: “Chipping In To SEMATECH,” San Jose Mercury News, 29 July 1988.
33. 对诺伊斯决定的反应：理查德·斯坦海默致诺伊斯，1988 年 7 月 30 日；亚瑟·罗克致诺伊斯，日期不详；M·肯尼斯·奥什曼致诺伊斯，日期不详；比尔·戴维多致诺伊斯，1988 年 7 月 29 日；安迪·格鲁夫致诺伊斯，日期不详；以上均为 ASB 的信函。“戈登·摩尔访谈，1994 年 8 月 17 日”，IA。
33. Reactions to Noyce’s decision: Richard Steinheimer to Noyce, 30 July 1988; Arthur Rock to Noyce, undated; M. Kenneth Oshman to Noyce, undated; Bill Davidow to Noyce, 29 July 1988; Andy Grove to Noyce, undated; all ASB. “Gordon Moore Interview, 8/17/94,” IA.
34. 将联盟成员限定为美国公司：http://www.sematech.org/public/corporate/history
34. Limit consortium to American firms: http://www.sematech.org/public/corporate/history
35. 用旗帜包裹，硫磺岛图像覆盖其上：米勒·邦纳，作者采访。
35. Wrapped in the flag, Iwo Jima image over the top: Miller Bonner, interview by author.
36. 六十九人：11 月 15 日落成典礼 VIP 区名单，ASB。历史回顾：Noyce，“RNN/落成典礼”，1988 年 11 月 10 日，ASB。
36. Sixty-nine people: list of VIP section for November 15 dedication, ASB. Throughout the history: Noyce, “RNN/Dedication,” 10 Nov. 1988, ASB.
37. 外部先生：采访 Robert Noyce，关于他在爱荷华州 SEMATECH 的工作。
37. Mr. Outside: Interview, Robert Noyce, regarding his work at SEMATECH, IA.
38. 首席执行官办公室：SEMATECH 运营计划 1989，6，ST。
38. Office of chief executive: SEMATECH Operating Plan 1989, 6, ST.
39. 忠诚分裂：采访 Robert Noyce，关于他在爱荷华州 SEMATECH 的工作。
39. Split loyalty: Interview, Robert Noyce, regarding his work at SEMATECH, IA.
40. 别开口：米勒·邦纳，作者采访。会议吸引了 32 位律师：布朗宁和谢特勒，SEMATECH，32。无话可说：罗伯特·诺伊斯访谈，关于他在 SEMATECH 的工作，IA。
40. Don’t open your mouth: Miller Bonner, interview by author. Meeting drew 32 lawyers: Browning and Shetler, SEMATECH, 32. Nothing to extract from: Interview, Robert Noyce, Regarding his Work at SEMATECH, IA.
41. Noyce 绕着会议桌走：Miller Bonner，作者采访。
41. Noyce going around conference table: Miller Bonner, interview by author.
42. Noyce 解开了他的领带：Browning 和 Shetler，SEMATECH，82-83。
42. Noyce removed his tie: Browning and Shetler, SEMATECH, 82–83.
43. 预算会议故事：米勒·邦纳，作者采访。
43. Budget meeting story: Miller Bonner, interview by author.
44. 名片：米勒·邦纳（作者采访）；丹·塞利格森（作者采访）。组织结构图：特纳·哈斯蒂（作者采访）。
44. Business cards: Miller Bonner, interview by author; Dan Seligson, interview by author. Organization chart: Turner Hasty, interview by author.
45. 来自我们共同的知识基础：Noyce，“国家半导体咨询委员会，Robert N. Noyce 博士的讲话”，1989 年 3 月 8 日，ST.
45. From our base of shared knowledge: Noyce, “National Advisory Council on Semiconductors, Remarks by Dr. Robert N. Noyce,” 8 Mar. 1989, ST.
46. 虚拟垂直整合：Noyce 引自《合作实现全面质量》（“由 SEMATECH 为美国半导体行业编写”），第 1 卷，1990 年 6 月 15 日，第 1 页。80 % 的日本财团垂直整合：Grindley、Mowery 和 Silverman，《SEMATECH 和合作研究》，脚注 15。
46. Virtual vertical integration: Noyce quoted in “Partnering for Total Quality,” (“Prepared by SEMATECH for the U.S. Semiconductor Industry”), vol. 1, 15 Jun. 1990, 1, ST. Vertical integration of 80 percent of Japanese consortiums: Grindley, Mowery, and Silverman, SEMATECH and Cooperative Research, footnote 15.
47. 88% 的小企业：面临风险的战略行业，12。
47. 88 percent small businesses: A Strategic Industry at Risk, 12.
48. 供应商-制造商关系：美国政府问责局 (GAO) 在 20 世纪 80 年代末进行的一项优秀调查是SEMATECH 为加强美国半导体产业所做的努力。
48. Supplier-manufacturer relations: An excellent survey from the late 1980s is Government Accounting Office, SEMATECH’s Efforts to Strengthen the U.S. Semiconductor Industry.
49. 制造商的观点：特纳·哈斯蒂致作者，2000 年 8 月 11 日。
49. Manufacturer’s perspective: Turner Hasty to author, 11 August 2000.
50. 更友好的诉讼：特纳·哈斯蒂致作者，2000 年 8 月 11 日。喝彩：布朗宁和谢特勒，SEMATECH，37。
50. Friendlier lawsuits: Turner Hasty to author, 11 August 2000. Ovation: Browning and Shetler, SEMATECH, 37.
51. DARPA：威廉·斯宾塞，作者采访。
51. D-A-R-P-A: William Spencer, interview by author.
52. Fab 建设记录：SEMATECH 运营计划 1989，15。SEMATECH和行业标准 fab 成本来自 Browning 和 Shetler，SEMATECH，86。
52. Fab construction records: SEMATECH Operating Plan 1989, 15. SEMATECH and industry standard fab costs are from Browning and Shetler, SEMATECH, 86.
53. 令人痛苦的犹豫不决：安·鲍尔斯，作者采访，2004年8月16日。薄弱环节：诺伊斯在达雷尔·邓恩的《SEMATECH首席执行官详述高管分歧》（《电子新闻》，1989年4月3日）一文中被引用。根据一份为期三年的雇佣协议，SEMATECH继续向卡斯特鲁奇支付薪水。或许运行更顺畅：诺伊斯在柯克·拉登多夫的《SEMATECH成员减少反而可能发展壮大：缩减规模或有助于联盟更顺畅地运作》（《奥斯汀美国政治家报》 ，1992年1月19日）一文中被引用。
53. Agonizing indecision: Ann Bowers, interview by author, 16 Aug. 2004. Weak link: Noyce quoted in Darrell Dunn, “SEMATECH Chief Details Exec Rift,” Electronic News, 3 April 1989. Under the terms of a three-year employment agreement, SEMATECH continued making salary payments to Castrucci. Might run more smoothly: Noyce quoted in Kirk Ladendorf, “SEMATECH Could Grow With Fewer Members: Downsizing May Help Consortium Function Smoother,” Austin American-Statesman, 19 Jan. 1992.
54. 偶尔发表演讲：“Big Bang，巴黎，RNN 谈话要点”，1988 年 4 月 12 日，爱荷华州；“RNN 谈话要点，Cowen 投资集团”，1988 年 6 月 22 日，爱荷华州；“RNN，英特尔：为 20 世纪 80 年代的挑战做好准备”，CIS 峰会演讲，1988 年 7 月 19 日。58篇演讲：米勒·邦纳，作者采访。
54. Deliver occasional speeches: “Big Bang, Paris, RNN Talking Points,” 12 April 1988, IA; “RNN Talking Points, Cowen Investment Group,” 22 June 1988, IA; “RNN, Intel: Preparing for the Challenges of the 1980s,” CIS Summit Talk, 19 July 1988. 58 speeches: Miller Bonner, interview by author.
55. 诺伊斯-邦纳对话：米勒·邦纳，作者采访。
55. Noyce-Bonner conversation: Miller Bonner, interview by author.
56. 许多大师：罗伯特·诺伊斯接受采访，谈及他在爱荷华州 SEMATECH 的工作。
56. Many masters: Interview, Robert Noyce, regarding his work at SEMATECH, IA.
57. Noyce 扮演 Springsteen：家庭照片，ASB。远程汽车启动器：Miller Bonner，作者采访；“AutoCommand 'AutoCommand PLUS 远程汽车启动器安装手册'”，ASB。
57. Noyce as Springsteen: family photo, ASB. Remote car starter: Miller Bonner, interview by author; “AutoCommand ’AutoCommand PLUS Remote Car Starter Installation Manual,” ASB.
58. 诺伊斯驾驶战斗机：“罗伯特·诺伊斯驾驶 RF-4C，1989 年 9 月 7 日，德克萨斯州伯格斯特罗姆空军基地”[相册]，ASB。糖果店里的孩子：米勒·邦纳，作者采访。
58. Noyce flying fighter jet: “Robert Noyce Flies the RF-4C, 7 September 1989, Bergstrom AFB, TX” [photo album], ASB. Kid in a candy store: Miller Bonner, interview by author.
59. 诺伊斯的随笔：未标注的页面出现在标有“RNN-涂鸦！”的文件中。他自大学以来最快乐的时光：吉姆·拉弗蒂，作者采访。
59. Noyce’s jottings: unlabeled pages appearing in file marked “RNN-Doodles!” ASB. Most fun he’d had since college: Jim Lafferty, interview by author.
60. 这让我感到惊讶：韦恩·东（Wayne Higashi）接受作者采访时如是说。东和吉姆·拉弗蒂（Jim Lafferty）在接受作者采访时，讲述了机械变速器的故事。
60. It amazed me: Wayne Higashi, interview by author. Higashi and Jim Lafferty, in their interviews with the author, are the sources for the mechanical transmission story.
61. 这给了我很大的信心：韦恩·东（Wayne Higashi），作者访谈。诺伊斯协助使用的传输变体在[此处应插入参考文献]中有所描述。Frank A. Fritz 和 Paul B. Pires，“用于汽车应用的齿轮式无级变速器”，SAE（汽车工程师协会）技术论文系列910407，由 Wayne Higashi 提供。
61. It gave me a great deal of confidence: Wayne Higashi, interview by author. A variant of the transmission with which Noyce helped is described in Frank A. Fritz and Paul B. Pires, “A Geared Infinitely Variable Transmission for Automotive Applications,” SAE [Society of Automotive Engineers] Technical Paper Series 910407, courtesy Wayne Higashi.
62. 受影响的日历：Noyce 1989 年日记本，ASB。当头一棒：Ann Bowers 致 Grant Gale，无日期，但信封邮戳日期为 1988 年 12 月 14 日，GCA。
62. Impacted calendar: Noyce 1989 datebook, ASB. Kick in the side of the head: Ann Bowers to Grant Gale, no date but envelope postmarked 14 Dec. 1988, GCA.
63. 你必须走多远：JF Welch，“德雷珀奖”，[演讲稿]，ASB。诺伊斯对德雷珀奖的评论：诺伊斯，德雷珀奖演讲笔记，ASB。盖尔感谢诺伊斯：盖尔致诺伊斯，1990年3月2日，ASB。
63. How far do you have to reach: J.F. Welch, “Draper Prize,” [speech typescript], ASB. Noyce’s Draper comments: Noyce, notes for Draper speech, ASB. Gale thanking Noyce: Gale to Noyce, 2 March 1990, ASB.
64. 增加资金：SEMATECH 的努力，5、26；Grindley、Mowery 和 Silverman，《SEMATECH 和合作研究》，16。授予的 SEMATECH 合同：美国政府问责局，《SEMATECH 的努力》，26。上一年的合同：联邦参与 SEMATECH 咨询委员会，《SEMATECH 1990：提交国会的报告》，ES-4。
64. Increased funding: SEMATECH’s Efforts, 5, 26; Grindley, Mowery, and Silverman, SEMATECH and Collaborative Research, 16. SEMATECH contracts awarded: United States Government Accounting Office SEMATECH’s Efforts, 26. Previous year’s contracts: Advisory Council on Federal Participation in Sematech, SEMATECH 1990: Report to Congress, ES-4.
65. 我们都是客户：罗伯特·诺伊斯，“SEMATECH 和国家议程：在 SEMI/SEMATECH 成员面前的讲话”，1990 年 5 月 24 日，ST。
65. We’re all customers: Robert Noyce, “SEMATECH and the National Agenda: Remarks Before SEMI/SEMATECH Members,” 24 May 1990, ST.
66. 他很乐意出去玩：安·鲍尔斯，作者采访，2004 年 8 月 16 日。
66. He was up for hanging out: Ann Bowers, interview by author, 16 Aug. 2004.
67. 与约瑟夫弟兄的谈话描述：安·鲍尔斯，作者采访；佩妮·诺伊斯，作者采访。
67. Description of the conversation with Brother Joseph: Ann Bowers, interview by author; Penny Noyce, interview by author.
68. 与霍斯钦斯基的对话：保罗·霍斯钦斯基，作者采访。
68. Conversation with Hwoschinsky: Paul Hwoschinsky, interview by author.
69. 与乔布斯共度良宵：史蒂夫·乔布斯接受作者采访。乔布斯回忆说，这次会面发生在诺伊斯去世前“大约一周”。1990年5月24日，诺伊斯在圣马特奥向SEMI-SEMATECH的成员发表了演讲。
69. Evening with Jobs: Steve Jobs, interview with author. Jobs recalls this evening taking place “about a week” before Noyce’s death. Noyce delivered a speech to members of SEMI-SEMATECH in San Mateo on 24 May 1990.
70. 改变他们的偶像：Miller Bonner 等人，“Robert N. Noyce，1927–1990”，SEMATECH 内部出版的纪念册，ST.
70. Change their idols: Miller Bonner et al., “Robert N. Noyce, 1927–1990,” memorial brochure internally published by SEMATECH, ST.
结论
Conclusion
1. 将他们对诺伊斯的回忆录入国会记录：其中包括阿尔伯特·戈尔、约瑟夫·利伯曼、艾伦·克兰斯顿、诺曼·米内塔、理查德·格普哈特、劳埃德·本特森、唐·爱德华兹、梅尔文·莱文、莱昂·帕内塔和杰克·皮克尔。（国会记录，众议院，1990年6月5日和6月6日；国会记录，参议院，1990年6月5日、6月6日、6月13日、9月14日；国会记录，补充发言，1990年6月6日、6月11日、6月13日、6月14日。）国家瑰宝：迪克·切尼致安·鲍尔斯，1990年6月14日[盖有该日收到的印章]，ASB。少数人之一：D. Allan Bromley 致 Ann Bowers，1990 年 6 月 7 日，ASB。最具影响力的个人力量：Stan Baker，“业界哀悼一位领袖的逝世”，《电子工程时报》，1990 年 6 月 11 日。工业革命的缔造者：Evelyn Richards，“随着诺伊斯的离世，一个时代也随之结束”，《华盛顿邮报》 ，1990 年 6 月 5 日。改变二十世纪：Judy Mann，“最好的榜样是那些默默无闻的人”，《华盛顿邮报》，1990 年 6 月 8 日。苹果致敬：ASB。
1. Entered their memories of Noyce into the Congressional Record: these include Albert Gore, Joseph Lieberman, Alan Cranston, Norman Mineta, Richard Gephardt, Lloyd Bentsen, Don Edwards, Melvin Levine, Leon Panetta, Jake Pickle. (Congressional Record, House, 5 June and 6 June 1990; Congressional Record, Senate, 5 June 1990, 6 June 1990, 13 June 1990, 14 Sept. 1990; Congressional Record, Extension of Remarks, 6 June 1990, 11 June 1990, 13 June 1990, 14 June 1990.) National treasure: Dick Cheney to Ann Bowers, 14 June 1990 [stamped as received on that date], ASB. One of the few: D. Allan Bromley to Ann Bowers, 7 June 1990, ASB. Most powerful personal force: Stan Baker, “Industry Mourns Loss of a Leader,” Electronic Engineering Times, 11 June 1990. Create industrial revolution: Evelyn Richards, “In Noyce’s Passing, An Era Also Ends,” Washington Post, 5 June 1990. Transform twentieth century: Judy Mann, “The Best Role Models are Those Without Fame,” Washington Post, 8 June 1990. Apple tribute: ASB.
2. 确保我们做好准备：Noyce 在 Karlgaard 的文章“Bob Noyce 与Upside对话”中引用。
2. Make sure we’re preparing: Noyce quoted in Karlgaard, “Bob Noyce Talks to Upside.”
3. 或许只有100个元件：特纳·哈斯蒂，埃文·拉姆斯塔德采访，1997年4月25日，埃文·拉姆斯塔德提供。人均9000万个晶体管：SIA网站：http://sia-online.org/pre_facts.cfm
3. Maybe 100 components: Turner Hasty, interview by Evan Ramstad, 25 April 1997, courtesy Evan Ramstad. 90 million transistors per person: SIA Web site: http://sia-online.org/pre_facts.cfm
4. NSF Robert Noyce 奖学金计划：Joan T. Prival 致作者，2005 年 1 月 25 日。
4. NSF Robert Noyce Scholarship Program: Joan T. Prival to author, 25 Jan. 2005.
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——。“硅谷的商业文化：它是未来的模式吗？”载于《区域文化、管理行为和创业精神：国际视角》，Joseph Weiss 编，第 23-42 页。纽约：Quorum Books，1988 年。
———. “The Business Culture of Silicon Valley: Is it a Model for the Future?” In Regional Cultures, Managerial Behavior, and Entrepreneurship: An International Perspective, ed. Joseph Weiss, 23–42. New York: Quorum Books, 1988.
Whittington, Dale 编。《高科技的美好愿景：北卡罗来纳州的微电子政策》。教堂山：北卡罗来纳大学出版社，1985 年。
Whittington, Dale, ed. High Hopes for High Tech: Microelectronics Policy in North Carolina. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.
威尔斯，加里。《约翰·韦恩的美国：名人政治》。纽约：西蒙与舒斯特出版社，1997年。
Wills, Garry. John Wayne’s America: The Politics of Celebrity. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997.
Yoffie, David B.“一个行业如何建立政治优势。”哈佛商业评论，1988 年 5 月至 6 月，82-89 页。
Yoffie, David B. “How an Industry Builds Political Advantage.” Harvard Business Review, May–June 1988, 82–89.
回忆录、演讲和回忆录
Recollections, Presentations, and Memoirs
“微电子学的宏观视角：英特尔的戈登·E·摩尔”，IEEE 设计与测试，1984 年 11 月，17。
“A Macro View of Microelectronics: Gordon E. Moore of Intel,” IEEE Design and Test, November 1984, 17.
“Art Rock on Faith and Luck”，Upside Preview Issue，1989 年夏季，15。
“Art Rock on Faith and Luck,” Upside Preview Issue, Summer 1989, 15.
Faggin, Frederico “微处理器的诞生”。重印于《Byte 精选集》，Jay Ranade 和 Alan Nash 编辑，第 354-357 页。纽约：麦格劳-希尔出版社，1994 年。
Faggin, Frederico “The Birth of the Microprocessor.” Reprinted in Best of Byte, ed. Jay Ranade and Alan Nash, 354–357. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994.
Hogan, C. Lester.“是时候对集成电路做出决定了。” 《西部电子新闻》，1963 年 2 月，第 24 页。
Hogan, C. Lester. “It’s Time for a Decision on Integrated Circuits.” Western Electronic News, February 1963, 24.
——。“对半导体技术过去的思考和对未来的展望。”界面时代，1977 年 3 月，19-36 页。
———. “Reflections on the Past and Thoughts About the Future of Semiconductor Technology.” Interface Age, March 1977, 19–36.
Kilby, Jack S.“集成电路的发明。” IEEE电子器件学报33，第7期（1976年7月）。
Kilby, Jack S. “Invention of the Integrated Circuit.” IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices 33, No. 7 (July 1976).
Kvamme, E. Floyd. “硅谷生活：亲身感受该地区的发展。”载于《硅谷优势：创新与创业的栖息地》， Chong-Moon Lee、William F. Miller、Marguerite Gong Hancock 和 Henry S. Rowen 编辑，第 59-80 页。斯坦福：斯坦福大学出版社，2000 年。
Kvamme, E. Floyd. “Life in Silicon Valley: A First-Hand View of the Region’s Growth.” In The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation and Entrepreneurship, ed. Chong-Moon Lee, William F. Miller, Marguerite Gong Hancock, and Henry S. Rowen, 59–80. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
摩尔，戈登。“关于半导体行业研究的一些个人观点。”载于《创新引擎：一个时代的终结中的美国工业研究》，理查德·S·罗森布鲁姆和威廉·J·斯宾塞编，第167页。波士顿：哈佛商学院出版社，1996年。
Moore, Gordon. “Some Personal Perspectives on Research in the Semiconductor Industry.” In Engines of Innovation: U.S. Industrial Research at the End of an Era, ed. Richard S. Rosenbloom and William J. Spencer, 167. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.
——。“英特尔——存储器和微处理器”，《代达罗斯》 125，1966 年春季：55-80。
———. “Intel—Memories and the Microprocessor,” Daedalus 125, Spring 1966: 55–80.
———.“将更多元件塞进集成电路。”电子学，1965 年 4 月 19 日，114–117。
———. “Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits.” Electronics, 19 April 1965, 114–117.
Noyce, Donald S.“从蜡烛到电脑：Ralph Brewster Noyce (1893–1984) 的一生。”未发表的家族史，1995 年 11 月。由 Don Noyce 提供。
Noyce, Donald S. “From Candles to Computers: A Life of Ralph Brewster Noyce (1893–1984).” Unpublished family history, Nov. 1995. Courtesy Don Noyce.
诺伊斯，哈丽特·诺顿。“我记得。”未发表的家族史，1988 年。由唐·诺伊斯提供。
Noyce, Harriet Norton. “I Remember.” Unpublished family history, 1988. Courtesy Don Noyce.
Rock, Arthur. “风险投资家的战略与战术。”哈佛商业评论，1987 年 11 月至 12 月，63-67 页。
Rock, Arthur. “Strategy vs. Tactics from a Venture Capitalist.” Harvard Business Review, November–December 1987, 63–67.
——2002 年 9 月 30 日，在加利福尼亚州山景城计算机历史博物馆举行的“风险投资传奇人物”小组讨论会上发表的演讲。
———. Presentation at “Legends of Venture Capital” panel, Computer History Museum, Mountain View, Calif., 30 Sept. 2002.
论文
Theses
Bassett, Ross Knox. “新技术、新人、新组织：MOS晶体管的兴起，1945-1975。”博士论文，普林斯顿大学，1998年。
Bassett, Ross Knox. “New Technology, New People, New Organizations: The Rise of the MOS Transistor, 1945–1975.” PhD diss., Princeton University, 1998.
康拉德，丽贝卡。“使心之谷变得庸俗化。”加州大学圣巴巴拉分校论文，1983 年。
Conrad, Rebecca. “Slurbanizing the Valley of the Heart’s Delight.” University of California Santa Barbara thesis, 1983.
Freund, Robert E.“晶体管行业的竞争与创新。”博士论文，杜克大学，1971 年。
Freund, Robert E. “Competition and Innovation in the Transistor Industry.” PhD diss., Duke University, 1971.
Kleiman Herbert S.“集成电路：电子行业产品创新案例研究。”博士论文，纽约大学，1966 年。
Kleiman Herbert S. “The Integrated Circuit: A Case Study of Product Innovation in the Electronics Industry.” PhD diss., New York University, 1966.
Kraus, Jerome. “半导体行业的经济研究。”博士论文，新社会研究学院，1973 年。
Kraus, Jerome. “An Economic Study of the Semiconductor Industry.” PhD diss., New School for Social Research, 1973.
莱库耶，克里斯托夫。“硅谷的形成：工程文化、创新和工业增长，1930-1970 年。”斯坦福大学博士论文，1999 年。
Lécuyer, Christophe. “Making Silicon Valley: Engineering Culture, Innovation and Industrial Gowth, 1930–1970.” PhD diss., Stanford University, 1999.
洛文，丽贝卡。“抓住绝佳机遇：斯坦福大学、工业界和联邦政府，1937-1965 年。”博士论文，斯坦福大学，1990 年。
Lowen, Rebecca. “Exploiting a Wonderful Opportunity: Stanford University, Industry, and the Federal Government, 1937–1965.” PhD diss., Stanford University, 1990.
塞维利亚，拉蒙·C.“就业实践和产业重组：以硅谷半导体产业为例，1955-1991 年。”博士论文，加州大学洛杉矶分校，1992 年。
Sevilla, Ramon C. “Employment Practices and Industrial Restructuring: A Case Study of the Semiconductor Industry in Silicon Valley, 1955–1991.” PhD diss., UCLA, 1992.
斯坦穆勒，威廉·爱德华。“微观经济学和微电子学：集成电路技术的经济研究。”博士论文，斯坦福大学，1987 年。
Steinmueller, William Edward. “Microeconomics and Microelectronics: Economic Studies of Integrated Circuit Technology.” PhD diss., Stanford University, 1987.
来自大众媒体的综合文章
General articles from the popular press
商业周刊。1960 年 3 月 26 日，1965 年 10 月 30 日，1968 年 10 月 5 日，1969 年 10 月 4 日，1974 年 4 月 20 日，1981 年 12 月 14 日，1996 年 2 月 5 日。
Business Week. 26 March 1960, 30 October 1965, 5 October 1968, 4 October 1969, 20 April 1974, 14 December 1981, 5 February 1996.
电子新闻。1956年8月至1980年12月。
Electronic News. August 1956–December 1980.
《纽约时报》1983年2月27日、1984年1月13日、1984年11月10日、1984年3月9日、1987年3月8日、1988年1月13日、1988年4月1日、1989年9月7日。
New York Times. 27 February 1983, 13 January 1984, 10 November 1984, 9 March 1984, 8 March 1987, 13 January 1988, 1 April 1988, 7 September 1989.
《旧金山纪事报》1980年9月22日、1980年9月23日、1980年9月30日。
San Francisco Chronicle. 22 September 1980, 23 September 1980, 30 September 1980.
圣何塞水星报。1985年1月至1987年12月。
San Jose Mercury News. January 1985–December 1987.
标准普尔行业调查。1980 年 1 月至 1986 年 12 月。
Standard and Poor’s Industry Surveys. January 1980–December 1986.
西部电子新闻。1956年1月至1962年12月。
Western Electronic News. January 1956–December 1962.
“工程师关注集成消费品”，《电视文摘》，1964 年 3 月 30 日，第 7-8 页。
“Engineers Eye Integrated Consumer Products,” Television Digest, 30 March 1964, 7–8.
“美国如何才能在全球范围内竞争”，《财富》杂志，1989 年 6 月 5 日，第 248 页。
“How the U.S. Can Compete Globally,” Fortune, 5 June 1989, 248.
“IBM、AT&T 为 SEMATECH 贡献技术”，《洛杉矶时报》，1988 年 1 月 27 日。
“IBM, AT&T Contributing Technology to SEMATECH,” Los Angeles Times, 27 January 1988.
《经济学人》 1980 年 12 月 27 日刊登的《快速思考芯片》一文，第 65-66 页。
“Quick Thinking for Chips,” The Economist, 27 December 1980: 65–66.
史密斯，亚当。“硅谷精神。” 《时尚先生》，1981 年 11 月，第 13 页。
Smith, Adam. “Silicon Valley Spirit.” Esquire, November 1981, 13.
“特别报道：工业发展/选址。”电子工程时报，1981年11月9日。
“Special Report: Industrial Development/Site Selection.” Electronic Engineering Times, 9 November 1981.
“德克萨斯城坚持不懈，最终成功捕获 SEMATECH。” 《波士顿环球报》，1988 年 1 月 27 日。
“Texas City’s Persistence Pays in Battle to Snare SEMATECH.” Boston Globe, 27 January, 1988.
“创始文件”，《福布斯快讯》，2000 年 5 月 29 日，无页码。
“The Founding Documents,” Forbes ASAP, 29 May 2000, unpaginated.
“微处理器诞生 25 周年：业界辩论”，Upside，1994 年 11 月 1 日。
“The Microprocessor’s 25th Birthday: An Industry Debate,” Upside, 1 November 1994.
“固态电子产业的分裂”，《创新》 8，1969 年。
“The Splintering of the Solid-State Electronics Industry,” Innovation 8, 1969.
“美国财团效仿日本组织模式。”远东经济评论，1990年5月24日。
“US Consortiums Mimic Japanese Organisation.” Far Eastern Economic Review. 24 May 1990.
“费尔柴尔德相机——一家成长型公司的肖像。” 《金融世界》，1962 年 9 月 12 日，第 10 页。
“Fairchild Camera—Portrait of a Growth Company.” Financial World, 12 September 1962, 10.
“仙童半导体公司：公司简介。”固态杂志，1960 年 9 月/10 月，第 1 页。
“Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation: Company Profile.” Solid State Journal, September/October 1960, 1.
《电子学五十年》特刊，1980 年 4 月 17 日，第 326 页。
“Fifty Years of Electronics,” a special issue of Electronics, 17 April 1980, 326.
“电子产品中最热门的产品。” 《巴伦周刊》，1958 年 8 月 11 日。
“Hottest Thing in Electronics.” Barron’s, 11 August 1958.
“强大的微缩模型。” 《时代》周刊，1965 年 3 月 4 日，93-94 页。
“Mighty Miniatures.” Time, 4 March 1965, 93–94.
“将科学变成产业”，IEEE Spectrum，1966 年 1 月，102。
“Turning a Science into an Industry,” IEEE Spectrum, January 1966, 102.
Appelbome, Peter. “形势严峻。” 《德克萨斯月刊》，1985 年 10 月。
Appelbome, Peter. “The Chips Are Down.” Texas Monthly, October, 1985.
巴加梅里，安妮。“没有政策就是好政策。” 《福布斯》，1984 年 6 月 18 日。
Bagamery, Anne. “No Policy is Good Policy.” Forbes, 18 June 1984.
Beeler, Jeffrey. “半导体行业代表对日本发出警报。”计算机世界，1979 年 6 月 25 日。
Beeler, Jeffrey. “Semi Industry Reps Raise Alarm on Japanese.” Computerworld, 25 June 1979.
Benner, Susan. “硅谷上空的暴风云。” 《公司》杂志，1982 年 9 月，第 84 页。
Benner, Susan. “Storm Clouds Over Silicon Valley.” Inc., September 1982, 84.
布卢门撒尔，凯伦。“芯片联盟的组织者希望美国每年提供 1.25 亿美元。” 《华尔街日报》，1987 年 5 月 13 日。
Blumenthal, Karen. “Chip Consortium’s Organizer Wants U.S. to Provide $125 Million Annually.” Wall Street Journal, 13 May 1987.
Brody, Herb. “高科技竞赛：各州争夺市场份额。”高科技，1985 年 1 月。
Brody, Herb. “The High Tech Sweepstakes: States Vie for a Slice of the Pie.” High Technology, January 1985.
Brooks, Nancy Rivera.“州政府官员哀叹 SEMATECH 落入德克萨斯州。” 《洛杉矶时报》，1988 年 1 月 7 日。
Brooks, Nancy Rivera. “State Officials Lament Loss of SEMATECH to Texas.” Los Angeles Times, 7 January 1988.
Burrows, Peter.“比尔·斯宾塞努力改革SEMATECH。”电子商业，1992年5月18日。
Burrows, Peter. “Bill Spencer Struggles to Reform SEMATECH.” Electronic Business, 18 May 1992.
Bylinsky, Gene. “硅谷的日本间谍。” 《财富》杂志，1978 年 2 月 27 日。
Bylinsky, Gene. “The Japanese Spies in Silicon Valley.” Fortune, 27 February 1978.
——。“英特尔如何赢得内存芯片的赌注。” 《财富》杂志，1973 年 11 月。
———. “How Intel Won Its Bet on Memory Chips.” Fortune, November 1973.
Caldo, JT “半导体，电子工业的年轻巨头。” 《分析师杂志》，1959 年 8 月 15 日，71-72 页。
Caldo, J. T. “Semiconductors, Young Giant of the Electronics Industry.” Analysts Journal, 15 August 1959, 71–72.
Churbuck, David.“当今的公司给创新一个机会。” PC Computing，1989 年 9 月。
Churbuck, David. “Today’s Companies Give Innovation a Chance.” PC Computing, September 1989.
科尔，史蒂夫。“当魔法消失时。” 《公司》，1984 年 10 月，第 83 页。
Coll, Steve. “When the Magic Goes.” Inc., October 1984, 83.
Dean, KJ 和 G. White。“半导体的故事：寻找最佳晶体管。” 4 部分系列文章之二。《无线世界》，1973 年 2 月，第 67 页。
Dean, K. J., and G. White. “The Semiconductor Story: Search for the Best Transistor.” Part 2 of a 4-part series. Wireless World, Februrary 1973, 67.
丹斯莫尔，比尔。“圣克拉拉谷电子产业在‘自我一代’的十年中走向成熟。” 《半岛时报论坛报》，1979 年 12 月 28 日。
Densmore, Bill. “The Santa Clara Valley Electronics Industry Comes of Age During the ‘Me’ Generation decade.” Peninsula Times Tribune, 28 December 1979.
Djean, David. “西行哈！硅谷游客指南。” PC-Computing，1989 年 6 月，99。
Djean, David. “Westward Ha! A Visitor’s Guide to Silicon Valley.” PC-Computing, June 1989, 99.
Donohue, James F. “微处理器的最初二十年：它的发展历程。” EDN 微处理器，1988 年 10 月 27 日，第 22-23 页。
Donohue, James F. “The Microprocessor’s First Two Decades: The Way it Was.” EDN Microprocessor, 27 October 1988, 22–23
恩斯特罗姆，特蕾丝。“小硅谷。”高科技，1987 年 1 月。
Engstrom, Therese. “Little Silicon Valleys.” High Technology, January 1987.
埃里克森，斯坦福。“霍根如何拯救费尔柴尔德。”国际管理，1970 年 7 月，22。
Erickson, Stanford. “How Hogan Rescued Fairchild.” International Management, July 1970, 22.
法洛斯，詹姆斯。“美国工业：它出了什么问题，如何拯救它。” 《大西洋月刊》，1980 年 9 月，第 35-50 页。
Fallows, James. “American Industry: What Ails It, How to Save It.” The Atlantic, September 1980, 35–50.
盖尔曼，埃里克。“硅谷的摊牌。” 《新闻周刊》，1985 年 9 月 30 日，第 46 页。
Gelman, Eric. “Showdown in Silicon Valley.” Newsweek, 30 September 1985, 46.
Hatano, Daryl G.“为什么SIA提起301贸易诉讼。”日本经济杂志，1985年10月12日。
Hatano, Daryl G. “Why SIA Filed the 301 Trade Action.” Japan Economic Journal, 12 October 1985.
约翰斯顿，莫伊拉。“硅谷的高科技、高风险和高档生活。” 《国家地理》，1982 年 10 月，459。
Johnston, Moira. “High Tech, High Risk, and High Life in Silicon Valley.” National Geographic, October 1982, 459.
Kehoe, Louise. “芯片制造商向国会寻求帮助。”伦敦金融时报，1987 年 3 月 5 日。
Kehoe, Louise. “Chip Makers Ask Congress for Help.” Financial Times of London, 5 March 1987.
——。“SEMATECH 给硅谷带来打击。”伦敦金融时报，1988 年 1 月 8 日。
———. “SEMATECH Blow to Silicon Valley.” Financial Times of London, 8 January 1988.
Kindel, Stephen 和 Robert Teitelman。“年轻人，向东走。” 《福布斯》，1983 年 6 月 20 日，第 132 页。
Kindel, Stephen and Robert Teitelman. “Go East, Young Man.” Forbes, 20 June 1983, 132.
Ladendorf, Kirk.“SEMATECH 成员减少反而可能发展壮大：缩减规模或有助于联盟更顺畅地运作。” 《奥斯汀美国政治家报》，1992 年 1 月 19 日。
Ladendorf, Kirk. “SEMATECH Could Grow With Fewer Members: Downsizing May Help Consortium Function Smoother.” Austin American-Statesman, 19 January 1992.
拉扎勒斯、西蒙和罗伯特·E·利坦。“民主党人即将就产业政策展开内战。” 《大西洋月刊》，1984 年 9 月。
Lazarus, Simon, and Robert E. Litan. “The Democrats’ Coming Civil War over Industrial Policy.” Atlantic Monthly, September 1984.
米勒，巴里。“微电子技术引发航空电子动荡。” 《航空周刊与航天技术》，1962 年 3 月 19 日，55-73 页。
Miller, Barry. “Microelectronics Causes Avionics Turmoil.” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 19 March 1962, 55–73.
米勒，杰克。“电子学被誉为充满活力的巨婴。”旧金山新闻，1955 年 8 月 24 日。
Miller, Jack. “Electronics is Hailed as Big Lusty Infant.” San Francisco News, 24 August 1955.
佩蒂特，查尔斯。“硅谷奇才”，《半岛时报论坛报》，1977年9月21日
Petit, Charles. “Wizard of Silicon Gulch,” Peninsula Times Tribune, 21 September, 1977
雷德伯恩，汤姆和罗伯特·马格努森。“受税收法案打击，电子公司寻求更广泛的政治基础。” 《洛杉矶时报》，1981年11月15日。
Redburn, Tom, and Robert Magnuson. “Stung by Tax Bill, Electronics Firms Seek Broader Political Base.” Los Angeles Times, 15 November 1981.
赖克，罗伯特·B.“为什么美国需要产业政策。”哈佛商业评论，1982 年 1 月至 2 月。
Reich, Robert B. “Why the U.S. Needs an Industrial Policy.” Harvard Business Review, January–February 1982.
Reid, TR “新思想的诞生：两个你不知道名字的人，他们的思想改变了你的世界。” 《华盛顿邮报》，1982 年 7 月 25 日。
Reid, T. R. “Birth of a New Idea: Two Men Whose Names You Don’t Know Whose Notions Changed Your World.” Washington Post, 25 July 1982.
里希特，保罗。“硅谷正努力应对艰难时期。” 《洛杉矶时报》，1981 年 11 月 15 日。
Richter, Paul. “Silicon Valley Wrestles with Hard Times.” Los Angeles Times, 15 November 1981.
萨利斯伯里，大卫·F.“高科技专家描述培育其产业所需的条件。”基督教科学箴言报，1984 年 8 月 31 日。
Salisbury, David F. “High-Tech Experts Describe What it Takes to Nurture their Industry.” Christian Science Monitor, 31 August 1984.
萨缪尔森，罗伯特·J.“芯片行业的呼吁。” 《华盛顿邮报》，1987 年 6 月 24 日。
Samuelson, Robert J. “Chip Industry’s Plea.” Washington Post, 24 June 1987.
斯坎德林，玛吉。“两位创始人离开仙童公司，成立自己的电子公司。” 《帕洛阿尔托时报》，1968 年 8 月 2 日。
Scandling, Marge. “2 of Founders Leave Fairchild, Form Own Electronics Firm.” Palo Alto Times, 2 August 1968.
Shuit, Douglas. “Deukmejian 悄悄竞购高科技研究中心”，《洛杉矶时报》 ，1987 年 9 月 5 日。
Shuit, Douglas. “Deukmejian Quietly Bids for High-Tech Study Center,” Los Angeles Times, 5 September 1987.
Siekman, Philip.“在电子领域，重大的赌注取决于微小的芯片。” 《财富》杂志，1966 年 6 月，第 120 页。
Siekman, Philip. “In Electronics, the Big Stakes Ride on Tiny Chips.” Fortune, June 1966, 120.
史密斯，李。“财团能否战胜日本？” 《财富》杂志，1989 年 6 月 5 日，第 245 页。
Smith, Lee. “Can Consortiums Defeat Japan?” Fortune, 5 June 1989, 245.
塔马金，鲍勃。“微型电路的大世界。” 《芝加哥每日新闻》 ，1966 年 11 月 3 日。
Tamarkin, Bob. “Tiny Circuitry’s Big World.” Chicago Daily News, 3 November 1966.
特纳，弗雷德里克·杰克逊。“西方对美国民主的贡献” 《大西洋月刊》，1903 年 1 月，第 91 页。
Turner, Frederick Jackson. “Contributions of the West to American Democracy” Atlantic Monthly, January 1903, 91.
Waldman, Peter 和 Brenton R. Schlender，“芯片的衰落：联邦政府发挥重要作用是振兴半导体公司的方式吗？” 《华尔街日报》，1987 年 2 月 17 日。
Waldman, Peter, and Brenton R. Schlender, “Falling Chips: Is a Big Federal Role the Way to Revitalize Semiconductor Firms?” Wall Street Journal, 17 February 1987.
Waldman, Peter.“芯片制造商的 SEMATECH 合资企业急于击败对手，但路径受到质疑。” 《华尔街日报》，1988 年 1 月 8 日。
Waldman, Peter. “Chip Makers’ SEMATECH Venture Rushes to Vanquish Foe, but Path is Questioned.” Wall Street Journal, 8 January 1988.
Wolfe, Tom.“罗伯特·诺伊斯的修补：硅谷的崛起”，《时尚先生》，1983 年 12 月，346-74 页。
Wolfe, Tom. “The Tinkerings of Robert Noyce: How the Sun Rose on Silicon Valley,” Esquire, December 1983, 346–74.
已发表的关于罗伯特·诺伊斯的文章或作者
Published Articles About or By Robert Noyce
“鲍勃·诺伊斯创建了硅谷，现在他被要求拯救它。” 《今日物理》，1988 年 9 月，第 50 页。
“Bob Noyce Created Silicon Valley and Now He’s Asked to Save It.” Physics Today, September 1988, 50.
“英特尔的鲍勃·诺伊斯就集成电路行业发表讲话。” EDN/EEE。1971年9月15日。
“Bob Noyce of Intel Speaks Out on the Integrated Circuit Industry.” EDN/EEE. 15 September 1971.
“用数字衡量创造力：罗伯特·诺伊斯访谈录。”哈佛商业评论，1980 年 5 月至 6 月，122-132 页。
“Creativity by the Numbers: An Interview with Robert Noyce.” Harvard Business Review, May–June 1980, 122–132.
“英特尔的罗伯特·诺伊斯懊恼不已。” 《商业周刊》，1974 年 12 月 14 日，第 32-33 页。
“Intel’s Robert Noyce Kicks Himself Upstairs.” Business Week, 14 December 1974, 32–33.
“半导体行业的新领军企业。” 《商业周刊》，1976 年 3 月 1 日。
“New Leaders in Semiconductors.” Business Week, 1 March 1976.
《罗伯特·诺伊斯：特别致敬》，《圣何塞水星报》，1990 年 6 月 17 日。
“Robert Noyce: Special Tribute,” San Jose Mercury News, 17 June 1990.
柏林，莱斯利。“罗伯特·诺伊斯和仙童半导体，1957-1968 年。”商业史评论75（2001 年春季）：63-101。
Berlin, Leslie. “Robert Noyce and Fairchild Semiconductor, 1957–1968.” Business History Review 75 (Spring 2001): 63–101.
Bonner、Miller、W. Lane Boyd 和 Janet A. Allen。“Robert N. Noyce，1927–1990”，SEMATECH 内部出版的纪念册。
Bonner, Miller, W. Lane Boyd, and Janet A. Allen. “Robert N. Noyce, 1927–1990,” commemorative brochure internally published by SEMATECH.
Bradsher, Keith.“Noyce 被任命为 SEMATECH 联盟负责人”，《洛杉矶时报》，1988 年 7 月 28 日。
Bradsher, Keith. “Noyce Named Head of SEMATECH Consortium,” Los Angeles Times, 28 July 1988.
凯恩，赫伯。“最新消息。” 《旧金山纪事报》，1980 年 2 月 5 日。
Caen, Herb. “Update.” San Francisco Chronicle, 5 February 1980.
Dolan, Carrie 和 Eduardo Lachica。“SEMATECH 任命英特尔的 Noyce 领导半导体行业研究小组。” 《华尔街日报》，1988 年 7 月 28 日。
Dolan, Carrie, and Eduardo Lachica. “SEMATECH Names Intel’s Noyce to Head Semiconductor Industry Research Group.” Wall Street Journal, 28 July 1988.
弗拉纳根，詹姆斯。“罗伯特·诺伊斯还是伊万·博斯基？选择权真正在我们手中”，《洛杉矶时报》，1990 年 6 月 10 日。
Flanagan, James. “Robert Noyce or Ivan Boesky? The Choice is Really Ours,” Los Angeles Times, 10 June 1990.
Karlgaard, Richard. “Bob Noyce 与英特尔对话。” Upside，1990 年 7 月，54。
Karlgaard, Richard. “Bob Noyce Talks to Intel.” Upside, July 1990, 54.
林德格伦，尼洛。“构建一个理性的双头怪兽：罗伯特·诺伊斯和戈登·摩尔的管理风格”，创新[1970]。
Lindgren, Nilo. “Building a Rational Two-Headed Monster: The Management Style of Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore,” Innovation [1970].
洛伍德，亨利。“罗伯特·诺顿·诺伊斯（1927 年 12 月 12 日 - 1990 年 6 月 3 日）”。《美国国家传记》，约翰·A·加拉蒂和马克·C·卡维斯编辑，第 541-543 页。纽约：牛津大学出版社，1999 年。
Lowood, Henry. “Robert Norton Noyce (12 December 1927–3 June 1990).” American National Biography, ed. John A. Garraty and Marc C. Carves, 541–543. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
麦克尔亨尼，维克多·K.“不满成为事业的动力”，《纽约时报》，1976 年 12 月 15 日。
McElheny, Viktor K. “Dissatisfaction as a Spur to Career,” New York Times, 15 December 1976.
Noyce, Robert N.“虚假的希望和高科技小说。”哈佛商业评论，1990 年 1 月至 2 月，31-34 页。
Noyce, Robert N. “False Hopes and High-Tech Fiction.” Harvard Business Review, January–February 1990, 31–34.
——。“微电子学。” 《科学美国人》，1977 年 9 月。
———. “Microelectronics.” Scientific American, September 1977.
——。“硬件前景与局限性。”载于《计算机时代：二十年回顾》，Michael Dertouzous 和 Joel Moses 编辑，第 321-337 页。剑桥：麻省理工学院出版社，1979 年。
———. “Hardware Prospects and Limitations.” In The Computer Age: A Twenty-Year View, ed. Michael Dertouzous and Joel Moses, 321–337. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979.
——。“竞争与合作——八十年代的处方。”研究管理，1982 年 3 月，13-17 页。
———. “Competition and Cooperation—A Prescription for the Eighties.” Research Management, March 1982, 13–17.
Noyce, Robert 和 Marcian E. Hoff, Jr. [Ted Hoff]。“英特尔微处理器发展史”，IEEE Micro，1981 年 2 月。
Noyce, Robert, and Marcian E. Hoff, Jr. [Ted Hoff]. “A History of Microprocessor Development at Intel,” IEEE Micro, February 1981.
佩里，特克拉。“名人第一份工作”，IEEE Spectrum，1967 年 7 月，48。
Perry, Tekla. “Famous First Jobs,” IEEE Spectrum, July 1967, 48.
Petit, Charles. “硅谷的奇才。” 《半岛时报论坛报》，1977 年 9 月 21 日。
Petit, Charles. “Wizard of Silicon Gulch.” Peninsula Times Tribune, 21 September 1977.
Port, Otis.“鲍勃·诺伊斯创建了硅谷。他能拯救它吗？” 《商业周刊》，1988 年 8 月 15 日，第 76 页。
Port, Otis. “Bob Noyce Created Silicon Valley. Can He Save It?” Business Week, 15 August 1988, 76.
理查兹，伊芙琳。“随着诺伊斯的逝世，一个时代也随之结束：电子先驱象征着一个充满冒险精神和创新精神的时代。” 《华盛顿邮报》，1990 年 6 月 5 日。
Richards, Evelyn. “In Noyce’s Passing, an Era Also Ends: Electronics Pioneer Symbolized a Swashbuckling, Innovative Age.” Washington Post, 5 June 1990.
斯莱特，罗伯特。“罗伯特·诺伊斯：硅谷市长。”载于斯莱特，《硅谷肖像》。剑桥：麻省理工学院出版社，1987 年。
Slater, Robert. “Robert Noyce: The Mayor of Silicon Valley.” In Slater, Portraits in Silicon. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987.
斯特劳德，迈克尔。“英特尔的诺伊斯告诉硅谷：不要把我们的错误归咎于他人。” 《半岛时报论坛报》，1985 年 11 月 13 日。
Stroud, Michael. “Intel’s Noyce Tells Silicon Valley: Don’t Blame Others for Our Mistakes.” Peninsula Times Tribune, 13 November 1985.
特德洛，理查德·S.“罗伯特·诺伊斯与硅谷：迈向新的商业世界。” 《企业巨擘：七位商业创新者及其建立的商业帝国》。纽约：哈珀·柯林斯出版社，2001年。
Tedlow, Richard S. “Robert Noyce and Silicon Valley: Toward a New Business World.” Giants of Enterprise: Seven Business Innovators and the Empires they Built. New York: Harper Collins, 2001.
沃森，劳埃德。“芯片发明者将分享 35 万美元现金奖励。” 《旧金山纪事报》，1989 年 10 月 4 日。
Watson, Lloyd. “Chip Inventors to Share $350,000 Cash Prize.” San Francisco Chronicle, 4 October 1989.
沃尔夫，迈克尔·F.“集成电路的起源：两位美国创新者如何将许多人心中的概念变为现实。” IEEE Spectrum，1976 年 8 月。
Wolff, Michael F. “The Genesis of the Integrated Circuit: How a Pair of U.S. Innovators Brought Into Reality a Concept that was on the Minds of Many.” IEEE Spectrum, August 1976.
国会证词和政府文件
Congressional Testimony and Government Documents
“国防科学委员会及其他军事顾问小组中的偏袒和偏见”。美国众议院政府运作委员会下属小组委员会听证会，第98届国会。1983年9月22日。
“Favoritism and Bias Within the Defense Science Board and Other Military Advisory Panels.” Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Congress. 22 September 1983.
《高科技企业区位与区域经济发展》。为美国国会联合经济委员会货币和财政政策小组委员会编写的工作人员研究报告。1982年6月1日。
“Location of High Technology Firms and Regional Economic Development.” Staff study prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Monetary and Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. 1 June 1982.
“致国防部长的备忘录”。载于美国国防科学委员会国防半导体依赖性工作组，《国防科学委员会半导体依赖性工作组报告》。1987 年 2 月。
“Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense.” In United States Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Semiconductor Dependency, Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Semiconductor Dependency. February 1987.
《制胜技术：加利福尼亚州和全国的新产业战略》。加利福尼亚州工业创新委员会报告。1982 年 9 月。
“Winning Technologies: A New Industrial Strategy for California and the Nation.” Report of the California Commission on Industrial Innovation. September 1982.
面临风险的战略产业。国家半导体咨询委员会向总统和国会提交的报告，1989 年。
A Strategic Industry at Risk. Report to the President and the Congress from the National Advisory Committee on Semiconductors, 1989.
联邦政府参与SEMATECH咨询委员会。《SEMATECH 1990：提交国会的报告》。1990年5月。
Advisory Council on Federal Participation in Sematech. SEMATECH 1990: A Report to Congress. May 1990.
———. SEMATECH：1989 年的进展与展望。
———. SEMATECH: Progress and Prospects 1989.
国会预算办公室。《联邦政府资助SEMATECH的益处和风险》。1987年9月。
Congressional Budget Office. The Benefits and Risks of Federal Funding for SEMATECH. September 1987.
美国商务部。《美国高科技产业竞争力评估》。政府印刷局，1983年。
Department of Commerce. Assessment of U.S. Competitiveness in High Technology Industries. Government Printing Office, 1983.
国际贸易管理局 [A-588-504]。“来自日本的可擦除可编程只读存储器半导体；暂停调查。”联邦公报，第 51 卷，第 151 期。1986 年 8 月 6 日，28253。
International Trade Administration [A-588-504]. “Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory Semiconductors From Japan; Suspension of Investigation.” Federal Register, Vol. 51, No. 151. 6 August 1986, 28253.
诺伊斯，罗伯特。“半导体行业概览”。1983年4月在商务部国际贸易管理局的证词。载于《高科技产业：概况与展望——半导体行业》。美国政府印刷局，1983年。
Noyce, Robert. “Overview of the Semiconductor Industry.” Testimony before the International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, April 1983. In High Technology Industries: Profiles and Outlooks—The Semiconductor Industry. Government Printing Office, 1983.
——。“打击贸易违法者的独特方法。” 1989年5月24日，在美国国际贸易委员会第301条委员会作证。
———. A Unique Approach Against Trade Violators.” Testimony delivered before the Section 301 Committee of the U.S. International Trade Commission. 24 May 1989.
——。1981年4月2日，在美国众议院筹款委员会发表的声明。
———. Statement Before the Committee on Ways and Means, United States House of Representatives.” 2 April 1981.
——。向国会作证，众议院能源和商业委员会电信和金融小组委员会，高清电视：众议院能源和商业委员会电信和金融小组委员会听证会。1989 年 9 月 13 日。
———. Testimony Before Congress, Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, High Definition Television: Hearing Before the House Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. 13 September 1989.
维护关键基础：美国半导体材料和设备产业。国家半导体咨询委员会工作文件。1990 年 7 月。
Preserving the Vital Base: America’s Semiconductor Materials and Equipment Industry. Working Paper of the National Advisory Committee on Semiconductors. July 1990.
里根，罗纳德。“1983 年 1 月 25 日在国会联席会议上发表的国情咨文。总统文集：罗纳德·里根政府。”
Reagan, Ronald. “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union: 25 January 1983. Papers of the Presidents: Administration of Ronald Reagan.
桑德斯，WJ III，“国际贸易政策”。1983年4月在商务部国际贸易管理局的证词。载于《高科技产业：概况与展望——半导体产业》。美国政府印刷局，1983年。
Sanders, W. J. III, “International Trade Policy.” Testimony before the International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, April 1983. In High Technology Industries: Profiles and Outlooks—The Semiconductor Industry. Government Printing Office, 1983.
西格尔，伦尼。《在国会作证》，众议院科学技术委员会科学、研究和技术小组委员会以及众议院预算委员会教育和就业工作组。1983 年 6 月 16 日，1100–1101 页。
Siegel, Lenny. Testimony Before Congress, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Technology and the Task Force on Education and Employment of the House Budget Committee. 16 June 1983, 1100–1101.
美国众议院筹款委员会贸易小组委员会。《高科技与日本产业政策：决策者的战略》。1980年10月1日，华盛顿：美国政府印刷局，1980年。
Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives. High Technology and Japanese Industrial Policy: A Strategy for Policymakers. 1 October 1980, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980.
美国商务部国际贸易管理局。《高科技产业概况与展望：半导体产业》。1983年4月。
U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration. High Technology Industries, Profiles and Outlooks: The Semiconductor Industry. April, 1983.
美国总审计署，《从 Sematech 事件中吸取的教训》，GAO/RCED-92-289，华盛顿特区，1992 年 9 月。
U.S. General Accounting Office, Lessons Learned from Sematech, GAO/RCED-92-289, Washington, D.C., September 1992.
美国国际贸易委员会。《影响集成电路世界贸易的竞争因素》。华盛顿特区：美国政府印刷局，1979 年 11 月。
U.S. International Trade Commission. Competitive Factors Influencing World Trade in Integrated Circuits. Washington, D.C.: GPO, November 1979.
美国参议院民主党经济工作组。“产业政策和生产力小组委员会报告。” 1980 年 8 月 4 日。
U.S. Senate Democratic Task Force on the Economy. “Report of the Subcommitteee on Industrial Policy and Productivity.” 4 August 1980.
美国国防科学委员会国防半导体依赖性工作组。“国防科学委员会半导体依赖性工作组报告。” 1987 年 2 月。
United States Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Semiconductor Dependency. “Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Semiconductor Dependency.” February 1987.
美国政府问责局。“国际贸易：关于美日半导体安排的观察”。提交给美国参议员劳埃德·M·本特森的简报报告。美国政府印刷局，USIAD-87-134BR。
United States Government Accounting Office. “International Trade: Observations on the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement.” Briefing Report to the Honorable Lloyd M. Bentsen, United States Senator. Government Printing Office, USIAD-87-134BR.
——。1989 年 SEMATECH 活动财务审计评估1991 年 4 月。
———. Assessment of the Financial Audit for SEMATECH’s Activities in 1989 April 1991.
——SEMATECH为加强美国半导体产业所做的努力1990 年 9 月。
———. SEMATECH’s Efforts to Strengthen the U.S. Semiconductor Industry September 1990.
美国参议院。“银行、住房和城市事务委员会：国际金融小组委员会关于电子行业贸易和技术的监督听证会记录（未经校正）”。华盛顿特区：1980 年 1 月 15 日。
United States Senate. “Uncorrected Transcript of Proceedings, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: Subcommittee on International Finance, Oversight Hearing on Trade and Technology in the Electronics Industry.” Washington, D.C.: 15 January 1980.
风险投资与创新。为美国国会联合经济委员会编写的研究报告。1984 年 12 月 28 日，S. Prt. 98–288。
Venture Capital and Innovation. Study prepared for the Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States. 28 December 1984, S. Prt. 98–288.
视频
Videos
“活着的传奇：来自国家商业名人堂的人物简介”。日期不详[1988年、1989年或1990年初]。视频，SEMATECH档案馆。
“Living Legends, Profiles from the National Business Hall of Fame.” No date [1988, 1989, or early 1990]. Video, SEMATECH archives.
《集成电路简报》。视频由仙童半导体公司发行。1966年，由哈里·塞洛提供。
“A Briefing on Integrated Circuits.” Video distributed by Fairchild Semiconductor. 1966, courtesy Harry Sello.
Noyce接受《改变世界的机器》采访的视频，英特尔档案馆。
Noyce interview for “The Machine that Changed the World.” Video, Intel archives.
《硅谷》。由胡里奥·莫林编剧、制片和导演。视频，SSC。
“Silicon Valley.” Written, Produced, and Directed by Julio Moline. Video, SSC.
追悼会。1990年6月9日，德克萨斯州奥斯汀。视频，SEMATECH档案馆。
Memorial Service. 9 June 1990, Austin, Texas. Video, SEMATECH archives.
追悼会。1990年6月18日，加利福尼亚州圣何塞。视频，英特尔档案馆。
Memorial Service. 18 June 1990, San Jose, California. Video, Intel archives.
访谈和口述历史
Interviews and Oral Histories
作者的访谈记录列于附录 A，第 385 页。
The author’s interviews are listed in Appendix A, page 385.
英特尔档案馆保存的口述历史，全部由一位名叫“斯坦”的采访者进行。
Oral histories held in the Intel archives, all conducted by an interviewer identified as “Stein.”
Bill Davidow、Gene Flath 和 Bob Noyce，1983 年 8 月 13 日
Bill Davidow, Gene Flath, and Bob Noyce, 13 Aug. 1983
汤姆·罗，1983年10月10日和1984年2月15日
Tom Rowe, 10 Oct. 1983 and 15 Feb. 1984
戈登·摩尔、格里·帕克和莱斯·瓦达兹，1983年10月17日
Gordon Moore, Gerry Parker, and Les Vadasz, 17 Oct. 1983
埃德·格尔巴赫、安迪·格鲁夫和泰德·詹金斯，1983年10月24日
Ed Gelbach, Andy Grove, and Ted Jenkins, 24 Oct. 1983
斯坦·马佐尔、基思·汤姆森和罗恩·惠蒂尔
Stan Mazor, Keith Thomson, and Ron Whittier
Rob Walker 的口述历史，视频，硅谷创世纪收藏，斯坦福大学特藏部。
Oral histories by Rob Walker, Video, Silicon Genesis Collection, Stanford Special Collections.
史蒂夫·艾伦、劳伦斯·本德和理查德·斯坦海默，1995年5月25日
Steve Allen, Lawrence Bender, and Richard Steinheimer, 25 May 1995
弗雷德里科·法金，1995 年 4 月 22 日
Frederico Faggin, 22 April 1995
理查德·霍奇森，1995年9月19日
Richard Hodgson, 19 Sept. 1995
莱斯特·霍根，1995年8月22日
Lester Hogan, 22 Aug. 1995
泰德·霍夫，1995年3月3日
Ted Hoff, 3 March 1995
雷吉斯·麦肯纳，1995年8月22日
Regis McKenna, 22 Aug. 1995
亚瑟·罗克，2002年11月12日
Arthur Rock, 12 Nov. 2002
杰里·桑德斯，2002年10月18日
Jerry Sanders, 18 Oct. 2002
哈里·塞洛，1995年4月8日
Harry Sello, 8 April 1995
采访者：埃文·拉姆斯塔德。由埃文·拉姆斯塔德惠赠作者。
Interviews by Evan Ramstad. Provided to the author courtesy Evan Ramstad
斯科特·克罗姆，1995年4月
Scott Crom, April 1995
罗兰·克罗斯，1996年2月
Rowland Cross, Feb. 1996
格兰特·盖尔，1994年10月
Grant Gale, Oct. 1994
戈登和贝蒂·摩尔，1997年5月18日
Gordon and Bettie Moore, 18 May 1997
亚瑟·罗克，1997年5月19日
Arthur Rock, 19 May 1997
玛丽安·斯坦丁·伍尔夫，1995 年 4 月
Marianne Standing Woolfe, April 1995
莱斯·瓦达兹，1997年5月18日
Les Vadasz, 18 May 1997
查理·斯波克采访，未注明日期，但进行于 20 世纪 90 年代后半期。由查理·斯波克惠赠作者。
Interviews by Charlie Sporck, undated but conducted in the second half of the 1990s. Provided to the author courtesy Charlie Sporck.
大卫·艾利森
David Allison
汤姆湾
Tom Bay
朱利叶斯·布兰克
Julius Blank
鲍勃·格雷厄姆
Bob Graham
维克·格里尼奇
Vic Grinich
安迪·格鲁夫
Andy Grove
达里尔·哈塔诺
Daryl Hatano
理查德·霍奇森
Richard Hodgson
让·霍尔尼
Jean Hoerni
尤金·克莱纳
Eugene Kleiner
弗洛伊德·克瓦姆
Floyd Kvamme
杰伊·拉斯特
Jay Last
雷吉斯·麦肯纳
Regis McKenna
戈登·摩尔
Gordon Moore
杰里·桑德斯
Jerry Sanders
唐·瓦伦丁
Don Valentine
对罗伯特·诺伊斯的深度访谈
Extended interviews of Robert Noyce
Robert N. Noyce 等人，Herbert S. Kleiman 采访。采访内容为研究“集成电路：电子行业工艺创新案例研究”，1965 年。录音带，斯坦福大学特藏部。
Robert N. Noyce and others, interviews by Herbert S. Kleiman. Interviews conducted for research on “The Integrated Circuit: A Case Study in Process Innovation in the Electronics Industry,” 1965. Audio tape recordings, Stanford Special Collections.
《改变世界的机器》访谈记录，英特尔档案馆。
Transcript of the “Machine that Changed the World” interview, Intel archives.
1990 年 5 月 23 日，Rich Karlgaard 对 Noyce 进行了采访。该采访刊登在《 Upside 》杂志1990 年 7 月刊的《Bob Noyce 访谈录》中。
Noyce interview by Rich Karlgaard, 23 May 1990. Printed in “Bob Noyce Talks to Upside,” Upside, July 1990.
“采访罗伯特·诺伊斯——1973 年”，英特尔档案馆。
“Interview Robert Noyce—1973,” Intel Archives.
罗伯特·诺伊斯访谈录，关于他在 SEMATECH 的工作，英特尔档案馆。
Interview, Robert Noyce, Regarding his Work at SEMATECH, Intel Archives.
罗伯特·诺伊斯，尼洛·林德格伦采访。日期不详，但大约在1965年。图片由帕特里夏·林德格伦提供。
Robert Noyce, interview by Nilo Lindgren. No date, but roughly 1965. Courtesy Patricia Lindgren.
Robert Noyce，TR Reid 采访，1982 年 3 月 31 日。由 TR Reid 提供。
Robert Noyce, interview by T. R. Reid, 31 Mar. 1982. Courtesy T. R. Reid.
访问的网站
Websites accessed
“计算机发展史：迷你版”网站。
“A History of the Computer: Mini” Web site.
http://www.pbs.org/nerds/timeline/mini.html
http://www.pbs.org/nerds/timeline/mini.html
美国电子协会 (AeA) 主页。
AeA [American Electronics Association] home page.
http://www.aeanet.org访问日期：2001年5月27日。
http://www.aeanet.org Accessed 27 May 2001.
Leo Esaki，“日本科学的全球影响力”，
Leo Esaki, “The Global Reach of Japanese Science,”
http://www.jspsusa.org/FORUM1996/esaki.html访问日期：2004 年 11 月 1 日。
http://www.jspsusa.org/FORUM1996/esaki.html Accessed 1 Nov. 2004.
富尔曼半导体制造工艺术语表
Fullman Glossary of the Semiconductor Manufacturing Process
http://www.fullman.com/semiconductors/Semiglossary访问日期：2001 年 3 月 20 日。
http://www.fullman.com/semiconductors/Semiglossary Accessed 20 Mar. 2001.
基因泰克公司网站。
Genentech Web site.
http://www.gene.com访问日期：2004 年 8 月 24 日。
http://www.gene.com Accessed 24 Aug. 2004.
哈佛商学院，《工作知识》通讯，2000 年 12 月 4 日。
Harvard Business School, Working Knowledge newsletter, 4 Dec. 2000.
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/pubitem.jhtml?id=1821&t=special_reports_donedeals
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/pubitem.jhtml?id=1821&t=special_reports_donedeals
HP（惠普）历史和事实网站。
HP [Hewlett-Packard] History and Facts Web site.
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/abouthp/histnfacts.htm
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/abouthp/histnfacts.htm
英特尔博物馆。
Intel museum.
http://www.intel.com/intel/museum/25anniv/html访问日期：1999 年 1 月 17 日。
http://www.intel.com/intel/museum/25anniv/html Accessed 17 Jan. 1999.
英特尔网站。
Intel Web site.
www.intel.com访问日期：2001 年 1 月 28 日。
www.intel.com Accessed 28 Jan. 2001.
Intersil半导体术语词典
Intersil Lexicon of Semiconductor Terms
http://rel.semi.harris.com/docds/lexicon/preface.html访问日期：2001 年 3 月 20 日。
http://rel.semi.harris.com/docds/lexicon/preface.html Accessed 20 March 2001.
硅谷微电子行业网站。
Microelectronics in Silicon Valley Web site.
http://www-sul.stanford.edu/edpts/hasrg/histsci/microel.html访问日期：2001 年 6 月 18 日。
http://www-sul.stanford.edu/edpts/hasrg/histsci/microel.html Accessed 18 June 2001.
麻省理工学院电子研究实验室网站：
MIT Research Laboratory of Electronics Web site:
http://webrle.mit.edu/groups/g-surhst.HTM访问日期：2001 年 3 月 28 日。
http://webrle.mit.edu/groups/g-surhst.HTM Accessed 28 March 2001.
诺贝尔物理学奖官方网站。
Nobel Prize Web site for Physics.
www.nobel.se/physics/laureates/1956现为http://nobelprize.org/physics/
www.nobel.se/physics/laureates/1956 Now http://nobelprize.org/physics/
“诺兰·布什内尔。”
“Nolan Bushnell.”
http://www.campusprogram.com/reference/en/wikipedia/n/no/nolan_bushnell.html
http://www.campusprogram.com/reference/en/wikipedia/n/no/nolan_bushnell.html
PBS网站上的“晶体管化！”
PBS Web site for “Transistorized!”
http://www.pbs.org/transistor访问日期：2001 年 3 月 20 日。
http://www.pbs.org/transistor Accessed 20 March, 2001.
SEMATECH 网站。
SEMATECH Web site.
http://www.sematech.org/public/corporate/history访问日期：2001 年 3 月 15 日。
http://www.sematech.org/public/corporate/history Accessed 15 March 2001.
半导体行业协会（SIA）网站。
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) Web site.
http://sia-online.org/home.cfm
http://sia-online.org/home.cfm
《时代》杂志网站上的威廉·肖克利页面。
William Shockley page at Time Web site.
http://www.time.com/time/time100/scientist/profile/Shockley.html
http://www.time.com/time/time100/scientist/profile/Shockley.html
指数
Index
高级微设备公司（AMD），219、255、260、262
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), 219, 255, 260, 262
飞机所有者和飞行员协会，202
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, 202
美国空军，24，92，102。另见美国国防部。
Air Force, U.S., 24, 92, 102. See also Defense Department, U.S.
艾利森，戴夫，95岁。另见符号学
Allison, Dave, 95. See also Signetics
Altair 电脑套件，226
Altair computer kit, 226
铝触点，98–99
aluminum contacts, 98–99
AMD。参见Advanced Micro Devices 。
AMD. See Advanced Micro Devices
Amelco-Teledyne，124，161
Amelco-Teledyne, 124, 161
美国电子协会（AEA），第209、224、236、262页。另见西部电子制造商协会
American Electronics Association (AEA), 209, 224, 236, 262. See also Western Electronics Manufacturers Association
美国证券交易所，250
American Stock Exchange, 250
安吉尔，吉姆，162，385
Angell, Jim, 162, 385
苹果电脑，250–53，276–77
Apple Computer, 250–53, 276–77
史蒂夫·乔布斯，1、2、307
Steve Jobs of, 1, 2, 307
阿姆布鲁斯特、莱斯利·戈万、x
Armbruster, Leslie Gowan, x
阿姆斯特朗，波莉，x
Armstrong, Polly, x
阿雷奥拉，何塞，x，385
Arreola, Jose, x, 385
阿西莫夫，艾萨克，5
Asimov, Isaac, 5
科罗拉多州阿斯彭，228，277
Aspen, Colorado, 228, 277
Atari，253
Atari, 253
爱荷华州大西洋城，10-12
Atlantic, Iowa, 10–12
AT&T，24、287、288。另见贝尔实验室。
AT&T, 24, 287, 288. See also Bell Labs
奥杜邦协会，211
Audubon Society, 211
德克萨斯州奥斯汀，281、286-88、291-92、300-301、305
Austin, Texas, 281, 286–88, 291–92, 300–301, 305
汽车电子，206，239
automotive electronics, 206, 239
Autonetics，北美航空旗下部门，121–22
Autonetics, division of North American Aviation, 121–22
贝利，约翰，385
Bailey, John, 385
鲍德里奇，马尔科姆，272
Baldridge, Malcolm, 272
鲍德温，埃德，95-96，105-8，161
Baldwin, Ed, 95–96, 105–8, 161
鲍德温，梅根，xi
Baldwin, Megan, xi
富兰克林学会巴兰坦奖章，140
Ballantine Medal of the Franklin Institute, 140
巴巴多斯，西印度群岛，237
Barbados, West Indies, 237
约翰·巴丁, 25–26, 33, 53–54, 68–69
Bardeen, John, 25–26, 33, 53–54, 68–69
巴塞特，罗斯，x
Bassett, Ross, x
汤姆·贝，96、105–6、112、142、148、385
Bay, Tom, 96, 105–6, 112, 142, 148, 385
比德林，戴夫，161，385
Beadling, Dave, 161, 385
贝克曼，阿诺德，84–85，87–88，163
Beckman, Arnold, 84–85, 87–88, 163
以及 Shockley，55–56、58、72、74–78
and Shockley, 55–56, 58, 72, 74–78
Beckman Instruments，55、71、72、74
Beckman Instruments, 55, 71, 72, 74
贝尔，亚历山大·格雷厄姆，25岁
Bell, Alexander Graham, 25
贝尔加拿大公司，189。另见微系统国际有限公司（MIL）。
Bell Canada, 189. See also Microsystems International Limited (MIL)
贝尔实验室，42、63、79、99、103、126、181
Bell Labs, 42, 63, 79, 99, 103, 126, 181
Shockley 和，53–55
Shockley and, 53–55
晶体管位于，24–27，33，39–40，73
transistor at, 24–27, 33, 39–40, 73
柏林，史蒂夫和维拉，x
Berlin, Steve and Vera, x
双极电路，173–74，180
bi-polar circuits, 173–74, 180
伯肯斯托克，吉姆，385
Birkenstock, Jim, 385
布兰克，尤利乌斯，9，132，385
Blank, Julius, ix, 132, 385
在费尔柴尔德，94、106、119、161
at Fairchild, 94, 106. 119. 161
在八组数据中，81–86、96、112、124
in group of eight, 81–86, 96, 112, 124
在肖克利，61、65、67、78
at Shockley, 61, 65, 67, 78
博恰雷利，卡洛，49岁
Bocciarelli, Carlo, 49
博尔斯，约翰·S.，118
Bolles, John S., 118
米勒·邦纳, 292–93, 297–98, 385
Bonner, Miller, 292–93, 297–98, 385
《知识之书》第8章
Book of Knowledge, 8
博格沃特，莉兹，x
Borgwardt, Liz, x
博罗沃伊，布伦达，148，385
Borovoy, Brenda, 148, 385
博罗沃伊、罗杰、ix、140、148、162、181、204、226、385
Borovoy, Roger, ix, 140, 148, 162, 181, 204, 226, 385
与日本的谈判，134，184
and negotiations with Japan, 134, 184
博特姆利，贝蒂（第一任妻子），42-46页。另见诺伊斯，贝蒂·博特姆利
Bottomley, Betty (first wife), 42–46. See also Noyce, Betty Bottomley
博特姆利，弗兰克（岳父），43-44
Bottomley, Frank (father-in-law), 43–44
Bottomley，Helen MacLaren（婆婆），43–44
Bottomley, Helen MacLaren (mother-in-law), 43–44
鲍尔斯，安（第二任妻子），第 ix、233–34、245、247–48、264、269、289、300–302、305、385 页
Bowers, Ann (second wife), ix, 233–34, 245, 247–48, 264, 269, 289, 300–302, 305, 385
以及苹果电脑公司，251，253
and Apple Computer, 251, 253
作为顾问，238–39
as consultant, 238–39
以及英特尔，230–31，235
and Intel, 230–31, 235
移居加利福尼亚州，230–32
move to California, 230–32
作为诺伊斯基金会主席，306
as Noyce Foundation chair, 306
与诺伊斯同行，277–78，292
travel with Noyce, 277–78, 292
婚礼，234-35页。另见“家庭”条目。
wedding, 234–35. See also family
Boysel，Lee，192–93，385
Boysel, Lee, 192–93, 385
布拉德利，阿尔伯特，385
Bradley, Albert, 385
布拉德利，比尔，47岁，49岁
Bradley, Bill, 47, 49
沃尔特·布拉顿, 25, 26, 53–54, 68, 69
Brattain, Walter, 25, 26, 53–54, 68, 69
布罗姆利，D.艾伦，305
Bromley, D. Allan, 305
布朗，杰瑞，266
Brown, Jerry, 266
巴克利，奥利弗，26岁
Buckley, Oliver, 26
巴克斯鲍姆，凯，385
Bucksbaum, Kay, 385
巴菲特，沃伦，9，3，166，209，385
Buffett, Warren, ix, 3, 166, 209, 385
Burroughs（计算机制造商），139，204
Burroughs (computer manufacturer), 139, 204
布什，乔治·H·W，6，301，305
Bush, George H. W., 6, 301, 305
布什，范内瓦尔，31岁
Bush, Vannevar, 31
Busicom（日本计算器公司），183–88，195–96，199
Busicom (Japanese calculator company), 183–88, 195–96, 199
商业周刊，第150、159、167、212、245页
Business Week, 150, 159, 167, 212, 245
Caen，《草药》，246–47
Caen, Herb, 246–47
卡埃勒, 241–43, 275–77, 306
Caere, 241–43, 275–77, 306
计算器，184、185、187、195
calculators, 184, 185, 187, 195
加利福尼亚州，5、52、119、143、209。另见旧金山湾区；硅谷；具体地点
California, 5, 52, 119, 143, 209. See also San Francisco Bay Area; Silicon Valley; specific locations
加州电子协会，238
California Electronics Association, 238
加州公共事业委员会，209
California Public Utilities Commission, 209
加州晶体管公司，86
California Transistor Corporation, 86
卡拉尼什基金会，239–41，275
Callanish Fund, 239–41, 275
摄像机，背景板，94
camera, step-and-repeat, 94
坎贝尔，汤姆，270，385
Campbell, Tom, 270, 385
资本利得税，168，262
capital gains tax, 168, 262
卡梅尔谷牧场，278
Carmel Valley ranch, 278
卡特，吉米，5岁，245
Carter, Jimmy, 5, 245
卡特，约翰，84、92、106、112、120、128、150、161
Carter, John, 84, 92, 106, 112, 120, 128, 150, 161
Casady，Michelle，xi
Casady, Michelle, xi
卡斯托、马尔·戴尔和玛丽尔斯，第九卷，第385页
Casto, Mar Dell and Maryles, ix, 385
保罗·卡斯特鲁奇, 292, 296–97
Castrucci, Paul, 292, 296–97
审查员，274
Censtor, 274
钱德勒，阿尔弗雷德，154
Chandler, Alfred, 154
卓别林，乔，50岁，385
Chapline, Joe, 50, 385
切尼，迪克，305
Cheney, Dick, 305
芯片：(1103)、189、195、197、204 (4004)（参见微处理器）(8008)、206；(8080)、217、226 (80386)、257
chip: (1103), 189, 195, 197, 204 (4004) (See microprocessor) (8008), 206; (8080), 217, 226 (80386), 257
双极，173–74，180
bi-polar, 173–74, 180
计算器，184–88，195，199
calculator, 184–88, 195, 199
EPROM存储器，203–4，239，272
EPROM memory, 203–4, 239, 272
翻转，174
flip, 174
逻辑，187
logic, 187
MOS，173–74，180–82，187。另见集成电路；微处理器
MOS, 173–74, 180–82, 187. See also integrated circuit; microprocessor
芯片市场，259、263、272、283
chip market, 259, 263, 272, 283
Chorus Pro Musica，35
Chorus Pro Musica, 35
内乱，168
civil disturbances, 168
克拉克，乔治，31，35，36，46，385
Clark, George, 31, 35, 36, 46, 385
克拉克，约翰，x
Clark, John, x
克拉克霍尔（格林内尔），21–22
Clark Hall (Grinnell), 21–22
科布，约翰，231
Cobb, John, 231
科恩、凯西和比尔，385
Cohen, Kathy and Bill, 385
相干辐射（激光公司），192
Coherent Radiation (laser company), 192
冷战，29，82，91
Cold War, 29, 82, 91
大学时期，14。另见格林内尔学院；麻省理工学院
college years, 14. See also Grinnell College; MIT
美国商务部，284
Commerce, U.S. Department of, 284
元件，硅芯片电路，100–101
components, silicon chip circuit, 100–101
康普顿，卡尔，29岁
Compton, Karl, 29
计算机，135、160、162、185、192-93、227
computer, 135, 160, 162, 185, 192–93, 227
以及集成电路，139
and integrated circuit, 139
个人，226，250–52，278
personal, 226, 250–52, 278
尺寸为：139、183、205
size of, 139, 183, 205
汽车电子会议，206
Conference on Automobile Electronics, 206
公理会教堂，9-12、14、22
Congregationalist Church, 9–12, 14, 22
美国国会：关于资本利得税，168
Congress, U.S.: on capital gains tax, 168
关于 SEMATECH 资金，第 289 页。另见SIA；游说。
on SEMATECH funding, 289. See also SIA; lobbying
控制终端公司，188
Control Terminal Corporation, 188
可转换债券，164
convertible debentures, 164
库克，保罗，166，385
Cook, Paul, 166, 385
康宁玻璃公司，192年
Corning Glass, 192
企业领导力奖（麻省理工学院），246
Corporate Leadership Award (MIT), 246
科里根，威尔弗雷德，260
Corrigan, Wilfred, 260
科顿，杰夫，386
Cotton, Jeff, 386
科伊尔，阿尔弗雷德“巴德”，80-81、83、85、89、113、158、166
Coyle, Alfred “Bud,” 80–81, 83, 85, 89, 113, 158, 166
柯里，杰拉德，166，386
Currie, Gerard, 166, 386
网络司令部，192
Cybercom, 192
DARPA（国防高级研究计划局），287、289、296
DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Administration), 287, 289, 296
数据技术，166
Data Tech, 166
Davidow，Bill，183，203-4，205，386
Davidow, Bill, 183, 203–4, 205, 386
汤姆·戴维斯，122–23, 164, 240
Davis, Tom, 122–23, 164, 240
爱荷华州迪科拉，12
Decorah, Iowa, 12
美国国防部，29、47、50、63、83、121
Defense Department, U.S., 29, 47, 50, 63, 83, 121
以及费尔柴尔德，130–31
and Fairchild, 130–31
作为集成电路市场，137
as market for integrated circuit, 137
和 SEMATECH，266、281–85、291、293、296。另请参见DARPA
and SEMATECH, 266, 281–85, 291, 293, 296. See also DARPA
国防科学委员会半导体依赖性工作组，284
Defense Science Board Task Force on Semiconductor Dependency, 284
戴高乐，夏尔，286
de Gaulle, Charles, 286
爱荷华州丹麦镇，10
Denmark, Iowa, 10
《得梅因纪事报》，7，16
Des Moines Register, 7, 16
德克梅吉安，乔治，287
Deukmejian, George, 287
Diasonics，275
Diasonics, 275
迪茨，蒂姆，x
Dietz, Tim, x
迪芬德弗，大卫，386
Diffenderfer, David, 386
扩散，63，65，93-94
diffusion, 63, 65, 93–94
数字设备公司（DEC），217
Digital Equipment Company (DEC), 217
数字手表，208，213。另见Microma
digital watch, 208, 213. See also Microma
二极管，100，107。另见四层二极管；隧道二极管
diode, 100, 107. See also four-layer diode; tunnel diode
离婚，214-18，234
divorce, 214–18, 234
多恩学院，228–29，230
Doane College, 228–29, 230
多德，里克，xi
Dodd, Rick, xi
德雷克，乔治，386
Drake, George, 386
DRAM 存储器，263–64。另见芯片（1103）。
DRAM memory, 263–64. See also chip (1103)
德雷珀奖，301
Draper Award, 301
杜卡基斯，迈克尔，266
Dukakis, Michael, 266
达顿，吉姆，243，386
Dutton, Jim, 243, 386
伊士曼柯达（树脂），94
Eastman Kodak (resin), 94
托马斯·爱迪生，97岁
Edison, Thomas, 97
埃利希，保罗，212，214
Ehrlich, Paul, 212, 214
艾希勒，约瑟夫，118
Eichler, Joseph, 118
艾勒，芭芭拉，386
Eiler, Barbara, 386
艾森豪威尔，德怀特·D.，55岁，91岁
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 55, 91
艾特尔-麦卡洛，116
Eitel-McCullough, 116
静电计，41
electrometer, 41
电子新闻，87，212，289
Electronic News, 87, 212, 289
电子学，82，118–19
electronics, 82, 118–19
微电子学，253
microelectronics, 253
固态，39，53。另见集成电路
solid state, 39, 53. See also integrated circuit
艾夫曼，布莱恩，241–42
Elfman, Brian, 241–42
1973年能源危机，209-10
energy crisis of 1973, 209–10
企业家，6，56，192，246，250
entrepreneur, 6, 56, 192, 246, 250
硅谷对……的推崇，第253-256页。另见罗伯特·N·诺伊斯，《天使投资》；罗伯特·N·诺伊斯，《指导年轻创业者》。
Silicon Valley veneration of, 253–56. See also Noyce, Robert N., angel investing; Noyce, Robert N., mentoring young entrepreneurs
EPROM 存储芯片，203–4，239，272
EPROM memory chip, 203–4, 239, 272
公平人寿保险公司，23、24、25、106
Equitable Life Insurance Company, 23, 24, 25, 106
江崎，Leo，3，66
Esaki, Leo, 3, 66
《时尚先生》杂志，第5卷，第246、249页
Esquire magazine, 5, 246, 249
埃弗里特，布鲁斯，386
Everitt, Bruce, 386
Faggin, Frederico, 188, 195。另请参见微处理器
Faggin, Frederico, 188, 195. See also microprocessor
费尔柴尔德，谢尔曼，83–84，92–93，120，152–53，155，181
Fairchild, Sherman, 83–84, 92–93, 120, 152–53, 155, 181
费尔柴尔德航空，83
Fairchild Aviation, 83
费尔柴尔德相机和仪器，83–86，88–92
Fairchild Camera and Instrument, 83–86, 88–92
以及 Fairchild Semiconductor，112–13、120、124、147–48、151
and Fairchild Semiconductor, 112–13, 120, 124, 147–48, 151
管理，106，112-113，128，142-143，146-147，149，150-153
management of, 106, 112–13, 128, 142–43, 146–47, 149, 150–53
Fairchild录音设备公司，83
Fairchild Recording Equipment Corporation, 83
仙童半导体公司。参见仙童半导体公司，以及其衍生公司。
Fairchildren. See Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, spinoffs of
仙童半导体公司，1、105、119
Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, 1, 105, 119
下降，150–51
decline of, 150–51
研发与制造之间的鸿沟，125-28
development-manufacturing divide, 125–28
二极管工厂，123
diode plant of, 123
以及 Fairchild Camera，112–13、120、124、147–48、151
and Fairchild Camera, 112–13, 120, 124, 147–48, 151
融资，88–89，95，112–113，120，124
financing of, 88–89, 95, 112–13, 120, 124
创立于 88–92 年
founding of, 88–92
八人组，第 82-86、96、112、124 页
group of eight at, 82–86, 96, 112, 124
以及 IBM，92–93、100、135
and IBM, 92–93, 100, 135
以及电视购物广告，130
and infomercial, 130
以及创新，129–30
and innovation, 129–30
仪器仪表部门，142
instrumentation division of, 142
以及英特尔，171–72，181
and Intel, 171–72, 181
国际化，120–22，131–34，272
internationalizing, 120–22, 131–34, 272
制造于，95、106、114-115、119、125-126、131
manufacturing at, 95, 106, 114–15, 119, 125–26, 131
诺伊斯对（参见罗伯特·N·诺伊斯，《仙童公司总经理》）；专利见第90、97、99-100、102-104、106-100页。
Noyce’s management of (See Noyce, Robert N., as Fairchild general manager); patents at, 90, 97, 99–100, 102–4, 106–10
研发于，90、97、102、106-8、119、122-23、125-26、130-31
R&D at, 90, 97, 102, 106–8, 119, 122–23, 125–26, 130–31
出售给美国国家半导体公司，272–73
sale to National Semiconductor, 272–73
硅晶体管，92–94，96，121–22
silicon transistors at, 92–94, 96, 121–22
衍生产品，124、126-27、134、147-48、181
spin-offs of, 124, 126–27, 134, 147–48, 181
敲击测试，103
tap test at, 103
女性，第94-95、100、101、115、125、132、146页。另见集成电路；微逻辑；平面工艺
women at, 94–95, 100, 101, 115, 125, 132, 146. See also integrated circuit; Micrologic; planar process
费伯，苏珊，x
Ferber, Susan, x
费什巴赫，赫尔曼，30岁
Feshbach, Herman, 30
费曼，理查德，245
Feynman, Richard, 245
菲茨帕特里克，安妮，x
Fitzpatrick, Annie, x
吉恩·弗拉斯，157, 170, 172, 237–38, 386
Flath, Gene, 157, 170, 172, 237–38, 386
福特希尔学院，254
Foothill College, 254
财富500强，255
Fortune 500, 255
《财富》杂志，第212、227、260页
Fortune magazine, 212, 227, 260
四层二极管，71–73
four-layer diode, 71–73
四相系统，192–93，199
Four-Phase Systems, 192–93, 199
弗兰克，纳撒尼尔，30岁，32岁，37岁
Frank, Nathaniel, 30, 32, 37
富士通, 263, 272
Fujitsu, 263, 272
Gale，Grant，17–18、22、24、25–27、30、37、144、273–74
Gale, Grant, 17–18, 22, 24, 25–27, 30, 37, 144, 273–74
诺伊斯对第300-301页的赞赏
Noyce’s appreciation of, 300–301
Gelbach，Ed，184，198–99，203–4，206，225–27，386
Gelbach, Ed, 184, 198–99, 203–4, 206, 225–27, 386
盖尔曼，默里，30，34
Gell-Mann, Murray, 30, 34
基因泰克（生物技术公司），253
Genentech (biotech company), 253
通用汽车（GM），206
General Motors (GM), 206
通用晶体管，79，80
General Transistor, 79, 80
乔治，威尔弗雷德，386
George, Wilfred, 386
锗，39、47、72
germanium, 39, 47, 72
在基尔比的集成电路中，108
in Kilby’s integrated circuit, 108
对于晶体管，26、49、117、121–22
for transistors, 26, 49, 117, 121–22
格默尔，约翰，386
Germer, John, 386
吉本斯，詹姆斯·F.，386
Gibbons, James F., 386
吉尔德，乔治，5
Gilder, George, 5
美国政府，210
government, U.S., 210
计算机，135
computers of, 135
以及日本政府，260–63
and Japanese government, 260–63
在半导体行业中的作用，第264-271页。另见美国国会；美国国防部。
role in semiconductor industry, 264–71. See also Congress, U.S.; Defense Department, U.S.
研究生宿舍（麻省理工学院），30、34、35
Graduate House (MIT), 30, 34, 35
格雷厄姆，鲍勃，157、177、183-184、187、196、198-199
Graham, Bob, 157, 177, 183–84, 187, 196, 198–99
格雷厄姆，威廉，284
Graham, William, 284
格林沃尔德，露丝，386
Greenwald, Ruth, 386
格雷格森，唐，386
Gregson, Don, 386
格里尼奇，维克多，61、74、78、81、94、119
Grinich, Victor, 61, 74, 78, 81, 94, 119
在八人组中，82–86、96、112、124
in group of eight, 82–86, 96, 112, 124
爱荷华州格林内尔，7，13–18，246
Grinnell, Iowa, 7, 13–18, 246
格林内尔，约西亚，14岁
Grinnell, Josiah, 14
格林内尔学院，13–14、211、242、274、298、307
Grinnell College, 13–14, 211, 242, 274, 298, 307
作为英特尔投资者，参见第166页、第208-209页。另见罗伯特·诺伊斯。
as Intel investor, 166, 208–9. See also Noyce, Robert
N.，作为格林内尔学院学生理事
N., as Grinnell College student trustee
格林内尔先驱报，9、15
Grinnell Herald Register, 9, 15
八人小组（Blank、Grinich、Hoerni、Kleiner、Last、Moore、Noyce 和 Roberts），第 82-86、96、112、124 页。另见仙童半导体公司
group of eight (Blank, Grinich, Hoerni, Kleiner, Last, Moore, Noyce and Roberts), 82–86, 96, 112, 124. See also Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation
格罗夫，安迪，1，129，178，189，198-99，207，248，252，291，386
Grove, Andy, 1, 129, 178, 189, 198–99, 207, 248, 252, 291, 386
与诺伊斯的风格形成对比，4，175-76
contrast with Noyce’s style, 4, 175–76
作为经理，188、190、227-228、231、237
as manager, 188, 190, 227–28, 231, 237
Noyce、Moore 和，157、158、170、175–77、224–25、257
Noyce, Moore and, 157, 158, 170, 175–77, 224–25, 257
关于硅谷，254
on Silicon Valley, 254
Vadasz 在 MOS, 173, 180–82 中写道
and Vadasz on MOS, 173, 180–82
格罗夫，伊娃，214
Grove, Eva, 214
瑞典国王古斯塔夫六世·阿道夫，69
Gustav VI Adolph, King of Sweden, 69
哈斯，伊西，111，112，386
Haas, Isy, 111, 112, 386
哈戈皮安，基普，386
Hagopian, Kip, 386
汉密尔顿，大卫，386
Hamilton, David, 386
哈纳芬，莫里斯，77–78
Hanafin, Maurice, 77–78
哈灵顿，鲍勃，221–22、245、253、386
Harrington, Bob, 221–22, 245, 253, 386
哈特，加里，266
Hart, Gary, 266
《哈佛商业评论》，269
Harvard Business Review, 269
哈斯蒂，特纳，296，386
Hasty, Turner, 296, 386
Hatano, Daryl, x, 386
Hatano, Daryl, x, 386
Hayden, Stone, and Company（投资公司），79、112、166
Hayden, Stone, and Company (investment firm), 79, 112, 166
惠普公司，x，67，116，268
Hewlett-Packard, x, 67, 116, 268
东韦恩，299–300, 386
Higashi, Wayne, 299–300, 386
霍尔，弗雷德，386
Hoar, Fred, 386
霍巴特，吉姆，192，386
Hobart, Jim, 192, 386
霍奇森，理查德，108、113、140、166、169、248、289、386
Hodgson, Richard, 108, 113, 140, 166, 169, 248, 289, 386
在费尔柴尔德管理学中，第 89-90、105、150-51、152、224 页
in Fairchild management, 89–90, 105, 150–51, 152, 224
以及八人组，84–85
and group of eight, 84–85
以及 IBM，92–93
and IBM, 92–93
海外利益，121，132
overseas interests of, 121, 132
Hoerni, Jean, 61, 90, 93, 99, 127
八组，82–86、96、112、123–24
in group of eight, 82–86, 96, 112, 123–24
关于诺伊斯的管理风格，第107、108、109页
on Noyce’s management style, 107, 108, 109
关于氧化层，102–5，107–8
on oxide layers, 102–5, 107–8
在肖克利实验室，65、67、70、73、78。另见平面工艺。
at Shockley Labs, 65, 67, 70, 73, 78. See also planar process
霍夫，泰德，ix，162–63，174，199，206，386
Hoff, Ted, ix, 162–63, 174, 199, 206, 386
作为 Busicom 联络员，185–89、195–96、197。另见微处理器
as Busicom liaison, 185–89, 195–96, 197. See also microprocessor
Hogan, C. Lester, 152, 181
Hogan, C. Lester, 152, 181
霍尼韦尔（计算机制造商），188
Honeywell (computer manufacturer), 188
香港，2，131
Hong Kong, 2, 131
霍斯利、斯穆特、58、64、74、77
Horsley, Smoot, 58, 64, 74, 77
休斯航空，95
Hughes Aviation, 95
霍辛斯基，保罗，ix，148，218–19，239，240–41，243，303，386
Hwoschinsky, Paul, ix, 148, 218–19, 239, 240–41, 243, 303, 386
IBM（国际商业机器公司），42、83、118、120
IBM (International Business Machines), 42, 83, 118, 120
作为 Fairchild 的客户，92–93，100
as Fairchild customer, 92–93, 100
以及平面过程，141
and planar process, 141
1980年代，268，287–88
in 1980s, 268, 287–88
以及半导体存储器，151，282
and semiconductor memories, 151, 282
以及 System 360，139
and System 360, 139
产业政策，264-67
industrial policy, 264–67
电气与电子工程师协会 (IEEE)，x，196，245，307。另见无线电工程师协会。
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), x, 196, 245, 307. See also Institute of Radio Engineers
英国无线电工程师学会（IRE），48
Institute of Radio Engineers (IRE), 48
集成电路，122–24，134–36，248，253
integrated circuit, 122–24, 134–36, 248, 253
早期成本和价格，112，138
early cost and price of, 112, 138
发明和开发，1–2，5，100–102，108–12，140
invention and development of, 1–2, 5, 100–102, 108–12, 140
市场营销，134–37
marketing of, 134–37
与德州仪器公司的专利纠纷，139-41
patent dispute with Texas Instruments, 139–41
和平面过程，104–5、108、109、111、245
and planar process, 104–5, 108, 109, 111, 245
英特尔公司，178–91、195–206、220、255、257
Intel company, 178–91, 195–206, 220, 255, 257
计算器芯片位于，184–88，199
calculator chip at, 184–88, 199
顾客人数：178、197、204
customers, 178, 197, 204
荣获年度电子公司奖，第243-44页
as Electronics Company of the Year, 243–44
第一个 fab，169–70
first fab of, 169–70
政府事务委员会，270
Government Affairs Committee at, 270
首次公开募股（IPO），197，200
initial public offering (IPO), 197, 200
发射，1–2，151，164，169–70，171
launch of, 1–2, 151, 164, 169–70, 171
裁员人数分别为：188、223–24、231
layoffs at, 188, 223–24, 231
制造地点：171, 227
manufacturing at, 171, 227
NM Electronics，158–59，162，164
as NM Electronics, 158–59, 162, 164
研发地点：171、208、283
R&D at, 171, 208, 283
罗伯特·诺伊斯大楼，307
Robert Noyce Building at, 307
以及保密，160，171
and secrecy, 160, 171
股票/股份，164–65，197–98，200，209，255
stock/shares of, 164–65, 197–98, 200, 209, 255
女性，200–202。另见芯片（具体名称）；微处理器个人名称
women at, 200–202. See also chip (specific name); microprocessor names of individuals
知识产权，第79、87、181、293页。另见专利。
intellectual property, 79, 87, 181, 293. See also patents
美国国税局（IRS），124
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 124
国际卡车司机兄弟会，第296分会，235
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local #296, 235
费尔柴尔德国际生产，131–33
international production at Fairchild, 131–33
国际贸易协会，272
International Trade Association, 272
国际操作工程师联盟
International Union of Operating Engineers
39号地方工会，235
Local 39, 235
发明，第97-100页、109-110页、141页、182-183页。另见专利。
invention, 97–100, 109–10, 141, 182–83. See also patents
爱荷华州。参见格林内尔学院；各个城镇名称
Iowa. See Grinnell College; individual town names
爱荷华科学院，212
Iowa Academy of Science, 212
日本，107，133–34，295，305
Japan, 107, 133–34, 295, 305
Busicom in, 183–88, 195–96, 199
Busicom in, 183–88, 195–96, 199
政府和半导体行业，260-63页
government and semiconductor industry, 260–63
国际贸易及工业部（MITI），261
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 261
Noyce，第 117、134、184、195、228 页
Noyce in, 117, 134, 184, 195, 228
与美国的竞争，281–82、285、288、291、306–7
U.S. competition with, 281–82, 285, 288, 291, 306–7
贾勒特，吉姆，270
Jarrett, Jim, 270
杰弗里斯，大卫，x，386
Jeffries, David, x, 386
詹宁斯，彼得，5
Jennings, Peter, 5
乔布斯，史蒂夫，ix，1，2，189，250–53，266，307，386
Jobs, Steve, ix, 1, 2, 189, 250–53, 266, 307, 386
合资企业，121
joint venture, 121
琼斯，艾伦，386
Jones, Alan, 386
琼斯，吉恩，9，170，386
Jones, Jean, ix, 170, 386
琼斯，维克多，61，64，71，73，74，386
Jones, Victor, 61, 64, 71, 73, 74, 386
约瑟，兄弟，301，302-3
Joseph, Brother, 301, 302–3
乔斯，约翰，386
Joss, John, 386
卡卢佩克，鲍勃，386
Kaloupek, Bob, 386
柏、巴基和汉克，386
Kashiwa, Bucky and Hank, 386
卡特纳，莱昂内尔，111
Kattner, Lionel, 111
基廷，夏洛特·马修斯，386
Keating, Charlotte Matthews, 386
凯珀，弗兰克，386
Keiper, Frank, 386
肯尼迪，大卫·M.，x
Kennedy, David M., x
肯尼迪，罗伯特，157
Kennedy, Robert, 157
俄亥俄州肯特州立大学，193–94
Kent State University, Ohio, 193–94
克尔曼，亚瑟，387
Kerman, Arthur, 387
基尔比，杰克，3，108–10，139–40，248，284，301
Kilby, Jack, 3, 108–10, 139–40, 248, 284, 301
金博尔，玛吉，x
Kimball, Maggie, x
金，马丁·路德·金，116，157
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 116, 157
凯鹏华盈，尤金，124、192、240、387
Kleiner, Eugene, 124, 192, 240, 387
在费尔柴尔德，第85、94、106、114、119名
at Fairchild, 85, 94, 106, 114, 119
八组，82–86、92、112、123–24
in group of eight, 82–86, 92, 112, 123–24
在肖克利，61、65、67、78-79
at Shockley, 61, 65, 67, 78–79
Kleiner、Perkins、Caufield 和 Byers，240、253
Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield, and Byers, 240, 253
克莱恩，亚历克斯，x
Kline, Alex, x
克纳皮克，迪恩，58，61，65，77
Knapic, Dean, 58, 61, 65, 77
科布林，唐，387
Kobrin, Don, 387
小岛芳雄，184、187、195、199。另请参阅Busicom
Kojima, Yoshio, 184, 187, 195, 199. See also Busicom
韩国。参见韩国
Korea. See South Korea
科恩伯格，亚瑟，245
Kornberg, Arthur, 245
科兹梅茨基，乔治，123
Kozmetsky, George, 123
克雷斯，史蒂夫，387
Kress, Steve, 387
劳工，海外，131–33
labor, overseas, 131–33
工会。参见工会。
labor unions. See unions
拉弗蒂，吉姆，ix，4，228，248，279–80，299，387
Lafferty, Jim, ix, 4, 228, 248, 279–80, 299, 387
拉姆，唐纳德，x
Lamm, Donald, x
宾夕法尼亚州兰斯代尔, 49–50, 52
Landsdale, Pennsylvania, 49–50, 52
大规模集成电路（LSI），160
Large Scale Integration (LSI), 160
创业活动大约有159场
startup activity around, 159
激光器，192
lasers, 192
最后，Jay，ix，69–71，122–24，127，146，161，387
Last, Jay, ix, 69–71, 122–24, 127, 146, 161, 387
在费尔柴尔德，88、90、94、113、120
at Fairchild, 88, 90, 94, 113, 120
在八人组中，82–86、96、112、124
in group of eight, 82–86, 96, 112, 124
以及集成电路，111–12
and integrated circuit, 111–12
以及平面过程，107–8
and planar process, 107–8
在肖克利，61、65、67、73、78-79
at Shockley, 61, 65, 67, 73, 78–79
裁员，188，223–24，231
layoffs, 188, 223–24, 231
《草叶集》（惠特曼），306
Leaves of Grass (Whitman), 306
莱库耶，克里斯托夫，9
Lécuyer, Christophe, ix
Leggett, Glenn, 193–95, 387
Leggett, Glenn, 193–95, 387
莱霍韦茨，库尔特，104，141
Lehovec, Kurt, 104, 141
勒努瓦，蒂姆，x
Lenoir, Tim, x
莱文，杰瑞，116，131，387
Levine, Jerry, 116, 131, 387
专利许可，第55、79、117、134-135、139-140、269页。另见专利。
licensing of patents, 55, 79, 117, 134–35, 139–40, 269. See also patents
终身成就奖章，302
Lifetime Achievement Medal, 302
林德格伦，帕特里夏，387
Lindgren, Patricia, 387
加利福尼亚州利弗莫尔，207，237
Livermore, California, 207, 237
游说，3
lobbying, 3
关于资本利得，262
on capital gains, 262
针对轮流停电，209
against rolling blackouts, 209
SEMATECH，283–84
SEMATECH, 283–84
关于新航，262, 266, 268–70, 273
on SIA, 262, 266, 268–70, 273
洛斯阿尔托斯山，117
Los Altos Hills, 117
《洛杉矶时报》，271
Los Angeles Times, 271
洛伍德，亨利，x
Lowood, Henry, x
伦德格伦，丹，265
Lundgren, Dan, 265
麦凯恩，约翰，285
McCain, John, 285
麦当劳餐厅，227家
McDonalds restaurants, 227
麦克纳里，汤姆，287
McEnery, Tom, 287
McKenna，Regis，ix，203–4，245，248，251，387
McKenna, Regis, ix, 203–4, 245, 248, 251, 387
麦凯，布鲁斯，387
Mackay, Bruce, 387
麦克劳德，诺曼，241
MacLeod, Norman, 241
麦克默里，哈姆斯特拉，60
McMurry, Hamstra, 60
麦克默里，查尔斯和安，387
McMurray, Charles and Ann, 387
麦克纳马拉，罗伯特，137
McNamara, Robert, 137
氧化镁，42
magnesium oxide, 42
缅因州，168–69、201、211、214、217、234
Maine, 168–69, 201, 211, 214, 217, 234
马内斯，芭芭拉，200–202，215–16，232
Maness, Barbara, 200–202, 215–16, 232
曼利，查尔斯，387
Manly, Charles, 387
制造。请参阅具体公司或产品名称。
manufacturing. See specific company or product name
制造示范车辆（MDV），287–88
manufacturing demonstration vehicle (MDV), 287–88
市场营销，119
marketing, 119
在费尔柴尔德，91，106
at Fairchild, 91, 106
集成电路，134–37
of integrated circuit, 134–37
在英特尔，177、198、203
at Intel, 177, 198, 203
迈克·马库拉，204、250、252–53、276、280、387
Markkula, Mike, 204, 250, 252–53, 276, 280, 387
婚姻，51，215，300
marriage, 51, 215, 300
以及婚外情，第146、200-202、215、216、232页。另见鲍尔斯，安（第二任妻子）；诺伊斯，贝蒂·博特姆利（第一任妻子）。
and extramarital affair, 146, 200–202, 215, 216, 232. See also Bowers, Ann (second wife); Noyce, Betty Bottomley (first wife)
口罩，94
masks, 94
麻省理工学院。参见麻省理工学院
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. See MIT
马修斯，夏洛特，8岁
Matthews, Charlotte, 8
马佐尔，斯坦，187
Mazor, Stan, 187
梅尔乔，杰克，387
Melchor, Jack, 387
存储设备，163、172-73、180、282
memory devices, 163, 172–73, 180, 282
1103芯片，207
1103 chip, 207
DRAM，263–64
DRAM, 263–64
早期半导体存储器，151，172
early semiconductor memories, 151, 172
EPROM芯片，203–4
EPROM chip, 203–4
磁芯，172–73
magnetic core, 172–73
市场需求量为 223、273
market for, 223, 273
硅栅MOS，186
silicon-gate MOS, 186
台面晶体管, 73, 93, 102, 121–22
mesa transistor, 73, 93, 102, 121–22
信使，乔治，387
Messenger, George, 387
Miami University of Ohio, 18–19
微电路。参见集成电路
microcircuits. See integrated circuit
微型计算机，183
Microcomputer, 183
微逻辑器件，135–36。另见集成电路
Micrologic device, 135–36. See also integrated circuit
Microma，208，213，223，227
Microma, 208, 213, 223, 227
微处理器，306；（4004），203，206；（8080），217，226；（80386），257
microprocessor, 306; (4004), 203, 206 (8080), 217, 226; (80386), 257
发展，162，182–83，195–96
development of, 162, 182–83, 195–96
市场，199–200，203–6，212。另见芯片
market, 199–200, 203–6, 212. See also chip
Microsystems International Limited (MIL)，189–90，207
Microsystems International Limited (MIL), 189–90, 207
军工复合体，29
military-industrial complex, 29
军用市场，83、121、137、266。另见美国国防部。
military market, 83, 121, 137, 266. See also Defense Department, U.S.
米尔斯，彼得，292
Mills, Peter, 292
米姆斯，马特，140
Mims, Matt, 140
民兵导弹，121–22，130
Minuteman missile, 121–22, 130
麻省理工学院（MIT），x，24，44，246
MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), x, 24, 44, 246
与格林内尔学院相比，28-29
contrast with Grinnell College, 28–29
研究生宿舍，地址：30、34、35
Graduate House at, 30, 34, 35
物理系历史，第29-30页。另见诺伊斯，罗伯特·N.；研究生作品
physics department history, 29–30. See also Noyce, Robert N.; graduate work of
麻省理工学院，226
MITS, 226
摩尔，贝蒂，167，170
Moore, Betty, 167, 170
摩尔，戈登，ix，143，170，187，227，291，387
Moore, Gordon, ix, 143, 170, 187, 227, 291, 387
互补的工作方式，98-99，156
complementary work style of, 98–99, 156
在费尔柴尔德，1、93、96、102、126、137-38
at Fairchild, 1, 93, 96, 102, 126, 137–38
在八人组中，82–86、96、112、124
in group of eight, 82–86, 96, 112, 124
关于集成电路，109、111、112
on integrated circuits, 109, 111, 112
在英特尔，156–57、160–66、173、198、257、273
at Intel, 156–57, 160–66, 173, 198, 257, 273
投资额为 241
investing by, 241
离开费尔柴尔德，148，151-52
leaving Fairchild, 148, 151–52
作为经理，106、108、119、122-23、131、197
as manager, 106, 108, 119, 122–23, 131, 197
在存储设备上，173、180、263
on memory device, 173, 180, 263
在微处理器上，183
on microprocessor, 183
在新创企业中，156–57，160
in new venture, 156–57, 160
关于 Noyce，143、153、169
on Noyce, 143, 153, 169
Noyce、Grove 等，176、224–25、257
Noyce, Grove and, 176, 224–25, 257
关于革命者，193
on revolutionaries, 193
1103s，189
on 1103s, 189
在 SEMATECH 展会上，第 291 期
on SEMATECH, 291
在肖克利实验室，61–66、72、73、75、78、86
at Shockley Labs, 61–66, 72, 73, 75, 78, 86
以及工会，235，238
and unions, 235, 238
莫尔斯，菲利普，30岁，32岁
Morse, Philip, 30, 32
MOS（金属氧化物硅）芯片，173–74、180–82、187。另见芯片，（1103）
MOS (metal-oxide-silicon) chip, 173–74, 180–82, 187. See also chip, (1103)
动机，109，134
motivation, 109, 134
摩托罗拉，152，283
Motorola, 152, 283
加利福尼亚州山景城，108、116、123、169、178
Mountain View, California, 108, 116, 123, 169, 178
芒利，米奇，x
Munley, Mickey, x
新泽西州默里山，24
Murray Hill, New Jersey, 24
迈尔斯，唐娜，387
Myers, Donna, 387
纳尔，吉姆，111
Nall, Jim, 111
全国制造商协会，246
National Association of Manufacturers, 246
全国州长
National Governors’
协会，271、274、286
Association, 271, 274, 286
国家劳工关系委员会，235
National Labor Relations Board, 235
国家科学奖章，5，245
National Medal of Science, 5, 245
国家技术奖章，301
National Medal of Technology, 301
美国国家科学基金会，284，307
National Science Foundation, 284, 307
美国国家半导体公司，147–48、150、255、262–63、272–73
National Semiconductor, 147–48, 150, 255, 262–63, 272–73
美洲原住民，211
Native Americans, 211
纽堡，罗恩，x，387
Newburgh, Ron, x, 387
纽芬兰，211
Newfoundland, 211
纽斯坦，莫里斯，31-32、35、36、37、46、387
Newstein, Maurice, 31–32, 35, 36, 37, 46, 387
牛顿，赫斯特·P.，387
Newton, Hester P., 387
纽约证券分析师协会，223
New York Society of Security Analysts, 223
纽约证券交易所，82
New York Stock Exchange, 82
《纽约时报》第25、135、245、248页
New York Times, 25, 135, 245, 248
日本电气公司（NEC），134
Nippon Electric Company (NEC), 134
NM Electronics，第 158-159 页、第 162 页、第 164 页。另见英特尔公司。
NM Electronics, 158–59, 162, 164. See also Intel company
诺贝尔奖，3、25、66、68-70、110、248
Nobel Prize, 3, 25, 66, 68–70, 110, 248
非均匀传输，299–300
Non-uniform transmission, 299–300
诺曼，鲍勃，111，387
Norman, Bob, 111, 387
诺丁汉，韦恩，32–33，37–39，40
Nottingham, Wayne, 32–33, 37–39, 40
诺伊斯，亚当，9
Noyce, Adam, ix
诺伊斯，贝蒂·博特姆利（第一任妻子），77、88、155、170、201
Noyce, Betty Bottomley (first wife), 77, 88, 155, 170, 201
关于加州搬迁，60-61
on California move, 60–61
与诺伊斯离婚，214-18
divorce from Noyce, 214–18
在婚姻早期，47、51-52、65
in early married life, 47, 51–52, 65
家庭生活，143–46
family life of, 143–46
在缅因州，168–69、201、211、214、217、234
in Maine, 168–69, 201, 211, 214, 217, 234
婚礼，42–46
wedding, 42–46
诺伊斯，比尔（儿子），9，51，88，118，226，387
Noyce, Bill (son), ix, 51, 88, 118, 226, 387
诺伊斯，鲍勃（唐·诺伊斯的儿子），387
Noyce, Bob (son of Don Noyce), 387
诺伊斯，唐纳德·斯特林（兄弟），ix，10–11，13–14，19，23，44，59，116，212，274，387
Noyce, Donald Sterling (brother), ix, 10–11, 13–14, 19, 23, 44, 59, 116, 212, 274, 387
诺伊斯，多蒂（弟媳），31，46，387
Noyce, Dotey (sister-in-law), 31, 46, 387
诺伊斯，盖洛德·布鲁斯特（兄弟），ix，7–8，10，18，20，31，35，116，235，387
Noyce, Gaylord Brewster (brother), ix, 7–8, 10, 18, 20, 31, 35, 116, 235, 387
在鲍勃的婚礼上，44-46
at Bob’s wedding, 44–46
在追悼会上，305
at memorial service, 305
诺伊斯，哈丽特（母亲），17，161，228-229，230，235，249
Noyce, Harriet (mother), 17, 161, 228–29, 230, 235, 249
以及公理会教堂，9-14，16
and Congregationalist Church, 9–14, 16
唐，兄弟，12
Don, brother to, 12
举办婚礼，44–46
hosting wedding, 44–46
父母的担忧，20、23、169
parental concerns of, 20, 23, 169
诺伊斯，玛格丽特（女儿），117、212、300-303
Noyce, Margaret (daughter), 117, 212, 300–303
诺伊斯，佩妮（女儿），第 9、118、144、179、213、387 页
Noyce, Penny (daughter), ix, 118, 144, 179, 213, 387
出生日期：52
birth of, 52
关于父亲，2，214，220
on father, 2, 214, 220
在学校，88，212
in school, 88, 212
诺伊斯，波莉（女儿），9，78，212，387
Noyce, Polly (daughter), ix, 78, 212, 387
诺伊斯，拉尔夫（父亲），20，44，46，157
Noyce, Ralph (father), 20, 44, 46, 157
以及公理会教堂，9-14，16
and Congregationalist Church, 9–14, 16
以及诺伊斯教堂，228–29
and Noyce Chapel, 228–29
诺伊斯，拉尔夫·哈罗德（兄弟），9，12，116，387
Noyce, Ralph Harold (brother), ix, 12, 116, 387
诺伊斯，鲁本·盖洛德（曾祖父），14
Noyce, Reuben Gaylord (great-greatgrandfather), 14
诺伊斯，罗伯特·N.：作为精算师，23，106
Noyce, Robert N.: as actuary, 23, 106
天使（私人）投资，第192-93页，第218-20页，第240页，第275页
angel (private) investing by, 192–93, 218–20, 240, 275
愚人节玩笑，148
April Fool’s joke, 148
41号手臂骨折
arm fracture of, 41
对政府合同的态度，50，130-31，281
attitude toward government contracting, 50, 130–31, 281
对管理的态度，90、106-7、128、154、180
attitude toward management, 90, 106–7, 128, 154, 180
出生日期，10-11
birth of, 10–11
书籍印刷类比，138
book-printing analogy of, 138
相机（爱好），278
camera (hobby), 278
相机（步进重复设计），94
camera (stepandrepeat design), 94
童年时期，11-18
childhood of, 11–18
大学时期，14（另见格林内尔学院；麻省理工学院）；计算机方面，212、225-227、252、278
college years, 14 (See also Grinnel College; MIT); on computers, 212, 225–27, 252, 278
关于信心，113、133、179、246
on confidence, 113, 133, 179, 246
关于合作研究，281
on cooperative research, 281
创造力，97–98，130–31
creativity of, 97–98, 130–31
为纪念某某而宣布的纪念日，3, 246, 304–5
day declared in honor of, 3, 246, 304–5
死亡，303–5
death of, 303–5
决定离开费尔柴尔德，149-54
decision to leave Fairchild, 149–54
决定离开肖克利，81岁
decision to leave Shockley, 81
以及对冲突的厌恶，35、89-90、145、198、260
and dislike of confrontation, 35, 89–90, 145, 198, 260
厌恶等级制度，114–16、128、191
dislike of hierarchy, 114–16, 128, 191
论文，38–42
dissertation of, 38–42
以及潜水，18、19、21
and diving, 18, 19, 21
离婚，214–18，234
divorce of, 214–18, 234
草案关注事项，第24、25、51、52条
draft concerns of, 24, 25, 51, 52
早期物理学研究，17–19
early physics studies of, 17–19
婚外情，146，200-202，215-16，232
extramarital affair of, 146, 200–202, 215–16, 232
作为费尔柴尔德公司总经理，战绩为105胜7负、111胜16负、119胜23负、128胜34负、142胜43负、146胜48负、153胜54负。
as Fairchild general manager, 105–7, 111–16, 119–23, 128–34, 142–43, 146–48, 153–54
作为 Fairchild 研发主管，90、95、106–7
as Fairchild R&D head, 90, 95, 106–7
家庭生活，1，47，51-53，65，117-118，134，143-146，178-179，220，228-229，277，300-303
family life of, 1, 47, 51–53, 65, 117–18, 134, 143–46, 178–79, 220, 228–29, 277, 300–303
作为硅谷之父，246
as father of Silicon Valley, 246
财务，早期，16，20，34-37，45，52，86，113，203
finances, early, 16, 20, 34–37, 45, 52, 86, 113, 203
以及富布赖特奖，37
and Fullbright award, 37
滑翔机和模型飞机制造，6–9，37
glider and model plane building by, 6–9, 37
麻省理工学院研究生论文，30-42
graduate work of (MIT), 30–42
作为格林内尔学院学生，17、19-22、27-29、33
as Grinnell college student, 17, 19–22, 27–29, 33
作为格林内尔学院的理事，第144、166、193-94、208页
as Grinnell college trustee, 144, 166, 193–94, 208
在八人组中，82–86、96、112、124
in group of eight, 82–86, 96, 112, 124
关于群体思维，172
on group think, 172
高中，14-18岁
high school, 14–18
关于信息经济，271
on information economy, 271
作为英特尔董事会主席，第238-39页、第243-46页、第250页、第255页
as Intel board chair, 238–39, 243–46, 250, 255
作为英特尔总监，第257-58页，第297页
as Intel director, 257–58, 297
担任英特尔总裁期间，第157-59页、第160-91页、第195-210页、第222-28页
as Intel president, 157–59, 160–91, 195–210, 222–28
投资理念，240–41
investment philosophy of, 240–41
工作，早期，16，20，23，28
jobs, early, 16, 20, 23, 28
作为领导者与管理者，153，225-27
as leader vs. manager, 153, 225–27
终身成就奖章，302
Lifetime Achievement Medal, 302
（反对轮流停电的）游说活动，209
lobbying by (against rolling blackouts), 209
（资本利得）游说，262
lobbying by (capital gains), 262
（SEMATECH）的游说，283–84
lobbying by (SEMATECH), 283–84
（SIA）的游说，第262、266、268-70、273页
lobbying by (SIA), 262, 266, 268–70, 273
对加利福尼亚的爱，59、82、118-19
love of California, 59, 82, 118–19
婚姻记录（参见Bowers, Ann; Noyce, Betty Bottomley）
marriages of (See Bowers, Ann; Noyce, Betty Bottomley)
指导青年创业者，2，192–93，241–43，275–77，278，280，299–300，306，307
mentoring young entrepreneurs, 2, 192–93, 241–43, 275–77, 278, 280, 299–300, 306, 307
关于微处理器，182–83、185、186、195–96、203–6
on microprocessor, 182–83, 185, 186, 195–96, 203–6
移居加利福尼亚州，59-60，62
move to California, 59–60, 62
关于墨菲定律，255
on Murphy’s Law, 255
以及音乐，15、35-36、51、144、191
and music, 15, 35–36, 51, 144, 191
以及诺贝尔奖，3、66、110、246
and Nobel Prize, 3, 66, 110, 246
讣告，共305篇
obituaries for, 305
石油和天然气投资，第300-301页，第304页
oil and gas investment, 300–301, 304
关于乐观主义，264
on optimism, 264
专利号为 48、87、9799、100、117、389-90
patents of, 48, 87, 97, 99, 100, 117, 389–90
慈善事业，210-12、228-29、274、306
philanthropy of, 210–12, 228–29, 274, 306
在菲尔科，47-52
at Philco, 47–52
哲学，240
philosophy of, 240
物理学研究，17–19
physics studies of, 17–19
偷猪案，23
pig stealing by, 23
飞行员爱好和私人飞机，2、117、179-80、201、202、208、213、228-29、252、278-80、304-5
pilot hobby and personal airplanes of, 2, 117, 179–80, 201, 202, 208, 213, 228–29, 252, 278–80, 304–5
房产所有者为：218、277、278、302
property owned by, 218, 277, 278, 302
公众形象，243–49
public image of, 243–49
海鹦空运，211
puffin airlift by, 211
关于快速而粗糙的研究方法，175
on quick-and-dirty research approach, 175
作为 Rapid Robert，1、34、37
as Rapid Robert, 1, 34, 37
与日本的关系，117、134、184、195、260、269
relationship with Japanese, 117, 134, 184, 195, 260, 269
关于宗教，16、118、235
on religion, 16, 118, 235
作为文艺复兴时期的人物，305
as Renaissance man, 305
水肺潜水，278
scuba diving of, 278
作为 SEMATECH 首席执行官，289–304
as SEMATECH CEO, 289–304
未来感，2，3，206
sense of future, 2, 3, 206
以及壳牌奖学金，37
and Shell Fellowship, 37
在肖克利半导体实验室，59–62、64–68、71–78、80–81
at Shockley Semiconductor Labs, 59–62, 64–68, 71–78, 80–81
以及滑雪，2、38、41、191-92、228、248
and skiing, 2, 38, 41, 191–92, 228, 248
吸烟，16，233–34
and smoking, 16, 233–34
演讲日程表，297–98
speaking schedule of, 297–98
作为发言人，239
as spokesman, 239
以及股票期权，120、150、165、179、197-98、246
and stock options, 120, 150, 165, 179, 197–98, 246
对教育的支持，274，306
support for education by, 274, 306
以及修补，7、16、36-37、51、144、278、298、299-300
and tinkering, 7, 16, 36–37, 51, 144, 278, 298, 299–300
旅行方式（商务），117、184、195-97
travel by (business), 117, 184, 195–97
旅行方式（家庭度假），168–69
travel by (family vacation), 168–69
乘车（前往中国），277
travel by (to China), 277
前往欧洲的旅行方式，117、121、196-197、228
travel by (to Europe), 117, 121, 196–97, 228
前往日本的交通方式：117、184、185、228
travel by (to Japan), 117, 184, 185, 228
旅行（与鲍尔斯同行），277–78，292
travel by (with Bowers), 277–78, 292
财富，早期的不适感，113，117，203
wealth, early discomfort with, 113, 117, 203
财富为 255, 275
wealth of, 255, 275
以及青年运动，213
and youth movement, 213
诺伊斯教堂，228–29
Noyce Chapel, 228–29
诺伊斯基金会，306
Noyce Foundation, 306
宾夕法尼亚州奥克蒙特，230
Oakmont, Pennsylvania, 230
讣告，305
obituaries, 305
石油和天然气投资，第300-301页，第304页
oil and gas investment, 300–301, 304
奥利维蒂公司，121
Olivetti corporation, 121
奥尔森，基思，387
Olson, Keith, 387
全页，276–77。另请参见卡埃雷
OmniPage, 276–77. See also Caere
《论世间苦难》（叔本华），第二卷
“On the Sufferings of the World” (Schopenhauer), ii
欧佩克（石油输出国组织），209
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), 209
奥斯古德，查尔斯，5
Osgood, Charles, 5
奥什曼，肯尼斯，276，291，387
Oshman, Kenneth, 276, 291, 387
氧化层，102–5，107–8。另见Hoerni，Jean；平面工艺
oxide layers, 102–5, 107–8. See also Hoerni, Jean; planar process
Page Mill Partners，219
Page Mill Partners, 219
帕列夫斯基，马克斯，166
Palevsky, Max, 166
加利福尼亚州帕洛阿尔托，56–59
Palo Alto, California, 56–59
《帕洛阿尔托时报》，95
Palo Alto Times, 95
专利号：53–54、66、70、73、87
patents, 53–54, 66, 70, 73, 87
在费尔柴尔德球场，比分分别为90、97、99-100、102-4、106-10。
at Fairchild, 90, 97, 99–100, 102–4, 106–10
集成电路，1，109，110-11，139
integrated circuit, 1, 109, 110–11, 139
以及知识产权，79、87、181、293
and intellectual property, 79, 87, 181, 293
许可，55、79、117、134-35、139-40、269。另见罗伯特·H·诺伊斯的专利。
licensing of, 55, 79, 117, 134–35, 139–40, 269. See also Noyce, Robert H., patents
佩德森，卡尔，9
Pedersen, Karl, ix
马来西亚槟城，207
Penang, Malaysia, 207
JC Penney，242
J.C. Penney, 242
珀金斯，汤姆，240
Perkins, Tom, 240
个人电脑（PC），226–27，250–52，278
personal computer (PC), 226–27, 250–52, 278
慈善事业：贝蒂·诺伊斯，234
philanthropy: of Betty Noyce, 234
罗伯特·诺伊斯，第210-12页，第228-29页，第274页，第306页
of Robert Noyce, 210–12, 228–29, 274, 306
Philco，42，46–52，67–68
Philco, 42, 46–52, 67–68
光刻技术，94
photolithography, 94
《物理评论》，66
Physical Review, 66
Pickle，JJ，287
Pickle, J. J., 287
皮雷斯，保罗，299-300
Pires, Paul, 299–300
平面工艺，108、109、111、141、245。另见氧化层
planar process, 108, 109, 111, 141, 245. See also oxide layers
PN 交汇处，26，93–94，99
P-N junction, 26, 93–94, 99
政策和程序手册，116
policy and procedures book, 116
政治行动委员会（PAC），267
Political Action Committee (PAC), 267
《大众科学》，7，16
Popular Science, 7, 16
人口爆炸（埃利希），212
Population Explosion, The (Ehrlich), 212
俄勒冈州波特兰市，237
Portland, Oregon, 237
普雷斯托维茨，克莱德，267，268–69
Prestowitz, Clyde, 267, 268–69
宝洁公司，146
Procter and Gamble, 146
量子隧穿，65–66
quantum tunneling, 65–66
Radio Shack，213
Radio Shack, 213
拉姆斯塔德，埃文，第九卷，第387页
Ramstad, Evan, ix, 387
随机存取存储器（RAM），180
random access memory (RAM), 180
雷神公司，161
Raytheon, 161
研发（研究与开发）：合作，281
R&D (research and development): cooperative, 281
在 Fairchild Semiconductor，90、97、102、106-8，122–23、125–26、130–31
at Fairchild Semiconductor, 90, 97, 102, 106–8, 122–23, 125–26, 130–31
政府资助，130–31
government funding of, 130–31
在英特尔，171，283
at Intel, 171, 283
方法，175
method of, 175
在麻省理工学院，29
at MIT, 29
在肖克利，74、76-77、86
at Shockley, 74, 76–77, 86
里根，罗纳德，5，256，266-67，272，274，301
Reagan, Ronald, 5, 256, 266–67, 272, 274, 301
雷德蒙德，玛丽莲，x
Redmond, Marilyn, x
里德，约翰，387
Reed, John, 387
里德，TR，ix
Reid, T. R., ix
瑞姆制造公司，105、107、161
Rheem Manufacturing, 105, 107, 161
Roberts, Sheldon, 80–81, 99, 127, 387
Roberts, Sheldon, 80–81, 99, 127, 387
在费尔柴尔德，90，93
at Fairchild, 90, 93
在八人组中，82–86、96、112、124
in group of eight, 82–86, 96, 112, 124
在肖克利，61、65、70、78
at Shockley, 61, 65, 70, 78
洛克，亚瑟，127，240，264，275，291，387
Rock, Arthur, 127, 240, 264, 275, 291, 387
苹果电脑和，251
Apple Computer and, 251
以及 Fairchild，80–83、85、89、113、122–23
and Fairchild, 80–83, 85, 89, 113, 122–23
以及 Intel，156–59、164–68、179、188–89、225
and Intel, 156–59, 164–68, 179, 188–89, 225
洛克菲勒家族，54, 166, 192
Rockefeller family, 54, 166, 192
罗德、凯瑟琳、x
Rod, Catherine, x
罗杰斯，TJ，290
Rogers, T. J., 290
ROLM，276，291
ROLM, 276, 291
罗森菲尔德，约瑟夫，166，208-9
Rosenfield, Joseph, 166, 208–9
罗森塔尔，萨姆，208
Rosenthal, Sam, 208
萨赫，康涅狄格州，95
Sah, C. T., 95
Sanders, Jerry, 252, 255, 259, 288。另见Advanced Micro Devices
Sanders, Jerry, 252, 255, 259, 288. See also Advanced Micro Devices
伊利诺伊州桑威治，22，28
Sandwich, Illinois, 22, 28
旧金山湾区，5、56、61、80、118、152
San Francisco Bay Area, 5, 56, 61, 80, 118, 152
高科技就业人数，250
high technology employment in, 250
《旧金山纪事报》，第246页
San Francisco Chronicle, 246
加利福尼亚州圣何塞，305
San Jose, California, 305
圣何塞商业杂志，286
San Jose Business Journal, 286
圣何塞喷气机中心，280，299
San Jose Jet Center, 280, 299
《圣何塞水星报》第5、250、263、286、304、305页
San Jose Mercury News, 5, 250, 263, 286, 304, 305
圣何塞州立大学，254
San Jose State University, 254
圣克拉拉, 196, 207, 208, 209, 285
Santa Clara, 196, 207, 208, 209, 285
圣克拉拉县，118、250、254、256、276
Santa Clara County, 118, 250, 254, 256, 276
圣克拉拉谷，5
Santa Clara Valley, 5
加利福尼亚州圣克鲁斯，237
Santa Cruz, California, 237
加利福尼亚州圣罗莎，107
Santa Rosa, California, 107
萨罗菲姆，法耶兹，166
Sarofim, Fayez, 166
佐佐木正 184, 387
Sasaki, Tadashi, 184, 387
Scansoft，306
Scansoft, 306
斯伦贝谢，263
Schlumberger, 263
叔本华，亚瑟，第二任
Schopenhauer, Arthur, ii
科学数据系统，165
Scientific Data Systems, 165
科学知识，33
scientific knowledge, 33
斯库利，约翰，277
Sculley, John, 277
美国证券交易委员会（SEC），第125、220、222、275号
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 125, 220, 222, 275
塞利格森，丹尼尔，第九卷，第387页
Seligson, Daniel, ix, 387
哈里·塞洛，95、153、249、387
Sello, Harry, 95, 153, 249, 387
SEMATECH，6，281–98，304
SEMATECH, 6, 281–98, 304
以及黑皮书，283
and black book, 283
资助，283–85、287、289、294、301
funding of, 283–85, 287, 289, 294, 301
管理，288–92，293，296，300
management of, 288–92, 293, 296, 300
制造商-供应商关系，295-96，301-2
manufacturer-supplier relations, 295–96, 301–2
任务，282–83，294–96，301–2
missions of, 282–83, 294–96, 301–2
诺伊斯的赛程安排在297-98，300
Noyce’s schedule at, 297–98, 300
以及 SIA，283
and SIA, 283
选址，285–87
siting of, 285–87
以及 SRC，281
and SRC, 281
作为一家初创公司，290
as startup, 290
半导体，26.另见芯片；集成电路；PN结；晶体管
semiconductor, 26. See also chip; integrated circuit; P-N junction; transistor
半导体行业，159，203，258–73
semiconductor industry, 159, 203, 258–73
国际挑战，258–59
international challenge in, 258–59
日本政府采取的方法，260–63
Japanese government approaches to, 260–63
裁员人数从 222 人增加到 24 人
layoffs from, 222–24
海上生产，132–33
offshore production, 132–33
以及石油化工产品，209
and petrochemicals, 209
SIA游说，第262-263页，第266-270页，第271-273页，第277页
SIA lobbying, 262–63, 266–70, 271–73, 277
工会，115–16，236
unions in, 115–16, 236
美国政府的做法，264-70
U.S. government approach to, 264–70
半导体行业协会。参见SIA（半导体行业协会）。
Semiconductor Industry Association. See SIA (Semiconductor Industry Association)
半导体研究公司（SRC），281
Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC), 281
SEMI（半导体供应商协会），296
SEMI (suppliers’ trade organization), 296
参议院小企业委员会，262
Senate Committee on Small Business, 262
沙科夫，尤金，387
Sharkoff, Eugene, 387
夏普电子，184
Sharp Electronics, 184
谢泼德，马克，140
Shepherd, Mark, 140
志摩正敏，185
Shima, Masatoshi, 185
肖克利，吉恩，53岁，54岁
Shockley, Jean, 53, 54
肖克利，威廉，52岁，63岁，88岁，97岁
Shockley, William, 52, 63, 88, 97
以及 Beckman，55–56、58、72、74–78
and Beckman, 55–56, 58, 72, 74–78
以及四层二极管，71–73
and four-layer diode, 71–73
管理风格分别为：67、73、86、87
management style of, 67, 73, 86, 87
1968-1970 年诺贝尔奖
Nobel Prize of, 68–70
专利，53–54
patents of, 53–54
招募方式，52，59–62
recruiting by, 52, 59–62
作为教师，68，86-87
as teacher, 68, 86–87
晶体管，25、40、55
transistor of, 25, 40, 55
肖克利半导体实验室，56、63-64、71、81、87、95
Shockley Semiconductor Laboratories, 56, 63–64, 71, 81, 87, 95
管理层，67、73、114
management at, 67, 73, 114
研发，74、76-77、86
R&D at, 74, 76–77, 86
团队，第 61-65 页。另见Shockley, William 的《鞋盒创业公司》，第 218-220 页。
team at, 61–65. See also Shockley, William shoebox startups, 218–20
SIA（半导体行业协会），3，260，262-263，266-269，271-273，278，281，306
SIA (Semiconductor Industry Association), 3, 260, 262–63, 266–69, 271–73, 278, 281, 306
游说活动，第262、266、268-70、273页
lobbying by, 262, 266, 268–70, 273
Signetics，124，136–37，141
Signetics, 124, 136–37, 141
硅，159
silicon, 159
基本性质，63
basic properties of, 63
在集成电路中，136
in integrated circuits, 136
在晶体管中，63、72、92-94、96
in transistors, 63, 72, 92–94, 96
硅栅，180–82
silicon gate, 180–82
MOS存储器，186
MOS memory, 186
硅谷，212–14、220、270、280、286
Silicon Valley, 212–14, 220, 270, 280, 286
世代传承，307
generational succession in, 307
以及高科技企业家，249-50
and high-tech entrepreneurs, 249–50
先驱者，4-5
pioneers of, 4–5
从农业向工业转变，5、52、119、143
shift from agriculture to industry, 5, 52, 119, 143
加入工会，237-38
unionizing in, 237–38
辛格尔顿，亨利，123，251
Singleton, Henry, 123, 251
西特纳，雷克斯，76岁
Sittner, Rex, 76
斯科尼亚，汤姆，388
Skornia, Tom, 388
斯莱特，约翰·克拉克，29–30，32，34
Slater, John Clarke, 29–30, 32, 34
史密斯，罗伯特，9，8，388
Smith, Robert, ix, 8, 388
史密斯，查尔斯·B.，192
Smith, Charles B., 192
史密斯，克里斯蒂，x
Smith, Christy, x
法国兴业半导体 (SGS), 121, 123
Societa Generale Semiconduttori (SGS), 121, 123
软件，203，276
software, 203, 276
固态电路。参见集成电路
solid circuits. See integrated circuit
固态电子学，39，53。另见半导体。
solid-state electronics, 39, 53. See also semiconductors
韩国，132，273
South Korea, 132, 273
苏联，82，272
Soviet Union, 82, 272
斯普特尼克和，91
Sputnik and, 91
斯宾塞，威廉，388
Spencer, William, 388
衍生公司。参见Fairchild Semiconductor 的衍生公司。
spin offs. See Fairchild Semiconductor, spinoffs of
斯波克，查理，ix，153，248，266，268，272，388
Sporck, Charlie, ix, 153, 248, 266, 268, 272, 388
在费尔柴尔德，119–20、126、129、131–32、142、146
at Fairchild, 119–20, 126, 129, 131–32, 142, 146
在英特尔，224，245
at Intel, 224, 245
离开费尔柴尔德，147–48、149、150
leaving Fairchild, 147–48, 149, 150
在国家队，255、260、272
at National, 255, 260, 272
在 SEMATECH，281–82，288–90
at SEMATECH, 281–82, 288–90
卫星通讯社，91
Sputnik, 91
站立，玛丽安娜，17岁，18岁
Standing, Marianne, 17, 18
斯坦福大学，x，56，57，58，87，254
Stanford University, x, 56, 57, 58, 87, 254
斯图尔特，瑞秋，x
Stewart, Rachel, x
史蒂文斯，塞缪尔，19岁
Stevens, Samuel, 19
史蒂文森，阿德莱，三世，265
Stevenson, Adlai, III, 265
股票和股票期权，120、125、127、150、163、192、246
stock and stock options, 120, 125, 127, 150, 163, 192, 246
转换，220–22
converting, 220–22
英特尔，164–65，197–98，200，209
Intel, 164–65, 197–98, 200, 209
当日股票销售额，221–22
same-day stock sales, 221–22
斯德哥尔摩，69。另见诺贝尔奖
Stockholm, 69. See also Nobel Prize
斯通，纳尔逊，388
Stone, Nelson, 388
中风，亨利，31岁，388
Stroke, Henry, 31, 388
斯特朗，杰瑞，8岁
Strong, Jerry, 8
表面态，39，149
surface states, 39, 149
Syosset，纽约州，85、133、149。另见费尔柴尔德相机和仪器
Syosset, New York, 85, 133, 149. See also Fairchild Camera and Instrument
Tandem Computer，253
Tandem Computer, 253
税收：资本利得，168，262
taxes: capital gains, 168, 262
八人组，124
group of eight, 124
科技创新博物馆，307
Tech Museum of Innovation, 307
技术：成本，137–39
technology: cost of, 137–39
需要 182
need for, 182
泰莱达因，123
Teledyne, 123
Telettra，121
Telettra, 121
鲍勃·特蕾西，ix，275–76, 388
Teresi, Bob, ix, 275–76, 388
特蕾西，唐娜，9
Teresi, Donna, ix
特曼，弗雷德里克，31，57-58，286
Terman, Frederick, 31, 57–58, 286
德州仪器 (TI), 93, 183, 199, 283
Texas Instruments (TI), 93, 183, 199, 283
集成电路，108–9，111，135，139–40
integrated circuits of, 108–9, 111, 135, 139–40
存储设备，207，282
memory devices of, 207, 282
本周科学新闻，第249期
This Week in Science, 249
《时代》杂志，250
Time magazine, 250
1974年贸易法，第267条
Trade Act of 1974, 267
1980年代贸易逆差，260
trade deficit, 1980s, 260
晶体管：贝尔实验室，24–27、33、39–40、73
transistor: at Bell Labs, 24–27, 33, 39–40, 73
以及计算机，135
and computers, 135
在费尔柴尔德，92–94，96
at Fairchild, 92–94, 96
锗，24、49、117、121–22
germanium, 24, 49, 117, 121–22
梅萨，73、93、102、121–22
mesa, 73, 93, 102, 121–22
诺贝尔奖，68-70
Nobel Prize for, 68–70
诺伊斯对第38、39-40页的兴趣
Noyce’s interest in, 38, 39–40
在菲尔科，47-50
at Philco, 47–50
销售额，82–83
sales of, 82–83
肖克利，25岁，40岁，54岁
of Shockley, 25, 40, 54
硅，63，72，92-94，96
silicon, 63, 72, 92–94, 96
真空管和，24–27，33
vacuum tubes and, 24–27, 33
传输，不均匀，299–300
transmission, non-uniform, 299–300
特雷比格，詹姆斯，253
Treybig, James, 253
《真正的财富》（霍斯钦斯基），218
True Wealth (Hwoschinsky), 218
塔夫茨学院，43
Tufts College, 43
隧道二极管（负阻二极管），65–66
tunnel diode (negative-resistance diode), 65–66
数字的暴政，101-2
tyranny of numbers, 101–2
联合碳化物公司，169–70
Union Carbide, 169–70
工会，115–16，235–38
unions, 115–16, 235–38
联合电气工人（UE），237
United Electrial Workers (UE), 237
美国日本半导体协定（1986年），272
United States Japan Semiconductor Agreement (1986), 272
加州大学伯克利分校，254，274
University of California at Berkeley, 254, 274
德克萨斯大学，287
University of Texas, 287
CE Unterberg, Towbin（投资银行），197
C. E. Unterberg, Towbin (investment bank), 197
真空管，24–27，33
vacuum tubes, 24–27, 33
Vadasz, Judy, 191, 214, 388
Vadasz, Judy, 191, 214, 388
瓦达斯，莱斯，157、173、174、180–81、186、219、388
Vadasz, Les, 157, 173, 174, 180–81, 186, 219, 388
瓦伦丁，唐，250，388
Valentine, Don, 250, 388
瓦里安，116
Varian, 116
风险投资，第 86、89、123、157、168、179、240、262 页。另见Rock、Arthur Kleiner、Perkins、Caulfield 和 Byers 的著作。
venture capital, 86, 89, 123, 157, 168, 179, 240, 262. See also Rock, Arthur Kleiner, Perkins, Caulfield, and Byers
电子游戏，253
video game, 253
越南战争，167，213-14
Vietnam war, 167, 213–14
沃格纳，琳达，388
Vognar, Linda, 388
《华尔街日报》，第82卷，第105页
Wall Street Journal, 82, 105
战争：冷战，29、82、91
war: Cold War, 29, 82, 91
越南，167，213–14
Vietnam, 167, 213–14
第二次世界大战，第15、17、29页。另见美国国防部。
World War II, 15, 17, 29. See also Defense Department, U.S.
华盛顿特区，270、278、297
Washington, D.C., 270, 278, 297
《华盛顿邮报》，285
Washington Post, 285
手表模块，208
watch modules, 208
沃森，休，388
Watson, Hugh, 388
沃森，托马斯，小，83岁，93岁
Watson, Thomas, Jr., 83, 93
爱荷华州韦伯斯特城，12-13
Webster City, Iowa, 12–13
韦克勒，吉恩，388
Weckler, Gene, 388
魏斯科夫，维克多，30，38，245
Weisskopf, Victor, 30, 38, 245
富国银行，旧金山，221
Wells Fargo Bank, San Francisco, 221
韦尔蒂，约翰，260
Welty, John, 260
WEMA。参见西部电子
WEMA. See Western Electronics
制造商协会 Wescon（贸易展），96、111、170
Manufacturers Association Wescon (trade show), 96, 111, 170
西部电气公司，72、79、98、126
Western Electric, 72, 79, 98, 126
西部电子制造商协会（WEMA），209、224、236、262
Western Electronics Manufacturers Association (WEMA), 209, 224, 236, 262
惠伦，阿尔弗雷德“巴德”，ix，31，34，388
Wheelon, Alfred “Bud,” ix, 31, 34, 388
白宫科学委员会，284
White House Science Council, 284
怀特，鲍勃和菲利斯，388
White, Bob and Phyllis, 388
惠特曼，沃尔特，306
Whitman, Walt, 306
维尔特，蒂姆，266
Wirth, Tim, 266
妻子，高管，145。另见鲍尔斯，安（第二任妻子）；诺伊斯，贝蒂·博特姆利（第一任妻子）
wives, executive, 145. See also Bowers, Ann (second wife); Noyce, Betty Bottomley (first wife)
沃尔夫，汤姆，5，246，249
Wolfe, Tom, 5, 246, 249
沃尔夫，艾伦·W.，267，268
Wolff, Alan W., 267, 268
女性：在装配工作中，46、115、125、132、173
women: in assembly work, 46, 115, 125, 132, 173
在费尔柴尔德，94–95、100、101、146
at Fairchild, 94–95, 100, 101, 146
在英特尔，200–201
at Intel, 200–201
伍尔夫，玛丽安，388
Woolfe, Marianne, 388
第二次世界大战，15、17、29
World War II, 15, 17, 29
沃兹尼亚克，史蒂夫，250–52
Wozniak, Steve, 250–52
赖特，吉姆，287
Wright, Jim, 287
耶尔弗顿，杰克，114–16，124，388
Yelverton, Jack, 114–16, 124, 388
叶特，克莱顿，268
Yeutter, Clayton, 268
杨，约翰，266
Young, John, 266
青年运动，193–94，213
youth movement, 193–94, 213
赵紫阳，277
Zhao Ziyang, 277
Zschau，Ed，388
Zschau, Ed, 388
照片中，鲍比·诺伊斯站在他的两个哥哥唐（左）和盖洛德（右）中间，哥哥们双手合十祈祷。照片由唐·诺伊斯提供。
Bobby Noyce between his two older brothers, Don (left) and Gaylord (right), who clasp their hands in prayer. Courtesy Don Noyce.
诺伊斯，大约12岁，抱着他的双簧管。家庭照片。
Noyce, about age 12, with his oboe. Family photos.
鲍勃（左）和盖洛德（右）与他们的爱犬小猪以及他们送报纸用的自行车合影。家庭照片。
Bob (left) and Gaylord (right) with their dog Piglet and the bikes they used for their paper route. Family photos.
12岁的鲍勃和14岁的盖洛德自豪地展示着他们在1945年夏天制作的滑翔机。鲍勃不久后就尝试从这个车库的屋顶起飞。家庭照片。
Bob, age 12, and Gaylord, age 14, proudly display the glider they built in the summer of 1945. Bob would soon attempt to take off from the roof of this garage. Family photos.
鲍勃和盖洛德全速奔跑，准备放飞滑翔机。全家福。
Bob and Gaylord run at top speed to launch their glider. Family photos.
少年时期的鲍勃·诺伊斯和他喜爱制作的模型飞机之一。家庭照片。
A teenage Bob Noyce with one of the model planes he loved to build. Family photos.
20岁的诺伊斯是联盟跳水冠军，他正准备代表格林内尔学院参加跳水比赛。图片由唐·诺伊斯提供。
Noyce, 20 years old and a conference diving champion, prepares to dive for his school, Grinnell College. Courtesy Don Noyce
格兰特·盖尔，诺伊斯的大学物理老师，是他向诺伊斯介绍了晶体管。图片由格林内尔学院档案馆提供。
Grant Gale, Noyce’s college physics teacher who introduced him to the transistor. Courtesy Grinnell College Archives.
1950 年，诺伊斯四兄弟——唐、盖洛德、鲍勃和拉尔夫——的家庭照片。
The four Noyce brothers—Don, Gaylord, Bob, and Ralph—in 1950. Family photos.
1953年，鲍勃·诺伊斯和贝蒂·博特姆利与他们的父母在婚礼当天合影。从左至右：拉尔夫·诺伊斯牧师、贝蒂·博特姆利·诺伊斯、哈丽特·诺伊斯、弗兰克·博特姆利、鲍勃·诺伊斯和海伦·博特姆利。照片由乔治·克拉克提供。
Bob Noyce and Betty Bottomley and their parents on the couple’s wedding day in 1953. Left to right: Reverend Ralph Noyce, Betty Bottomley Noyce, Harriet Noyce, Frank Bottomley, Bob Noyce, and Helen Bottomley. Courtesy George Clark.
1962 年圣诞节前后，诺伊斯的四个孩子在新家的台阶上微笑。家庭照片。
Noyce’s four children smile from the steps of their new home around Christmas, 1962. Family photos.
肖克利半导体实验室的员工们正在庆祝他们的老板威廉·肖克利因发明晶体管而荣获1956年诺贝尔物理学奖。肖克利坐在桌子的主位上。诺伊斯站在他身后左侧，手里拿着一个酒杯。杰伊·拉斯特站在照片的最右侧角落。戈登·摩尔和谢尔顿·罗伯茨坐在桌旁。图片由英特尔公司提供。
The employees of Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory celebrate the award of the 1956 Nobel Prize for Physics to their boss William Shockley for his invention of the transistor. Shockley sits at the head of the table. Noyce stands behind him and to the left, holding a wine glass. Jay Last stands in the far right corner of the shot. Seated at the table are Gordon Moore and Sheldon Roberts. Courtesy Intel Corp.
威廉·肖克利。诺伊斯说，1955年接到肖克利的电话，就像“与上帝对话”。照片由查克·佩恩特拍摄，斯坦福新闻社提供。
William Shockley. Receiving a call from Shockley in 1955, Noyce said, was like “talking to God.” Photo by Chuck Painter, Courtesy Stanford News Service.
此处及对面页：在这些日期为1956年8月14日的未知笔记本页面中，诺伊斯详细描述了隧道二极管，这种器件验证了量子力学的一个关键理论。发表第一篇关于该器件论文的江崎利奥因其工作荣获1973年诺贝尔物理学奖。
Here and facing page: In these unknown notebook pages, dated August 14, 1956, Noyce gives a full description of a tunnel diode, a device that demonstrated a key theory of quantum mechanics. The man who published the first paper on the device, Leo Esaki, was awarded the 1973 Nobel Prize for Physics for his work.
仙童半导体公司的八位未来创始人以及承诺帮助他们筹集资金的两位银行家在这张美元钞票上签了名，作为他们之间的合同。图片由朱利叶斯·布兰克提供。
The eight future founders of Fairchild Semiconductor and the two bankers who pledged to help them find financing signed this dollar bill as their contract with each other. Courtesy Julius Blank.
1957年秋季，仙童半导体公司的八位创始人沐浴在加州的阳光下，合影留念。诺伊斯坐在正中央，一只胳膊搭在椅背上。从诺伊斯顺时针方向依次是：让·霍尔尼、朱利叶斯·布兰克、维克多·格里尼奇、尤金·克莱纳、戈登·摩尔、C·谢尔顿·罗伯茨和杰伊·拉斯特。照片由朱利叶斯·布兰克提供。
The eight founders of Fairchild Semiconductor pose in the California sunshine shortly after starting their company in the fall of 1957. Noyce sits front and center, his arm slung over the back of his chair. Seated clockwise from Noyce are Jean Hoerni, Julius Blank, Victor Grinich, Eugene Kleiner, Gordon Moore, C. Sheldon Roberts, and Jay Last. Courtesy Julius Blank.
这张支票是仙童半导体公司首笔销售的预付款：100个晶体管，以每个150美元的价格卖给了IBM。如今，同等晶体管的价格还不到一美分的十万分之一。家庭照片。
This check is an early installment on Fairchild Semiconductor’s first sale: 100 transistors, sold to IBM for $150 apiece. Equivalent transistors today cost less than a hundred-thousandth of a penny. Family photos.
1961年9月，斯坦福大学教务长弗雷德里克·特曼与诺伊斯和仙童半导体公司研发主管戈登·摩尔一起为该公司新的研发大楼举行了奠基仪式。家庭照片。
In September 1961, Stanford provost Frederick Terman joined Noyce and Fairchild Semiconductor research head Gordon Moore in breaking ground for the company’s new Research and Development building. Family photos.
其他几位仙童半导体公司的创始人看着诺伊斯，诺伊斯正站在生产区的设备旁摆姿势拍照。图片由朱利叶斯·布兰克提供。
The other Fairchild founders look at Noyce, who poses near equipment in the production area. Courtesy Julius Blank.
上图： 1959年，诺伊斯向仙童半导体公司母公司首席执行官约翰·卡特讲解该公司突破性的平面工艺。卡特对半导体几乎一无所知。家庭照片。
Above: Noyce in 1959, explaining Fairchild Semiconductor’s breakthrough planar process to John Carter, CEO of the firm’s parent company. Carter knew almost nothing about semiconductors. Family photos.
左图：诺伊斯摄于1962年左右，当时仙童公司刚刚开始销售其集成电路。图片由格林内尔学院档案馆提供。
Left: Noyce in about 1962, shortly after Fairchild began selling its integrated circuit. Courtesy Grinnell College Archives.
诺伊斯集成电路专利中的几幅关键插图。
Several key illustrations from Noyce’s integrated circuit patent.
首款以单片芯片形式提供的集成电路是仙童半导体公司于 1961 年推出的电阻-晶体管逻辑 (RTL) 触发器。图片由仙童半导体公司提供。
The first integrated circuit available as a monolithic chip, Fairchild’s 1961 resistor-transistor logic (RTL) flip flop. Courtesy Fairchild Semiconductor.
1963年5月，一位仙童半导体公司的员工正在使用显微镜将芯片封装到她右侧托盘上的金色“接头”中。她戴着发网和手套，这是公司为减少生产过程中器件污染而强制要求的。照片背景中可以看到一位男士正在监督这些女工（她们总是被称为“女孩”）的工作。图片由斯坦福大学图书馆特藏部提供。
A Fairchild Semiconductor employee in May 1963 uses a microscope to package chips in the gold “headers” lying in the tray to her right. She is wearing a hairnet and gloves in a company-mandated effort to reduce contamination of the devices in production. Visible in the background is a man supervising the women (always called “girls”) at work. Courtesy Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries.
鲍勃·诺伊斯和制造主管查理·斯波克在仙童半导体位于缅因州波特兰的工厂与员工交谈。诺伊斯的管理风格轻松随意，这是他的一大特色。图片由仙童半导体提供。
Bob Noyce and manufacturing head Charlie Sporck speak to employees at Fairchild’s Portland, Maine facility. A casual style was a hallmark of Noyce’s approach to management. Courtesy Fairchild Semiconductor.
沃克的马车轮酒吧是半导体工程师和其他员工下班后常去的几个著名聚会场所之一。一些公司的律师担心公司机密会在饮酒时泄露，因此明确劝阻员工不要经常光顾马车轮酒吧。照片由卡罗琳·卡德斯拍摄。图片由卡罗琳·卡德斯和斯坦福大学图书馆特藏部提供。
Walker’s Wagon Wheel was one of several famous after-hours meeting places for semiconductor engineers and other workers. Some firms’ lawyers, concerned corporate secrets might be spilled over drinks, explicitly discouraged employees from frequenting the Wagon Wheel. Photo by Carolyn Caddes. Courtesy Carolyn Caddes and the Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries.
布伦达和罗杰·博罗沃伊、贝蒂和鲍勃·诺伊斯，以及保罗·霍沃辛斯基（戴着假胡子，叼着烟斗）在维也纳洽谈授权协议，他们在一块他们认为会逗乐他们的朋友查理·斯波克的标牌旁合影。查理·斯波克刚刚离开仙童半导体公司，加入了美国国家半导体公司。这是一张家庭合影。
Brenda and Roger Borovoy, Betty and Bob Noyce, and Paul Hwoschinsky (in fake mustache and pipe) in Vienna for a licensing deal, pose near a sign they think would amuse their friend Charlie Sporck, who had just left Fairchild for National Semiconductor. Family photos.
左图：这张照片拍摄于 1969 年，当时 41 岁的诺伊斯很高兴回到他新创办的英特尔公司的实验室。图片由英特尔公司提供。
Left: Noyce was 41 and happy to be back in the lab at his new startup, Intel, when this photo was taken in 1969. Courtesy Intel Corp.
下图：年轻的英特尔公司几乎所有员工在公司第一栋办公楼前合影。摩尔身后戴眼镜的高个子是泰德·霍夫。霍夫右边是安迪·格鲁夫，左边两位（身穿粗花呢夹克的）是莱斯·瓦达兹。图片由英特尔公司提供。
Below: Nearly the entire staff of the young Intel poses in front of the company’s first building. The tall man in glasses behind Moore is Ted Hoff. To the right of Hoff is Andy Grove, and two people to the left (in the tweed jacket) is Les Vadasz. Courtesy Intel Corp.
上图：英特尔首款微处理器的这则广告在技术界引起了极大的关注。诺伊斯是英特尔微处理器研发的幕后推手。图片由英特尔公司提供。
Above: This advertisement for Intel’s first microprocessor generated enormous interest within the technical community. Noyce was a driving force behind the microprocessor at Intel. Courtesy Intel Corp.
右图： 20世纪70年代中期英特尔公司里一个沉思或紧张的时刻。图片由英特尔公司提供。
Right: A pensive or tense moment at Intel in the mid-1970s. Courtesy Intel Corp.
1978 年，英特尔联合创始人鲍勃·诺伊斯和戈登·摩尔与安迪·格鲁夫（他很快晋升为他们“总裁办公室”的成员）在芯片布局图前合影。图片由英特尔公司提供。
Intel co-founders Bob Noyce and Gordon Moore with Andy Grove, who rose quickly to join them in the “Office of the President,” pose before a chip layout in 1978. Courtesy Intel Corp.
1971 年，诺伊斯带领他的牧歌乐队参加文艺复兴博览会。照片由杰斐逊·科顿拍摄，由杰斐逊·科顿提供。
Noyce leading his madrigal group at a Renaissance Faire, 1971. Photo by Jefferson Cotton, Courtesy Jefferson Cotton.
诺伊斯与微处理器发明者泰德·霍夫在诺伊斯位于英特尔的办公室隔间里，可能是在 20 世纪 70 年代末。照片由 Regis McKenna 提供。
Noyce with Ted Hoff, inventor of the microprocessor, in Noyce’s Intel cubicle, probably in the late 1970s. Courtesy Regis McKenna.
诺伊斯与苹果电脑联合创始人史蒂夫·乔布斯在为州长杰里·布朗举办的晚宴上。乔布斯是众多视诺伊斯为重要影响人物的企业家之一。图片由雷吉斯·麦肯纳提供。
Noyce and Apple Computer co-founder Steve Jobs at a dinner for Governor Jerry Brown. Jobs is one of many entrepreneurs who count Noyce among their major influences. Courtesy Regis McKenna.
1978年10月，诺伊斯访问东京电气公司（TEC）冲户分公司期间，与日本工程师们进行了交流。多年来，诺伊斯与日本半导体行业的管理人员保持着异常密切的关系，尽管他非常担心日本公司可能会将美国公司挤出市场。家庭照片。
Noyce addresses Japanese engineers during a visit to Tokyo Electric Company (TEC) Okito in October 1978. Noyce enjoyed an unusually close relationship with Japanese semiconductor executives for many years, although he became greatly concerned that their firms might drive American companies out of business. Family photos.
1980年，吉米·卡特总统授予诺伊斯国家科学奖章。家庭照片。
President Jimmy Carter awards Noyce the National Medal of Science in 1980. Family photos.
诺伊斯装扮成超人庆祝五十岁生日。他的妻子安·鲍尔斯（两人于1975年结婚）送给他这套服装，给了他一个惊喜。附上全家福照片。
Noyce celebrates his fiftieth birthday dressed as Superman. His wife Ann Bowers, whom he married in 1975, surprised him with the costume. Family photos.
1988年，罗纳德·里根总统授予诺伊斯国家技术奖章。图片由英特尔公司提供。
President Ronald Reagan awards Noyce the National Medal of Technology in 1988. Courtesy Intel Corp.
诺伊斯在加州大学戴维斯分校发表演讲。（他的妻子说他从未在戴维斯分校演讲过。）他于1982年至1988年担任加州大学理事。家庭照片。
Noyce speaks at a campus of the University of California. (His wife says he never spoke at Davis.) He was a Regent of the University of California from 1982 to 1988. Family photos.
1983年，诺伊斯在英特尔的办公隔间外咧嘴一笑。照片由卡罗琳·卡德斯拍摄。图片由卡罗琳·卡德斯和斯坦福大学图书馆特藏部提供。
Noyce grins outside his Intel cubicle, 1983. Photo by Carolyn Caddes. Courtesy Carolyn Caddes and the Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries.
诺伊斯展示他的Volant滑雪板。他是这家公司的创始投资人之一。家庭照片。
Noyce shows off his Volant skis. He was a founding investor in the company. Family photos.
诺伊斯和他的妻子安·鲍尔斯喜欢一起滑雪。请注意诺伊斯戴的英特尔滑雪帽。家庭照片。
Noyce and his wife Ann Bowers enjoyed skiing together. Note Noyce’s Intel ski cap. Family photos.
诺伊斯在他二战时期海军工兵飞机的驾驶舱内。家庭照片。
Noyce in the cockpit of his World War Two era Seabee airplane. Family photos.
老布什总统祝贺安·鲍尔斯和鲍勃·诺伊斯荣获德雷珀奖。附家庭照片。
President George H. W. Bush congratulates Ann Bowers and Bob Noyce on Noyce’s Draper Award. Family photos.
诺伊斯在SEMATECH（一家政府与产业界联合成立的制造研究机构）的正式开幕式上发表讲话。从1988年到1990年去世，诺伊斯一直担任SEMATECH的创始首席执行官。图片由SEMATECH提供。
Noyce speaks at the official opening of SEMATECH, a joint government-industry manufacturing research consortium. From 1988 until his death in 1990, Noyce served as SEMATECH’s founding CEO. Courtesy SEMATECH.
1989年9月，诺伊斯在德克萨斯州奥斯汀附近的伯格斯特罗姆空军基地准备驾驶RF-4C侦察机。SEMATECH公司的员工秘密安排了这次飞行，想给诺伊斯一个惊喜。附家庭照片。
Noyce prepares to fly the RF-4C at Bergstrom Air Force Base near Austin, Texas, in September 1989. SEMATECH employees secretly arranged the flight as a surprise for Noyce. Family photos.
诺伊斯和他的共同发明人杰克·基尔比因在集成电路领域的贡献，共同获得了首届查尔斯·斯塔克·德雷珀奖——被誉为“工程界的诺贝尔奖”。家庭照片。
Noyce and his co-inventor Jack Kilby share the first Charles Stark Draper Award—the so-called “Nobel Prize of Engineering”—for their work on the integrated circuit. Family photos.
在去世前两天，诺伊斯惊喜地发现数十名SEMATECH员工身穿印有“鲍勃·诺伊斯，青少年偶像”字样的T恤衫迎接他，T恤衫上还引用了一位仰慕者的名言。图片由英特尔公司提供。
Two days before he died, Noyce was surprised to be greeted by dozens of SEMATECH employees wearing t-shirts emblazoned with the phrase “Bob Noyce, Teen Idol” and captioned with a quote from an admirer. Courtesy Intel Corp.